ML20211H031
| ML20211H031 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/23/1986 |
| From: | Merschoff E, Naidu K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211H015 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99901043 99901043-86-01, 99901043-86-1, NUDOCS 8611040372 | |
| Download: ML20211H031 (8) | |
Text
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ORGANIZATION: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRTC CORPORAT10N PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA REPORT INSPECTION INSPECTION N0.: 99901043/86-01 DATE: May 12-15, 1986 ON-SITE HOURS: 17 CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Nuclear Services Integration Division ATTN: Mr. T. A. Christopher General Manager Monroeville Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT:
M.A. Hamrick TELEPHONE NUMBER:
(412) 374-7504 NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACTIVITY: Dedication of replacement components manufactured and supplied by other divisions of Westinghouse.
r n
ASSIGNED INSPECTOR:
dW 9f23[%
K. R. Naidu, Reactive Inspection Section (RIS)
Date OTHER INSPECTOR (S):
9!a3[ft APPROVED BY:
-E. W. Merschoff, Chief RIS, Vendor Program Branch Date INSPECTION BASES AND SCOPE:
A.
BASES:
10 CFR Part 21, Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.
B.
SCOPE: Review status of previous inspection findings and discuss the implementation of WCAP-1062.
PLANT SITE APPLICABILITY: Limerick Unit 1(50-352); Peach Bottom 2&3 (50-277; 50-278).
8611040372 861030 PDR GA999 ENVWEST 99901043 PDR
ORGANIZATION: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA REPORT INSPECTION N0.: 99901043/86-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 2 of 8 A.
VIOLATIONS:
None.
B.
NONCONFORMANCES:
None.
C.
UNRESOLVED ITEMS:
None.
D.
STATUS OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS:
The items of noncompliance discussed below were identified when the manufacturing operations were located at East Pittsburgh and are discussed in Inspection Reports 99900330/83-01 and 83-02. Since then, the manufac-ture of switchgear components and accessories for nuclear power plant applications have been transferred to their SEC0 Road facility (Docket No.
99901043).
1)
(Closed) Violation (83-01): The violation identified that a current copy of 10 CFR Part 21 was not posted. The violation remained open pending review of measures established to prevent recurrence. The inspector observed two copies of Revision 6 of 10 CFR Part 21, dated September 12, 1983, posted at the SEC0 Road facility, where activities related to the refurbishment of Class IE circuit breakers are per-formed. A note attached to the copy stated that although Revision 7, dated May 9,1984 was issued, it was not posted because the revi-sion is not substantive. The Quality Assurance Group (QA) is desig-nated lead responsibility to ensure that current copies of 10 CFR Part 21 are posted at various locations. A list of locations and names of responsible individuals are maintained by QA.
2)
(Closed) Nonconformance (83-01, Item A): The nonconformance identi-fied that from the available inspection records it could not be estab-lished that 21 replacement undervoltage trip attachments (UVTAs) re-ceived 100 percent inspection of critical items. This condition was contrary to the commitments made in a Westinghouse letter (NS-EPR-2762) dated May 6, 1983, to the NRC (E.P. Rahe to H. Denton) which stated, in part, regarding the replacement DS-416 UVTAs, "After the failures at McGuire, replacement units were required to be manufac-tured...Since the problem at McGuire was linked to manufacture control
ORGANIZATION: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99901043/86-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 3 of 8 of critical dimensions on selected parts,100% quality control checks of the... critical parts were instituted in the new procedure. Those parts were labeled ' critical' meaning only that they would henceforth be subjected to 100% dimensional checks...."
Quality Control Inspection (QCI) 37, dated June 17, 1983, titied " Inspection require-ments for selected critical parts for use in Class 1E equipment," was developed to document the inspection requirements to be applied.
3)
(Closed) Nonconformance (83-01, Item B): The shop order information issued for replacement UVTAs did not identify the applicable drawing revisions to be used for the required 100 percent inspection of the
" critical items". Document NQD 379 Revision 0, dated October 31, 1983, was developed which lists the critical parts and the respective draw-ing numbers, including current revisions.
4)
(Closed) Nonconformance (83-01, Item C): The nonconformance identified that Certificates of Conformance (C of C) were on file for only five of the eight replacement UVTAs that have been shipped on Purchase Order 54X470254 to the McGuire site.
