ML20211J189

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Application to Amend License DPR-72,consisting of Rev 0 to Tech Spec Change Request 149 Permitting one-time Extension to 24-month Surveillance for Local Leak Rate Tests of Eight Containment Isolation Valves
ML20211J189
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/04/1986
From:
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20211J167 List:
References
NUDOCS 8611110025
Download: ML20211J189 (3)
v • d • e


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FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NO. 50-302/ LICENSE NO. DPR-72 REQUEST NO.149A, Revision 0 CONTAllmENT ISOLATION VALVES / LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTS-REACTOR COOLANT PtMP SEAL BLEED 0FF ISOLATION LICENSE DOCtMENT INVOLVED: Technical Specifications PORTIONS: Surveillance 4.6.1.2.d,-Page 3/4 6-3 Table 3.6 Item 9, Page 3/4 6-19 Table 3.6 Footnote, Page 3/4 6-21A DESCRIPTION OF REQUEST:

This _ submittal requests that provisions be provided for valves ' MUV-253, MUV-?S8, ML'V-259, MUV-260, and MUV-261 such that these valves "need not be subject to Type C Leakage Test until Refuel VI".

MUV-253 is a 1" air operated globe valve that isolates the common seal return from the reactor coolant pumps. It is located outside containment in the auxiliary building. It automatically closes on receipt of a reactor building isolation and cooling signal. MUV-258, MUV-259, MUV-260 and MUV-261 are 1" globe valves located in the reactor building. They isolate seal return from each individual reactor coolant pump and_ they will automatically close on receipt of a reactor building isolation and cooling signal.

REASON FOR REQUEST:

Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 and Technical Specification surveill ance 4.6.1.2.d requires that Type C leakage tests of containment isolation valves be performed at interv als no greater than 24 months. Local Leak Rate Tests (LLRTs) were performed during Refuel V on valves subject to Type C tests. The i

next LLRTs would be performed during Refuel VI. Due to the length of the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) outage, fuel cycle VI was extended until Fall of 1937. The 24-month surveillance period would expire before start of Refuel VI, therefore, Florida Power Corporation (FPC) pro'ceeded with Type C testing of containment isolation valves during the RCP outage (at approximately twelve months into the 24-month surveillance interval). However, some containment isolation valves were not tested.

The reasons for not testing valves MUV-253, MUV-258, MUV-259, MUV-260, and MUV-261 are as follows:

1) Testing had been performed approximately 12 months prior and the acceptance criteria were met,
2) previous test results showed little valve degradation compared _to tne acceptance criteria, and
3) interference with Reactor Coolant Pump work.

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SAFETY EVALUATION OF REQUEST:'

Tests o f. ~ the exterior' valve (for penetration 377), MUV-253, were last performed April 8,1985, and the results showed little valve degradation when compared to the acceptance criteria. As a result of the 24 month surveillance interval, the next scheduled LLRT for this valve is April 8,1987. However, Refuel VI is not scheduled to begin until September 19, 1987. This one-time exemption request represents an approximate twenty-two week extension to the LLRT- for MUV-253. Based on the valve's test history, degradation is not expected to be significant during the period until the next test.

The interior valves (for penetration 377); MUV-258, MUV-259, MUV-260 and MUV-261, were last. tested July 24, 1985. The results of the tests showed little valve degradation when compared to the acceptance criteria. The next 24 month surveillance for these valves would be due by July 24, 1987. This one-time exemption request represents an approximate nine week extension (until Refuel VI) to the LLRT for these valves. Based on the valves' test history, degradation is not expected to be significant during the period until the next test.

Additionally, the TMI-2 lessons learned and industry experienced operational difficulties with reactor coolant pump seals have negated the original basis for the controls of the isolation valves associated wi th seal return.

Presently, should a small break LOCA occur, the reactor coolant pumps may be required to operate. For reliable operation of the pumps, it is recommended that seal injection not be perturbed. However, the resultant "A" or "B" Engineered Safeguards (ES) actuation would isolate the seal return.

Therefore, Florida Power Corporation's abnormal procedures require operators to open seal return containment isolation valves following . an ES System Reactor Building Isolation signal.

Leakage that may occur until Refuel VI through these seal return isolation valves is considered acceptable since:

1) Seal return flow is small;
2) the makeup and purification system is a closed system designed to l handle radioactive effluent, and;
3) operator response wi th regard to these valves for most accidents would be to place them in the open position.

Considering the test results, the post-accident requirements, and the reactor.

building isolation capabilities of these seal return valves, extension to the l 24 month LLRT surveillance until Refuel VI is acceptable.

1 SHOLLY EVALUATION OF REQUEST:

Florida Power Corporation (FPC) proposes this amendment does not involve ~ a

significant hazards consideration. The change to the surveillance frequency for Type C leak rate testing of the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal return i containment isolation valves is a one-time only extension. These valves are required to be leak rate tested every 24 months. The last leak rate test resul ts showed li ttle valve degradation when compared to the acceptance cri teri a. The requested surveillance extension is a temporary one. Valve i

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MUV-253 leak rate test will be delayed approximately Nenty-two weeks. Leak rate tests for valvss MUV-258, MUV-259, 't1UV2260 and fiUV-261 ~ will be delayed approximately nine weeks. Based on the valvet' test history, degradation is not expected to be significant during the period until the next test.

Additionally, the operator response with regard to these valves would be to

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place them in the open position.

Based on the above, FPC finds'the amendmbnt will not:

1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident. previously. evaluated because. the valves were last tested satisfactorily; 'and little valve degradation is expected during the period until the next testi -
2) Create the possibility of ,a new-or different kind ~of accident from any accident previously . evaluated. .because the proposed change introduces no new mode of pl ant operation nor does it requi re a

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physical modification. . ~

3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. Any reduction s of the margin of safety 'will be insignificant since the operator- response during most accidents is to place .these valves in the open position.

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