ML20211G566
| ML20211G566 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/1999 |
| From: | Halverson E ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211G544 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-95-07, IP-M-0570, IP-M-0570-R00, NUDOCS 9908310289 | |
| Download: ML20211G566 (15) | |
Text
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Attachment 4 to U403229 l
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1 Calculation.IP-M-0570 9908310289 990825 PDR ADOCK 05000461 P PDR
s Attachment 4
', , to U-603229 CALCULATION COVER SHEET Page t__ Of .12_
M NSED IP-M-0570 00 DEPT DIV CALCULATION NO REVISION ADDENDUM VOLUME TITLE: Generic Letter _95-07_ analysis.of_ opening capability under.a_ worst case _ scenario involving degradation.and. failures of. multiple.. valves.
SIGNATURE BLOCK L CORP PREPARED Tills CALC:l IPC $^37% yng ('[] go U j PREPARED BY Eric_Halverson CONFIRMATION REOUIRED YES/NO: l no I PAGF NOISP I I CONFIRMFD-08./19./99- --
kRINT FJeld Work To Be Performed Per ECN Listed Below DAH ~ MAWRE ECN NO RFO DATE CID UPDATED CIIECKED BY . _ - -
~
T ~ SidfiXTORE REVIEWED BY _ [' _A.. d MM ggg DATE ' '
[ " SIGNAT)fRE ECN's listed above shallinclude
- Volume Report
- as Affected Documents.
READY FOR INCORPORATION APPROVED BY _75_ YES/NO/(N/A): l n/a l ASSIGNED TO: l l DATE RFI: l !
'RINT 2 /M I??. dA W A> jffGNATURE DATE //
OWNER $ REVIEW NON-IP CALC g REVIEWED BY . .. A
_. PRINT B l TE SIG5TUii5 h CALCULATION BATCH LIST y (May use computer print out and attach it with cover sheet or specify it's location if provided elsewhere in the calculation.) ;
IS Tills A PARENT CALCt YES kl NOl l h U
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DEPENDENT CALCULATIONS Enter either a Parent. Revision. Alias. Addendum or Volume in the relationship column) Z
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CALCULATION COVER SHEET (Conunued) Page 2_ of 12 _
M NSED IP-M-0570 , 00 bTPT DIV CALCULATION NO REVISION ADDENDUM VOLUME System Code (s) (or NA): HP _
Equipment Identification No. (EINs) (or NA): _1E22-E015 Support Number (s) (or NA): Location (Blds/Elev/ Area (or NA):
Historic / Temporary: Yes l l NA[ Microfiche Attached: Yes l l NoR Topic Code: l M90 l NON-CALC INPUTS / OUTPUTS / REFERENCES (Specify the Location, if provided elsewhere in the calculation)
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DEPENDENT CALCULATIONS (Enter either a Parent. Revision. Alias. Addendum or volume in the relationship column)
STATUS
- RELATIONSHIP g_M CALCULATION NO EFJ _6.DQ D_ K__BEFORE AFTER l
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7 REVISION HISTORY Page 4-.-.- of 12__
M NSED_ IR-M-0570 _ _ 00_..___ ___
DEPT DIY CALCULATION NO REVISION ADDENDUM VOLUME REVISION OBJECTIVE: See.page_5 WHAT INITIATED CHANGE: See page 5 _ _ _
l J
(B N
n AFFECTED PAGES: All 9 y ;
Table..of contents:_. Page ;g l NE-1.61.01 1-4. 2 !
Table.of_ Contents 4 Z
)
Objective 5 l Background 5 Methodology 6 References __ _ _ _ 6 __
l inputs and. Assumptions 7-9 _
Analysis10-12_. _ . - - - - . __
l Conclusion _ 12._ _ _ _-._ _ _ - - - - . - . . . - - _
Attachments
- _
__ Ref erence_18 ____ _. . .. _1 page _ _ . ____. _ - . _ _ - _ . _ ~ - - j
_ Re f e r e n c e . 20 ___ _ ____ _1 p a g e _ . ... ___. _ __._. _ _ . _ _ . ._._ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ . . _ _ _ . !
I Note: Preparer provide explicit instructions for volume / Addendum Calculations to be incorporated using
" Administrative Revisions".
j
0-IP-M-0570 E4 Rev. O Page 5 OBJECTIVE:
. Evaluate the HPCS suppression pool suction valve 1E22-F015, for the potential for pressure induced pressure locking due to back leakage through various valves. This evaluation.is being performed in-order to make the assumptions for the GL 95-07 evaluation for this' valve consistent with those made for the
- GL 89-10 evaluation.
BACKGROUND:
Additional. scenarios that could'cause pressure locking were recently postulated. For example, NRC INFO Notice 96-08 identified a closed HPCI valve located very close (<3 pipe dia.)
to the.feedwater system that experienced a pressure lock.
Thermally induced pressure locking for 1E22-F015 is addressed in Calculation IP-M-0381, R/0 - A. .
The pressure induced pressure locking scenacio requires pressurized fluid to be trapped in the bonnet. In order to accomplish this both surfaces of the disk must be sealed. The most likely scenario to cause this disk face sealing would be a rapid depressurization in the line trapping high pressure between the two disk faces. Subsequent heating of the trapped fluid would further exacerbate the problem.
In the case of the HPCS suppression pool suction valve such a phenomena should not occur since there should not be high pressure fluid in the valve bonnet. It is therefore highly unlikely both disc faces would be sealed. Normally the suppression pool suction valve would see suppression pool head on one side and low pressure fluid (i.e., normal standby system head) on the other. A scenario was identified however, where higher pressure could potentially be seen on the upstream side of the valve,as a result of valve degradation / failure.
It is postulated that backleakage (from the vessel) during normal operation could pressurize the bonnet of 1E22-F015. This would not occur during operation of the HPCS pump since flow would be back to the vessel and since the subject valve is on the suction side of the HP pump. When the HP pump is in operation from the normal source (RCIC tank) the pressure on the downstream side of the F015 valve would be about equal to the tank head. The leakage path that could pressurize the bonnet would be from the RPV'through check valve 1E22-F005, containment isolation valve 1E22-F004, check valve 1E22-F024 and check valve 1E22-F016 It would also have to be assumed that check valve 1E22-F002 in the line 1HP05C leading back to the RCIC tank was relatively leak tightl.
1 Note that although RCIC is similarly connected to the RCIC tank such a scenario.is not possible with RCIC since there is a relief path back to the RCIC storage tank via 1RIllA (reference M05-1079-2) which would prevent pressurization of the associated piping.
i IP-M-0570 Rev. O Page 6 For this to occur multiple valve degradation / valve failures would have to occur in such a manner as to create high pressure at the subject valve. For example, multiple valves in the injection line would have to be leaking while the check valve from the RCIC
. tank was not. This combination of events, while possible, would be highly unlikely. None the less analysis will be performed to confirm that the valve will function under this worst case scenario.
METHODOLOGY:
Pullout loads will be evaluated using methods given in NMAC NP-6660-D, Application Guide for Motor Operated Valves in Nuclear Power Plants.
REFERENCES :
- 1) NMAC, " Application Guide for Motor Operated Valves in Nuclear Power Plants", NP-6660-D
- 2) IP-M-0001 R/01
- 3) DC-ME-09-CP, R/11 (including ECN 27799) 4)~ SQ Package, SQ-CL-716 R/06(including A/D drawings 2994-3, R/D)
- 5) 3C10-1079-001, R/8
- 6) IP-M-0381, R/0 - A
- 7) IP-M-0246, R/4
- 8) EPRI NP-4993
- 9) M06-1074-1, R/AH
- 10) M05-1074-1,,R/AF ,
- 11) 3C10-1079-001, R/8
- 12) INEL -96/0382, Results of Pressure Locking / Thermal Binding
]
Tests of Gate Valves, June 1997 q
- 13) A28-1405-1, R/F
- 14) IP-O-0071, R/01
- 15) GE 22A3759A:1, R/4
- 16) CPS 8451.50, R/7
- 17) IP-M-309, R/0 (all addenda)
- 18) Anchor / Darling July 22, 1992 letter, T. A. Boring to D. Swindle (Attachment 1)
- 19) MWO F09932 & D35175
- 20) Inspection sketch (Attachment 2)
- 21) OS-1074-1, R/7
- 22) CPS 5062.04, R/26 J
l IP-M-0570
. , . Rev. O Page 7 INPUTS AND ASSUMPTIONS:
- 1. Per Reference 4, the stem length and diameter are 55" x 1.75". The stem weight would be 3.14 x .875" x .875" x 55" x .28 lb/cu. in. = 37 lbs. Per field measurement (Reference 20) the weight of the disc is ~280 lb and the hub diameter is ~6".