Discussions with cognizant personnel indicate that during April 1983, the UVTAs were not identified with unique serial numbers during manufacture. As such, the UVTAs were accounted for by the total lot shipped and not by the unique serial numbers. A report, C&Ps/EP-CB (83)-255, dated April 14, 1983, documenting a trip by a Westinghouse Nuclear Services Integration Division (WNSID) engineer to the McGuire site during April 4-7, 1983, provides the following information.
QUANTITY l
DATE OF RECEIVED QUANTITY DATE EVENT C 0F C AT SITE INSTALLED l
April 5, 2 UVTAs & 8 trip 1983 a.m.
shafts were hand i
carried to W site April 4, office 1983 2
0 UVTAs had coils with incorrect voltage and were not given to the C of C station voided
-2 0
1 l
ORGANIZATION: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99901043/86-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 4 of 8 QUANTITY DATE OF RECEIVED QUANTITY DATE EVENT C 0F C AT SITE INSTALLED April 5, A courier hand-1983,-p.m.
carried 2 UVTAs to replenish the ones April 5, given in the morning 1983 2
0 April 6, Duke installed 2 1983 UVTAs 2
April 8, Design error (groove 1983 to ring) identified, replacement activities commence no charge April 10-11, 6 UVTAs hand carried 1983-to site April 8-9, 6
Rejected 1 due to 1983 incorrect interface
-1 5
Replaced 2 UVTAs installed on April 6
-2
-2 April 13, Shipped 3 UVTAs April 13, 3
3 1983 1983 TOTAL 8
8 E.
OTHER INSPECTION FINDINGS AND COMMENTS:
1.
Background Information on Beaver Failures a.
Reported Failures On February 6, 1986, the shunt trip coil in a LBB 22250 MW tyre molded case circuit breaker manufactured by Westinghouse failed at the Peach Pottom Unit 2 Nuclear Power Station. The breaker was installed in a transfer panel to protect the 120 volt, 6'c Herz power supply to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) frem I
undervoltage, overvoltage, and underfrequency conditions.
The breaker was equipped with a magnetic overcurrent trip device and a shunt trip coil (STC) in series with an "A" contact that is activated by the breaker's moving contact arms. The failure
ORGANIZATION: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99901043/86-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 5 of 8 occurred when the "A" contact did not open when the breaker tripped; resulting in the overheating of the STC and ultimately-an open circuit in the shunt trip circuit. On January 16 and 24, 1986, similar problems were identified in identical breakers at the Peach Bottom Unit 3 plant. On November 9,1984, Limerick 1 reported an identical failure.
It is essential that the STC remains operable to be ready to trip the circuit breaker on re-ceipt of an abnormal voltage condition. The failures described above have occurred in LBB 22250MW type breakers with a STC.
ASCO Electrical Products Company, Incorporated (ASCO) Parsipanny, New Jersey procured these breakers from Westinghouse Beaver facility and installed them in safety related RPS power supply monitoring panels (required for Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs))
for the Limerick and Peach Bottom Nuclear Power Plants.
b.
Follow-up Inspection at ASCO:
~
The NRC inspector conducted an inspection at ASCO on March 17 and 18, 1986 and the results are documented in Inspection Report 99901054/86-01. During the inspection, ASCO's Purchase Orders (P0s) for the breakers to Westinghouse were reviewed.
The P0s were stamped "Q" to indicate that the breakers were intended for safety-related applications and require C of C stating that the breakers were suitable of Class 1E applications including IEEE-344. ASCO received C o Cs (with the breakers) from WB stating that the breakers satisfy Class 1E nuclear safety-related requirements addressed in IEEE-323 (1974) and IEEE-344 (1975).
c.
Follow-up Inspection at Limerick and Peach Bottom:
To obtain additional information on the breaker failures, the NRC inspector visited the Limerick and Peach Bottom Nuclear Power Stations on March 24-26, 1986. The licensee disassembled one of the failed breakers at the Peach Bottom plant and ex-plained the malfunctioning of. the "A" contact in the breaker which causes the STC to burn out. The inspector observed that the rivet which joins the handle-post to the operating mechanism was not ground off during manufacture to remove excess material.
The excess material in the rivet appeared to impede the proper functioning of the "A" contact which opens when the breaker trips. Westinghouse requested that Peach Bottom ship two of the six failed breakers to WB for tests and evaluation. WB completed the tests on April 10, 1986.
