ML20209E543

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Reactor Operations Annual Rept,Aug 1986
ML20209E543
Person / Time
Site: University of Missouri-Columbia
Issue date: 08/31/1986
From: Brugger R, Meyer W
MISSOURI, UNIV. OF, COLUMBIA, MO
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8609110081
Download: ML20209E543 (184)


Text

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Research Reactor Facility UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI Research Park Colurnbia. Missouri 65211 September 3, 1986 Telephone (314) 882-4211 Di rector Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference:

Docket 50-186 University of Missouri Research Reactor License R-103

Subject:

Annual Report as required by Technical Specification 6.1.h(4).

Dear Sir:

Enclosed are twelve (12) copies of the 1985-86 Operations Annual Report for the University of Missouri Research Reactor as mentioned in my letter of August 20, 1986.

Si cerely,

?

Walt A. Meyer, Jr.

Acting Reactor Manager Enclosures Soh0f86 Q, y PDR h El E \

j4 COLUMBIA KANSAS CITY ROLLA ST. LOUIS an equal opportunity iristitution I

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I UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI RESEARCH REACTOR FACILITY I

REACTOR OPERATIONS I ANNUAL REPORT AUGUST 1986 I

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Compiled by the Reactor Staff Submitted by 1

l Walter A. Meye , Jr.

Acting Reactor Manager RevieNe nd Approved 3

h j jff

) e D. o B ugge Director .

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I TABLE OF CONTENTS I Section Page Number REACTOR OPERATIONS

SUMMARY

, . . . . . . . . . . . I-1 through I-16 I I.

II. CHANGES TO THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1 through I-10 III. REVISIONS TO THE HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT ..... III-1 only IV. PLANT AND SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . IV-1 through IV-3 V. NEW TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS ............ V-1 through V-2 VI. SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACTIVITIES ....... VI-1 through VI-2 ,

VII. REACTOR PHYSICS ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . VII-1 through VII-3 I VIII.

SUMMARY

OF RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS .

RELEASED TO THE ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . VIII-1 through VIII-2 I IX-1 through IX-10 IX.

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEYS . . . . . . . . .

X.

SUMMARY

OF RADIATION EXPOSURES TO FACILITY STAFF, EXPERIMENTERS, AND VISITORS . . . . . . . X-1 through X-2 I

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l SECTION I l REACTOR OPERATIONS

SUMMARY

1 July 1985 through 30 June 1986 l

The following table and discussion summarize reactor operations in the period 1 July 1985 through 30 June 1986.

Date Full Power Hours Megawatt Days of Total Time of Schedule July 1985 684.1 285.11 91.95 102.98 Aug. 1985 689.6 287.41 92.69 103.81 Sep. 1985 658.2 274.43 91.42 102.38 Oct. 1985 265.54 85.50 95.75 l 637.0 Nov. 1985 631.9 263.32 87.76 98.29 Dec. 1985 632.8 263.71 85.05 95.26 Jan. 1986 665.7 277.41 89.48 100.21 Feb. 1986 578.3 241.15 86.06 96.38 Mar. 1986 683.6 284.74 91.88 102.91 Apr. 1986 661.5 275.68 92.00 103.05 May 1986 661.3 275.64 88.88 99.55 June 1986 658.6 274.50 91.33 102.29 Total for Year 7842.6 3268.64 89.5 % of 100.3 % of time for yr. sched time I . at 10MW for yr. at 10MW I *MURR is scheduled to average at least 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> per week at 10MW.

Total time is the number of hours in a month or year.

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[ JULY 1985

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The reactor operated continuously during July with the following excep-L tions: two shutdowns for refueling and flux trap changes; three shutdowns for maintenance; and five unscheduled shutdowns.

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On July 16, a nuclear instrument anomaly scram occurred when the nuclear L instrument detector for channel number five (power range monitor) failed.

The detector and cables were replaced and the channel was tested satisfactori-

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ly. The failure of channel five was attributed to embrittlement of the cable I

L_ insulation and subsequent current leakage in the detector leads. The reactor was refueled and returned to normal operation.

On July 18, during pre-startup nuclear instrument checks, the rod-run-in function for nuclear instrument channel number five was determined to be

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inoperable. The rod-run-in function had tested satisfactorily prior to the June 16 reactor startup. Electronics technicians replaced the rod-run-in J dual trip unit and recalibrated the drawer. The drawer functions were tested

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satisf actorily and the instrument was returned to operation. On August 13,

{ 1985 a letter was sent to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulations explain-ing the circumstances and corrective action taken.

On July 19, a reactor scram occurred as a result of a momentary loss of electrical power. This was verified by the Power Plant and the reactor was returned to normal operation.

On July 21, the reactor was manually scrammed when the outer personnel airlock door chain tensioning mupler came apart. The coupler was repaired and the reactor was refueled and returned to normal operation.

On July 23, a problem again developed with the chain tensioning coupler on the outer personnel airlock door. A manual rod-run-in was initiated and repairs were comnleted on the coupler. The reactor was refueled and returned to normal operation.

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On July 28, a channel five high power rod-run-in occurred when a machin-ist inadvertently bumped the drywell for this channel while removing a re-l flector sample rotator from below the reactor bridge.

Major maintenance items for July included: replacing N. I. channel #5 l

detector; replacing rod-run-in dual trip unit in N. I. channel #5 drawer; re-pairing the chain tensioning coupler on the outer personnel airlock door; re-l building the lead solenoid on valve 546( A); and replacing the old N-3, N-2 wedge with a new N-3 wedge in the back graphite region.

( AUGUST 1985 The reactor operated continuously during August with the following excep-l four shutdowns for refueling and/or flux trap changes; two shutdowns tions:

for maintenance; and one unscheduled shutdown.

On August 1, a rod-run-in occurred with no indication other than the

" regulating blade out of automatic" annunciation. After the rod-run-in was W reset, unusual oscillations were detected on the channel five (power range monitor) indication. A manual rod-run-in was initiated and the detector for channel five was replaced. The rod-run-in was attributed to the failure of this detector. The new detector was response checked satisf actorily and the reactor was returned to normal operation.

Major maintenance items for August included: replacing N.I. channel five detector; replacing the inboard and outboard motor bearings on primary pump 501B; replacing valve solenoid 529F; and replacing the shear pin on the person-nel airlock doors.

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l l SEPTEMBER 1985 l

The reactor operated continuously during September with the following l exceptions: two shutdowns for refueling and flux trap changes; two shutdowns for maintenance; two shutdowns for fuel shipping and four unscheduled shutdowns.

On September 6 and September 20, a rod not in contact with magnet rod run-j in occurred when control blade "C" disengaged from its magnet during routine shimming. In each case the anvil was cleaned and its position with respect to the guide tube was checked before the reactor was returned to operation.

I During a maintenance shutdown, a pull test of the control blade was performed i

to determine if there was mechanical binding in the offset mechanism. There was indication of increas'd loading in the upper 5" of blade travel. This l

mechanism was subsequently replaced October 17, 1985 on its normal biennial cycle.

On September 13, the reactor scrammed during a routine shimming of control l

blade "A". The only indicated annunciation was the rod not in contact with magnet rod run-in. The rod drive and safety system relays were inspected, but l

the cause of the scram could not be determined. The reactor was returned to normal operation and no further problems of'this sort occurred.

On September 30, a channel 5 high power rod run-in occurred while loading i

reflector samples approximately one hour after a normal start-up. The rod run-in was reset and full power was regained in about three minutes. The Channel 5 l

power indication, which was indicating high prior to the rod run-in, was lowered to the power setting determined by secondary calorimetric.

Major maintenance items for September included: replacing nitrogen bank "B" solenoid; shipping 16 spent fuel elements to Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear l Company, Idaho Falls, Idaho; removing secondary pump P-1 motor controller due to an electrical fault and removing the pump motor to inspect for possible winding damage.

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OCTOBER 1985 The reactor operated continuously during October with the following excep-tions: five shutdowns for refueling and flux trap changes; three shutdowns for maintenance and five unscheduled shutdowns.

On Octobcc 1 and October 4, a rod not in contact with magnet rod run-in occurred when control blade "C" disengaged from its magnet during routine I shimming. In each case, the guide tube was checked for proper alignment. f After the rod run-in which occurred October 4, the drive mechanisms for rod "C" and "0" were switched to see if this recurring problem might be an electrical f ault in the drive mechanism. The offset mechanism for control blade "C" has since been replaced on its normal biennial cycle and no further problems of this type have occurred.

l On October 5, a manual rod run-in wls, initiated upon receiving a low domestic cold water (DCW) pressure alarm in the control room. DCW supplies cooling water to the primary pumps, the main air comprestor and to the emergency generator when it is running. The operator sent to investigate the alarm dis-covered that a physical plant employee had secured DCW to the reactor facility to contain a leak in the greenhouse south of the reactor. The DCW to the reactor was quickly restored and the reactor was returned to power with no further problems.

On October 10, a manual scram was initiated upon discovering that the trol-ley support pin on the inner personnel airlock door had sheared. The support pin and the lower guide bearing were replaced and the reactor was returned to normal operation.

I On October 18, af ter a maintenance day during which the offset "C" mecha-nism was replaced on its normal biennial cycle, fluctuations of about 1% were noted on the power range monitors during the normal startup. The fluctuations I I-5

decreased and eventually ceased upon approach to Xenon equilibrium and appeared

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to be rod-height related. Efforts to determine the cause of the fluctuations included verifying flux trap reactivity and sample integrity, and examining the primary water de-ionizing system for entrapped air. The exact cause of these

' fluctuations could not be determined, however it was concluded that they were related to the replacement of offset "C" mechanism. The offset mechanism sus-pected of causing the power fluctuations was replaced during the next scheduled e

L maintenance day, October 24, 1985, and the problem has not recurred. The mecha-nism removed from service was found to have greater bearing clearance than pre-p L,

vious offsets, thus allowing slight movement of the control blade due to pool flow turbulence in the blade gap.

On October 20, the reactor scrammed upon the loss of site electrical power.

L Site power was restored in about 45 minutes and the reactor was refueled and returned to normal operation.

On October 31, the reactor f acility conducted a successful drill to test

[ the response and interaction of MURR personnel with the emergency support groups.

Major maintenance items for October included: shipping eight spent fuel elements to Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company, Idaho Falls, Idaho; replacing the meter on the back-up isolation system monitor; replacing the trolley support pin and the lower guide bearing on the inner airlock door; removing beamport "F" centertube

[ and installing a nuclear fluorescent tube for a nuclear engineering experiment; installing Modification Package' #85-5 on offset "C", which consisted of a 3/16" tapered shim plate placed between the pedestal and the offset base; replacing offset "C" plechanism per procedure (twice); installing a rebuilt detector, cables and the D. C. amp, on N. I. channel #3; repairing the "T" coupling on the discharge side of the charging pump (P533); replacing Nitrogen bank "A" solenoid; and removing the outer row pneumatic tube from service by installing a blank flange.

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" NOVEMBER 1985 The reactor operated continuously during November with the following exceptions: three shutdowns for refueling and/or flux trap changes; two shut-downs for maintenance; and four unscheduled shutdowns.

On November 7, a high power scram occurred during a normal start-up due to a momentary electrical line voltage surge. During the shutdown period prior to the start-up, the control panel voltage line conditioner was temporarily removed from service for maintenance. It was determined that the absence of the line conditioner permitted the momentary line voltage surge which caused this scram. The line conditioner was repaired and placed back in service and no further problems of this type have occurred.

On November 18 and November 23, the reactor scrammed upon the loss of site electrical power. In each case, power was restored in approximately two hours and the reactor was refueled and returned to normal operation.

On November 24, a power level interlock scram occurred when valve 546(B) solenoid malfunctioned, ca'using the valve to fail open. Valve 546(B) is one of two (redundant) in-pool convection cooling loop valves which open on loss of primary coolant. The opening of this valve permitted a certain amount of coolant flow to bypass the core. The resulting reduction in core flow was sensed by core tP pressure sensor 929, which immediately initiated the scram.

The primary and pool coolant systems remained in operation, providing normal cooling after the shutdown. The solenoid was repaired and the reactor was returned to normal operation.

Major maintenance items for November included: repairing the control i

panel line conditioner; replacing the 0-ring seals on valves 546 (A and B);

repairing valve 546(B) solenoid; removing the N. E. fluorescent centertube and installing an iron filter centertube in Beamport "F" and replacing valve 527C air diaphragm.

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DECEMBER 1985 The reactor operated continuously in December with the following excep-tions: two shutdowns for refueling and flux trap changes; four shutdowns and one power reduction for maintenance; and four unscheduled shutdowns.

On December 10 and December 20, the reactor scrammed due to a momentary loss of electrical power. Each case was verified with the University Power Plant, and the reactor was returned to normal operation.

On December 19, a high-power scram occurred during a normal reactor I start-up while cycling the wide range monitor switch. The scram was attri-

  • buted to a static charge buildup between the switch contacts. The switch was cycled through its normal range to discharge any remaining static charge, and a normal reactor start-up was completed with no further problems.

On December 20, the building exhaust air plenum radiation monitor I initiated a reactor isolation. All reactor personnel responded according to the procedure for a reactor isolation. Remote monitoring indicated no unusual radiation levels and the containment building was re-entered and declared safe by a Health Physics survey. The cause of the isolation was traced to a f aulty resistor in the area radiation monitor. This resistor was replaced and the reactor was returned to normal operation.

Major maintenance items for December included: replacing valve 527C actuator solenoid; replacing check valves 550 C and 0; replacing the gasket at the poison addition flange; replacing the shock absorber spring in the outer personnel airlock door; replacing the multivolt transmitter (MV/I) for the primary TC ; and replacing a faulty resistor in the area radiatjon monitor.

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s JANUARY 1986 The reactor operated continuously in January with the following excep-tions: four shutdowns for refueling and/or flux trap changes; two shutdowns for maintenance; and four unscheduled shutdowns.

On January 2, a reactor scram occurred as a result of a momentary loss of site electrical power that was verified by the Power Plant. A hot start-

- up was performed and the reactor returned to normal operation.

