ML20209H557

Proposed Findings of Fact of Intervenors Bridget Little Rorem,Et Al.*

ML20209H557
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	02/03/1987
From:	Guild R BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE FOR THE PUBLIC INTERES, ROREM, B.
To:
Shared Package
ML20209H487	List: ML20209H483 ML20209H508 ML20209H557 ML20209H583
References
OL, NUDOCS 8702060077
Download: ML20209H557 (170)

Text

__

I CateEi!:

17 FB -4 P4 :20 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING B N n:

.tt F1 h.

In the Matter of

)

)

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

)

No. 50-456 Ob-

)

50-457 (Braidwood Nuclear Station,

)

Units 1 and 2)

)

)

)

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT OF INTERVENORS BRIDGET LITTLE ROREM, ET AL

)

)

)

Robert Guild

)

Robert L. Jones Douglass W. Cassel, Jr.

Business and Professional People for the Public Interest 109 North

Dearborn,

01300 Chicago, Illinois 60602

)

(312) 641-5570 February 3, 1987

)-

8702060077 870203 PDR ADOCK 05000456 PDR o

_j

O 101.

In a routine safety inspection begun by NRC inspector

()

Leonard McGregor April 19, 1982, published as Inspection Report 82-05 on February 2, 1983, the NRC iden'. Afied Seve'tity Level III items of noncompliance and imposed a $100,000 civil penalty.

In C) his transmittal letter, Regional Administrator James Keppler concluded that "the results of the inspection indicate serious weaknesses in your management control systems as evidenced by a

()

breakdown of your quality assurance (QA) program as it relates to the installation and installation inspection of mechanical safety-related equipment."

Int. Ex. 86.

()

102.

As the NRC informed Edison of its inspection findings prior to the publication of Inspection Report 82-05, Edison commissioned a review of the effectiveness of quality assurance

()

and quality control activities at each of the Braidwood contractors.

The review was conducted by the "Braidwood Technical Support Group" under the direction of the new Project (j

Manager, Michael Wallace, and was conducted in September, 1982.

Wallace's report was provided to his then-superior James Maley, the then-Edison Manager of Projects before transmittal to Edison's president and chairman James O'Connor.

Stipulation, Tr.

)

10020.

The report to Maley and O'Connor concluded that in general "there is an overall attitude and approach to QA/QC on site (e.g. staffing levels, importance of QC activity, etc.)

)

which needs to be raised to a level consistent with current acceptable and expected practices."

With respect to the electrical contractor, L.K. Comstock, the review group's report 1

!jo

e

O concluded that there was developing a "significant backlog of hangers requiring inspection" that ineffective non-statistically based 35% inspection of hangers will require future 1004

)

inspections and some " retrofit inspections."

The need for more t

QC inspectors at Comstock was identified.

Int. Ex. 87.

i 103.

In Inspection Report 83-18/17, published more than a

O year later on January 27, 1984, the NRC Staf f identified serious l

concerns about the adequacy of the Edison and Comstock quality i

j assurance / quality control programs at Braidwood.

The Staff iO-required Edison to provide additional information to demonstrate the effectiveness of Edison and Comstock programs for accomplish-I ing electrical installations in accordance with NRC requirements.

10 The NRC observed that there existed a significant and increased i

i backlog of QC inspection, a large number of open inspection correction reports (ICRs) and nonconformance reports (NCRs), an lO ongoing review of existing quality control records and the re-i l

quirements to train and manage large numbers of QA and QC j

i personnel.

The Staff observed, further, that Comstock had em-i(3' ployed a new Quality Control manager as of August 1, 1983 -- the I

i i

third QC manager within one year.

i On the basis of these observations, the NRC " expressed b) concern in regard to the ability of the CECO /LKC organizations to j

continue new electrical construction activities at their current i

pace."

Int. Ex. 3 at 7.

id) 104.

On January 31, 1984, Edison notified the NRC Staff of i

potentially significant deficiencies reportable pursuant to 10 l

CFR Section 50.55(e) with respect to weaknesses in the Comstock

)C)

Quality Control records program.

weaknesses were identified in 1

l 2

(O i

4

O the areas in the timeliness of retrievability, accountability of production records to support installations, use of outdated O

forms and completeness of records.

Comstock had been directed to perform a 100% document review.

Int. Ex. 3 at 1.

105.

After the publication of Inspection Report 82-05 and the

O civil penalty findings of February 1983, the NRC Staff undertook a special quality assurance program team inspection in June 1983.

This inspection identified quality assurance deficiencies in each

O of the four major contractors at Braidwood, including the electrical contractor, L.K. Comstock Company.

In Inspection Report 83-09, published May 7, 1984, NRC Regional Administrator O

James Keppler informed Edison President James O'Connor of his conclusion that the deficiencies were attributable to " inadequate contractor programs and workmanship, inadequate Licensee reviews O

of the contractor programs, and inadequate Licensee quality assurance overview to ensure construction activities met all requirements.

The violations indicate the need for more O'

aggressive CECO management involvement in and support of the Ceco QA program to ensure that all safety-related activities performed by contractor personnel are in accordance with the

O

'*9"l*"I d

""*"d*'d8 ""d 11 '" '*9"I"*"*"

I"

Ex. 88.

106.

Because of concerns regarding construction quality at Braidw iO d as refle ted in the findings of Inspection Reports 82-05 and 83-09, the NRC imposed upon Edison the requirement to undertake the reinspection program which was later identified as the Braidwood Construction Assessment Program intended by the

.O 3

lO l

=

10.

NRC to address QA problems identified at Braidwood, Keppler deposition, May 20, 1985, Transcript 98, Gardner Transcript 17663: "the fact that we have required the Company to institute a

)

program of the magnitude of BCAP is indicative that we have concerns about construction.

I wouldn't ask them to do that if I didn't have concerns about construction."

Maiman, Tr. 3811-12.

l Neither the NRC nor Edison had identified the existence of harassment, intimidation, production pressure or the lack of authority and organizational freedom in the L.K. Comstock Quality Control program.

The Braidwood Construction Assessment Program j

(BCAP) did not acknowledge or address these problems.

107.

From the inception of the program until the present, t

O the senior Edison quality assurance official has been Walter J.

Shewski, the corporate Manager of Quality Assurance.

Mr. Shewski currently reports to James J. O'Connor, President and Chairman of 10 Commonwealth Edison Company, and serves as the primary source of i

information regarding construction quality assurance activities at Braidwood.

Shewski, Tr. 10121-22.

Mr. Shewski holds the l O' ultimate authority to stop work where conflicts between cost and i

schedule as opposed to quality considerations arise.

Mr. Shewski is also responsible for bringing to Mr. O'Connor for resolution j C) quality vs. production disputes.

Edison's Mr. O'Connor only learned of such problems when he was informed on March 29, 1985, i

that a large number of Comstock QC inspectors had made complaints

)

earlier that day of harassment and intimidation to the NRC site i

residents.

O'Connor Tr. 10073.

Mr. Shewski received neither l

criticism nor reprimand for the NRC's findings of quality l) assurance breakdown in Inspection Report 82-05 (Shewski Tr.

4 l

i

!O

--v-w.-~---a,c-~

...--n

.O-10144), nor any deficiencies in his work performance.

Shewski Tr. 10151.

Mr. Shewski has never recommended a stop work order 3

for construction activity to Mr. O'Connor, nor has he ever asked him to resolve a conflict between the quality assurance and project construction departments.

Shewski Tr. 10188.

Although

' C)

Mr. Shewski, by happenstance, was personally informed of Comstock's improper weld inspection documentation practices through talking directly to weld inspector Richard Martin, he

(3 failed to ensure that the broad scope of the practices was recog-nized or that these improper practices were corrected.

Although Mr. Shewski was informed that Comstock weld inspectors performed jO field inspections of numerous welds reflected only on personal notes documented on formal checklists only after the fact, Mr.

Shewski failed to recognize this evidence of programmatic

()

deficiencies in the Comstock quality control program.

Shewski Tr. 10179-86.

Mr. Shewski holds the opinion that quality control manager Irving DeWald's work performance is " pretty good" and he (3'

is aware of no deficiencies in Mr. DeWald's work, nor that Mr.

DeWald has been placed under the supervision of QA manager Robert t

Seltman.

Shewski Tr. 10186.

l()

108. The position of Quality Control Manager at Comstock was i

held by Robert Brown from April 1980 until November 1982.

He was succeeded by Thomas Corcoran, who, in turn, was replaced by Irvin DeWald in August 1983.

DeWald Tr. 1219-220.

3 109.

Upon becoming QC Manager in 1983, Mr. DeWald en-l countered a backlog of over 14,000 quality control inspections lO not performed, some more than one year old, since the time of 1

5 O

50 installation.

DeWald Tr. 1228.

In addition, Mr. DeWald faced C l

backlog of over 50,000 quality documents which required review for discrepancies.

The documents included the Inspection Reports evidencing the results of electrical quality control inspections for welding, electrical terminations, cable pulling, calibra-tions, material receiving, configurations, and conduits.

In addition, Mr. DeWald was responsible for supervising the quality control inspection activities for the ongoing electrical con-struction work.

DeWald Prefiled at 7, Tr. 1228-1230.

At the

O time Mr. DeWald had available only 36 inspectors to inspect the work of 400 craftsman.

At the time of his testimony DeWald employed approximately 100 inspectors to inspect Comstock's elec-

O trical construction activities.

DeWald Tr. 1230.

110. Daniel Shamblin, Edison's Project Construction Superin-tendent, is the official at Braidwood responsible for administra-O tion of the Braidwood on-site construction contracts, including the contract for the electrical work performed by L.K. Comstock.

Shamblin, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 16274) at 3.

Shamblin has been

(

responsible since May 1984 for monitoring and overseeing both the production and quality control work of L.K. Comstock.

In this i

capacity, Edison's construction superintendent oversees the acti-()

vities of Comstock's Quality Control department.

Id. at 1-5.

As Site Construction Superintendent, Mr. Shamblin is also charged with cost and schedule responsibilities.

Shamblin Tr. 16275-279.

33 111.

Shamblin replaced his predecessor Richard Casaro in the position of Site Superintendent, apparently due to weaknesses in Mr. Casaro's quality assurance activities characterized by Mr.

33 Shamblin as "a lack of documentation to support the quality of 6

i

O l

O the work in the field."

Shamblin held to the view that while the quality of work was always there, there was an absence of the C) evidence of quality required by Commission regulations.

Shamblin Tr. 16281-2.

Shamblin's replacement of Casato was cited by Edison to the NRC as a corrective action for quality assurance O-deficiencies cited in Inspection Report 82-05.

Shamblin Tr.

16283.

In its March 23, 1984, response to the NRC concerns regarding the effectiveness of Constock's QA/QC program reflected

()

in Inspection Reports 83-18/17, Edison noted the creation of a new position " Supervisor of Inspectors" held by Richard Saklak.

Shamblin Tr. 16289.

Noting that Comstock had a current comple-O ment of 51 field inspectors, Edison concluded, " Project Construction is confident that the number of Quality Inspectors is adequate to ensure that timely inspections are performed and

()

that the number of backlogged inspections is reduced."

Int. Ex.

7.

Upon taking the Superintendent position in May of 1984, Shamblin concluded that there was a lack of organization and g'

sufficient inspection personnel to perform these tasks.

Shamblin Tr. 16292-293.

Mr. DeWald continued to believe that the number of QC inspectors were inadequate to the task.

112.

Shortly af ter becoming Construction Superintendent,

)

Mr. Shamblin initiated a series of discussions with Comstock QC Manager DeWald, Project Manager Frank Rolan and other Comstock management regarding the large backlog of uncompleted quality control inspection work.

Shamblin made clear that Edison was very concerned about the large existing backlog, which he calculated as then over 6,000 field inspections not completed.

7 O

iO He emphasized that reduction of this backlog must be the first priority of Comstock's production and quality control personnel.

Shamblin criticized Comstock for its failure to promptly train

,v, recently added personnel.

Shamblin stressed that " positive results (i.e., the significant current inspection backlog reduction) must be seen very shortly."

He required that Comstock construction and quality control meet with him every Monday to report on the previous week's progress in this priority backlog reduction program.

Int. Ex. 8.

O In this June 9, 1984, letter memorializing discussions with Comstock over the preceding weeks, Shamblin established a set of priorities for Comstock Quality Control work, first, the backlog; O

and second, field inspections of ongoing work activity with all other activities assigned lower priority.

Id. at Att. A.

Shamblin further documented a list of 12 action items required of O

Comstock for completion of the work priorities.

Prominent among those assigned exclusively to Comstock Quality Control were the cross training of QC inspectors to improve " personnel availabili-O ty and flexibility," and the review by QC supervisors of "the actual work practices of field inspection personnel with the goal of increasing inspector productivity and resulting inspection O

output."

Id. at Att. B.

None of the action items emphasized enhancing or maintaining the quality of QC inspector work performance.

O 113.

In 1981 Irving oewald worked at Braidwood as a Level II QC inspector for L. K. Comtock.

He, and a few other weld inspectors, including Richard Martin, performed so called " grid O

area basin weld inspections" documenting large numbers of welds 8

O

O on single inspection reports, documenting multiple days' inspec-tion work.

As DeWald states (DeWald Prefiled at 24), "the pro-O cedures were interpreted quite differently" in those days.

Id.

The former inspection and documentation practices followed by Mr.

DeWald and the others raised questions about the acceptability of O

this work.

For example, in December of 1984, inspectors John Walters, Mike Blake and Dan Asmussen encountered a 1979 checklist by Inspector Richard Yankeltis documenting, on a single sheet, O

the inspection and acceptance of 1,166 welds.

In a letter of concern to management Asmussen stated, "I cannot accept a On reject rate for that many welds inspected."

Int. Ex. 18.

One of O

the many hangers listed on the old grid inspection cover sheet happened to be the subject of a 1984 reinspection which identi-fled extensive welding defects not identified in the previous

()

grid inspection.

Mr. Asmussen and the others stressed that at the time the Yankeltis grid inspection report stood as presumably valid evidence of acceptable quality workmanship.

The only re-O Sponse by Asmussen's management was to assure him that such concerns would be addressed somehow, but that no specific remedial program was necessary.

Assistant QC manager Ken O

W cthingt n explained that his concerns would in some unspecified fashion be taken care of by existing corrective action programs including BCAP, which would somehow consider his concerns and, if O

"*"*"t'd' pr Vide appropriate corrective action.

Mr. DeWald added that Asmussen was free to reinspect the component himself.

To suggest that Mr. Asmussen, then assigned to the backlogged d

ument review program, should personally reinspect the 1,166 O

9 O

!O i

welds is patently unreasonable.

Moreover, Dewald's response simply fails to address the inspector's programmatic concerns.

114.

In July, 1982, the newly promoted QC Supervisor

)

i Richard Saklak was charged with the mission by Comstock construc-l tion of trying to bring the quality control department " zoo" under control and to organize a production system for. responding

0 1

to the installation reports from the production department.

Saklak Tr. 8014-15.

At 24 years of age, the young Mr. Saklak had previously been employed as a cost and scheduling engineer at 10 l

Edison's LaSalle station and immediately prior to his QC reassignment had been a planning and scheduling engineer for 4'

i Comstock production.

Saklak Tr. 7992.

He had no prior quality 10 j

control work experience.

Very quickly after Mr. DeWald's appear-t j

ance as quality control manager in august of 1983, he evaulated i

i Mr. Saklak as a "very aggressive individual" who had taken on JO added responsibilities under him, duties that would have been I

performed by Assistant Quality Control Manager "with great enthu-siasm and zest."

DeWald concluded that " Rick is a real asset to the Braidwood QC department."

Int. Ex. 52.

While Mr. DeWald was i

j to maintain this high opinion of Mr. Saklak right up until the i

end of his tenure in April of 1985, his evaluation would prove 1

lC) ironic indeed.

DeWald Profiled at 2733.

l 115.

Prior to November of 1982, Comstock had performed l

inspections of conduits, junction boxes, safety-related cable 3

pans and conduit and cable pan hangars on only a 354 sampling i

l basis.

On September 25, 1982, Edison surveillance discovered that in 84% of the design drawing areas in Unit I containment, i

l(3 absolutely no quality inspections had been performed on any of l

I 10 i

!O i

IO the safety-related installations.

Overall, on an installation design drawing basis, some 69% of the drawing areas "have not had I C) even one QC inspection performed."

The corrective action 're-1 quired to assure adequate quality control coverage was the direc-tion to Comstock QC to perform 1004 inspection of all safety-

{CF related' installations.

Int. sus. 20s, 207.

Despite Comstock QC management's reports that QC manpower was unavailable to cover j

installation and repair inspection requests, Edison determined l(3 that "no additional personnel are required to perform these inspections."

Int. Ex. 226.

By August of 1983, the mounting i

workload and needed QC personnel had produced a backlog of over

{(3 14,000 inspections and 50,000 documents requiring review.

DeWald Profiled at 7.

Int. Ex. 4.

I 116.

Mr. DeWald's predecessor, Thomas Corcoran, had been 1y) removed from his position as Quality Control manager under cir-cumstances that raise questions about the compromise of quality for costs, schedule and production considerations.

As Mr. DeWald 3

understood, Mr. Corcoran was insufficiently attuned to construction practices and requirements and instead exhibited quality consciousness.

DeWald Tr. 1227.

Then-NRC resident in-spector, Leonard McGregor received a phone call from Mr. Corcoran

)

j shortly after his removal as Comstock Quality control manager.

McGregor learned that Corcoran had made quality allegations re-garding Comstock to the NRC.

McGregor was informed that such an 1) allegation had been received by the Commission and referred to j

its Office of Investigation.

He was aware of no further action on the matter.

McGregor, Tr. 11482-484, 11714, Tr. 11828, Tr.

l l

l 11

!O l

!C) 11829; Int. Ex. 48, in canara.

117.

Shortly after he became Comstock's QC manager, DeWald instituted weekly Friday meetings with all QC supervision and

C) inspectors in attendance. DeWald Tr. 1786.

Management used these meetings to report regularly on the status of completed and i

uncompleted installations.

Seese Tr. 2372; Bowman Tr. 6872.

1 0 DeWald relied upon these weekly meetings as a primary means for j

communication with QC inspectors.

DeWald Tr. 1786.

Management usually described those areas of inspection that were behind and g

those areas which needed more manpower allocated to them.

Snyder Tr. 4241.

Assistant QC manager Larry Seese would read the status reports which detailed the progress being made on projects to O

eliminate in8pection backlogs and the projected dates of com-t pletion of those projects.

Snyder Tr. 4243; Bowman Tr. 6871-i 6873; Perryman Tr. 9663.

i-John Seeders testified that at these L

meetings DeWald commented about being under schedule pressure 3

from Edison.

Seeders Tr. 7567.

From these meetings, Seeders j

understood that the quantity of inspections was emphasized over

,0 inspection quality because the weld inspectors would comment that 1

"DeWald wants numbers again" when DeWald pushed inspectors for greater productivity.

Seeders Tr. 7566.

QC inspector Terry l

J 10 Gorman also interpreted these weekly meetings as reflecting man-agement's emphasis of quantity over quality in urging inspectors to perform more inspections.

Gorman Tr. 5798.

Mr. Gorman re-called DeWald's complaints that not enough work was being accom-plished because too many people were sitting around the office I

when they should have been out in the field performing more i

j inspections.

Gorman Tr. 5776-77.

QC inspector Robert Wicks 10 i

12 4

l

!O

-,y,-,--.---

y--,-,,,,-_om,m-

__y-,. _, -,

._c.-..----_,-,.%.,m,_,, - - + - -, _. - ~,

^

TD 7

testifiedthathebelievedquantitywasemphshizedover-quality because Comstock management was trying totmeet Edison-imposed I) deadlines.

Wicks Tr. 77077-78.

It was shop talk among QC in-spectors that Comstock stressed quantity over quality.

Wicks Tr.

7087.

Several inspectors remembered DeWald-talking aNo'ut a mini-13 mum required number of inspection to be performed (Martin Tr.

9240-9241) as an attempt to eliminate inspection backlog._ Bowman Tr. 6866-6867.

(3 118.

Six inspectors testified that Comstock QC management j

was pressuring inspectors for production undee an Edison' threat to cancel the Comstock contract if the inspection backlogxwas not (3

eliminated by certain dates.

Gorman Tr. 5840-41; Holley Tr.

5151-2; Bossong Tr. 9857; Hunter Tr. 8499-0500, 8744-47; Peterson Tr. 5950-5951; Seeders Tr. 7567-7569.

Three inspectors acknow-

'(3 ledged that the threatened loss of Comstock's contract was shop talk among the QC inspectors.

Bossong Tr. 9857; Gorman Tr. 5840-41, 5871, 5884-5885; Seeders Tr. 7568.

Mr. Seeders testified g

that such shop talk was fairly common when Comstock was not meeting its deadlines.

Seeders Tr. 7568.

Inspector Danny Holley recalled a meeting in the summer of 1984 at which QA manager Robert Seltman indicated that if the backlog of inspections was O

not eliminated, it could mean that the livlihood of Comstock at Braidwood would be lost.

Holley Tr. 5151-52.

Inspector R.

D.

Hunter testified that m te than once at the weekly meetings O

during 1984, DeWald had stated that Comstock was in danger of losing its contract if it failed to satisfy certain promised completion dates.

Hunter Tr. 8499-8500, 8655, 8744, 8747.

13 O

C.

N CE

Incpactor D2Gn Patercon raccllcd a Spacial m20 ting where assistant QC manager Larry Seese indicated that things were looking very critical for Comstock and that everyone's help was

()

needed to eliminate the backlog.

Peterson Tr. 5950-5951.

Mr.

DeWald acknowledged such a rumor that Comstock was in jeopardy of losing its electrical contract, however, he recalled the rumor

()

circulating in January, 1985.

DeWald Tr. 1345-1347. Ultimately, Comstock did lose its contract for a portion of the electrical work on Unit II.

The Gus K. Neuberg Company has replaced

()

Comstock for a portion of the Unit II electrical installation and inspection work.

DeWald Tr. 1349.

119.

In order to monitor inspector productivity and manage

()

the inspecton backlog elimination program as well as the performance of inspections on current installations, Comstock's QC management developed a status tracking system.

Under this

()

system, the scheduled completion of various inspection tasks, including the inspection backlogs which existed in the spring of 1984, were projected on the basis of the number of average O

in8pections an individual inspector was expected to perform in a

day, e.g., an average expected level of performance, goal or quota.

Int. Ex. 23; Seese, Prefiled (ff. Tr.2320 at 8-10; Seese

()

Tr. 2350-51; Saklak, Tr. 8116-18.

For example, DeWald's early June, 1984 backlog completion schedule was based on the average of five welding, equipment and configuration inspections per day;

)

six termination inspections per day; and seven conduit inspections per day on average. Int. Ex. 12.

The status report figures showing the number of inspections actually performed were compiled from individual inspectors' daily reports passed through 14 O

O the inspectors' leads summarized and routed to the status department.

Comstock management posted the periodic status l

!iO reports for QC inspectors' information.

Seese Tr. 2498-99; DeWald Tr. 1576-78.

Comstock management acknowledged utilizing the status reports and tracking system to regulate inspector 2 C) overtime assignments, and to transfer inspectors f rom one inspection area to another.

Seese Prefiled (ff. Tr. 2320) at 9; Seese Tr. 2350; [Saklak Tr. 8116-18.]

(3 120.

New finding.

In the case of QC inspector Herschel Stout, QC management acknowledge use of his early inspection status reports as the basis for administering a written reprimand

O low average daily productivity.

On March 19, 1985, QC Manager DeWald delivered a written reprimand to Stout prepared by QC Supervisor Saklak (Stout l<3

' Deposition, Ex. 2.)

In addition, Stout was reprimanded for excessive absenteeism based on a " Monday-Friday" absentee syndrome.

Using Stout's daily status reports, Saklak calculated O

that for the period between January 28 and March 19, 1985, Stout had worked a total of 166.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and had completed a total of 34 inspections.

From this data, Saklak calculated that Stout had performed an average of 1.6 inspections per day.

(Stout g

Dep., Ex. 2.)

Stout's lead, QC inspector Larry Bossong, while agreeing that Stout's productivity was abnormally low expressed the opinion that management's warning was unfair.

g (Bosong, Tr. 9839.)

At the time of the warning DeWald compared Stout's performance to that of other inspectors who were performing 5, 6 or as many as 8 inspections a day.

(Stout, Tr. Dep. 32; 94.)

In 15 O

.O Stout's opinion such use of inspector productivity dcta meant that a quota was being imposed.

(Stout, Tr. 85-86.)

121.

QC inspector Mark Klachko had been employed as an inspector at Comstock since 1982.

He served as a lead welding inspector from August 1983 until February 1985 when he resigned his position to avoid management pressure.

(Klachko Dep. Tr.

O 20;78 Klachko Dep. Ex. 2.)

As a lead inspector Klachko assigned work to Level II inspectors and collected their daily status reports for transmission to Comstock management.

(Klachko Tr.

O 30.)

Klachko believed that Assistant QC Manager Larry Seese was using daily status reports to determine the overall status of the job.

(Klachko, Dep. Tr. 54-55, 193.)

On a number of occasions,

!O Mr. Klachko was approached by Supervisor Saklak and QC Manager DeWald who inquired into the inspection productivity of individual inspectors working for Mr. Klachko. (Klachko, Dep. Tr.

O 32-33.)

Mr. Klachko believed that Saklak and DeWald relied on the individual inspection status reports to monitor inspector productivity.

(Klachko, Dep. Tr. 31-32.)

Saklak and DeWald O'

questioned Klachko regarding disparities in inspector performance.

(Id.)

122.

After hearing from Saklak or DeWald Mr. Klachko would O

tell the inspector in question that he was being watched and that the status reportu were being used as " counts" of individual inspector productivity. (Klachko, Dep. Tr. 33.)

Mr. Klachko was O

aware that individual inspectors were questioned regarding their productivity by supervisors.

(Klachko, Dep. Tr. 35.)

Mr.

Klachko resigned his lead position on February 19, 1985 in order O

to avoid the supervisory pressure and growing inspector morale 16 l

O

. ~_ _.

l

'O problems.

(Klachko, Dep. Tr. 72-79.)

i 123.

QC inspector Danny Holley understood that an average

.O expected performance of 8 or 10 welding and configuration inspections per day was expected through shop talk among the inspectors.

(Holley, Tr. 5117-18, 5127, 5251.)

Inspector Franco 1

13 Rolan also understood that 8 inspections per day were to be j

performed.

(Rolan, Tr. 4862.)

QC inspector Larry Bossong understood from talk among the inspectors that a rate of one 33 inspection per hour represented the average " rule of thumb" although, of course, actual work depended upon the complexity and the accessibility of the component. Bossong Tr. 9963-64.

While

.O Comstock QC management undoubtedly avoided the blatantly improper device of publishing an explicitly precise requirement for minimum daily inspector production - a " quota" - it is apparent O

that DeWald, Saklak and others in Comstock supervision communicated and enforced real expected levels of inspector productivity.

g It is logical that supervision recognized that variations of difficulty would affect inspector work from day to day.

However, it is apparent that average levels of inspector performance measured in completed inspection checklists of work found

'O acceptable - were measured in scheduling the backlog completion l

effort, were monitored in the evaluation of success in meeting, s hedule requirements on a group, crew and individual level; and O

l that low average productivity was sanctioned.

It is noteworth-;

that in counting Mr. Stout's production rate to support his written reprimand, Saklak and DeWald failed to credit Mr. Stout 17 0

r

,..,g.,-e,----,,,

,,,n,-

-. ~ - -

O in several instances for completed inspections where the component was found rejectable instead of acceptable.

For example, Mr. Stout appears to get no credit for the rejectable g) inspection finding on March 5 nor for the two inspections leading to a rejectable finding reported on his February 14 daily inspection status report.

DeWald, Prefiled Att. 4.

124.

Former NRC Braidwood Resident inspector Leonard McGregor described complaints of Comstock management pressure to compromise quality for production or quantity considerations.

In two visits to the site Resident's office in the morning and over the noon break on March 29, 1985, more than 24 Comstock quality control inspectors presented their concerns to McGregor, to the O

other site Resident Robert Schulz and through a conference call to the NRC's regional management.

McGregor and Schulz documented a summary of these concerns in a March 29, 1985 memorandum O

addressed to Mssrs. Warnick and Weil, subject:

" Quality Control Allegations From L.K. Comstock Inspectors."

Mr. Weil subsequently memorialized a summary of the inspectors' statements O'

from notes he made of the conference call in a memorandum to Mr.

Norelius, dated April 5, 1985.

Int. Ex. 42 and Int. Ex. 42A (in camera).

Mr. McGregor testified that at some point during O

the NRC visit by the 24 Comstock inspectors a request was made for a show of hands to determine how many agreed that Comstock QC management was emphasizing quantity over quality.

McGregor O

recalled that inspectors' agreement with the statement was verbally unanimous without abstentions or denials and that he or Schulz relayed that agreement to the region during the conference

-O call.

McGregor, Tr. 17534-35.

QC inspector Herschel Stout 18 O

O testified that he made the statment and requested the show of hands by inspectors.

Stout Dep at 23.

McGregor and Schulz O

noted in their memorandum to Warnick and Weil at 5 and 6, "all of the inspectors stated that they thought quantity was first and quality work or inspections were secondary."

April 5, 1985 memo

.O at 3.

In McGregor and Schulz's March 29, 1985 memo to Warnick and Weil they document a number of inspector statements supporting O

this unanimous understanding that Comstock QC management emphasized quantity over quality.

Inspector X, identified at hearing as Richard Snyder, described his encounter the previous

.O day with QC supervisor Saklak which had precipitated the mass complaints to the NRC the next day.

Saklak's harassment and threat against Snyder was preceded by Saklak's efforts to

(3 pressure Snyder to improperly close out calibration ICRs without engineering review.

Snyder declined citing procedure and he quotes Saklak as saying "No wonder we have such a backlog of g

documents.

You won't evaluate them or close them out."

Later an angry Saklak stormed back and threatened Snyder:

"at times you make me so pissed off that if beating was legal you would be dead."

(Id. at 1.)

Snyder had previously complained about

.g Saklak's lack of certification and qualification in the area he supervises including calibration inspections. (McGregor Tr. 11558)

According to Snyder, Saklak ordered inspectors around on things 3

he knows nothing about.

"It is done just to get the paper work completed so the numbers look good."

(Id. at 2.)

Either Snyder or another inspector recounted the hiring of g

19

.O

jo new leads who, under their only recently enforced probationary policy, were being pressured to make production by Comstock management "Our leads were more or less told in a meeting last

. C)

Friday that as long as our numbers stay down (the numbers of NCRs or ICRs they generate) they (the inspectors) won't be evaluated.

If you don't keep them down to a fair level then you will go back on eight hours - will lose your overtime - and they will jump all over your ass."

(Id. at 3.)

The press for quantity over quality was clearly related by

!O the Comstock inspectors to management's misuse of inspection status reports.

"They are going through our status now (numbers of. inspections completed and numbers of NCRs or ICRs written)

-O they are always interested in numbers - not quality - in fact we had a guy written up last week because he didn't have enough numbers."

This is an apparent reference to the mid-March written

-O reprimand by management against Herschel Stout for low productivity as exhibited by his daily inspector status reports.

