ML20210Q163
| ML20210Q163 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/1999 |
| From: | Clifford J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210Q167 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9908130165 | |
| Download: ML20210Q163 (6) | |
Text
_ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[fM%q t
UN'TE! STATES
!s Zi j
NUCLEAR REGULAiORY COMMISSION
- ~f WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
,o NORTH ATLANTIC ENERGY SERVICE CORPORATION. ET AL.*
DOCKET NO. 50-443 SEABROOK STATION. UNIT NO.1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 61 License No. NPF-86 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment filed by the North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation, et al. (the licensee), dated November 4,1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
~
- North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (NAESCO)is authorized to act as agent for the:
North Atlantic Energy Corporation, Canal Electric Company, The Connecticut Light and Power Company, Great Bay Power Corporation, Hudson Light & Power Department, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company, Montaup Electric Company, New England Power Company, New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc., Taunton Municipal Light Plant, The United lliuminating Company, and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.
9908130165 990812 PDR ADOCK 05000443 P
)
- 2. - Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-86 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 61, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B are incorporated into Facility License No. NPF-86. NAESCO shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
J mes W. Clifford, hief, Section 2 Project Directorate i Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: August 12, 1999 l:
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 61 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-86 DOCKET NO. 50-443 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginallines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages have been provided.*
Remove Insert 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-6*
3/4 5-6*
B 3/4 5-1*
B 3/4 5-1*
B 3/4 5-2 8 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-3
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350 F x
' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the following valves a.
are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed:
Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position SI-V-3 Accumulator Isolation Open*
SI-V-17 Accumulator Isolation Open*
SI-V-32 Accumulator Isolation Open*
SI-V-47 Accumulator Isolation Open*
SI-V-114 SI Pump to Cold-Leg Isolation Open RH-V-14 RHR Pump to Cold-Leg Isolation Open RH-V-26 RHR Pump to Cold-Leg Isolation Open RH-V-32 RHR to Hot-Leg Isolation Closed RH-V-70 RHR to Hot-Leg Isolation Closed SI-V-77 SI to Hot-Leg Isolation Closed SI-V-102-
.SI to Hot-Leg Isolation Closed b.
At least once per 31 days by:
Verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water, and l
1) 2)
Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that. is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
c.
By a visual inspection which verifies that no. loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the Jump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall
)e performed:
1)
For all accessible areas of the containment prior to j
establishing primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and 2)
At least once daily of the areas affected within containment by containment entry and during the final entry when primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
- Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.
SEABROOK - UNIT l' 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 30.68,61 l
L
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T GREATER THAN OR LOUAL TO 350'F SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
~
4.5.2 (Continued) d.
At least once per 18 months by:
1)
Verifyino automatic interlock action of the RHR s Reactor Coolant S stem to ensure that with a simu;rstem from the isted or actual Reactor Coolant 5 stem pressure signal greater than or acual to 365 psig, the interlo ks prevent the valves from being openec.
2)
A visual inspecti6n of the containment' sump' by debris and that th subsystem suction inlets are not restricted structural distre(trash racks, l corros, ion. ) show no evidence of sump components screens etc.
ss or abnorma e.
At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
1)
Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on (Safety Injection actuation and Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump) test signals, and 2)
Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection actuation test signal:
l a)
Centrifugal charging pump, b)
Safety Injection pump, and c)
RHR pump.
f.
d;qfferential pressure on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to8 r Specification 4.0.5:
1)
Centrifugal charging pump, t 2480 psid;,
2)
Safety Injection pump, k 1445 psid; and 3)
RHR pump, k 171 psid.
-I SEABROOK.- UNIT 1 3/4 5-6 Amendment No. 33 WI 2 31Nf
13/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE' COOLING SYSTEMS-PASES
-3/4.'5.1 ~ ACCUMULATORS-The'0PERASILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS)-accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the~ accumulators.
This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial ~ cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration, and pressure ensure that the as'sumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.
~
.The accumulator power-operated isolation valves are considered to be
" operating bypasses" in~the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.
In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single-failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.
The limits for operation with an accumulator ino'perable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event. occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.
If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator.is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode.
where this capability is not required.
3/4.5.2'and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS-The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core' cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the. loss of one subsystem through any single-failure consideration.
Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is~ capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double-ended' break of the largest RCS cold-leg pipe ' downward. -In addition.
each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core. cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.
-With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.
The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be
' OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps and safety injection pumps except the required OPERABLE charging pump to be in-operable.in MODES 4 and 5'and in MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on pro-vides assurance that a mass' addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV or RHR suction relief valve.
SEABROOK UNIT'l' B 3/4 5-1
EMERGENCYERE UTJAG FYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5.2and 3/4.5.3 ECCSM$YSTEMS (Continued)
When the RCS has a vent na equal to or greater than 18 square inches, one Safety Injection pum be made OPERABLE wten in MODE 5 or MODE 6 (below 200 F). When ope ating M this co cold overpressure protection is provided by the mechanical vent opening, equal to or square inches, thatis required to be present in the RCS boundary prior to making the SI pum OPERABLE. This required RCS vent area and the surveillance requirement to verify the pre RCS vent area provides assurance that a mass addition transient can be relieved and th overpressure protection is provided.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. With the exception of the operating centrifugal charging pump, the E pumps are normally in a standby, non-operating mode, As such, flow path piping has the p develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Maintaining the piping from the refueling (RWST) to the RCS full of water (by verifying at the accessible ECCS piping high points excluding the operating centrifugal charging pump) ensures that the system will perform prop its full capacity into the RCS upon demand. This will also prevent water hammer, pump cavita pumping of non-condensable gas (e.g., air, nitrogen, or hydrogen) into the reactor vesse injection (SI) signal or during shutdown cooling. The 31 day Frequency tdes into conside
. nature of gas accumulation in the ECCS piping and the procedural controls governing system op Surveillance Requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assuran proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow re pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pu exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or ab that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.
3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The li on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that: (1) sufficient water is ava containment to permit recirculation cooling frow to the core and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in t cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analys The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.
1 SEABROOK-UNIT 1 83/45-2 Amendment No. 6,61
. EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (Continued)
The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
/
l l
l 3
l l-4
)
SEABROOK-UNIT 1 B3/45-3 Amendment No. 4, 61