ML20211C273
| ML20211C273 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/1999 |
| From: | Peterson S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211C280 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9908250199 | |
| Download: ML20211C273 (19) | |
Text
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UNITED STATLS
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NUCLEAR REGULATOHY COMMISSION
's WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 4001 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION 4
CITY OF ALACHUA CITY OF BUSHNELL CITY OF GAINESVILLE CITY OF KISSIMMEE CITY OF LEESBURG CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH AND UTILITIES COMMISSION.
- CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH CITY OF OCALA ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION AND CITY OF ORLANDO SEMINOLE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE. INC.
CITY OF TALLAHASSEE DOCKET NO. 50-302 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 185 j
License No. DPR-72 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Florida Power Corporation, et al. (the licensees), dated July 30,1998, as supplemented on April 8 and July 8,1999, i
complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment
- can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; l
D. - The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common c'efense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and 9908250199 990823 8
DR ADOCK 05000302 PDR l.t
. E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility
{
Operating License No. DPR-72 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 185, are hereby incorporated in the license. Florida Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
6 S eri R. Peterson, Chief, Section 2 Project Directorate il Division of Project Licensing Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of issuance: August 23, 1999 F
L-
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.185 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 DOCKET NO. 50-302 Replace the following pages of the Appendix 'A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Paae Insert Paae 3.7-24 3.7-24 3.7-25 3.7-25 3.7-26 3.7-26 B 3.7-60 B 3.7-60 B 3.7-61 B 3.7-61 B 3.7-62 B 3.7-62 B 3.7-63 B 3.7-63 B 3.7-64 8 3.7-64 B 3.7-65 B 3.7-65 B 3.7-65A B 3.7-658 B 3.7-65C 5.0-18 5.0-18 5.0-19 5.0-19 5.0-20 5.0-20 5.0-21 5.0-21 5.0-22 i
j
CREVS 3.7.12 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)
LCO 3.7.12 Two CREVS trains and the Control Complex Habitability Envelope (CCHE) shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One CREVS train A.1 Restore CREVS train 7 days inoperable.
to OPERABLE status.
B.
CCHE inoperable due B.1 Restore CCHE 7 days to a breach or boundary.
breaches in excess of the limit sort ANQ_
less than or equal to 1 square' foot in excess of the limit.
C.
Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion NOR Time of Condition A or AND B not met in MODE 1, 2, 3'or 4.
C.2 Be in MODE 5.
36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-24 Amendment No.185 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only
CREVS 3.7.12 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.
Required Action and
NOTE------------
l NOTE associated Completion Place in emergency Time of Condition A recirculation mode if l sg7g or B not met during automatic transfer to I
j movement of emergency recirculation mode irradiated fuel is inoperable.
(
assemblies.
NOTE D.1 Place OPERABLE CREVS Immediately train in emergency recirculation mode.
08 D.2 Suspend movement of Immediately l NOTE irradiated fuel assemblies.
E.
Two CREVS trains E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.
Immediately inoperable or Norg breaches exist in the CCHE that exceed Condition B during MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.
F.
Two CREVS trains F.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable or irradiated fuel NOTE breaches exist in the assemblies.
CCHE that exceed Condition B during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-25 Amendment No. 185 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only w
CREVS 3.7.12 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.12.1 Operate each CREVS train for 31 days 2 15 minutes.
SR 3.7.12.2 Perform required CREVS filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the Testing Program.
Ventilation Filter Testing Program SR 3.7.12.3 Verify each CREVS train actuates to the 24 months emergency recirculation mode on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
SR 3.7.12.4 Verify CCHE boundary leakage does not exceed 24 months allowable limits as measured by performance NOTE of an integrated leakage test.
Crystal River Unit 3 3.7-26 Amendment No.185 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only
.CREV5 B 3.7.12 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)
BASES BACKGROUND The principal function of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) is to provide an enclosed environment from which the plant can be operated following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity or toxic gas.
The CREVS consists of two trains with much of the non-safety related equipment common to both trains and with two a
independent, redundant components supplied for major items of safety related equipment (Ref. 1). The major equipment consists of the normal duty filter banks, the emergency filters, the normal duty and emergency duty supply fans, and the return fans. The normal duty filters consist of one bank of glass fiber roughing filters. The emergency filters consist of a roughing filter similar to the normal filters, high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, and activated charcoal adsorbers for removal of gaseous activity (principally iodine). The rest of the system, consisting of supply and return ductwork, dampers, and instrumentation, is not designed with redundant components.