On January 7, the reactor was manually scrammed when the drive chain

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shock absorber shear pin on the outer personnel airlock door sheared during a door cycling event. The pin was replaced and the reactor was refueled and returned to normal operation.

s On January 17, the shift supervisor initiated a manual scram upon dis-covery of erratic temperature indications from temperature element 901A (Primary Tc). No safety system functions are associated with this temperature element. Two primary Tc scrams are provided in the green leg of the safety system through temperature elements 980 A and B, and the temperature indications from these elements were normal at this time. An electronics technician tightened a loose input lead, cleaned the connector terminals, and calibrated the recorder for temperature element 901A. A hot start-up was performed and temperature indications from temperature element 901A were stable.

On January 18, a channel 5 high power rod run-in occurred during a reflector sample handling evolution. The rod run-in was reset and full power was regained in about three minutes.

Major maintenance items for Jantury included: replacing temperature element 901A (Primary Tc) MV/I module; replacing the shear pin on the outer airlock door; replacing the shock absorber spring on the inner airlock door; replacing the outboard motor bearing in secondary pump P-1; replacing the I-9 I

[ secondary low sump cut-out circuitry; replacing pump bearings and seals in pool pump 508A; and installing Modification Package 85 new regulating blade off-set mechanism.

FEBRUARY 1986 The reactor operated continuously in February with the following excep-tions: one shutdown for refueling and a flux trap change; three shutdowns for maintenance; and four unscheduled shutdowns.

~ On February 2, the shif t supervisor initiated a manual rod run-in to investigate erratic temperature indications from temperature element 901A

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(Primary Tc) . These erratic temperature indications were determined to be I spurious and the reactor was returned to full power. No safety system func-L.,

tions are associated with this temperature element. Two primary Tc scrams

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are provided in the green leg of the safety system through temperature ele-monts 980 A and B, and the temperature indications from these elements were

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normal at this time. An electronics technician later replaced the millivolt transmitter for 901A and no further problems of this type have occurred.

Later on February 2, a manual scram was initiated when the inner air-l lock door would not shut due to an obstruction wedged in its track. The ob-l struction proved to be an electrical extension cord which had fallen off of a cart being brought into the containment building by an experimenter. The cord was dislodged and removed and the reactor was refueled and returned to normal I

l operation.

A third unscheduled shutdown took place on February 2 when a high-power scram occurred while cycling the wide range monitor switch during a normal l

reactor start-up. The scram was attributed to a static charge buildup between Lhe switch contacts. The switch was cycled though its normal range to dis-charge any remaining static charge, and a normal reactor start-up was completed with no further problems.

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L On February 13, a reactor scram occurred twice while cycling the wide range monitor switch during normal reactor start-ups. It was previously felt that this recurring problem was due to a static charge buildup between the switch contacts. However, after the second occurrence on this day, the entire l

switch module was replaced and the problem remained. This isolated the source l of the problem to the channel 4 drawer. A faulty.picoammeter module was re-placed and the instrument was recalibrated. The reactor was returned to l

normal operation and no further problems of this type occurred.

Major maintenance items for February included: replacing temperature l

element 901A (Primary Tc) millivolt transmitter; replacing the picoammeter l module in N. I. channel #4 drawer; changing the heads on the emergency generator; replacing the Elgar AC line conditioner; installing Modification l

Package 86-1 (adding new reflector element 5F, removing the N-3 wedge, moving l

the K-2, K-3 wedge to the old N-3 wedge position); and installing the new K-5 rotator.

l MARCH 1986 l The reactor operated continuously during March with the following ex-ceptions: four shutdowns for refueling and/or flux trap changes; two shut-1 downs for maintenance; and two unscheduled shutdowns.

On March 13, pressure transmitters 944 A and/or B initiated a scram l

during a normal reactor startup. The primary and secondary coolant tempera-tures were lower than usual during this startup due to the extended length of the shutdown period. When a secondary coolant pump was started; the sub-sequent cooling of the primary caused an exaggerated oscillation in the core discharge pressure indication, resulting in the reactor Inop low pressure scram. The reactor was allowed to heat up for a short time on pump heat and a startup was completed with no further problems.

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l On March 31, reactor process instrumentation breaker 2C813 trippGd, causing a scram. It was eventually discovered that a beamport research worker i

had plugged a vacuum pump into a red-tagged (marked emergency use only) elec-trical outlet on the mezzanine level which is routed through this breaker. I The increased current load created by this pump caused the breaker to open I when the pump cycled on. The outlets on the mezzanine level have since been l physically removed from service to prevent the recurrence of a similar prob-lem. The person responsible for this occurrence was instructed about the seriousness of disregarding the tag on the mezzanine receptacle, and the j

safety implications of violating any red tagged equipment.

{ Major maintenance items for March included: installing a new experi-mental can, sapphire filter and shutter door in Beamport "C"; installing a l

new iron collimator in Beamport "F"; replacing the impeller, seal and keeper on pool pump P508A; replacing a fuse in the area radiation monitoring system; l

replacing the source range drive switch; and replacing the reactor (Tc)

I millivolt transmitter.

I j APRIL 1986 The reactor operated continuously in April with the following exceptions:

1 Two shutdowns for refueling; two shutdowns for maintenance; and seven un-i scheduled shutdowns.

l On April 1, reactor process instrumentation breaker 2CB1B tripped, l

{ causing a scram. This occurred as a result of an increased current load created by an improperly placed vacuum pump as discussed in March 1986 sum-l ma ry .

On April 11, 12, 17 and 29, nuclear instrument channel four (wide range monitor) high power rod run-ins occurred while shimming the control rods to clear the regulating blade 60% withdrawn annunciation. These rod run-ins 1-12 I

I occurred simultaneously with the clearing of this annunciation. No actual I high-power transients were observed on any instrumentation and full power was restored within two minutes in each case. This particular problem did not occur each time the regulating blade 60% withdrawn annunciation cleared and the randomness of the occurrences made troubleshooting difficult. It is sus-pected that electrical interference is occurring between an annunciator relay and the channel 4 rod run-in module.

On April 20, a reactor scram and isolation occurred; all personnel exited the containment building according to procedure. After checking all remote '

radiation indications, operations personnel re-entered the containment build-ing with portable monitors and discovered a failed high voltage tube and resistor in the power supply of the area radiation monitor. The tube and resistor were replaced and the reactor was refueled and returned to normal operation.

On April 24, a rod not in contact with magnet rod run-in occurred when control rod "C" disengaged from its magnet while pulling rods during a reactor startup. The reactor was unable to override xenon on the subsequent startup attempt and was refueled and returned to normal operation.

Major maintenance items for April included: replacing the solenoid coil and plunger for valve 527E; replacing the flow orifice in primary loop B; re-turning unirradiated fuel element AM0-215 for inspection by the fabricator; installing an iron filter in beamport "F" and inserting the centertube full l in; and replacing the high voltage tube and a resistor in the ARMS.

MAY 1986 The reactor operated continuously in May with the following exceptions:

two shutdowns for refueling; three shutdowns for maintenance; one power 1-13

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[ reduction to allow the inspection of a pump in the mechanical equipment room; and ten unscheduled shutdowns.

Two nuclear instrument channel four (wide range monitor) high power rod run-ins (May 2 and May 28) and one channel four high power scram (May 16)

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occurred during routine control blade shimming. All of these occurred as the regulating blade 60% withdrawn annunciation cleared. No actual high power b

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transients were observed. Electrical interference is the suspected cause, L although it has been difficult to isolate the problem. Electronics technicians are currently working on this recurring problem with electrical distribution

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consultants from the University Campus Facilities office.

Three nuclear instrument channel five (power range monitor) high power rod run-ins (one May 24 and two May 27) and one channel five high power scram L No actual high power transients (May 27) occurred during normal operation.

were observed on any instrumentation. The DC amplifier and the detector for

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channel five were subsequently replaced on June 5,1986.

On May 12, the reactor scrammed with no indication except the " rod not in contact with magnet" annunciation. The " white rat" scram circuit monitors were installed in both the green and yellow legs of the safety system. No

[ further problems of this type have occurred.

On May 15, a rod not in contact with magnet rod run-in occurred when control blade "B" disengaged from its magnet during a normal Startup. The r blade drive mechanism and offset were inspected and no anomalies were indi-L cated. A normal startup was completed with no further problems, o On May 29, a nuclear instrument channel two (intermediate range monitor) short period rod run-in occurred during a normal startup after routine main-tenance. All period indications appeared normal at the time. The rod run-in was reset and a normal startup was completed with no further problems of this type.

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A routine safety insp:cticn t:as conductcd by K. R. Ridgway, C. H. Brown and E. R. Schweibinz of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, May 12-14, 1986. No items of noncompliance were noted.

Major maintenance items for May included: satisf actory completion of the annual containment building leak rate test; replacing the bearings and reworking the shaft for pool pump P-508A.

JUNE 1986 The reactor operated continuously in June with the following exceptions:

three shutdowns for refueling and/or sample changes; three shutdowns for main-tenance; and ten unscheduled shutdowns.

On June 5, two nuclear instrument channel five (power range monitor) high power rod run-ins and three channel five high power scrams occurred. All of these shutdowns occurred within minutes after reaching full power. The cause was traced to the channel five detector which was replaced; the D. C. amplifier for channel five was also replaced and no further problems of this type have occurred.

On June 9, the reactor scrammed due to the loss of site power. Power supplied to the facility was transferred from the University Power Plant to the City Power Plant. The reactor was subsequently refueled and returned to normal ooeration.

On June 15, three rod not in contact with magnet rod run-ins occurred due to momentary losses of site power. The cause for these, confirmed by power l plant personnel, was determined to be a breaker cycling at the power plant.

After the third rod run-in, the reactor was refueled and this particular prob-blem at the power plant has not recurred.

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I On Juna 26, a nuclcar instrum:nt channal two (intermediato rang 2 monitor) short period scram occurred during a normal startup after a maintenance shut-down. Period indications for channels 1, 2, and 3 appeared normal at the time (no actual short period was indicated). The scram was reset and a normal start-up was completed with no further problems.

Major maintenance items for June included: replacing the D. C.

amplifier and the detector for nuclear instrument channel five; installing a center ground tap on the control room 10 KVA transformer; and replacing the meter for DPS-9288 (primary heat exchanger differential pressure).

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l SECTION !!

l CHANGES TO THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES Revised October 1981 i

I I As required by the MURR Technical Specifications, the Acting Reactor l

Manager reviewed and approved the changes to the Standard Operating Procedures i

I and the Emergency Procedures.

I A. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES:

l There have been 3 revisions (19, 20, and 21) made to the Revised October I 1981 manual during the past year.

I B. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES:

As required by the MURR Technical Specifications, the Acting Reactor l

Manager reviewed and approved the changes to the Emergency Procedures.

There were 4 revisions (1, 2, 3, and 4) made to the Site Emergency l

l Procedure Section of the Emergency Procedures and 2 revisions (1 and 2) to the Facility Emergency Procedure Section of the Emergency Procedures.

l The revisions to the Standard Operating Procedures and Emergency Procedures are contained in this section with the part of each page that was revised l

marked on the right side of the page by a bracket (3).

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REVISION NUMBER 19 I TO OCTOBER 1981 MANUAL The Emergency Procedures Section was deleted and replaced with the new section titled: REACTOR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES as follows:

Sec. No. Page No. Date (Original) Sec. No. Page No. Date (Original)

TABLE OF CONTENTS 7/3/85 INTRODUCTION 7/3/85 REP-1 REP-1-1 7/3/85 REP-16 REP-16-1 7/3/85 REP-2 REP-2-1 7/3/85 REP-17 REP-17-1 7/3/85 REP-3 REP-3-1 7/3/85 REP-18 REP-18-1 7/3/85 REP-4 REP-4-1 7/3/85 REP-19 REP-19-1 7/3/85 REP-5 REP-5-1 7/3/85 REP-20 REP-20-1 7/3/85 REP-6 REP-6-1 7/3/85 REP-20 REP-20-2 7/3/85 REP-7 REP-7-1 7/3/85 REP-21 REP-21-1 7/3/85 REP-8 REP-8-1 7/3/85 REP-21 REP-21-2 7/3/85 REP-9 REP-9-1 7/3/85 REP-21 REP-21-3 7/3/85 REP-9 REP-9-2 7/3/85 REP-22 REP-22-1 7/3/85 REP-9 REP-9-3 7/3/85 REP-10 REP-10-1 7/3/85 I REP-11 REP-11-1 7/3/85 REP-12 REP-12-1 7/3/85 REP-13 REP-13-1 7/3/85 REP-13 REP-13-2 7/3/85 REP-14 REP-14-1 7/3/85 I REP-15 REP-15-1 //3/85 REP-15 REP-15-? 7/3/85 REP-15 REP-15-3 7/3/85 11-2 I

REACTOR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES TABLE OF CONTENTS '

hection N 7, Page No.

HEP-0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-0-1 3 EP-1 FAILURE TO SCRAM OR ROD RUN-IN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-1-1 MEP-2 REACTOR SCRAM FROM CAUSES OTHER THAN LOSS OF FLOW OR PRESSURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-2-1 EP-3 REACTOR SCRAM FROM LOSS OF PRIMARY SYSTEM PRESSURE OR FLOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-3-1 EP-4 HIGH RADIATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-4-1 REP-S NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT FAILURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-S-1 REP-6 FAILURE OF THE AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (ARMS) . . . . REP-6-1 REP-7 LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN REACTOR CONTROL ROOH AND EXPERIMENTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-7-1 l REP-8 CONTROL R00 DRIVE FAILURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .'. REP-8-1 REP-9 ELECTRICAL ANOMALIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-9-1 REP-10 FAILURE OF EXPERIMENTAL APPARATUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-10-1 REP-11 LOW FIRE MAIN PRESSURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-11-1 REP-12 LOSS OF SERVICE WATER TO FACILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-12-1 REP-13 LOSS OF SECONDARY FLOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-13-1 REP-14 LOSS OF POOL FLOW DURING REACTOR OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . REP-14-1 REP-15 LOSS OF POOL WATER LEVEL DURING REACTOR OPERATION . . . . . . REP-15-1 REP-16 VALVES 507A AND 5070 FAIL TO CLOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-16-1 REP-17 , PRESSURIZER VALVES FAIL TO OPERATE . . . . . , . . . . . . . . REP-17-1 REP-18 BOTH ANTISIPHON VALVES (543A AND $438) FAIL TO OPEN . . . . . REP-18-1 REP-19 FAILURE OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING VALVES (546 A/B) . . . . . . REP-19-1 REP-20 HIGH ACTIVITY LEVELS IN TliE PRIMARY COOLING SYSTEM (FPM) . . . REP-20-1 Rtr-21 HIGH STACK HON 110R INDICATIOPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-21-1 REP-22 00MB OR OTHER OVERT THREATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-22-1 lRev.7/30/85 App'd M

REACTOR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES INTRODUCTION It cannot be overly stressed that the guideline for any emergency procedure shall be actions which safeguard personnel and equipment, in that order.