(Id. at 3.)

A further comment:

"They don't want somebody who will do the inspection, they want someone to sign the paper."

(Id,.)

Further, "they are going through our status reports now and the word is out now that they are going to weed out three lO inspectors and what they are basing it on is the number and not quality."

(Id.at 4.)

O

.O 20

!O

.O Comstock's emphasis on quantity over quality is evidenced in the minds of complaining inspectors by the old weld inspection

()

and documentation practices from Mr. DeWald's days as a level two inspector:

"This person passed 93 cable pan hangers with 1114 welds and all these welds were accepted.

These 93 cable hangers

'O were completed in one day."

(pa at 5.)

One QC inspector, identified as inspector B, compared Braidwood to his past experience in the industry:

"I have been O

inspecting for 15 years and this is the first nuclear job I have seen where quantity is first - not quality."

(Id. at 5.)

On the basis of these Comstock QC inspector complaints, O

described by Mr. McGregor as unprecedented in number by any prior experience in the industry (McGregor Tr.17549

,),

together with their experience with past quality assurance problems at Comstock

-(3 including inspector harassment complaints and particularly in light of Edison's unwillingness to recognize and promptly correct these problems (McGregor, Tr. 11593 and 11831,) McGregor and Ci Schulz jointly urged a strong and decisive response:

"It appears at first glance with the information we have received or some other aggressive action of the electrical work may g) be necessary to establish the quality of past l

work and the quality of the ongoing work.

The lack of action by CECO QA in this area i

needs to be addressed along with CECO management's slowness or inability to take corrective action.

The resident inspectors

.O appraised CECO management last fall of the problems in L.K. Comstock quality control department."

Id. at 6.

O As the record in this proceeding tragically reflects, work 21 O

O was not stopped at Comstock.

The harassment and production pressure concerns by the many Comstock inspectors were not 13 seriously investigated and corrected.

No one addressed the lack of action by Edison management or quality assurance on these problems; and, most seriously, no action has yet been taken to

'O establish the quality of past work and the quality of the work that continued af ter March 1985 under the flawed Comstock quality control program.

O 125.

In April 1984, Comstock quality control management at the corporate level adopted a new salary structure for Level II QC inspectors providing for a minimum of $12.00 per hour with O

additional.50 per hour increments for each aditional certification obtained by the inspector.

The cross-training of Comstock inspectors was seen by Edison and QC management as a 13 means for improving productivity through enhanced QC availability and flexibility.

Int. Ex. 8 at Att. B.

The administration of this new cross certification and salary plan proved problem

' Cj ridden from the start and simply represented another tool for management reward and punishment of inspector productivity and l

l another source of pressure on the Comstock inspectors.

Very early in the program QC manager DeWald made clear the limits of g

this new cross training program.

In a memorandum for all QC personnel DeWald quoted corporate Manager Marino who had l

announced the plan:

"the training is up to the individual and g

not a scheduled item."

DeWald stressed that there would be no letup in inspector productivity in order to accomplish the cross training required for additional certifications and additional 22 O

i

i O

pay.

"All daily work assignments are to be accomplished prior to cross training.

This, too, will mean the training may have to be done on the individual's own time.

Also, that the lead, QC n

.v Supervisor and Asst. Manager will coordinate the training to ensure all QC commitments are covered prior to training."

Int.

Ex. 254.

DeWald Prefiled at 9-11; DeWald Tr. 1735; Int. Ex. 9.

Despite the promised fairness of the new salary scheme, new inspectors continued to be paid premium wages -- some at $16 per hour rather than the $12 per hour rate paid to existing

'O inspectors.

Snyder Tr. 4031; Rolan Tr. 4955; Bossong Tr. 9946; Klatchko Dep, at 73-74.

Inspectors were not only unhappy with the resumed salary disparities, but with the obligation to O

promptly train the new inspectors who were already being paid more than their trainers.

DeWald Prefiled at 14; Shamblin Prefiled at 24.

Ironically consistent with Comstock's

O retaliatory practices, Mr. DeWald's remedy for the inspectors' discovery of the pay disparity was to dismiss the QC Department secretary responsible for leaking the information to the QC work force.

Att. 5 to DeWald Prefiled, "J.

Seeders' Letter of l

Accusations and Concerns," at 2.

126. The most striking example of asserted poor quality O

inspection performance is reflected in the history of Inspector Richard Martin.

Ironically, the sanctions imposed by management l

upon Mr. Martin appeared to relate to Mr. Martin's failure to O

meet productivity standards and his expression of quality concerns.

Mr. Martin's only sanction for poor quality performance came because at the instance of Edison when Martin O

was found to have xeroxed weld inspection checklists.

23 0

O Ironically, Mr. Martin was the fall guy for a practice sanctioned by his supervision and motivated by Martin's response to production pressure and his belief that such a practice would I O expedite his inspection work.

In its rebuttal case, Edison acknowledges a number of cases of poor inspector work performance as measured by unacceptably high reject rates disclosed in the

O PTL overinspection of their work.

There is simply no evidence of any warnings, reprimands, or other adverse action by supervision against these inspectors for the clearest cases of poor performance; failure to detect large numbers of rejectable conditions.

For example, consider the cases of Danny Holley and Assmussen.

Marcus Prefiled.20-24, 28-29(ff Tr. 15568).

O 127. QC supervisor Richard Saklak came to the Quality Control Department with no Quality Control work experience or training.

Saklak's background was in cost and scheduling; and his mission

O was to straighten out the QC department.

Des;ite clear program-i matic as well as explicit procedural requirements that he and l

other supervisors be trained and certified in the areas of

'O inspection which they supervised, up to the very end of his tenure at Comstock QC, Mr. Saklak failed to obtain needed training and to undergo required testing and certification in the O

inspection disciplines which he supervised.

In February of 1984 DeWald noted that Saklak required qualification in a total of seven disciplines: penetrations, cable tray, welding, configura-O tions, calibrations, equipment, and receiving.

He set a deadline of June 1 for Mr. Saklak to obtain certification in all of these areas.

Int. Ex. 253.

June came and went and in July of 1984, O

DeWald noted again that Procedure 4.1.2 required him to be 24 0

~

O

" qualified / trained in the areas you are assigned responsibility for."

DeWald merely asked for a projection completion date.

(3 Int. Ex. 276.

Less than a month before his termination, DeWald once again informed Saklak in writing, "You are required to j

become certified in the areas of your responsibility, and then

O proceed to the remaining areas as soon as possible."

Int. Ex.

219.

Obviously, little importance was attached to these idle proddings.

QC Management's actions in failing to assure qualifi-O cation and formal training for QC Supervision spoke far more loudly than the ineffectual procedures or idle memos from DeWald.

The clear message to QC inspectors was that knowledge,

(3 experience, and qualifications in the areas of Comstock's quality control work were valued less than the overriding objective of meeting production requirements.

Saklak himself acknowledged as

()

much when he observed that obtaining formal certifications appeared to be of relatively lower priority than getting the work done.

33-Ultimately, only after the NRC received allegations from Mr.

Snyder about the clear procedural violations involved in Saklak's lack of certifications, and after the March 29, 1985, mass l

mplaints by Comstock inspectors to the NRC, did Comstock O

finally make formal acknowledgement of their failures to ensure qualification, training and certification of supervisors.

Nonconformance Report 4528 was initiated September 17, 1985, by

. O Mr. DeWald.

It notes deficiencies in supervisor qualifications in violation of Procedure 4.1.2, paragraph 1.25, " Position Deliniation," Rev. 61581.

Under that procedure, supervisors 25 O

Kast, Saklak, Hall, Phillips, and Brown lacked required j

certifications in the areas supervised, in particular for the period August '83 through September

'84, Mr. Saklak was assigned supervisory responsibilities over all inspection areas.

He was certified, however, only in cable pull, terminations, conduit and CEAs.

"The procedure violation occurred throughout the entire

)

period R. Saklak held the position of QC supervisor as he was not certified in all areas he supervised."

The nonconformance report I

also notes that under later revisions of the procedure, supervisors R. Tuite, J. Hii, J. Walters, A. Simile and K.

Worthington were also in violation of the procedure for failure to obtain training and certification in all areas supervised.

Of

)

particular note, General QC Supervisor Tony Simile became certified in the area of visual weld inspection only on July 12, 1985, as a Level III, although he supervised welding and J

configurations until March 27, 1985, and all inspection areas thereafter.

Int. Ex. 24.

Ironically, the corrective action for this NCR excuses Mr. Simile's lack of certification on the basis

)

that only a Level II capability was required by the ANSI standard and "a review of Mr. Simile's resume provides sufficient past experience and qualifications prior to 9/84 in order to satisfy

)

the Level II capability requiremente of ANSI N 45.2.6 (1978).

Mr. Worley Puckett was purportedly fired for possessing such qualifications.

In resolution of the nonconforming condition, no

[)

action whatsoever was required to review the effects of the lack of qualifications on the Comstock QC program.

In fact, the Comstock procedure was revised to eliminate certification as a 9

mandatory precondition for supervisory work.

Int. Ex. 24 at 10.

26 0

!O 128. Former QC Supervisor Richard Saklak's abusive bullying and harassing treatment of inspectors with respect to their (3

performance of their inspection activities was the subject of testimony by virtually all of the QC inspectors who appeared before the Licensing Board.

Comstock management was fully aware

()

of Saklak's temperment but considered him an effective and capable supervisor nontheless.

DeWald, Prefiled (ff. Trl700 ) at 29; DeWald, Tr. 1287-88, 1760, 1850, 1910; Seltman, Prefiled (ff.

[

()

Tr.

) at 22-23; Seltman, Tr. 2060, 2063-64; Seece, Prefiled (Tr.,

,) at 22; Int. Ex. 44.

The QC inspectors who worked under Mr. Saklak, of course, saw things differently.

Mustered, Tr.

O 4970-4975.

Seeders, Tr. 7367, 7370-72, 7438.

Rolan, Tr. 4668-

[

74.

Martin, Tr. 8439 8451; Holley, Tr. 5100; Martin, Tr. 9439-40, 9449-50; Martin Tr. 9412-13, 9416, 9423, 9424-26.

Martin

()

9417-9420.

Perryman (as a witness to Saklak threats to Supervisor Joe Hii.)

Tr. 9640-9643.

On the way back to the field office in Perryman's presence, Saklak said of Joe Hii: "If J e Hii was utside r s mething he'd kick the shit out of him or O

something like that."

Tr. 9643.

Joe Hii recalls that Saklak lost his temper and yelled at him for not finishing a project on time.

Hii, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 16608) at 4.

Snyder Tr. 4182 4196.

O Int. Ex. 42 and 42A.

129. QC Manager Irving DeWald generally lacked the respect of the Comstock Quality Control inspectors either for his

)

technical knowledge of electrical and structural installation and inspection disciplines, his leadership and skilla as a manager, I

his general personality, or his willingness to stand up for 27 O

'O quality in the face of production pressure.

In short, the QC inspectors at Comstock held Mr. DeWald in very low regard, saw him as a poor role model for quality and, most charitably, felt 3

sorry for him for his withdrawn and troubled personality.

As Inspector Dean Peterson put it: "To put it honestly, I couldn't have a lower opinion of him."

As a person, as a manager of QC inspectors, as to his inter-personal skills with employees, as to his seeming ignorance in the field and his lack of managerial skills.

Peterson, Tr. 5964.

"If I had any questions, he would probably be the last person I would go to."

Id.

Mr. DeWald lacked the respect of the Quality Control department according to Inspector Franco Rolan.

Rolan, Tr. 4838.

DeWald was O

inaccessible and cold.

"He was not the sort of man who would 4

come by and say ' Good morning' he'd walk right past you and never speak to you."

Bowman, Tr. 6909.

QC Inspector Danny Holley, the O

soft-spoken and gentle man with hardly a harsh word to say about anyone, recounted his efforts to privately alert Mr. DeWald to the growing problems at Comstock.

DeWald acknowledged the morale problem among the inspectors, but said it was something we would have to live with.

Mr. Holley volunteered to assist Mr. DeWald in addressing the morale problem among the inspectors and

<3 recounted to him similar efforts he had undertaken at the request of his company commander in the Army.

Holley, Tr. 5246.

After several private meetings with DeWald in which DeWald was on the

'()

whole unresponsive, Mr. Holley simply gave up.

Mr. Holley conceded that DeWald was responsive in one instance:

Well, in one instance, I had to be blunt with the man because he was not a very personable 13 man you know.

For example when he would come 28 10

=. _. _

0 in the morning into the office he would walk up the stairs and people would.say, ' Good morning, Irv' or ' Good morning, Mr. DeWald,' and he would sort of look at them and walk past and lO never say nothing to them, like he always had a chip on his shoulder or something.

In one of our meetings I told him 'A lot of people look down on you because of that.'

After that particular meeting, for a week or two weeks, when he would come in the morning he would say

' Good morning.'

He'd sit down and chat with iO people.

Then he sort of reverted back to his

-- his old self.

l Holley, Tr. 5250.

It's not like at least some of the inspectors didn't try to get along with QC Manager DeWald.

.O 130. QC Inspector Larry Perryman recounted an instance with DeWald and former Edison construction superintendent Casaro that reflected poorly on Mr. DeWald's knowledge of inspection O

techniques as well as on both gentlemen's emphasis on work quantity over quality.

DeWald was unhappy with Mr. Perryman's documentation on NCRs and ICRs of numerous instances of

'O undersized welds on cable pan hangers in the unit 2 switch gear j

room.

The documents reached DeWald for review.

He and Edison's construction superintendent Mr. Casaro came out to the location lCi and asked Perryman to point out the hanger with the 28 undersized welds.

Upon pointing out the welds in question, DeWald became irate.

DeWald said that he believed the welds were of sufficient C) size, but only got angry when Perryman handed him his fillet l

gauge so that he could measure them himself.

Edison's Mr. Casaro turned to another hanger and stated that the welds were long (3

enough.

Perryman, Tr. 9648-49.

Perryman agreed, but stated that the weld was in the wrong place.

Casaro responded, "Well, I'll have the design document changed."

Perryman said to let him know O

when that had been accomplished and he would reinspect.

29 O

O Soon thereafter, DeWald returned with Stu Klevens from Sargent & Lundy, a Level III weld inspector.

Perryman resented O

DeWald's effort to override his inspection findings.

Perryman, Tr. 9650.

When DeWald first observed the undersized welds, Perryman O

had asked him to check the size himself using Perryman's weld fillet gauge.

DeWald employed the wrong end of the gauge to measure the weld size.

When Perryman pointed that out to him,

(3 "he got kind of hostile about it and threw it down and said he never used that end."

Perryman suggested that he'd better start.

Mr. Perryman expressed his disbelief that Mr. DeWald was O

unfamiliar with the proper use of such a basic tool of weld inspection issued to all weld inspectors, and included in weld inspector training and certification tests.

Perryman, Tr. 9650-

O 51.

131. QC Manager Irving DeWald held a Level III welding inspector certification pursuant to Comstock's Braidwood O

Procedure 4.1.3.

As part of his certification procedure, Mr.

i DeWald completed a written proficiency or general exam, scoring only 85% in October 24, 1983.

Mr. DeWald acknowledged that the

c) questions he missed sought basic information expected to be known by a Level III weld inspector.

DeWald, Tr.

This is the same exam administered to Level II welding inspectors.

Several years later, during the process of upgrading inspector

()

qualifications to the more recent revision D of Procedure 4.1.3, Mr. DeWald was required to take a mock field practical welding examination.

Mr. DeWald not only failed to score the required

O l

30 l

10

iO 1004, but he failed to identify deficiencies on three of the six welds examined.

The conclusion that Mr. DeWald had flunked his welding inspector practical was reviewed and approved by g_

Assistant QC Manager Larry Seese, who required QC Manager DeWald to complete an additional one-hour lecture, 8-hour lecture / demonstration, 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> on the job training, and an additional successful practical exam.

Int. Ex. 17.

132.

There was a general and consistent belief among QC inspectors that QC Manager Irv DeWald, as a Level II weld inspector in 1980-81, had signed a checklist documenting his inspection of 1000 or more welds in a single day.

Eight of the QC inspectors who testified were aware through general talk among O

the inspectors of a DeWald 1000 plus checklist, but had not seen it themselves.

(Hunter, Tr. 8495-98; Martin, Tr. 8495-98; Martin, Tr. 8294, 8332-33; Mustered, Tr. 5061-62, 5087; Rolan, Tr. 4762-63, 4770-71; Stout Dep. Tr. 144-145; Klachko Dep. Tr.

192, 265-66; Hii, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 16608) at 3; Gorman, Tr.

5817-18, 5828)

Six of the inspectors that testified claimed to

.O have actually seen one or more DeWald 1000 weld checklists.

(Bossong, Tr. 9848-50; Bowman, Tr. 6890-91; Holley, Tr. 5154-56; Perryman, Tr. 9653-57; Peterson, Tr. 5933, 5935)

O Inspector Wicks actually saw such a checklist signed by Mr.

DeWald (Wicks, Tr. 7154).

He spoke to other inspectors about DeWald's checklist, including others who had actually seen it.

O Wicks, Tr. 7155.

Inspector R.D.

Hunter understood that the existence of such a DeWald 1000 weld checklist was common knowledge among the QC inspectors.

Hunter, Tr. 8732.

He O

recalled that Inspectors Terry Gorman and Jeff Hutson came across 31 O

'O the DeWald checklist during a document review in the QC vault.

Hunter, Tr. 8733.

QC Inspector Gorman testified that the general C) consensus among inspectors was that "it was impractical to do that many weld inspections in one day and do them quality minded or accurately."

Gorman, Tr. 5819.

QC Inspector Larry Perryman

'(3 encountered a checklist documenting the inspection of 1039 welds signed by Mr. DeWald.

Mr. Perryman encountered this DeWald checklist in the course of the backlog effort in early 1984.

He

.(3 was attempting to trace a Hanger Installation Report (HIR) to a valid inspection checklist in the QC vault.

The HIR would be traceable to a single original inspection checklist or Form 19

O documenting acceptance of many components and welds in a large area referred to only as a " grid square."

Photoccpied or

" reconstituted" checklists were made for each hanger included in

()

the original grid.

The 1039 weld checklist signed by DeWald was one of these.

Perryman, Tr. 9653-54.

QC Inspector Danny Holley recalls coming across one of Mr. DeWald's reports in the vaults.

!ci "The report covered a whole room of supports, and there was 1000 welds plus on it, and he had signed it of f all in one day."

Holley, Tr. 5155.

Mr. Holley recalls seeing such a DeWald checklist several times before and after DeWald returned as QC g)

Manager, Tr. 5156.

Mr. Holley even recalled that the DeWald checklist was for welds reflected on a specific drawing number for an area where Mr. Holley had done a lot of work.

Tr. 5159.

g As Mr. Holley recalls, "Everybody talked about those records Tr. 5157.

QC Inspector Thurman Bowman recalls being shown the DeWald 1000 weld checklist in the QC vault area by Inspector 32 O

1 1

O Don Coss.

Bowman, Tr. 6890-93.

It reflected the inspection on a single day of over 1100 welds.

Tr. 6892.

Although he originally understood from the signature and date that such inspections had

)

been accomplished in one day, Mr. Bowman has since been informed that the checklist could have been the result of several days' work.

Tr. 6892.

At the direction of Tony Simile, Mr. Dowman undertook a search for this checklist during the course of the proceeding, but was unable to locate the document.

Bowman, Tr.

6894; Bowman, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 16000).

O Mr. DeWald himself states that he is " pretty certain" that he has never documented 1000 or more welds on a single inspection checklist.

DeWald, Tr. 1492.

He says he doubts that it was

O possible that he ever did so.

Id.

However, when asked in deposition the maximum number of welds he had documented on a single checklist, Mr. DeWald could not remember and until found O

in a casual search through his old weld inspection checklists, he had not recalled documenting as many as 551 welds on a single inspection checklist.

DeWald, Tr. 1500.

Int. Ex. 19.

Mr.

O DeWald himself graphically described the early weld inspection practices:

Because there was just a small amount of inspec-tors there at the time of following quite a large number of craft, and they would complete an area -- and this is my understanding -- they would complete an area, document it on the PTL sheet, and fill out the inspection report on O

various days; and they did not do it each and every day that they done the inspections.

DeWald, Tr. 1479.

This was Mr. DeWald's understanding of the inspection practices followed in the days of Mr. Yankeitis' 1166 33 0

O weld checklist, Int. Ex. 18.

DeWald confirmed that these were the practices employed by him and the handful of other weld inspectors during the period November, 1980 until October, 1981,

()

when he served as a Level II weld inspector.

DeWald, Tr. 1479-80.

Although DeWald heard through his supervisors that rumors of his 1000 welds in one day inspection were circulating among the

)

inspectors, he took no action to address their concerns because he felt he had done nothing wrong.

DeWald, Tr. 1489.

133.

QC Inspector Richard Martin had served as a weld inspector along with Mr. DeWald.

Mr. Martin described the weld inspection documentation practices in those days under Mr.

DeWald's tutelage.

Martin, Tr. 8343-78, 9384-97, 9583-84, 9606-07.

As a rule, no official documentation of rejectable conditions was ever made unless the craft couldn't fix the defect promptly, only then would an Inspection Correction Report be O

issued writing up the defect.

Tr. 8349.

Martin would simply note rejectable conditions in his personal notebook without indicating the identity of the welder or the particular weld l0 found defective.

Tr. 8351.

Only acceptable items were documented on the official weld inspection checklists.

Tr. 8352.

l This system employed by Martin and the others for performing and C) documenting weld inspections was not provided for by any comstock j

quality procedure.

Tr. 8358.

Mr. Martin recalls in those days actually inspecting on the order of 300 or 350 welds in one day.

IO Tr. 6376.

1 It was not until October of 1983 when, by happenstance, the practice of documenting weld inspections on personal notebooks O

and completing checklists later not in the office came to an end.

34 10

.O Edison's corporate Quality Assurance Manager, Walter Shewski, questioned Comstock management regarding audit findings of

' C) xeroxed checklists.

He wes apparently concerned that such photocopying evidenced document falsification.

As Mr. Martin describes the incident: "There were a lot of CECO auditors there.

O There were auditors from Byron.

I explained to Mr. Shewski that I took my notes and filled my checklist out.

He asked me if I took a procedure with me.

I said no.

I did not have a O

procedure.

He asked me if I filled the checklist out -- excuse me.

He asked me if I took the checklist and used it for points of inspection as I inspected the weldings; and I said no, I did

'O not.

At that point he simply said, ' Retrain him,' and that was it.

That was the meeting."

Martin, Tr. 9575.

Shortly thereafter Mr. DeWald gathered the QC inspectors together and

!<3 directed that they begin to use the checklists in the field.

Tr.

9576.

Of course, all of the weld inspectors have been following the practice employed by Mr. Martin of completing the checklists 43 from their personal notes only after they left the field, a practice they had been trained in by Mr. DeWald.

Martin, Tr.

9577.

The only rationale for following the shoddy inspection and

g) documentation practices employed in the days of Mr. DeWald's service as a Level II weld inspector was to permit a spartan quality control force to meet the production demands of the

.O welding crews.

The shortcut of completing quality documentation only long after the inspector left not only the specific welds to be documented but the field itself represents a fundamental abuse 35

'O u..

-,---mey--,.m, _ - - - - - -.. -,, _ -, - -. -. - - -,

--1, q

w

'O of sound quality control practices and the requirements of the Commission's Quality Assurance Criteria for recording inspection results as evidence of acceptable quality.

Production pressure g) is simply the only understandable explanation for such corner-cutting.

DeWald's lack of knowledge of inspection techniques, his old welding inspection practices and his training of inspector Martin in such techniques as interpreted through the folklore and shop talk of the inspectors years later established a discreditable model of disrespect for quality.

!O 134.

Edison's production pressure on Comstock Quality i

Control to eliminate the inspection backlog was translated directly by Comstock management into pressure on the QC

!O inspectors to increase productivity.

On June 16, 1984 QC Manager DeWalc of supervisors Saklak and Worthington a " plan of how we can improve the inspection output" which he described as an action 10 item assigned by " corporate and CECO PCD."

Int.'Ex. 269.

j Notes from a June 27, 1984 Comstock QC staff meeting attended by DeWald, Worthington, Saklak and Seese note that even Mr. Saklak 10'

" points out that in the Rush for the Quantity of Inspections, the Quality of paperwork has slipped."

Int. Ex. 272.

As pressures i

mounted, the effects began to take their toll on the QC 3

inspectors.

The rapidly eroding morale and widespread complaints of inspectors was communicated to QC management.

DeWald l

documents the results of suggestions forms submitted by

. O inspectors the end of June 1984 including concerns about inspection documentation practices, communication between supervision and inspectors, the need to protect QC independence O

from construction influence including more inspector backing from

)

i 36 1

O l

O their management, lack of trust and confidence in management, myriad training problems, complaints about salary and benefits, C) concerns regarding inspector burnout from excessive overtime and failure to emphasize QC quality not quantity.

Int. Ex. 274.

Though apprised of these concerns, QC management showed little C) interest in taking other than cosmetic action in the face of Edison's continued production demands.

Id.

135.

Through the use of average expected levels of C) inspector performance and inspector status reports on completed work, Comstock management continued to monitor the backlog completion schedule.

That schedule for mid-July 1984 assumes a C) production rate of nine welding and configuration inspections per day and nine junction box and small equipment inspections per day.

On July 23, 1984 Mr. DeWald notes a " drastic drop in the

()

number of inspections performed," during the week of July 13-19, 1984.

He directs a review to determine root cause and notes that such reduced productivity "is impacting all previously estimated

()

completion dates."

Int. Ex. 287.

136.

Production pressure is felt directly by QC supervisor Saklak, who responds to a DeWald August 6, 1984 memo noting his

()

failure to accomplish an audit response in time by noting all of the conflicting demands on him and the inspectors he supervises.

Int. Ex. 277.

C) 137.

By early october, 1984, when the QC inspection backlogs were to have been eliminated, Assistant Manager Larry Seese notes that there is a steady increase in the number of inspections not C) completed in the current group.

Int. Ex. 283.

Elimination of 37 0

O the backlog had simply produced slippages in the completion of current inspections.

138.

Edison's construction superintendent Dan Shamblin compliments QC manager Irv DeWald on September 25, 1984, for the completion of the backlog inspections.

He notes, ironically, O

that the efforts of Comstock's QC management and inspectors will ensure that "Braidwood Station will be completed and will receive a license."

Att. 3 to Shamblin, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 16274).

By

()

October 4, 1984, Shamblin declares that the " morale question" among Comstock QC inspector is " closed."

He notes a laundry list of actions almost wholly cosmetic in nature which he asserts will

()

be effective in solving whatever problems may exist.

Such ineffectual devices as holding an after-hours pizza party, scheduling a picnic and installing a kitchen unit for the QC O

inspectors reflect the tenor of Edison's lack of seriousness about these problems.

In his report to Project Manager Mike Wallace, Mr. Shamblin emphasizes: "While we will never be able to

()'

satisfy every individual, I believe the actions are responsive to the concerns."

For the part of Comstock Quality Control management, Edison notes that the QC Manager and his assistant

()

reviewed Comstock policy stating that QA personnel "are independent from the pressures of production.

It is the policy of the L.K. Comstock and Company, Inc. that the quality of the

()

work comes first versus the quantity of the work."

Att. 4 to Shamblin, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 16274).

Such words are, of course, hollow.

Contrary actions by Edison and Comstock management speak far m re 1 udly t the Comstock QC inspectors.

Ironically, O

38 O

O-Shamblin's words come only days after ratifying the retaliatory treatment of former inspector John Seeders and on the heels of his endorsement of the discriminatory termination of Level III inspector Worley Puckett.

139.

The perceptions among Comstock QC inspectors of harassment and pressure to compromise quality continued to grow during this period.

In early 1985 Edison instituted a new allegations management program, known as " Quality First."

Base line interviews were conducted with all site quality control

'O inspectors, including those of L.K. Comstock Company.

The Comstock inspectors raised a number of concerns regarding emphasis on quantity over quality.

As a matter of course, the

O investigation of these complaints would have been assigned to Construction Superintendent Dan Shamblin.

However, in these cases, his superior, Edison's Manager of Projects, Tom Maiman put O

all Comstock complaint investigations on hold pending the l

I resolution of the labor management conflict which Edison saw as the force behind the inspectors' complaints.

Maiman, Tr. 3850-O' 53.

Mr. Maiman saw no conflict of interest in Mr. Shamblin's investigation of QC inspector complaints of undue production pressure.

Id.

Only after the 24 Comstock QC inspectors C) complained in mass to the NRC of harassment and pressure to compromise quality did Mr. Maiman on March 29, 1985, direct the immediate initiation of action to investigate the long-pending O

complaints.

Maiman, Tr. 3859.

Again, Mr. Shamblin, who was the source of the production pressure on Comstock, was assigned responsibility for investigating these production pressure C) complaints.

39 O

'O 140.

Mr. Shamblin's investigation was a mere sham.

Of course, he never seriously investigated himself or Edison's key C

role in imposing a production pressures on Comstock Quality Control inspectors.

Predictably, he concluded that Comstock's Quality Control management was not concerned more about C) production than quality and that the QC department was effectively implementing its policy of assuring independence of Quality Control inspectors from production pressure.

Except for O

the case of Mr. Saklak, who was sacrificed, Edison's Mr. Shamblin concluded that no other cases of intimidation or harassment had been found.

Int. Ex. 22.

No substantive changes were called for O

in the operation of the Comstock quality control program.

And in the case of Mr. Saklak, Edison didn't even have the courtesy to tell him directly what, if anything, he had done wrong or why he

()

had been barred from employment at Edison's nuclear sites.

Int.

Exs. 37, 38 and 39.

Curiously, Comstock's formal action with respect to Mr. Saklak's harassment of Mr. Snyder was not to O

discharge him for misconduct, but to simply treat him as " laid off."

Id.

This action suggests strongly that Mr. Saklak was sacrified to placate the NRC, and that Edison and Comstock lacked

(3 any conviction that Saklak was guilty of wrongdoing.

After al, he had been the subject of praise in his loyal pursuit of the Company's production objective up until the end.

numbers."

This is an apparent reference to the mid-March written 43 reprimand by management against Herschel Stout for low I

j productivity as exhibited by his daily inspector status reports.

(Id. at 3.)

A further comment:

"They don't want somebody who 40 10 i

O will do the inspection, they want someone to sign the paper."

(Id.)

Further, "they are going through our status reports now and the word is out now that they are going to weed out three O

inspectors and what they are basing it on is the number and not quality."

(Id.at 4.)

Comstock's emphasis on quantity over quality is evidenced in the minds of complaining inspectors by the old weld inspection and documentation practices from Mr. DeWald's days as a level two inspector:

"This person passed 93 cable pan hangers with 1114 welds and all these welds were accepted.

These 93 cable hangers were completed in one day."

(Id. at 5.)

One QC inspector, identified as inspector B, compared 10 Braidwood to his past experience in the industry:

"I have been inspecting for 15 years and this is the first nuclear job I have seen where quantity is first - not quality."

(Id. at 5.)

O on the basis of these Comstock QC inspector complaints, described by Mr. McGregor as unprecedented in number by any prior experience in the industry (McGregor Tr.