However,. redundant dampers are provided for isolation of the ventilation system from the surrounding environment.
The ventilation exhaust duct is continuously tested by radiation monitor RM-A5, which has a range of 105 to 106 counts per minute. The monitor is set to alarm and initiate the emergency recirculation mode of operation when the radiation level reaches approximately two times the l
background count rate.
The Lontrol Complex Habitability Envelope (CCHE) the space within the Control Complex served by CREVS.
"v includes Control Complex floor elevations from 104 t'n 180 feet and the stair enclosure from elevation 95 to 133 feet.
The elements which compromise the CCHE are walls, doors, a roof, floors, floor drains, penetration seals, and ventilation isolation dampers.
Together the CCHE and CREVS provide an enclosed environment from which the plant can be operated following an uncontrolled releasc of radioactivity or toxic gas.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-60 Amendment No. 185
m CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES BACKGROUND Design calculations determine the maximum allowed leakage v"
(continued) into the CCHE below which control room operator dose and toxic gas concentrations remain within approved limits.
Integrated leak tests of the CCHE determine actual leakage.
The difference between allowed and actual leakage is converted to an allowance for breach areas (in square inches) that may exist in the CCHE to accommodate normal operating and maintenance activities.
Breaches in excess of the calculated area renders the CCHE incapable NOTE of performing its function, and therefore inoperable.
Routine opening and closing of the CCHE doors for personnel passage and the movement of equipment is accounted for in the design calculations.
A continuous i
leakage of 10 cubic feet per minute is assumed to account for this.
Holding or blocking doors open for short periods of time does not constitute a breach of the CCHE as long as the doors could be closed upon notification of a radiological or toxic gas release.
CREVS has a normal operation mode and recirculation modes.
l During normal operation, the system provides filtered, conditioned air to the control complex, including the controlled access area (CA) on the 95 foot elevation.
When switched to the recirculation mode, isolation dampers close isolating the discharge to the controlled access area and isolating the outside air intake.
In this mode the system l
recirculates filtered air through the CCHE.
The control complex normal duty ventilation system is operated from the control room and runs continuously.
During normal operation, the outside air intake damper is g.
partially open, the atmospheric relief discharge damper is closed, the discharge to the CA is open, and the system return damper is throttled. This configuration allows a controlled amount of outside air to be admitted to the control coraplex. The design temperature maintained by the system is 75 F at a relative humidity of 50%.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.7-61 Amendment No.185 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only L
CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES BACKGROUND Three signals will cause the system to automatically switch (continued) to the recirculation modes of operation.
1.
Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) signal (high reactor building pressure).
2.
High radiation signal from the return duct radiation monitor RM-A5.
3.
Toxic gas signal (chlorine or sulfur dioxide)
The recirculation modes isolate the CCHE from outside air l
to ensure a habitable environment for the safe shutdown of the plant. In these modes of operation, the controlled access area is isolated from the CCHE.
I Upon detection of ESAS or toxic gas signals, the system switches to the normal recirculation mode. In this mode, dampers for the outside air intake and the exhaust to the CA will automatically close, isolating the CCHE from outside air exchange, ar,d the system return damper will open '.hus allowing air in the CCHE to be recirculated.
Additionally, the CA fume hood exhaust fan, CA fume hood auxiliary supply fan, and CA exhaust fan are de-energized and their corresponding isolation dampers close. The return fan, normal filters, normal fan, and the cooling (or heating) coils remain in operation in a recirculating mode.
