ML20209J338
| ML20209J338 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1987 |
| From: | Hind J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Sylvia B DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8702060286 | |
| Download: ML20209J338 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000341/1985047
Text
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JAN 2'S 1987
Docket No. 50-341
The Detroit Edison Company
ATTN:
B. Ralph Sylvia
Group Vice President
Nuclear Operations
6400 North Dixie Highway
Newport, MI 48166
Gentlemen:
This letter refers to a discussion between Mr. R. Kelm, Director, Nuclear
Security of your staff and Messrs. J. R. Creed and T. J. Madeda of my
Safeguards staff on December 23, 1986, regarding the status of your Nuclear
Security Improvement Plan (NSIP) for Fermi 2.
On May 1, 1986, in response to our request, you submitted a program (NSIP)
to augment specific corrective actions being taken in response to violations
and findings identified in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-341/85047, dated
February 11, 1986. The NSIP provided a broad approach to improving the
long-term effectiveness of the security program at the Fermi 2 site and the
major elements of the plan were intended to be completed by December 31, 1986.
Additionally, the NSIP addressed the management concerns described in our
December 24, 1985 letter sent to you under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f).
NRC inspection efforts since the submittal of the NSIP have shown a dedicated
licensee effort both at the senior site management level and sectirity
organization level to adequately implement and document comitments identified
in your NSIP. Your efforts have been successful in most areas and you'r staff
has accomplished many of the objectives of the NSIP. However, recent
inspection efforts continue to identify weaknesses in the performance of your
site security program specifically in the areas of access control and
documenting security weaknesses. While none of these weaknesses were of a
major security significance, they indicate a trend that is of concern to us.
In view of our findings and as discussed with Mr. Kelm, we requested that you
continue four specific sections of your NSIP until June 30, 1987. These areas
are presented in the attached enclosure. The continuation of these items will
allow you to continue to evaluate the appropriate resolution of the noted
weaknesses.
You are asked to respond within 30 days of your receipt of this letter with
confirmation that the mentioned portions of the NSIP will continue to be
implemented.
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The Detroit Edison Company
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JAN 2'S 1987
If you have any questions, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Please feel free to contact Mr. J. R. Creed (3I2/790-5643) of my staff.
Sincerely,
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. ck A. Hin , Director
ivision of Radiation Safety
and Safeguards
Enclosure: As stated
cc w/ enclosure:
F. H. Sondgeroth, Licensing
Engineer
P. A. Marquardt, Corporate
Legal Department
DCS/RSB (RIDS)
Licensing Fee Management Branch
Resident Inspector, RIII
Ronald Callen, Michigan
Public Service Commission
Harry H. Voight, Esq.
Nuclear Facilities and
Environmental Monitoring
Section
Monroe County Office of
Civil Preparedness
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ENCLOSURE
To assure the successful implementation of your security program we
request that you continue several specific sections of your NSIP.
These areas include the following:
a.
Goal A.4 -
Continue internal surveillance of applicable NRC
security inspection procedures modules, targeting
those specific modules for increased effort in
aspects of your security program which the licensee
has experienced implementation problems.
b.
Goal B.1 -
Continue to implement the program which requires
personnel errors to be less than 10 per month.
Expand the scope of this program of personnel
errors to include those also committed by the
security organization.
c.
Goal B.5
Continue to maintain or improve your maintenance
-
program on security related equipment.
d.
Goal B.10 -
Coordinate senior site management and nuclear security
management efforts to followup and adequately resolve
correct surveillance findings.