If, while operating the University of Missouri Research Reactor, a situation l

develops that requires an emergency action as set forth in these procedures, it cust be remembered that for a transient type accident, Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.36, dictates certain actions as pertaining to safety limits and limiting safety system settings. In the case of a transient type l

accident, the Shif t Supervisor must determine before resuming operaticn if a safety limit, as illustrated by the safety limit curves set forth in the MURR Technical Specifications has been exceeded. If, in fact, a limit has been exceeded, the reactor shall remain shutdown until the Commission authorizes resumption of cperation. Limiting safety settings are those settings which will initiate automatic action to prevent exceeding a safety limit. If a safety system setting is exceeded without receiving an automatic function trip, the reactor shall be shut down and the Commission notified. The cause of the failure will be noted and corrective action taken before operations resume.

The following actions shall be taken by reactor operating personnel for the conditions listed.

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Rev.J]3,0]85_ App'd lijfftA I

I REP-1 FAILURE TO SCRAM OR R0D RUN-IN I IF, for any reason, the reactor fails to scram or rod run-in automatically when caTled for by the protective system, the Reactor Operator shall:

I IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Scram the reactor.
2. Ensure all the rods are full in.
3. Ensure the reactor is shutting down as indicated by nuclear instrumentation.

I SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Notify the shif t supervisor of scram.
2. Verify that safety limits and LSSS were not exceeded.
3. Make console log entry and fill out UNSCHEDULED SHUTDOWN report.
4. Determine and correct the problem before resuming operation.

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Orig. 7/3/85 App'd hm REP-1-1 I

REP-2 REACTOR SCRAM FROM CAUSES OTHER THAN LOSS OF FLOW OR PRESSURE IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Acknowledge c:use of scram and take corrective actions as required.
2. Monitor nuclear instrumentation to assure reactor is shutting down.
3. Verify the blades are full,in and rod dr!ve mechanisms driving in.

I SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Notify the shif t supervisor of scram.
2. Make console log entry and fill out UNSCHEDULED SHUTDOWN report.

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Orig. 7/3/85 App'd  % REP-2-1 I

I REP-3 REACTOR SCRAM FROM LOSS OF PRIMARY SYSTEM PRESSURE OR FLOW IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Acknowledge the cause of scram.

I I 2. Check that primary system is in normal shutdown lineup.

3. Check for AT across the in pool heat exchanger.

4 Monitor nuclear instrumentation to assure reactor is shutting down.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Notify the shif t supervisor of scram.
2. Place primary system switches and controls in normal shutdown mode.
3. Make console entry and fill out UNSCHEDULED SHUTDOWN report.

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I Orig. 7/3/85 App'd OQTA REP-3-1 I

E REP-4 HIGH RADIATION A. IF increase in radiation levels above aormal is detected before any trip B TEvel occurs; the operator shall: u IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Notify the shift supervisor.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Closely monitor the radiation level.
2. The shif t supervisor may lower reactor power to prevent continued rise in radiation levels.
3. Notify the Manager of Reactor Health Physics.

E B. E the alarm trip point js, exceeded, the operator may:

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. At the discretion of the shift supervisor, initiate a rod run-in.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Notify the Reactor Manager.
2. Notify the Manager of Reactor Health Physics.

C. In the event radiation levels have reached a magnitude to cause reactor E isolation, pro::edures outlined in FEP-2 shall be followed. 5 I

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Orig. 7/3/85 App'd M REP-4-1

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REP-5 l

NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT FAILURE IF any nuclear instrument channel required for reactor operation

  • is deterliiTned to not function correctly and the reactor has not scrammed due to

! instrument failure, the reactor operator shall:

E IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Scram the reactor.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Notify the shift supervisor.

l 2. The nuclear instrument channel shall be repaired and tested prior to l

restarting the reactor.

3. Make console log entry and fill out UNSCHEDULED SHUTDOWN report.

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I I *HOTE: ALL SIX NUCLEAR CHANNELS REQUIRED TO BE OPERATIONAL FOR REACTOR STARTUP; CHANNELS 2 THROUGH 6 REQUIRED OPERATIONAL I DURING OPERATION AT POWER.

I Orig. 7/3/85 App'd (AM REP-5-1 I

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I REP-6 FAILURE OF THE AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (ARMS)

A. FAILURE OF BUILDING AIR PLENUM OR REACTOR BRIDGE (ARMS)

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Notify the shift supervisor.
2. Switch 1*nputs from the detector in offgas duct, Room 114, or reactor bridge to operational monitors to determine if the detector is functioning.
3. IF the detector is NOT functioning; manual scram until repaired.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Notify the Manager of Reactor Health Physics.
2. IF the detector for the affected area is functioning, it may remain connected to the operational monitor to which it was 3 switched, while the affected area monitor is being repaired. g
3. Portable monitoring equipment shall be set up to monitor radiation in the displaced area.

B. FAILURE OF ARMS OTHER THAN SPECIFIED IN "A":

1. Temporary or portable monitoring equipment may be set up to a monitor radiation levels. I
2. Notify the shift supervisor.
3. Notify the Manager of Reactor Health Physics.

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I Orig. 7/3/85 App'd  % REP-6-1 I

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REP-7 L

LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN REACTOR CONTROL ROOM AND EXPERIMENTERS A. DURING REACTOR STARTUP L 1. The reactor shall be held steady at the existing power until repairs or temporary communication can be established.

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B. DURING STEADY STATE

1. If repairs or temporary communications cannot be made in a reasonable period of time, the reactor shall be shut down.

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Orig. 7/3/85 App'd hd REP-7-1 E

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E REP-8 CONTROL R0D DRIVE FAILURE IF the reactor operator detects a stuck or inoperative drive mechanism. E m

he shaTT:

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Scram the reactor, noting approximate stuck position.
2. Place master switch in test to prevent mechanisms from driving in. _
3. Verify the reactor is shutting down by nuclear instrumentation.

SilBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Notify the shif t supervisor.

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2. Disconnect power to affected rod drive mechanism and install dummy load test connector.
3. Insert unaffected mechanisms manually.
4. Make console log entry and fill out UNSCHEDULED SHUTDOWN report.

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I REP-8-I M

Orig. 7/3/85 App'd I

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I REP-9 ELECTRICAL ANOMALIES I NOTE: AN AN0MALY SUCH AS SINGLE PHASING OR A REDUCTION IN LINE I VOLTAGE MAY NOT BE OBVIOUS. THE REACTOR MAY OR MAY NOT SHUT DOWN. SYMPT 0MS MAY INCLUDE DIMMING OF LIGHTS, LOSS OF SOME CONTAINMENT LIGHTS OR LOSS OF SOME PROCESS SYSTEM EQUIPMENT.

I A. SINGLE PHASING OR LOW LINE VOLTAGE In the event of a single phasing or low voltage condition, the reactor operator shall:

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Scram the reactor /or if already scrammed, check reactor shutdown.
2. Turn 0FF all pump and cooling tower fans in an expeditious manner.
3. Place all valve controls in their normal shutdown position and manual mode.

4 Trip the auto transfer switch on substation "B".

I SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Notify the shif t supervisor.
2. Check emergency generator and its loads for proper operation.
3. Determine cause of electrical anomaly and try to remedy it.
4. If a rabbit is in the reactor, transfer P-tube blower to emergency power and return the rabbit.
5. Trip the supply breakers for MCC-1, MCC-2A AND MCC-2B in cooling tower.

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I REP-9-1 Orig. 7/3/85 App'd K I

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I RECOVERY ACTIONS:

1. Check all three phases on each substation for proper voltages.
2. Place the following loads in a condition that they may be individually monitored on light off.
a. SF1/RFI
b. SF2/RF2
c. Main Air Compressor
d. Air Conditioning Compressors:

Room 212 - located by Electronics Shop Room 232 - located by Health Physics sink

e. Ventilation Air Compressor
f. Chill Water Pumps E E
g. Vacuum Pumps
h. SP-4
1. Cooling Tower Sump Pumps J. Condensate Return Pumps
3. When starting systems, closely monitor any equipment known to be running at the time the electrical anomaly was noted.

4 A Full Power Startup Checksheet shall be performed prior to l starting up the reactor.

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REP-9-2 Orig. 7/3/85 App'd lhd I

I B. SUSTAINED LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Check the reactor shutdown.
2. Turn OFF all pump and cooling tower fan switches. ]

I 3. Place all valve controls in their normal shutdown position and manual mode.

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5. Trip the master supply breaker on substation "B".

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

I 1. Notify the shif t supervisor.

2. Check emergency generator and its loads for proper operation.
3. Check gas tank level and project remaining run time of E. G.
4. Determine cause of electrical power loss.
5. If a rabbit is in the reactor, transfer P-tube blower to emergency power and return the rabbit.
6. Trip the suoply breakers for MCC-1, MCC-2A and MCC-2B in cooling tower.
7. Make console log entry and fill out UNSCHEDULED SHUTDOWN report.

RECOVERY ACTIONS:

1. Check all three phases on each substation for proper voltages.
2. When starting the system, closely monitor any equipment known to be running at the time of the electrical power loss.
3. A Full Power Startup Checksheet shall be performed prior to starting up the reactor.

I C. M0MENTARY LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER:

(only a reactor scram occurred)

1. Notify the shift supervisor.
2. Verify momentary loss of electrical power with power plant.

!I l 3. The reactor may be operated af ter performing a Reactor Short Form Precritical Checksheet.

4 Make console lag entry and fill out UNSCHEDULED SHUTDOWN report.

Orig. 7/3/85 App'd  %\ REP-9-3 lI u

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REP-10 FAILURE OF EXPERIMENTAL APPARATUS Upon receiving reliable information that experimental equipment is oper- E 3

ating in a manner hazardous to personnel and the hazard is due to radiation from the reactor, the reactor operator shall:

E IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Reduce power by rod run-in.
2. Secure the experiment or keep personnel away.
3. If the problem is significant enough to require control room personnel, shut dcwn the reactor and return experiment to a safe condition.

I SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Notify the shif t superviscr.
2. Repair experiment or place in safe condition before restarting tre reactor.

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I REP-10-1 Orig. 7/3/85 App'd I

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I REP-ll LOW FIRE MAIN PRESSURE IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Send operator to fire main pressure gauge to determine pressure.
2. If pressure remains below minimum pressure required by last Emergency Pool Fill Flow Test (CP-16), shut down the reactor.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Notify the shift supervisor.
2. Determine cause for fire main low pressure.

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Orig. 7/3/85 App'd W REP-11-1 I

I REP-12 LOSS OF SERVICE WATER TO FACILITY Upon loss of the water service to the facility, the reactor operator shall:

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

Shut down and secure the reactor.

1.

I SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Notify the shif t supervisor.
2. Announce to entire facility that water service has been interrupted.
3. Secure, tag out, and make an entry in the reactor logs that the following equipment has been secured as per REP-12.
a. Cooling Pumps SP1, SP2, SP3, and SP4
b. Emergency Generator Unit I
c. Main Air Compressor
d. Vacuum Unit Pumps
e. Air Conditioning Units (NOTE: Only if CT sump is too low to permit operation of SP-4.)
f. Hot Water Recirculating Pump
g. Af ter the reactor has been secured, secure the primary coolant water system since pumps P501 A/B no longer have cooling water.
h. Room 212 (North Counting Room) Air Conditioner (Notify Research and Applications Group)
1. Room 232B (ETSRC Counting Room) Air Conditioner (Notify Research and Applications Group.)
j. Ice Machine (inner passage way)

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4. Upon restoration of water to the Facility, return all systems to normal status.
5. Announce to entire Facility the restoration of water scrvice.

REP-12-1 Orig. 7/3/85 App'd lh I

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REP-13 LOSS OF SECONDARY FLOW A. GRADUAL FLOW REDUCTION E secondary flow is gradually decreasing, the Reactor Operator shall:

k IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

p 1. Send the Assistant Duty Operator to the cooling tower to L assess the flow reduction problem. (see NOTE below) c 2. Switch secondary pumps to determine whether the action corrects L the deterioratias flow condittoa5-

3. Notify the shif t supervisor.
4. Monitor the position of S-1 and reactor temperature.
5. IF primary / pool temperature cannot .be managed, the reactor shall s

Fe shut down, leaving primary and pool systems in operation.

E NOTE: A LOSS OR REDUCTION IN SECONDARY FLOW MIGHT BE CAUSED BY: h a) Mechanical failure of a secondary cooling pump.

b) Air binding of a secondary cooling pump.

[ c) A break in the secondary cooling line.

d) Loss of water in the cooling tower causing pump to shut off when low sump level switch is tripped.

{ e) Restriction in flow due to a faulty check valve on the discharge side of a running sump pump.

f) Failure in low sump level cutout circuitry (proper sump level, but pumps trip off).

g. Clogged suction strainer.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Determine cause of flow reduction and determine effects on further operation.

Orig. 7/3/85 App'd d REP-13-1

I B. COMPLETE LOSS OF SECONDARY FLOW IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. IF loss of flow is due to loss of secondary pump or pumps, start He standby pump.
2. IF the standby pump cannot be put on the line, reduce reactor power Ff rod run-in to less than 100 KW.
3. Notify the shif t supervisor.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS: -

1. IF the sump level is normal and pumps cannot be started, bypass He low sump cutout circuitry and try to restart the pumps.
1. IF seconaary flow cannot be returned to maintain reactor operating Evels, the reactor should be shut down.
2. Return secondary system to normal before restarting the reactor.