Upon detection of high radiation by RM-A5 the system switches to the emergency recirculation mode. In this mode, the dampers that isolate the CCHE from the surroundings will automatically close. The CA fume hood exhaust fan, CA fume hood auxiliary supply fan, CA exhaust fan, normal supply fan, and return fan are tripped and their corresponding isolation dampers close. Manual action is required to restart the return fan and place the emergency fans and filters in operation. The cooling (or heating) coils remain in operation.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-62 Amendment No.185
e l'
i CREVS B 3.7.12
. BASES l
l APPLICABLE During emergency operations the design basis of the CREVS and H
SAFETY ANALYSIS the CCHE is to provide radiation protection to the control room operators. The limiting accident which may threaten the habitability of the control room (i.e., accidents resulting in release of airborne radioactivity) is the postulated maximum hypothetical accident (MHA), which is assumed to occur while in MODE 1. The consequences of this event in MODE 1 envelope the results for MODES 2, 3, and 4, and results in the limiting radiological source term for the control room habitability evaluation (Ref. 2). A fuel handling accident (FHA) may also result in a challenge to control room habitability, and may occur in any MODE.
However, due to the severity of the MHA and the MODES in which the postulated MHA can occur, the FHA is the limiting radiological accident in MODES 5 and 6 only. The CREVS and
.the CCHE ensures that the control room will remain habitable following all postulated design basis events, maintaining exposures to control room operators within the limits of GDC 19 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A (Ref. 3).
The CREVS is not in the primary success path for any accident analysis. However, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System meets Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement since long term control room habitability is essential to mitigation of accidents resulting in atmospheric fission product release.
LCO Two trains of the control room emergency ventilation system are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available assuming a single failure disabling the other train. Failure to meet the LCO could result in the control room becoming uninhabitable in the unlikely event of an accident.
The required CREVS trains must be independent to the extent allowed by the design which provides redundant components for the major equipment as discussed in the BACKGROUND section of this' bases. OPERABILITY of the CREVS requires the following at a minimum:
a.
A Control Complex Emergency Duty Supply Fan is OPERABLE; i
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-63 Amendment No.185
CREVS B 3.7.12
' EASES LCO b.
A Control Complex Return Fan is OPERABLE; l
(continued) c.
HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively l
restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; l
d.
Ductwork and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained; and e.
The CCHE is intact as discussed below.
The CCHE boundary including the integrity of the doors, walls, roof, floors, floor drains, penetration seals, and ventilation isolation dampers must be maintained within the assumptions of the design calculations.
Breaches in the CCHE must be controlled to provide assurance that the CCHE remains capable of performing its function.
If the total open breach area in the CCHE exceeds the limit determined in approved design analyses (Reference 2), currently 35.5 square inches, the CCHE is rendered inoperable and entry into LCO Condition B is required.
NOTE The upper bound of the breach area for the LCO is the sum of the breach area limit plus one square foot (144 square inches).
If the Required Action of LCO Condition B is not met within the respective Completion Time, then j
-Condition C or D, as applicable, must be entered.
The ability to maintain temperature in the Control Complex is addressed in Technical Specification 3.7.18.
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CREVS must_be OPERABLE to j
ensure that the CCHE will remain habitable during and following a postulated accident. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, the CREVS. must be OPERABLE to cope with a release due to a fuel handling accident.
l (continued)
' Crystal River Unit 3 B-3.7-64 Amendment No. 185 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only j
CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES ACTIONS A.1 With one CREVS train inoperable, action must be taken to restore the train to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREVS train is adequate to perform the radiation protection function for control room personnel. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE CREVS train could result in loss of CREVS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an accident occurring l
during this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability.
B.1 With the CCHE inoperable due to breaches in excess of approved design calculations, but within the criteria stated, operation may continue for 7 days.
Restoration of excess breaches is not limited toJteturning the opening to its pre-breached condition, but can also be accomplished using temporary sealing measures as described in plant procedures and/or work instructions.
Condition B will permit opening breaches in the CCHE to support maintenance and modification to the habitability won envelope boundary.
It also will establish an allowance for the discovery of breaches during routine operation, and provide the opportunity to repair the breach in a time frare consistent with the ',;w safety significance of small breaches in the CCHE.
Condition B also provides an opportunity, following an l
unsuccessful CCHE leak r6te test, to determine the cause I
for excessive leakage, cc. rect it, and perform a re-test.
Excessive leakage measured during an integrated leak test can be converted to an equivalent breach size in accordance with approved design calculations.