),

together with

,O' their experience with past quality assurance problems at Comstock including inspector harassment complaints and particularly in light of Edison's unwillingness to recognize and promptly correct these problems (McGregor, Tr. 11593 and 11831,) McGregor and Schulz jointly urged a strong and decisive response:

O "It appears at first glance with the information we have received or some other aggressive action of the electrical work may be necessary to establish the quality of past work and the quality of the ongoing work.

The lack of action by CECO QA in this area O

needs to be addressed along with CECO 41 0

O management's slowness or inability to take corrective action.

The resident inspectors appraised CECO management last fall of the problems in L.K. Comstock quality control

'O department."

Id,. at 6.

As the record in this proceeding tragically reflects, work was not stopped at Comstock.

The harassment and production g

pressure concerns by the many Comstock inspectors were not seriously investigated and corrected.

No one addressed the lack of action by Edison management or quality assurance on these problems; and, most seriously, no action has yet been taken to establish the quality of past work and the quality of the work that continued after March 1985 under the flawed Comstock quality control program.

125.

In April 1984, Comstock quality control management at the corporate level adopted a new salary structure for Level II O

QC inspectors providing for a minimum of $12.00 per hour with additional.50 per hour 'ncrements for each aditional certification obtained by the inspector.

The cross-training of O

Comstock inspectors was seen by Edison and QC management as a means for improving productivity through enhanced QC availability and flexibility.

Int. Ex. 8 at Att.

B.

The administration of O

this new cross certification and salary plan proved problem ridden from the start and simply represented another tool for management reward and punishment of inspector productivity and another source of pressure on the Comstock inspectors.

Very early in the program QC manager DeWald made clear the limits of l

this new cross training program.

In a memorandum for all QC O

personnel DeWald quoted corporate Manager Marino who had 42

,0

O announced the plan:

"the training is up to the individual and not a scheduled item."

DeWald stressed that there would be no O

letup in inspector productivity in order to accomplish the cross training required for additional certifications and additional pay.

" All daily work assignments are to be accomplished prior to O

cross training.

This, too, will mean the training may have to be done on the individual's own time.

Also, that the lead, QC Supervisor and Asst. Manager will coordinate the training to O

ensure all QC commitments are covered prior to training."

Int.

Ex. 254.

DeWald Prefiled at 9-11; DeWald Tr. 1735; Int. Ex. 9.

Despite the promised fairness of the new salary scheme, new 0

inspectors continued to be paid premium wages -- some at $16 per hour rather than the $12 per hour rate paid to existing inspectors.

Snyder Tr. 4031; Rolan Tr. 4955; Bossong Tr. 9946; O

Klatchko Dep. at 73-74.

Inspectors were not only unhappy with the resumed salary disparities, but with the obligation to promptly train the new inspectors who were already being paid (y

more than their trainers.

DeWald Prefiled at 14; Shamblin Prefiled at 24.

Ironically consistent with Comstock's retbliatorypractices,Mr.DeWald'sremedyfortheinspectors' i~ discovery of the pay disparity was to dismiss the QC Department

()

secretary responsible for leTr.iri the information to the QC work force.

Att. 5 to DeWald ? ct'i al, "J.

Seeders' Letter of Accusations.

Concers," at 2.

and O

126. The most striking example of asserted poor quality inspeccion performance is reflected in the history of Inspector Richard Martin.

Ironically, the sanctions imposed by management O

upon Mr. Martin. appeared to relate to Mr. Martin's failure to 43

O meet productivity standards and his expression of quality concerns.

Mr. Martin's only sanction for scor quality

()

performance came because at the instance of Edison when Martin was found to have xeroxed weld inspection checklists.

Ironically, Mr. Martin was the fall guy for a practice sanctioned (3

by his supervision and motivated by Martin's response to production pressure and his belief that such a practice would expedite his inspection work.

In its rebuttal case, Edison O

acknowledges a number of cases of poor inspector work performance as measured by unacceptably high reject rates disclosed in the PTL overinspection of their work.

There is simply no evidence of O

any warnings, reprimands, or other adverse action by supervision against these inspectors for the clearest cases of poor performance; failure to detect large numbers of rejectable O

conditions.

For example, consider the cases of Danny Holley and Assmussen.

Cite to Marcus Prefiled.

127. QC supervisor Richard Saklak came to the Quality Control I Ci Department with no Quality Control work experience or training.

Saklak's background was in cost and scheduling; and his mission was to straighten out the QC department. Despite clear program-9 matic as well as explicit procedural requirements that he and other supervisors be trained and certified in the areas of inspection which they supervised, up to the very end of his tenure at Comstock QC, Mr. Saklak failed to obtain needed O

training and to undergo required testing and certification in the inspection disciplines which he supervised.

In February of 1984 DeWald noted that Saklak required qualification in a total of g

44 O

O seven disciplines: penetrations, cable tray, welding, configura-tions, calibrations, equipment, and receiving.

He set a deadline f June 1 f r Mr. Saklak to obtain certification in all of these

.O areas.

Int. Ex. 253.

June came and went and in July of 1984, DeWald noted again that Procedure 4.1.2 required him to be

" qualified / trained in the areas you are assigned responsibility for."

DeWald merely asked for a projection completion date.

Int. Ex. 276.

Less than a month before his termination, DeWald once again informed Saklak in writing, "You are required to become certified in the areas of your responsibility, and then proceed to the remaining areas as soon as possible."

Int. Ex.

219.

Obviously, little importance was attached to these idle

O proddings.

QC Management's actions in failing to assure qualifi-cation and formal training for QC Supervision spoke far more loudly than the ineffectual procedures or idle memos from DeWald.

O The clear message to QC inspectors was that knowledge, experience, and qualifications in the areas of Comstock's quality control work were valued less than the overriding objective of

-O meeting production requirements.

Saklak himself acknowledged as much when he observed that obtaining formal certifications appeared to be of relatively lower priority than getting the' work O

done.

cite Saklak Tr.

Ultimately, only after the NRC received allegations from Mr.

Snyder about the clear procedural violations involved in Saklak's O

lack of certifications, and after the March 29, 1985, mass complaints by Comstock inspectors to the NRC, did Comstock finally make formal acknowledgement of their failures to ensure 13 qualification, training and certification of supervisors.

45 0

-==.

i 10 Nonconformance Report 4528 was initiated September 17, 1985, by Mr. DeWald.

It notes deficiencies in supervisor qualifications ICF in violation of Procedure 4.1.2, paragraph 1.25, " Position Deliniation," Rev. 61581.

Under that procedure, supervisors Kast, Saklak, Hall, Phillips, and Brown lacked required I C) certifications in the areas supervised, in particular for the period August '83 through September '84, Mr. Saklak was assigned supervisory responsibilities over all inspection areas.

He was 3D certified, however, only in cable pull, terminations, conduit and CEAs.

"The procedure violation occurred througho'ut the entire period R.

Saklak held the position of QC supervisor as he was not

(3 certified in all areas he supervised."

The nonconformance report also notes that under later revisions of the procedure, supervisors R. Tuite, J. Hii, J. Walters, A. Simile and K.

h3 Worthington were also in violation of the procedure for failure to obtain training and certification in all areas supervised.

Of I

particular note, General QC Supervisor Tony Simile became

g-certified in the area of visual weld inspection only on July 12, i

1985, as a Level III, although he supervised welding and configurations until March 27, 1985, and all inspection areas thereafter.

Int. Ex. 24.

Ironically, the corrective action for

)

this NCR excuses Mr. Simile's lack of certification on the basis that only a Level II capability was required by the ANSI standard and "a review of Mr. Simile's resume provides sufficient past g

experience and qualifications prior to 9/84 in order to satisfy the Level II capability requirements of ANSI N 45.2.6 (1978).

Mr. Worley Puckett was purportedly fired for possessing such

,:O 46 lO l

O qualifications.

In resolution of the nonconforming condition, no action whatsoever was required to review the effects of the lack of qualificati~ons on the Comstock QC program.

In fact, the Comstock procedure was revised to eliminate certification as a mandatory precondition for supervisory work.

Int. Ex. 24 at 10.

128. Former QC Supervisor Richard Saklak's abusive bullying and harassing treatment of inspectors with respect to their performance of their inspection activities was the subject of testimony by virtually all of the QC inspectors who appeared O

before the Licensing Board.

Comstock management was fully aware of Saklak's temperment but considered him an effective and capable supervisor nontheless.

DeWald, Prefiled (ff. Tr.

) at

O 29; DeWald, Tr. 1287-88, 1760, 1850, 1910; Seltman, Prefiled (ff.

Tr.

,)

at 22-23; Seltman, Tr. 2060, 2063-64; Seese, Prefiled (Tr.

) at 22; Int. Ex. 44.

The QC inspectors who worked under O

Mr. Saklak, of course, saw things differently.

Mustered, Tr.

4970-4975.

Seeders, Tr. 7367, 7370-72, 7438.

Rolan, Tr. 4668-74.

Martin, Tr. 8439 8451; Holley, Tr. 5100; Martin, Tr. 9439-O 40, 9449-50; Martin Tr. 9412-13, 9416, 9423, 9424-26.

Martin 9417-9420.

Perryman (as a witness to Saklak threats to s

Supervisor Joe Hii.)

Tr. 9640-9643.

On the way back to the O

field office in Perryman's presence, Saklak said of Joe Hii: "If Joe Hii was outside or something he'd kick the shit out of him or something like that."

Tr. 9643.

Joe Hii recalls that Saklak O.

lost his temper and yelled at him for not finishing a project on time.

Hii, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 16608) at 4.

Snyder Tr. 4182 4196.

Int. Ex. 42 and 42A.

O 129. QC Manager Irving DeWald generally lacked the respect 47 10

10 of the Comstock Quality Control inspectors either for his technical knowledge of electrical and structural installation and O

inspection disciplines, his leadership and skills as a manager, his general personality, or his willingness to stand up for quality in the face of production pressere.

In short, the QC

' Ci inspectors at Comstock held Mr. DeWald in very low regard, saw him as a poor role model for quality and, most charitably, felt sorry for hin for his withdrawn and troubled personality.

As

'(3 Inspector Dean Peterson put it: "To put it honestly, I couldn't have a lower opinion of him."

As a person, as a manager of QC inspectors, as to his inter-personal skills with employees, as to

.(D his seeming ignorance in the field and his lack of managerial skills.

Peterson, Tr. 5964.

"If I had any questions, he would probably be the last person I would go to."

Id.

Mr. DeWald O

lacked the respect of the Quality control department according to Inspector Franco Rolan.

Rolan, Tr. 4838.

DeWald was inaccessible and cold.

"He was not the sort of man who would lg come by and say ' Good morning' he'd walk right past you and never speak to you."

Bowman, Tr. 6909.

QC Inspector Danny Holley, the soft-spoken and gentle man with hardly a harsh word to say about any ne, re unted his efforts to privately alert Mr. DeWald to O

the growing problems at Comstock.

DeWald acknowledged the morale problem among the inspectors, but said it was something we would have to live with.

Mr. Holley volunteered to assist Mr. DeWald g

in addressing the morale problem among the inspectors and recounted to him similar efforts he had undertaken at the request of his company commander in the Army.

Holley, Jr. 5246.

After 48 O

10 several private meetings with DeWald in which DeWald was on the whole unresponsive, Mr. Holley simply gave up.

Mr. Holley conceded that DeWald was responsive in one instance:

g)

Well, in one instance, I had to be blunt with the man because he was not a very personable man you know.

For example when he would come in the morning into the office he would walk up the stairs and people would say, ' Good morning, i(3 Irv' or ' Good morning, Mr. DeWald,' and he l

would sort of look at them and walk past and never say nothing to them, like he always had a chip on his shoulder or something.

In one of our meetings I told him 'A lot of people look down on you because of that.'

After that

!(3 particular meeting, for a week or two weeks, when he would come in the morning he would say

' Good morning.'

He'd sit down and chat with people.

Then he sort of reverted back to his

-- his old self.

(3 Holley, Tr. 5250.

It's not like at least some of the inspectors didn't try to get along with QC Manager DeWald.

130. QC Inspector Larry Perryman recounted an instance with

()

DeWald and former Edison construction superintendent Casaro that reflected poorly on Mr. DeWald's knowledge of inspection techniques as well as on both gentlemen's emphasis on work O'

quantity over quality.

DeWald was unhappy with Mr. Perryman's documentation on NCRs and ICRs of numerous instances of undersized welds on cable pan hangers in the unit 2 switch gear room.

The documents reached DeWald for review.

He and Edison's

()

construction superintendent Mr. Casaro came out to the location and asked Perryman to point out the hanger with the 28 undersized welds.

Upon pointing out the welds in question, DeWald became g

irate.

DeWald said that he believed the welds were of sufficient size, but only got angry when Perryman handed him his fillet gauge so that he could measure them himself.

Edison's Mr. Casaro g

49 O

O-turned to another hanger and stated that the welds were long enough.

Perryman, Tr. 9648-49.

Perryman agreed, but stated that lc) the weld was in the wrong place.

Casaro responded, "Well, I'll j

have the design document changed."

Perryman said to let him know when that had been accomplished and he would reinspect.

Soon thereafter, DeWald returned with Stu Klevens from 3

Sargent & Lundy, a Level III weld inspector.

Perryman resented l

DeWald's effort to override his inspection findings.

Perryman, Tr. 9650.

O When DeWald first observed the undersized welds, Perryman had asked him to check the size himself using Perryman's weld fillet gauge.

DeWald employed the wrong end of the gauge to measure the weld size.

When Perryman pointed that out to him, "he got kind of hostile about it and threw it down and said he never used that end."

Perryman suggested that he'd better start.

, O Mr. Perryman expressed his disbelief that Mr. DeWald was unfamiliar with the proper use of such a basic tool of weld inspection issued to all weld inspectors, and included in weld

( O' inspector training and certification tests.

Perryman, Tr. 9650-51.

131. QC Manager Irving DeWald held a Level III welding

!;O inspector certification pursuant to Comstock's Braidwood Procedure 4.1.3.

As part of his certification procedure, Mr.

DeWald completed a written proficiency or general exam, scoring only 85% in October 24, 1983.

Mr. DeWald acknowledged that the questions he missed sought basic information expected to be known by a Level III weld inspector.

DeWald, Tr.

This is the (3

same exam administered to Level II welding inspectors.

Several f

50 i

!O

O years later, during the process of upgrading inspector qualifications to the more recent revision D of Procedure 4.1.3, C)

Mr. DeWald was required to take a mock field practical welding examination.

Mr. DeWald not only failed to score the required 100%, but he failed to identify deficiencies on three of the six 0

welds examined.

The conclusion that Mr. DeWald had flunked his welding inspector practical was reviewed and approved by Assistant QC Manager Larry Seese, who required QC Manager DeWald J3 to complete an additional one-hour lecture, 8-hour lecture / demonstration, 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> on the job training, and an additional successful practical exam.

Int. Ex. 17.

()

132.

There was a general and consistent belief among QC inspectors that QC Manager Irv DeWald, as a Level II weld inspector in 1980-81, had signed a checklist documenting his

()

inspection of 1000 or more welds in a single day.

Eight of the QC inspectors who testified were aware through general talk among the inspectors of a DeWald 1000 plus checklist, but had not seen it themselves.

(Hunter, Tr. 8495-98; Martin, Tr. 8495-98; q)

Martin, Tr. 8294, 8332-33; Mustered, Tr. 5061-62, 5087; Rolan, Tr. 4762-63, 4770-71; Stout Dep. Tr. 144-145; Klachko Dep. Tr.

192, 265-66; Hii, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 16608) at 3; Gorman, Tr.

,O 5817-18, 5828)

Six of the inspectors that testified claimed to i

have actually seen one or more DeWald 1000 weld checklists.

(Bossong, Tr. 9848-50; Bowman, Tr. 6890-91; Holley, Tr. 5154-56; Perryman, Tr. 9653-57; Peterson, Tr. 5933, 5935)

Inspector Wicks actually saw such a checklist signed by Mr.

DeWald (Wicks, Tr. 7154).

He spoke to other inspectors about

'O 51 O

l

O

' DeWald's checklist, including others who had actually seen it.

Wicks, Tr. 7155.

Inspector R.D.

Hunter understood that the existence of such a DeWald 1000 weld checklist was common

).

knowledge among the QC inspectors.

Hunter, Tr. 8732.

He j

recalled that Inspectors Terry Gorman and Jeff Hutson came across i

the DeWald checklist during a document review in the QC vault.

O.

Hunter, Tr. 8733.

QC Inspector Gorman testified that the general consensus among inspectors was that "it was impractical to do that many weld inspections in one day and do them quality minded O

l or accurately."

Gorman, Tr. 5819.

QC Inspector Larry Perryman encountered a checklist documenting the inspection of 1039 welds 4

signed by Mr. DeWald.

Mr. Perryman encountered this DeWald

!O checklist in the course of the backlog effort in early 1984. lHe was attempting to trace a Hanger Installation Report (HIR) to a valid inspection checklist in the QC vault.

The HIR would be i

lO traceable to a single original inspection checklist or Form 19 documenting acceptance of many components and welds in a large area referred to only as a " grid square."

Photocopied or O

" reconstituted" checklists were made for each hanger included in the original grid.

The 1039 weld checklist signed by DeWald was 4

{

one of these.

Perryman, Tr. 9653-54.

QC Inspector Danny Holley

)

recalls coming across one of Mr. DeWald's reports in the vaults.

"The report covered a whole room of supports, and there was 1000 l

welds plus on it, and he had signed it off all in one day."

O Holley, Tr. 5155.

Mr. Holley recalls seeing such a DeWald i

checklist several times before and after DeWald returned as QC Manager, Tr. 5156.

Mr. Holley even recalled that the DeWald b) checklist was for welds reflected on a specific drawing number 1

l 52 lO 1

.,-._._,.__.._.-m...

for an area where Mr. Holley had done a lot of work.

Tr. 5159.

As Mr. Holley recalls, "Everybody talked about those records 3

Tr. 5157.

QC Inspector Thurman Bowman recalls being shown the DeWald 1000 weld checklist in the QC vault area by Inspector Don Coss.

Bowman, Tr. 6890-93.

It reflected the inspection on a

]

single day of over 1100 welds.

Tr. 6892.

Although he originally understood from the signature and date that such inspections had been accomplished in one day, Mr. Bowman has since been informed J

that the checklist could have been the result of several days' work.

Tr. 6892.

At the direction of Tony Simile, Mr. Bowman undertook a search for this checklist during the course of the J

proceeding, but was unable to locate the document.

Bowman, Tr.

6894; Bowman, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 16000).

Mr. DeWald himself states that he is " pretty certain" that 9

he has never documented 1000 or more welds on a single inspection checklist.

DeWald, Tr. 1492.

He says he doubts that it was possible that he ever did so.

Id.

However, when asked in deposition the maximum number of welds he had documented on a g

single checklist, Mr. DeWald could not remember and until found in a casual search through his old weld inspection checklists, he had not recalled documenting as many as 551 welds on a single inspection checklist.

DeWald, Tr. 1500.

Int. Ex. 19.

Mr.

DeWald himself graphically described the early weld inspection practices:

Because there was just a small amount of inspec-tors there at the time of following quite a large number of craft, and they would complete

_J an area -- and this is my understanding -- they 53 O

O-would complete an area, document it on the PTL sheet, and fill out the inspection report on various days; and they did not do it each and every day that they done the inspections.

DeWald, Tr. 1479.

This was Mr. DeWald's understanding of the inspection practices followed in the days of Mr. Yankeitis' 1166 weld checklist, Int. Ex. 18.

DeWald confirmed that these were l) the practices employed by him and the handful of other weld inspectors during the period November, 1980 until October, 1981, when he served as a Level II weld inspector.

DeWald, Tr. 1479-

!(3 80.

Although DeWald heard through his supervisors that rumors of his 1000 welds in one day inspection were circulating among the inspectors, he took no action to address their concerns because O

he felt he had done nothing wrong.

DeWald, Tr. 1489.

133.

QC' Inspector Richard Martin had served as a weld inspector along with Mr. DeWald.

Mr. Martin described the weld

O inspection documentation practices in those days under Mr.

DeWald's tutelage.

Martin, Tr. 8343-78, 9384-97, 9583-84, 9606-07.

As a rule, no official documentation of rejectable l(3 conditions was ever made unless the craft couldn't fix the defect promptly, only then would an Inspection Correction Report be issued writing up the defect.

Tr. 834!.

Martin would simply ij) note rejectable conditions in his personal notebook without indicating the identity of the welder or the particular weld found defective.

Tr. 8351.

Only acceptable items were documented on the official weld inspection checklists.

Tr. 8352.

3 This system employed by Martin and the others for performing and documenting weld inspections was not provided for by any Comstock quality procedure.

Tr. 8358.

Mr. Martin recalls in those days

)

54 0

O actually inspecting on the order of 300 or 350 welds in one day.

Tr. 6376.

It was not until October of 1983 when, by happenstance, the q) practice of documenting weld inspections on personal notebooks and completing checklists later not in the office came to an end.

Edison's corporate Quality Assurance Manager, Walter Shewski, questioned Comstock management regarding audit findings of xeroxed checklists.

He was apparently concerned that such photocopying evidenced document falsification.

As Mr. Martin describes the incident: "There were a lot of CECO auditors there.

There were auditors from Byron.

I explained to Mr. Shewski that I took my notes and filled my checklist out.

He asked me if I O

took a procedure with me.

I said no.

I did not have a procedure.

He asked me if I filled the checklist out -- excuse me.

He asked me if I took the checklist and used it for points O

of inspection as I inspected the weldings; and I said no, I did not.

At that point he simply said, ' Retrain him,' and that was it.

That was the meeting."

Martin, Tr. 9575.

Shortly O

thereafter Mr. DeWald gathered the QC inspectors together and directed that they begin to use the checklists in the field.

Tr.

9576.

Of course, all of the weld inspectors have been following C) the practice employed by Mr. Martin of completing the checklists from their personal notes only after they left the field, a practice they had been trained in by Mr. DeWald.

Martin, Tr.

O 9577.

The only rationale for following the shoddy inspection and documentation practices employed in the days of Mr. DeWald's O

service as a Level II weld inspector was to permit a spartan 55 0

J

)

quality control force to meet the production demands of the welding crews.

The shortcut of completing quality documentation only long after the inspector left not only the specific welds to be documented but the field itself represents a fundamental abuse of sound quality control practices and the requirements of the

)

Commission's Quality Assurance Criteria for recording inspection results as evidence of acceptable quality.

Production pressure is simply the only understandable explanation for such corner-

)

cutting.

DeWald's lack of knowledge of inspection techniques, his old velding inspection practices and his training of inspector Martin in such techniques as interpreted through the D

folklore and shop talk of the inspectors years later established a discreditable model of disrespect for quality.

134.

Edison's production pressure on Comstock Quality B

Control to eliminate the inspection backlog was translated directly by Comstock management into pressure on the QC inspectors to increase productivity.

On June 16, 1984 QC Manager DeWald demanded

[)'

gof supervisors Saklak and Worthington a " plan of how we can improve the inspection output" which he described as an action item assigned by " corporate and CECO PCD."

Int. Ex. 269.

]

Notes from a June 27, 1984 Comstock QC staff meeting attended by DeWald, Worthington, Saklak and Seese note that even Mr. Saklak

" points out that in the Rush for the Quantity of Inspections, the 3

Quality of paperwork has slipped."

Int. Ex. 272.

As pressures mounted, the effects began to take their toll on the QC inspectors.

The rapidly eroding morale and widespread complaints f inspe tors was communicated to QC management.

DeWald D

56 9

O documents the results of suggestions forms submitted by inspectors the end of June 1984 including concerns about in8pection documentation practices, communication between O

supervision and inspectors, the need to protect QC independence from construction influence including more inspector backing from their management, lack of trust and confidence in management, myriad training problems, complaints about salary and benefits, concerns regarding inspector burnout from excessive overtime and failure to emphasize QC quality not quantity.

Int. Ex. 274.

Though apprised of these concerns, QC management showed little interest in taking other than cosmetic action in the face of Edison's continued production demands.

-Id.

O 135.

Through the use of average expected levels of inspector performance and inspector status reports on completed work, Comstock management continued to monitor the backlog O

completion schedule.

That schedule for mid-July 1984 assumes a production rate of nine welding and configuration inspections per day and nine junction box and small equipment inspections per O'

day.

On July 23, 1984 Mr. DeWald notes a " drastic drop in the number of inspections performed," during the week of July 13-19, 1984.

He directs a review to determine root cause and notes that

! O such reduced productivity "is impacting all previously estimated completion dates."

Int. Ex. 287.

136.

Production pressure is felt directly by QC supervisor O

Saklak, who responds to a DeWald August 6, 1984 memo noting his failure to accomplish an audit response in time by noting all of t

the conflicting demands on him and the inspectors he supervises.

g 57

,0 i

O Int. Ex. 277.

137.

By early October, 1984, when the QC inspection backlogs were to have been eliminated, Assistant Manager Larry Seese notes

)

that there is a steady increa,se in the number of inspections not completed in the current group.

Int. Ex. 283.

Elimination of the backlog had simply produced slippages in the completion of

)

current inspections.

138.

Edison's construction superintendent Dan Shamblin compliments QC manager Irv DeWald on September 25, 1984, for the completion of the backlog inspections.

He notes, ironically, that the efforts of Comstock's QC management and inspectors will ensure that "Braidwood Station will be completed and will receive a license."

Att. 3 to Shamblin, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 16274).

By October 4, 1984, Shamblin declares that the " morale question" among Comstock QC inspector is " closed."

He notes a laundry list

O of actions almost wholly cosmetic in nature which he asserts will be effective in solving whatever problems may exist.

Such ineffectual devices as holding an after-hours pizza party, O'

scheduling a picnic and installing a kitchen unit for the QC inspectors reflect the tenor of Edison's lack of seriousness about these problems.

In his report to Project Manager Mike

'O Wallace, Mr. Shamblin emphasizes: "While we will never be able to t

satisfy every individual, I believe the actions are responsive to the concerns."

For the part of Comstock Quality Control management, Edison notes that the QC Manager and his assistant reviewed Comstock policy stating that QA personnel "are independent from the pressures of production.

It is the policy

()

of the L.K. Comstock and Company, Inc. that the quality of the 58 O

'O work comes first versus the quantity of the work."

Att. 4 to Shamblin, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 16274).

Such words are, of course,

)

hollow.

Contrary actions by Edison and Comstock management speak far more loudly to the Comstock QC inspectors.

Ironically, Shamblin's words come only days after ratifying the retaliatory

()

treatment of former inspector John Seeders and on the heels of his endorsement of the discriminatory termination of Level III inspector Worley Puckett.

O 139.

The perceptions among Constcck QC inspectors of harassment and pressure to compromise quality continued to grow during this period.

In early 1985 Edison instituted a new

()

allegations management program, known as " Quality First."

Base line interviews were conducted with all site quality control inspectors, including those of L.K. Comstock Company.

The

()

Comstock inspectors raised a number of concerns regarding emphasis on quantity over quality.

As a matter of course, the investigation of these complaints would have been assigned to O

Construction Superintendent Dan Shamblin.

However, in these cases, his superior, Edison's Manager of Projects, Tom Maiman put all Comstock complaint investigations on hold pending the resolution of the labor management conflict which Edison saw as

()

the force behind the inspectors' complaints.

Maiman, Tr. 3850-53.

Mr. Maiman saw no conflict of interest in Mr. Shamblin's investigation of QC inspector complaints of undue production

()

pressure.

Id.

Only after the 24 Comstock QC inspectors complained in mass to the NRC of harassment and pressure to compromise quality did Mr. Maiman on March 29, 1985, direct the g

59 O

C) -

immediate initiation of action to investigate the long-pending complaints.

Maiman, Tr. 3859.

Again, Mr. Shamblin, who was the source of the production pre'sure on Comstock, was assigned s

)

responsibility for investigating these production pressure complaints.

140.

Mr. Shamblin's investigation was a mere sham.

Of

)

course, he never seriously investigated himself or Edison's key role in imposing a production pressures on Comstock Quality Control inspectors.

Predictably, he concluded that Comstock's Quality Control management was not concerned more about production than quality and that the QC department was effectively implementing its policy of assuring independence of Quality Control inspectors from production pressure.

Except for the case of Mr. Saklak, who was sacrificed, Edison's Mr. Shamblin concluded that no other cases of intimidation or harassment had O

been found.

Int. Ex. 22.

No substantive changes were called for in the operation of the Comstock quality control program.

And in the case of Mr. Saklak, Edison didn't even have the courtesy to O

tell him directly what, if anything, he had done wrong or why he had been barred from employment at Edison's nuclear sites.

Int.

Exs. 37, 38 and 39.

Curiously, Comstock's formal action with

C) respect to Mr. Saklak's harassment of Mr. Snyder was not to discharge him for misconduct, but to simply treat him as " laid off."

Id.

This action suggests strongly that Mr. Saklak was

!C) sacrified to placate the NRC, and that Edison and Comstock lacked any conviction that Saklak was guilty of wrongdoing.

After al, he had been the subject of praise in his loyal pursuit of the 13 Company's production objective up until the end.

60 O

I O

Comstock's emphasis on quantity over quality is evidenced in C) the minds of complaining inspectors by the old weld inspection and documentation practices from Mr. DeWald's days as a level two inspector:

"This person passed 93 cable pan hangers with 1114 C) welds and all these welds were accepted.

These 93 cable hangers were completed in one day."

(1d. at 5.)

One QC inspector, identified as inspector B, compared

()

Braidwood to his past experience in the industry:

"I have been inspecting for 15 years and this is the first nuclear job I have i

seen where quantity is first - not quality."

(Id. at 5.)

()

on the basis of these Comstock QC inspector complaints, described by Mr. McGregor as unprecedented in number by any prior experience in the industry (McGregor Tr.17549

),

together with O

their experience with past quality assurance problems at Comstock including inspector harassment complaints and particularly in light of Edison's unwillingness to recognize and promptly correct g

these problems (McGregor, Tr. 11593 and 11831,) McGregor and Schulz jointly urged a strong and decisive response:

"It appears at first glance with the C) information we have received or some other aggressive action of the electrical work may be necessary to establish the quality of past work and the quality of the ongoing work.

The lack of action by CECO QA in this area needs to be addressed along with CECO 3

management's slowness or inability to take 4

corrective action.

The resident inspectors appraised CECO management last fall of the problems in L.K. Comstock quality control department."

lO Id_. at 6.

t l

61

.O l

l

.O 201.

In the spring of 1984, Edison and Comstock were l

responding to concerns expressed by the NRC regarding the l C) continued effectiveness of the Comstock ouality Assurance /ouality l.

I Control problem to address the enormous backlogs of inspections l

and quality documents requiring review.

Int. Ex. 6 and 7.

To 3

respond to these problems, Comstock had proposed additions to the j

Quality Control inspector work force including the addition of i

one level III welding inspector to address NRC identified

!(3 problems in the welding inspection area.

Int. Ex. 9; DeWald Profiled (ff. Tr. 1700) at 40-41; DeWald Tr. 1763-64.

On May 15, 1984, Comstock interviewed and hired Worley O. Puckett for this j(3 level III position.

Mr. Puckett's background as reflected in the interview and his resume demonstrated qualification for the level 4

III position.

