ML20211D483
| ML20211D483 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/12/1987 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8702200453 | |
| Download: ML20211D483 (86) | |
Text
J ORIGINAL f
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Briefing on Advanced Reactor Designs (Public Meeting)
I OCatlOn:
Washington, D.
C.
Cate:
Thursday, February 12, 1987
(
Pages:
1 - 65 Ann Riley & Associates Court Reporters 1625 i Street, N.W., Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 g
(202) 293-3950 8702200453 870212 kb. 7 PDR 1
4 L
1 D I SCLA 1 MER 2
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This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the 7
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on e
2/12/87 In the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9
i4. tJ., tJash i ng t on,
D.C.
The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain
(
gg 12 inaccuracies.
1S The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.105, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the
,16 matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript 17 do not necessarily reflect, final determination or beliefs.
No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commission'may 21 authori=e.
l 22 23 24 25
s 1
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
/
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
BRIEFING ON ADVANCED REACTOR DESIGNS 4
~
5 Public Meeting 6
7 8
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1987 9
1717 H Street, N.W.
10 Washington, D.C.
I 11 12 The Commission met, pursuant to Notice, at 4
13 2:04 p.m.
t 14 15 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
16 LANDO W.
ZECH, JR., Chairman of the Commission 17 THOMAS M. ROBERTS, Commissioner 18 JAMES K. ASSELSTINE, Commissioner 19 FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL, Commissioner 20 KENNETH M. CARR, Commissioner 21 l
22 NRC STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
l l
23 S.
Chilk W.
Parler 24 V.
Stello R. Vollmer i
l 25 B. Sheron T. King
4 2
1 STAFF AND PRESENTERS (Continued):
2 3
C. Neal 4
5 AUDIENCE SPEAKERS:
6 7
D. Rossin F. Gavigan 8
A. Millunzi E. Northrup 9
10 11
~
12 13 7
1 14 15 16 17
/
18 19 20 21 l
22 23 24 25
t 3
1 PROCEEDINGS
(
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Good afternoon, ladies and 3
gentlemen.
The Commission is meeting this afternoon to hear 4
from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on their 5
-activities related to the review of Department of Energy's 6
advanced reactor concepts.
Today's discussion is on three 7
advanced concepts; a 350 megawatt modular high temperature 8
gas-cooled reactor, a 425 megawatt inherently _ safe modular 9
liquid metal reactor, and a 900 megawatt sodium advanced fast 10 reactor.
11 The Commission was briefed on these advanced designs 12 by the Department of Energy and their contractors on the 9th 13 of October, 1986.
It's my understanding that Dr. David Rossin 14 is here today, Assistant Secretary of Department of Energy for 15 Nuclear Energy.
Dr. Neil Brown, consulting technologist for 16 safety, General Electric Corporation; John Mcdonald, Atomic 17 International; and Dan Mears of Gas-Cooled Reactor Associates 18 are available in tha audience to respond to questions if we 19 see fit to call upon them.
20 So we thank all of you for being with us, as well as 21 the staff today.
This is an information briefing and we don't 22 anticipate any formal action on the Commission's part today.
23 Do any of my fellow Commissioners have any opening 24 remarks they'd like to make?
25
[No response.]
5 4
1 Would you proceed then, Mr. Stello.
2 MR. STELLO:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There are a 3
number of advanced reactors we are looking at.
The three that 4
you mentioned will be, in fact, the subject of the briefing 5
this afternoon.
We are committed to work with DOE in trying 6
to identify the significant important regulatory issues, and 7
there are a number of them that we will be talking about this 8
afternoon, to make sure that we have enough information so 9
that we can eventually present a reasoned judgment for the 10 Commission to support the concepts or to identify the 11 significant problems and questions for the Commission as we 12 continue our review.
13 As you said, we are not finished and this is strictly 14 a status briefing.
We will identify the examples of the more 15 significant issues in the briefing.
And with that, Brian, let 16 me get you to start.
i 17
[ Slide.]
18 MR. SHERON:
Very quickly, what we're going to tell 19 you about in this briefing is the three DOE-sponsored concepts 20 for advanced reactors.
We had described these reactors and 21 our activities associated with them in a previous SECY paper, 22 86-368, which I believe we sent down to you last December.
23 What we're going to tell you about in this 24 presentation is the purpose, scope and schedule of our reviews; 25 the review approach that we're taking; and I think most
O 3
5 1
importantly, to alert you to some of the major issues that we
/
2 will be facing as we embark on these design reviews.
3
[ Slide.]
4 Just to remind you that there are a number of 5
reactors that have been labeled advanced reactors that the 6
staff is currently reviewing.
There are three light water 7
reactor concepts, the first is the advanced PWR by 8
Westinghouse, also called RESAR (SP/90) ; there's an advanced 9
BWR which General Electric is proposing and is currently being 10 submitted for review; and then there is an EPRI advanced light 11 water reactor requirements document, which is also under 12 review.
13 In addition to the advanced light water reactors, 14 there are three non-light water reactors which DOE is now 15 sponsoring; two are liquid metal reactors, one is a gas-cooled 16 reactor.
And it's just these three reactors that we'll be 17 briefing you on.
18
[ Slide.]
19 What we are trying to do in our review of these 20 advanced concepts is to provide early guidance in DOE's design 21 process on the licensing requirements or the licenseability 22 for each concept.
We're also reviewing them to see the extent 23 to which these concepts can meet licensing requirements.
24 We are also, as part of this review, looking at the 25 adequacy of DOE's proposed research and development programs l
6 1
that are designed to support these concepts and to identify i
2 any additional R&D that we think might be needed.
3 The other thing we're looking for in these reviews 4
is to look for insights where NRC should sponsor some of its 5
own confirmatory research to assist us in future licensing 6
application reviews of these advanced concepts.
7 And lastly; we just want to point out that these 8
results of the staff review, the licenseability reviews, that 9
we're conducting we understand may be utilized by DOE in 10 determining which of these concepts they intend to support for 11 future development.
12
[ Slide.]
13 The scope of our review for each of these three 14 concepts submitted by DOE encompasses a review of a preliminary 15 safety information document which is sort of like a PSAR but 16 it's not as detailed; a probabilistic risk assessment which 17 would be submitted and reviewed; and then their research and l
18 development program description.
These three comprise the 19 total scope of the staff review at this time.
20 At this time I'm going to ask Tom King, who is a l
21 section leader in our Safety Program Evaluation Branch, to 22 continue with the presentation.
Tom is the section leader 23 that is basically heading up the review team in NRC.
24
[ Slide.]
25 MR. KING:
Thank you.
We currently have inhouse the
i 7
1 PSID, PRA and the R&D program description for all three t'
2 concepts.
We received those for the HTGR in the early fall 3
and then for the LMR's in late fall.
So those are all under 4
review at the present time.
5 The review approach that we're taking was, one, to 6
familiarize the staff with the design concepts; that took 7
place approximately over the past two years with a series of 8
meetings with DOE and its contractors where we were briefed on 9
the design, and we also briefed ACRS several times on the 10 design.
That process is basically complete at this time.
11 As part of those reviews, we've identified what we 12 felt were some key issues associated with these concepts that 13 needed to be concentrated on in the review.
We supplied 14 identification of those issues, we've discussed them with-DOE 15 and their contractors.
16 We currently, as part of the review, are planning to 17 do some independent analysis to assess the key safety 18 attributes that these designs are claiming to have; we're i
19 doing that through national laboratories, primarily Brookhaven 20 and Oak Ridge.
21 And based upon the analysis, the information provided 22 by DOE, by our independent analysis and review and by review of 23 the DOE program, we are planning as part of this review to 24 develop licensing guidance on these designs.
And we're i
25 planning to use existing LWR criteria where it's practical to i
8 1
do so, and then develop additional criteria to address any 2
unique aspects associated with these designs.
Then we plan to 3
make an assessment of the potential of these designs to meet 4
those criteria.
5 Issues with policy implications we plan to raise to 6
the Commission's attention.
And our plans at this time are to 7
document the review of each concept via a Safety Evaluation 8
Report.
There will be three safety evaluation reports, one 9
for each concept.
Those will be reviewed by ACRS, CRGR, and 10 we plan to provide them for your review prior to our issuing 11 them.
12 We do not have in the schedule at the present time 13 any provision for public comment on those SER's.
i 14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
You do not have any provision 15 for public comment?
16 MR. KING:
No, we do not.
I 17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
We'll save the point, I 18 guess, until Q and A is here, but I would like the staff to 19 address the question that you mentioned here in the viewgraph.
20 You point out that public policy in this area, and ultimately 21 conceivably DOE's own decisions could be affected by our 22 review.
So it seems to me that it's essential that our 23 review be subjected to open scrutiny and review by the public 24 and by interested parties, but -
25 MR. STELLO:
Let me try to answer that now if I l
1
t 9
1 can.
The idea was to, since these are significant issues as 2
you will see in a moment that we need to address, we felt it 3
important to get the Commission review of that.
It doesn't 4
preclude then the public comment process after the Commission i
5 review before the Commission reaches a final decision.
I 6
think you probably will want to do that, but I think it ought 7
to be at the discretion of the Commission as to where the next 8
steps go.
9 What we think is important is to have it presented 10 to you prior to getting the public comment so that you'll have 11 a chance to react to it and then decide what the review 12 process ought to be thereafter, rather than have us decide 13 that for you.
I think these issues are too significant for us 14 to do that independent of the Commission.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, who am I to disagree 16 with that.
17
[ Laughter.)
18 But I think the point is that we probably have not 19 really worked out in any detail or very well the agency's i
20 procedures in this area.
And rather than belaboring it 21 further now, we probably need to think about that at some 22 point, exactly how we're going to proceed.
Because from time i
23 to time, outsiders, whoever they are, have brought up important 24 issues in these things and we don't want to wait until the tail 25 end of a long process for that to happen.
That's enough said I
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think.
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Let me just say, too, that I think 3
you could have worded that a little differently.
It sounds 4
like you've excluded public comment.
I'm not so sure you 5
meant that.
6 MR. STELLO:
Prior to bringing it to the Commission.
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I know.
But certainly, the 8
Commission may see well fit to have public comment.
I would 9
imagine that we would.
But let's go ahead.
10
[ Slide.]
11 MR. KING:
The next slide just graphically shows our 12 schedule, and we won't dwell on it other than our schedule for 13 issuing the SER's is for the HTGR in January of 1988 and for 14 the two LMR's in April of 1988.
15 (Slide.]
16 This slide is just a quick summary of accomplishments 17 to date.
I mentioned we had had meetings with ACRS, with DOE 18 and its contractors, and we've developed a draft NUREG 19 concerning the development and utilization of the advanced 20 reactor policy statement, which we currently have inhouse 21 review at the present time.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Could I just ask a short 23 question about PRA reviews?
At this stage, these obviously 24 are PRA analyses at a rather fundamental level as opposed, I l
25 suppose, to the very detailed kind of things -- probabilities
~
11 1
of a pump failing or whatever goes into a detailed PRA these 2
days.