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I Orig. 7/3/85 App'd M REP-13-2 I

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L REP-14 L LOSS OF POOL FLOW DURING REACTOR OPERATION I E pool flow rate drops below 435 gpm in either loop without generating an automatic scram, the Reactor Operator shall:

L IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

I u 1. Scram the reactor.

2. Shut down the pool system, leaving the primary and secondary on the line.

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- SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

- 1. Notify the shif t supervisor.

L 2. Determine the cause of pool flow loss and correct it before restarting the reactor.

3. Make console log entry and fill out UNSCHEDULED SHUTDOWN reports.

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I REP-14-1 Orig. 7/3/85 App'd h%

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I REP-15 LOSS OF POOL WATER LEVEL DURING REACTOR OPERATION IF the pool level becomes less than the RRI limit (= 29 f t.) and continues to recWe:

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. 3 cram the reactor.
2. Notify the shif t supervisor.
3. Secure P508A and B and verify valve 509 closes.
4. Secure P5138.
5. Place master switch (151) in TEST position.
6. Manually close valve 509 if it has not closed automatically.
7. Close valve 547 by activating the manual 3-way valve on the upper bridge level.
8. Ensure valve 547 has closed by local activator indication or light indication in control room.

At this point, the pool is isolated from the process leg of the pool cooling sy stem.

CAUTION: INCREASED RADIATION LEVELS DUE TO LOW POOL LEVEL MAY CAUSE l

uA REACTOR ISOLATION. ALLOW ALL PERSONNEL EXCEPT FE0 MEMBERS T0 LEAVE CONTAINMENT. THIS TYPE OF EMERGENCY HAS SEVERE EN0 UGH g CONSEQUENCES TO WARRANT EMERGENCY LEVEL EXPOSURES UP TO 25 g R/HR BY FE0 PERSONNEL TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC. MONITOR RADIATION LEVELS CLOSELY FOR RADIATION DOSE ASSESSMENT.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

IF pool level stops decreasing, continue with section (A). If level continWs to decrease, go to section (B).

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REP-IS-I Orig. 7/3/85 App'd k I

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I A. LEAK ON PROCESS SIDE OF V509

1. Enter room 114 observing proper radiation protection.
2. Attempt to locate and secure the leak with all available means.

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3. Efforts should be made to contain the leakage in the room 114 pipe trench, l the labyrinth sump and waste tanks (i.e., secure labyrinth sump pump when 1 5 waste tanks are full).

J NOTE: THE PIPE TRENCH AND LABYRINTH SUMP VOLUME (T0 A HEIGHT EQUAL TO THE TOP 0F PIPE TRENCH) IS APPROXIMATELY 14,000 GALLONS.

I 4 If the pool level had receded to a point that a higher than normal radia-I tion level was created on the bridge, water from T300 and T301 should be added to reduce the radiation levels.

5. Perform recovery actions as per section (D).

B. LEAK INSIDE V509 OR THROUGH BEAMPORTS

1. Activate the FE0 as per SEP-1. .
2. Isolate containment of all but FE0 members.
3. Check beamport floor and room 114 tunnel to determine the source of the leak.
4. IF the leak is through the beamports go to Section (C). IF the leak is Tnside V509 continue:
5. Continue to operate the primary system and secondary system, if possible.
6. Secure the tunnel and cooling tower sump pumps.
7. Efforts should be made to contain the leakage in the room 114 pipe trench, the labyrinth sump and waste tanks (i.e., secure labyrinth sump pump when I waste tanks are full).

NOTE: THE PIPE TRENCH AND LABYRINTH SUMP VOLUME IS APPR0XIMATELY 14,000 GALLONS.

8. If leak cannot be secured, and a core void is suspected, open the emergen-cy pool fill valve under the floor plate at the pool edge to full open.

I This will commence filling the facility to the ground level (covering the core).

9. Perform a facility evacuation.
10. Perform recovery actions as per section (D).

Orig. 7/3/85 App'd NW REP-15-2 I

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I C. LEAK THROUGH BEAMPORT

1. Isolate containment of all but FE0 members.
2. Continue to operate the primary and secondary systems.
3. Secure the tunnel and cooling tower sump pumps.
4. Efforts should be made to contain the leakage in the room 114 pipe trench, the labyrinth sump and waste tanks (i.e., secure labyrinth sump pump when waste tanks are full).

NOTE: THE PIPE TRENCH AND LABYRINTH SUMP VOLUME IS APPROXIMATELY 14,000 GALLONS.

5. Observing proper radiation protection, begin dismantling the experiment at the suspected beamport so attempts to stop the leak can be performed.
6. Perform recovery actions of section (D).

D. RECOVERY FROM SIGNIFICANT POOL LEAK

1. Repair cause of leak.

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2. Install necessary piping to interconnect waste system and pool system.
3. Return pool water to pool af ter filtering as much as possible, as per g SMP-11, APPENDIX II.

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REP-15-3 Orig. 7/3/85 App'd (k $

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REP-16 VALVES 507A AND 507B FAIL TO CLOSE l

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E these valves fail to close, the Reactor Operator shall:

5 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

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1. Place the master control switch (IS1) to TEST.
2. Place the 507A and/or 507B AUT0/ MANUAL switch to MANUAL.

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3. Place the OPEN/CLOSE switch to CLOSE.

1 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

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1. Notify the shift supervisor.

j 2. Determine cause of failure of the 507 valves and correct before continuing reactor operation.

5 NOTE: FAILURE OF THESE VALVES TO CLOSE PRESENTS A PROBLEM ONLY IN THE EVENT OF A PIPE RUPTURE OR OUT OF P0OL LEAK IN THE PRIMARY SYSTEM. CHECK VALVE 502 BACKS UP THE FAILURE OF 507B PREVENTING DRAINING OF THE CORE AND THE ANTISIPHON l

SYSTEM PREVENTS CORE DRAINING IN CASE OF 507A FAILURE.

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.I REP-16-1 Orig. 7/3/85 App'd k 5

I REP-17 PRESSURIZER VALVES FAIL TO OPERATE In the event of malfunction of any of the pressurizer valves, such that they cannot be closed from the control room, the Reactor Operator shall:

I IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Shut down the reactor.
2. Close the appropriate manual isolation valve in-line with the failed valve.

I SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Notify the shif t supervisor.
2. Determine cause of malfunction and correct the malfunction of the g pressurizer valve before continuing reactor operation. 5 I

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Orig. 7/3/85 App'd \d REP-17-1 I

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I REP-18 BOTH ANTISIPHON VALVES (543A AND 5438) FAIL TO OPEN I IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Open 543A or 543B manually with T-wrench.
2. If unsuccessful, close the air supply valve and. disconnect copper tubing on the valve side of 3-way solenoids for 543A or 5438,
3. If the valve has not opened, use the T-wrench to manually open the valve.
4. If all attempts fail to open either valve and a void core is suspected, carry out the Reactor Isolation Procedure (FEP-2).
5. Notify the shif t supervisor.

NOTE: EITHER VALVE (543A OR 543B) WILL PERFORM THE DESIRED FUNCTION.

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I orig. 7/3/85 App'd k REP-18-1 I

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I REP-19 FAILURE OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING VALVES (546 A/B)

A. BOTH VALVES FAIL TO OPEN FOLLOWING SCRAM FROM LOSS OF PRES 5URE OR FLOW I

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Place master control switch in TEST.
2. Place the valve 546 A/B AUT0/ MANUAL switch in MANUAL.
3. Place the valve 546 A/B OPEN/CLOSE switchs in OPEN. ,
4. Notify the shif t supervisor.

E the valve or valves have still not opened:

5. Open the valve manually with T-wrench.
6. If unsuccessful, close the air supply line to the valve at the bridge and disconnect copper tubing on the valve side of the 3-way solenoid.
7. If the valve has not opened, use the T-wrench to manually open the valve.
8. IF all attempts fail to open one of the valves, operate the Fimary and secondary cooling systems.

B. ONE OR BOTH VALVES FAIL OPEN DURING REACTOR OPERATION IF indication is received that one or both valves have opened and the reactor has not scrammed *; the Reactor Operator shall:

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Scram the reactor.
2. Notify the shif t supervisor.
  • NOTE: IF 546 A/B OPENS DURING OPERATION, A FLOW PATH FOR THE PRIMARY COOLANT BYPASSING THE CORE IS ESTABLISHED (ABOUT 30 - 33% OF ORIGINAL CORE gFLOW).

THIS REDUCED FLOW WILL NOT LEAD TO CORE DAMAGE S0 LONG AS NORMAL TEMPERA- B TURE, POWER AND PRESSURE ARE MAINTAINED. THIS REDUCED FLOW RATE, HOW-EVER, DECREASES OUR SAFETY MARGIN FROM THE SAFETY LIMIT CURVES BY ABOUT 60%, SO THE REACTOR IS TO BE SHUT DOWN UPON RECEIPT OF THIS ACCIDENT a (THE CORE AP SCRAM FROM DPS 929 SHOULD HAVE INITIATED AUTOMATICALLYgBY ONE OR BOTH 546 YALVES OPENING).

REP-19-1 Orig. 7/3/85 App'd 5

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REP-20 HIGH ACTIVITY LEVELS IN THE PRIMARY COOLING SYSTEM (FPM)

F Upon receiving indication of an abnormally high level of radioactivity l in the primary cooling system, the Reactor Operator shall:

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Scram the reactor.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

b 1. Notify the shif t supervisor and Manager of Reactor Health Physics.

2. Precautionary reduction of flow - secure one pump to decrease flow by one-half.

M NOTE: THIS ACTION ASSUMES WORST CASE CONDITION, A FUEL ELEMENT L FAILURE. THE REDUCED FLOW IS TO MINIMIZE PLATE EROSION.

E 3. Determine the source of radioactivity and magnitude of activity by:

5 WARNING: EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE OBSERVED WHEN ENTERING AREAS CONTAINING PRIMARY COOLANT. THESE AREAS SHOULD BE MONITORED BY HEALTH PHYSICS BEFORE ENTRY. ADEQUATE PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN BEFORE ENTERING THESE AREAS.

a. Checking fission product monitor,
b. Observing off gas recorder if primary system should automatically L vent.
c. Having primary water sample analyzed.
d. Conducting radiation surveys in areas containing primary coolant.

Orig. 7/3/85 App'd {hSfA REP-20-1 o

I

3. IF the source of activity is determined to be fission products, a 3 Turther reduction of primary flow to approximately 500gpm is necessary N to reduce plate erosion. To accomplish this:
a. Fully open the bypass valve (538A or 5388) around the pump that is running.
b. Throttle valves 540 A and B.
4. Clean up contaminated systems by:
a. Leaving the primary cooling and primary cleanup loops in operation to clean up the primary system.

WARNING: THE RADIATION LEVELS IN THE DEMINERALIZER ROOMS MAY BE EXTREMELY HIGH.

5. When equipment and personnel are ready to identify the leaking fuel element, the primary systems should be shut down as per 50P IV.2.

WARNING: 00 NOT ENTER ROOM 114 UNTIL ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. A HEALTH PHYSICS' SURVEY IS VITAL PRIOR TO ENTRY.

6. Identify the leaking or ruptured fuel element. The fuel element which g is leaking fission products must be accurately identified and placed 5 in safe storage before the remaining intact elements may be utilized.

This will be accomplished in the following manner:

a. Have the Health Physics personnel move the portable gaseous and particulate monitors to the reactor bridge for continuous monitoring. Health Physics personnel will be present.

Move each element from the core to the "X" or "Y" basket, b.

c. Draw a grap sample from above each element and give to the laboratory group for analysis. If one of these samples indicates fission products present, this element will be inspected first.
d. Move the fuel element from one of the baskets to the fuel inspection rig for visual inspection,
e. The Reactor Manager will determine the disposition of the leaking fuel element (s).

I I

Orig. 7/3/85 App'd IM M REP-20-2 I

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I I

REP-21 HIGH STACK MONITOR INDICATIONS In the event of High Stack Monitor readings (Gas, Particulate or Iodine in excess of alarm points):

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Notify the shift supervisor.
2. Contact the Health Prysics office during normal working hours.

Af ter hours, contact: HEALTH PHYSICS CALL LIST.

3. Evaluate the extent of iodine and particulate levels with overlay I, and g with overlay II. If the extent of radioactivity is great enough to enter event classifications, the highest category of event indicated I by gas, iodine or particulate reading will be used to classify the event.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. IODINE AND PARTICULATE (overlay I)

Check the stack monitor reading with overlay I. The ranges of values represented on the overlay are the threshold levels of concentrations cor-responding to specific emergency events in excess of Technical Specification I limits. .

The overlay thresholds assume the present release rate will be constant I for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. They are conservative, since the present release rate may exist for less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the emergency action levels are:

UNUSUAL EVENTS - 3800 MPC average over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ALERT EVENTS - 19000 MPC average over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> SITE AREA EMERGENCY - 95000 MPC average over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (i.e., for UNUSUAL EVENT + could have 91,200 MPC for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> = 3800 MPC x 24 hrs; therefore still have 3800 MPC average over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)

These overlays are to graphically assist the operator's judgement as to the extent of release.

I Orig. 7/3/85 App'd lt REP-21-1 I

I

I

2. GAS (overlay II) 3
a. IF gas concentration exceeds 6.5 x 10 CPM (3800 MPC) but less than T3 x 10" CPM (19,000 MPC), and remains between these levels for I hour with no evidence of declining, the event shall be classified as an UNUSUAL EVENT.
b. IF gas concentration exceeds 3.3 x 10 4CPM (19,000 MPC) but less than g T*6 x 105 CPM (95,000 MPC) and remains between these levels for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 3 with no evidence of declining, the event shall be classified as an ALERT.

