ML20211K125

Rev 2 to Detailed Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-20.0, ATWS Mitigating Sys Actuation Circuitry (Amsac)

ML20211K125
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	02/20/1986
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
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ML20211H488	List: ML20211H483 ML20211J864 ML20211K125
References
SQN-DC-V-20.0, NUDOCS 8702260548
Download: ML20211K125 (18)

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{{#Wiki_filter:. ATTACHMENT 3 .G_a P.c::rd B42 '86 03 03 502 F TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY k ~ Office of Engineering g DETAn.ID DESIGN CRITERIA NO. 50N' "" "-20.0 SICUOYAH NUCI.IAR PLAIC TITLE: ANTICIPATED TRANSIDCS k'ITF.010 SCRAM (AT Si MITICATING ~ SYSTCi ACTUATION CIRCU!TRY (AMSAC) f O d u 24, N ISSUE DATE: k REVISION RO R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 DATE n/20/85 2/20/86 10-7 /.-P 5 [

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a REVISION LOG ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS LTMOUT SCRAM (ATUS) MITICATING Titler SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITRY f AMSAC) DESCRIPTION OF REVISION 4,,%',e, - 3_ =.. 1 Changed C-20 permissive set point design input on pages 2 and 3 11-20-85 [' as noted. 2 Changed C-20 permissive signal delay on pages 2 and 3. Changed 2-20-86 auxiliary feedwater flow response time requirement on page 3. Clarified response time definition on page 3. Added design input re ference on page 4. 6 J 1 o SS 00 48 4 9 E75289.07 fva 00534 ggPe DES 4 78) D G O A h Y** A ks 0 O.jhMg Mdw yh

.8 DESIGN CRITERIA COORDINATION LOG SON-DC-V-20.0 Plant: SEOUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT Design Criteria No: ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS) MITICATION SYSTEM s ACTUATION CIRCUITRY (AMSAC) Design Criteria For Revision: 2 R. Denotes review A. Denotes approval ~ U .g E% 25 Y m t.e, "5E

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s [. _g f.! [k SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WIIHOUT SCRAM j n A e ( ATWS) MITIGATING SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUIkRY (AMSAC) SON-DC-Y -20* 0 ' r, g. S, - } y:O TABLE OF CONTENTS .V Page dy. ~ 1 1.0 SCOPE. 2.0 DEFINITIONS. 1 3.0 DESIGN BASIS I 4.0 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS..................... 2 i 5.0 TESTING. .l. 4 +

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6.0 '0UALITY ASSURANCE. 4 /,

7.0 REFERENCES

x 8.0 APPENDICES 5 X, 10,, 9.0 FICURE(S) '[' ( {z - e-l r. f i 1 f.. >.) ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS -l - AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater AMSAC - Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigating System Actuation Circuitry ATWS - Anticipated Transient Without Scram ~ c RCS - Reactor Coolant System RPS - Reactor Protection System SQN - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I _i. E75289.07 NEB-Jan. 22, 1986 TVA 10535 (EN DES 7 77) e .co.ia +.. - w/.@ I d,,i.].13@ jgwd.,. 4Mp( 4 (.

1 ,\\ .I J SEQUOYAH NUC1. EAR PLANT - Ah?ICIFATED TRANSIENTS WIm0UT SCRAM ,( ATWS) MITICAT7_NG, SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITRY ( AMSAC) SON-DC-V-20.0 1 l 1.0 SCOPE