3 When you do that kind of analysis for the basic i
4 design, which I gather is more or less in hand now, what level 5
of confidence do you have that you've got the big issues, if 6
you understand what I'm saying, that those PRA analyses are 7
not going to be very far wrong, that changes to those things 8
will depend on the smaller factors like probabilities of pump 9
failings and that sort of thing?
Do you have a high degree of 10 confidence that those broad PRA's are pretty good, does that 11 depend in great detail on the design itself?
or how would you 12 comment on that?
13 MR. KING:
I think it does depend on the design.
14 You're right, at the conceptual design stage we're basically 15 having a PRA that's commensurate with that level of design i
16 detail.
It will be addressing systems and major components.
17 Things like breakers' locations and types of breakers aren't 18 defined at this point so the PRA wouldn't be able to address 19 those kinds of things.
j 20 But I think when you look at these designs and the 21 way they're accomplishing their safety functions, I don't i
22 think that PRA is going to be too dependent on things like the 23 type of breakers you're using.
I think the PRA results at 24 this point can be used to identify the major accident 25 initiators.
There will certainly be some uncertainty on the 1
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frequency with which they'll occur, which we're going to have
/
2 to take into consideration in their review.
But I think they 3
will give us a good ballpark feel for the major accident 4
initiators and what the risk is associated with those.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I hope what you're saying is 6
the simplicity of these designs is such that you have a pretty 7
high level of confidence that you're not overlooking a major 8
factor when you or DOE in its submittals have reviewed the 9
PRA's, or carried out the PRA's.
10 MR. KING:
At this point that's our view.
When 11 we're finished reviewing the PRA's we'll be able to give you a' 12 better answer.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
All right.
(
14
[ Slide.]
15 MR. KING:
Quickly, on resources, these are the i
16 resources we currently have in FY87 and are projecting in 17 FY88.
They are sufficient to do the job.
There's one 18 difference between these resources and what is in the SECY 19 paper we provided to you in December and that is the technical 20 assistance funding in FY87 is $400K lower now than it was in 21 the SECY paper.
That is because when we got into the details 22 of planning and laying out this work it came out to cost less 23 money; it's not that we're short on funds.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's FY87, but for FY88 l
25 our funding apparently, assuming things go well on the Hill as l
13 1
submitted, the funding will be adequate to cover what you need
/
2 to do to keep pace with the timetable?
3 MR. KING:
Yes.
If we receive funding consistent 4
with those numbers, that will be adequate.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How would this compare to 6
the amount of effort that it would take to review an 7
application, an LWR application, against the fairly extensive 8
body of regulatory requirements that we now have in place for 9
LWR's?
And is this enough really to do a meaningful review of 10 what really are different and novel design concepts?
11 MR. KING:
Well, I'm not too sure what it costs to 12 review an LWR.
If you let me use Clinch River as an example, 13 I can talk to that.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
15 COMMISSIONER ~BERNTHAL:
Must you?
16 (Laughter.)
l 17 MR. KING:
That was over a two-year period where we 18 did the CP review; took approximately $12 million in technical 19 assistance funds and about 35 FTE's.
Now, we did a lot of, --
20 at that point in time the design was fairly final, and we did 21 a lot of basically final design review.
Clinch River did not 22 have the extent of inherent safety features that these designs i
l have in them so we had to look at a lot more of the plant.
23 l
24 I think at this stage, with the concentration of 25 safety features and the simplifications that are involved and i
i
14 1
the fact that we're just concentrating on a conceptual design, r
2 I feel these are reasonable numbers.
3 MR. VOLLMER:
As far as LWR, my best recollection is 4
we're talking 25 or 30 FET's over a period of three or four 5
years.
And as far as technical support, I would guess 6
somewhere half to three-quarters of a million on average.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
So what you're 8
really counting on is the simplicity of the design and the 9
ability to focus effort on relatively fewer safety systems.
10 MR. KING:
Yes.
11 MR. STELLO:
Wait.
When this review is finished --
12 all it is is conceptual.
All this does is identify whether 13 there are inherent issues associated with this which will give
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14 us significant questions with respect to then developing the 15 inforr.ation necessary in the detail to do the equivalent of a 16 licensing review.
This is nowhere near comparable to a l
17 licensing review; it's a conceptual review process.
i l
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Fair enough, although I 19 gather that at least a part of the effort is to try and I
20 identify all of the relevant issues that we can.
So it may 21 not be in the detail of a license review, but the objective I 22 think is to try and find things early on, to surface the 23 issues at the outset.
24 MR. STELLO:
Wait until we get finished with a 25 couple of examples and I think I'll come back to that, question.
15 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Are these numbers just for 2
DOE's submittals, or are they designed to involve the LWR 3
advanced reactors, too?
4 MR. KING:
Just the DOE submittals.
5
[ Slide.]
6 What we wanted to do is talk about some of the major 7
issues, and we have identified three which we feel need to be 8
raised to the Commission's attention because of their potential 9
policy implications, and then later on we'll give some examples 10 of some of the other issues that we'll need to look at as part 11 of these reviews.
12 The three major issues we've called, one, the 13 treatment of several accidents; two, the design approach to 14 containment; and three, the approach to design certification.
15 We plan to recommend a specific resolution to the i
16 Commission on each of these issues.
We currently have under 17 discussion the exact timing of when we would make that 18 recommendation.
19
[ Slide.]
20 The first of these issues is the treatment of severe 4
21 accidents, and briefly, what is being proposed by DOE -- and 22 this in general applies to all three of these concepts -- is 23 the plants are being designed to prevent offsite releases 24 greater than the Environmental Protection Agency Protective 25 Action Guidelines for accident sequences that are more frequent 1
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1 than in the range 10 to the minus 6th to 10 to the minus 7th i
2 per year.
They're using inherent or passive reactor shutdown 3
and decay heat removal systems to accomplish their plant safety 4
functions with high reliability.
5 As a result, these plants are -- it's proposed that 6
they be able to accomodate ATWS and station blackout type 7
events with a significant margin to core damage.
Because of 8
these features and plant performance, all three designs are f
j 9
proposing that no offsite evacuation plans be required.
1 l
10 Now in reviewing this approach, this proposed 11 approach, the kinds of things that we're going to have to look 12 at are reliability and performance of the passive reactor 13 shutdown system and passive decay heat removal system --
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's an extraordinarily i
15-stringent guideline up there at the top.
I call it a safety 16 goal; that's really what it is.
Substantially more stringent j
17 by -- if you take a reasonable qualitative reading, certainly 18 by one or two orders of magnitude than the Commission's 10 to 19 the minus 6th large offsite release criterion.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
They're going to be built 21 on 10-mile sites.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And I guess the reason I t
23 make the point is that then I go back to the previous page and j
24 I was going to ask what you mean by design approach to i
25 containment.
What's that mean?
17 1
MR. KING:
We've got a slide on that and we'll tell i
2 you what's being proposed.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And I assume that working in 4
somewhere here is the Fort St. Vrain scenario where we have to 5
start dealing in numbers and asking the question at what point 6
are the uncertainties small enough and the core melt PRA's 7
reliable enough that we would not require containment.
We've 8
done that once already.
9 MR. STELLO:
Precisely what we're going to talk 10 about.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
12 (Slide.]
13 MR. KING:
Again, back on the question of severe y
14 accidents.
In looking at these designs and whether we want to 15 accept the proposed DOE approach or not, we're going to have 16 to address a number of things in addition to the reliability 17 of the shutdown and decay heat removal systems.
We're going 18 to have to look at the risk associated with accidents beyond 19 those considered in the design, which might include other 20 potential severe accident initiators, how much margin to core 21 damage do these designs really have, any potential for 22 recriticality in severe accidents, need for additional accident 23 prevention or mitigation features, -- again it gets back to 24 your question of emergency planning or is the containment 25 adequate, that kind of thing -- what source terms are being
18 1
proposed for use in assessing the compliance of these designs t
2 with the criteria, the uncertainties associated in the analysis 3
and supporting technology with these designs, and the need for 4
emergency evacuation plans.
5 There's a number of key issues that need to be 6
considered in assessing whether what's being proposed is 7
acceptable or not.
8 (Slide.]
9 If we can get to the next slide, it gets to your 10 question on containment.
I'll quickly run through what's 11 being proposed for the three designs.
For the modular HTGR 12 there is no containment building or confinement building being 13 proposed.
What is being proposed is that the fission product 14 retention capability of the fuel, which acts in conjunction 15 with the passive shutdown and decay heat removal systems, is 16 sufficient to prevent large offsite releases.
That these 17 plants acting with these passive shutdown and decay heat 18 removal systems keep the fuel temperature low enough that 19 there are basically very minor releases.
l 20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Basically no fuel failure 21 is the objective.
22 MR. KING:
Basically, yes.
And the circulating 23 activity is controlled via technical specification type 24 requirements that when the helium is released, the activity 25 that's released along with it is low enough that you still
O 19 1
keep below the Protective Action Guidelines.
f 2
MR. STELLO:
Excuse me, Commissioner Asselstine 3
asked no fuel failure.
If I remember right, the designs of 4
these things do anticipate that you can have some fission 5
product release in the pellets, for whatever reason.
But I 6
think maybe you were anticipating no massive, major meltdown 7
of fuel, which is what this precludes.
You just don't lose 8
the geometry, but you can have clearly failed in this thing.
9 MR. KING:
In those little pellets.
There will be 10 some that are initially failed, just initial manufacturing 11 defects which will contribute to the circulating activity.
12 And then when you get into the accident condition there may be 13 a few more that fail but no large-scale failure of those.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, we can ask the l
15 representatives that are, but my understanding was that the t
16 fuel was designed so that the passive, radiative and maybe 17 other -- I guess primarily radiative -- cooling is such that 18 you never reach the point at which you have anything beyond 19 diffusion through the fuel pellet barriers.
And therefore, in 20 a real sense you do not have fuel failure, and the integrity 21 of the fuel particles is maintained.
Unless they're damaged 22 for some other reason.
l 23 MR. STELLO:
As a result of the overheating.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's right.
You do not 25 reach the point -- you cannot reach the point, supposedly, in l
1
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20 1
heating, at which you begin to deteriorate the fuel.
/
2 MR..STELLO:
Another way to say it is they are 3
designed so that they can withstand the high temperatures 4
necessary to give you this passive heat removal.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Right.
So I think that no 6
fuel failure is in fact what they are claiming.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's right.
8 MR. KING:
All right, the two liquid metal reactors.
9 First, PRISM, which is the 425 megawatt thermal design with 4
10 General Electric as the lead designer.
They are proposing a 11 low pressure, low volume containment barrier which utilizes the 1
12 reactor guard vessel, which is a vessel that has a dual purpose i
7 to contain any leakage of sodium from the reactor vessel and 13 14 fits closely around the reactor vessel, and then a welded 15 barrier across the top of the reactor vessel, of the reactor 16 head.