DeWald Profiled ( f f. Tr.1700) at 42.

Mr. Puckett

!()

brought with him almost twenty years of experience as a pipe i

i fitter, ship fitter and nuclear component welder in the United States Navy.

Mr. Puckett graduated with honors f rom the Navy's i

iO-year-long welding school and spent four years at the specialized Nuclear Test Facility at Idaho Falls as a nuclear component welder and shop supervisor making repairs and installing i

components on nuclear prototype reactors and training nuclear

)

welders and Navy officers on welding and repair techniques.

Mr.

i i

Puckett also served as supervisor of Nuclear Submarine Tender Pipe Shop and Repair Facility, where he performed planning and

)

estimating functions supporting the maintenance of thirteen I

nuclear submarines and surface craft.

Int. Ex. 26.

Ironically, one of the young Naval of ficers that Mr. Puckett trained was

)

i 62 j

IO 1

O later Comstock QA/QC Manager, Robert Marino.

Pucket Tr. 6332.

During the course of Mr. Puckett's Navy nuclear welding work, Mr.

Pu kett had occasion to supervise and inspect the work of other O

nuclear welders both at the nuclear power training unit, Idaho Falls, and on the nuclear sub tender where from 18 to 20 welders w rked under his supervision.

Puckett Tr. 6330-31.

At Idaho O

Falls, Mr. Puckett supervised other senior enlisted men who were also certified nuclear component welders (Pucket Tr. 3332) who he understood were hand-picked by admiral Rickover for these specialized positions.

Id_.

202.

After retirmenent from the United States Navy, Mr.

Puckett was hired at the Zimmer nuclear power station in Moscow, Ohio by the Henry J. Keiser Company where he worked in a variety of positions for some nine years until the project was cancelled in January, 1984.

Int. Ex. 26; Puckett Tr. 6336-6418.

At the O

Zimmer facility, Mr. Puckett was initially hired and qualified as a Level II mechanical quality assurance inspector, a position he held for approximately 18 months.

Thereaf ter, he was promoted to O'

the positon of Lead Mechanical Inspector charged with performing visual weld inspections, mostly to the ASME boiler and pressure vessel code.

Mr. Puckett personally inspected four to five thousand welds and supervised from ten to twenty other Level II inspectors.

Tr. 6334-6345.

No NRC items of noncompliance were identified with respect to Mr. Puckett's weld inspection activities.

Puckett Tr. 6340.

Thereafter, Mr. Puckett transferred from the quality assurance to the construction department at Zimmer where he was promoted to the position of (O

Chief Weld Engineer in which capacity he was responsible for all 63

'O

O of the weld-related activities at the Zimmer project including operation of the weld test facility, tool room and weld rod O

issuance facilities.

Puckett Tr.- 6347-48.

Mr. Puckett was evaluated as meeting or exceeding all requirements in this position by project construction superintendent Sandlin.

Appl.

O Ex. 43; Puckett Tr. 6352-57.

Mr. Puckett had received similar good evaluations during his prior tenure at Zimmer.

Puckett Tr.

6358; Int. Ex. 46.

O 203.

In April, 1982, Mr. Puckett received the first critical evaluation which he had received at any time in his Navy or l

civilian nuclear program experience.

Puckett Tr. 6351.

After jO Mr. Puckett had been effectively displaced in the senior weld I

j engineering position by Mr. Manfred Goedecke as part of a site-wide management restructuring in which new management was brought 0

into virtually all departments including quality and I

construction.

The new Zimmer project manager, Mr. Albersong brought Mr. Goedecke with him from the Midland facility in lO Michigan.

Puckett Tr. 6348-49.

While he was evaluated as i

meeting requirements overall (App. Ex. 45), Mr. Puckett sought and received clarification of the adverse aspects of this lO evaluation.

App. Ex. 46.

Mr. Goedecke noted that Puckett had been responsible for a welding organization consisting of only one welding engineer, two aides and a clerk which was in dire I

need f additi nal qualified personnel.

Goedecke noted that

!O Puckett was exceptionally industrious and possessed exceptional i

i ability, knowledge, and understanding of general welding

' methodologies and techniques.

He noted that Mr. Puckett had O

1 64 O

O demonstrated an exceptional administrative ability and showed promising higher management potential.

He recommended that organizational changes underway be made so that Mr. Puckett may g

have the opportunity for improvement and advancement.

App. Ex.

46.

Thereaf ter, Mr. Puckett was reassigned positions in the weld

• "'I"***'"' d*""*"" **

"h* **"*' d* * "*"*'*"*"" "**

O restructured and wide-spread corrective action programs were implemented ultimately leading to the cancellation of the project.

Mr. Puckett successively held positions of Project Weld Engineer and Lead Historical Weld Engineer through January, 1984 when the project was shut down.

Int. Ex. 26.

204.

After Mr. Puckett left the senior weld engineering O

position in 1981 and had been replaced by Manfred Goedecke and his associate, Mr. Flaherty, the NRC Staff identified numerous items of noncompliance at Zimmer, including items of O

noncompliance in the Zimmer welding program.

Puckett Tr. 6371-381; App. Ex. 49.

For example, in an inspection conducted by NRC inspector J. F. Schapker, among others (Mr. Schapker later O

investigated Mr. Puckett's technical concerns at Braidwood and testified in this proceeding), the NRC imposed a civil penalty for a severity Level III violation stemming from welder IlO qualification document deficiencies and failure to adequately control weld filler metal in the test facility.

App. Ex. 49, Transmittal letter at 1-2.

In Mr. Puckett's opinion, the O

deficiencies identified at Zimmer were the responsibility of Mr.

j Goedecke, who had directed the programs which were found at l

fault.

Puckett Tr. 6381-90 6393-6413.

Mr. Puckett was never l

O disciplined or reprimanded for any involvement in the NRC's 65 l

lO l

i

O findings at Zimmer.

Puckett Tr. 6413.

205.

Mr. Puckett's experience with the NRC's enforcement O

activities at Zimmer served as a powerful standard and precedent for his evaluation of the Comstock welding inspection program at Braidwood.

Based on his experiences with NRC enforcement at O

Zimmer, Mr. Puckett determined to prevent a recurrence of similar problems at Braidwood.

In Mr. Puckett's opinion, problems he encountered during the course of his duties as the newly hired

()

Level III weld inspector at Comstock were every bit as serious as those which had led to the cancellation of the Zimmer project.

Puckett Tr. 5592-93.

However, much to his surprise, after acting

()

to prevent a recurrence of a QA breakdown at Braidwood and suffering retaliatory termination as a consequence, Mr. Puckett found that the NRC, and inspector Schapker in particular,

()

apparently had two different sets of rules: one for Zimmer and one for Braidwood.

Under similar facts, the NRC treated Zimmer problems "as serious as a heart attack," but at Braidwood

()

such concerns were dismissed as not serious.

Puckett Tr. 5591-92, 6380-81, 6413, 6491 and 6589-90.

206.

During the course of Mr. Puckett's brief tenure at Comstock, he undertook wide-ranging activities to review the work

()

of the welding and welding inspection program at Comstock and to obtain the site certifications necessary for him to perform the duties of a Level III inspector.

Mr. Puckett familiarized 3

himself with the work of the Level II welding inspectors and solicited their opinions on needed changes in the inspection program.

For example, with Level II QC inspector Therman Bowman,

)

66 O

O an experienced welding inspector, Mr. Puckett discussed tho applicability of the AWSD 1.1 Code to thin guage materials within the scope of the Sargent & Lundy specification L2790 at the site

,g as well as the applicability of the AWSD 1.3 Code.

Bowman Tr.

6970-71.

Mr. Bowman suggested to Mr. Puckett that the field limit its use of the otherwise qualified E6013 electrode and instead utilize the more appropriate E7018 electrode for making cable pan to tube steel and unit strut welds.

Bowman made the suggestion on the basis that special welding skill was required for use of the 6013 high penetration rod on such light material.

Mr. Puckett agreed with the suggestion and subsequently, a procedural change was adopted accordingly.

Bowman Tr. 6972-73.

O-207.

Mr. Puckett toured the Braidwood facility generally and observed the quality of field work performed by Comstock.

Early in his tenure at Braidwood, Mr. DeWald took Puckett on a O

tour of the facility.

DeWald pointed out welds to Mr. Puckett which DeWald had inspected when he previously worked as a Level II weld inspector.

The welds were on a very large hanger but O

even through glancing at the welds, Puckett observed a number that he deemed unacceptable.

The welds he observed had undercut, excessive spatter, slag, overlap and craters below the nominal O

wall thickness.

While Mr. Puckett acknowledges that the acceptability of welds is a matter of individual inspector judgment within limit, Puckett stated that he would not have had

()

a weld inspector working for him who had accepted some of the welds he observed.

Puckett Tr. 6214-6220.

Mr. Puckett expected that after he had become qualified, he would have returned to 33 these areas and further dispositioned the welds he observed.

61 O

i

O 208.

During his tenure, Mr. Puckett undertook the assignment of overseeing the Comstock welder test facility.

(

Puckett qualified two other Level II QC inspectors to run the facility and wrote a set of test facility operating rules to be provided to each welder candidate to insure that the welder was

!()

aware of the rules during the test.

App. Ex. 71.

Mr. Puckett was concerned that there be adequate quality control inspector verification of the welder qualification process.

Puckett Tr.

.3 6186-197, 6202.

(

209.

During the course of his tenure, Mr. Puckett identified concerns regarding errors, inconsistencies and alterations of

.(3 Comstock's welder qualification records.

Puckett Tr. 6136-41, 6150-51, 6162-64, 6176-79.

210.

In the course of his' tenure at Comstock, Mr. Puckett (J

also developed a concern that Comstock did not have an adequate procedure or practice for the control of weld filler material in the field.

At the time he was at Braidwood, Mr. Puckett observed

'(3 that the craft was not required to turn unused weld rod or electrode to the weld rod withdrawal facility.

Tr. 5210-11.

Instead, the practice followed permitted a welder to draw a certain amount of rod and then to store unused electrodes in an

. (3 uncontrolled manner overnight or over the weekend to be used at a later time.

Rod at the time was being issued by craftsmen to raftsmen without supervision by QC or engineering.

Pucket Tr.

- C) 5612.

Mr. Puckett further believed that the procedure itself should require QC involvement in the issuance and control of filler material to assure that it was properly controlled.

)

62 10

!O' Puckett Tr. 5613-14.

Mr. Puckett brought these concerns to the attention of Messrs. DeWald, Seese and Saklak who. told him that the procedure was to be changed to take these concerns into O

account.

Puckett Tr. 5614.

211-During the course of his tenure, Mr. Puckett identified a number of concerns about deficiencies in Comstock's welder qualification records.

Pucket Tr. 6137-38, 6149-52, 6155, 6159-63.

These concerns were identified by Mr. Puckett during the d

course of only a partial review which was underway at the very time of his termination.

Puckett Tr. 5679; App. Ex. 68.

In Mr.

Puckett's opinion, the errors, alterations and inconsistencies in the. quality records made the actual qualification of the welders

!O l

indeterminate and would necessitate either the~ identification of sufficient objective evidence to properly correct the documends or the requalifiction of the welders.

Even without seeking such

O objective evidence, Puckett was aware that the NRC had cited the 2

Zimmer facility for serious violations of NRC regulations because l

of such inconsistencies of welder qualifications rebords.

.O i

212.

In addition, Mr. Puckett had identified a number of l

problems and inconsistencies with Comstock's existing welding procedures which he believed required general rewriting and jO requalification using the more contemporary American Welding Society Dl.3 Sheet Metal Code.

Puckett Tr. 5456-5463.

Comstock i

I welding procedures as written were simply a mess.

Instead of

O providing clear, written instructions for both the craftsman and inspector as to the essential variables including base metals, l

l filler materials and specified techniques in the body of the O

procedure, the reader was forced to sheaf through innumerable t

63 lO l

s e

A3 confusing, contradictory and redundant attachments to the procedure which, themselves, were the only source of

C) specification of essential welding variables.

In effect, the use of more than a dozen technique sheets for a particular procedure gave the QC inspectr the option of reasoning, "if this one C) doesn't work, let's use this other one.

If it doesn't work, use another one."

Puckett, Tr. 5455-5456, 5472-83.

In addition, Mr.

Puckett identified the failure to qualify stainless steel welding 13 under Comstock procedure 4.3.14.

NCR 3145 was initiated by GC inspector John Miner at Mr. Puckett's initiative and such welding was stopped as Mr. Puckett recommended on August 10, 1984.

O DeWald Prefiled (ff. Tr. 1700) at 48; Simile Prefiled (ff, Tr.

-3305) Att. 1 at 1; Geiseker Tr. 2972.

Comstock apparently acknowledged the appropriateness of Mr. Puckett's action in this

()

regard and later requalified the procedure and removed all unqualified welds from the field.

Simile Prefiled (ff. Tr. 3305) at 12-13; Simile Tr. 3362-63.

In addition, Mr. Puckett o

identified through information from inspectors in the field a concern that bi-metallic welding of stainless steel to carbon steel was being performed without qualified procedure.

App. Ex.

59'

O 213.

Finally, Mr. Puckett identified a concern regarding the failure to properly provide for the welding of A-36 to A-446 steel in the Comstock procedures.

At his initiative, QC nv inspector Miner issued NCR 3099 documenting this concern.

Puckett Tr. 5393-96; App. Ex. 55.

Mr. Puckett, on that same date, requested by memo that Mr. DeWald issue a stop work 64 a

.O

lO f

directive halting the welding of A-36 to A-446 using E-7018 electrode.

App. Ex. 52.

DeWald agreed and authorized the work St ppage which took place August 17, 1984.

DeWald Tr. 1693; App.

O Ex. 54.

214.

Mr. Puckett's handling of this dispute appears to have been found acceptable at the time by Comstock and Edison.

The fg nonconformance report, NCR 3099, which documented the discrepancy, was initiated at Mr. Puckett's recommendation by then-certified Level II inspector John Miner, and was approved by all appropriate reviewers as a valid nonconforming condition.

Int. Ex. 28.

Mr. Puckett's subsequent recommendation that welding of A-36 to A-446 steels be s' topped was reviewed and O

[

approved by the then-certified Level III welding inspector, Mr.

DeWald; and a stop work order was approved by the responsible Comstock Production Manager, Mr. Rolan.

DeWald Tr. 1693; App.

O While DeWald, Rolan and Edison may well have Ex. 52, 53 and 54.

been unhappy with the stop work since it interfered with production, there is simply no contemporaneous evidence that the O

parties disputed Mr. Puckett's technical position.

A stop work order under the circumstances was appropriate to control a condition that was acknowledged to be nonconforming.

Corrective O

action was to be simple and prompt, such an order would have little practical effect.

This seemed to be the case here.

However, if corrective action required more extensive effort and O

time, work of potentially indeterminate acceptability would not continue to be performed in the meantime.

215.

Mr. Puckett's recommendation that in the revision of O

the Comstock welding procedures they be requalified to the 65 0

O current AWS D 1.3 Code was technically sound, and certainly of sufficient merit to warrant careful consideration.

Instead, no serious consideration was given to Mr. Puckett's recommendation at the time; and only after his termination, and in the course of

(

this proceeding, has Comstock or Edison sought to rely on Mr.

O Puckett's recommended use of the AWS D 1.3 Code as evidence of his incompetence on which his termination was assertedly based.

Long after the fact of Mr. Puckett's termination, even Edison's O

rebuttal witness Kurtz acknowledges that additions of the AWS D 1.1 Code promulgated after the newer D 1.3 Code came into existence specified that it, the D 1.1 Code, was not intended for O

materials less than one-eight inch, and that, thereafter, Sargent

& Lundy's Braidwood specification L-2790, Amendment 42, provided permission for contractors to use the newer AWS D 1.3 Code "where O

base metals thinner than one-eight inch" are to be welded.

Kurtz Prefiled (ff. Tr. 12881) at 8-9.

216.

During his tenure, Mr. Puckett raised a number of O

concerns to Comstock supervisors Saklak, DeWald and others, but they were not receptive.

Puckett Tr. 5660-61.

Mr. Puckett had warned Mr. DeWald and QA manager Seltman on several occasions

()

"that we had these massive problems...."

Puckett sought to get the Comstock management together so that they could decide what needed to be done, what line of defense to adopt to solve these O

problems.

Puckett Tr. 5465.

In the face of these mounting problems, Mr. Puckett sought to head off what had happened at Zimmer -- NRC identification of wide-spread problems which could lead to a shut down or cancellation of the project.

Pucket Tr.

g 66 O

.g.

6248-6251.

In order to convey his mounting concerns and to motivate a prompt and serious response by Comstock management,

{()

Mr. Puckett wrote a personal note to Mr. DeWald -- as one old inspector to another -- urging that he take serious action.

Puckett Tr. 6248.

217.

Using an informal note format addressed simply, "Irv,"

jg Puckett cited the results of his past weeks' preliminary review of welding procedure problems:

stainless, the A-36, the galvanized sheet steel which he urged be qualified to the D 1.3 Code and the many other inconsistencies previously identified citing his own past experience -- no doubt at Zimmer -

"with the procedures being what they are and the moral (e) of the QC inspectors being what it is, we are dangerously approaching a complete breakdown in our QC program.

I think you are aware of this and I'm sure neither of us would want this to happen."

App.

O Ex. 56.

218.

Of course, the frank discussion and prompt corrective action by Comstock management simply never occurred.

Instead,

=O Puckett was read the riot act by QA manager Robert Seltman who informed him, in no uncertain terms, that Comstock's Mr. Marino in the home office was very displeased with Puckett for having written his memo.

Referring to Mr. Puckett's memo of August 22, 1984 (App. Ex. 56), and Puckett's rec 0mmendation, there, "that an all-out effort be started to do a complete review of our procedures, welders qualification and welders filler material witherawal forms," Seltman directed that Mr. Puckett personally, within the week, was to go to the vault, review all the welders' i O qualification withdrawal forms, since the beginning of the t

l 67

!O

O project, all welders' qualification test forms, review all the procedures with needed changes -- all within the space of a week.

Puckett told Seltman "You know this is physically impossible.

There is no way I can do this."

Seltman responded, "That's what you' re requested to do."

Puckett asked "Will I have O

any help with this?" Seltman replied, "There will be no help."

Puckett Tr. 62-60.

He got permission to have access to the vault and he started his review.

Id.

13 219.

Earlier that same day, when Mr. Puckett had renewed his concerns regarding the use of the AWS D 1.3 Code, Edison's engineer James Geiseker told him, " Shut up.

I don't want to here

' C) no more about it."

Puckett thought it unlikely that anyone else with Edison or Comstock would be responsive to his concerns.

Puckett Tr. 6262.

l()

220.

During the course of his employment at Comstock, Mr.

Puckett was not permitted to obtain the certification necessary to exercise the authority of a Level III quality control 33' inspector, nor was he given the supervisory authority over the Level II welding inspectors, which was contemplated for his position and which authority was given to Puckett's successor,

<3

' Tony Simile.

221.

Mr. Puckett understood that it was Comstock company policy that uncertified personnel were not authorized to initiate such quality documents as nonconformance reports.

Puckett Tr.

43 I

5662.

In his prefiled testimony, DeWald claims there was no such j

policy and that Puckett's misunderstanding evidenced his incompetence.

DeWald Prefiled (ff. Tr.

) at 44-45.

In 68 j

O

O fact, though, no uncertified personnel has ever initiated a nonconformance report during DeWald's tenure (DeWald Tr. 1681),

no written company policy authorizes such action by uncertified

)

personnel, nor did DeWald ever provide such authorization to Mr.

Puckett himself during the time he was at Braidwood and pending certification as a Level III welding inspector.

DeWald Tr. 1681.

Yet, the authority to identify, control, and correct problems was central to DeWald's description of job description.

Id.

222.

After Puckett's termination, the validity of many of O

Puckett's technical concerns were validated by the actions of his successor at Comstock, Tony Simile, and in the instances where simile failed to act effectively by findings of the NRC inspector O

who ultimately inspected Puckett's technical concerns.

Simile Prefiled (ff. Tr. 3305) at 9-19; Schapker Prefiled (ff. Tr.

10954); App. Ex. 51.

O 223.

Worley Puckett was fired on August 27, 1984 (DeWald Prefiled (FF. Tr. 1700) at 444) less then a week after having been given the " impossible" assignment to remedy all of the problems he had urged Comstock management to seriously address.

Mr. Puckett's replacement, Tony Simile, had been contacted several days before Puckett's firing and told report to Braidwood O

to replace Puckett.

Over the weekend, DeWald graded Mr.

Puckett's last practical weld exam.

After already deciding to fire Mr. Puckett, DeWald flunked Puckett on his weld exam on O

August 26, 1984 (App. Ex. 5) the day before his termination.

DeWald Tr. 16548.

224.

Comstock advanced several pretextural excuses for the termination of Worley Puckett.

In response to Puckett's

()

complaint of retaliatory discharge in violation of the Employee 69 0

O Protection provisions of the Energy Reorganization Act, Comstock claimed Puckett was dismissed because of his low score on the O

weld inspector proficiency exam.

The U.S. Department of Labor Area Director rejected this assertion in favor of his conclusion that Puckett's protected activity was the basis for his firing.

O Int. Ex. 11.

Puckett's score of 88 exceeded both the established passing score of 80 (DeWald Tr. 1661) and even the score of 85 achieved by Level III weld inspector and QC manager Irving DeWald O

on the same exam.

Int. Ex. 17.

225.

In defense of Mr. Puckett's claim for unemployment compensation, Comstock asserted that yet another ground was O

relied upon for his firing:

" falsification of his credentials during the interview."

Int. Ex. 27.

The Administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services rejected this claim by

_I_f_.

Mr. DeWald disclaimed any f

O Comstock as unsupported.

knowledge of this assertion by Comstock and agreed that Puckett had neither falsified his credentials (DeWald Tr. 1650) nor o'

inaccurately presented his work experience in his resume.

DeWald Tr. 1652-57.

l 226.

Comstock had never used its asserted 90-day evaluation O

p licy as a basis for any termination prior to that of Mr.

Puckett (DeWald Prefiled Att. 7), nor were any evaluations of Mr.

Puckett's work performance actually performed during his tenure at Braidwood.

DeWald himself had failed his Level III inspector g

mock practical exam, but he was permitted to obtain additional training and retake the exam.

227.

During his tenure at Comstock, Worley Puckett was O

70 0

O highly respected by the Quality Control inspectors who were familiar with his work.

For example, welding inspector Danny Holley volunteered:

pg Well, I could say Mr. Pucket was, you know -- maybe I'm out of line, but the welding inspectors that were around when Mr. Puckett was here really respected his -- his professionalism and his background and really felt that he was doing a good O

job.

When he was let go, a lot of people, you know, brought to their own mind, "Why was he let go?" There was talk, like I said, that was going on around the office.

Holley Tr. 5273.

.O QC inspector Dean Peterson expressed the common understanding:

From what I heard, it was basically he had issued a stop work order on the welding -- exactly why, I don't know -- and the fact that the Comstock O

management, apparently, felt that it wasn't warranted and fired him because of it.

Peterson Tr. 5965-66.

The inspectors understood that Comstock management's reliance on

.O the 90-day evaluation policy was mere pretext:

"Yes, I remember that, because we were talking about it because it was like his 91st day or something like that.

We thought it was real

O peculiar, because nobody got laid off after 90 days."

Comstock management had never used such a policy, Puckett was the first.

"It was very peculiar."

Rolan Tr. 4914.

Inspector R.

D. Hunter O

thought that Puckett was capable and believes he was terminated.

for making waves.

Hunter Tr. 8646.

Puckett's termination and O

O 71

.O

O his assertion that the represented management retaliation for his quality concerns was common knowledge among QC inspectors at Comstock.

Martin Tr. 9233; Bowman Tr. 6955; Wicks Tr. 7133; and

)

i Gorman Tr. 5886.

228.

It is apparent, given Mr. Puckett's wealth of experience and ample background in nuclear grade welding and quality assurance, that his qualification to effectively perform the visual weld inspection duties of a Level II or Level III quality control inspector is established.

The denial of Mr.

O Puckett's Level III certification on grounds that he has failed to establish his ability to perform the visual inspection of welds rests on evidence of a series of practical weld inspection O

exams taken by Mr. Puckett.

Although not relying substantially on this evidence in support of the Puckett termination, Comstock and Edison point to Mr. Puckett's failure to pass his field O

practical examinations to undermine his qualifications.

The evidence is thin, at best, supporting this thesis, and may, in fact, evidence yet another pretext for the retaliatory actions d

against Mr. Puckett that actually occurred.

Minutes of the Comstock supervision staff meeting conducted August 22, 1984, the day of Puckett's stop work recommendation C) and mere days before his termination, supports this view.

In minutes endorsed by Mr. DeWald of a meeting attended by Messrs.

l Seltman, Seese, Dominique, Nash, Saklak and Worthington, DeWald

!(3 notes:

"Puckett failed his practical per J. Hii.

1st test paperwork lost.

2d test failed.

Took coupon test."

(Int. Ex.

282; emphasis added.)

This document surfaced as part of Rick l C)

Saklak's personal " Pearl Harbor," file produced af ter the rebuttal 72 O

O testimony of Saklak's successor Joe Hii.

In that rebuttal testimony, Mr. Hii responds to the question of the lost Puckett

()

test on which he had scored 100%:

"I have no recollection of such an incident ever taking place.

I do not recall a test being lost or disappearing."

Hii, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 16608) at 7.

O Intervenors' Exhibit 282, the contemporaneous minutes of the August 22, 1984, staff meeting suggest that, in fact, Puckett had, indeed, passed his field weld practical exam, thus fully

()

qualifying him for formal certification as the Comstock Level III welding inspector.

Mr. Puckett's later asserted failure to score 100% on the weld coupon mock practical exam could not have served O

as a basis, in fact, for his termination, since the failing grade was only determined af ter DeWald decided to fire Puckett, after Puckett's replacement, Tony Simile, had been contacted to come to O

Braidwood and only a day before Puckett was actually informed of his termination.

229.

The after-the-fact review of Puckett's test by Mr.

.O vannier for purposes of this proceeding adds no further credence to Comstock's transparent claim that the Puckett coupon test was a basis for his termination.

It was DeWald's grading of the test with Puckett's termination already in mind which is dispositive.

<3 Moreover, Mr. Vannier's after-the-fact evaluation was so hyper-critical that, fairly interpreted, he would have flunked even Level III weld engineer Vogt, who had written the test answers

~O employed by DeWald in grading Puckett.

Vogt, himself, failed to note several slag indications on weld 45 noted by Vannier.

Vannier, Tr. 3285.

While a 100% score was required of the field

)

73 0

'O practical, in practice tests were grcded with the subjectivity and room for judgement inherent in weld inspection, well in mind.

Veneer's standard was simply not the one employed by Comstock for Puckett or anyone else.

230.

Finally, Mr. DeWald took the position that since Mr. Puckett was not yet certified as a Level III QC

'O inspector that he was not empowered to sign Comstock quality documents.

Puckett, Tr. 6380-82.

Ironically, Puckett was responsible for training and qualifying the QC inspectors who ran O

the weld test facility but was determined to have violated Comstock procedure when he signed quality documentation simply indicating that he had witnessed a test.

Id,.; App. Ex. 74.

O Ironically, Mr. Puckett's successor, Anthony Simile, was not certified as a visual weld inspector, Level III, until July 12, 1985, although he supervised weld inspection activities from September 1984 onward.

Int. Ex. 24 at 5-10.

Comstock has simply not explained this disparate treatment of Puckett and Simile.

.O

,0

,O i

l O

74

O 300.

Seeders' version of events to this point seems most plausible.

A. complete or 100% review of calibration records was, indeed, for all practical purposes, an impossible assignments for

)

Sears, or anyone else, given the scope of the tasks, time and resources conceivable available.

It seems most likely that either Mr. Seeders' task was not clearly defined by his supervisor, and he performed a sampling review consistent with these vague instructions; or, Seeders' interpreted, properly, his instructions, in the only reasonable manner consistent with the iO nature of his calibration records by way of character and scope and in light of the available time permitted by the demands of his ongoing calibrations inspections work.

In order to perform a O

complete review to determine whether ICR's had been initiated in l

each instance of an out-of-calibration condition without limits l

as to time or equipment involved, it would have required O

literally a complete review of all tool calibration records and calibration ICR documentation from the beginning of the project.

A complete calibration document review was indeed undertaken at a

O later time.

It involved the work of several people over a period of months.

Most likely, then, the Comstock supervision, woefully ignorant of the calibrations inspection program and pressure from

()

Edison provided Seeders no clear guidance in this assignment involving the audit response than they had in the past two years l

over his ongoing inspection activities.

'(3 301.

The events involved in the retaliatory transfer of former Level II QC inspector John Seeders, after his encounter with supervisor, Rick Saklak and Seeders' complaint of harassment lO and pressure to compromise quality contained in hi August 17, l

l l

75 0

O 1984 letter, had become common knowledge among the QC inspectors and have formed a part of the fabric of harassment and production

'O

=

pressure in the Comstock Quality Control department.

QC inspector Therman Bowman was present along with many other inspectors in the Comstock QC office that day.

"I was in the

'O

. when Mr. Saklak came into the room and shouted down to room.

Mr. Seeders, 'Are you done yet,' or something along those lines, and Mr. Seeders responded that he was working at it and I had O

observed Mr. Seeders dealing with some what appeared to be five-by-eight hard cards, and he was adding numbers.or writing to them or adding information to them in some manner, and Mr. Seeders O

then -- excuse me -- Mr. Saklak then said to Mr. Seeders, 'If you want to play games, I can play games with you,' or,

,I can play games too,' and Mr. Seeders says

'I'm working at it, I'm working

O at it.'

and he had been -- prior of Mr. Saklak coming in, he had been doing something with these cards -- I don't know what -- and then Mr. Saklak responded, 'If you want to play games with me' O

and Mr. Seeders then followed him out of the room."

Bowman, Tr.

6776-77.

Mr. Bowman then after became aware of Seeders' August 17, 1984 complaint letter.

Bowman, Tr. 6950-51 and that

()

thereafter, Seeders was confronted with the choice of being terminated or transferred out of QC to the engineeting group.

Bowman, Tr. 6952.

302.

R. D. Hunter read Seeders' August 17, 1984 g

letter, which was common knowledge among the inspectors.

He understood Seeders' assertion that he had been transferred in retaliation for having written the letter.

Hunter, Tr. 8650.

QC

()

l 76 0

.~

~

0 1

inspector Larry Perryman understood that somehow because of an argument between Saklak and Seeders, seeders had been transferred.

Perryman, Tr. 9636.

QC inspector Larry Bossong O

agrees that the Saklak/ seeders matter was commonly discussed

[

among inspectors and that the transferred took place "probably because of Saklka getting to him."

Bossong, Tr. 9860.

QC O

inspector Richard Martin confirms that the subject of Seeders' transfer was commonly discussed among the QC inspectors and they understood from Mr. Seeders that a transfer would be the last step before they terminated him.

He felt that working as an engineer, that he would not be under the protection of 10CFR 50 and such other regulations in that he felt that he would soon be te rminated.

That was his main concern.

Martin, Tr. 9232.

