ML20211J296

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Notice of Violation from Insp on 860821-0920
ML20211J296
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/05/1986
From: Walker R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211J270 List:
References
50-369-86-28, 50-370-86-28, NUDOCS 8611110093
Download: ML20211J296 (3)


Text

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ENCLOSURE NOTICE OF VIOLATION Duke Power Company Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 McGuire Units 1 and 2 License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17 During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on August 21 - September 20, 1986, violations of' NRC requirements were identified.

The violations involved a failure to comply with Technical Specification (TS) due to an inoperable pressurizer code safety valve, diesel generators not verified to be operable and the 7-day channel operation test had not been executed for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors and failure to report to NRC an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation and a deviation from TS.

In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1986), the violations are listed below:

A.

Technical Specification 3.4.2.2 requires in modes 1, 2 and 3 that all pressurizer Code safety valves be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 psig+/-1%.

With one pressurizer Code safety valve inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or the unit must be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Contrary to these requirements, on September 2,1986, with McGuire unit 1 in mode 3, pressurizer code safety valve INC1 lifted at a pressure of 2370 psi.

The valve was subsequently found to have a repeatable setpoint of 2320 psi.

The valve was inoperable from June 1985 until September 1986, during which time, the unit was operated for extended periods in modes 1, 2 and 3.

i This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement 1).

This violation is for Unit 1 only.

B.

Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, requires in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4, that two emergency diesel generators be operable.

With one diesel generator inoperable, the remaining diesel must be verified operable within I hour and at.least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

Both diesel generators must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or the plant must be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within.the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Technical Specification 3.9.2 requires in mode 6 that, at a minimum, two Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors be OPERABLE and operating with Alarm

'Setpoints at 0.5 decade above steady-state count rate, each with continuous l

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Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 McGuire Units 1 and 2 License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17 visual indication in the control room and one with audible indication in the containment and control room.

It is also required that each Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:

1.

A CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, 2.

An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to the initial start of CORE ALTERATIONS, and 3.

An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 7 days.

Contrary to the above:

1.

0n August i and August 10 with McGuire unit 2 operating in mode 1,

- diesel generators 2B and 2A respectively were not verified to be operable within the 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> allowed when the remaining diesel was inoperable.

2.

On August 5,1986, with McGuire unit 1 in mode 6, it was determined that the 7-day channel operation test due to be performed on August 3, 1986 had not been executed.

This is-a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I).

C.

10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (ii), as implemented by Duke Power Company Procedure RP/0/A/5700/10, requires that any event or condition that results in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS), be reported to the NRC as soon as practical and, in all cases, within four hours of the occurrence.

10 CFR 50.72 (b) (B) as implemented by Duke Power Company Procedure RP-0-A-5700-10 requires that any deviation from the plant's technical specifications authorized pursuant to 50.54 (x) be reported to the NRC as soon as practical and, in all cases, within one hour of the occurrence.

Contrary to the above:

1.

On August 27, 1986, the NRC Operations Center was not notified of a Unit 2 ESF (Auxiliary Feedwater System) actuation within the required four-hour time period.

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Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 McGuire Units 1 and 2 License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17 2.

On September 2,1986, the NRC Operations Center was not notified of a deviation from plant technical specifications on McGuire unit I as authorized pursuant to 50.54 (x).

This is a-Severity level V Violation (Supplement 1).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Duke Power, Company is hereby required to submit to this Office within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply including (for each violation):

(1) admission or denial of the violation, (2) the reason for the violation if admitted. (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be.given to extending the response time.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Cf Y

~4 Roger D. Walker, Director Division of Reactor Projects Dated 3t Atlanta, Georgia thisf9ayofNovember1986

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