ML20211F698
| ML20211F698 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1987 |
| From: | Davis A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Sylvia B DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8702250178 | |
| Download: ML20211F698 (2) | |
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s FEB 18 887 1
Docket No. 50-341 The Detroit Edison Company ATTN:
B. Ralph Sylvia Group Vice President Nuclear Operations 6400 North Dixie Highway Newport, MI 48166 Gentlemen:
This refers to an investigation performed by the NRC Office of Investigations (01) at your facility. A copy of the synopsis of Investigation Report 03-84-021 is enclosed with this letter.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the investigation.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules and Practices," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
We will gladly discuss any questions you may have relative to this letter or the referenced material.
Origtral signed Irf A. Cert 0-wi s A. Bert Davis Acting Regional Administrator i
Enclosure:
01 Investigation Report 3-84-021 Synopsis i
cc w/ enclosure:
l F. H. Sondgeroth, Licensing Engineer P. A. Marquardt, Corporate l
Legal Department i
DCS/RSB (RIDS) l Licensing Fee Management Branch l
Resident Inspector, RIII l
Ronald Callen, Michigan l
Public Service Commission Harry H. Voight, Esq.
0702250170 070210 Nuclear Facilities and PDH ADOCK 05000341 l
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SYNOPSIS
'I On September 28, 1963 NRC Region 111 requested that 01 conduct an insestigation of alleged harassnent and intimidation of Quality Control Inspectors and Quality Control record falsification by L.K. Comstock Company, the electrical contractor at the Detroit Edison Company (DECO),
Ferci 2 Nuclear Power Station.
In December 1984, 01 began an investigation of those allegations by reviewing a previously conducted DECO Nucleer Security investigation of the Comstock matter and attempting to corroborate the DECO findings.
DECO's investigaticn determined the allecation of harassment and intimidation was unsubstantiated. A former L.K. Comstock OC Inspector apparently perceived that Comstock inspectors were being pressured into signing hundreds of conduit inspection checklists for system turnover and was uncomfortable with that assignment because they were not afforded the opportunity te verify dispositions of rejectable items.
01 has determired that the L.K. Comstock system turnover procedure for jurisdictional relinquishment of records to DECO allowed for an inspector's sign-off. This sign-off of inspection checklists merely indicated that Comstock's portion of the systems inspection was complete.
All holdpoints, deviation dispositions, and nonconforrance requests were punchlisted for later dispositier. verification by DECc. That procedure, once explained to the alleger, removed any concern as to the accept-ability of the sign-off and the related alleged duress of the situaticn.
DECO Nuclear Security also investigated the allegation of QC record falsification and received a statenent from a former L.K. Comstock QC Supervisor admitting to three (3) forgeries of the alleger's name on conduit inspection checklists. 01 reviewed the DECO investigation, reviewed approximately 3000 Comstock conduit inspection checklists and idertified one (1) additicnal suspected forgery, apparently signed by the same OC Supervisor. That document was not submitted for forensic handariting examination. The forner Comstock 0 Supervisor who admitted to the original three forgeries, however, stated under oath that he corritted no other record falsifications, contrary to Ol's findings. He also statec that the forgeries resulted fror undue pressure exerted by l
Deco to expedite the system turnover process, but he was either unable or unwilling to identify any individuals f rom DECO who nay have been responsible for that pressure.
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Case No. 3-E4-021 1
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FEB 181987 Docket No. 50-341 The Detroit Edison Company ATTN:
B. Ralph Sylvia Group Vice President Nuclear Operations 6400 North Dixie Highway Newport, MI 48166 Gentlemen:
This refers to an investigation perfonned by the NRC Office of Investigations (01) at your facility. A copy of the synopsis of Investigation Report 03-85-013 is enclosed with this letter. No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the investigation.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules and Practices," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
We will gladly discuss any questions you may have relative to this letter or the referenced material.
Stigtnot signed by A. Dert Davis A. Bert Davis Acting Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
OI Investigation Report 3-85-013 Synopsis cc w/ enclosure:
F. H. Sondgeroth, Licensing Engineer P. A. Marquardt, Corporate Legal Department DCS/RSB (RIDS)
Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Ronald Callen, Michigan Public Service Coninission Harry H. Voight, Esq.
Nuclear Facilities and Environmental Monitoring f
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SYNOPSIS On July 22, 1985, NRC Region III Administrator requested the Office of Investigations (01) conduct an investigation of an alleged material false statement by Detroit Edison Company (Deco) relating to an operator error which occurred on July 2, 1985, at the Fermi 2 facility.
This investigation has developed evidence indicating that on July 3,1985, DECO plant management had reason to believe that a premature reactor criticality resulting from an operator error had occurred.
Deco management recognized the incident as non-reportable under the Code of Federal Regulations; however, it The was perceived as a significant public relations and licensing issue.
afternoon of July 3, 11 days after the operator error occurred, Deco management did notify the NRC Resident inspector of the operator rod pull error and stated, contrary to the advice of a nuclear consultant and one of their DECO reactor engineers, that the error did not result in reactor criticality.
did advise that reactor engineering was perfoming a review of data to assess The NRC Resident Inspector understood that he would be advised criticality.
of the reactor engineering group's findings as soon as they became available.
On July 5, 1985, DECO management again met and were purportedly convinced by 110-114 reactor engineering that, in fact, the reactor had been critical for a On that date, and subsequently on July 8-12, 1985, the NRC second period.
Resident Inspector and the Resident inspector trainee were on the Fermi site.
They interacted with licensee personnel and attended the Deco staff meetings chaired by the same individuals who notified the NRC Resident Inspector on Those DECO employees were fully aware of July 3, 1985 of the operator error.
the changed criticality findings and made no effort to notify the NRC represen-tatives of the new DECO position regarding premature criticality.
10, 1985, the Commission met to discuss significant issues relating to On July Fermi 2 and to vote or, a full power license for that facility.
The Deco Vice President Nuclear Operations, and Assistant Manager Nuclear Production were Neither present and observed the discussion of significant operator errors.
DECO representative, both of whoe were admittedly aware of the July 2 operator error and the latter aware of the premature criticality, attempted to clarify infomation which was furnished by NRC Region III to the Comission, that only one operatcr error had occurred following fuel load.
NRC Director, Division of Licensing, signed the Fermi 2 full On July 12, 1985, power license. On July 15, 1985 DECO advised the NRC Senior Resident Inspector That notification was the first of the premature criticality of July 2.
public admission by Deco of what was their official corporate position regarding reactor criticality resulting from an operator error, established on July 5, 1985.
Case No. 3-85-013 1
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