That barrier is what's being called the containment 17 barrier, and any leakage of primary sodium would be within that 18 barrier and any radiation associated with that would be 19 retained in that barrier.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
So that the design basis for 21 that barrier, then, is only to contain leakage of primary 22 coolant; is that what you're saying?
I 23 MR. KING:
Well again, this design, with its passive l
l 24 decay heat removal and its ability to withstand ATWS designs 25 or ATWS events, it's proposed that there are no other accidents
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21 1
that could cause the breach of the primary system or the 2
containment barrier; that the only thing that will get out 3
basically would be if there's a leak of sodium.
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
So the answer is yes.
5 MR. KING:
So the answer is yes.
6 For SAFR, the 900 megawatt thermal design with 7
Rockwell International, again, they have a lo# pressure, low 8
volume containment utilizing the reactor guard vessel and the 9
reactor head.
But because the reactor head has mechanical 10 seals in it, they have a secondary containment barrier above 11 the reactor head area to contain any leakage that will come 12 through those seals.
13 That's what's being proposed.
14
[ Slide.]
15 In reviewing these proposals, in addition to 16 considering the things that we talked about under the severe 17 accident question we're going to have to look at do the 18 results of the accident analysis indicate that additional 19 mitigation is desirable in these designs to account for 20 uncertainties in safety analysis, PRA results or supporting 21 technologies, or due to other potential severe accident 22 initiators such as sabotage.
23 I think the question of containment and severe 24 accidents are tied closely together.
You know we've split 25 them apart in this presentation.
22 1
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I take it there's no
/
2 reason why a more substantial containment isn't feasible for 3
these designs; it's simply a matter of economics.
Is that 4
right?
5 MR. KING:
No, that's not true.
The passive decay 6
heat removal systems rely on the natural convection of ambient 7
air, and if you put a containment ardund all that --
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
You bottle up the air.
9 MR. KING:
You bottle up the air.
You make it much 10 more difficult to have that natural --
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
So they're 12 incompatible.
13 MR. KING:
Yes.. That's what's being argued at the f
14 present time.
15 MR. STELLO:
It just keeps changing more and more 16 the fundamental parts of the facility.
If you then go from 17 passive systems you'd have to have active systems and cooling i
18 systems.
The question then obviousOf r ecomes did that improve 19 safety or did that detract from c2 ton;,.
I don't know that we l
20 will have the opportunity to get into trying to do those 21 partial differential type analyses, nor do I know that you 22 need to do them to come to grips with this -- are these 23 particular designs adequate and safe, maybe even far safer, 1
24 than current technology to warrant going ahead with them.
25 That's really the question that's being asked.
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23 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
In the case of the liquid 2
sodium-cooled systems, could you tell us a little bit about 3
the positive void coefficient or absence thereof, or the 4
sodium void coefficient that leads the designers to claim that 5
you cannot have a major accident or release beyond loss of 6
7 MR. KING:
The ovefall void coefficient in both the 8
liquid metal designs is positive.
The argument that's being 9
presented is that you're not going to get into a situation 10 where you avoid the core and have a reactivity excursion.
11 There's basically two ways you can void the core; one is drain' 12 the sodium out of it, and you've got the guard vessel around 13
(
the reactor vessel and presumably we're going to cut the drain 14 lines or eliminate the possibility of inadvertently draining 15 it through an operator action.
The other way is you could 16 boil the sodium somehow; get into an accident condition that 17 raises temperatures high enough.
18 What is being proposed is that these designs with 19 their passive shutdown and decay heat removal keep the sodium 20 temperature so far away from boiling that it's a very, very 21 low probability that you'd get into that kind of situation and 22 therefore you don't really need to worry about positive void 23 accidents because their probability is very, very low.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
So it's the pool type 25 technology that prevents the first order of loss of coolant
l 24 1
accident, I guess, and then the second order -- is the
(
2 containment really designed as a second barrier or something?
3 No, it's only designed to contain the sodium activity.
4 MR. KING:
Yes, the containment is not designed for 5
any energetic type accident, but it's the passive nature of 6
the decay heat removal and shutdown features of this plant 7
that make the probabilities of having very high sodium 8
temperatures very low.
That's the second part of the argument.
9
[ Slide.]
10 Design certification.
All three concepts are 11 proposing standard designs that would be submitted for design I
12 certification.
Now being that these designs are very different r
13 than LWR designs and being that they have less operating 14 experience associated with them than the LWR design, there are 15 certain issues that we feel are associated with the plans for 16 design certification, and I've listed these in the form of four 17 questions.
18 one, is the extent and level of design detail 19 proposed by DOE for certification consistent with the 20 Commission's desire to certify an essentially complete plant s
21 design?
What is being proposed is that the safety-related 22 features of these designs would be certified in terms of 23 essentially complete design information.
Other portions of 24 the plant which are not considered safety-related the design 25 information may be not final.
We're looking at the extent of
25 1
that right now.
2 What level of operating experience, existing 3
technology, supporting R&D is required to support 4
certification?
Again, it's a new plant question, and 5
ultimately that could lead to the question:
is a prototype 6
plant required before we would certify this design.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
It's an unanswerable 8
question, but the sense that I got at least when the Commission 9
was considering the advanced reactor policy statement and I 10 think probably former Chairman Palladino was well positioned to 11 make an informed judgment in this area -- the sense that one 12 got is that he, and I think the Commission, felt that it would 13 be truly extraordinary if you would find yourself able to issue 14 a design certification without having a prototype.
15 Do you share that point of view?
16 MR. KING:
Basically, my personal point of view is 17 that a prototype should be required to be built unless these 18 designers could show basically that they've got enough R&D or 19 separate effects type full-scale testing that they can claim 20 that they have verified their analysis tools for the full 21 range of operating in accident conditions, and that from the 22 information the uncertainties are low enough that we could 23 essentially say we know that design very well.
I think it's 24 going to be a tough position to demonstrate but I'm not 25 precluding at this point that it can be demonstrated.
I
26 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
It's not* impossible but it 2
would probably be cheaper to build a prototype and to sell the 3
electricity, is basically what you're saying.
4 COMMISSIONER CARR:
On Item 1; but on Item 2 it 5
depends on how complete Item 1 was.
MR. KING:
I think 1 and 2 are certainly related.
I 6
7 think the fact that you have the final design, though, doesn't 8
necessarily mean that you've got all the operating experience, 9
R&D that backs it up.
10 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Yes, but you would have a lot 11 better push than you would if you didn't have the final 12 design.
13 MR. KING:
True.
I think if you have the final 14 design at least you'll know what you're looking for in terms 15 of R&D and experience.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But I think it's an important 17 point and I don't necessarily speak out of any personal 18 prejudice or conviction, at least any prejudices I have I 19 probably have already stated.
But from my knowledge of how this agency works and the conservatisms that are built 20 21 into our process and your processes at the craff level, it 22 seems to me that one would not want to mislead DOE or the 23 potential vendors in any way into thinking that there is a 24 high probability of getting by without a prototype.
It's not i
25 impossible, but --
i
27 1
MR. STELLO:
Well, two of them are going to have 2
some kind o'f plan.
The only issue is the third one, and the 3
third one is the HTGR.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
No.
5 MR. STELLO:
The HTGR is the one that does not 6
propose at the moment to use -- is my memory correct?
7 MR. KING:
Yes, that's correct.
8 MR. STELLO:
And you already have at least some 9
experience with it.
You're right, it's a very difficult 10 question to answer before you've done the review, and I think 11 we may be pushing ourselves to try and suggest that we could 12 recommend either way until we're finished.
13 The two that would be clearly difficult to see 14 certifying before prototypical testing would be the liquid 15 metal designs, and they are proposed so it's not an issue.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
The HTGR is in a funny 17 categ6ry in a way, though, because you're really scaling down 18 large-scale experience, are you not?
They're back to the 19 prismatic core configuration now, graphite; and before they 20 decided to do that they were in the pebble bed type of 21 configuration, both of which have been demonstrated now on a 22 larger scale.
23 MR. STELLO:
Yes, I think we need to finish before 24 we can answer that.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yeah, okay.
.i
_,, _. _. _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _..___ -. -.._.. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _. _ _., _ _ _ _. - _ _,, _... _. _.....,.,. _, _. _. _,..... _ _ _. _ _ _ _,., _ _ _. -.. ~. _ _ _ _...,... _ _ _ - -, _ _..,. - _ _ -. _., _ _ - -
O 28 4
1 MR. STELLO:
Two are answered already for you, the f
2 thIird one is not.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Although the Rockwell is 4
looking at the proposed goals and key features in DOE advanced a
5 concepts.
I gather what Rockwell is arguing is that they'll 6
utilize the testing of the first commercial unit, which sounds 7
like they still want certification before they build their 8
prototype.
i 9
MR. KING:
No.
What they would do is build the 1
10 first commercial unit, test it and then ask for certification 11 of design.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
You know, one of g
the arguments the industry always makes on these advanced 13 14 design concepts is that they're so different from what we have 15 now.
And I would say in the HTGR area the reliability 16 performance of what we have now is so different than what the 17 industry would want.
Why wouldn't a prototype be essential 18 before anybody would buy one of these things anyway?
19 I would think that if I were a utility executive the 20 first thing I'd want is to say you build one, you demonstrate 21 that the thing can work reliably and safely, and then we'll 22 talk to you about buying one of these things.
But they're so 23 different than what we have now that we want a high degree of 24 assurance that these things will perform the way we anticipate 25 they will perform.
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29 1-MR. KIRG:
I think you're certainly right and I
'2 think DOE realizes that.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Then why aren't we just 4
saying there's going to be a prototype in every case?
5 MR. KING:
They're trying to differentiate between 6
building a prototype for marketing reasons and building a 7
prototype for licensing reasons, and right now they're 8
maintaining that distinction at least on the HTGR.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
In fairness, the bad 10 experience at the existing HTGR, as you know, is more balance 11 of plant than it is in the --
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, but the fundamental l
13 question is the circulators, and before anybody buys one of 14 those things I would think what they'll want is a high degree 15 of assurance that in fact the circulators will work well, and h
16 particularly if there's water involved that they won't be 17 soak'ing the core periodically.
l 18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Can't argue with that.
l 19 MR. STELLO:
But you don't need a prototype test to 20 do that either.
If that's the issue.
I think the market 21 forces may dictate one way or the other.
But I think you're 22 pushing us pretty hard to make a judgment we can't make.
23 We're not ready to make it.
l l
24 MR. KING:
And I think as part of this conceptual 1
25 review I agree, we want to try and if we can get some guidance i
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30 1
to DOE'in these areas, do it now and not wait for five or ten 2
. years.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's right.
i 4
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
You mentioned balance of 5
plant and safety systems before.
What kind of approach are 6
you taking to the safety-related, important to safety issues?
7 How much of this plant are we going to, again, make that kind 8
of a dividing line and how much of the plant are we going to 9
be focusing on, and how much are we not going to be focusing i
10 on.