- 2. As discussed previously, during the subject " highly unlikely" scenario, higher pressure could be seen on the upstream side of the valve. Backleakage from the vessel during normal operation could pressurize the bonnet of 1E22-F015. When the HP pump was started, pressure in the downstream piping would decrease since flow would be back to the vessel and since the subject valve is on the suction side of the HP pump. The minimum pressure on the downstream side of the F015 valve would be about equal to the RCIC tank head (bottom of tank elevation = 737', reference A28-1405-1, R/F) . The static head (assuming 100 F water) due to the minimum RCIC tank elevation is 737' - 720' (Reference M06-1074-1) = 17' (~7.3 psi).
- 3. The minimum suppression pool level is ~731' (Reference M05-1074-1). Containment pressure will conservatively be assumed as zero. The static head (assuming 180 F water) due to the minimum suppression pool level is 731' - 720' (Reference M06-1074-1) = 11' (~4.6 psi).
- 4. There is an alarm set at 80 psig downstream of F015 (Ref.
21). The condition of the HP system hardware should be maintained such that even under worst case conditions pressures downstream of F015 do not exceed ~80 psig (Reference 22). Conservatively 100 psig will be used based on nominal Relief Valve 1E22-F014 setpoint (Reference 10).
- 5. Increases in area temperatures could possibly heat the fluid in valve bonnets and further exacerbate the pressure lock condition. The event of concern for room heatup under the subject scenario is the DBA LOCA. High energy line break is not a concern for the subject valve based on IP-M-0381, R/0-A, et. al. The DBA LOCA would add heat to the HPCS pump room (where the valve is located) due to room loads and heat transfer from the suppression pool (as it heats up). Under a LOCA in containment (prior to opening the suction valve) the heat up of the room would be due primarily to equipment (i.e., pump) operation (the piping would contain " cold" RCIC storage tank water). When the HP pump is in operation the associated area cooler is also in operation. As such the changes in room temperature would not be rapid or significant. This is consistent with calculation 3C10-1079-0001, Figure R3 which shows little heat up during the initial portions of the event. Calculation 3C10-1079-001 models areas inside secondary containment to determine secondary containment drawdown times and temperatures. Heat input from containment to secondary containment through the containment wall was included in the analysis model.
1
)
)
,' IP-M-0570 I Rev. O Page 8 )
The analysis is split into two parts, a short term analysis and a long term. analysis. GE 22A3759AM, R/4, figure ;
3.3.1.18 and 3.3.2.4 provides the curves of suppression pool l temperature response following a DBA. The temperature
{
starts at 95*F and increases to a peak of slightly over i 180*F in about 40,000 seconds. The short term and long term l analysis used a containment / suppression pool temperature of 185*F (reference IP-O-0071, Rev. 1, attachment 1, 3C10-1079- :
001, Table 8 and 3C10-1079-001, Appendix R) during the initial portions of the event. The model is clearly I conservative as illustrated below:
IE 3cio 1079-001 1E I 170 <
m5 E 160 150
- 140 j130 -
,m ,
110 100 100 1000 10000 100000 Time (sec.)