ORGANIZATION: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA REPORT INSPECTION N0.: 99901043/86-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 6 of 8 1
2.
Meeting Summary The Renewal Components Services (RCS) group of WNSID met with members of Westinghouse, Control Products Division, Beaver, the NRC and Philadelphia Electric Company (licensee) to discuss the molded case circuit breakers (breakers) which failed at the Limerick and Peach Bottom Nuclear Power Stations. The inspector stated that the purpose of the meeting and inspection was to obtain additional information on the results of tests performed at the WB facility on two of the six molded case circuit breakers which failed at the Limerick and Peach Bottom Nuclear Power Plants. The information is necessary to determine:
- Whether the RPS pcwer supplies at the Limerick and Peach Bottom Nuclear Power Stations are adequately protected.
- Whether other types of breakers (model numbers) were manufactured with identical operating mechanisms which are susceptible to failures.
- Whether tests could be performed on existing breakers (in operation) to verify the correct operation of the STC.
- The necessity to issue an NRC information notice to alert users of these breakers of the potential problems when used with a STC.
Westinghouse would not provide these test results to the NRC inspector. This reluctance to provide information was contrary to Mr. J. S. Moore's policy statement dated Jur.e 29, 1983 which states, in part, " Westinghouse has committed per attached policy, to a program for ensuring that equipment, parts and services as provided by Westinghouse meet applicable requirements for nuclear service and that our customers to whom Westinghouse supplies such equipment and parts are provided with accurate and timely information for the proper and safe installation, operations, maintenance, and repair of such Westinghouse supplied equipment and parts...."
Consequently, as stated in the cover letter to this inspection report, Westinghouse has been requested to provide this information within 30 days.
ORGANIZATION: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99901043/86-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 7 of 2 3.
Westinghouse Test Recommendations WB recommended certain tests detailed below be performed on the a.
breakers at Limerick and Peach Bottom Nuclear Power Plants to verify operability of the STCs.
If the breakers failed the tests they were to be replaced. Implementation of these tests would assure that the RPS power supplies were protected from being exposed to abnormal voltage conditions.
b.
WB stated that LB 22250, HLB 22250, and DA 22250 type breakers have operating mechanisms similar to LBB 22250 type breakers and could experience failures when required to trip with STCs.
WB recommends the following tests to ascertain the operability c.
of the breaker.
1)
Perform a continuity check on the STC after each breaker operation via the two leads exiting the breaker.
2)
The potential of non-perforrance of the back-up STC protec-tion can be determined by completing the following tests.
a)
Manually close the breaker and continue to hold the operating handle in the "0N" position.
b)
Apply the STC rated voltage through the two -leads exiting the breaker until the breaker trips or one l
second elapses.
c)
While continuing to hold the handle in the "0N" position, perform a centinuity check of the shunt trip circuit. Continuity indicates a malfunction in the "A" contact. An open circuit indicates that the "A" contact performed its intended function.
4.
NRC Action The NRC issued Information Notice 86-62 informing all nuclear power reactor facilities holding an Operating License or Construction Permit to alert them of a potentially significant problem involving the failure of the LPB 22250 type Westinghouse molded case breakers, and that LB 22250, HLB 22250, and DA 22250 type molded case breakers have similar operating mechanisms.
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t ORGANIZATION: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPGRATION PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.-
99901043/86-01 RESULTS:
PAGE 8 of 8 F.
PERSONS CONTACTED:
Westinghouse Electric Company Nuclear Energy Systems Monroeville, Pl
- D. N. Alsing, Manager, QA Systems and Compliance
- B. F. Barnett, Quality Engineer, NTSD
- E. K. Figenbaum, Principal Engineer, NTSD
- M.A. Hamrick, Manager, CA Systems and Audits
- J. J. Jelevich, Manager, E0 Programs
- W. J. Johnson, Manager, Product Licensing
- S. Long, Senior Quality Engineer, OA Systems and Audits R. B. Miller, Nuclear Safety Engineer P. Morris, Manager, Instrumentation and CH Systems Licensing
- D. E. Rygg, Manager, RCS Engineering Westinghouse Electric Corporation Control Products Division Beaver, Pennsylvania G. Dore, Product Manager Philadelphia Electric Company Philadelphia C. B. Harmon, QA Manager C. B. Tuttle, Electrical Engineer J. J. Gyrath, Electrical Engineer e----
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