And to what extent in your approach are we trying to 11 learn the lessons of the light water area where I think in 12 hindsight it's fair to say a lot of things that we didn't 13 think were all that important before and we didn't focus much 14 attention on, either the industry or the NRC, are turning out 15 to be very important.
In fact, they're the root cause of a i
16 fair amount of operating events today.
17 MR. KING:
I think at this stage of the review 18 that's a key question.
We need to look at basically the whole 19 plant to see if what's being proposed in terms of the 20 distinction between safety-related and not safety-related is i
21 correct.
22 MR. STELLO:
But I think in fairness a point to make 23 is they may have made the case that says it almost is 24 completely independent of what balance of plant you put here; 25 you don't need to worry about safety.
No matter how many 9
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31 1
times it's challenged, no matter what the frequencies are or 2
the nature of them, the plant is designed so you just don't 3
need to focus on that at all.
4 Whether we agree with that remains to be seen, but 5
at least one can start with the possibility that one can 6
design a plant that way.
And that very much is the way 7
they're coming at it.
We need to do more to decide.
It's an 8
open question.
9 MR. KING:
The last two items quickly deal with the.
10 modular nature of these designs.
Item 3, because these are 11 modular designs they're trying to allow enough flexibility in-12 the plant that's certified so the utility doesn't have to buy 13 the full set of modules; he can buy one, two, three, whatever 14 he wants.
In certifying that design, we're being requested to 15 allow flexibility to -- when the plant is certified to allow 16 the utility the flexibility to come in and buy the certified 17 design that he wants.
So we're looking at how would we 18 address that, in the review.
19 And the last item dealing with the manufacturing 20 license.
These designs are trying to use shop fabrication as 21 much as practical.
At this point in time, it looks like what 22 they will be shop fabricating are essentially the reactor 23 vessel, guard vessel type module and maybe some 24 balance-of-plant modulen, steam generator will be shipped 25 separately.
So these aren't things where you put the whole
32 1
plant on a barge and ship it to the site; on major components 2
there will be a lot of shop fabrication.
3 So the preliminary feeling of the staff is we don't 4
need to have a manufacturing license like, say, the off-shore 5
power people have.
But we raised the question anyway because 6
it did come up in looking at these designs.
7 MR. PARLER:
If you could put all the pieces together 8
so that you have something that you would call the expert 9
quality utilization facility, unless it's being done,under a 10 contract with and for the account of the Department of Energy, 11 you're going to have to have some sort of license.
12 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Yes, I'm just astounded --
13 MR. KING:
It may be a moot question at this point 14 but it's on here because in the initial interactions with DOE 15 the question came up by some of the staff members.
And that 16 depended on the extent of shop fabrication and what was 17 actually going to be shipped in a single unit.
But I think 18 after we found out more detail I don't think it's a very big 19 question anymore.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I was certainly under the 21 impression -- it might be incorrect and it might go back,'in 22 the case of the HTGR at least, to when they were still viewing 23 the pebble bed system, that that thing was going to be largely 24 shop fabricated and barge-shipped to the site.
And under 25 those circumstances -- I don't know what the plan is now
t 33 1
exactly but it would seem to me that the welding and all the 2
processes that go into fabricating and buttoning up the 3
nuclear steam supply system is something that you'd have to 4
license.
Isn't it?
5 MR. KING:
Yes, but I think we would do it under an 6
application for a specific site review versus a manufacturing 7
license where you haven't selected the site yet.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Sounds weird.
9 MR. PARLER:
We can discuss the details later on, 10 but if you put these things down so that you have a utilization 11 facility that's being done for commercial purposes you have to 12 have a license or else you violate the law.
This is no new 13 ground to be plowed; we have the experience with the 14 arrangement some years ago for the off-site plant, so we have 15 a pretty good understanding of that.
16 MR. STELLO:
I'm getting confused.
There's no 17 question that they will need a construction permit operating 18 license before they can go forward.
I 19 MR. PARLER:
Correct.
20 MR. STELLO:
The issue I think is in addition, do 21 you need manufacturing license under whatever the appendix is i
22 for it, as an issue to start with.
You clearly will be 23 manufacturing this for one to be operated in such a way that 24 it will be licensed through some process, as a CP and an OL 25 separate or as a standardized, certified plant, but it will be l
1
34 1
going through some licensing process.
2 There's an added question with respect to the 3
manufacturing license.
4 MR. PARLER:
It's the added question about the 5
manufacturing license to which I was addressing my comments.
6 If you put something together off of the site and what you put 7
together becomes a utilization facility which is shipped to 8
the site, you have to have some sort of license to put the 9
thing together.
10 There's a question of degree; how many components 11 can you make or how many can you put together before you have 12 the thing.
Now, that is a utilization facility.
That's-13 pretty basic stuff, for us old codgers.
j 14 (Laughter.]
15 MR. STELLO:
They will definitely be licensed; the 16 issue is will they need two.
Will they need a manufacturing 17 license in addition to a CP and an OL.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
It depends on how much 19 they put together offsite in the factory.
20 MR. STELLO:
Right.
But they will be licensed, no 21 question.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right, we've taken care of that 23 one I think.
24
[ Slide.]
25 MR. KING:
The last slide is just some other key i
35 1
issues that we're going to consider in the review.
The
. t 2
adequacy of the experimental data supporting performance of 3
the fuel.
The liquid metal reactors are using metal fuel --
4 that's not a -- I guess metal fuel was used on the Fermi-1 5
reactor but other than that we haven't looked at a liquid 6
metal plant using metal fuel in a long time.
7 Adequacy of inservice inspection provisions.
What 8
source terms are going to be used for siting and for design.
9 All three designs are proposing that control rooms be 10 considered non-safety grade; we feel that's an issue.
With 11 the multi-module designs they've got a computer type 12 multi-module control system; we need to look at that in terms 13 of its interactions with safety systems and the rest of the 14 plant.
15 And structural criteria for graphite.
We don't 16 really have any that the NRC has endorsed at this point; we 17 need to look at what needs to be done there.
18 That concludes the prepared slides.
19 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
I could call for 20 questions from my fellow commissioners but before I do that, l
21 I might say we have a number of people in the audience tha't 22 have come here today.
I didn't name all the names; I see 23 others in the audience that I know, too, I didn't call out.
24 But, Mr. Stello, do you propose to call any of your industry 25 people, or is there anybody that would like to contribute to i
1
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36 1
the discussion today?
2 MR. STELLO:
We didn't plan to call on any of them, 3
but if some questions come up that are beyond the scope it 4
might'be appropriate, as Commissioners have questions.
We i
5 really wanted to give you the briefing, and I think those in 6
the audience are also being appraised of where we are at the 7
same time.
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right, let me call for questions 9
from my fellow Commissioners and we'll see what transpires.
10 Commissioner Roberts?
11 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I'd like to ask Dr. Rossin, 12 do you have to fight the battle for this program every budget 13 cycle?
s 14 MR. ROSSIN:
Yes, sir.
15 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I was afraid that was the-16 answer.
That's all I have.
17 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Asselstine?
I 18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
A couple of questions.
On t
19 the PRA's, what kind of a data base do we have now for sodium-retaining components, how would you compare that to the 20 21 data base that we have for light water reactor components, and j
what kind of uncertainties do you think you're going to see in 22 23 trying to do these analyses of accident probability, that I 24 gather will play a pivotal role in deciding how much mitigation 25 if any to do on these designs?
37 1
MR. KING:
Certainly, the data bases for the liquid i
g 2
metal plants are not as extensive as for the light water i
i 3
plants.
There has been a program underway at Oak Ridge for 4
several years collecting reliability data on liquid metal 5
components that involves looking at plants like EBR-2, FFTF, 4
6 loop tests that have been done.
I'm not sure whether data 7
from foreign countries is included in that or not.
i l
8 But there is an effort underway by the industry to l
9 organize and collect that data supporting the liquid metal 10 component reliability.
What the uncertainties are associated 11 with that I'm not prepared to answer that right now.
i 12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Am I right, though, that 13 it's kind of a key question you're going to have to answer, i
14 particularly before you accept the design assumption that you f
15 can basically put all your eggs in the prevention basket?
16 MR. KING:
Yes, I think that is a key question.
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Second question.
Two of 18 these are liquid metal concepts, and I think both of the
- l 19 designers of those concepts said at the last meeting, -- if 20 they didn't both say it in the meeting, at least privately I 21 know that one of them confirmed -- that to be economically 22 feasible, both of those design concepts depend upon plutonium 23 recycle.
24 If that's the case, why isn't fuel cycle a fairly 25 fundamental issue high on your list to be addressed?
If the
38 1
country and we are not prepared to accept recycle, it seems to
/
2 me we ought to know that before we spend millions of dollars 3
pursuing designs that depend for their economic viability on 4
recycle.
5 Conversely, if we're prepared to accept that, why 6
not reopen the GESMO proceeding and decide?
7 MR. STELLO:
That was one of the questions I had in 8
mind that I think we ought to call on industry to answer.
9 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Fine.
Who do we have to volunteer?
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Please come to the microphone and i
11 identify yourself for the reporter, please.
1 12 MR. GAVIGAN:
My name Frank Gavigan from Department 13 of Energy.
We recognized the problem of licensing a metal 14 fuel recycle plant is an important part of this whole licensing 15 issue.
As you know also, the efforts in metal fuel are fairly 16 new in the sense of we're moving past feasibility and toward 17 engineering demonstration.
18 As a part of that process, we are building enough 19 information to introduce the metal fuel cycle as a licensing 20 issue.
It's in our planning and it's something that's 21 obviously necessary as part of an onsite, recycle plant.
22 That's the way our planning now stands.
l 23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
When would you anticipate i
24 that that issue be addressed?'
j 25 MR. GAVIGAN:
Present planning looks for it in about i
,..,__._,,____._..._____.___._-m
39 1
1 three years, for us to come with it.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Three years?
How much are 3
you going to spend on these two designs over three years?
4 MR. GAVIGAN:
Roughly $30 million, $25 million on 5
the reactor design itself.
1 6
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And you think it makes 7
sense to spend the $25 or $30 million before you know whether 8
you can use the design or not?
9 MR. GAVIGAN:
Yes, because we're doing it for other 10 reasons.
We're interested in the potential of metal fuel from 4
11 the viewpoint of safety and performance.
Licensing is an i
12 additional issue.
13 g
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
So what you're saying is 15 that whether or not this particular entire plant design were I
16 the ultimate outcome, the research knowledge to be derived in i
17 the meantime might be applicable to other systems, and that in 18 itself would be of use.
19 MR. GAVIGAN:
That's quite true.
Metal fuel is not l
20 specific for modular design; it's applicable to large 21 monolithic plants as well.
t 22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Although, I think what you 4
23 have in mind are plants that wouldn't be licensed.
Or are you I
24 thinking about licented commercial facilities?
I i
25 MR. GAVIGAN:
Not talking about licensed light water
. - -.,. -.... ~,., - -
40 1
reactor commercial facilities.