The short term analysis shows negligible temperature increase out to 600 seconds (10 minutes) using this conservative model. The initial HPCS temperature modeled in the long term analysis was (conservative for EQ purposes) 13 5'F. The analysis plot showed virtually no increase in temperature (from 135 F) till ~10000 seconds (2.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />).
The actual heat transfer to the room from the pool would be negligible till well beyond 600 seconds, due to the small temperature gradient between the room and containment and due to the large thermal masses (i.e., concrete) in the walls of the HPCS room. Heat transfer from the room to the valve. bonnet would be delayed by the large mass of steel and stagnant water (initially at ambient temperatures) in the associated piping and valve. As such significant heat up of the fluid in the bonnet is not expected till at least an hour into the event. Since HPCS would transfer from the RCIC storage tank to the suppression pool in less than ~30 minutes (150,000 gallon /5000gpm) the fluid in the bonnet of the HPCS suction valve will experience negligible temperature increase prior to opening. Therefore, heat increase of the water in the bonnet prior to opening of the valve does not need to be considered. I I
j
t
,* IP-M-0570 Rev. O Page 9
- 6. Per Reference 7 the disc seat area is 235 sq. in, area.
- 7. Information on friction (p) from EPRI NP-4993, pg 5-9 gives friction factors of ~ .3 for wetted surfaces. Other references (Reference 1) give various ranges from ~.35 to as high as .5 for friction factors. We will use .5 for friction at torque ears and .4 at the seating surfaces.
This is consistent with the methods used in Reference 17.
Use of .4 for seating surfaces is considered appropriate for this analysis on the following basis. The actual pressure at the seating surfaces will not be as high as assumed in this analysis. A portion of the pressure force is required to separate the two disc halves by bending around the hub.
In addition, reference 22 requires venting the line to the Suppression Pool if the high pressure alarm is received. As such, there is 20% margin to the line pressure (100 psig) used throughout this calculation 2. Also, for the scenario being evaluated, as soon as the valve is cracked open the pressure lock scenario is terminated.
- 8. CPS has typically used valve factors to calculate pullout thrust. Due to the unique nature of the phenomena being evaluated we will use the longer form given on page 5-5 of Reference 1.
- 9. The torque switch for this valve is bypassed during initial valve opening (Ref. CPS 8451.50 Section 9. 6) . As such the valve will function if motor capability and manufacturer valve limits are not exceeded. Since this is a short lived, one time event this is reasonable and appropriate.
- 10. Under the pressure lock scenario the downstream disk must move downstream as depressurization occurs in order to seal both disk faces. This movement will tend to decrease the pressure in the bonnet since there would be an increase in available volume. The same thing occurs when " Slop" between the stem & Disk ears is taken up. Due to the rigor that would be required to quantify this no credit for it will be taken in this calculation. This conservatism is so noted,
- 11. Large diameter flex wedge gate valves typically use shallow seat angles (2 -3). Per Ref. 18, a 3* seat angle will be used in this analysis. Field measurement validated this to be a conservative value (Attachment 2).
- 12. Per Reference 19, packing load is ~1900 lb. Use 2100 lb to account for potential measurement inaccuracies.
2 Note that this margin plus the margins discussed on page 12 are sufficient to accomodate a as high as about .5.
4' IP-M-0570 Rev. O Page 10 ANALYSIS:
The equation for required stem thrust (F R) for gate valves from 1 I
NMAC (Ref. 1) can be written:
PM P DP 3 FR(lbs) =
TRF
.Where: FR
= Required stem thrust load to operate. valve (lbs) j i
Fw-
= Disc and stem weight load (lbs)
FPACK
= Packing friction-load (lbs)
Fp =
Piston effect load (lbs)
Fop = Differential pressure load (lbs).
F3
= Sealing load (seating / unseating) (lbs). This load is the vertical component of the sealing contact force.
TRF = Torque reaction factor (dimensionless). The-torque reaction load is a function of the required stem thrust; therefore, the torque reaction depends on the sum of the individual loads in the required stem thrust equation.
The equation presented uses a torque reaction factor to account for the torque reaction load.