If the calculated breach size is less than or equal to 179.5 square inches then operation may continue while locating the source of the leakage and performing a re-test.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.7-65 Amendment No.185 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only
CREVS B-3.7.12 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 NOTE (continued)
In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, or breaches in the NOTE CCHE which exceed allowable limits cannot be closed within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status,.the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The I
allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
D.1 and 0.2 NOTE During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, if the inoperable CREVS' train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, or breaches in the CCHE which exceed allowable NOTE limits, cannot be closed within the associated Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREVS train must immediately be placed in the emergency recirculation mode. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automat c actuation will occur, and that any i
active failure will.be readily detected.
l An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately WTE suspend activities that could release radioactivity and require isolation of the CCHE. This places the plant in a l
condition that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
Required Action D.1 and D.2 are modified by a Note j
indicating to~ place the system in the emergency mode if automatic transfer to emergency mode is ' inoperable.
i E21 w0TE
'If both CREVS trains are inoperable or breaches in the CCHE exceed the limits of Condition B in MODE 1, 2, 3, or i
4, the.CREVS may not. be capable of performing the intended function and the plant is in a condition outside i
the accident analysis. Therefore,.LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.
1 L
(continued)
Crystal River. Unit 3 8 3.7-65A bp adment No.185 NOTE - Valid b
.i Cycle 13 Only h
CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES-
- ACTIONS E,1 l "
(continued)
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, when two CREVS trains are inoperable or breaches in the CCHE NOTE exceed the limits of Condition B, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could release radioactivity that could enter the CCHE. This places the l
plant in a condition that minimizes the accident risk.
I This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
1 i
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.12.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systons should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Since the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing each train once every month adequately checks proper function of this system. Systems such as the CR-3 design without heaters need only be operated for 215 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system. The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy available.
53_3.7.12.2 This SR verifies that the required CREVS testing is f
performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CREVS filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory. Guide 1.52, (Ref. 4) as described in the VFTP Program description (FSAR, Section 9.7.4). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal absorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in I
detail in the VFTP.
This SR verifies that each CREVS train actuates to place the i
control complex into the emergency recirculation mode on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the typical fuel cycle length.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3-B 3.7-65i3 Amendment No. 185 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 Only 4
i... )
n ts CREVS B 3.7.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1224 REQUIREMENTS 4
(continued)
'This SR verifies the integrity of the CCHE and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air.
During the cmergency mode of operation, the CCHE is designed to be a closed environment having limited air exchange with its surroundings.
Performance of a periodic leak test verifies the continuing integrity of the CCHE.
The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with the typical fuel cycle length.
N0st The design of the CCHE precludes performance of the i
commonly applied leak test characterized by pressurization to a nominal value and measurement of the make up air required to maintain pressurization.
The test for CR-3 is performed by operating CREVS in the l
emergency recirculation mode with the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System operating to maintain a differential
_ pressure between the CCHE and the Auxiliary Building.
The Auxiliary Building will be at least 1/8 inch water gauge negative-relative to the. CCHE.
Tracer gas will be used to determine the leakage rate.
The acceptance criteria:for the test is a leakage rate that would not result in control room personnel exceeding dose limits described in Reference 3 following the most limiting accident.
A detailed description of the conditions for conduct of the test are provided in Reference 2.
i REFERENCES 1.
FSAR, Section 9.7.2,1.g.
2.
CR-3 Control Room Habitability Report, dated July 30, 1998.
3.
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, CDC 19.
4.
l Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2,1978.
1 Crystal River Unit.'3 B 3.7-65C.
Amendment No.185 NOTE - Valid Until Cycle 13 only
c Procedures, Programs and Manuals
[:
5.6 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manual's 5.6.2.11 Secondary Water' Chemistry Program (continued) t" c.
Identification of process sampling points, which shall include monitoring the discharge of the condensate pumps for evidence of condenser in leakage; i
d.
Procedures for the' recording and management of data; i
e.
Procedures defining corrective actions for all off control point chemistry conditions; and f.
A procedure identifying the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data and the sequence and timing of administrative events, which is required to initiate corrective action.
5.6.2.12 Ventilation Filter. Testing Program (VFTP)
A program shall be established to implement the following required testing of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) and the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust System (ABVES) per l the requirements specified in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978, and/or as specified herein, and in accordance with ANSI l
N510-1975 and ASTM D 3803-89 (Re-approved 1995).
a.
Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that an inplace test of the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters shows a penetration < 0.05% when tested in accordance with l
Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978, and in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of between 37,800 and 47,850 cfm.
b.
Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that an inplace test of the' carbon adsorber shows a system bypass < 0.05% when l
tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of between 37,800 and 47,850.cfm.
c.
Demonstrate for each train of the CREVS that a laboratory test of a sample of the carbon adsorber, when obtained w described in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D 3803-89 1
(Re-approved 1995) at a temperature of 30 C and relative humidity of 95% with methyl iodide penetration of less than 2.5%.
4 (continued)
Crystai River Unit 3 5.0-18 Amendment No.185
Procedures, Programs and Manuals
{
5.6 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6.2.12 VFTP -(continued) d.
Demonstrate for each train of CREVS that the pressure drop across the combined roughing filters, HEPA filters and the carbon adsorbers is < AP=4" water aauge when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978, and ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of between 37,800 and 47,850 cfm.
e.
Demonstrate for each train of the ABVES that an inplace test of the HEPA filters shows a penetration < 1% vhen tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of between 35,253 and 43,087 cfm.
f.
Demonstrate for each train of the ABVES that an inplace test of the carbon adsorber shows bypass < 1% when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 at the system flowrate of between 35,253 and 43,087 cfm.
g.
Demonstrate for each train of the ABVES that a laboratory test of a representative sample of the carbon adsorber, when obtained as described in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D 3803-89 (Re-approved 1995) at the temperature of 30 C and relative humidity of 95% with methyl iodide penetration of less than 12.5%.
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the VFTP test frequencies.
)
5.6.2.13 Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program This program provides controls for potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in the Radicactive Waste Disposal (WD) System, the quantity of radioactivity contained in gas storage tanks or fed into the offgas treatment system.
The gaseous radioactivity quantities shall be determined following the methodology in Branch Technical Position (BTP) ETSB 11-5, " Postulated Radioactive Release due to Waste Gas System Leak or Failure".
The liquid radwaste quantities shall be determined in accordance with Standard Review Plan, Section 15.7.3, " Postulated Radioactive Release due to Tank Failures".
The program shall include:
a.
The limits for concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the Radioactive Waste Disposal (WD) System and a surveillance program to ensure the limits are maintained.
Such limits (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-19 Amendment No.185 I-
Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals l
-5.6.2.13
- Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program (continued) shall be appropriate to the system's design criteria, (i.e.,
whether or not the system is designed to withstand a hydrogen explosion).
b.
A surveillance program to ensure that the quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank and fed into the offgas treatment system is less than the amount that would result in a whole' body exposure of 2 0.5 rem to any individual in an unrestricted area, in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents.
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program surveillance frequencies.
1 5.6.2.14 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program A diesel fuel oil testing program to implement required testing of both new fuel oil and stored fuel oil shall be established.
The program shall include sampling and testing requirements, and acceptance criteria, in accordance with applicable ASTM Standards.
The purpose of the program is to establish the following:
a.
Acceptability of new fuel oil for use prior to addition to storage tanks by determining that the fuel oil has the followinc properties within l'imits of ASTM D 975 for Grade No. 2-D fuel oil:
1.
Kinematic Viscosity, 2.
Water and Sediment, 3.
Flash Point, 4.
Specific Gravity API; b.
Other properties of ASTM D 975 for Grade No. 2-D fuel oil are within limits within 92 days following sampling and addition of new fuel to storage tanks.
c.
Total particulate contamination of stored fuel oil is < 10 mg/L when. tested once per 92 days in accordance with ASTM D
)
2276-91 (gravimetric method).
U 5.6.2.15 Not-Used (continued)
Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-20 Amendment No. 185 l
Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals l
5.6.2.16 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)
This program ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions taken.
Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an
~
evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists.
Additionally, other appropriate limitations and remedial or compense. tory actions may be identified to be taken as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Condition and Required Actions.
This program implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6.
The SFDP shall contain the following:
a.
Provisions.for cross train checks to ensure a loss of the capability to perform the safety. function assumed in the accident analysis does not go undetected; b.
Provisions-for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists; c.
Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities; and d.
Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions.
A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed.
For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:
a.
A required system redundant to the system (s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable); or b.
A required system redundant to the system (s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or c.
A required system redundant to the support system (s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above;is also inoperable.
(continued)
Crystal River Unit 3.
5.0-21 Amendment No. 185
,