IF gas concentration exceeds 1.6 x 10 5CPM (95,000 MPC) but less than I

l c.

l T~x 106 (FULL SCALE) and remains between these levels for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> with no evidence of declining, the event shall be classified as a SITE AREA E EMERGENCY. 5 i

i

d. IF gas concentration reaches full scale and remains there for 10 minutes Ethout decline and cannot be attributed to electronic failure, the event shall be classified as SITE AREA EMERGENCY.
e. IF gas concentration shows no signs of leveling off or declining,

' determine a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> average concentration each 30 minutes by using the formula:

i CPM = AVE 30 MIN READING (CPM) 24 HOUR AVE 48 Use this 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> average to determine the event classification.

I l NOTE: A GENERAL FORMULA FOR DETERMINING 24 HOUR AVERAGE CONCENTRATIONS E IS AS FOLLOWS. ANY APPROPRIATE TIME INTERVAL CAN BE USED BUT E MUST BE EXPRESSED IN MINUTES.

AVE INTERVAL READING INTERVAL TIME DURATION (MIN)

(in CPM) x 60 (MIN /HR)

CPM "

24 HOUR AVE 24 HOUR 5 or simplified CPM 24 HOUR AVERAGE "

AVE INTERVAL READING (CPM) x INTERVAL TIME DURATION (MIN) 1440 I

REP-21-2 Orig. 7/3/85 App'd R I

I I

M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M WW EVALUATION OF IODINE / PARTICULATE CONCENTRATION TIME DURATION OF RISE (MINUTES) l COUNTS / MINUTE INDICATED 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 4

UNUSUAL EVENT 2.5x10 4 5x104 7.5x10 4 1x105 1.25x10 5 1.5x105 1.75x105 2x105 2.25x105 2.5x105 2.75x105 3x105 (3800 MPC)

LBJ ALERT 1.25x105 2.5x10 5 3.75x10 5 5x105 6.25x10 5 7.5x10 5 8.75x10 5 1x106 (19000 MPC) (Full Scale)

SITE AREA 6.25x105 1.25x10 6 EMERGENCY (> Full (95000 HPC) Scale) for example: [A] A rise of 5 x 10" CPM in 10 minutes would correspond to 3800 MPC.

[B] A rise of 2.5 x 10 CPM 5 in 10 minutes would correspond to 19000 MPC.

NOTE: KEEP IN MIND THAT THESE THRESHOLD LEVELS OF CONCENTRATION WOULD HAVE TO EXIST CONTINUOUSLY FOR 24 HOURS TO BE CONSIDERED A 24 HOUR AVERAGED CONCENTRATION.

Orig. 7/3/85 App'd N n

b L

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REP-22 BOMB OR OTHER OVERT THREATS Upon any direct threat or actions by any person or group of persons which 3 may endanger personnel safety or the safe operation of the reactor, the DUTY E OPERATOR shall:

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Immediately shutdown the reactor and secure the master control switch.
2. Notify the shift supervisor.

Insure all doors are secured, with priority to the truck entry door 3 3.

and personnel airlock door.

g

4. Notify the University police by telephone.
5. Facility evacuation or partial evacuation may be used to remove persons from affected areas.

I NOTE: FACILITY STAFF SHOULD NOT ENTER ANY E

DIRECT CONFLICT EXCEPT WHEN NECESSARY FOR THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY. g I

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I REP-22-1 Orig. 7/3/85 App'd I

I

REVISION NUMBER 20 ,

TO OCTOBER 1981 MANUAL Page Number Date Revised Page Number Date Revised g

SOP /I-9 7/30/85 TABLE OF CONTENTS REP-0-1 7/30/85 S0P/I-14 7/30/85 INTRODUCTION REP-0-2 7/30/85 SOP /II-9 7/30/85 S0P/A-la 7/30/85 S0P/III-6 7/30/85 SOP /A-lb 7/30/85 S0P/IV-2 7/30/85 S0P/A-5b 7/30/85 S0P/IV-8 7/30/85 SOP /A-8a 7/30/85 SOP /IV-10 7/30/85 SOP /A-8b 7/30/85 S0P/VI-1 7/30/85 S0P/VI-3 7/30/85 S0P/VI-4 7/30/85 S0P/VI-5 7/30/85 SOP /VI-Sa 7/30/85 SOP /VI-5b 7/30/85 S0P/VI-7 7/30/85 SOP /VII-2 7/30/85 S0P/VII-2a 7/30/85 SOP /VII-2b 7/30/85 SOP /VII-4 7/30/85 SOP /VIII-11a 7/30/85 11-3

will normally be used to establish the 10 MW power level, however, the nominal steady state power level shall not exceed 10 MW. The reactor shall not be operated at a power level which causes the steady state secondary calorimetric to L exceed 10.5 MW unless it is confirmed that the secondary calorimetric is in error or out of commission.

( The primary system DI flow bypasses the core and yet it flows through the primary flow orifice. Therefore, the primary flow as read on the recorder should be decreased by the primary

[

DI flow before the value is used in calculating the power level.

The recorder values should be logged on the log sheets without L correction.

g I. Steady state reactor powers of 1 MW and greater will be deter-L mined by .the method stated above. The power indicated by 3 Channels 4, 5, or 6 shall be maintained greater than 100% during 3 steady state full power operation. Channels 4, 5, and 6 are 3 adjusted by proper positioning of the drawer amplifier feedback potentiometers. Af ter adjustment of a potentiometer, the change

( in indicated power shall be logged in the console log and the new pot setting logged on the Startup Nuclear Data Sheet. The

{ Shif t Supervisor's approval must be obtained before adjustment of any Power Range Monitor. Adjustments shall only be made af ter a determination of the power level by heat balance.

J. Minimum ' nuclear instrumentation for normal operation shall be two (2) intermediate range channels with period trip, two (2) power range channels each with high flux trips and one (1) wide range channel with high flux trip.

K. During reactor operation the control room shall be occupied only by persons authorized by the Reactor Manager or Shif t Supervisor. .

Rev. 7/30/85 App'd Qld SOP /I-9

{

s

I I.4.5 Shutdown

A. Shutdown operations will be accomplished under conditions designed to assure safety of the reactor and personnel.

B. Shutdown of the reactor will be in accordance with approved ]

procedures. ] g C. Conditions causing automatic shutdown of the reactor will be 5 l

investigated as to cause, and corrective action taken prior to restarting the reactor.

(

D. Unscheduled shutdown sheets will be filled out for all unplanned rod run-ins and scrams that occurred while at power or after all drive full in lights have cleared when pulling ]

rods to take the reactor critical. ]

E. Entry into controlled access high radiation areas following reactor shutdown shall be preceded by a radiation survey.

F. The Shift Supervisor shall have a shutdown checksheet ]

perfomed if the control room will be unattended for an ]

extended period of time. ]

l G. An entry in the console log book that the reactor has been I secured after an operating or testing period shall be made by )

the reactor operator assigned to the console.

I'i l I.4.6 Experiments A. The Reactor Manager will have operating authority over all l

experiments performed within the reactor containment or which may affect reactor operations.

l

( B. All experimental programs will be evaluated by the reactor operating organization and by the Reactor Manager, j C. Experimenters are required to inform the reactor centrol room l

of any activity which may affect reactor operation.

D. All experimenters will be required to complete an indoctrin-l ation training course on the relationship between his experiment and reactor operations, emergency procedures, and radiation safety.

l

' I Rev. 1 0/91 App'd b'- SOP /I-10 I

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I I.4.9 Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Materials In accordance with 10 CFR 73, special requirements must be met in safeguarding Special Nuclear Material. The safeguards provided and the procedures applicable to maintaining the security of I Special Nuclear Materials are contained in the facility Security Plan and Security Procedures.

I.4.10 Equipment Tag Out Procedure I.4.10.1 Purpose The purpose 'of tagging equipment is to prevent damage to equipment or personnel or to provide supplemental information concerning a special operating proqedure.

I.4.10.2 Tagging Equipment -

Three tags will be used. See Appendix A for a sketch of the A.

danger tags. The tag color designates its purpose as follows:

Red - Danger to personnel Yellow - Danger to equipment White - Supplemental information concerning an operating procedure I B. The Shift Supervisor's approval must be obtained before s equipment is tagged. 3 C. All tags and the tag log' must be filled out and tags attached to equipment by a licensed operator. The tag log must contain a description of the equipment tagged, reason for tagging, date, and initials of operator initiating the tag.

I I.4.10.3 Removing Tags ',

A. The Shift Supervisor's approval must be obtained before any tags are removed.

B. When the tags are removed, the date of removal and the initials of the individual clearing the tags shall be entered on the tag log.

Rev. 10/81 App'd .L,.- _ 50P/I-13

Table 881 Normal Reactor Operating Ranges I

Normal Operating Range Units Parameters I

1. Thermal Power, 5 MW Operation 5 5% MW
2. Thermal Power,10 MW Operation 10 + 0% MW 3 5% ]
3. Primary Coalant Flow, 5 MW Operation 1850 t 50 gpm ]

Primary Coolant Flow,10 MW Operation 3700 t 50 gpm ]

4. Reactor Outlet Coolant Temperature 136 *F I
5. Rea: tor Inlet Coolant Temperature 120 *F
6. Pressurizer Pressure 67 + 3 psig
7. Pressurizer Level CENTERLINE + 4 to -8 inches
8. Pool Coolant Flow, 5 MW Operation 600 100 gpm Pool Ccolant Flow,10 MW Operation 1200 1 100 gpm
9. Pool Outlet Temperature (Hot Leg) 105 *F
10. Pool Level 29.' - 7" t 3" feet-i nches

' 11. Resistivity, Outlet of DI-300 >500K ohms-cm

12. S-1 Temperature Demand Set 120 *F
13. S-2 Temperature Demand Set 100 *F I

I I

I I

Rev. 7/30/85 App'd \M SOP /I-14 I

g

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Containment integrity is required anytime irradiated fuel is F.

being handled.

G. Health Physics coverage shall be necessary when the pool is below normal operating level, inspecting irradiated fuel, I shipping irradi&ted fuel and handling suspected ruptured irradiated fuel.

H. One Senior Reactor Operator and one Reactor Operator must be present to handle fuel. Only a Senior Reactor Operator, a Reactor Operator, a Reactor Operator trainee, or Auxiliary ]

Operator under the direct supervision of a Senior Reactor ]

Operator may handle fuel. The Auxiliary Operator wi d assist ]

in fuel handling only to the extent of passing the fuel element ]

across the weir divider, and may not handle fuel in or out of ]

I the core, or in or out of a storage location. The Senior ]

Operator is in charge of the fuel handling evolution and is responsible for the proper conduct of the evolution.

I. The fuel element fuel plates on the convex and concave ends are very fragile. When moving an element, it is important to approach an obstacle with the side plate facing the obstacle to prevent accidental damage to the fuel plate.

j. Two fuel nandling tools are provided. One is a short manually operated tool to be used with the pool at refuel level. The I other is a long air operated tool used with the pool at normal operating level.

I K. Latching and unlatching the manually operated fuel handling tool: When latching the fuel element, the red indicator will come up when the tool has engaged properly. A locking key is then inserted in a groove which prevents the unlatching handle from moving. However,_0D_0, NOT lift this handle when moving the element. To unlatch the element, remove the locking key and hold down on the top of the tool with one hand and lift the unlatching handle with the other. This prevents the tool from accidentally lif ting the element off its seat when loading I into the reactor.

L. Latching and unlatching the air operated fuel handling tool:

When latching a fuel element, you will have to get a feel (with practice) for when the tool is in its proper place on the element. Slowly release the air operator handle. The Rev. 7/30/85 App'd (M SOP /II-9

I tool should move downward slightly as the tool pulls down into 3 the element. Verify the element is latched by observing 3 that the red indicator on the horizontal cylinder is fully 3 retracted. When unlatching the element, push down on the 3 tool while slowly pushing down the air operator handle to the 3 locked released position. When in the reactor, never lift the 3 tool off the element. Always allow the tool to float up off 3 the element. It will not float up if the element is attached 3 but can easily be worked off the element by pushing down and ]

turning until it floats off. Failing to release the element ] l in this manner may result in accidentally lifting and leaving ]

the element a few inches off of its seated position without 3 realizing it. 3 II.2.2 Procedure for Handling Fuel In or Out of the Core 3' A. Obtain a fuel handling sequence from the Reactor Physicist. ] g B. Inspect the fuel handling tool. 3 C. Place the bridge ARMS to upscale position. ]

D. Insure the pool is at the normal operating level or pump the ]

pool to refuel level as necessary. 3 E. Remove the pressure vessel head. ]

F. Turn on the Source Range Monitor Scaler and Chart Recorder. ]

Drive in the fission chamber to =1000 counts. 3 G. Attach a fuel element to the handling tool. 3 H. The operator handling the fuel element tool shall verify that ]

the element is fully latched and verbally report this to the 3 supervising Senior Reactor Operator. ] l Note: A positive latch is achieved only when the red plunger ]

on the air-handling tool is fully retracted and flush with the 3 cylinder. Any protrusion of the plunger means the fuel element]

is not latched. ]

I. Remove and visually identify the fuel element and place it in ]

the position specified on the loading sheet. 3 J. Verify the element is seated in its new position. If in the ]

reactor, utilize board and reference mark. ]

I App'd I . . -. 50P/II-10 Rev. 10/81 I

1 annunciation occurs. Also verify the correct response of the console power meter and recorder at this signal level.

X. Set trip adjust potentiometer (Rl) to obtain an indication I on the front panel meter equal to 119% 1%, the desired setting from High Power Scram. Verify that scram light (D516B) is energized, and that Channel 4-5-6 High Power Scram annunciation occurs. Also verify the correct response of the console power meter and recorder at this signal level.

L. Return meter reading to less than 115%.

M. Set function switch to operate.

l N. Clear rod run-in and scram trips by rotating " reset" switch g to left and right.

O. Reset the annunciator.

P. WRM-4 is now ready for operation.

III.5 Check of Power Range Monitor Channel 5 and 6 I A. Select Test / Feedback Module corresponding with the mode of operation intended (the modules are marked and color coded with the colors used on the Mode Indicating Lights) and place the correct module in the drawer.

I B. Place the Power Selector Switch 158 in the applicable position for the operation intended.

C. Record the actual setting of the drawer amplifier feedback ]

potentiometer on the Startup Nuclear Data Sheet. 3

0. Set the notentiometer to the calibration value determined by the Electronics Technician and marked on the potentiometer.