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c y fg The criteria conteir.co i.s this document establish minimum functional and design j {y for ' ne anticipated transient without scram ( ATUS) mitigating system requirements t actuation circuitry (AMSAC) of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN). '3 Id I '9 ,u - 2.0 DEFINITIONS i I: / ' ' 2. l ' A - An anticipated operational occurrence as defined in Appendix A of ,c 10CFr.50 fo ttowed by the failure of the reactor trip portion of the 7 prote.ction :.f stem as specified in General Design Criteria 20 of 10CFR50,,- Appendix A (reference 7.1.4). / 2.2 AMSAC - AIVS equipment, which is to function as a backup system for the react'or pantection system (RPS), as required by 10CFR50.62(c)(1), "AMSAC," (re ference '7.1.3). p.0 /LISICN BASIS Th/ design of the AMSAC system shall comply with 10CFR50.62 " Requirements for ' R.Uuction of Risk f rom ATWS Events for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" (reference 7.1.3). 3.1 Sa fe ty Raouit eunts - The AMSAC system has no safety-related requirements, g as per the Aiks final rule (reference 7.1.3), but its implementation shall ~ l be such that it will not degrade the RPS, the auxiliary feedwater fAFW) 4 - system or other safety-related systems. '!. 2 Redundancv - There are no redundancy requirements for the AMSAC system, however, appropriate coincidence logic shall be utilized to avoid inadvertant actuation. 3.3 Diversitv Recutree#nts - Equipment diversity to the extent reasonable and practicable to minimize the potential for cor non cause failures is required f rc,A the sensors eutput to, but not including, the final actuation device (e.g., existing circuit breakers may be used for the AFW initiation). The sensors need not be of a diverse design or manuf acture. Existing protection system instrument sensing lines, sensors, and sensor power supplies may be. used. Sensors and instrument sensing lines should be selected such that adverse interactions with existing control systems are avoided. 1.4 Electrical Ino?oendence Ranuirements - AMSAC input and output signals shall be isola ted f rom the RPS, AFW system, and other safety-related systems with isolation devices. An a:ceptable method for electrical isolation is provided in Append".x A. 3.5 Physleal Scearatiec Reouirements - All field wiring associated with AMSAC shall be imp lemented in accordance with SQN-DC-V-12.2, " Separation of Electrical Equipment and Wiring," (re ference 7.2.1) such that separation criteria for safety-related systems are not violated. r,7 $ 2 80. 0 / NEB-Jan. 22, 1986 'T V A 10$3$ (tN K4 7 77) e' ...u s. .a. o A-,., 6.t.

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - AhTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WI'1EOUT SCRAM (ATWS) MITICATING SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITRY (A* SAC) SON-DC-V-20.0 3 .- x 3.6 Environmental Requirements - The AMSAC system equipment qualification shall Q, ' be consistent with the non-safety-related equipment qualification licensing basis for the plant during anticipted operational occurrences only. AMSAC system design shall, therefore, meet plant normal and abnormal condition parameters as supplied in WCAP-1C858, Table 1 of Section 3 (reference 7.1.11. s 3.7 Seismic Recuirements - Seismic qualification for the AMSAC system is not required. H owever, the AMSAC system shall be designed so as not to degrade the seismic qualification of other plant systems for which seismic .~- qualificacion is required. 1.8 Power SunpIv Requirements - The AMSAC logic power shall be provided from an ~ instrument power supply source that is independent of existing RPS power supplies. A safety-related power supply for the AMSAC is not required, but operability during loss of of fsite power is required. 3.9 Wirine Recuirements - All electrical cables associated with AMSAC shall he designed in accordance with SQN-DC-V-11.3, " Power, Control, and Signal Cables for Use in Category I Structures," (reference 7.2.21. 3.10 Aeoendix R Recuirements - All potential AMSAC system interfaces with Appendix R equipment and control systems shall comply with SQN-DC-V-10.7, "10CFR50, Appendix R, Type II Items," (reference 7.2.11 4.0 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ?i The function of the AMSAC is to mitigate the ef fects of an ATWS. The AMSAC must ~ function to actuate the AFW system and trip the main turbine when required to prevent reactor coolant system (RCS) overpre s surid t. ion, maintain fuel integrity, and meet 10CFR100 radiation release requirements. t 4.1 Instrumentation and Control Recuirements Alarms,; Status Lights, and Diagnostics - Main control room indication shall be provided for system trip, operability, and test status. 4.2 Control Locic Requirements - The AMSAC functional logic diagram is provided t in Figure 1 for design information. 4.2.1 Permissives and Interlocks - A permissive signal, designated as C-20, shall be provided to defeat the block of the AMSAC system f arm the AMSAC) if two cut of two turbine impulse chamber pressure bistables are actuated indicating that the plant is at or above 70-percent full power. The AMSAC system shall be automatically blocked at plant power levels below 70 percent. Removal of the C-20 permissive signal shall be delayed by approximately 120 seconds. The C-20 signal shall l be isolated from the RPS by qualifieo class IE isolators. 2 h E75289.07 NEB-Jan. 22, 1986 TVA 10535 (EN DE5-7 77)