I'm not talking about licensed 2
light water reactor commercial facilities.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
But if recycle is 4
an issue for any design that has to be licensed by the NRC, it 5
seems to me you want to know the answer to whether or not 6
you're going to be able to pursue recycle fairly early on in 7
that process, certainly before you spend a lot of money, i
8 pursuing the option, regardless of which option it is; little 9
plant, big plant, whatever.
10 MR.-GAVIGAN:
That's true.
But the performance of 11 an onsite fuel cycle is not mandatory until near the end of 12 the fuel cycle itself and you begin to need recycle.
So it's 13 not as out of whack as it might appear.
i 14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
Except you don't t
l 15 want to pursue a concept that depends for its economic 16 viability on -- I mean, you may not need recycle until later 17 on, but if the concept is only viable if you have recycle, you 18 wouldn't pursue the concept to start with if you weren't going 19 to get recycle.
20 MR. GAVIGAN:
That's true.
I 21 MR. ROSSI"-
The economics of these systems obviously i
22 is going to depend en what you do with the fuel cycles, so the f
23 economics depends on recycle.
That doesn't say that these j
24 things aren't feasible without recycle; it just says that if I
25 you recycle, that's going to have an impact on the economics of 1
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41 1
the system and may have an impact on decisions by people who 2
are going to buy them.
That doesn't mean we shouldn't develop 3
them.
4 Now, the world is going ahead, whether we proceed 5
with GESMO or not.
We spend a lot of time in this country 6
arguing about an Environmental Impact Statement on recycle, 7
and meanwhile the rest of the world is going ahead and doing 8
its thing.
9 So I:think we have to use some judgment, some 10 programmatic judgment within DOE as to whether we spend money 11 on something or not.
But these concepts that we're proposing 12 and the safety of these concepts and what NRC has to do with 13 them, it seems to me, doesn't depend on a decision about 14 whether or not there will be recycle.
That's another issue.
15 We may have to argue programmatically as to how much we spend 16 on various things depending on what may happen in the future, 17 but that doesn't impact the safety of these designs.
And 18 that's the purpose of this review.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
I guess my response 20 would be first, I thought my question last time to the 21 designers was, were these designs economically feasible 22 without recycle and I thought the answer was no, they weren't.
23 And I guess the second point I would say is that on 24 the safety side, we have the safety of the design 25 responsibilities but we also have the other responsibility on
e 42 1
the recycle question.
2 MR. ROSSIN:
But not at this stage.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Jim, I understand the 4
concern and I have a question of my own I'd like to piggyback i
5 in a minute, but if you pursue the line of questioning too much, pretty soon you're back into the same old mode that the 6
7 NRC has always been in where somehow we were requir'ed to make 8
a high threshold judgment on whether somebody was really going 9
to build this plant, whether it was really a sensible plant.
10 And in my judgment Congress has told us, and I i
11 believe the Commission in its policy has decided, that we 12 aren't in that business anymore.
And provided we reach a low 13 threshold judgment that this is not a frivolous business that 14 we're about, then our job is to respond to whatever they bring l
15 forward, and surely it's not a frivolous enterprise that l
l 16 they're involved in.
17 MR. ROSSIN:
I'd like to question one word, 18 Commissioner, and that is economically viable.
We don't know 4
19 what's viable and what isn't ten years from now.
What we're j
20 really talking about in economics is whether something is 21 economically attractive relative to the other options you 22 have.
And we can't really definitively make that judgment 23 now, and as Commissioner Bernthal said, it's really not NRC's 24 prerogative at this point either.
25 We have to decide whether it's worthwhile to pursue
43 4
1 the research and development and at this point our decision is 2
yes, it's worthwhile to do so.
And it may be that these 3
concepts at some time in the future,-regardless of whether 4
you're going to recycle the stuff or not, may be economically 5
attractive.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I'll grant you that I 7
suspect that there are other groups like t'he Congress that are 8
much more responsible than we are for making those kinds of 9
decisions.
I guess I was more in terms of our own planning 10 responsibilities.
If the recycle issue has to be faced and if 11 it is a fairly significant one in terms of whether you do or 12 do not proceed with one or more of these concepts, my question 13 was if we have responsibilities to make those judgments 14 shouldn't we be doing that or at least highlighting that as 15 the significant issue that this agency has to face?
16 MR. ROSSIN:
Well, I think there's no harm in 17 highlighting it, but my understanding is that the commission 18 is going to conduct these safety reviews, and I think the 19 issue of recycle or no recycle is not a basis that the 20 commission has to say well, we refuse to do it.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINB:
Sure.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Having said that, though, 23 let's get at this thing from our end.
Granted, you have no 24 submittal yet, we have no submittal yet from DOE, but it seems 25 to me that there is some reason to encourage DOE to make that
44 4
1-submittal as early as is possible and reasonable from their 1
2 standpoint because NMSS will have to be involved in this at 3
some point.
And I gather up to now they're not involved at j
4 all.
1 5
The question I have for the NRC Staff is even given 6
what we know today, should NMSS be making some threshold
[
7 judgment on the safeguards aspects of this technology?
We do, i
8 after all, have a broad conceptual design.
I suppose if DOE 1
9 doesn't want to hear from us on that issue at this time, then 10 we're not obliged to respond and we can probably save the f
11 money by not responding.
But where are we?
There's no felt i
12 j
need for NMSS to look at this at all yet?
Is that the answer?
13 MR. KING:
We have had NMSS look at the safeguards i
j 14 and security standpoint on the reactor exclusive of the 15 reprocessing, fuel fabrication facility.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But not the reprocessing
)
l 17 part.
j 18 MR. STELLO:
We haven't done anything on the i
.i 19 reprocessing.
I don't know that we need to.
GESMO was fairly 20 far down the pike when it was stopped, and we were just at the i
21 stages of going to the hearing, essentially had completed our j
review and made our findings, and it was certainly feasible.
22 i
23 There isn't a question of feasibility here.
l 24 I think where we need to commit our resources is J
25 when it's an actual application.
I don't see that there's a 4
. ~.,,,
--n-e-n-w,--.----,n,n,,
,,,_.,m,
__,,,,_,nn,.__,-w._n.-_n_,-,n,mn~,
45 1
question about the feasibility of reprocessing.
We've done 2
that with GESMO; we were there.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Even with this technology 4
that's now being proposed.
It is a novel reprocessing --
5 MR. STELLO:
Well, from the safeguards point of view 6
you're talking about the same issue.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Except that feasibility 8
never was the central issue on GESMO.
Sure it's feasible to 9
do it --
10 MR. STELLO:
I was answering the safeguards 11 question.
The question was from a safeguards point of view do 12 we need to get into it.
I don't see any difference from a 13 safeguards point of view here as what we had in GESMO.
14 With respect to the technology of reprocessing for 15 the purpose of making this fuel, I don't know that we know 16 enough about it to know whether we need to.
I said I think 17 that's an issue that might have to wait until DOE is prepared '
18 to tell us that there's a technology issue here.
I'm not 19 aware of any.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Let me make clear what, at l
21 least in my view,'we owe DOE in this business.
Whether its t
22 reprocessing or whether it's the reactor design, containment 23 or lack there of, whatever it is, it seems to me if we, NMSS 24 in the case of the reprocessing elements, see a problem what 25 we owe DOE is a very, very early warning signal on that, and i
L
46 1
that's really the point I'm trying to make.
2 MR. STELLO:
All right.
I think I see the point 3
you're getting at.
Let us engage in a conversation and 4
explore the issue to determine whether there's some fundamental 5
technology issues here that we ought to try to make some, if 6
you will, feasibility assessment about, and we'll discuss that with DOE and well let you know if we jointly, we and DOE, need 7
8 to get into it.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, or any issues of 10 rules, procedures, whatever it might be, whether or not it's
)(
11 technology.
12 MR. STELLO:
With respect to reprocessing.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
For us.
s 14 MR. STELLO:
Yes.
We'll do that.
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Asselstine, do you have 16 any other questions?
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
No.
18 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Bernthal?
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Let's see, I had one or two 20 things I wanted to ask about.
Start with a simple one.
What 21 is graphite structural criteria, that very last thing that you 22 mentioned on the last slide.
What does that mean?
23 MR. KING:
In the HTGR, the core support structure 24 is basically made out of graphite.
It has to withstand 25 seismic events, thermal stresses, both transient and steady
47 1
state.
There is no ASME code like we have for steel components 2
that can be used on those structures.
We need to identify what 3
is going to be used, and if there needs to be some R&D 4
something to make that acceptable our idea was to try and 5
identify what that is.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Why should it be anymore 7
difficult or complicated than the criteria that apply, for 8
example, at Fort St. Vrain in that respect, structural 9
criteria?
10 MR. KING:
I'm not sure it's going to be much 11 different.
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Would you come up to the microphone 13 and identify yourself, please?
14 MR. NORTHRUP:
I'm Gene Northrup of GA Technologies.
15 There is a trial use ASME code on graphite structures that is 16 in the review process, and as it flows through the system of 17 ASME it will become a code for use.
It is bhsed upon the 18 design of Fort St. Vrain as well as the graphite structures in 19 the THTR and the graphite structure materials that have been 20 used in Great Britain.
So there is a large data base.
21 What is being referred to here in the bullet on the 22 slide is pulling all that data together into a reference base t
23 that we will use specifically for the MHTGR design.
Here we i
24 are looking at heavier loads, seismic loads that have been 25 looked at in past designs is the main one.
Radiation is the
48 1
same.
Thermal is the same, but we do have the slightly higher 2
seismic loads.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
You want to qualify a plant 4
for a variety of seismic conditions as opposed to a single --
5 MR. NORTHRUP:
As opposed to a single site, and 6
therefore it requires simply a documentation about that.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTEAL:
Okay, thank you.
8 For NRC Staff, I guess for you, Vic, I'm curious to 9
know how the responsibilities for the reviews that we have to 10 do here are now going to be divided between NRR and Research 11 in view of the restructuring that we've done in cur 12 organization.
Does Research do it all or is it all in one 13 branch of Research now, or what happens?
(
14 MR. SHERON:
I'll answer that.
Right now, the plan 15 is for the advanced DOE concepts to be reviewed in the Office 16 of Research in I guess it's --
17 MR. STELLO:
Let me answer'the question simply.
18 Certification, NRR.
Advanced reactors, Research.
When it 19 comes to certification, which is a licensing process, that's 20 NRR.
The research side of it up to feasibility and the rest 21 of it is in Research, and Brian will be responsible for th'at 22
-- I'm sorry, Bill Morris will be responsible for that in 23 Research.
All of those which will go through the licensing 24 process, certification, will be done in the NRR side.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
So the breakdown then that
c o
49 O
l 1
we have on slide 8 -- you don't have them numbered, I do -- I l
2 assume they reflect a new organization.
I don't think they 3
must, as a matter of fact, as I look at it --
4 MR. STELLO:
They do not.