QC inspector Dean Peterson was also aware of the incident and Seeders' allegations, "Yes, yeah, because I remember now the O

comment John had made was it seemed funny to him that after the years of doing that, they suddenly now were finding things wrong with his program, the way it was set up, and that QA was telling O

him, 'Well, this is wrong, this is wrong, why did you do it this way?,' and he was more or less saying, 'Well, where have you been for the last few years?

Why now all of a sudden have you got an O

audit and why are you finding things wrong?'

This is the way things have been carried out for quite sometime."

He understood that such an audit took place only after Seeders' complaints.

O Peterson, Tr. 5958-61.

QC inspector Danny Holley explains that retaliation may come indirectly for inspectors' expression of quality concerns, "What happened to Mr. Seeders, being released

()

from the QC department -- I don't know the reason behind it, but 77 0

O I would imagine it's because of this letter.

You know, that's my own personal opinion."

Holley, Tr. 5266-67.

In the same vein,

'O "I don't know when Mr. Seeders was transferred out of the department, but it was after this letter had been written, and I personally feel that it was because of this letter, and that's

'O something that people -- or something I would -- would fear."

Holley, Tr. 5210.

303.

Mr. John Seeders was responsible for performing the

O calibrations inspections at comstock.

Neither his direct supervisor, his lead, Mr. Phillips, nor Mr. Phillips' supervisor, Mr. Saklak, were certified in the calibrations area.

Oc manager O

Irving DeWald was the only person in the supervisory chain over Mr. Seeders who did hold a calibrations certification.

DeWald, Tr. 1588-99.

Mr. DeWald's supervision of Mr. Seeders' activities

O was "very limited."

He never assisted Seeders in calibrations inspections nor observed Seeders in the performance of his calibrations inspection activities but relied instead on the

g~

supervision of Phillips and Saklak over the calibrations department.

DeWald, Tr. 1589-90.

Mr. Seeders was the only person actually performing calibrations work, although inspector j)

Myra Sproul technically held a certification in the area.

Ms.

Sproul was not capable of performing adequate calibrations inspections without refresher training.

DeWald, Tr. 1623.

304.

After Mr. Seeders' termination, comstock made the O

calibrations inspection activities a two-person job (DeWald, Tr.1606) and Comstock revised the calibrations procedure 4.9.1 and 4.9.4 to provide explicit calibration instructions for each 78 l

l

O type of took utilizing manufacturer's instructions or good calibration practices.

DeWald, Tr. 1606-07.

In addition, a quality control hold cabinet was established in the tool crib y

limiting access to the cabinet to only quality control personnel.

DeWald, Tr. 1607.

None of these actions were taken during Mr.

Seeders' tenure because management failed to recognize the existence of problems in the calibrations area.

DeWald, Tr.

1608.

Although there had been many audits of the calibration area, failure by the audits to research in sufficient depth may have accounted for Comstock's failure to previously identify problems in the calibrations area.

Mr. Robert Seltman, Comstock's QA manager, was responsible for these Comstock on-site

'O surveillances and audits.

DeWald, Tr. 1609.

305.

Mr. DeWald testified that one of the principal reasons he held Seeders responsible for the calibration document O

deficiencies as a basis for his punitive transfer in lieu of termination was the fact that Seeders had been trained in June, 1984 for a period of only ten minutes by Mr. Seltman in the area O

of deficient calibration inspections.

Mr. DeWald beleived this training was sufficient and that training inadequacies did not account for discrepancies in the calibration records.

DeWald, O

Tr. 1600-03.

l 306.

Comstock QA manager Robert Seltman performed an evaluation of Mr. Seeders' work that was the basis for his 3

punitive transfer in lieu of termination.

Seltman, Prefiled (ff.

Tr. 1960) at 16 and Att. 3.

In Seltman's opinion, Mr. Seeders l

l received adequate supervision in the performance of his O

calibration inspection work.

Seltman, Tr. 1995.

He did not 79 l

O 1

.O apprise himself whether or to what extent Mr. DeWald supervised Seeders in his calibration work in writing his September 25 3

evaluation.

Seltman, Tr. 1996.

Seltman also emphasized that Seeders had been retrained in June in the calibration procedure with respect to documentation deficiencies and was aware at the (3

time of his September evaluation that the training consisted of 10 minutes' refresher instruction.

Seltman, Tr. 1996-97.

He also attached particular significance to this retraining in his

, C) evaluation of Seeders' work.

Seltmen, Tr. 1997.

Mr. Seltman performed a personnel file review for Seeders at the time of his September 25 evaluation and identified no prior adverse O

performance evaluations founded on deficiencies of significance in his calibrations work.

Seltman, Tr. 2020.

Mr. Seltman did recall observing that Mr. Seeders had received a raise which

.(D would have been based upon effective work performance in his work as calibrations inspectors.

Seltman, Tr. 2021.

In March of 1984, Mr. Seltman himself had obtained a Level III certification iCf in all areas including calibrations.

Seltman, Tr. 2021-22.

Thus, of course, Mr. Seltman, as Quality Assurance manager had an interest in ascribing the calibrations inspections deficiencies to Mr. Seeders' dereliction of duty and not to his own failures c) to have identified problems in the calibrations inspections program through his auditing and surveillance responsibilities.

307.

After Mr. Seeders wrote his letter of August 17, 1984,

g)

Mr. Seeders' job responsibilities were changed to eliminate the previously assigned review initially prompted as a response to an earlier Commonwealth Edison Company audit finding in the

)

80 10

O calibrations area.

The review that Mr. Seeders had been assigned was reassigned to two or three additional people; however, their assignment was enlarged to cover the entire calibrations program.

g DeWald, Tr. 1901-02.

Initially, Seeders was not told to perform a 100% review of his calibrations records. DeWald, Tr. 1925.

In fa t, ewald did r. t instruct Seeders in the nature of this O

review at all, nor can he recall whether he told Mr. Saklak or Seeders' lead, Mr. Phillips to do so.

DeWald, Tr. 1925.

Mr.

Seltman's Prefiled testimony, page 11, states:

"Mr. John Seeders

.O was assigned to perform a 100% review of calibration by Mr.

DeWald."

DeWald, however, did not tell Seeders anything.

DeWald, Tr. 1925.

At the time that Seeders was expected to be performing the review, his lead, Mr. Phillips was on funeral leave and Seeders was expected to take over his responsibilities including performance of receipt inspections.

DeWald was aware O

that Seeders raised concerns about the number of tasks he was expected to perform.

DeWald, Tr. 1928.

Mr. Seeders testified that he believed his transfer in lieu of termination occurred O

because he had written his August 17, 1984 letter.

Seeders, Tr.

7491.

On September 27, 1984, Seeders was celled in to the office of Mr. DeWald.

QA manager Seltman joined them.

DeWald told O

Seeders that he could either take a transfer to engineering or be fired.

Seeders asked for time to think about it, DeWald 1

recponded, "No, you have got to decide right now."

Concerned C

about his family and his job, Seeders opted to take a transfer to Comstock engineering in lieu of termination.

Seeders, Tr. 7489-90.

O 308.

At the time of his transfer, Mr. Seeders had worked 81 lO l

i

)

1 with a QC inspector at Comstock for approximately two and-one L

half to three years.

Seeders, Tr. 7292.

309.

QA manager Robert Seltman initially approached Mr.

Seeders and informed him that DeWald would require a partial review of his calibration records.

No mention was made at that

)

time of the requirement for a 100% review.

Seeders, Tr. 7332-33.

Later, Seltment approached Seeders again and informed him that the 100% review would be required.

Seeders responded that, given

)

his work load, such a task would be impossible.

Seeders interpreted Seltman's initial request to call for a review of a few records in each category for the various tools within the

)

calibration department.

This instruction led to a report ll documentng the partial review dated July 28, 1984.

App. Ex. 26.

Mr. Richard Snyder, at that time a trainee, assisted Seeders for J

a part of this review during a session on July 21, 1984.

Seeders, Tr. 7335.

310.

Mr. Seeders recalled that Seltman insisted that he had 3

to turn something into CECO to meet a deadline for the audit response.

Seltman's response was that the partial review by I

Seeders was inadequate.

Seltman threw the document at Seeders.

Seeders, Tr. 7349.

)

311.

Seltman was extremely vague about the nature and scope of the review he expected Seeders to perform and did not bring to Seeders' attention the specific portion of the calibration

)

procedure in question.

Seeders, Tr. 7670.

He did not inquire of Seeders whether Seeders undertood that ICR's were to be initiated under the procedure for out-of-calibration or expired calibration 82

)

O' conditions.

Seeders, Tr. 7671.

He gave Seeders no example of I

the kind of records he expected Seeders to review, nor did he lg make any reference to specific calibration forms such as Form 23 or 23A's or Form 77's which he expected Seeders to review.

Seeders, Tr. 7671-72.

In substance, Seltman simply communicated that he needed something so he could respond to Edison.

Seeders,-

g Tr. 7672.

At the time Seeders was the full-time single calibrations inspector.

He was not provided any assistance either for those duties or the review he was to undertake.

Seeders, Tr. 7672-73.

Seeders was repeatedly approached by Mr.

Seltman who pressed him for a response for Edison.

He showed Seeders none of the memos he had sent to Edison on the subject.

O

~

Seeders, Tr. 7673-74.

312.

Thereafter, supervisor Rick Saklak came to him and told Seeders that he had to have something for the deadline.

Saklak and Seeders went to Seltman's office where Seltman stated, "I have to have something to submit to CECO.

How far did you get on your review?"

This is when Seeders handed him his partial

!O' review "and he threw it in my face," and informed Seeders that this would not do.

Seeders, Tr. 7675-76.

Seltman still provided Seeders with no specificity as to the nature of the review that he sought.

His partial review (App. Ex. 26) was left on the floor behind him where Seltman had thrown it.

Seeders, Tr. 7678.

313.

At Seltman's next contact, Seltman informed Seeders

C that they would require a 100% review of all of his calibrations i

records.

Seeders, Tr. 7679-80.

Seeders informed Mr. Seltman that this review, which would consist of every piece of O

calibration documentation going back years even before Seeders l

83 I

'O

O-had become calibrations inspector, represented an impossible task; thousands of documents were involved.

Seeders.couldn't imagine that Seltman genuinely understood the nature of his task.

Seeders, Tr. 7680-81.

With no further explanation or offer of assistance, Seeders set about this review while tending to his O

primary duty as calibrations inspector.

Seeders, Tr. 7683-84.

314.

By their very nature, calibrations inspections are in process and require the initiation of ICR's when called for, the

()

notation that tools were out of calibration when returned in that state, and the calibration of tools when called for.

"It has to be done at the time they are due or -- once it gets out of hand, C) you are dead in the water -."

Seeders, Tr. 7694.

315.

Thereafter, on August 8, 1984, Seeders' lead, Larry Phillips, who had gone on funeral leave which extended into a O

vacation.

During the period when Phillips was absent, Seeders took on Mr. Phillips' receiving work as well as is other duties.

Seeders, Tr. 7686.

O 316.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Saklak confronted Seeders to let him know in no uncertain terms that he was to complete all of these tasks.

He told Seeders that he would have other people do g

his leg work for him, a statement which was interpreted by Mr.

Seeders as suggesting that he would have other people, not certified in the area, go out and actually do the inspections with the expectation that Seeders falsely sign off the paperwork g

as if the inspections had been performed by him.

Seeders, Tr.

7692; Int. Ex. 23.

Seeders refused; Saklak responded, "sometimes in the business y u have to play chess to get by."

Seeders, Tr.

O 84 O

O 7694.

Seeders understood that either he acquiesce in this improper practice or he'd lose his job.

Seeders, Tr. 7694.

Saklak added that Seeders would never be trained in other O

inspection disciplines, prerequisite to receiving pay raises under Comstock's salary scheme -- unless he did as directed.

Seeders, Tr. 7695.

g 317.

At the time of these events, the company was facing Edison's imposed backlog reduction deadlines.

"We were approached on a -- on a daily basis about the backlog, about the need for the new employees to be trained so -- so they could --

they could help cut down this backlog."

Seeders, Tr. 7697.

318.

Thereafter, on the morning of August 17, 1984, while Seeders was preparing his daily status report for which he was responsible in Mr. Phillips' absence, Saklak' yelled at him from the other end of the office accusing Seeders of neglecting is

'O work.

Seeders, Tr. 7700-01.

Seeders responded that he had work in his hand and Saklak replied, "If you want to play games, I can play games with you" and he accompanied him from the office.

O Seeders, Tr. 7701.

Seeders was taken by Saklak to Assistant QC manager, Larry Seese's office who was that day acting in DeWald's absence.

Saklak insisted that Seese write Seeders up for a bad O

attitude.

Seeders urged Seese to interview a number of the people who had observed the exchange between him and Saklak that morning.

Seeders, Tr. 7703.

Seeders hoped that through interviewing others present, he could establish that he had done nothing wrong that morning, that it was Saklak who was way out of line.

Seeders, Tr. 7703.

O 319.

During the course of the day, Seese did in fact 85 O

)

interview some six other people who confirmed, in substance, Seeders' version of events.

In short, that Saklak had

)

precipitated the encounter and that Seeders was in fact performing his work at the time of Saklak's false claim.

Seeders, Tr. 7704-05.

Later that afternoon, Seeders spoke with

)

Seese and asked him whether the inspectors he had interviewed confirmed that Seeders was working on the status reports and that Saklak was out of line.

Seese's respnonse:

"It doesn't make any

)

difference what the other inspectors say."

Seeders, Tr. 7706.

At that time, Seese administered a written warning to Seeders.

To Seeder's request for a witness, Seese responded that it wasn't

)-

necessary and sent for Mr. Seltman.

Mr. Seese presented the written warning.

Seeders, Tr. 7707.

The written warning, (DeWald, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 1700 at Att. 5) was signed both by

)

Mr. Seese and Mr. Saklak.

The warning reflected no criticism against Seeders for failure to perform his work that morning.

The initial claim by Saklak that was refuted by the eyewitness

]

statements.

App. Ex. 4.

Having no basis for writing Seeders up for not doing his work, Mr. Saklak simply created new charges for the warning that was ultimately administered.

Seeders, Tr. 7711-3 12.

320.

Supervisor Saklak maintained the file of documents referred to as the " Pearl Harbor File" in which Saklak maintained files on the inspectors of incidents that he thought he could ude 3

against them if needed.

All of the inspectors knew of the file.

Seeders, Tr. 7713.

Seeders disputed the accuracy of the charges and refused to sign the warning.

Seeders, Tr. 7714-15.

That

)'

86 3

O evening, Mr. Seeders prepared his August 17, 1984 letter recounting the events leading up to his warning.

He addressed

! C) the letter to DeWald, included copies to Commonwealth Edison Company and the NRC site resident inspector, Mr. Schultz.

Int.

Ex. 23.

During the month that followed, Saklak, Seltman, DeWald, and Phillips left Seeders to his calibrations work.

None g

I informed him of any deficiencies.

Seeders, Tr. 7719-20.

321.

Late in September, Seeders was summoned to Mr.

DeWald's office DeWald informed him that he had too many

O deficiencies and that the company had determined that they should fire him or transfer him.

Although DeWald mentioned -interim findings by a recent Edison audit, he gave Seeders no opportunity to explain the circumstances which might have accounted for the apparent deficiencies, Despite Seeders' efforts to explain.

Seeders, Tr. 7722-24.

Seltman as well heard Seeders' efforst to O

explain; but DeWald's only response was "you have no choice --

take a transfer or you' re fired.

Id.

l 322.

Thereafter, Mr. Seeders encountered NRC resident

?O inspector Mr. Schulz.

Schulz asked if Mr. Seeders was happy in his new position and if he wished to push his allegations.

Seeders responded that he was afraid that he was going to lose O

his job, that he knew of no way he could push it.

"I wrote the letter about the conditions and the problems, and I couldn't understand why he would be asking me why I wanted to push C) something that I thought they should take care of."

"They,"

meaning the NRC.

Seeders, Tr. 7727-28.

Seeders was unaware that Mr. Schultz had participated in the very meeting with Edison and C)

Comstock at which Seeders' termination was discussed.

Seeders, 87 0

O Tr. 7729.

323.

Prior to Seeder's transfer, Seeders met twice with representatives of Commonwealth Edison Company, where he raised his concerns first in a meeting on August 22, 1984 with Mr. James Gieseker and a second meeting on August 23, 1984 which included O

Mr. Tapella as well.

Seeders discussed his concerns reflected in his August 17, 1984 letter and the meetings are reflected in memoranda written by Mr. Gieseker.

App. Ex. 92 and 93.

In those

O meetings, Gieseker acknowledged that Edison was aware of the problems at Comstock's QC department and that Edison had taken certain steps to attempt to remedy the problems Seeders had O

brought to his attention.

Seeders, Tr. 7730.

324.

Some time between Seeders' August 17, 1984 encounter with Saklak and his reprimand and letter of that date, and O

DeWald's transfer of Seeders in lieu of termination effective October 1, DeWald interviewed a number of those who had witnessed the August 17, 1984 encounter between Saklak and Seeders.

App.

O Ex. 4. Among them was then-trainee, Richard Snyder, who was to succeed Mr. Seeders after completing the 100% review of calibration records which management used as evidence to support Seeders' termination.

At hearing, Mr. Snyder explained his O

statement:

No one man said or did more than the other in that incident.

If I could say, after reading this, if I recall, the way that is worded there in my g

response, is I am not sure if that statement was tied to the Saklak/ Seeders incident.

If you read that -- maybe I am looking at it deeper, because I know at the time there was friction between Rick, Rick Saklak, and John.

And I believe in my honest opinion there was a case being built against Mr.

O Seeders as far as his work that he was 88 O

'O performing..."

Snyder, Tr. 4045.

325.

Sometime after August 17, 1984, Mr. Snyder was given the assignment to do the records review of the calibration g

documents.

The assignment was given him by Rick Saklak.

However, the scope of review assigned to Snyder was far greater than the review supervision had sought from Mr. Seeders.

No

.O longer were they simply looking for documentation of ICR's, Saklak told him "just to go and review the vault packages on all calibrated tools to come up with any problems -- and write them down -- that we might find in that package, paper problems."

Snyder, Tr. 4057, 326.

On March 13, 1985, Richard Snyder, himself, went to O

the NRC to complain about violations of Comstock procedure by management.

Believing that he could not get satisfaction within Comstock from his supervision, he complained to the NRC that

~O leads and supervisors were not certified in the area of calibrations as was required by Comstock procedures.

He believed l

that if he violated his procedures in that fashion, he would be 20 i

fired.

Snyder, Tr. 4217.

More than six months after Seeders' 1

complaints, Snyder's calibration supervision, Larry Phillips and Rick Saklak, were still not certified in the areas they O

supervised.

Snyder felt that he had had enough in the face of the mess in calibrations, he still had no one to turn to in supervision on questions of how to handle various problems.

O Snyder, Tr. 4218-19.

Myra Sproul, the only other certified calibrations inspector, did not want the job and, though certified, was not familiar with the practice in the department.

O Snyder, Tr. 4222-24.

Mr. Snyder's March 13, 1985 complaints are 89 l

lO

iO documented by Braidwood NRC resident, Leonard McGregor.

Int. Ex.

41.

' O 327.

on March 28, 1985, Mr. Snyder was the victim of harassment and improper threats by supervisor Rick Saklak involving Snyder's calibration inspection duties.

The 20 uncertified Rick Saklak improperly instructed Snyder to sign off calibration ICR's in violation of procedure.

The very fear that had prompted Snyder's March 13 complaints about lack of

!O certificat. ion for supervisors materialized in Saklak's March 28, 1985 harassment.

The next day, March 29, 1985, Snyder and some 23 other Comstock QC inspectors chronicled their grievances

O against Saklak and their complaints that Comstock management was sacrificing quality for quanitity.

Snyder stated his complaints regarding Saklak as documented by NRC inspectors McGregor and

O Schulz

Why is he threatening me with other things -- he is telling me what I have to do -- he is not certified in my area -- he doesn't even have a background in calibra-tion.

I know he got John out of there (an inspector q) removed from his job) he was railroaded out.

It wasn't John's fault because the department was messed up --

nobody was certified in that area.

Rick had a grudge against John so he got him moved out.

Int. Ex. 42; Snyder, Tr. 4488.

(O I

!O lO f

90

O

.O 400. Gregory Archambeault is a Level II certified electrical quality control inspector working in the area of cable pulling at

g)

Braidwood.

Since January 6, 1986, Archambeault, Tr. 12137, 12141 (MCIS).

Archambeault is employed by Multicraft Inspection Services, which detailed him to L.K. Comstock.

Id;- Archambeault began working at Braidwood on was hired to pull and termination inspections, Id., but he had previously been certified in other areas and hoped to obtain recertification at Braidwood and branch out.

Id. at 12691.

.O 401. Prior to his employment at Braidwood, Archambeault had been employed at four other nuclear sites as a certified Level II inspector.

Int. Ex. 109; Archarbeault, Tr. 12144-45.

Archambeault performed cable pulling inspections at two of those-other sites, termination inspections at two sites, and a full range of electrical inspections at one of those sites.

O Archambeault Tr. 12145-46.

402. After he arrived at Braidwood, Archambeault underwent a series of training activities including classtoom and on-the-job iO training.

Archambeault, Tr. 12147.

After that training, he was examined as to his qualifications in the area of cable pulling; he passed his examinations and was certified as a Level II

'O inspector.

Id.

403. Archambeault was initially assigned for training purposes to the night shif t at Braidwood, but it was his understand-ing that he would be moved to the day shift as a matter of course.

Archambeault, Tr. 12142, 12691.

Tom Skidmore, the Braidwood site representative for Archambeault's employer, gave

!O no indication to Archambeault that he would be regularly working 91 l

!O

+

10 the night shift.

(1d. at 12142) and Larry Bossong, the second 3-shift steard, assured him that the second shift assignment was

.O only for training purposes.

Id. at 12691.

404. Archambeault has a wife and children, and working the night shif t caused a hardship in his family life.

Id. at 12142,

{ C) 12691.

405. Shortly after his certification in February, 1986, Archambeault identified a number of quality concerns in the cable

()

area that ultimately led him to lodge complaints with Comstock and the NRC of production pressure taking precedence over quality considerations.

The first set of problems identified by

<3 Archambeault surfaced during a cable pull that he performed with a trainee in the upper cable spreading room at Braidwood soon after his certification.

Archambeault and the trainee noticed a

g number of what he termed " gross violations" involving cable bend radius, cable separation, damage to cables and cables dangling out of cable trays.

Archambeault, Tr. 12231-32.

Int. Ex. 115.

g Archambeault immediately brought the problems to the attention of his lead and his supervisor, Harry Revels, who told Archambeault to write a memo documenting the discrepancies.

Archambeault, Tr.

12233-34.

Archambeault pointed out to Revels that such discrepancies should be reported by means of a nonconformance report (NCR) but Revels insisted that Archambeault instead write an informal memorandum.

Id,.

Revels' explanation to Archambeault was that before writing an NCR Revels wanted to check with Sargent & Lundy to see if this problem had already been addressed.

Id.

Archambeault was unaware of any procedure or O

regulation that permitted him to delay writing an NCR until 92 O

O someone had checked with Sargent & Lundy.

Id. at 12244-45.

406.

Archambeault also indicated to Revels that he believed O

that the individual cables should be identified for future corrective action.

Revels replied to Archambeault that such individual identification wasn't within the scope of Comstock's O

duties and that Comstock did not have the manhours to undertake it.

Id. at 12246.

407.

Revels told Archambeault that he would have DeWald,

{

O Simile and some other personnel "look at the problem."

Id. at 12248.

In the days that followed, Archambeault repeatedly ques-tioned Revels about how the matter would be handled.

Revels 13 responded each time that DeWald, Simile and the others "didn't

~

have the time to look at it today."

Id. at 12249.

Revels did not give Archambeault any kind of response about how the problem O

would be handled until some weeks later when he arranged for simile and cable engineers from Comstock and Edison to accompany Archambeault to observe the problems.

Id. at 12249-50.

Simile O

agreed that the discrepancies were significant and ordered Archambeault to write an NCR.

Id. at 12250-51.

However, Simile I

directed Archambeault not to identify individual cables but O

rather to write a " generic" NCR, which Archambeault did.

Id,. at 12251-52; Int. Ex. 116.

408.

Archambeault continued to be troubled by the failure to C) identify the individual cable discrepancies, and on his free time over the next two weeks he compiled a comprehensive list of the individual discrepancies that he had seen.

Archambeault, Tr.

12255-56; Int. Ex. 117.

g 409.

After Archambeault wrote up the NCR, dated March 19, 93 O

O 1986, he continued to work the night shif t.

Archambeault, Tr.

12272.

Archambeault's understanding was that any shift changes O

had to be initiated through the Local 306 union steward, George Nemeth.

Id. at 12274.

On June 2, 1986, Archambeault wrote a note to Nemeth indicating his understanding that he had been C) hired to work the day shift and requesting a transfer to that shift.

Int. Ex. 118.

He never received a response from Nemeth.

Archambeault, Tr. 12275.

O 410.

Soon after Archambeault made his request to Nemeth, another QC inspector, Dennis Loos, was transferred from second shift to first shift, even though he did not request such a o

transfer.

Id. at 12278.

411.

Archambeault subsequently made verbal requests for transfer to both hemeth and his supervisor, Harry Revels.

Id. at g

12279.

Revels responded that he had nothing to do with shift transfer decisions.

Id. at 12280.

Nemeth told Archambeault to submit another written request.

Id. at 12279.

412. During the last week of May, Archambeault continued to g

be disturbed by Comstock's failure to deal adequately with the i

cable damage he had found in the upper spreading room.

He came to the conclusion, after talking with other inspectors and 3

l observing Comstock operations, that there was generally an

(

emphasis on quantity over quality at Comstock.

He drafted a letter to the NRC detailing his concerns, but before he sent it he "tried to resolve the problems through" Revels by showing Revels a copy of his letter in the hope that Comstock would be spurred to some action.

--Id.

at 12364-65.

Revels gave no

,o 94 l

O

O indication that he would respond to Archambeault's concerns.

Id.

at 12365-68.

413.

n June 3, Ar hambeault was performing a cable pull O

inspection when he noted a cable separation violation involving

-42 safety cables.

Archambeault, Tr. 12281-83.

Archambeault began to take the steps required to initiate a cable Separation Conflict Report.

Id,. at 12284.

Archambeault reported the prob-lem to Harry Revels and Mr. Revels checked Sargent & Lundy docu-

.O

-Id. at 12285.

Before Archambeault mentation on those cables.

could write the Cable Separation Conflict Report, he was reassigned by his lead, Don Schirmer, to a " hot pull" that was about to take place.

Id. at 12286-87.

O-414. Archambeault told Schirmer that he was unhappy with the reassignment be'cause he understood that procedures required him to complete his reporting on the previous pull before he was O

assigned to another pull.

Id.. at 12286-87.

Archambeault " felt that production was overshadowing quality" in this instance and made clear to Schirmer that he felt his reassignment to the new O

cable pull was inappropriate.

Id.

Nevertheless, Schirmer insisted that Archambeault assist with the new pull.

Id. at 12288.

415. The " hot pull" occupied Archambeault for the rest of that day and he was not able to return to his reporting on the separation problems until the next day, June 4.

Id.; Int. Ex. 119.

3 416. The " hot pull" reassignment convinced Archambeault that it was time to go to the NRC.

Later on June 4, Archambeault contacted Charles Weil of the NRC's Region III staff to convey O

Archambeault's growing concerns about an emphasis on production 95 0

7 O

over quality concerns at Comstock.

Specifically, Archambeault reported his concerns with the condition of the spreading room (D

cables and the attitude that had been revealed by Comstock's reassigning Archambeault to the hot pull before he was able to complete his reports on the cable separation problems.

<3 Archambeault, Tr. 12311-12.

Archambeault also reported numerous other related concerns.

Id.

For example, Archambeault reported to Mr. Weil that the majority of BESTCO QC inspectors were O

frustrated by Comstock's indifference to quality problems.

Id.

at 12313.

Archambeault passed on a number of comments by BESTCO inspectors that reflected their lack of morale as a result of O

Comstock's attitude.

Id. at 12313-14.

Archambeault stated that the general consensus among QC inspectors was that those who performed their jobs conscientiously "would be blacklisted" or q)

" looked down upon" or " moved around."

Id. at 12315.

In support of that belief Archambeault reported to Weil that QC inspector Rick Martin had been reduced to a document reviewer from a field inspector "because he did his job too well."

Id. at 12315-16.

O Other specific problems reported to Weil were an instance involving a cable pulled in violation of procedures while the inspector was still performing his pre-pull walkdown, instances of nonconformance reports being written but "never closed in a

(

timely fashion," examples of cable tray overfill conditions, problems with erroneous cable markings, and other problems at

!O Comstock indicating a serious indifference to quality.

Id. at 12316-21.

Int. Ex. 122.

O 417. on July 10, Archambeault made a second written request 96 l O i

O-to Nemeth and a Mr. Cartelli for a transfer to the day shift.

Archambeault, Tr. 12328; Int. Ex. 123.

That request was not

'O granted.

Id. at 12330.

418. At some point after July 10, the NRC undertook a series of inspection activities of Archambeault's concerns.

53 Archambeault, Tr. 12330-34.

419. Again, on August 7, Archambeault submitted a third l

written request for a transfer to the day shift.

Archambeault, O

Tr. 12335.

On August 27, 1986, Tony Simile denied Archambeault's transfer request.

Id. at 12335-36.

Int. Ex. 126.

I 420. During the time that Archambeault had formal transfer O

requests pending, up through mid-August 1984, four QC inspectors had been transferred from the second shift to the first shift.

Dennis Loos was transferred in late spring, and Ron Nelson, Ken O

willoughby and Les Peters were transferred to the day shift in the latter part of July and early August, after Archambeault had submitted his second formal transfer request.

Id. at 12355.

O when the three openings occurred in the first shift, Revels approached five inspectors to ask if they would be interested.

One inspector, John Thomas, declined the transfer.

Of the o

remaining four who expressed a willingness to be transferred, Archambeault was the only one who was passed up, even though he was qualified to perform any of the open inspection jobs.

Id. at 12355-58.

O O

421. Of the four other inspectors who were transferred, 97 O

bm

lO apparently only Mr. Willoughby made a written transfer request.

Mr. Loos did not request a transfer at all, and Mr. Nelson and

C)

Mr. Peter apparently made only oral requests.

Id. at 12363-64.

422. Af ter Archambeault's transfer request was denied in late July, Revels explained to Archambeault that Comstock had

O been afraid that their transfer of Archambeault to the first shift would appear to the NRC to be retaliation against 4

Archambeault.

Revels also informed Archambesult of rumors of a

O lay-off in september, and said that he understood Archambeault would be a prime candidate for an early lay-off.

That I-conversation prompted Archambeault to have his wife retype his 10 resume and send out a number of job inquiries to other companies.

Id. at 12359-60.

423. During the conversation between Archambeault and l(3 Revels, Revels implied that upper management at Comstock had indicated that Archambeault's communications with the NRC were the reason why he was a prime candidate for lay-off.

Revels r

told Archambeault that upper management had approached Revels o

with questions about Archambeault and the NRC contacts.

424. On August 19, 1986, Archambeault approached MCIS super-visor Pete LeSage to set up a meeting to resolve Archambeault's 43 difficulties.