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p _g SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS) MITICATING SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITRY (AMSAC) SQN-DC-V-20.0 4.2.2 Trips and Actuations - A turbine trip and startup of all AFW pumps ( 6 shall occur upon generation of an AMSAC signal. The AMSAC signal 3 shall be generated, if not blocked, when three out of four low-low water level signals in the steam generators are actuated. The steam generator low-low level signal shall be delayed approximately 30 seconds to ensure that the RPS will provide the first trip signals. 4.3 Performance and Reliability Recuirements - Although AMSAC is not a safety-related system, it shall incorporate into its design and construction only those elements which are of the highest reliability and quality reasonably achievable in order to avert improper system operation. 4.3.1 Accuracy Requirements - Trip accuracy for the steam generator narrow-range water level delta-P and the permissive C-20 signals shall be comparable to their counterparts in the exist-ing RPS. Trip accuracy shall include comparator setting accuracy, channel accurac'y (including the sensor) for each input, and environmental ef facts on rack-mounted electronics. 4.3.2 Time Response - The turbine trip response time

• from an AMSAC signal initiation shall be less than or equal to 30 seconds, including sensor delays. The AFW flow response time
• from an AMSAC signal initiation shall be less than or equal to 90 seconds, including l

sensor delays.

4.3.3 Reliability Requirements - The AMSAC system design shall minimize the

• frequency of inadvertent AMSAC actuations.

4.3.4 Failure Mode Effect Analysis - In addition to using high quality components, a failure mode ef feet analysis shall he performed to ensure a suf ficiently low probability exists for failure mechanisms of which will cause inadvertent AMSAC actuation or prevent AMSAC actuation when required. 4.4 Set Fd nt Recuirements - The AMSAC set point shall be no more than 5 percent of narrow-range span below the RPS steam generator low-low level set point. The C-20 permissive set point shall be set to allow for instrumentation error and yet assure the regirements of 4.2.1 of this criteria are met. Adjustable time delay set point for the C-20 permissive signal. shall be in the range of 0 to 240 seconds such that the AMSAC system remains armed l suf ficiently long to perform its function in the event of a turbine trip. Adjustable time delay set point for the low-low steam generator level signal shall be in the range of 0 to 60 seconds such that inadvertent AMSAC system actuation may be avoided and that the AMSAC system actuation will be initiated fast enough af ter an ATWS event to perform its mitigation functions for which it was designed as indicated in the SQN ATWS study (reference i 7.1.2).

• Response time here indicates the time interval following a step input in the variable i

being monitored from 5 percent above to 5 percent below the trip set point until the l intended system response is obtained. 4 E75289.07 NEB-Jan. 22, 1986 P'~ TVA 10h35 (EN DES 7 77) ~ M 4;m ,., pgjMgfg gN b 5 $Q m

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - AlfrICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS) MITICATING SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITRY (AMSAC) SON-DC-V-20.0 5.0 TESTING

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The AMSAC system design shall incorporate provisions for appropriate testing. The AMSAC system may be removed from service for test purposes. Appropriate measuren are to be established for testing prior to installation, operation, and periodically. Testing of AMSAC outputs through final actuation devices shall he performed during plant shutdown. 6.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE The AMSAC system shall be designed and implemented in accordance with the quality assurance guidance for non-safety-related ATWS equipment as defined in NRC Generic Letter 85-06 (reference 7.1.5).

