ML20209E853
| ML20209E853 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1985 |
| From: | Edelman M CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| (RDC-137(85)), PY-CEI-OIE-0074, PY-CEI-OIE-74, NUDOCS 8507120317 | |
| Download: ML20209E853 (2) | |
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f THE CLEVELAND ELECTR P.O. BOX $000 - CLEVELAND, OHIO 44101 - TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 - ILLUMINATING BLOG.
- 55 PUBLIC SQUARE Serving The Best Location in the Nation NORf%Y R. EDRMAN ObTn"'
June 27, 1985 PY-CEI/OIE-0074 L a
Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator, Region III office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 RE:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Isolation of Post Accident Sampling System Sample Dump Line
[RDC 137(85)]
Dear Mr. Keppler:
This letter serves as the final report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) concerning the design deficiency in the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) semple dump line.
Mr. J. McCormick-Barger of your office was notified on May 29, 1985, by Mr. T. A. Boss of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. that this problem was being evaluated per our Deviation Analysis Report (DAR) 241.
As a result of our analysis, we have determined that this condition is reportable per the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).
Description of Deficiency Just outside containment, a PASS sample dump line ties into the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) vent valve discharge line through containment penetration P429.
A single valve (P87F083) isolates the PASS line.
This is contrary to General Design Criteria 56 which requires that isolation be provided by two valves, unless suitable justification is given.
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.Mr. James G. Koppler June 27 1985 Analysis of Safety _11nolications If valve P87F083 were inadvertently left open (single failure) then post LOCA containment atmosphere could flow through vacuum breaker E12F605B into an unisolated line outside containment.
This could result in off-site radiation doses exceeding regulatory limits.
Corrective Action The results of our evaluation indicate that it is appropriate to add another valve in series with valve P87F083 in order to meet our design commitments.
ECN 28343-86-2151 is being initiated to effect the design change necessary to resolve this deficiency.
Please call if there are any additional questions.
Sincerely,
[
Murra R. Edelman Vice President Nuclear Group MRE:sab cc:
J. A. Grobe USNRC Site Office SBB50 D. E. Keating USNRC Site Office SBB50 Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Records Center, SEE-IN Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500' Atlanta, Georgia 33039