Archambeault indicated to LeSage that he was con-templating filing a discrimination charge with the Department of Labor based on his transfer denials but that he vould prefer to O

I work things out directly with Comstock, Edison, MCIS and the NRC.

Tr. 12368-70.

Int. Ex. 125.

O 425. LeSage then set up a meeting between Archambeault, 98 O

O Edison representatives Mr. Geiseker and Mr. Dougherty, Mr.

Nemeth and Mr. Cartelli.

At that meeting Archambeault voiced his

()

concerns and the participants agreed to set up a second meeting the next day including representatives from Comstock and the NRC.

Nothing was resolved at that second meeting.

Id. at 12381-83.

()

426.

Archambeault was granted his transfer to the day shift only after his deposition in this case in early September.

Archambeault, Tr. 12497-98.

O 427.

Richard Martin began performing cable pulling l

inspections on the second shift in October, 1985.

Martin, Tr.

12698.

In early 1986 craft laborers and craft supervision had

!O complained that their cable pulling activities were being delayed by unavailability of cable pulling inspectors.

Id. at 12700.

Rumors circulated on the secnd shift that Comstock was going to O

replace the second shift cable pulling QC supervisors in an attempt to " clean house" and eliminate any delays or potential conflicts with the crafts.

Id. at 12699-701.

Ci 428.

On April 28, 1986, Mr. Tuite and Mr. Lechner took over as second shift cable pulling supervisors.

They held a meeting with all of the second shift cable-pulling inspectors.

Id. at 12701-702.

At that meeting, Mr. Tuite assured the QC inspectors

<3 that he was not "out to get" them and that he and Mr. Lechner i

were there to make sure that QC did not get unfairly blamed for jg delays that were really the fault of the production side.

Id. at 12701-702.

On the subject of inspectors who required assistance in performing their QC inspection of cable pulling, Tuite said that if an inspector needed help or assistance on a pull he qg 99 O

O should get it whether it involves two, five or even seven j

inspectors as long as the request is reasonable.

Id. at 12703.

429. It had been a common practice on second shift for QC g) inspectors to assist one another in conducting cable pull inspections.

Martin, Tr. 12704.

On lengthy cable pulls involving multiple bends in multiple rooms, the common practice

)

was to have the lead QC inspector follow the head of the cable down the length of the pull while other inspectors stationed themselves at various bends and in various rooms to ensure proper labelling and to assure that the cable was not binding or subjected to stress or bend radius violations.

Additional inspectors were also used in places where the cable dropped or iO rose through risers from one elevation to another.

Martin, Tr.

12704-706.

430.

The number of inspectors that were needed to

O assist on a pull depends on the number of rooms, principally, but also on other factors such as the number of bends.

Martin, Tr.

j 12706.

For example, a cable pull involving a run of three

O' different rooms might require anywhere-from one to four people to assist the lead inspector, depending on the number of bends.

Id.

at 12707.

Tuite and Lechner's precedessor, Mr. Fray, always

'O found a way to accommodate QC inspectors' request for assistance in inspecting a pull.

Martin, Tr. 12708.

There were twelve to thirteen cable pull inspectors on second shift so that there were O

generally people available to use as assistants on a given cable pull.

Martin, Tr. 12709.

NF 431.

The first evening that Mr.

Tuite and Mr. Lechner were assigned to second shif t cable O

pulling, Mr. Martin was assigned to a complex cable pull of l

100 1 0 n

O approximately 350 feet that went through seven different rooms and around approximately twelve bends or risers.

Martin, Tr.

E) 12711-13.

Martin performed a walkdown and determined that he would need at least three and possibly four inspectors to assist him.

Martin, Tr. 12713-14.

When he requested assistance from

.O Mr. Lechner, Lechner replied that "we were going to be doing pulls differently, and that we were going to pulling -- doing pulls by ourself."

Lechner told Martin that inspectors on the C) day shift normally worked without assistance and that Martin "could just go ahead and do the pull by [him] self."

Martin, Tr.

12714-15.

When he denied Martin assistance, Lechner was

O aware of the length and complexity of the pull.

Martin, Tr.

12715.

Lechner denied the request inspite of the fact that there were perhaps four or five inspectors who had no other pulling

O assignments and were free to assist Martin.

Martin, Tr. 12716.

432. Because Martin had misgivings about one inspector's ability to monitor such a complex pull, he wrote Lechner a note O'

which he described "an official memo" asking for the assistance of three inspectors on the pull.

Martin, Tr. 12717-18.

Lechner refused the request and when Martin insisted that the pull required more than one inspector, Lechner replied " Fine.

You C) just sit there.

We'll get somebody else to do it."

Lechner then

(

assigned Don Schirmer to take over the pull.

Martin, Tr. 12718.

Schirmer performed the pull with the assistance of a trainee.

Id.

g 433.

Martin had been assigned to a particular craft foreman, Mr. Murphy, all of whone cable pulls Martin inspected.

Martin, Tr. 12719.

On the evening of April 28, after Lechner assigned 101 O

O Schirmer in Martin's place to the disputed cable pull, Lechner also removed Martin generally from his assignment to foreman Murphy and replaced him with Schirmer.

Martin, Tr. 12719.

O 434. The rest of the evening of April 28, Martin simply sat in the office and was not assigned any other cable pulling work.

The next day, April 29, Martin was assigned to perform hold tag verifications, a task which lasted about a week.

Martin, Tr.

12721-22.

435.

On April 29, Martin asked his shop steward, George Nemeth, to arrange a meeting with Lechner and Tuite to clear the air.

Martin, Tr. 12728.

Nemeth told Martin on the night of the 29th that he had set up a meeting with Lechner and Tuite for the O

night of the 30th.

On the 30th, Martin went to work as usual and Nemeth said he would contact Martin when Tuite and Lechner arrived for the meeting.

Martin, Tr. 12728-29.

Lechner and O

Tuite never showed up for the meeting.

Martin, Tr. 12730-31.

Martin discussed the situation with Nemeth, and both agreed that Martin should take his concerns to the NRC.

Martin, Tr. 12730-

-O 32.

Subsequently, Martin went to see Mr. Kropp at the NRC.

436. After he finished the hold tag verifications, Martin l

was assigned no further cable pulling work.

He occupied himself

)

by assisting other inspectors who were performing pulls.

Martin, Tr. 12722-23.

He assisted the other inspectors on his own initiative; no one assigned him to help them.

That situation C'

lasted for approximately two weeks.

Martin, Tr. 12723-24.

In mid-May, Martin was taken off the second shift, reassigned to the l

i first shift, and assigned to do clerical work for Mr. Seese.

l C)

He was given no further inspection work.

Martin, Tr. 12724.

i 102 O

i i

O 437. Shortly after his deposition in this case, Martin was reassigned to the third shift to perform what he termed " clean up O

inspections."

Martin, Tr. 12726-27.

O

'O O

O i

i lO I

O r

lO i

f l

103

!O

0:

501.

A number of encounters between Comstock quality control inspectors, representatives of supervision or management, C) form the basis for their widespread belief that management engaged in harassment and pressure to compromise inspection quality.

Many of these encounters represented the substance of O

the complaints voiced by the 24 Comstock QC inspectors to the NRC Site Resident Inspectors on March 29, 1985, precipitated by the Saklak harassment and abuse of inspector Snyder which took place O

the day before.

These incidents also form a part of the factual basis for the inspectors' general belief that Comstock management 1

was emphasizing inspection quantity or production over inspection

]O quality.

Int. Exa. 42 and 42A.

While the NRC memoranda of March 29 and April 5 are summary in character, both as to the f

statements made March 29 by the Comstock inspectors, as well as lC of the events they describe, they are substantively accurate in conveying the basis for the inspectors' general conclusions i

regarding emphasis on quantity over quality.

502.

In July 1984, supervisor Saklak threatened and abused g

QC inspector Mike Mustered in repeatedly ordering him to sign off or retract three inspection correction reports (ICRs) which l C)

Mustered had initiated on discrepant conduit hangers whose 4

installations differed from specifications on design drawings.

Mustered, Tr. 4970-72.

Saklak asserted that he had learned f rom fg -

Sargent & Lundy that the design specification was to be deleted and the drawings revised in the near future.

On that basis, he i

i improperly ordered Mustered to retract the ICRs although the field conditions remained discrepant until any such design 104 i

\\O i

,__.____m,

O_

changes were formally effective.

Mustered, Tr. 4972-73.

Others were present at the time and witnessed the Saklak abuse of k

Mustered.

Sakle.k, a large man, looked down at him, pointed hi:

3 finger and ordered repeatedly, "Just sign it off.

Sign it off.

I Sign it off."

Mustered refused.

Gorman, Tr. 5900.

The witness, inspector Gorman, observed that others present including supervisors Bob Tuite, Mike Lechner and Dave Soberski appeared to consider the encounter a laughing matter, although inspector Gorman did not and found Saklak's behavior unacceptable.

He told Mustered that he could count on him if he needed a witness or other support.

Gorman, Tr. 5900-03.

Saklak's actions in this instance were improper; and were clearly intended to impede and

\\

.O interfere with an inspector's performance of his quality

{

assurance function.

503.

QC inspector Dean Peterson was called in by his lead, O

John Walters, and his supervisor, Ken Worthington, who counselled him that his inspection productivity was too low.

Peterson, Tr.

5904.

Peterson explained that he had encountered welds that had O

not been adequately cleaned of galvanized spray paint which, in his judgment required further cleaning in order for him to effectively conduct his inspections.

Peterson, Tr. 5905-09.

O Supervisor Worthington told Peterson that he would be denied overtime because of his low productivity.

Peterson, Tr. 5915.

After this meeting with his supervisors, Peterson no longer O

cleaned off the remaining paint on the welds; but, instead he listed them on his daily status reports as painted and therefore inappropriate for inspection under established acceptance O

criteria.

Peterson, Tr. 6040-42.

Thereafter, his supervisors 105 O

O callnd Ptmc; in Dr 3 cecend nocting, ppin % diacucn hie productivity based on his determination not to inspect the O

painted welds.

John Walters told Peterson that he didn't feel that there was that much of a problem with the paint remaining on the welds, and he didn't think it would take long to clean off lO what was necessary in order to perform a valid inspection.

Peterson, Tr. 6839-40.

Thereafter, Peterson on one occasion in particular, noted on his daily status that he had completed

O approximately five inspections, but also noted some 15 or 20 components which he couldn't inspect due to the painted condition of welds on these hangers.

Peterson, Tr. 6041.

Walters and lO Worthington discussed this particular report with Peterson.

Peterson, Tr. 6042.

On that basis, apparently, they told him they could not warrant overtime for the amount of work he was

O doing.

Tr. 6042.

The supervisors' tone indicated that they were l

angry and upset with Peterson.

Id.

Peterson explained to them that if they were still worried about the amount of work he was

! Q doing, they should either take him off the one special project he was assigned to and permit him to inspect full time in the other, since it was apparent that they wanted him to accomplish more

g cable pan weld inspections (Peterson, Tr. 6044).

Thereafter, Peterson was called in by supervisor Tony Simile, who stated that he understood from Ken Worthington that they were displeased with Peterson's productivity.

Simile suggested a transfer to in-

O process weld inspection, which was acceptable to Peterson.

j Peterson also had been upset in his meeting with Walters and l

W cthington on the second occasion.

He told them: "Well, first O

l l

106 l

lO

e O

you complain because I'm not getting the numbers."

He then

(

3&tgre! rad not to spend the time to take the paint off the welds and n w his supervisors wete onpleainirvg in.caea tc na writ tro O

down the welds on his daily status that still had paint on them.

The supervisors appeared to be upset because he was documenting that he had gone out and looked at these welds and that they did g

have paint on them.

He felt like he was in a no-win catch-22 situation.

Peterson, Tr. 6846.

Before his transfer, inspector Peterson recalls that supervisor Ken Worthington had called in the entire group of inspectors working on the special project and had more or less asked the group, "What can we do to increase the amount of work that's being done?"

The group's response had been, "we need a better job of getting the welds clean."

Peterson, Tr. 6053.

Others in the group of inspectors also complained to Peterson O

about finding welds not completing cleaned of paint.

Peterson, Tr. 6054.

These ir.cidents between supervision and inspector Peterson and his crew can only be interpreted as signalling n

Comstock management's clear emphasis on inspection productivity over inspection quality.

If the problem encountered by Peterson and his crew was welds insufficiently cleaned of paint, the 10 l

appropriate remedy was to see that the craf t removed the paint i

prior to assigning the welds for inspection.

The inappropriate remedy was that chosen by Comstock management -- pressure on lO inspectors and removal of the offending inspector from the project in question.

[

504.

QC inspector Danny Holley testified that QC Manager lO cewald had spoken to him on several occasions about his i

I 107 O

t

- O i

productivity.

DeWald told him that he could perform more

(

inspectione then-ha had been performing, and that while he was a slow inspector,'his inspections werc goed.

sci 1r.f. TI, till, DeWald told him that he had noticed that Holley had not been doing the norm of inspections and that he should be able to do a

} C) little bit more.

Holley, Tr. 5113.

DeWald stated that along with the quality of inspections, there has to also be a norm of t

production as well.

Holley, Tr. 5114-15.

Holley recalls more j C) than one occasion over several months or a year where DeWald counselled him in this fashion.

Holley, Tr. 5116.

While DeWald 4

did not explain what he meant by the norm, Holley testified that

! C) it was understood among the inspections that such a norm was eight or ten inspections per day in the welding and configuration areas.

Holley, Tr. 5117.

Such an understanding was common j

O knowledge among the inspectors, according to Mr. Holley.

Holley, Tr. 5118.

Inspectors were aware of each other's productivity frem their daily inspection status reports which might show, for q

!O example,15 or 20 inspections for some or only one or two for others, depending upon the complexity of the inspections.

Holley, Tr. 5118.

In inspector Holley's opinion, the daily status sheets were maintained so that management could tell how

()

much work was being done.

Holley, Tr. 5119.

At various times, others in supervision besides Mr. DeWald, including supervisors Saklak, Mike Cass, lead Mark Klachko, supervisor Joe Hii and jg Chuck Tyler, among others, had approached him about his l

inspection productivity.

Holley, Tr. 5124.

Saklak in particular 9 t an9Ey and personal with Holley on the subject of his O

t 108 O

)) ~

productivity.

Holley, Tr. 5126.

The formar leed, Mark Klachko confirms that supervision including Saklak and DeWald had spoken to him about the inspection productivity of QC inspectors on his O

cceu.

he ceault tr. pr:ticulac superviacts autetten2ng nam and inspector Danny Holley about Holley's inspection productivity.

Klachko, Dep. Tr. 32-33, 101-02.

(3 505.

Level II welding inspector Therman Bowman had observed in the field during the course of his inspection activities a base metal reduction problem in a structural weld.

When he HD mentioned this problem to his lead inspector, Mr. Walters, i

Walters told him he should ignore it because it was not within the scope of Bowman's assigned inspection work.

Bowman, Tr.

!O 6795.

Bowman in turn told his welding inspection supervisor, Darryl Landers, about the base metal reduction problem and Landers told him to keep up his production or he would lose his

!O overtime.

Bowman, Tr. 6796.

While Landers' manner indicated that he might be joking, his words implied a threat.

Bowman, Tr.

~

6810.

Later that day, Bowman's supervisor, Worthington, returned 1

g the paper which Bowman had written documenting the base metal i

reduction problem, and told Bowman to deal with the problem as he j

saw fit.

Bowman finally issued a nonconformance report i

d O

umentin9 the dis repancy.

Bowman, Tr. 6812-14.

The conduct of all supervisors involved in this matter evinces an unsupportive attitude toward an inspector's performance of his g

quality assurance function in identifying deficiencies and an inappropriate implied threat that such inspection functions were contrary to the goal of meeting production requirements and might be sanctioned by the denial of an employment benefit - access to 109 0

.,--,-n-,,ea-w mm

-s-ne-,n_n,,w.,,,.-m,,nm...,e.,,-

m.

,,a---,

,-n,mm. - - -

-a,-, - -,m,,

.-m-

O overtime work and pay.

506.

QC supervisor Rick Saklak threatened to fire Level II

()

inspector Franco Rolan when Rolan resisted Saklak's direction to ccuplote e ncnconformance report in the manner desired by Saklak.

Rolan, who had recently been the subject of adverse NRC findings C) with respect to his inspection work, was told by Saklak, "When the NRC is through with you, you won't have any certifications."

Rolan took this to be a threat to fire him.

Rolan, Tr. 4676.

C)

Saklak claimed the authority to actually fire inspectors, but through this experience Rolan concluded that it would be very difficult for him to have done so.

Rolan, Tr. 4676.

The C) circumstances of Mr. Rolan's run-in with Mr. Saklak suggests, however, that it was Mr. Rolan's influence with his father, Frank Rolan, the Comstock Project Construction Manager, which averted

()

Saklak's threat, and not any limitations on Saklak's authority which influenced the outcome.

On November 5, 1984, inspector Rolan wrote a nonconformance report identifying a nonconforming

()'

condition on an installation drawing.

The drawing itself required revision to properly disposition the NCR.

Rolan, Tr.

4665-68, 4688-89, 4691.

In Rolan's opinion, identifying the electrician involved in the work an the NCR would be

()

inappropriate since it would unjustly blame a nonconforming condition on the electrician.

Rolan, Tr. 4694.

Rolan's direct lead had instructed him to handle the inspection the way he was

()

doing it.

Rolan, Tr. 4665-68.

Supervisor Saklak ignored the chcin of command and interceded, insisting that Rolan identify the electrician on the NCR.

Rolan, Tr. 4668-72.

When Rolan

)

110 O

i

O refused, Saklak threatened him.

Rolan, Tr. 4674, and Rolan reluctantly did as Saklak directed.

Rolan, Tr. 4673.

Mr. Rolan thereafter went to management every day for several weeks, 3g complaining about Saklak's actions.

He complained repeatedly to Assistant Manager Larry Seese in Irv DeWald's absence, and later to DeWald himself.

Rolan, Tr. 4677.

Ultimately, he followed the example of former inspector John Seeders and drafted a letter to be sent to the NRC and other authorities.

Rolan, Tr. 4677-78.

Before sending the letter, Mr. Rolan showed the letter to his

O father, the Project Manager Frank Rolan.

Thereafter, Rolan's lead Don Schirmer confirmed to Assistant Manager Larry Seese that Rolan had done as directed by him.

Rolan, Tr. 4678.

A meeting was held later with Saklak, young Rolan and Mr. DeWald.

DeWald informed Rolan that he intended to write Saklak up.

This was unsatisfactory to young Rolan, since Rolan believed that Saklak

!O had been written up many times for abusiveness to inspectors.

To DeWald's question, "What would you like me to do?" young Rolan l

suggested that Saklak be terminated.

Rolan, Tr. 4678-79.

Mr.

O Rolan's father asked his son not to send the letter he had drafted (Rolan, Tr. 4796); thereafter, Mr. Rolan, Sr. contacted DeWald and suggested that DeWald should fire Mr. Saklak for O

abusing his son.

(Rolan, Tr. 4798.)

Thereafter, DeWald issued a written warning to Saklak for ignoring the chain of command in directing Rolan's handling of the nonconformance report.

Int.

O Ex. 44.

DeWald's action following Project Manager Rolan's suggestions that he fire Saklak were taken merely to placate Mr.

Rolan, Sr. and not to punish Saklak for his serious misconduct in O

threatening young Mr. Rolan.

The warning actually issued by 111 t'O

O DeWald to Saklak, Intervenors' Exhibit 45, states in full

" Warning issued for bypassing the lead inspector and not investigating the situation prior to consulting the inspector.

The lead should have been questioned to ensure what direction was given to the inspector, therefore, following the supervision O

chain as established."

do warning was given for the threat against Rolan.

507.

Former lead QC inspector Mark Klachko was questioned O

on a number of occasions by supervisor Saklak and manager DeWald about low individual inspector productivity among inspectors on his crew.

Klachko Dep. Tr. 32-33.

Klachko understood that C)

Saklak and DeWald had relied upon the individual status reports prepared by inspectors to monitor individual inspector's productivity.

Dep. Tr. 31-32.

They questioned Klachko regarding O

disparities in inspector performance.

Id.

Mr. Klachko, in turn, would tell the inspector concerned that he was being watched and that his daily status reports were O

being used as " counts" of his daily productivity.

Dep. Tr. 33.

Mr. Klachko was also aware that the inspectors themselves were questioned regarding their productivity by Saklak and DeWald.

()

Including specifically QC inspector Danny Holley, Klachko Tr.

101-102.

Klachko ultimately resigned his lead inspector position O

n February 19, 1985, in order to avoid the tension between Comstock management pressure and the growing morale problems among his inspectors.

Klachko Dep. Tr. 72-79.

O 112 O

'O 508.

QC inspectors Larry Perryman, Larry Boscong End three others were assigned in March,1985, to work on a cable pan hanger walkdown program.

Perryman, Tr. 9720; Simile, Tr. 3423-

,:O 25; App. Ex. 106.

The walkdown program was part of a corrective action for discrepancies in cable pan hanger fabrication and

)O installation involving actions by Comstock, Edison and Sargent &

l l

Lundy (SEL), that was specified in the disposition of Edison NCRs 708 and 709.

Simile, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 3305), Att. 3 at 25; s

Perryman, Tr. 9805-06; Simile, Tr. 3416-17.

!O The task of Comstock QC inspectors was to compare the as-i built configuration of hangers actually found in the field which had.been fabricated by Systems Control Corporation (an off site 10 j

vendor) with the design drawings for the hangers.

Simile, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 3305) at 20; Simile, Tr. 3416-17.

The QC

]

inspectors, assisted by the S&L engineer, were to mark in red 10 I

pencil any differences between the as-built hanger configurations found in the field and the design on the design drawings.

Simile, Tr. 3417-18, 3421-22.

These red line drawings prepared O

by the quality control inspectors were called "rev o" drawings.

j Bossong, Tr. 9864-64; Perryman, Tr. 9680.

Thereaf ter, Sargent &

1 j

Lundy engineers were to perform a design evaluation of any lO deviations between the as-built hanger configurations found in l

I the field and the design on the design drawings.

Simile, Tr.

i j

3417-18, 3421-22.

Thereafter, Sargent & Lundy engineers O

performed a desisn evaluation of any deviations between the as-built condition of the hanger and the design requirements.

l Simile, Tr. 3418; Simile, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 3305) at 20.

iO Acceptable hanger configurations were depicted by S&L on a t

113 l

l

e different set of drawings called "Rev.A." drawings.

Bossong, Tr.

9865; Perryman, Tr. 9680.

Comstock QC inspectors would then

)

reinspect the hangers to determine whether the as-built configuration of the installed hanger corresponded with that shown on the Rev.A. drawing.

The inspectors were to use 3

checklists to indicate acceptance or rejection of the hangers.

Simile, Tr. 3418, 3421-22; Simile, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 3305) at 20.

The Rev.O. drawings were accompanied by hanger configuration 3

checklist (Form 7) which was normally utilized in performing configuration inspections under Comstock configuration inspection procedures to indicate the final QC acceptance of the hanger D

configuration.

Under this special program, the inspectors were expected to use such a Form 7 to document and verify the accuracy of the as-built hangers as reflected in the red-lined drawings.

3 Bosson, Tr. 9865; Perryman, Tr. 9674-80.

Bossong, Perryman and the other inspectors objected to this misuse of the configuration checklist Form 7 believing that it might be improperly understood g

as reflectng final QC verification of the adequacy of the hanger's configuration instead of simply verifying that the Rev.O. drawing reflected the as-built condition.

Perryman, Tr.

9675-81; Bosson, Tr. 9866-69; Simile, Tr. 3424-25.

g Because management was unresponsive to their concerns, Perryman, Bossong and the other inspectors requested transfers from the walkdown program to the in-process inspection duties to avoid further misinterpretation of their signatures on these checklists.

Perryman, Tr. 9720-22, 9682-86, 9759-62, 9679; App.

Ex. 105; Int. Ex. 35; Bossong, Tr. 9869, 9865; Simile, Tr. 3428-114 9

'O 32.

Repeated requests for transfer by Perryman and Bossong were denied.

Perryman, Tr. 9684-85, 9762; Int. Ex. 35; Bossong, Tr.

9873-75.

The requests were renewed.

Perryman, Tr. 9685, 9762;

)

Bossong, Tr. 9880; Int. Ex. 35.

Management denied these transfer requests asserting that such a transfer was not possible at this time for the duration of this short-term project not scheduled for completion until August 1.

This was DeWald's response of May 15, 1985 to Perryman's May 13 fourth request for a transfer.

Int. Ex. 35.

Mr. Perryman again made written request for a O

transfer to Comstock management on May 17, 1985, explaining his concerns:

"I'm requesting transfer out of the cable pan walkdown due to management and misleading information on the part of LKC management and the QA department.

I was informed that I was verifying the as-built dimension information of the hangers and that this information was not to determine actual acceptance in

O any way, shape or form other than my own review at a later date for these hanges to an approved design document.

Any intention of use of the Form 7's I have signed up to this date other than O

dimensional verification, was not my intent.

At this time, I wish to make corrections to my Form 7's in accordance to procedure 4.13.1 to reflect this fact."

Int. Ex. 35.

Ultimately, after these repeated expressions of concern, management acceded to the inspectors' complaints and adopted a clarification to the walkdown procedure May 30, 1985 providing O

for a notation on the Form 7 checklists limiting their construction as requested by the inspectors.

App. Ex. 107; App.

Ex. 108; Bossong, Tr. 9878-80; Perryman, Tr. 9767-69; Simile, Tr.

(3 3547-48.

On May 31, 1985, Mr. DeWald responded to Perryman's May 115

O

-O 17, 1985 transfer request as follows:

" Transfer from walkdown is granted, supplement has been revised to include your concerns."

C)

Int. Ex. 35.

In fact, comstock management, Tony simile in particular, determined the punish the dissenting inspectors for their quality concerns.

Simile advised Perryman, Bossong and the O

others that their transfers had been granted but told them they would not like where they were going.

Perryman, Tr. 9691-92, 9723-24, 9778; Bossong, Tr. 9870; Simile Tr. 34-35.

One (3

inspector declined this transfer to the unsought and undesireable second shift.

His objection was sustained.

Perryman also objected however, his objections were not honored.

Perryman, Tr.

l(3 9723-25.

Aware that Mr. Perryman's mother was dying of cancer, i

1 and that a transfer to night shift would interfere with his ability to care for her, Simile determined to nonetheless

(3 transfer Mr. Perryman for his complaining.

Perryman, Tr. 9692.

!O

,0 0

1 l

l 10 1

116 0

g 701.

Intervenors presented the testimony of two experts in industrial and organizational psychology, Dr. Richard D. Arvey and Dr. David J. McKirnan.

702.

Dr. Richard D. Arvey is Professor of Industrial Relations and Adjunct Professor of Psychology at the University lI3 of Minnesota (Arvey, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 4391) at 1 and Arvey, Prefiled Att. 1); and holds a PhD. in Psychology from the University of Minnesota.

Dr. Arvey's field of study is 13 Industrial / Organizational Psychology (id.).

His field involves, among other issues, a study of the factors that influence work behavior and methodologies for studying individuals and

!O organizations.

Id.

Dr. Arvey serves on the editorial board of several professional journals, teaches, publishes and consults i

with a number of prominent businesses and governmental agencies.

()

Id. at 1-2.

In his research Dr. Arvey has addressed issues specifically relating to the effects of punishment, discipline and harassment in organizations, including the impact of punitive lg behavioral styles exhibited by supervisors on employee morale and performance.

Id. at 2-3.

Dr. Arvey offered opinion testimony on l

how, f rom the perspective of industrial and organizational

43 psychology, it might be determined whether inspector performance was adversely affected by harassment or intimidation.

Dr. Arvey recommended that additional studies concerning inspector work performance including what he called " longitudinal studies" of

!O behavioral traces based on archival data including reinspections l

1 of Comstock QC accepted work and in-depth interviews be l

l conducted.

Arvey, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 4391) at 11-13.

After

.O 117 O

i

'O reviewing the weaknesses in a number of socici scicnca methodologies, Dr. Arvey concludes: "We will not be able to conclusively assess any cause and effect relationship in a

^O scientific fashion, but we can gain knowledge of the impact of harassment and intimidation on inspector performance using multiple behavioral science procedures.

However, these estimates O

will be imprecise at best.

Therefore, I recommend that data concerning the work itself be ascertained prior to reaching any conclusive determination."

In short, despite resort to the best

O social science tools available, one cannot conclusively establish whether work performance is adversely affected by harassment and intimidation.

Id. at 13.

Dr. Arvey also observes that

!O

" Employees are seldom going to admit that they personally did something in violation of policy (e.g., approved welds without all research required) because of their fears of self-

'O incrimination."

Id. at 9.

f 703.

Intervenors also presented testimony of an expert in social and clinical psychology, Dr. David J. McKirnan.

Dr.

O Mesirnan is an Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Illinois at Chicago.

McKirnan, Prefiled (ff. Tr.

10267) at 1.

He holds a Pi.D.

degree in clinical and social O

psychology from McGill University in Montreal, Canada.

Id.

Dr.

McKirnan is a member of a number of professional associations, he teaches and performs resoarch in the field with a particular

O focus on the operation of social norm and values.

Id. at 1-2.

Dr. McKirnan described the psychological processes whereby an organizational climate of harassment, intimidation and production O

pressure is likely to effect employees' values and work 118

'O

d

o performance.

Id.

Dr. McKirnan's analysis is based on a theory of " observational learning."

McKirnan, Prefiled at 3-10.

O Employees learn values as well as specific skills on'the job.

The learned values influence performance standards by " anchoring" the employaas' criterion for good cn: bad work as well as by

+

[O influencing an employee's motivation or incentive to perform i

]-

quality work.

Id. at 4.

i 704.

In order to analyze whether adverse observational

(3 learning from negative models had occurred, Dr. McKirnan suggested that three factors should be examined: 1) whether there was a model for the behavior or values in question (quantity over

! C) quality) which would serve as a " anchor" for the inspectors' standard for good or bad work; 2) if there were such models, whether they were viewed as representative of the larger

!C) organizational culture or, by contrast, whether they were merely I

eccentric or idiosyncratic and noncepresentative; and 3) whether i

the persons embodying these models were perceived as having

!O either formal or informal power to effect the rewards or punishments received by employees; or that conformity to the model would increase positive outcomes for employees while

<3 deviance from the model would decrease such outcomes.

McKirnan, l

Profiled at 7-8.

Workplace values of quantity over quality might lower inspectors' " anchors" for performance in subtle ways, so

()

that no inspector might recognize that he has accepted a piece of deficient work, but the inspectors might generally understand that the standard for passable work is being lowered.

McKirnan, Prefiled at 12.

q) 119 0

-.,~n,-

'O 705.

From a review of the three NRC Staff memoranda (dated March 29 and April 5, 1985), Int. Ex. 42, and excerpts from various depositions of Comstock QC inspectors, Dr. McKirnan

)

suggested how application of his analytical framework to statements by Comstock inspectors could be used in evaluating likely work performance effects from influences on the Comstock inspectors.

McKirnan, Prefiled at 8-11.