E. Set function switch to " operate". Verify that " drawer l

inoperative" lamp is extinguished.

F. Verify that power level trip indicators are extinguished.

G. Set function switch to " standby". Verify that power level trip indicators are extinguished, that " drawer inoperative" light (DS16A) is energized, and that a nuclear instrument anomaly annunciation occurs.

I I

Rev. 10LQ1Apo'd r'- . 50P/III-5 l

I H. Set function switch to "zero". Verify that both percent power meters (on the console and instrument cubicle) and i the recorder indicate O t 2%. Verify that a downscale light is received on the drawer and that a downscale alarm is received on the annunciator.

l

I. Set function switch to 110%. Verify that the console percent power meter and the recorder indicate 110% t 2% and the drawer meter indicates 110% t 5%.

( J. Set function switch to 75%. Verify that the console percent

! power meter and the recorder indicate 75% 2 2% and the drawer i meter indicates 75% i 5%.

K. Set function switch to 10%. Verify that the console percent power meter and the recorder indicate 10% 2% and that the drawer meter indicates 10% 2 5%.

L. Place function switch in " cal" position. Rotate reset switch to lef t or right to clear rod run-in and scram trips. g Reset annunciator board. Using the potentiometer provided W on the front of the drawer, apply an input current equivalent to the desired trip point for rod run-in (114% t 1%). Veri fy that rod run-in light (0517A) is energized and that Channels 4-5-6 High Power Rod Run-In annunciation occurs.

M. Apply an input current equivalent to the desired trip point for scram (119% 21%). Verify th'lt scram light (DS168) is ]

energized and that Channels 4-5-6 high power scram annuncia-tion occurs.

N. Return test signal to minimum setting. Set selector switch to operate. g

0. Rotate reset switch to reset position and release. Verify 3 that all trip indicators are extinguished. Reset the annunciator.

l P. Set the potentiometer to the setting corresponding to the last value determined by heat balance. This should be the setting determined in Step A.

Q. This PRM is now ready for operation.

I Rev. 7/30/85 App'd %% 50P/III-6 I

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Section IV PRIMARY COOLING SYSTEM IV.1 Startup of Reactor Cooling Loop L IV. l .1 Procedure I A'. Prior to placing the primary system on the line:

1. Verify that no primary system maintenance has been performed since the last shutdown of the primary system.

If maintenance has been perfonned on the system, insure that all valves disturbed are in their normal positions.

7 The Shift Supervisor will detennine if a valve lineup ]

y checksheet needs ts be completed. ]

Note: For Mode II or III operation, close the inlet valve (5108 or 510F) of the heat exchanger not being used and tag out the pump breaker which will not be used.

2. Verify the proper lineup of the following systems in I accordance with their respective SOP sections:

a., Nitrogen and Air System - Section VII.9 and 10 ]

l

b. Demineralizer System - Section VII.4 3 g c. Primary / Pool Orain Collection System - Section VII.6 ] ,

j 3. Verify or perform the following:

a. P501A/B shaft cooling water supply valves are open.
b. There aro at least 2000 gallons of water in T300.
c. Power is available to P501A/8, P533 and PS13A.
d. Primary system flow recorder and temperature recorders l are energized and the primary demineralizer flow recorder is energized. Time and date the recorders.
e. Place heat exchanger bypass switch 2541 in the position required for the heat exchanger combination to be used.

I l Rev. 10/81 App'd b- SOP /IV-1

I B. Verify antisiphon vent valve closed.

C. Verify antisiphon system manual drain valve closed. ]

0. Set the antisiphon system air regulator to 35 psig and open the air inlet valve.

E. Place master switch 1S1 to test.

F. Open valves 527E and F.

G. Place valve 545 switch to auto / closed.

H. Place valve 527A switch to auto / closed.

I. Place valve 5278 switch to auto / closed.

J. Place pump P-533 switch to auto, P-533 may or may not start, 3 depending upon demand.

. X. Af ter P-533 has completed charging, place valve 526 switch to auto / closed.

L. Place valve 507A/B switch to manual /open. Valves 543A/B will g automatically close at this time. E M. . Immediately place valve 527C switch to open. The primary system is now pressurized.

N. Cycle valves 546A/B switches to manual / closed.

O. Immediately start pump 501A or B. Verify proper flow.

P. Cycle valves 546A and B open and then closed one at a time and verify the increase and then decrease in primary system flow as each valve is cycled.

Q. Start the remaining, pump 501A or B.

Verify proper primary system flows.

R. Start pump 513A and verify proper flow.

Open the antisiphon system drain valve and blow the system 3 S.

dry. Close the valve, wait 10 seconds and repeat. This may have to be done three or four times to insure that all the water is drained.

T. Close the antisiphon system drain valve.

U. Insure that the antisiphon system pressure is between 35-40 psig; then close the air inlet valve.

I Rev. 7/30/85 App'd $ SOP /IV-2 I

~

[ OP5928A (9288) by closing valves 595C and 595D (595E 2.

and 595F).

{ HX503A (5038) by closing valves 5108 and 540A (510F and 3.

5408).

IV.5.2 Draining of Primary Heat Exchanger 503A (5038)

A. Connect with flexible hose drain valve 515A (515Y) to the Primary / Pool Drain Collection System Tank funnel in pipe tunnel or suction of Orain Collection Pump.

B. Open vent valve 518AA (518AI) and drain valve 515A (515Y) and allow the loop to slowly drain or be pumped down. If drain collection pump is used, start it at this time.

C. Insure that the drain rate is controlled such that Primary /

Pool Drain Collection System does not overflow the pool . As

( the pool level rises to the yellow band, lower it in 3 accordance with Section V.4.2. 3 D. Shut drain valve 515A (515Y) after system has been drained

{ and shut or tag vent valve 518AA (518AI) if necessary to 1 eave it open. l

{ 1. Insure drain collection pump is secured prior to shutting 515A (515Y).

IV.5.3 Filling of Primary Heat Exchanger 503A (5038)

A. Connect the pool T11 drain line at valve 518Q to the primary TH drain line at valve 5185 with a flexible hose.

B. Open vent valve 518AA (518AI) and check closed drain valve 515A (515Y). Run transparent tubing from vent valve 518AA (518AI) to the drain collection funnel .

C. Place the N2 and valve operating systens in operation as per

( Section VI.9.3.

D. Place the master switch 151 in " test".

( E. Open valve 509.

Open drain valves 518Q and 5185.

F.

Crack open V5108 (510F) and allow the heat exchanger to fill

( G.

slowly.

[ Rev. 10/81 App'd .Im . ._ SOP /IV-7 p '/,

s

I H. When a steady stream of water effuses from the vent line, close the vent valve 518AA (518AI) and valve 5108 (510F).

Caution: If the heat exchanger is to be lef t in the isolated and filled condition, crack open (and yellow tag) the vent valve 518AA (518AI) to prevent pressure buildup in the solid g loop. W I. Close drain valves 5180 and 518S.

J. Close valve 509 and return 151 to off.

K. Secure the N2 and valve operating systems if no longer needed.

IV.5.4 Restoration of Normal Operation of Primary Heat Exchanger I

503A (5038)

A. Remove all drain or fill connections.

B. Check shut the following valves:

1. Drain valve 515A (515Y).
2. Vent valve 518AA (518AI).

C. Open the following valves:

1. HX503A (5038) 510A-540A (510F-5408)
2. OPS 928A (9288) 595C-5950 (595E-595F)
3. FT912A (912E) 568A (5688)

D. Vent heat exchanger 503A (5038) by opening vent valve 518AA (518AI) untti no air bubbles ar,e seen escaping.

E. Startup primary loop following procedure IV.1.

IV.6 Isolation Oraining, Filling, Normal Operation of Primary Pump Loops The following procedure is written with two sets of valve and I

component numbers depending on the pump being isolated.

IV.6.1 Isolation of Primary Pump Loop 501A (5018)

A. Shut and tag the fo11cwing valves:

1. PI 916A/B (916E/F) 518A-5188 (518AH-518AB) ]
2. Pump 501A (5018) 510A-510C (5100-510E)

Rev. 7/30/85 App'd  % SOP /IV-8 I

s .

L IV.6.2 Oraining of Primary Pump Loop 501A (5018) r L A. Connect pump casing drain valve to Primary / Pool Orain Collection System Tank funnel in pipe tunnel or suction of r

L Drain Collection Pump.

8. Disconnect gauge lines to discharge gauge.

~

L C. Open discharge gauge valve 518A (518AH) and pump casing drain valve and allow the loop to slowly drain or be pumped down.

[ D.

1. If drain collection pump is used, start it at this time.

Insure that drain rate is utilized such that Primary / Pool Drain Collection System can' maintain level in system storage

{ tank.

E. Shut pump casing drain valve after system has been drained

[

" s and shut or tag discharge gauge valve if necessary to leave them open.

1. Insure Orain Collection Pump is secured prior to shutting g pump casing drain valve.

L IV.6.3 Filling of Primary Pump Loop 501 A (5018)

A. Connect the pool TH drain line at valve 518Q to the primary

~ TH drain line at valve 5185 with a flexible hose.

L 8. Run transparent tubing from the discharge gauge valve 518A (518AH) to the drain collection tank. funnel . Open valve 518A (518AH).

C. Start up the N2 and valve op system in accordance with

[ Section VI.9.3.

D. Place the master switch 151 in " test".

E. Open valve 509.

[

F. Open drain valves 518Q and 5185.

j G. Crack open the pump suction valve 510A (5100) and allow the loop and pump to fill slowly.

H. When a steady stream of water effuses from the gauge valve line, close the gauge valve 518A (518AH).

I. Open the discharge valve 510C (510E) and vent valve 518P.

Continue to fill the loop until a steady stream of water effuses from the vent valve, then close vent valve 518P.

Rev.10/81 App'd.[.<- SOP /IV-9

(

J. If the loop is to remain isolated, close valves 510C (510E) and 510A (5100).

K. Close drain valves 518Q and 518S and remove the flexible hose.

L. Close valve 509 and return 151 to off.

M. Secure the N2 and valve op system if no longer needed.

E N. Remove the transparent tubing fron discharge gauge valve 3 518A (518AH) and connect the gauge line to the valve. Open ]

518A (518AH). ]

IV.6.4 Restoration of Normal Operation of Primary Pump Loop 501A (5018)

A. Remove all drain or fill connections.

B. Check shut the primary pump casing drain valve.

C. Check open suction and discharge gauge valve.

D. Open the following valves:

1. PI 916A/B (916E/F) 518A-5188 (518AH-518AB)
2. Pump 501A (5018) ,

, 510A-510C (5100-510E)

E. Startup primary loop following procedure IV.1. ]

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L Section VI SECONDARY COOLING SYSTEM r VI.1 Startup of the Secondary System L

A. Before attempting to start up the secondary system, it should ]

[ be determined that:

1. Water level in the cooling tower basin is between 5 and 10 inches.

{ 2. All personnel are clear of cooling tower equipment and fans.

3. 011 level in the gear reducers to the fans is' normal.
4. The automatic sump makeup water isolation valve electrical ]

power switch is closed. ]

B. The following manually operated valves in the cooling tower should be in positions indicated:

Open Closed S-17 S-9 S-113 S-129. .

[

5-18 S-10 5-105 S-128 S-19 S-11 S-106 S-101 l S-20 S-12 S-107 S-126 I S-21 S-22 S-118 S-119 S-108 S-109 S-121 S-123 S-155 S-120 S-110 S-125

{ S-5 S-117 S-111 S-127 S-6 S-114 S-112 S-7 S-115 S-102 l

S-8 S-116 S-163 C. The following valves in equipment room 114 passageway and waste tank room should be in the positions indicated:

Rev. 7/30/85 App'd {A)Pfl\ SOP /VI-1 I

l Open Closed S-152 S-151 S-103 5-169 S-153 S-150 S-160 S-170 S-104 S-159 D. The following valves in equipment room 114 should be in the positions indicated:

Ooen closed l S-161 5-26 S-132 S-144 S-162 S-131 S-41 S-43 S-133 S-27 S-145 S-154 l

S-130 S-34 S-28 S-134 g S-23 S-35 S-29 S-135 S-24 S-45 S-137 S-136 S-25 S-140 S-138 S-39 S-141 ,5-139 g

~

5-30 S-142 S-157 5 S-31 5-143 5-158 E. For operation of the chiller units with feed water from SP-1, I

SP-2, SP-3 or SP-4, the following valves in room 278 should g be in the positions indicated as follows:

Open Closed S-53 5-55 S-51 S-148 S-54 S-56 5-52 S-147 S-146 S-149 l

S-57 S-58 F. Turn on Bailey Mater recorder Model E101 in the reactor control room to monitor secondary flow and temperature during operation.

E a

l Time and date chart. Secondary outlet temperature for each heat exchanger can be monitored in the control room with the l

digital readout and selector switch.

G. Verify that the circuit breakers for SP-1, SP-2, SP-3 and SP-4 on MCC-2 in the cooling tower are closed and that the control l switch on the panels is in auto mode.

I Rev. 10/81 App'd. - 50P/VI-2

[ H. Start two secondary pumps for 10 MW operation, or one pump for 5 MW operation.

Caution: Two pumps cannot be started at the same time because the

{ basin level will be drawn down faster than the makeup r water can be supplied, which will result in the actuation of a low sump level trip. Af ter one pump is started, it

~ is necessary to wait at least 10 minutes before starting L the second pump.

Verify that the correct flow occurs and that the pumps operate normal- ]

[ ly. Verify that the automatic sump makeup water isolation valve has ]

opened. The valve is designed to operate automatically with its ]

control function being: P1, P2 or P3 operating - the valve is open. ]

{ When all the P pumps are secured, with the exception of P4, the valve ]

is closed. The secondary system is now fully operational.

Note: The pumps should be operated alternately with neither carrying a major share of total on-line time. For single pump operation, use SP-3 whenever passible. The check valve on SP-3 is rated for higher flows than those on SP-1 or SP-2.

( I. Place the Calgon water treatment units in automatic control locally.