Those are based on the 5
organization prior to moving into the new concept in April.
6 Those are prior year numbers with the old structure.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's really all that I 8
have in the way of specific questions, but I really would like 9
to highlight this issue that we already discussed a little 10 bit, the issue of containment performance ere, and the 11 Commission's safety goal which is wrapped up in the question 12 fo= containment performance.
Because as we have discussed in 13 safety goal meetings and touched on here again today, at some 14 point it seems to me the Commission has to provide numbers and 15 quantitative guidance so the staff knows where we emerge from 16 that defense-in-depth requirement to the brave new world of no 17 containment requirement.
18 If indeed you can meet the kind of safety goal 19 criteria that were put up on the slide earlier, 10 to the
'20 minus 6th, 10 to the minus 7th probability of an event that 21 triggers the EPA Protective Action Guidelines, that sounds 22 very good but the Commission hasn't ruled that that's 23 adequate.
It may very well be adequate, but that's something 24 thet is a policy matter I think is still hanging out there.
25 And I would hope that we address that issue at some point.
s 1
5 50 i
1 MR. STELLO:
We're not prepared to make a 2
recommendation yet.
We need to have reviewed this design 3
enough to know --
.t 4
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Recommendation on what?
I'm 5
not talking about design; I'm talking about fundamental policy 6
here.
7 MR. STELLO:
I'm talking fundamental policy; a 8
recommendation, which way to go.
Are these designs inherently 9
safe enough so that you could conclude you don't need to add 10 additional features --
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's not fundamental 12 policy; that's design specific.
That's a design-specific 13 question.
14 MR. STELLO:
The question was asked earlier, if you 15 did add containment to these designs, would you in fact make 16 them more safe or less safe.
Those are the kinds of questions 17 we need to wrestle with before I think we're ready to deal 18 with the policy issue.
19 It isn't clear to me that if you said I want a 20 conventional large dry containment design on these facilities, 21 whether the net result is you have made it more safe or less 22 safe.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Separate issue, Vic.
It 24 seems to me that the issue the Commission needs to decide --
25 otherwise, DOE, whatever the passive cooling, any other
s 51 o
1 mechanism might be, whether containment hurts or not, it all-2 becomes irrelevant if the Commission is unwilling to say where 3
that threshold is, and we've go to do that at some point.
4 MR. STELLO:
We're operating under the assumption 5
that that is an open question that the Commission would, in 6
fact, agree with the design without question if it was 7
supportable.
We are operating, in doing the review, with that 8
assumption.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's the point.
10 MR. STELLO:
That's the way we're doing the review.
4 11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's not in our safety 12 goal criteria right now.
In our policy right now.
13 MR. STELLO:
Well, if there's a question as to 14 whether we should be making that assumption, then we definitely 15
-need guidance from the Commission.
I didn't believe we did,'
16 and that's why I didn't ask, because we have been operating 17 with the assumption that that was an open question and the I
18 Commission agreed it should be an open question.
j 19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
In fairness, the guidelines 20 that they show look very good but they are DOE's safety goal.
21 They look very good to me, but they aren't our safety goal 22 yet, and that's thL point I'm making.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Would you identify yourself, please?
24 MR. MILLUNZI:
My name is Andy Millunzi, I'm from 25 DOE with the HTGR program.
There have been two misconceptions
52 1
I think here during this discussion.
First of all, the HTGR 2
does have containment.
It's a containment syctem.
I think 3
when you enter into your deliberations relative to the 4
containment question, you havn to talk about the function that 5
you need to perform.
6 In the HTGR, we have defense-in-depth which has a 7
containment system which adequately retains the radionuclides 8
so good that you will not have to evacuate anyone mor's than 9
425 meters away from that plant.
This design and the concept 10 of this containment system is such that it does not require a 11 secondary containment building that you are so familiar with 12 because of the characteristics of many other reactors.
13 So I want to make it very clear; we do have a 14 containment system.
There's a containment system with 15 defense-in-depth, but it's so good with all the features that 16 it does not require that secondary containment building that 17 you're familiar with.
We are very confident that we will make 18 sure that we've laid that out very thoroughly, we're confident 19 that when everyone reviews it they'll agree with that 20 assessment.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Is the containment system 22 that you're talking about basically the fuel and the reactor 23 vessel?
1 24 MR. MILLUNZI:
It is essentially the fuel particle, 25 of course, and the manufacturing specifications, and then the i
6 53 1
capability of the graphite coupled with the passive decay heat i
2 removal.
We just don't get any temperatures that you have to 3
run into the problems that you need to do to perform the 4
containment function.
5 So I request each of you to think of the function 6
that must be performed when you're trying to reach a decision; 7
does a design need a containment building.
8 Second item.
On the need for a prototype.
There is 9
no doubt that there is a need for a prototype for economic 10 purposes.
Nobody is going to buy a pig in a poke.
This is 11 the first plant.
We have very stringent requirements which 12 have been laid on us by the potential users.
We need to run a 13 prototype to demonstrate that we can meet 85 percent 14 availability, for example, that for events down to one times 15 10 to the minus 5 we will not lose the investment and we won't 16 be down for more than six months.
That obviously needs a 17 demonstration before someone will buy it.
18 But we're talking today relative to the safety.
19 From a safety standpoint, the design, our approach and the 20 technology that we need to support our safety question, our 21 strong position right now is we will not need to run a 22 prototype to demonstrate that we know how we can meet the 23 safety requirements.
And we intend to be able to demonstrate 24 that.
We are confident that with our technology plan and the 25 rest of our program we will be able to show that we can
6 54 1
satisfy the concerns relative to protecting anybody at the 2
site boundary without the need to run a prototype.
3 So we do need a prototype, but again, we carefully 4
are separating the issues; one is economics, the other is 5
safety and licensing.
6 And in closing, all three of these designs are going 7
to pose a very difficult challenge for everyone.
They're new, 8
they're truly a second generation plant and we're coming at 9
them in a different way.
The characteristics of these plants 10 aren't like you're used to, so you're going to have to go back 11 to try to remember what are the functions we have to perform 12 and judge the plants against those functions.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I agree with that last 14 point, incidentally, and I understand that you do have a kind 15 of defense-in-depth in mind where one of the elements of the 16 multiple barrier is an unusual barrier associated with the 17 fuel fabrication.
I 18 What I would suggest is that some of the cartoonists l
19 that do their work for newspapers and some writers perhaps as 20 well may not see things that way.
Nor, more importantly 21 perhaps, are our own regulations and perhaps our policy as 22 well here right now structured to deal with that sort of 23 defense-in-depth.
It's not the traditional view of 24 defense-in-depth, and if there's any action item to come out 25 of this meeting I would urge that the staff look hard at these
s 55 1
issues of containment, safety goal, defense-in-depth and what
/
2 it's going to mean and come back to.the Commission with some 3
recommendations on those points so that we can establish a 4
firm policy in this area so none of you get surprised three or 5
four years down the road.
6 I'm not sure we've really made all those definitions 7
clear to ourselves, but I agree.with your comments.
Thank 8
you.
9 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Carr?
10 COMMISSIONER CARR:
I've got a little bit of a 11 problem in the purpose as opposed to the major issues to be 12 considered.
The purpose is you're going to provide guidance 13 early in the design process and then assess the potential of 14 the concepts to meet the requirements.
I assume out of that 15 will come something like highly likely to meet the requirements i
16 or likely or unlikely.
I don't know what kind of degree of 17 assurance you're going to give me.
18 It looks to me like what you're doing here is going 19 to have to be done all over again once you get the design.
20 This is going to be a preliminary look and when we're through 21 with it I'm not sure we can put -- I don't know how much f'aith 22 I'm going to be able to put into it without the final review.
23 MR. STELLO:
I think conceptually, if this comes out 24 okay, you agree that there's nothing fundamentally so 25 difficult, so onerous that it stands in the way of licensing.
{
56 1
Although clearly, the review and the actual judgment to issue f.
2 the license is clearly not made until sometime later.
You've 3
got to do it twice; that's correct.
4 COMMISSIONER CARR:
And I'm not sure how certain 5
you're going to be with the data you're going to have in hand 4
6 that you're going to come back with that.
You think you've 7
got enough data already in hand is what you're telling me, 8
that you're going'to be able to make this review.
9 MR. SHERON:
No, I think what we'll be able to tell 10 DOE is that if the design requirements and design commitments 11 which they are making and claiming will come true in their 12 final design actually are realized, then we will not have any 13 problem.
Let me take as an example their frequency, I guess, 14 of a severe accident as 10 to the minus 6th.
They will base that on a PRA.
We will not have a lot of design information 15 16 to really --
17 COMMISSIONER CARR:
It's not going to be a very good 18 PRA.
19 MR. SHERON:
That's right.
What we will be able to 20 tell them is that if they supply us the information that is 21 needed to substantiate the PRA when it is submitted, and if we 22 review it and indeed agree with them that their PRA supports 23 that conclusion, then we would not have any problem with it.
24 We can't give them an a priori --
25 COMMISSIONER CARR:
I think you said just what I
57 1
said.
2 MR. SHERON:
There's a risk involved on the part of 3
DOE going forward with this without having a complete design 4
in our hands.
We can only tell them that if their design 5
commitments come true, --
6 COMMISSIONER CARR:
You're going to tell them that 7
if it's as safe as you say it is, then we can buy it.
8
'ER. SHERON:
That's a good way to put it.
9 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Well, why don't you tell them 10 that now.
11
[ Laughter.)
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I think what they're saying, 13 though, is that we hope that DOE comes in, or that anybody 14 else comes in, with a design that is now so simple to analyze 15 from a fundamental physics standpoint that you can reach an 16 informed judgment at a very early stage.
Let me give an 17 example; we were discussing the case of the Lacrosse reactor 18 earlier this morning.
I think, if I'm not wrong, that that is 19 the only reactor in this country that was designed such that 20 there is not enough energy in the core to pop the containment, 21 and therefore, it is -- I believe that's true --
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Still operating.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
It's still operating.
The 24 AEC built the containment back in the old days.
You can reach 25 a pretty informed judgment on a design like that because then I
58 1
you don't have to go through all the games that we go through 2
right.now with --
3 COMMISSIONER CARR:
But you don't reach that judgment 4
until the design is final.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But the fundamentals of the 6
design are pretty simple in that case, and if someone comes in 7
with nothing more than this is the size of the core, this is 8
the heat content of the core, and that's what the containment 9
is going to withstand, that's a back of the envelope 10 calculation.
11 I think the message here is they hope that's what 12 they're going to get, and if they do then that would be 13 meaningful at an early stage, I would guess.
I don't know 14 whether we'd get anything lik& that.
15 COMMISSIONER CARR:
I guess I'm worried about the 16 deliverables from us to them.
It says we're going to provide 17 an SER and a licensing letter, but the data we're going to 18 have to do that on looks like it's got a lot of uncertainty in 19 it to me, and I'm not sure how valuable it's going to be when 20 we're through.