7.0 REFERENCES

7.1 Design Innut 7.1.1 Westinghouse AMSAC Ceneric Design Package, WCAP-10858, Section 3. 7.1.2 TVA Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ATWS Report, NEB-SAA-83-003. 7.1.3 10CFR50.62, "ATWS Final Rulemaking." 7.1.4 10CFR50, Appendix A 7.1.5 NRC Generic Letter 85-06, " Quality Assurance Guidance for ATWS Equipment That is Not Safety-Related," (A02 850422 0041 7.1.6 Westinghouse Owners Group AMSAC Generic Design WCAP-10858, Errata, l as transmitted in letter OG-163 (B45 851119 353). 7.2 Design Criteria 7.2.1" Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Detailed Design criteria for 10CFR50, Appendix ,R,, Type II Items, SQN-DC-V-10. 7. 7.2.2 Sequoya5 Nuclear Plant Detailed Design Criteria for Power Control and Signal cables for Use in Category I Structures, SQN-DC-V-11.3. 7.2.3 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Detailed Design Criteria for Separation of Electric Equipment and Wiring, SQN-DC-V-12.2. E75289.07 NEB-Jan. 22, 1986 TVA 10535 (EN DES.7 77) .I. ..c - : JYdft2IlidiA/Al2.5&p5SO5$2Cih

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM ( ATVS) MITICATING SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITRY (AMSAC) SON-DC-V-20.0 8.0 APPENDICES Process Sienal Isolation Relavs - j- ^. Criteria for Process Sienal Tsolation R e l a v s_ The following criteria are to be used in providing isola 1 tion between process signals and safety circuits: 1. A safety signal derived from the Solid-State Protection System (SSPS) shall override the process signal. 2. The isolation relays shall have a coil to contact rating of 500 volts. 3. TI e isolation relays and racks designated as Train A or Train B shall be seismically qualified. 4 Isolation relay circuits shall not be routed with any other circuit that equals or exceeds 500 volts. Ierlementation of Criteria f 1. The f'o11owing is a listing of the Au x il i a ry Relay Racks (ARR) and the cable routing schene utilized: AUXILIARY RELAY RACKS LOCATION I TRAIN A INON-DIV l TRAIN B !ACIILIARY CONTROL 1-L-11A 1-L-10 1-L-11B OP AUX INST ROOM 1-R-73,74 1-R-71,7 2.7 5,7 6. 80 1-R-7 7,7 8 SSS AUI INST ROOM 1-R-54 1-R-58 1-R-55 A (ARI) (AR?) (AR2) ROUTING SCEEME-AUIILIARY RELAY RACKS TRAIN B TRAIN A NON-DIV ( v 5-g } i{ 'J-c a 1 3 T NON A NON-DIV DIV NON-DIV B ROUTED WITH ROUTED WITH t ~ TRAIN A TRAIN B 2. (Sheets 1-4) illustrate the varicus isolation configurations l E75289.07 NEB-Jan. 22, 1986- --.TVA.10135 (EN DES-2.U) --..--- e.... i ahdis?id.4MskosAWgyg3& - - ~ - -

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~ SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WI'D10UT SCRAM l ( ATWS) MITICATING SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUITRY (AMSAC) SON-DC-V-20.0 4 TRAIN A C:KCUlT WITH INTERLOCK FROM TRAIN B DEVICE: "-{ I TRAIN B CONTACT ^ l $1 C l c c o j ~ e Il g - -l < ( NON-Div -l ARR @ =} ' ' ',, l l g-C s { 4 l / ~ l TRAIN A l g, lARR ( s l R -- x l l9 l 4 ,i L v i x TRAIN A MCC I l C I A l iSSPSiHS l y x Iz M l g l l TRAIN A AND TRAIN B PROCESS INTERLOCKS E75289.07 NEB-Jan. 22, 1986 TVA 10$35 (EN DES.7 77) ~ .L

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