Models for QC inspectors' values regarding quality would be provided by a common understanding among inspectors that a supervisor had performed an inordinately large number of inspections in a short period of time, or by supervisors' discouraging inspectors from taking the time to identify or document quality problemar and, particularly, by supervisors harassing, intimidating or retaliating against inspectors to emphasize quality concerns over production.

McKirnan, Prefiled at 8.

O Such models would be seen as representative of the larger organizational culture where it is generally understood by inspectors that inspection quantity is more important than O

quality.

The observation that various levels of management express such values, or ratify the expression of values by others, would confirm the representativeness of such models.

Conversely, failure by management to respond to repeated complaints about production pressure would also evidence the representativeness of such values.

McKirnan, Prefiled at 9.

3 706.

The understanding that such models had formal or i

{

informal power over inspectors would be evidenced by the ability i

of such supervisors to affect the termination, transfer, denial O

of overtime, pay or promotion or other employment effects.

l 120 0

O Conversely, evidence that such models can reward desired behavior also reflects power.

McKirnan, Prefiled at 9-10.

O 707.

On the basis of his review of the documented concerns by Comstock inspectors, Dr. McKirnan expressed the opinion that there were models for valuing production over quality at

O Comstock, that such models were viewed as representative of the larger organizational culture and that those supervisors who embodied such models were perceived as having formal and informal l

O power in the organization to reward and punish inspector l

behavior.

McKirnan, Prefiled at 10.

Dr. McKirnan expressed the opinion that it is highly probable that conditions of the

'O workplace significantly affected the quality control inspectors' values and attitudes toward their jobs, as well as their thresholds for approving work.

He stated explicitly, however, O

that the extent of any actual erosion in work performance is an empirical question that would have to be determined by rigorous evaluation using both behavioral science and engineering O

approaches.

McKirnan, Prefiled at 10.

Dr. McKirnan recommended strongly that such an investigation be undertaken given his judgment of the high probability that such an adverse shift in performance standards actually occurred.

McKirnan, Prefiled at

g 10-11.

708.

Finally, Dr. McKirnan expressed the opinion that it was lg highly unlikely that individual inspectos would admit to actions that both reflect very badly on his or her performance and endanger his or her job.

He suggests that inspectors might consistently perceive a shifting in the anchor for g

l l

121 L

[O l

O differentiating good from bad work, yet not perceive that he or she has accepted a piece of work that is " bad."

Such a condition

g would give rise to their having a widespread sense that quality control inspectors generally are under pressure to accept lower quality work -- hence their appeal to the NRC -- without any specific inspector feeling that he or she has knowingly approved a deficient piece of work.

McKirnan, Prefiled at 12.

709.

Edison commissioned Dr. Charles L. Hulin to review Intervenors' expert testimony and provide rebuttal testimony in

,O the proceeding.

Dr. Hulin holds a PhD. degree in Psychology from Cornell University and is Professor of Psychology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Hulin, Prefiled (ff.

O Tr.

) at 2-3; Hulin, Tr. 18181-82.

Dr. Hulin expected to receive a fee of $25,000 for the 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> he testified was required for his work.

Hulin, Tr. 18259-60.

While acknowledging

~O that no single piece or set of data is definitive on the matter, Dr. Hulin concluded, "On the basis of the multiple pieces of evidence that I have viewed, it seems highly unlikely that the 10' alleged harassment and intimidation and undue pressure by Comstock management adversely affected the quality of the work of the quality control inspectors."

Hulin, Prefiled at 18-19.

In O

~

preparing his prefiled testimony, Dr. Hulin briefly observed and informally spoke with six Comstock inspectors.

Hulin, Tr. 17901-04.

He made no notes of his conversations.

Hulin, Tr. 17904.

Dr. Hulin interviewed QC Manager Irv DeWald in the presence of counsel for Edison, but formed no opinion on his capabilities as QC Manager, nor of Mr. DeWald's attitude towards quality as

O opposed to quantity considerations.

Hulin, Tr. 17946.

He was, 122 O

j

'O however, impressed that DeWald was not a wimp who would submit to production pressures.

Hulin, Tr. 17948.

Dr. Hulin did not interview Mr. Shamblin, Edison's Project Construction Superintendent, nor Mr. Rolan, the Comstock Construction Manager.

Hulin, Tr. 17959.

Dr. Hulin did not interview Mr. Saklak.

O Hulin, Tr. 17961.

710.

Thereafter, Dr. Hulin prepared his rebuttal testimony for filing in this proceeding.

However, after the Licensing 13 Board admitted recent harassment and production pressure allegations by inspectors Archambault and Martin, Dr. Hulin undertook further work to determine whether or not his prepared O

testimony required alteration.

He interviewed six additional Comstock inspectors in September, 1986, to determine whether his testimony required modification.

"My purpose was to find out if O

there any problems that would cause me personally agony if I did not 'hange the testimony."

Hulin, Tr. 18007.

Application of this personal agony standard meant that a number of statements of O

concern regarding quality and production pressure given to Hulin were simply ignored.

711.

For example, a two hour interview with Inspector Norm

,9 Kimball was re21ected on a single page of Dr. Hulin's notes.

Mr.

l l

Kimball, of course, provided a lot more information not relevant to the purpose of his interviews.

Hulin Tr. 18006.

The l

interviews were also memorialized in verbatim transcripts g

prepared by a court reporter.

Hulin Tr. 18005.

In addition, Dr.

l Hulin's interviews were conducted in the presence of two lawyers

(

for Commonwealth Edison Company as well as George Marcus, an

)

l 123 i

O

)

Edison Quality Assurance Manager.

Hulin Tr. 18004-5.

Dr.

Hulin's interviews were conducted at the Braidwood site during the inspectors' working shift.

Tr. 18822.

The insecptors' immediate supervisors were informed of the identities of those inspectors to be interviewed.

Hulin Tr. 18023.

One of the inspectors interviewed was the other's lead inspector, Mr. Don Schirmer.

Hulin Tr. 18024.

Hulin introduced himself as a t

consultant for Edison's law firm and introduced those present who were themselves Edison lawyers.

Hulin Tr. 18027.

Notwithstanding these circumstances, Dr. Hulin believed that he received completely forthcoming, honest and accurate answers to his questions from the inspectors.

Hulin Tr 18028.

Although he 3

acknowledges that these circumstances tended to influence the inspectors to provide socially desireable answers.

fr. 18029.

Among other things, the interviewees were told that one purpose 3

of the interview was to determine if any quality concerns existed.

No efforts were made, however, to document any such concerns that were identified.

In Dr. Hulin's opinion, this 3

would not affect the interviewees' confidence in the forthrightness of the interviewer's.

Tr. 18038.

In Dr. Hulin's opinion, such a question as "do you feel free to bring the h) questions or concerns to middle management, i.e.,

Mr. DeWald, Mr.

Seltman or Mr. Simile?" is not such a loaded question as to suggest the desired answer.

Tr. 18043.

Dr. Hulin interpreted 3

statements by interviewees to the effect that Mr. DeWald was aloof as wholly consistent with reflecting free access to management.

Tr. 18057.

Inspectors Noble and Kimball each O

expressed reservations about access to Mr. DeWald; but neither 124 3

()

l-statement caused Dr. Hulin to make any changes in his testimony.

Hulin Tr. 18052.

Dr. Hulin agreed that a number of his questions

O were less likely than others to elicit candid, forthright answers, such as "Do you have any reluctance at all to bring concerns to Quality First or NRC?

Have you at any time been

<3 unable to perform a proper inspection because of production pressure?

Have you ever approved or accepted an inspection that should not have been accepted?

Do you have any feelings that

,0 cost and/or schedule orvetride quality?

And, have you ever been instructed or discouraged from documenting nonconforming conditions on the proper form?"

Hulin Tr. 18053-54.

Such

C) questions as these may be perceived as threatening and therefore elicit a less than forthright answer.

Hulin Tr. 18056-57.

At the beginning of each interview, an Edison lawyer introduced (3

himself and explained that QC inspector Gregory Archanbeault had asserted that a numberaof other inspectors among those to be interviewed by Dr. Hulin shared his opinons about production O

pressure and work quality and that these interviews sought to determine whether the interviewee shared those opinions.

Tr.

18058.

Dr. Hulin did not believe that such a statement tended to influence the interviewee's answers.

Hulin Tr. 18060-061.

The

<3 first inspector interviewed was Mr. Carl Bisky.

Of the seventy page transcript of Mr. Bisky's interview, some thirty pages

{g consist of questions by Edison's attorney.

Hulin Tr. 18067.

Dr.

Hulin made no notes of these questions and answers, none of which were relevant for his purposes.

Tr. 18068-069.

During this questioning, Mr. Bisky acknowledged he was aware as he believed g

125

!O

'O many others were, of nonconforming conditions in the upper cablo spreading room before Mr. Archanbeault insisted on addressing them in a nonconformance report.

Hulin Tr. 18069.

Bisky stated O

"everybody, I believe, was aware of it.

Greg pursued it, followed through.

He wanted -- he wanted -- would you call it an answer?

He had been wrote up.

Nothing had been changed; and when he checked up on it, evidently nothing had been changed so he just in a sense just followed through."- Hulin Tr. 18077-078.

This statement by Mr. Bisky did not cause Dr. Hulin to change his prepared testimony.

Hulin Tr. 18078.

Mr. Bisky also confirmed that these conditions were missed by many QC inspectors who had been in the area.

This statement did not cause Dr. Hulin to O

change his testimony.

Hulin Tr. 18079.

Mr. Bisky expressed reluctance to answer a question from Edison's counsel as to whether he had responded to a questionnaire circulated by Mr.

O Archanbeault soliciting inspector concerns.

Hulin Tr. 18081.

Dr. Hulin attached no significance to Bisky's reluctance to answer such a question.

Hulin Tr. 18083-084.

In his interview, O

Mr. Bisky was asked by Edison's counsel, "Do you consider Greg, Mr. Archanbeault to be a prima donna?"

Mr. Bisky answered, "No, I consider Greg to be an excellent inspector."

This answer did not cause Dr. Hulin to change his testimony.

Hulin Tr. 18086.

t l

Mr. Bisky's statements that some inspectors are sloppy in their i

work did not cause Dr. Hulin to change his testimony.

Tr. 18089.

O Dr. Hulin and the others interviewed QC inspector Norm Kimball.

Dr. Hulin noted that Mr. Kimball was exhibiting " extreme nervousness, rapid breathing, hyperventilation."

Hulin Tr.

O 18093-94.

In addition, QC inspector Chuck Noble appeared hostile 126 0

!O from his comments and body language during his interview.

Hulin Tr. 18098.

Although QC lead inspector Don Schirmer gave answers that were consistent and pleasing to comstock, Dr. Hulin rejected his initial belief that Mr. Schirmer was communicating the Comstock party line and instead concluded that he was giving only lO his candid opinions.

Hulin Tr. 18099-100. Dr. Hulin did not relate the nervousness and anxiety of Mr. Kimball and the hostility of Mr. Noble to the fact that their answers were 13 critical of the company and raised concerns or, conversely, that Mr. Schirmer's supportive answers related to his position as a i

lead inspector.

Hulin Tr. 18101.

Inspector Norm Kimball stated lO that the absence of clear Comstock policy on such matters as transfers, overtime, job assignments and terminations, provided room for arbitrary retaliatory actions by Comstock management.

,D Mr. Kimball identified John Seeders as a victim of retaliatory

(

transfer at the hands of supervisor Saklak.

Int. Ex. 195 at 15-17; Hulin Tr. 18101-106.

Kimball related with respect to

> O-Seeders:

I thought he was a good inspector.

He was doing his l

job.

Irv wanted to get rid of him and that was that.

But they didn't want to fire him, so they transferred him to engineering where -- understand

!O he has done a very good job.

Int. Ex. 195 at 16.

Such statements by Mr. Kimball did not cause Dr. Hulin to make lO any changes to his prepared testimony.

Hulin Tr. 18107.

Mr.

Kimball also told Dr. Hulin that QC Supervisor Tony Simile had discriminated against him in denying him an overtime assignment.

i lO Int. Ex. 195 at 19.

Kimball also related that "If you make l

127 10 l

l

O little waves, you're in trouble."

These statements did not cause Dr. Hulin to alter his testimony.

Hulin Tr. 18109.

Mr. Kimball

g expressed the theory that if you make little waves you're in really big trouble so that if you make waves, you best make big ones to protect yourself from retaliatory action.

Dr. Hulin interpretated these' statements as " lack of policy is not necessarily harassment."

Hulin Tr. 18113.

Mr. Kimball stated, (Int. Ex.

p. 34)

"I don't think the training program is anything like what it should be.

I think it's completely inadequate."

Mr. Kimball told Dr. Hulin that he had heard other inspectors had been discouraged from documenting nonconforming conditions.

Int. Ex. 195 at 49.

Mr. Kimball stated that he

O knew of a person who had been writing too many ICR's and as a result, was transferred into another department area where he wouldn't have the opportunity to write so many.

Those statements

,0 did not cause Dr. Hulin to alter or add to his prefiled testimony.

Tr. 18124.

Dr. Hulin concluded that this transfer did not represent harassment or intimidation.

Hulin Tr. 18126.

Inspector Chuck Noble had been removed from the lead position two weeks after he was told that one of his inspectors had been rejecting too much work.

Hulin Tr. 18128; Int. Ex. 196 at O

Mr.. Noble also expressed quality concerns about laminations in steel plate characterized by Dr. Hulin as taking over the interview with a "long, rambling account."

Tr. 18138.

No O

documentation was made of this concern of Mr. Noble's.

Hulin Tr.

18139.

Dr. Hulin failed to acknowledge that the leading or loaded questions and the circumstances of the interviews O

influenced the information given to him.

For example, inspector 128 O

)

Thomas expressed a very low opinion about other inspectors i

generally, "they don't care anything about working.

They just don't care.

I see a lot of it and that's one reason I couldn't be a lead out there any more...."

Mr. Thomas then adds a specific jibe at Greg Archanbeault:

"like Greg himself.

He's

)

one of the laziest persons I've ever seen in'my life."

Dr. Hulin failed to recognize that such a comment may have been suggested by the interest expressed in Mr. ARchanbeault's complaints by the

)

Edison lawyer.

Dr. Hulin didn't think Mr. Thomas' criticism of Archanbeault was prompted by a desire to please the interviewers.

Hulin Tr. 18144-6.

Although inspector Thomas testified that

)

inspector Dominique was chided for having written too many ICR's, Dr. Hulin concluded that no harassment or intimidation or production pressure was reflected in that incident and made no

)

changes in his testimony on that account.

Hulin Tr. 18153.

Although Dr. Hulin understood that management had transferred an inspector named Nelson after Nelson had pursued complaints that

)

craft were improperly walking on safety-related cables, Hulin did not believe that other inspectors might interpret such an action as punishing the inspector and rewarding the craft in a

)

conflict over quality matters.

Hulin Tr. 18155-156.

Despite the fact that Mr. Thomas acknowledged that he had had previous conflicts with Greg Archanbeault where Archanbeault had raised

)

quality concerns about Thomas' work.

Dr. Hulin did not consider such conflicts as bearing on Mr. Thomas' criticism of Archambeault.

Hulin Tr. 18159-160.

QC inspector Schlichter observed the intimidaton of inspector Martin by Craft foreman

)

129

)

O Krone and the subsequent removal of Mr. Martin from the field, l

Hulin Tr. 18162-167.

He was also informed that Krone had subjected Martin to ridicule in front of other Craft because of O

press accounts of Martin's inspection activities.

Dr. Hulin i

concluded that these actions did not reflect harassment, intimidation or production pressure.

O

-Id.

712.

The statements made by the QC inspectors interviewed by Dr. Hulin and the other Edison representatives in September of 1986, confirm that the pre-existing, wide-spread perception of harassment and pressure to compromise to quality extended to inspectors who had not been involved in the March, 1985 mass complaints to the NRC.

The statements made to Dr. Hulin confirm O

that the atmosphere of production pressure and harassment extended even more broadly among the inspector work force than the 24 who had gone to the NRC in 1985, and also had extended in

O time up until the very present, as reflected in the Martin and Archanbeault incidents.

Dr. Hulin, for his part, makes no reference whatsoever to these disturbing facts provided directly

!O to him through his September interviews.

His prepared testimony fails to acknowledge at all that he understood anything critical whatsoever from his interviews with quality control inspectors; O

and he, apparently, saw no reason to change or amend his testimony to reflect this adverse information at the time he took the stand.

Only the existence of verbatim transcripts of these O

interviews makes apparent the substance of these inspectors' concerns which Dr. Hulin has chosen to ignore.

The existence of these statements substantially undermines Dr. Hulin's rosy O

conclusions about the absence of harassment, intimidation, and 130

!O 1

l

O production pressure among Comstock Quality Control inspectors.

O

O iO

'O

O i O i

I

O

O i

O 131 l

1 0

O 800.

Edison's rebuttal case consisted primarily of evidence concerning the BCAP CSR and PTL reinspection programs.

Edison offered that evidence in an attempt to show that Comstock QC 3

inspector performance was not adversely affected by harrassment and production pressure and that the plant is basically safe.

The BCAP CSR program was clearly the focus of Edison's rebuttal g

case.

801.

The Braidwood Construction Assessment Program (BCAP) was a program of reinspections and reviews carried out by Edison in 1984 and 1985 covering safety related construction activities at Braidwood.

The BCAP was comprised of three principal program elements.

These were (1) the construction sample reinspection O

(CSR) (2) The reverification of procedures to specification requirements (RPSR) and (3) the review of significant corrective action program (RSCAP).

Kaushal, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 13068) at 4.

O 802.

The CSR consisted of a visual reinspection of a sample of on-site, safety-related construction work which as of June 30, 1984, had been completed and QC inspected.

The sample was O

selected based in part on engineering judgment and in part on the use of statistical concepts.

The reinspections were carried out from October, 1984 through July, 1985.

Kaushal, Prefiled (ff Tr.

13068) at 3, 13-16.

803.

The CSR (and other elements of BCAP) were carried out by the BCAP Task Force.

The BCAP Task Force Director was Edison O

employee Narindar Kaushal.

Kaushal reported directly to the Braidwood project manager, Mike Wallace, who had principal production responsibilities at Braidwood.

Kaushal Prefiled (Tr.

O ff. 13069) at 9-10.

The BCAP QA group, a part of Edison's QA 132 0

10 department, under the direction Edison employee, of Neil Smith, oversaw the BCAP Task Force activities.

Id. at 10.

20 804.

Discrepancies found by BCAP CSR inspectors were eval-uated for design significance by Sargent & Lundy, Edison's archi-tect-engineer.

Sargent & Lundy was responsible for developing the

! O design drawing specifications for Braidwood.

The activities of Sargent & Lundy, the BCAP Task Force, and BCAP QA were reviewed by an independent expert overview group (IEOG) established

O through the Evaluation Research Corporation.

Kaushal, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 13068) at 10-11.

805.

The ERC staff assigned NRC inspector Ronald Gardner to

<3 monitor on-site the implementation of the BCAP program.

Gardner was on-site from August 20, 1984 until June, 1985, during which time he engaged in daily oversight of BCAP activities.

Gardner Profiled (ff. Tr. 17606) at 3, 7.

4) 806.

During the hearings in this case, Edison never fully accounted for the reasons why BCAP was undertaken.

It appears, t

however, that the NRC required Edison to undertake BCAP in

)

response to serious and widespread problems documented in NRC Inspection Reports 82-05 and 83-09.

Inspection Report 82-05 documented a breakdown in the QA program at Braidwood that lO l

resulted in serious problems with mechanical equipment installation.

Int. Ex. 86.

Edison was assessed a $100,000 civil penalty and instituted a 100% reinspection of all mechanical

,O equipment installation.

Inspection report 83-09 documented numerous serious problems including six major violations in the electrical construction areas.

Int. Ex. 88.

i 133 10

10 807.

Prior to issuing Inspection Report 83-09, the NRC held a March 7, 1984 enforcement conference with Edison.

Intervenors

'g Exhibit 139, the report of the March 7th enforcement conference, summarizes the pending NRC inspection findings which were to be published in 83-09 and outlines the original version of BCAP that was finalized on April 2, 1984.

On May 7,1984, Inspection Report 83-09 was transmitted to Edison President James O' Conner.

In the transmittal letter, Intervenors Exhibit 88, NRC inspector Keppler stated that "the inspection revealed a number of defi-ciencies The major factors contributing to the deficiencies were inadequate contractor programs and workmanship, inadequate licensing reviews of the contractor programs, and inadequate O

licensee quality assurance overview to insure contractor activi-ties met all requirements."

808.

The inspection report included an outline of the

'O proposed BCAP program.

Keppler later testified at his deposition that "the fact that we have required the company to institute a program of the magnitude of BCAP is indicative that we have

!O concerns about construction.

I wouldn't ask them to do that if I didn' t have concerns about construction."

Keppler Dep., May 20, 1985, p. 98, quoted at Tr. 10811.

The BCAP program was imple-()

mented in June, 1984, the month following the issuance of Inspection Report 83-09.

Thereafter, the NRC held regular meet-ings with Edison to review BCAP progress, at which Edison was E) expected to put itself "in harmony with what.the NRC was expect-ing from us."

Kaushal, Tr. 13131.

809.

In light of the circumstances, and in light of NRC inspector O

Keppler's deposition testimony, it is apparent that BCAP was 134 0

13 l

required by the NRC to address serious QA problems at Braidwood.

)

810.

BCAP Director Kaushal was assigned to BCAP in March,

O 1984, af ter BCAP was conceived but before it'was implemented.

Kaushal, Tr. 13098.

NRC Inspector Gardner was assigned to BCAP in August, 1984.

Gardner, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 17606) at 3; Tr.

40 17569.

Ironically, neither Kaushal nor Gardner, the two men charged with the primary responsibility for running and overseeing the BCAP 13 program, was aware why BCAP had been initiated.

Kaushal was unaware of the March 7,1984 enforcement conference referred to in Intervenors' Exhibit 139, and of the May 7, 1984 transmittal

O letter for Inspection Report 83-09 from Keppler to O'Connor (Int.

Ex. 88); Kaushal disclaimed any knowledge whether or not the decision to implement BCAP was related to NRC concerns.

Kaushal, i C)

Tr. 13098-103, 13104, 13106-07, 13111-12.

Similarly, Gardner disclaimed knowledge of any connection between BCAP and problems i

identified by the NRC.

Gardner, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 17606) at 2,

<3 Tr. 17661-64.

I I

811.

Kaushal testified that reinspection programs resulting from known or suspected deficiencies in construction work often g

involve 100% reinspections of areas where problems are suspected.

Kaushal, Tr. 13079-84.

For example, Kaushal was aware that 100%

reinspections had been done at Zimmer, Marble Hill and Comanche Peak when problems were identified or suspected.

Kaushal, Tr.

O 13082-83, 13088.

Even at Braidwood, verification programs involving 100% reinspections have been conducted in response to known or suspected deficiencies in the installation of safety-g 135 O

O related mechanical equipment, cable pan hanger configuration, and quality control documentation.

Kaushal, Tr. 13089-93.

812.

BCAP was not such a reinspection program.

It was not

()

designed to look at suspected problems or to substitute for first-line QC inspections.

Kaushal, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 13068) at 5, 17.

In particular, BCAP was not designed to respond to the g

possible effects of harassment and production pressure on QC inspector work performance.

Id,. at 4.

Nor was BCAP designed to O

--Id.

at 3-4.

look for isolated design significant defects.

Rather, BCAP was designed as a quality " confirmation" program; the program design assumed that construction quality was good and relied on a sample size that would reveal recurring, programraatic construction problems.

Id. at 5-6, 16-17; Tr. 13326-28.

813.

The record contains evidence that NRC officials had misgivings about the sufficiency of the BCAP design, but no

O evidence that the NRC actually approved that design.

Edison forwarded the BCAP program document to NRC Inspector Keppler and his Staff for comments in June, 1984.

Keppler's response to 10 Edison, Intevenors' Exhibit 140, made 27 specific l

recommendations for changes in the program design.

Kaushal, Tr.

13114-116.

With only one exception, Edison responded to each of O

Keppler's comments that " Edison believes that no change to the existing BCAP document is warranted."

Kaushal, Tr. 13116-117.

814.

The Board ruled that Mr. Gardner was not competent to O

vouch on behalf of the NRC for the adequacy of the BCAP design, and that if Edison or the Staff wished to establish that the NRC i

had approved the BCAP design, they would have to present another C) witness.

Gardner, Tr. 17601-02.

No such witness was ever 136 0

3 produced.

815.

Two standards of independence for persons conducting

! C) design verification programs were discussed during the hearings:

the standard set forth in the so-called "Dingell letter" (Int.

Ex. 156, marked for identification purposes only) and the

!O standard sat forth in the BCAP program document for the Independent Expert Overview Group ( Appl. Ex. 137).

E.g.,

Kaushal, Tr. 13711-50, 13764-75.

Among the Dingell letter 13 requirements are that "the individuals or companies selected must be able to provide an objective, dispassionate technical judg-ment, provided solely on the basis of technical merit" and "that

O the design verification program must be conducted by companies or individuals not previously involved with the activities at [the l

plant] that they will now be reviewing."

Int. Ex. 156 at 2.

In

(3 addition, the company conducting the verification program should issue "only a final report, without prior licensee comment."

Id.

at 4.

iO 816.

Edison's Independent Expert Overview Group guidelines adopt some of the same independence requirements as the Dingell letter.

IEOG members "will be free of any significant contacts lO with Commonwealth Edison Company" and "will not have participated l

l in the design, construction or quality assurance activities related to the Braidwood Station or with Braidwood site contrac-IO tors within the last five years."

Appl. Ex. 137 at V-2.

817.

The BCAP program falls short of the independence criteria described above.

BCAP Director Kaushal was an Edison employee; he and the BCAP program were answerable directly to O

137 O-

~ -

tO-Edison management in the person of Mike Wallace, the Braidwood Project Manager, who was responsible for cost and scheduling considerations at Braidwood.

Kaushal, Tr. 13716.

There is some 10 question about the independence of even the Independent Expert Overview Group, given the fact that Mr. Laney had worked for Edison on two occasions prior to his Braidwood involvement and O

that Mr. Laney and Mr. Hansel, both members of the IEOG, had appeared as Edison witnesses in the Bryon licensing proceeding.

l Kaushal, Tr. 13966; Laney, Tr. 17246-47.

818.

Similarly, Sargent & Lundy, which performed the design significance evaluations at the heart of the BCAP program, did not meet the independence criteria of the Dingell letter.

, O Sargent & Lundy designed the Braidwood plant and played an on-going role in evaluating the significance of discrepancies before the BCAP program was initiated.

Kaushal, Tr. 13717-19, 13750,

,'I) 13967-70.

819.

The BCAP program also fell short of the Dingell letter l

requirements in that the BCAP report was not only edited by CI Edison but was indeed produced in the first instance by Edison.

Tr. 13726-29.

Edison's treatment of that report is a graphic illustration of the fact that Edison treated the BCAP effort as a C) litigation activity from the beginning.

The final BCAP report, a 120 page document, was put through some 30,000 or more pages of drafts.

Edison's attorneys participated heavily in the drafting

()

period.

Drafters were admonished by one official to sanitize their language in order not to arouse Intervenors' (or presumably the NRC's) attention; he warned subordinates to " avoid ( ) in Q

future writings the 'mau-mau' terrorist ammunition type statements t

138 O

O by writing in positive tones, avoiding negative words, expres-sions, sentences as much as possible."

Int. Ex. 157; Kaushal, O

Tr. 13731-37.

820.

The final BCAP report evidenced Edison's treatment of it as an adversarial litigation document.

For instance, Edison O

failed in the final report to express its discrepancy data on an item basis in addition to an inspection point basis, even though the NRC had clearly expressed its opinion that data should be O

presented on an item basis, and in spite of an apparent Edison commitment to express results in that manner.

Int. Ex. 140; Kaushal, Tr. 13122-31.

Similarly, Edison failed to attach to the O

BCAP report Sargent & Lundy's report on its engineering trend evaluations, which reflected a number of problems that were recurring in nature, but for which Sargent & Lundy recommended no O

follow-up action.

Kaushal, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 13068) at 33.

Indeed, the BCAP report contains few numbers at all.

821.

Ironically, the BCAP program itself was apparently the g'

victim of production pressures of the sort that Intervenors claim affected the Comstock QC department.

Those pressures are apparent in both the design and implementation of the BCAP O

pr gram.

In terms of program design, the sample size deemed adequate for the CSR program was apparently influenced by a desire not to unduly delay construction.

Kaushal, Prefiled (ff.

13068) at 6.

Moreover, the original target completion date g

for BCAP of December 24, 1984, proved to be highly unrealistic.

Kaushal, Tr. 13204-205.

BCAP was not completed until November of 1985.

Id.

From the standpoint of actual BCAP inspections and g

139 O

O evaluations, the BCAP engineers complained of forced overtime and other production pressures on them.

Early CSR inspection work

"""*ti'f'

' 'Y 'h*' **"'h*1 *** f * 'd t

""*P'"d O

inspections for a " midpoint look."

Gardner, Prefiled (ff. Tr.

17605) at 8-9; Kaushal, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 13068) at 21-22.

ardner n luded that the root cause of the CSR inspection O

problems was production pressure forcing BCAP task force inspectors to work at an unacceptably fast pace.

Gardner, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 17606) at 10, Gardner, Tr. 17732.

822.

As the two previous findings illustrate, BCAP's lack of independence is more than just a theoretical concern.

Edison's putting itself in the position of judging itself, treating BCAP as a litigation activity, and allowing production concerns to affect its conduct of the BCAP program, call into serious question the reliability of the BCAP results and lessen the O

reassurance that can be drawn from those results about inspector performance and plant safety.

823.

The CSR portion of the BCAP program was a sampling of O

the six electrical construction categories: cables, cable pans, cable pan hangers, conduit, conduit hangers, and electrical equipment installation.

Kaushal, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 13068) at 11-O 13.

The sample was chosen from items that had been QC inspected and accepted as of June 30, 1984.

Edison estimated that only 24%

l of the the total electrical construction items in the plant were O

" valid" and had been QC inspected and accepted as of June 30, 1984; only those items were _herefore eligible to be included in l

l the CSR sample.

Appl. Ex. 133; Int. Ex. 159.

Thus only 17% of O

conduit hangers, 29% of electrical equipment installations, 39%

140 0

'O of cable pans, 42% of conduits, and 59% of cable pan hangers were eligible to be included in the CSR samples.

Appl. Ex. 133; Int.

O Ex. 159.

The remaining 76% of the electrical construction items in the plant (some 72,216 items out of total of 94,947 electrical items in the plant) were ineligible for the CSR samples and were

.g thus not covered by the CSR program at all.

Edison did not claim

)

to be able to draw any statistical conclusions from CSR with 4

respect to those items, which comprise the bulk of the electrical

.g population at Braidwood.

824.

The fact that the CSR program covered only 24% of the total electrical construction population at Braidwood severely g3 limits the overall conclusions that can be drawn from the BCAP program with respect to overall hardware quality or QC inspector j

performance.

The CSR cutoff date of June 30, 1984 bears no relation to Intervenors' contention concerning harassment and production pressure.