Having said that, I quit.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTMAL:
Well, it could well be.
22 Maybe they should comment.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Dr. Rossin?
24 MR. ROSSIN:
Commissioner, what we're really looking 25 for at this point is the flip side of what you just indicated.
s 59 1
What we're asking for in the Safety Evaluation Report is for
/
2 you to evaluate the material on the basis of what we know now, 1
3 and in effect tell us whether there is any reason why we 4
shouldn't proceed.
These commitments, criteria, whatever you 5
want to call them that we set forth at this time and say we're 6
going to meet, I think the contractors realize that if they 7
come up against something in their detailed design and can't do 8
what they promised, they've lost the ballgame.
4 9
We're trying to find out whether the approach, if 10 we're successful in detailing it, will be acceptable.
What 11 we're counting on is something -- and I'll go right to the 12 heart of it because that's what is foremost in my mind -- and 13 that is, if the concept of the containment function as part of 14 the defense-in-depth argument, as we were just talking about a 15 few minutes ago, i'f the conclusion at the end of the safety 16 evaluation review is that yes, the function can be 17 accomplished, and if you do all the things you say you're i
18 going to do, the plant will be acceptable without a building 1
19 that is called a containment building, then we would have l
20 confidence that when the details are presented if we meet all 21 the other criteria the commission would not say yeah, you've 22 met all the criteria but we want you to put a building around 23 it.
24 That's what we're trying to determine at this time.
I 25 It's really making sure that we're not surprised in concept.
l
60 1
COMMISSIONER CARR:
You're looking for the obvious; 1
2 for us to tell you if there's something obvious.
3 MR. ROSSIN:
In this business I think we have to do
-4 that.
Yes, sir.
5 May I make one other point.
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Go right ahead.
7 MR. ROSSIN:
I just want to bake sure we don't get 8
off the track on the issue that was raised early in the discussion concerning recycle.
The Commission granted a 9
10 license for the Clinch River Breeder reactor a_few years ago, 11 and I guess I'm a little bit surprised that the question of 12 whether recycle is an issue or is not and liquid metal reactor 13 or metal fuel and its future as a recycle fuel would really be j
14 a critical part of the discussion at this point.
The generic 15 issue I assume would not interfere with this review, and I i
16 based that partly on the Commission's decisions on Clinch l
17 River which sent a message to me, anyway.
18 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Anything else?
19 Well, let me just say it seems to me very clear that 20 there's a need for a continuing dialogue between the DOE and 21 NRC on these matters.
It's also kind of clear in some ways to 22 me at least that we have to kind cf go back to basics and make 23 sure we understand the fundamentals of the game.
Most of us 24 have in mind a fair definition when we talk defense-in-depth 25 and here we're talking a little bit different definition of
\\
61 1
defense-in-depth, as I understand it.
/
2 When we talk containment we have various visual 3
concepts of containments, and here we're talking today of 4
different concepts of containment.
I think it's pretty 5
important when we talk about emergency planning and whether or 6
not we use prototypes and things like that -- those are things 7
that I think are very import' ant to discuss, and especially 8
important that we're communicating properly because certainly 9
I think DOE's pursuit of these advanced concepts is certainly 10 valuable, at least potentially valuable for the future of our 1
11 country.
And we in NRC want to carry out our responsibilities 12 working together so that there won't be any surprises, and if 4
13 there are surprises that we identify them as soon as we can.
14 On the other hand, i think that DOE chould continue l
15 their efforts to keep us informed as to what they're doing and l
16 to make sure that if they feel there might be problems here, 17 there's enough professional, knowledgeable people in DOE to 18 know the NRC responsibilities that we're informed, too.
So 19 that we kind of march into the future together.
l 20 I think it's very important to do that especially 21 because we really are talking in some areas about some visual 22 concepts of these terms that we have a little bit different 23 perhaps in mind from time to time.
24 But the future in advanced reactors is something 25 that I think is so important that I think we have to work l
l
~
-. -.-- - - -- --- - - -~ - --- -
t 62 1
together very diligently to pursue this area.
So to all of 2
our DOE people here today and to our industry people, I 3
particularly thank you for your valuable part of the 4
contributions to our discussion.
We certainly look forward, 5
the commission and the staff, to working with you even closer 6
in the future, and I think that if there is any improvement we 7
can make perhaps it's in communication so that at least for 8
some of us who are not completely familiar with the terms that 9
might be used in the advanced world, I think it's very 10 important that we do make sure that we are talking the same 11 language because I know that our goal is certainly similar, 12 and that is to go ahead the best we can with the safety of 13 advanced reactors and provide that kind of a future for our i
14 country.
15 Are there any other comments before we close today?
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
No other comment except the 17
-- we don't need to decide here and now, but the issue that I 18 mentioned earlier bears some thought I think.
We need to know 19 where we're going on this issue of the goals that we would 20 require, as you say, what containment really means, et cetera.
21 And I don't know whether staff plans to pursue that and come 22 back with a paper outlining the issues or where we're going.
23 But I don't think we ought to just let it lie unless we're 24 prepared to say, in effect, tacitly now that those guidelines 25 the staff has been assuming are okay, are in fact acceptable to
s 63 1
the Commission.
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Well, let's not let it lie.
I think 3
that perhaps it does take a little more thought rather than 4
try to lay something on the staff at the moment.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I agree.
6 MR. STELLO:
Well, we've been discussing whether we 7
ought to try to break those out as separate papers and try to 8
handle them that way, or whether we really need to wait until 9
we've done enough of the review so that we have the benefit of 10 the true understanding to try to make those reasoned judgments 11 when we have enough of the review under our belt to do it.
12 If you do them in isolation or in theory, it becomes 13 very, very difficult.
These are specific detailed concepts 14 that we're trying to answer those questions in terms of these 15 concepts, not in general.
I'm at least concerned that if we 16 attempt to do it before we're done with our review enough, we 17 might not do a good job.
18 on the other hand, maybe we need to go back and find 19-out from DOE can DOE wait until we project to be finished and 20 answer those questions then; is that good enough.
I think I'm 21 inclined to want to go that way.
If it isn't and there's some 22 reason we need to answer them earlier, then I think what I'd 23 suggest is we'll pick up and try to prepare two or three 24 position papers for the Commission to deal with, although I 25 must admit they're going to be very, very difficult to writ'e.
s 64 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Vic, I don't want to prolong 2
this, but we're back to the same issue that we discussed 3
. earlier.
I do not believe that one even wants to give the 4
appearance that somehow the underlying question of what is 5
acceptable to us as a safety goal in a plant that does not 6
have traditional containment, that that judgment somehow 7
depends on a specific design analysis.
I don't think it does.
8 Frankly, I'm prepared to say here and now today that 9
if, in fact, you meet with the uncertainties within reasonable 10 bounds, that 10 to the minus 6th, 10 to the minus 7th 11 criterion, that's acceptable to me, if I understand what 1
12 they're saying.
13 MR. STELLO:
And it meets our safety goal.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Oh, it meets it and then 15 some by some large margin.
16 MR. STELLO:
Right.
17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But it doesn't have a 18 containment in the traditional sense.
19 MR. STELLO:
Our safety goal does not require a 20 containment.
Our regulations do.
Our regulations cannot be 21 used to evaluate these designs.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But there are mutterings in 23 our safety goal about defense-in-depth and the words 24 containment are certainly there.
25 MR. STELLO:
But no requirement.
You can~ meet all i
l l
- -, - ~ - - - - - -
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s 65 1
of those requirements without containment in the present 2
safety goal.
And this is why I say to decide because you're 3
right.
If you meet those numbers you clearly meet the safety 4
goal, but you don't meet our regulations.
And is that still 5
okay.
The regulations that exist today, if you applied them, 6
these designs would meet them.
They go in fact beyond what 7
our regulations do in terms of approaching safety.
8 Part of the problem will be just like what we had to 9
do with CRBR, in fact eventually evolve a set of regulations 10 that are appropriate for these kinds of designs.
That's 11 something that will have to come out of this, which we will 12 then obviously apply later.
13 We're here to serve the Commission.
If you want us 1
14 to try to do that, I will.
I already thought about the issue 15 and it isn't clear to me it's useful to do it before we --
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Let us think about it a little bit 17 more and if we want to give you some guidance we will.
18 The meeting is adjourned.
19
[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the Commission meeting was 20 adjourned.]
21 22 23 24 25 l
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2 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 3
4 This is to certify that the attached eventslof a 5
meeting of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled:
6 7
TIT 12 OF MEETING:
Briefing on Advanced Reactor Designs (Public Meeting) 8 PLACE OF MEETING:
Washington, D.C.
9 DATE OF MEETING:
Thursday, February 12, 1987 10 11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for the file of the Commission taken
('
12 stenographically by me, thereafter reduced to typewriting by 14 me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and 4
15 that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the 16 foregoing events.
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19 20 21 22 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
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i R E V I S E D - 2/11/87
- i i
t STAFF-PRESENTATION TO NRC COMMISSIONERS J
ON ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE REVIEW 0F DOE ADVANCED REACTOR CONCEPTS i
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i 2/12/87 T, SPEIS, DIRECTOR, DSR0 l-T. KING, SECTION LEADEP, DSR0 i
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4 SCOPE OF PRESENTATION SUMMARIZE STAFF ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE REVIEW OF THREE DOE SPONSOPED ADVANCED REACTOR CONCEPTS.
THESE ACTIVITIES WERE DESCRIBED IN SECY-86-368, PRESENTATION COVERS:
PURPOSE / SCOPE / SCHEDULE OF REVIEWS, REVIEW APPROACH.
DISCUSSION OF SOME MAJ0P ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE ADVANCED DESIGNS, l
6
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NRC ADVANCED REACTOR REVIEWS CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS LWRS APWR (RESAR-SP/90)
ABWR EPRI - ALWR REQUIREMENTS DOCU."ENT NON-LWRS THREE DOE SPONSORED ADVANCED CONCEPTS:
350 MwT MODULAR HIGH TEMPERATURE GAS-COOLED REACTOR (MHTGR) i 425 MwT POWER REACTOR INHERENTLY SAFE MODULE (PRISM) -
LIQUID METAL REACTOR 900 MwT SODIUM ADVANCED FAST REACTOR (SAFR) - LIQUID METAL REACTOR IT IS THE REVIEW 0F THESE DOE SPONSORED NON-LWRS THAT IS THE SUBJECT OF TODAY'S PRESENTATION.
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4 PURPOSE OF STAFF REVIEW OF DOE SPONSORED ADVANCED CONCEPTS PROVIDE GUIDANCE EARLY IN THE DESIGN PROCESS ON THE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH CONCEPT, ASSESS THE POTENTIAL OF THE CONCEPTS TO MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS.
PROVIDE A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE DOE PROPOSED R & D PROGRAMS SUPPORTING EACH CONCEPT, PROVIDE INSIGHTS AS TO WHERE NRC SPONSORED RESEARCH SHOULD EE UNDERTAKEN TO SUPPORT NRC REVIEW OF FUTURE LICENSING APPLICATIONS OF ADVANCED HTGRS AND LMRS.
IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE RESULTS OF THE STAFF REVIEW MAY BE U TILIZED BY DOE AS A FACTOR IN DETERMINING WHICH OF THESE CONCEPTS TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING,
3 t-i-
SCOPE OF STAFF REVIEW FOR-EACH OF THE THREE CONCEPTS THE STAFF IS REVIEWING DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY DOE:
l PRELIMINARY SAFETY INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PSID)
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PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT (PRA) e R 8 D' PROGRAM DESCRIPTION I
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REVIEW APPROACH FAMILIARIZE STAFF WITH THE DESIGN CONCEPTS.
IDENTIFY KEY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THESE CONCEPTS, PERFORM SOME INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS TO ASSESS KEY SAFETY ATTRIBUTES OF THE CONCEPTS, BASED UPON ANALYSIS PRESENTED BY DOE, RESULTS OF NRC'S INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF DOE'S PROPOSED R a D PROGRAMS:
DEVELOP GUIDANCE ON LICENSING CRITERIA WHICH SHOULD APPLY BY BUILDING UPON EXISTING LWR CRITERIA WHERE PRACTICAL AND DEVELOPING ADDITIONAL CRITERIA TO ADDRESS THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DESIGN, ASSESS THE POTENTIAL OF THE DESIGNS TO MEET THE
- CRITERIA, RAISE ISSUES WITH POLICY IMPLICATIONS TO COMMISSION'S ATTENTION, DOCUMENT REVIEW OF EACH ADVANCED CONCEPT VIA A SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT (SER):
SERS APE TO BE REVIEWED BY ACRS, CRGR AND COMMISSION PRIOR TO ISSUING.
NO PROVISION IS IN THE SCHEDULE FOR PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE SERS.
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SCHEDULE FOR NRC REVIEW OF DOE ADVANCED
^
REACTOR CONCEPTS FY 86 FY 87 FY 88 1
JAS ONDJFMAMJJAS O N D J F iM I A :M J J A S l
1.
HTGR:
BEGIN STAFF REVIEW U
-PSID Review
-PRA Review U
U
-R&D Program Review
_U D
12/86-DRAFT SER TO ACIT5 U
U IEEUE BEC-77g8
-issue SER/LIC LTR 16/87 2.
S AFR:
BEGIN STAFF REVIEW
-PSID Review U
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-PRA Review V
U U
-R&D Program Review
glSSUE SER - 4/88
-issue SER/LIC LTR T/88 3.
PRISM:
~BEGIN STAFF REVIEW
-PSID Review U
U
~ -PRA Review U
V
-R&D Program Review U
U 5SOE SEii-4/88
-issue SER/LIC LTR l
1/88 h
+
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I ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO DATE APPROXIMATELY 35 MEETINGS WITH DOE AND ITS CONTRACTORS OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, SEVEN MEETINGS WITH ACRS (BOTH SUBCOMMITTEE AND FULL COMMITTEE) OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, DRAFT NUREG PREPARED ON DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION-OF ADVANCED REACTOR POLICY STATEMENT (NUREG-1226) h
STAFF RESOURCES APPLIED TO THE REVIEW FY 1987 FY 198,8 8
FTE la FTE IA NRR 8,0 1100 K 5.7 700 K l
RES 2.0 400 K 2.0 500]<_
TOTAL 10.0 1500 K 7,7 1200 K 4
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e MAJOR ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN REVIEW THREE MAJOR ISSUES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED WHICH DESERVE COMMISSION ATTENTION DUE TO THEIR. POTENTIAL POLICY IMP.LICATIONS.
THESE ISSUES ARE:
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TREATMENT OF SEVERE ACCIDENTS i
DESIGN APPROACH TO CONTAINMENT APPROACH TO DESIGN CERTIFICATION
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THE STAFF INTENDS TO RECOMMEND A SPECIFIC RESOLUTION TO.THE I
COMMISSION FOR ITS CONSIDERATION ON EACH OF THESE ISSUES.
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A TREATMENT OF SEVERE ACCIDENTS DOE'S PROPOSED TREATMENT OF SEVERE ACCIDENTS:
L PLANTS ARE TO BE DESIGNED TO PREVENT OFFSITE RFLEASES GREATER THAN THE EPA - PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDELINES FOR ACCIDENT SEQUENCES WITH A FREQUENCY OF> 10-6 _
10-7/YR.
INHERENT (PASSIVE) REACTOR SHUTDOWN AND DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS ARE TO BE USED TO ACCOMPLISH PLANT SAFETY FUNCTIONS WITH HIGH RELIABILITY.
AS A RESULT, THE PLANT DESIGNS SHOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOM-MODATE ATWS AND STATION BLACK 0UT EVENTS WITH SIGNIFI-J CANT MARGIN TO CORE DAMAGE.
BASED ON THE AB0VE THE REACTOR DESIGNERS ARE PROPOS-ING NO OFFSITE EVACUATION PLANS BE REQUIRED.
IN REVIEWING THIS PROPOSED APPROACH THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE TO BE CONSIDERED:
RELIABILITY AND PERFORMANCE OF PASSIVE REACTOR SHUT-DOWN SYSTEM i
RELIABILITY AND PERFORMANCE OF PASSIVE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM l
I
6 RISK ASSOCIATED WITH ACCIDENTS BEYOND THOSE CONSIDERED IN THE DESIGN, INCLUDING:
OTHER POTENTIAL SEVERE ACCIDENT INITIATORS MARGIN TO CORE DAMAGE
^
POTENTIAL FOR RECRITICALITY NEED FOR ADDITIONAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION OR MITIGATION FEATURES SOURCE TERMS UNCERTAINTIES IN ANALYSIS AND SUPPORTING TECHNO-LOGY NEED FOR EMERGENCY EVACUATION. PLANS i
.., - ~ _ - _.
o DESIGN APPROACH TO CONTAINMENT-DOE'S PROPOSED DESIGN APPROACH TO CONTAINMENT:
- MHTGR -
NO CONTAINMENT BUILDING, U TILIZE FISSION PRODUCT RETENTION CAPABI-LITY OF FUEL ACTING IN CONJUNCTION WITH PASSIVE SHUTDOWN AND DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS TO PREVENT LARGE OFF-SITE RELEASE,
- PRISM -
LOW PRESSURE / LOW VOLUME CONTAINMENT BARRIER UTILIZING REACTOR GUARD VESSEL AND WELDED REACTOR VESSEL HEAD.
- SAFR LOW PRESSURE / LOW VOLUME CONTAINMENT BARRIER U TILIZING REACTOR. GUARD VESSEL AND REACTOR VESSEL HEAD, WITH SECONDARY CONTAIN-MENT BARRIER BACKING UP REACTOR VESSEL HEAD TO CONTAIN HEAD SEAL LEAKAGE, LWR TYPE CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS FOR THESE DESIGNS ARE NOT PRO-POSED BECAUSE THE PROBABILITY OF EVENTS WHICH COULD LEAD TO l
SIGNIFICANT FISSION PRODUCT RELEASE ARE INDICATED BY THE DESIGNERS TO BE LOW,
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IN REVIEWING THESE PROPOSALS THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE TO BE CONSIDERED:
DO THE RESULTS OF THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS INDICATE ADDITIONAL MITIGATION IS DESIRABLE.TO ACCOUNT FOR:
UNCERTAINTIES IN SAFETY ANALYSIS, PRA OR SUPPORT-ING TECHNOLOGY i
UNCERTAINTIES DUE TO OTHER POTENTIAL SEVERE ACCI-DENTS SUCH AS SABOTAGE.
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o APPROACH TO DESIGN CERTIFICATION CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOE SPONSORED ADVANCED CONCEPTS AND DOE'S PLANS FOR DESIGN CERTIFICATION RAISE THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS REGARDING WHAT THE NRC SHOULD RE-QUIRE IN ORDER TO CERTIFY A NEW REACTOR CONCEPT:
1)
IS THE EXTENT AND LEVEL OF DESIGN DETAIL PROPOSED BY DOE FOR CERTIFICATION CONSISTENT WITH THE COMMISSION'S DESIRE TO CERTIFY AN ESSENTIALLY COMPLETE PLANT DESIGN?
2)
WHAT LEVEL OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE, EXISTING TECHNO-LOGY AND SUPPORTING R8D IS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT CERTI-FICATION (I.E. IS A PROTOTYPE PLANT REQUIRED TO BE BU(cT AND OPERATED PRIOR TO DESIGN CERTIFICATION)?
3)
WHAT INFORMATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO ALLOW FLEXIBI-m.
LITY IN THE DESIGN CERTIFICATION FOR VARIATIONS IN PLANT SIZE (I.E. NUMBER OF MOD'ULES)?
4)
IS A MANUFACTURING LICENSE (10CFR50, APPENDIX M) RE-l QUIRED PRIOR TO SHOP FABRICATION OF REACTOR MODULES?
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'.o OTHER KEY ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN REVIEW ADEQUACY OF EXPERIMENTAL DATA SUPPORTING PERFORMANCE OF FUEL, ADEQUACY OF INSERVICE INSPECTION PROVISIONS, SOURCE TERMS FOR SITING AND DESIGN, USE OF A NON-SAFETY GRADE CONTROL ROOM.
MULTI-MODULE CONTROL SYSTEM.
GRAPHITE STRUCTURAL CRITERIA.
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SCHEDULING NOTES a
TITLE:
BRIEFING ON ADVANCED REACTOR DESIGNS SCHEDULED:
2:00 P.M., THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1987 (OPEN)
DURATION:
APPR0X l-1/2 HRS SPEAKERS:
NRR 45 MINS
- T. SPEIS
- T. KING THE FOLLOWING WILL BE IN THE AUDIENCE TO RESPOND TO QUESTIONS:
- DOE A. DAVID ROSSIN ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY
- GE DR. NEIL BROWN CONSULTING TECHNOLOGIST FOR SAFETY
- ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL JOHN MCDONALD, AI DIVISION DIRECTOR, OR DR. RICHARD OLDENKAMP, Al DIRECTOR l
POWER PLANT PROJECTS i
- GA TECHNOLOGIES T.E. NORTHROP, GENERAL MANAGER POWER REACTOR PROGRAMS
- GAS COOLED REACTOR ASSOCIATES DAN MEARS, GENERAL MANAGER i
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TP.ANSMITTAL T0:
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Document Control Desk, 016 Phillips ADVANCED COPY TO:
The Public Document Room j
DATE:
2 I '7 f7 3:
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FROM:
SECY Correspondence & Records Branch 3:
3:
3l; Attached are copies of a Commission meeting transcript and related meeting
$ :ll-document (s). They are being forwarded for entry on the Daily Accession List and 3
placement in the Public Document Room. No other distribution is requested or a :.'
required.
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Copies 3
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C&R Branch files the original transcript, with attachments, without SECY papers.
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