I In lieu of using TRF, a torque reaction load may also be applied j directly. The following equation applies:
FR"FW+FPACK + Fp + F 9p + FT+F3 Where p(Torque)
FT= r p = friction r = disk radius l'
e ,/*
a-IP-M-0570 Rev. O Page 11 For 1E22-F015, using data (enveloping for both) from. Reference 7,
. (using: limiting stem' thrust) and inputs / assumptions, under our pressure lock scenario:
Fs = 26500 '(Sin 3*) *
=-1387-* .4
=-555-lb' Fop =. ApA
= .4 APE = AP1 ' + AP2 Where AP1 p3,,,,, _ p p ,,1 AP2. = Paonnet - PUpstream
=
(100-7.3)
= + (100-4. 6)
E 189 psid ,
Now this pressure is applied across-the disk area.
A = disk area hub area
= 235 sq. in. - x (3")2 = 207 sq. in.
FDP = .4 (207) (189)
=.15,649 lb FPACK = 2100~lb (Ref 19) (pg 9, para 12)
Fw = 280 lb + 37 lb = ~320 lb Fx Determined through iteration (conservatively guess 22,000
- 1b) using stem factor
- (Torque) p
- SF
- F, .
FT= g =
r where Fa is listed below, seat dia. = 17.3 (Reference 57 and SF = .023 per Reference 7
= .5 (22,000). (.023) (12 ) / (17. 3/2)
E 351 lb Fp = pA p = Bonnet pressure = 189 lb A = Stem Area 2.4 in2 (Reference 7)
- = 189 (2.4) = -454 lb 1 FR = 15649 + 2100 + 320 - 454 + 351 + 555 E.18,521 -lb
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1.H IP-M-0570
~- +s.
Rev. O Page 12 This is well below the valve open limits of 26500 lbs (Reference 7).and, at p = .18 (Reference 7),.below the degraded voltage motor limits of 21860 lbs (after lube degradation) (Reference 7).
~
'In addition to the margins discussed above, the following margins are available to account for uncertainties in the inputs:
. Motor capability of 21860 based on -1% voltage, when not subtracting 1%, pullout ^ capability would be greater than
~22,000 lbs.
Past testing'(Reference 19) had p on the order of .14 which provides approximately 25,000 motor capability.
- ENo credit is taken for- hammer blow
.No credit'takensfor.the reduction in pressure as discussed in Assumption 10.
No credit was taken for motor stall capability.
CONCLUSION:
Valve 1E22-F015 will function during the subject scenario.
r
- 17) 827 6 ;
FAX:917) 827 4806 July 22.1992 Illinois Power Company i Attention: Mr. Don Swindle
~
Subject:
Disc Angle for Volves included on A/DV S.O. EB671 l
)
l l
Don: l A/DV Drafting Standord spells out the following as the general guideline for determining disc ang!e:
Disc Anote l Pressure Class Size 150,300,600 2 1/2'- 12' 5' 150,300,600 14'- 24' 3' ,
I l
900,1500,2500 2-1/2' B' 5' i l
900,1500,2500 10'- 24' 3' j l
Assigning disc ongles is not olways os block & white os listed above. The transition from 5' to S* with volve stre and pressure roting con vary with spectflo volve requ!rements. However,in onswer to your request of 7/21, for the volves included under A/DV S,0. EB671, the disc ongle (disc to stem) will be either 5' or 3'.
If you have 5ny further questions, please coll.
ANCHOR /DARI.ING val.VE COMPANY Jer.
T.A. Boring Project Engine-cc: D. Wr'cht R. Moletto EB671 file a
s,
' ~
TP-(M-o6?o SPARE blSC FOR 1E22-F015 20 INCH Stock Code SA0259
=
6.0 inchs =
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n i s-i 61/2" inchs {
I 1
1 l
19 inchs 3 1
{ \ 1 Ted Danley /[e .8/19/99 4 3/4 inchs =
[ Q, 9 9* * '
-Weight is 285#'s including the shipping box j