J. Pumps SP-1, SP-2, SP-3 and SP-4 may be operated locally during main-

[ K.

tenance by means of controls provided at each of the pump stations.

Periodically check and adjust valves S-17, S-18, S-19, S-20, S-21 and S-22 located atop the cooling tower to assure equal flow through each.

VI.2 Procedure for Operation of Bypass Control Valves S-1 and S-2 -

The controllers for operating the control valves S-1 and S-2 are located on the instrument cubicle in the control room as an integral part of the primary and pool water temperature recorders respectively. Provisions are made for both manual and automatic control operation modes:

A. Manual Operation

1. Energize process system and controller.
2. Adjust the valve position with the manual control button on front panel until pool and reactor coolant temperatures stabilize at the desired values.

I Rev. 7/30/85 App'd LAhTA SOP /VI-3

B. Manual to Automatic Transfer l

Control can be transferred from manual to automatic operation at any time.

1. Turn control transfer switch on front panel to auto position.

C. Automatic to Manual Transfer

1. Turn control transfer switch on front panel to bal position.
2. Adjust manual control on front panel until deviation meter on front panel indicates no deviation. With no deviation present, red lneter pointer is aligned with red index line of setpoint tape indicator.
3. Turn control transfer switch on front of panel to man post-tion. The system temperature is now controlled by manual control.

NOTE: Caution must be used in going from the automatic mode g to the manual mode in that if the indicated valve E deviation is not brought into balance with the valve' adjustment button on the controller prior to turning to the manual mode, and if there is a large difference between the manual position demand and the position of the valve in the stabilizer auto mode, a significant positive or negative reactivity change could occur.

This would be due to the valve leaving its position in the auto made and traveling as rapidly as possible to the position d'emanded by the manual setpoint when the manual mode is selected.

The bal mode permits the manual control position demand to be equated to the stable position of the valve while being operated in the auto mode before the manual mode is selected.

VI.3 Cooling Tower Operations ]

VI.3.1 Operation of The Cooling Tower Fans ]

The cooling tower fans required for operation is a function of both the reactor power level and/or climatic conditions. Control over the use of these fans rests with the Shif t Supervisor who will Rev. 7/30/85 App'd kl M SOP /VI-4 I

I maintain process ccolant tempsratures within standard operational limits as specified in the MURR Technical Specifications and I Section I of the Standard Operating Procedures.

Prior to starting the fans, the oil level in each fan shall be I checked and marked off on the startup checksheet. This is to be checked prior to lighting off the fans or ten minutes after the fans have been secured. After an idle period during the winter months, the blades shall be checked to make certain ice accumula-tion on the surface of the blades will not cause an imbalance while the fans are in operation. Such an imbalance could result in damage to the fan units. A vibration switch installed near the gear reducer will stop the fan if excess vibration occurs, but this switch shall not be relied upon to prevent damage from ice accumu-I 1ation.

VI.3.2 Deicing The Cooling Tower ]

CAUTION: PLASTIC FILL MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO ICE UP. ]

During very cold months, the external wooden louvers may become ]

mostly covered with ice. The following procedure should be used:

A. Notify the Shif t Supervisor of the need to deice.

B. Maintain communication either with radios or the intercom box at the cooling tower.

I C. Have the control room operator secure the cooling tower fan for the tower bay in which deicing is desired. All three cooling tower bays may be deiced at the same time but it must be remembered that some cooling capacity is lost when deicing.

D. Allow enough time for the fan motor to coast to a stop and then place the fan motor main breaker forward / reverse switch to reverse.

E. Notify the control room to start the fan. It will now be run-ning in reverse to force heat aut through the ice covered slats.

I F. Periodically check to see if ice is clear; about every 30 minu tes. When clear, use the above procedure to place the fan in fomard rotation. ,

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VI.3.3 Winter Operations (Temperatures Expected Below Freezing) ]

I Due to the potential for ice to significantly damage the ] s plastic fill, every precaution nust be exercised to prevent ice ] g butidup on the wooden louvers and in the plastic fill. ] E When the cooling tower is to be lef t unattended for more ]

than one day (or on a long maintenance day), perform the follow- )

ing steps to prevent ice buildup in the plastic fill: ]

1. Open or verify open the basin steam supply valve. ]
2. Verify the steam solenoid valve operable. ]
3. Seure CT makeu'p automatic valve. ]
4. Prop open CT basin float valve to drain water between auto- ]

matic valve and float valve. ]

5. Verify the CT makeup line heat tape is attached and operable, ]
6. Secure both air conditioning units and tag. ]
7. Secure P-4 and tag. 3 I

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I VI.4 Shutdown of the Secondary System Upon completion of shutdown of the reactor, reactor primary and pool loop cooling systems, the secondary cooling loop can be shutdown as follows:

A. Shutdown secondary pump or pumps. If more than one secondary pump is operating, they should be secured simultaneously to minimize check valve slam. This is done from the control room l instrument panel.

B. Verify that system flow reccrdei indicates no flow and that g the chiller pump SP-4, has automatically started to provide coolant flow to the chiller units. During winter months when the air conditioning units will not be in service, SP-4 will be placed out of comission and verification of its operation g during thcse months will not be necessary. E C. Turn off cooling tower fans.

VI.5 Oraining and Filling the Secondary System I

The following procedure will be used in draining and filling the secondary (shell) side of heat exchangers HX-503A and B and HX-521A and B.

VI.S.1 To Orain HX-503A (5038) .

A. With the reactor shutdown, shutdown the primary and pool cooling systems per 50P IV and V.

B. Shutdown the secondary system per paragraph VI.4.

C. After radiation surveys have been made in equipment room 114, enter room 114 and perfonn the following:

1. Close valves S-23, S-27 S-31 and S-39 (S-24) (5-41) to isolate HX-503A (5038).
2. C3nnect a drain line to S-136 (S-117) and run it to the nearest clean water drain.
3. Open S-136 (S-137) to drain the heat exchanger.
4. Open S-141 (S-142) to vent the heat exchanger.

Rev. 10/81 App'd $0: -

50P/'/I-6

D. This op;raticn t;ill allow water to drain from th] shell sid) of HX-50?A (5038).

VI.S.2 To Drain HX-521A (5218)

A. With the reactor shutdown, shut down the reactor primary and pool cooling systems per SOP IV and V.

B. Shut down the secondary system per paragraph VI.4. ]

C. Af ter radiation surveys have been made in equipment room 114, I enter room 114 and perform the following:

1. Close valves S-26, S-43, S-35, and S-28 (S-25) (5-45).
2. Connect a drain line to S-139 (S-140) and run it to the nearest clean water drain.
3. Open S-139 (S-140) to drain the heat exchanger.

l

4. Open S-143 (S-144) to vent the heat exchanger. ,

D. This operation will allow water to drain from th'e shell side of HX-521A (521B).

VI.S.3 To Fill HX-503A (5038)

If system integrity has been broken, check that it has been I A.

properly restored.

B. Close drain valve S-136 (S-137).

C. Slowly ,open valve S-23 (S-24) while venting through S-141 (S-142).

D. When an air-free flow of water is indicated at S-141 (S-142),

close S-141 (S-142).

E. Open S-27, S-31 and S-39 (5-41) .

F. " Jog" SP-1, SP-2 or SP-3 and insure a good air-free flow from all other secondary system vent valves, 5-145, S-154, 5-149, S-146 and S-144 Then close all vent valves and S-27.

G. Run SP-1, SP-2 or SP-3 and check system for leaks and for proper operation.

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VI.S.4 I

To Fill HX-521A (5218)

A. If system integrity has been broken, check that it has been I

properly restored.

B. Close drain valve S-139 (S-140).

C. Slowly open valve S-26 (S-25) while venting through S-143 g (S-144). u D. When an air-free flow of water is indicated at S-143 (S-144),

closes-143(S-144).

E. Open 5-28. S-35 and S-43 (S-45). -

F. " Jog" SP-1. SP-2 or SP-3 and insure a good air-free flow from all other secondary system vent valves, S-145, 5-154, S-149, S-146 and S-144. Then close all vent valves and S-28.

G. Run SP-1. SP-2 or SP-3 and check system for leaks and for croper operation, g VI.6 Secondary Water Treatment Procedures VI.6.1 Secondary Water Systerr. Responsibility I

The responsibility of the secondary water treatment is within the operations group of the reactor, with one individual given prime responsibility and a co-worker to learn and be closely associated ]

with the total operation. The secondary water treatment system ]

is designed to minimize corrosion, deposition, microbiological growth, and other major chemical problems which are present in the secondary cooling water system.

VI.6.2 Secondary Water Conductivity Control To control conductivity (total dissolved solids), water is sampled and monitored by the conductivity unit located in the tunnel of room 114. If the conductivity is greater than the system setpoint, l

an automatic blowdown is initiated. The fresh water makeup, which replaces the water lost through the blowdown, lowers the conduc- ]

l tivity. See Section II.4 for specifications. ] g i

Rev. 10/81 App'd,!9,- 50P/V! 8 1

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I Section VII ]

AUXILIARY SYSTEMS g

VII.1 Reactor Power Calculator I ,

The automatic power calculator uses an input signal from the primary and pool AT sumers and calculates a power heat balance using analog type computer circuitry. The power level is read out continuously on a digital meter which gives the reactor power in megawatts. The flow signals used to calculate the power are input manually through a. potentiometer built into the I system for both pool and primary flows.

l VII.1.1 Setting the Potentiometers The flow potentiometers are set at the fraction of total recorder I flow that is being used. The primary flow recorder has a full scale reading of 2000 gpm for each loop, thus the total rece Jer flow available is 4000.

To determine the pot setting, add the indicated flow in loops A and B and subtract the cleanup flow from this total.

This number is the total core flow. Divide the total core flow l by 4000. The resulting fraction should be set into the pot.

The pool flow recorder has a full scale reading of 800 gpm for each loop and the pool cleanup flow is extracted before the pool water flows through the heat exchangers. To determine the pot setting for pool flow, add the indicated flow of I loops A and B and divide by 1600. The resulting fraction should be set into the pot.

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Rev. 10/81 App'd- - ' - SOP /VII-1

VII.1.2 Ch cking Op;rability of Calculator The accuracy of the power calculator shall be checked daily af ter the first set of process data is taken provided steady state temperature conditions have been reached. This check is made by hand calculating the reactor power using the process instrumentation. The results of this calculation shall be recorded in the comments section of the process data log.

VII.2 Ventilation Exhaust System (EF-13/EF-14) ]

The ventilation exhaust system is required to be operable whenever cond ]

tainment integrity is required (Tech. Spec. 4.2.b). Exhaust fans EF-13 3 and EF-14 provide the driving force for the exhaust system. The normal ]

exhaust fan lineup consists of either EF-13 or EF-14 running, with the ]

remaining fan in standby. The running fan / standby fan are shifted ]

between EF-13 and EF-14 on at least a biweekly frequency. ]

VII.2.1 Fan Failure Alarm Abnormal conditions associated with the exhaust fans are annunciated

]I

]

by the Fan Failure Alarm System according to the following diagram. ]

FAN CONDITIONS GREEN YELLOW BUZZER ]

LIGHT FLASHER ]

One Fan Running and the x 3 other in "AUT0". ]

One fan running and the X 3 X

other in "0FF" of "HANO". ]

One fan running and no X X 3 voltage to other fan. ]

No fans running with x x ]

control power available. ]

One fan running, other in ]

standby, but no flow X X ]

(broken belt, etc.) . ]

Both fans running due to ]

loss of control power. ]

Botn fans running out X X 3E control power available. ]u 3

Of f gas high activity. X X Rey, 7/30/85 App'd b TN. 50P/VII-2

- =_.

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L U VII.3 Emergency Power System VII.3.1 Testing of the Emergency Power System

{

At least once a week the emergency generator will be started

[ automatically and permitted to run for at least 30 minutes.

This event will be noted in the console log. An amber light mounted on a side panel in the control room will energize

[ whenever the emergency generator is running. In addition to F this, the emergency generator will be operated for a period of L about 30 minutes prior to each startup after a shutdown exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. At least once a month commercial power to the auto transfer switch will be interrupted at unit substation B in order to allow the emergency generator to start and immediately assume full load conditions (CP-17). 3

[ A load test (CP-17) shall be performed af ter any work on the emer- 3 gency generator except for routine maintenance that has been proven 3 to not cause a problem (such as engine oil and filter changes, 3

{ governor oil checks, new fan belts and gas tank sediment draining ]

checks). ]

VII.3.2 Prior to Starting A. Check engine oil level.

B. Check that fuel pump controls are in a4to and on.

VII.3.3 To Start Engine Locally F

L A. Place the Remote-Stop-Run switch to run position.

B. When the engine comes up to speed (1800 rpm), check water L flow to drain from engine cooling system.

C. Check fuel settling bowl full of gasoline.

Rev. 7/30/85 App'd[ SOP /VII-2a ]

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D. Check oil pressure gauge reading properly.

E. Check ameter reading a low positive charge rate.

F. Check that engine temperature does not become excessive

(>212').- If engine temperature does become excessive under a no load condition, this means that the cooling system is not functioning and the engine should be stopped inanediately until cooling water can be issued to the engine.

VII.3.4 To Stop Engine Run engine for 30 minutes and then return Remote-Stop-Run switch to the remote position. Engine will then return to l its normal (standby) status.

VII.4 Reactor Demineralizer System VII.4.1 Normal Operation There are four beds of mixed resin loaded for normal operation of the reactor. Two beds are nonna11y in service, one on the I pool system and one on the primary system. The third mixed bed is stored in the remaining DI column in a standby condition ]

(see VII.4.6). The fourth bed shall be stored in the resin ]

storage tank after being taken off service. The nonnal cycle for a resin bed will be from the DI column to the storage tank; from the storage tank to the regenerator; after a regeneration, l froin the regenerator to a DI column.

Note: The resin stored in the storage tank shall be held before regeneration a sufficient time for the shorter half life I isotopes to decay.

Note: The respective valves on each DI column are all numbered the same. The subsequent instructions will apply to any of the DI columns.

I Note: Standard procedure shall be to transfer to the DCT the i

tritium water from each resin bed when it comes off service as I

per Section VII.4.3.9. The unit will be refilled with DI ]

\ water and logged as such.

