ML20210U240
| ML20210U240 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1986 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210U235 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8606020255 | |
| Download: ML20210U240 (3) | |
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s SAFETY.CVALUATION BY TRE OFFICE OF MUCLEAR REACT 0E REGt!LATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.103 70 PROVISIOML GPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-16 GPU NISCiLEAR CORP 0VTION UD JERSEY CENTRAL POWER A LIGHT COMPANY OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATIMI STATIM DOCKET NO. 50-2P9
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Ry letter dated January 30, 1986, GPU Nuclear (the licensee) has reouested an amendment to Provisional Operating License No. OPR-16 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Statien (0yster Creek). This amendment would authorize changes to Section 3.5 of the Appendix A Technical Specifications (TS) pertaining to the limitirg conditions for ODeration (LCO. When one of the
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two trairs of the Studby Gas Treatment System (SEGTS) is declared inoperable. The changes are to the power operation and the refueling reactor operation modes in TS 3.5.B.3.a.1 end 3.5.B.3.b.1, respectively.
The change which is the same for both reactor operation modes would lessen the requirement on then the other SBGTS must be demonstrated operable. The change is from within 2 hears in the current TS to within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> unless significant painting, fire, or chemical relea:se has taken place in the building within 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> and then within I hour of the end of the 12-hour period.
2.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION The licensee has proposed its Technical Specificat' ion Change Request (TSCR) 133 to allow a deleyed demonstration of the operability cf the redundant SBGTS after one or the two SBGTS is <!eclared inoperable. TSCR 133 would delay the demonstration of the operable SBGTS trafn if significant cainting, fire, or chemical release has taken place in the Reactor Buildina within t
the previous 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Current T5 surveillance tests which are net being changed by this TSCR provide adequate assurance that the SBaTS will operate upon demand. The proposed TSCR would increase phnt safety by increasing e
system. availability and avoiding unnecessary degradation of the system from a significant painting, fire, or chemical release.
ThecbrrentTSfordemonstratingtheoperabilityofthe'S3GTS,uponthe loss of one train, do not address circumstances where significant rainting, fire, or chemical release has taken place in the Reactor Buf1 ding within e
the previcus 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. TS 4.5.K.1.a requires certain tests of the SEGTS following significant painting, fire, or chenical release in the Reactor
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.I-Buildine wt.ile the SBGTS was in operation.
Following the current TS require-ments for demonstr.ating operability could, unda~r these conditions in the Reactor Eutiding, degrade the SBSTS unnecessarily and would not er. hance the j
safety of the plant.
In addition, demonstrating operability during these conditicrs would require subsecuent compliance with TS 4.5.K.I.a and declaring the secord SECTS inoperable until the tests of the charcoal were known. This would reduce system availability and rnay require an unnecessary plant shutdoc.
The function of the SBGTS is to treat and exhaust the atmosphere of the reactor building to the stack during containment isolation conditions during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and a fuel han:. fling accident with a minimum release of radioactive material.to'the environments. Two separate filter traf ns are provided, each having 1001 capacity. The SBGTS has particulate and charcoal filters which can be damaged by fumes frcm painting, fires or chemical releases.
1 The licensee stated in.spection Report 50-219/84-11 identified the need for a
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chanpe in the current TS based upon Licensee Event Report (LER) 84-7 on the licensee % failure to test an SBGTS within the required time.
In this inspection report on LER 84-7, it was stated that on April 2,1984, Diesel Generator No.1 (DG-1) was declared inoperable as a result of a failure to fast start during the monthly surveillance. This resulted in the Associated SBGTS-1 being declared incperable, because DG-1 is the emergency power supply for SBGTS-1. TS 3.5.B.3.b.1 then required demonstration of the operability of the redundant SBGTS (in this case SBGTS-2.) within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. At the time of DG-1 failure, torus painting was in progress. The painting was stopped but the SBGTS operability tests were delayed for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> in accordance with station procedures to prevent degradation of the charcoal filters fron absorption of paint fumes.
The BWR Standard Technical Specifications applicable to Oyster Creek (BWR-STS, WREG-0123, Revision 1) do not require the redundant SBGTS to be tested after an SBGTS has been declared ineperable for the power operation and refueling modes. The BWR-STS require the inoperable SBGTS to be operable within 7 days (power operation) or 30 days (refueling) as does the current TS which are not chenged by this action. The BWR-STS reouire testing the SBGTS following i
painting, fire, or chenical release in any ventilation zone communicating a
with the SBGTS because the fumes n:ay damage the SBGTS filters to the point it could be inoperable.
Therefore, based on the above, the staff concludes that operation of Oyster Creek ylth this proposed TSCR 133 is acceptable.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTA' CONSIDERATION This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installaticn or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the i
arendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational
radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed find-ing that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordinoly, this amend-ment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). ' Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed nanner, and (?) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: J. Donohew Dated:
May 28,1986.
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