Many of the incidents exhibiting harassment or production pressure that have been developed in this record occurred after June 30, 1984:

. The Comstock campaign to eliminate the backlog was reaching its most intense period in June 1984.

During j

that month, DeWald received a memorandum from Shamblin l

emphasizing the urgency of eliminating the backlog and announcing weekly meetings for progress reports. FF. 112.

. The termination of inspectors Puckett and Seeders, arguably the most egregious incidents of harassent in th9.

extensive record, occurred in August 1984.

FF. 201 et.

seq. and 301 et. seg.

JO

. On March 29, 1985, 24 Comstock QC inspectors went to the NRC to complain about problems at Comstock including i

I production pressures that, in their view, placed an emphasis on quantity over quality in the Comstock QA organization. FF. 124.

lO

. Allegations of harassment and production pressure l.

141 O

t O continued well into 1986 as exemplified by the retaliation incidents involving Rick Martin and Greg Archambeault described at greater length in Findings 401 et. seq.

It is bvious that the CSR data, which omit major portions iO of the evidence in this record and skip a contested period of two years, are inadequate to test Intervenors' contentions.

825.

Even for the small portion of the electrical g

population that was addressed by the CSR program, the CSR data do not either dispr'ove Intervenors' contentions or prove that the plant is safe and well constructed.

Three types of data were produced as a result of the BCAP CSR program.

The first, the raw data from the CSR reinspections was tabulated in terms of the number of discrepancies and the number of acceptable conditions identified by the CRS overinspectors.

Second, those numbers were used to compute so-called " agreement rates."

Third, the discre-4 pancies were analyzed to determine whether they were design

O significant.

The first type of data, the raw numbers of discre-pancies and acceptable conditions, arguably validates rather than j

allays the concerns expressed in Intervenors' contentions.

The

O latter two categories of data do not address Intervenors' conten-1 tions at all in a meaningful way they certainly do not disprove Intervenors' allegation that production pressure and harassment

!'O may have resulted in adverse QC work performance.

Finally, the last category of data, concerning the design significance of the defects, does not prove that the plant is safe.

10 826.

Although the CSR inspectors found that only 2% of the valid, in-scope conditions in the CSR sample were discrepant, tne number of discrepant conditions and items is striking in absolute i

l C) terms.

The CSR inspectors found 3,578 discrepant conditions, of 142

O

O which no less than 1,057 (30%) were " notable," meaning that they reduced the capacity of the item by 10% or more.

Att. 2C O

(Kaushal - 3) Revised.

Fifteen percent of all welds reinspected contained at least one discrepant condition. DelGeorge, Tr.

16793.

Even more striking, discrepancies were found in 86% of

()

the cable pan hangers, 73% of the electrical equipment installation, 64% of the cable pans, 59% of the conduits, and 56%

of the conduit hangers.

App. Ex. 181.

Edison argued,that many

()

of those discrepancies were insignificant, but conceded that all discrepant conditions represented departures from original design criteria.

Kaushal, Tr. 13177.

Indeed, even ignoring the C) conditions that Edison terms insignificant, notable discrepancies were found in 53% of the cable pan hangers, 43% of the equipment installations, 20% of the conduit hangers, 9% of the cable pans,

()

and 8% of the conduits. Two recurring categories of discrepancies were troubling enough that they prompted Edison to undertake comprehensive walkdown programs:

absence of stiffeners in struc-()

tural steel supporting electrical equipment and improper attach-ment of conduit to supports.

Kaushal, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 13068) at 29-33; Kostal, Tr. 14365-66; Thorsell, Tr. 14367-68, 15000-01.

()

827.

In sum, although it would be difficult to draw firm conclusions about the adequacy of Comstock QC inspector perfor-mance from the raw CSR data, those data do reveal that Comstock

()

QC inspectors overlooked a very large number of defects, includ-ing many serious defects.

Indeed, NRC inspector Gardner, while acknowledging that his own personal standards were high, and that he had never developed formal criteria for differentiating good

()

143 O

... _ ~

iO from poor inspection programs, testified that a good inspection program would have resulted in fewer discrepant items than were found in the CSR program and that in his view, the Comstock QC

)

inspectors were not effective in the " classical" Appendix B sense of identifying all defects.

Gardner, Tr. 17633-45, 17807-11, 17814-15, 18347-49.

Even Edison Vice President DelGeorge testi-O fied that he found the number of discrepant welds on its face to be unacceptable, although upon review of the nature of the dis-crepancies he determined inspector performance to have been ade-

,40 quate.

DelGeorge, Tr. 16793.

828.

The second type of data generated as a result of the CSR program was agreement rates.

Agreement rates were expressed

>O as a percentage of conditions within the reinspected sample deetaed acceptable by the CSR overinspectors.

Edison presented the testimony of its Vice President, Lou DelGeorge and

!O statistician Marvin Frankel, who has done considerable work for Edison over the past three years, concerning the conclusions that can be drawn for the CSR agreement rate statistics.

'O 829.

DelGeorge concedes, as does Edison expert witness l

Hulin, that pressure can affect the performance of an inspector.

DelGeorge, Tr. 16796.

Nevertheless, DelGeorge con-lO cludes as a result of his engineering analysis of agreement rate data and Dr. Frankel statistical analysis of that data that as an empirical matter the Comstock QC inspectors performed effectively

' C) and were unaffected by the harassment and production pressure alleged by Intervenors.

DelGeorge, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 16740) at 13.

O 830.

No conclusion can be drawn from the CSR agreement rate 144 i

I

O data with respect to the quality of QC inspector performance.

BCAP was designed to examine hardware, not to test the adequacy 3

of QC inspector performance or to answer questions regarding the possible effect of harassment and intimidation on Comstock QC inspector performance.

Kaushal, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 13068) at 4, O

Tr. 13181-182.

In many respects BCAP is ill suited to examine inspector performance.

The CSR overinspectors did not examine the same inspection packages as the QC inspectors, the CSR O

inspectors did not necessarily employ the same acceptance criteria as the original inspectors, and most fundamentally, agreement rates are no measure in and of themselves of inspector O

performance.

831.

The CSR overinspectora did not examine the same attributes as the QC inspectors.

In the electrical construction O

categories, the CSR checklist and instructions were not based on the original Comstock inspection checklist.

Kaushal, Tr. 13180-86.

In particular, the following attributes inspected by the o

original QC inspector were not included on CSR checklists:

(1) Items or attributes judged discrepant by the QC inspector.

Kaushal, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 13068) at 8.

(2) Items or attributes not deemed potentially design lO significant.

Kaushal, Tr. 13180-86.

(3) Inaccesible or non-recreatable items or attributes.

Kaushal, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 13068) at 18-19.

(4) Discrepant conditions of a type previously identified and addressed in some fashion by Edison or one of its g

contractors.

("out of scope" items).

Kaushal, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 13068) at 23.

l 832.

Applicant's Exhibit 131 exemplifies the differences in the checklists between the original QC inspection and the CSR g

145 0

o overinspections.

Exhibit 131 indicates that with respect to cables the CSR inspectors examined nine attributes.

Eleven other attributes were not included on the checklist or were inspected O

according to alternate criteria because they were non-recreatable, inaccessible, not potentiall design significant, or the subject of outstanding nonconformance reports.

g 833.

The BCAP program developed not only its own inspection checklist, but also its own acceptance criteria that in some cases may have differed from the original QC acceptance criteria.

Kaushal, Tr. 13180, 13182-86.

834.

As the previous three findings indicate, the CSR overinspectors did not even pretend to recreate the inspections of the Comstock QC inspectors.

Comparing the CSR inspection results with Comstock QC inspection results is in a very real sense comparing apples and oranges.

The differences between the O.

checklists and acceptance criteria in the two programs severely limit the certainty with which the results of the CSR inspections may be used to judge the quality of the Comstock QC inspections.

O 835.

Perhaps the most fundamental limitation of the CSR data is the fact that Edison has expressed it in terms of agreement rates.

Agreement rates in and of themselves reveal nothing about O

the effectiveness of QC inspector performance.

As Edison witness DelGeorge conceded, Intervenors Exhibit 188 proves that agreement rates are affected not only by the variable of.QC inspector O

accuracy, but also by the variables of the overinspector accuracy rate and the craft error rate.

DelGeorge, Tr. 16810-13.

Never-theless, DelGeorge admits that he never attempted to determine O

the value of a single one of those three variables.

DelGeorge, 146 0

O Tr. 16822-23, 16841-42.

Inde ed, DelGeorge asserted none of those individual values was even ascertainable at the time that he

O performed his analysis.

Id.

Because DelGeorge cannot assign a value to either the craft error rate or the overinspector accuracy rate, it is impossible to determine from the agreement (3

rate figures he had produce what the QC inspector accuracy rate was.

It follows inexorably that no conclusion may be drawn from the agreement rate figures concerning the effectiveness of O

Comstock Qc inspector performance.

836.

Intervenors' Exhibit 188 demonstrates that agreement rates are always substantially higher than QC accuracy rates.

O Indeed, as both Table il and Table #2 of that exhibit reflect, agreement rates can be as much as 40-50 points higher than QC inspector accuracy rates, depending on the value assigned to O

craft error rate and the overinspector accuracy rate.

Appl. Ex.

182-184 reveals the same fact.

However, because Applicants adopted a different set of assumptions in their Exhibits 182-84, o

the difference between agreement rates and QC inspector accuracy rates was not quite as large.

837.

Edison presented no empirical evidence whatever to 33 show that the assumptions it employed in its Exhibit 182-84 were any more reasonable than the assumptions employed in Intervenors' Exhibit 188. Id.

838.

On redirect and supplemental direct examination,

O Edison asked its witnesses DelGeorge and Frankel to pinpoint on Int. Ex. 188 where the CSR agreement rates would fall and to draw inferences from that with respect to QC inspector accuracy and

)

147

O

O craft error rate.

By means of that testimony Edison apparently intended to infer that QC accuracy rates must have fallen within an acceptable range such as 80% or better.

However, no such

.zg inferences may be drawn.

First, not having established a value for craft error rates, Edison may not infer a value for QC i sp tor accuracy rates.

Second, Edison never established or O

attempted to establish what an acceptable QC accuracy rate would be at a nuclear plant such as Braidwood.

No inference may be drawn that any rate short of 100% would be acceptable.

Third, and perhaps most important, the agreement rates discussed in Edison's testimony concerning the CSR program are substantially inflated.

A pure agreement rate, such as that reflected in Int.

Ex. 188, is calculated on the basis of all defects found by the overinspector as a proportion of the total number of conditions or attributes inspected.

Edison's agreement rates, by contrast, O

exclude many defects found by the CSR overinspector, such as the defects deemed "out of scope" because they are already the subject of an NCR or walkdown.

For instance, the BCAP CSR cable

'O pan hanger configuration inspections found between 300 and 400 configuration discrepancies.

Kaushal, Tr. 13378.

All of those discrepancies were deemed "out of scope" and not included in the

'O agreement rate figures.

He.d those discrepancies and other "out of scope" discrepancies overlooked by original QC inspectors and found by CSR overinspectors been included in the CSR agreement rate figures, the agreement rates would have been lower than the figures Edison has presented.

839.

DelGeorge testified that regardless of the usefulness

.O of agreement rates as a measure of QC inspector performance at a 148

~O

i given moment!in time, agreement rates are a good indicator in 0

changes in inspector effectiveness over tim.

DelGeorge, Tr.

).

g 16945-46.

According to DelGeorge, agreement rates can indicate changes in QC performance over time even if other variables affecting agreement rates are unknown because there is no reason

)

to believe that those other variables would move in a manner that is inconsistent with QC inspector accu;acy.

Id. at 16926-27, 16991-96.

)

840.

The principal weakness with that argument is that Edison presented no evidence at'all concerning what effects the movement of those other variables'.

There is no basis in the

)

record to make any assumption at all concerning variations in the craft error rate.

Given the agreement rates for two different periods of time, Edison cannot tell what the QC inspector

)

accuracy rate was at either of those points in time.

It follows inevitably that Edison cannot therefore make any statement at all with respect to the change or lack of change of the QC accuracy j

rate from one period to the other.

841.

To be more specific, Edison concludes from the lack of a statistically significant decline in agreement rates from one period of years to another at Braidwood that QC inspector

)

performance did not decline from one period to the next period.

DelGeorge, Tr. 16929-46.

According to Edison, it is unreasonable to assume that Comstock's craft labor quality rose from the first

)

period to the second in direct proportion to a decline in QC inspector performance so as to result in a constant agreement

)

~Id.

That argument is flawed for two reasons.

First, rate.

149

)

O there is no basis in the record for any assumption about the movement of craft error rates; the hypothetical movement described by Edison may thus not be assumed to be any more mv unlikely than any othe type of movement.

Second, Edison has ignored an additional variable that affects agreement rates:

the subjective or objective nature of the work being inspected.

According to Edison's testimony, the agreement rates for objective (non-weld) attribute inspections may be as much as 5 percentage points higher than the agreement rates for the subjective (weld) attributes.

Marcus, Prefiled (ff. Tr.

15568) at 13, 31.

The proportion of objective attributes in the CSR data base increased from about 6% before July 1,1982 to O

about 28% after that date.

Frankel, Tr. 17106-07.

Consequently, according to Edison's own testimony, the agreement rates after July 1, 1982 should have risen to account for the increase in O

objective attributes.

The fact that agreement rates did not rise after that date may thus logically be accounted for by a decline in QC inspector accuracy.

O 842.

The methodclogy employed by Frankel and DelGeorge was to pose a hypothesis based on Intervenors' contentions and then test the hypothesis against the data.

The validity of their conclusions depends on whether (1) their hypotheses accurately reflect Intervenors' allegations and are adequately supported in the record and (2) whether DelGeorge and Frankel have tested all O

possible hypothetical effects alleged in Intervenors' direct case.

843.

The hypotheticals posed by DelGeorge and Frankel are an O

inadequate basis for testing Intervenors' contentions because 150

'O

D they are based on assumptions with no foundation in the record and based on only the most extreme interpretations of I

Intervenors' evidence.

DelGeorge and Frankel failed to pose hypotheticals that would test a variety of effects that were suggested by Intervenors' expert testimony.

844.

First, DelGeorge and Frankel tested only for declining trends in agreement rates, principally after July 1982.

Frankel, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 17082) at 12, 20, 25-27; DelGeorge, Prefiled 3

(ff. Tr. 16740) at 21, 27-29, 33-37, 44.

The hypothesis they were testing was that if the incidents of harassment and produc-tion pressure alleged by Intervenors, which occurred primarily J

after early 1982, affected the quality of QC inspector perfor-mance, that effect would necessarily manifest itself as a decline in inspector performance beginning in 1982.

That hypothetical assumes that inspector performance prior to 1982 was effective D

and unaffected by harassment or production pressure.

Otherwise, if QC inspector performance had been adversely affected prior to 1982, a steady level of QC inspector performance before and after D

1982 would be consistent with Intervenors' contention that harassment and production pressure in 1982 and beyond had an adverse affect on inspector performance.

D 845.

But there is no evidence in the record (Edison has certainly not developed or identified any) to support Edison's assumption that the Comstock QC performance was adequate and O

unaffected prior to 1982 by harassment or production pressure.

To the contrary, the record contains evidence indicating that Comstock was plagued with problems long before the incidents that 8

are the subject of Intervenors' direct case here.

For instance, 151 0

O the debilitating inspection backlog and massive quality documentation problems had begun prior to mid-1982.

FF. 109.

C)

Edison found in 1982 that Comstock had failed to perform a single QC inspection on significant safety-related areas of the plant.

FF. 115.

In 1981, when DeWald was a Level II inspector, Comstock C) inspectors comonly used " grid area" checklists to document large numbers of inspections, up to 1200 at a time.

FF. 113.

adn it was a common perception among QC inspectors who testified in this C) record that DeWald had once claimed to complete hundreds and perhaps 1000 weld inspections in a day, a task which is impossible to perform properly in that period of time. FF. 132.

()

FF. 101-109, 111, 113-115, 116.

846.

Even if the hypothetical tested by DelGeorge and Frankeld were not based on the unsupported assumption that QC O

inspector performance was not adversely affected by production pressure prior to mid-1982, that hypothetical is utterly inadequate to test Intervenors' allegations.

Intervenors'

()-

experts testified (as did Dr. Hulin) that based on well accepted social science modele, incidents involving the harassment and pressuring of workers can have an adverse effect on work g

performance.

Dr. McKirnan testified that based on his review of an admittedly limited portion of the record in this case, there is reason to fear such adverse effects occurred at Braidwood.

But both Dr. McKirnan and Dr. Arvey acknowledged the limitation g_

of the evidence available to them and refrained from concluding with certainty whether in fact adverse work effects did occur in the Comstock QC department and if so, to what extent.

Each of

)

152 O

. O thcs stated the need for a careful, empirical study to examine the possible effects, and Dr. Arvey emphasized, based on his own experience, the difficulty and complexity of testing for such

. O adverse-effects with precision.

Arvey, Tr. 4433.

847.

Because Dr. McKirnan and Dr. Arvey did not specify precisely how and to what extent the adverse effects of

' O production pressures at Comstock would manifest itself a test of their theories would have to explore any number of possibilities:

The number of people affected.

An incident of

,()

harassment or production pressure may affect just the direct victim of harassment, or perhaps that person close associates on the job, or perhaps any inspector who was aware of the harassment, or perhaps all inspec-tors as a group.

The duration of time of the effect.

The effects from

.)

an incident of harassment might last for a matter of hours, a day, a week, a month, or years.

When the effect manifests itself.

The effects of an incident of harassment appear immediately, or after a period of days, or after a period of weeks perhaps, O

depending on who is affected and how close they are to the original incident.

The magnitude of the harassment and the effect.

Different levels of pressure might produce different degrees of work effects.

Work performance might be 13 affected by as little as it or as much as 99%, and it may be affected to a different extent at different points in time.

It is obvious that an inquiry into possible adverse work 13 effects of harassment or production pressure is a highly complex

(

l clinical inquiry.

848.

However, Edison never attempted to explore the iO many possibilities and complexities listed above.

Rather, DelGeorge and Frankel only tested the most extreme hypothetical that could possibly be drawn from Intervenors' expert

O testimony

that every alleged incident of harassment was 100%

4 153

.O

O effective (whatever that means), that every worker in the Comstock work force suffered adverse work effects, that the adverse work effects were severe (30% or more) and that those effects lasted for a very long period of time.

DelGeorge, Tr.

16936,16949, 16989.

Disproving such an extreme hypothesis does not by any means disprove the possibility that significant adverse work performance involving a number of Comstock QC inspectors resulted from the production pressure discussed in Intervenors' direct case.

The DelGeorge and Frankel hypothesis

,O is not based on a fair reading of Dr. McKirnan's and Dr. Arvey's testimony and simply fails to acknowledge the possibility of other significant, although not massive and universal, adverse

.O work effects.

For example, if an incident of harassment caused 10% of the Comstock QC inspectors to lower their performance by 30% for a period of a full month, an unquestionably serious

-O effect that would be consistent with the McKirnan and Arvey testimony, the agreement rates for'all inspectors for that quarter would be lowered only 1% or less, a result that DelGeorge

!O would dismiss as insignificant.

849.

The CSR data does not even permit an analysis of hypotheses less extreme than the one put forward by DelGeorge and O

Frankel.

Frankel examined all data for all inspectors aggregated for periods of two years or more.

It is apparent that work performance would have to be extreme, long lasting, and very 3

widespread to manifest themselves as signifcant under his analysis.

Similarly, DelGeorge examined data aggregated for all, or virtually all, inspectors by quarter.

DelGeorge admitted that O

l l

154 l

O l

t

O his data base would permit him to look only for "macrosccpic" changes and would not reveal effects for smaller numbers of inspectors or shorter periods of time.

Tr. 16766-69.

In sum, 3

the DelGeorge and Frankel agreement rate trending methodology does not provide a fair test of Intervenors' claims.

850.

One of the most striking aspects of DelGeorge's testi-mony is his failure to explain observed phenomena.

The CSR and PTL agreement rate charts appended to DelGeorge's testimony revealed that therir were swings in the CSR agreement rates from quarter to quarter and in the PTL agreement rates from month to month.

The swings in CSR quarterly agreement rates were on the order of 5% or less for aggregated inspection point data (Att.

O 2C-DelGeorge 1 and 2) and apparently as much as 50% for per weld data (Att. 2C-DelGeorge 3).

DelGeorge made no attempt in his testimony to account for those quarter to quarter changes or to

-O explain why they are unrelated to incidents of harassment.

Rather, DelGeorge offered only his bare opinion that any changes were not caused by incidents of harassment.

His testimony thus

-O raises more que9tions than its answers.

It amounts to unadorned and unsubstantiated conclusions from a highly interested party and thus can carry no persuasive weight, particularly in light of his admission that he set out to perform his analysis with the

" hope" that he could show an absence of a'dverse work effects -

related to production pressure.

DelGeorge, Tr. 16759.

O 851.

DelGeorge suggests in his direct testimony that the l

l l

fact that QC inspectors did not overlook any design significant l

defects is an indication that their performance was adequate.

O DelGeorge, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 16740) at 13, Tr. 16771-72.

But 155 0

~ -

O design significance is no more a valid measure of QC inspector performance than agreement rates.

Mr. DelGeorge admitted on O

cross examination that the normal measure of QC inspector performance is the standard of original design acceptance criteria; an inspector is judged in terms of how well or how O

poorly he detects discrepancies from original design criteria.

DelGeorge, Tr. 16776-81.

The design significance of a defect is not something that can be determined in the field by a quality 13 control inspector; design significance can only be determined after the fact by engineers on the basis of both the QC observation and other data unavailable to the QC inspector.

Tr.

13 16775-76.

QC inspectors are not trained to search specifically for design significance defects, and indeed Mr. DelGeorge testified that " notable" defects, which are the most serious O

defects from a design significance standpoint, are in general no more obvious to a QC inspector than what Edison would term

" insignificant" discrepancies.

Tr. 16786.

In sum, no conclusion O

about the adequacy of Comstock QC inspector performance can be drawn from the fortuity that none of the 3578 discrepancies that they overlooked turned out to be design significant.

852.

In addition to the CSR results, Edison presented the g

results of the routine Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory (PTL) overinspection program results for Comstock for the period July 1,

1982 to June 30, 1986.

The PTL sample items are chosen by a lO method that is "tandom" in a-lay sense, but not in a statistical sense.

The PTL sample does not constitute a probability sample and no statistical conclusions can be drawn from that sample to O

156 0

O the broader population.

Marcus, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 15568) at 11, 14; Frankel, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 17082) at 25.

853.

Edison drew the following conclusions from the PTL data.

First, DelGeorge concluded that the overall PTL agreement rates exhibited acceptable QC inspector performance and that the month-by-month PTL agreement rate figures did not exhibit any O

adverse trend related to incidents of harassment or production pressure.

DelGeorge, Prefiled (ff. Tc. 16740) at 12-14, 34.

DelGeorge also testified that he examined the individual PTL O

results for 20 of the 24 Comstock inspectors who made complaints to the NRC on March 29, 1985 and found no apparent trends or changes over time in their individual performance that would O

support intervenors' claims.

Id. at 34.

Mr. Marcus testified that he had examined the PTL results on a monthly basis and investigated the performance of individual inspectors during any O

month for which overall agreement rates fell below 90%.

Marcus claimed that the drop in agreement rates for those particular months could be attributed to the poor performance of specific O

individuals and that he found no cause for concern.

Marcus, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 15568) at 18, et seq.

Marcus and DelGeorge together examined the agreement rates for each of the 100 C) inspectors who were included in the PTL program and claimed to have found no pattern of poor performance for any inspector that might be attributable to the effects of harassment and O

intimidation.

Marcus, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 15568) at 30.

Finally, Mr. Frankel performed a linear regression analysis on the monthly PTL agreement rates and concluded that there was no declining O

trend apparent in those agreement rates.

Frankel, Prefiled (ff.

157 O

l

.O Tr. 17082) at 26-27.

853.

The PTL data is of little use in' evaluating Intervenors' claims.

Because the PTL sample was not a probability sample, no statistical conclusions can be drawn to the broader population.

Moreover, the PTL program, like the CSR O

program, relies on the use of agreement rates, which reveal nothing at all about QC inspector accuracy rates.

Finally, there is no indication that Edison's evaluation of the PTL data con-O sidered any but the extreme version of Intervenors' claims that Edison purported to test by means of the CSR data.

Indeed, even more than the CSR analysis, Edison's PTL analysis raises many O

more questions than it answers.

First, the PTL agreement rates exhibit striking swings from as much as 25% from month to month.

Att. 2C (Frankel-2).

During 8 of those months, overall agreement

()

rates for the PTL program fell below the level Edison considered acceptable.

Marcus, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 15568) at 13, 17.

Even more striking, the agreement rates for 19 out of the 100 inspec-O tors covered by the PTL program fell below the 90% threshold considered acceptable by Edison.

Marcus, Prefiled (ff. Tr.

15568) at 28-30.

854.

All of the above phenomena occurred during periods

()

when Intervenors allege there were harassment and production pressure problems at Comstock.

DelGeorge offered his conclusory opinion that none of the swings in agreement rates cited above

-g bore any relation to alleged incidents of harassment but provided no analysis at all.

Similarly, Marcus seemed conte..L to attribute poor agreement rates to individual inspectors and g

158 O

O specific problems of those inspectors without making any attempt to correlate those swings with incidents of harassment and production pressure.

Which specific incidents of harassment and g

production pressure did DelGeorge and Marcus consider?

What assumptions did they make about which inspectors might be

=

affected by particular incidents of harassment, what effects, if

.O any, did they assume would result from a general atmosphere of production pressure?

When would any effects manifest themselves?

For how long?

Because DelGeorge and Marcus failed to address any of those crucial questions in their testimony, their conclusory opinions cannot be given any weight.

855.

The use of " design significance" as a standard for hardware quality is questionable.

To begin with, hardware items could fall well below their original design criteria without being considered design significant.

In fact, not one of the O

1057 CSR discrepancies categorized by Sargent & Lundy as

" notable" (reducing an item's capacity by 10% or more) was deemed design significant.

Sargent & Lur.dy's design significance

O calculations were carried out by using successive levels of l

" refinement."

When one set of calculations produced results that indicated a concern about design significance, Sargent & Lundy O

turned to a "more refined calculations" which, by eliminating purported conservatisms in the first set of calculations, enhanced the acceptability of an item.

Sargent & Lundy employed

!O multiple layers of refinement in order to arrive at its conclusions that no discrepancies were design significant.

Kostal, Tr. 15076, 15083-85.

When pressed on cross examination, O

Kostal was hard pressed to think of any discrepancy that would be 159 0

O so severe as to meet his test of design significance.. Kostal, Tr. 1243-69.

Thus, only limited reassurance can be gained from 0

the fact that Sargent & Lundy did not consider any of the BCAP discrepancies to be design significant.

856.

No design significant discrepancies were identified in I) the CSR sample.

Kaushal, Prefil'ed (ff. Tr. 13068) at 28.

Based on the sampling methodology used, that finding supports a conclusion with at least 954 confidence that at least 95% of the O

valid, in scope, accessible electrical work completed and oC accepted prior to June 30, 1984 is free of design significant defects.

Id. at 14; Kaushal, Tr.14190; DelGeorge, Prefiled (ff.

O Tr. 16470) at 13.

DelGeorge suggests that the CSR results, and in particular the lack of design significant defects are an indication of acceptable hardware quality at Braidwood.

Id. at O

48, sowever, the lack of design significant defeccts in the CSR sample provides very little reassurance of acceptable hardware quality at the plant.

O' 857.

Most significantly, the statistical conclusion concerning the absence of design significant defects does not apply to the 76% of the electrical construction items at

()

Braidwood that did not f all within the pre-June 30, 1984 scope of the BCAP program.

Similarly, no conclusion with respect to design significant defects may be drawn even with respect to 5%

of the electrical construction items that were included within g

the BCAP scope.

Thus, all that BCAP provides, even by Edison's terms, is a 95% confidence that some 19% of the electrical natruction items are free of design significant defects.

O 160

.O

O Evidence of continued harassment and production pressure at-Comstock has continued unabated since the cut-off date for the

c)

CSR sample; there is reason for concern about the quality of the many items QC inspected and accepted since that date.

858.

Moreover, there is reason for concern over even the 19%

of electrical construction items that were d'eemed free of design q) significant defects as a result of Edison's statistical analysis.

Although the 954 confidence level is superficially reassuring, Kaushal's own testimony suggests that such a confidence level is

O j

not high enough in the face of the widespread construction and QA problems that have been demonstrated in this record.

859.

Kaushal indicated that a 954 confidence level was

!O considered adequate because BCAP was a " confirmation" program that assumed construction quality and the QA program were accep-i table; BCAP was designed simply to give an added layer of confi-

O dence and to look for recurring, program

atic design significant discrepancies as opposed to isolated discrepancies.

Kaushal, Prefiled (ff. Tr. 13068) at 3-5, 16-17.

But Edison has not offered

!O BCAP in its rebuttal case as merely a confirmation program; Edison presents BCAP as an adequate response to Intervenors' l

direct case which reveals widespread QC and hardware problems at IO Braidwood.

According to Kaushal's testimony, the appropriate response to allay concerns about known or suspected deficiencies in a plant is a reinspection / verification program as opposed to a 10 t

confirmation program.

Kaushal, Tr. 13079-81.

Such verification programs often involve 100% reinspections such as those conducted at Zimmer, Marble Hill, Comanche Peak and even Braidwood.

I C>

Kaushal, Tr. 13083-93.

161 i

O 860.

One inescapable conclusion from the CSR program is that the electrical construction populations at Braidwood are riddled with defects, many of them " notable."

of the 3578 defects found in the electrical populations, 1057 were notable.

Att. 2C (Kaushal-3), revised.

If the CSR sample is representative of the 13 overall electrical population at Braidwood, then there may be some 15,000-18,000 discrepancies in that population of which some 4,000-5,000 are notable.

O 861.

Kaushal testified that "it is not abnormal that construction errors occur in the construction of a nuclear plant.

However, such errors are normally expected to be discovered and 13 corrected by the checks and balances inherent in an overall quality program."

Kaushal, Prefiled, (ff. Tr. 13068) at 5.

The difference between the situation at Braidwood and the normal

!O situation described by Kaushal is that the CSR program reveals that thousands of discrepancies have gone undetected at Braidwood, including perhaps thousands of " notable" discrepan-

! Cf cies.

Edison asserts that those many outstanding defects are of no great concern because of the generous design margins found in any nuclear plant.

But to the extent that those many discrepan-13 cies will remain in the plant as built, the plant now has less design margin to deal with uncertainties in operation than it was designed to have.

Edison has performed no analyis of the aggre-gate effect of the many discrepancies that remain in the plant or g

j of the degree to which conservatisms in the plant have now been

~

reduced.

In sum, the hardware picture that the CSR program pr du ed is n t alt gether reassuring.

O 162 i

O

O io Respectfully submitted, 10

^

ROBRTGUILhoneofthe

.O

^tt ""*Y" f " I"t*""*" ""

Bridget Little Rorem, et al.

Robert Guild Robert.L. Jones

O Douglass W. Cassel, Jr.

Business and Professional People for the Public Interest 109 North

Dearborn,

1. 1300 l

Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 641-5570 O

O lO lO lO 163

!O

..