Rev. 10/81 App'd,b..- 50P/VII-3

V!7.4.1.1 Placing the Reactor Cleanup System in Service I

Service through the OI column on reactor watar is through F201, through the OI column downflow and out the 01 column, then through F203 or F202 to the detonized reactor water effluent.

To place the system in service from a complete shutdown condition, carry out the following steps:

A. Insure all valves on the DI column are closed.

B. Check the resin-filter log book and the status board to determine the exact status of all beds.

C. Ooen valves F4 and F6 on filter F201.

D. Open valves 012 and DIS on the desired DI column to service ]

the reactor.

E. Open valves F9 and F10 on outlet' filter F203 (or valves F7 and F8 on outlet filter F202).

F. Remotely open valves 527E and 527F from the control room.

Vent the DI column and the filters if they had been drained since the last system shutdown.

G. Turn on DI flow recorder; time and date same.

H. Start pump P513A.

I. Adjust for proper flow by throttling F201 outlet valve F4 and P513A bypass valve V515W. Insure that the pump discharge pressure does not exceed 110 psig.

Note: The bypass valve F5 shall remain closed except to check the condition of the filters.

VII 4.1.2 Placing the Pool Cleanup System in Service Service through O! column to deionized pool water is through F200, then downflow through 01 column, out of O! column, through F204 or F205 and discharges approximately 3 feet below normal pool surface. gl To place the pool cleanup system in service from a fully 5j shutdown condition, carry out the following: l A. Insure all valves on the DI column are closed. f I

Rev. 7/30/85 App'd kD1h 50P/VII-4 i

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F. 1. Natural uranium;

2. Special nuclear materials as defined in Title 10, Part 70, Paragraph 70.4m of the Federal Code of Regulations (i.e., plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched in isotope 233 or 235);
3. Pure elements: Li, Na, K. Rb, Cs, Ca, Sr, Ba, Hg, Os, H, 0, F, Ne, Ar Kr. Xe, and P;
4. Compounds: NH 4 NO 3 , CaC 2 , Ca0, perchlorates, perman-I 5.

ganates, Na20 , and Na20 2; Materials which chemically react with water to produce undesirable quantities of heat and pressure;

6. Any explosive, flammable, combustible, or toxic materials.

E. Capsules may be run shielded with cadmium or boron (as

- boron, BC, or BN) but weight and time are restricted due to the heat generated and their reactivity effect on the reactor. The experimenter sh'all take measures to insure the heat generated can be dissipated without causing damage to the rabbit or sample. The following limitations apply to shielded capsules it, addition to the activity

. limits of Section VIII.3.2.A:

1. The authorized p-tube user will inform the control room he is going to run shielded capsules and will insert the rabbit so that the cap is on top when the rabbit is in the reactor.

/

2. Cadmium shielded capsules:
a. 5 or less grams of cadmium may be run for up to 30 minutes.
b. 50 or less grams of cadmium may be run for up to 10 seconds in row 1 or 20 seconds in row 2.
3. Boron shielded capsules:

NOTE: The weight limit is only on the boron, i.e.,

the carbon weight in BC does not count towards ]

the weight limit.

I Rev. 7/30/85 App'd W@h\ ,

SOP /VIII-11a

a. 10 or less grams of baron may be run for up to
10 seconds in row 1 or 20 seconds in row 2.

Between 10 to 15 grams of boron may be run up to b.

10 seconds in row 1 or 20 seconds in row 2, but must be approved by Director of NAP and Reactor l

Manager prior to running.

F. Except for the baron or cadmium shielded samples, the con- ]

trolling factor for determining the weight and time limits of a sample to be irradiated in the p-tube is the activity limitation of Section A. If the activity limits do not further restrict a sample's size, the following weight limits shall apply: g

1. For irradiation times up to 30 minutes, the maximum E weight of irradiated materials in one rabbit will be 2 grams with two exceptions:
a. A maximum of 10 grams of water or dried feces;
b. Only 1 mg of chemical compounds in solution.
2. For irradiation times of 30 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, the maximum weight of irradiated materials in one rabbit will be 1 gram with two exceptions:
a. A maximum of 10 grams of water or dried feces;
b. Only 500 pg of chemical compounds in solution.

The weight limits above d'o not include the weight of the rabbit, polyethylene vial, or packing, or the cadmium (or other metal) shields.

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REACTOR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES TABLE OF CONTENTS S;ction No. Page No.

REP-0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-0-1 ]

REP-1 FAILURE TO SCRAM OR ROD RUN-IN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-1-1 REP-2 REACTOR SCRAM FROM CAUSES OTHER THAN LOSS OF FLOW OR PRESSURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-2-1 REP-3 REACTOR SCRAM FROM LOSS OF PRIMARY SYSTEM PRESSURE OR FLOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-3-1 REP-4 H I GH R AD I ATI O N . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RE P-4-1 REP-5 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT FAILURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-5-1 ,

REP-6 FAILURE OF THE AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (ARMS) . . . . REP-6-1 LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN REACTOR CONTROL ROOM IREP-7 AND EXPERIMENTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-7-1 REP-8 CONTROL ROD DRIVE FAILURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-8-1 REP-9 ELECTRICAL ANOMALIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-9-1 i

REP-10 FAILURE OF EXPERIMENTAL APPARATUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-10-1 REP-11 LOW FIRE MAIN PRESSURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-11-1 REP-12 LOSS OF SERVICE WATER TO FACILITY

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-12-1 REP-13 LOSS OF SECONDARY FLOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-13-1 REP-14 LOSS OF P0OL FLOW DURING REACTOR OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . REP-14-1 REP-15 LOSS OF POOL WATER LEVEL DURING REACTOR OPERATION . . . . . . REP-15-1 REP-16 YALVES 507A AND 507B FAIL TO CLOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-16-1 REP-17 PRESSURIZER VALVES FAIL TO OPERATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-17-1 REP-18 BOTH ANTISIPHON VALVES (543A AND 543B) FAIL TO OPEN . . . . . REP-18-1 REP-19 FAILURE OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING VALVES (546 A/B) . . . . . . REP-19-1 1

REP-20 HIGH ACTIVITY LEVELS IN THE PRIMARY COOLING SYSTEM (FPM) . . . REP-20-1 i

REP-21 HIGH STACK HONITOR INDICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-21-1 l REP-22 BOMB OR OTHER OVERT THREATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REP-22-1 Rev. 7/30/85 App'd M REP-0-1 ]

REACTOR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES INTRODUCTION It cannot be overly stressed that the guideline for any emergency procedure shall be actions which safeguard personnel and equipment, in that order.

If, while operating the University of Missouri Research Reactor, a situation develops that requires an emergency action as set forth in these procedures, it must be remembered that for a transient type accident, Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.36, dictates certain actions as pertaining to safety limits and limiting safety system settings. In the case of a transient type accident, the Shift Supervisor must determine before resuming operation if a safety limit, as illustrated by the safety limit curves set forth in the MURR Technical Specifications has been exceeded. If, in fact, a limit has been exceeded, the reactor shall remain shutdown until the Commission authorizes resumption of operation. Limiting safety settings are those settings which will initiate automatic action to prevent exceeding a safety limit. If a safety system setting is exceeded without receiving an automatic function trip, the reactor shall be shut down and the Commission notified. The cause of the failure will be noted and corrective action taken before operations resume.

The following actions shall be taken by reactor operating personnel for the conditions listed.

I Rev. 7/30/85 App'd b REP-0-2 ]

REACTOR STARTUP CHECKSHEET DATE:

FULL POWER OPERATION (or Low Power Forced Circulation) TIME (Started):

BUILDING AND MECHANICAL EOUIPMENT CHECKLIST

~~ -

1. Run emergency generator for 30 minutes and check the governor oil level.

(Required if shutdown for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or af ter each maintenance day.)

I 2. a.

b.

Check operation of fan failure buzzer and warning light. Shift fans.

(Required if shutdown longer than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.)

Test stack monitor per SDP while in west tower.

I 3.

c. Test the stack monitor low flow alarm.

Visual check of room 114 equipment completed.

a. P501A and P5018 coolant water valves open.
b. Si and S2 hydraulic pumps on (oil level normal).

I c.

d.

e.

Pump controllers unlocked to start (as required).

Insure N2 backup system on per SOP.

Open air valve for valve operating header (V0P 31).

I f.

g.

h.

N2 backup valve open.

Check valves 599A and 599B open.

Pipe trench free of water (af ter maintenance day, check the four-pipe annulus drain valves for water leakage).

1. Add DI water to beamport and pool overflow loop-seals.

J. Vent the 6000 gallon pool hold up tank.

4 Visual check of CT and secondary equinment completed. ]

Oil level in CT fans normal (after maintenance day).

I 5.

a.

b. Secondary makeup isolation valve power switch closed.

Beamport Floor

]

a. Beamport radiation shielding (as required).

I b. Unused beamports checked flooded (after maintenance day).

c. Seal trench low level alarm tested (af ter maintenance day).

Emergency air compressor (load test for 30 minutes after maintenance day).

6.

7. Reactor Pool
a. Reflector experimental loadings verified and secured for start-up,
b. Flux trap experimental loading verified and secured for start-up, or strainer in place.

I c. Check power on and reset, as necessary, silicon integrator, totalizer setting, silicon rotator and alarm system.

REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM CHECKLIST

1. All chart drives on; charts timed and dated. IRM recorder to slow.
2. Fan failure warning system cleared.

Annunciator board energized; horn off.

l 3.

I g 4. Television receiver on.

3 5. Primary / pool drain collection system in service per 50P.

6. Secondary system on line per S0P (as needed).
7. Primary system on line per SOP.

j a. Primary cleanup system on line.

I 8. Pool system on line per 50P.

a. Pool cleanup system on line.

l g b. Pool skimmer system vented.

l E c. Pool reflector AP trips set per 50P.

9. Valves Si and 52 cycled in manual mode and positioned as required.
10. Nuclear Instrumentation check completed per 50P.

i

a. The following trip values were obtained during the check:

I. IRM-2, run-in seconds (11+1) Scram seconds (9+1) ]

IRM-3, run-in seconds (1171) Scram seconds (971) ]

WR!t-4, run-in  % (114+1)

~~

Scram  % (119+1) ~ ]

l I PRil-5, run-in PRM-6, run-in

% (11471)

% (11471)

Scram Scram

(11971)

% (11971)

Channel 4, 5, and o pots returned to last heat balance position.

~

]

]

11.

12. SRM-1 detector response checked and set to indicate > 1 cps.

Rev. 7/30/85 App'd IAM\ SOP /A-la

REACTOR STARTUP CHECKSHEET, FULL POWER OPERATTON (Cont'd)

13. Check of process radiation monitors (front panel checks).
a. Fission product monitor,
b. Secondary coolant monitor.

NOTE: Items 14 through 35 are to be completed in sequence immediately prior to pulling rods for a reactor startup.

14. Annunciator tested. l g
15. Annunciator alarm cleared or noted.
16. Power selector switch 158 in position required.
17. a. Bypass switches 2540 and 2S41 in position required.
b. All keys removed from bypass switches.
18. Master switch 151 in "on" position.
19. Magnet current switch on, check " Reactor On" lights. g
20. Reactor isolation, facility evacuation and ARMS checks (af ter maintenance day).

These items are to be checked with scrams and rod run-ins reset, and when 3 appropriate items are actuated, verify that the TAA's do trip,

a. Reactor isolation switch (leave valves and doors closed) (af ter maint. day).
b. Facility evacuation switch (check outer containment horns) (af ter maint. day).
c. ARMS trip setpoints checked and tripped, check buzzer operational locally for all channels and remotely for channels 1 through 4 and 9.

Channel 1 - Beam Room South Wall l Channel 2 - Beam Room West Wall E

Channel 3 - Beam Room North Wall Channel 4 - Fuel Storage Vault Channel 6 - Cooling Equipment Room 114 Channel 7 - Building Exhaust Air Plenum (after maintenance day).

Channel 8 - Reactor Bridge (switch in " Normal") (af ter maintenance day).

Channel 9 - Reactor Bridge backup (switch in " upscale") (af ter maint day). l volts. (520 + 10 VOC) m

d. Check HV readings: ]
e. Check 150V reading: volts. (150 TOC +20)

( - 5) d

f. Selector switch on ARMS in position 5. g
g. Trip backup monitor with attached source (af ter maintenance day).
h. Reactor isolation horns switch in " Isolation Horns On" position. Valves and l

doors open.

l 1. All ARMS trips set per 50P.

I j. Check ventilation fans, containment and backup doors.

21. Operat? reg blade from full-out to full-in and set at 10" + .05".
a. Check rod run-in function at 10% withdrawn and annunciator at rod bottomed.
22. Raise blade A to 2* and manually scram.
23. Raise blade B to 2" and trip manual rod run-in.
24. Raise blade C to 2" and scram by WRM trip.
25. Raise blade O to 2" and scram by IRM trip.
26. Annunciator board energized; horn on.
27. Jumper and tag log cleared or updated.
28. IRM recorder in fast speed.
29. Check magnet current for 90 ma on each magnet.
30. Cycle WRM range switch.
31. Predicted critical blade position ( inches).
32. Pre-startup process data taken.

l Visually check room 114 and 0.I. area af ter all systems are in operation.

33.

a. Check oil reservoir for pump P501A, P501B, and PS33 for adequate supply. 3 Add if necessary. E 34 Routine patrol completed.
35. Reactor ready for startup.

Time (Completed) 5enior Reactor Operator App'd ll A SOP /A-lb Rev. 7/30/85 I

1 E Date:

NUCLEAR DATA Rod Position Nuclear Instrumentation Power by Heat '

Time Average Channel Channel Channel Channel Channel Channel Balance in MW RR CR 1 2 3 4 5 6 Primary / secondary l

l I

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I

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lI i

I Rev. 5/ i4 App'c ly W (Retypea only 7/30/85)

SOP /A-Sa I

Date Mode PROCESS DATA Time In Pool Ht. Exch.

Pressurizer Level g Pool Refl. IP i PS 944A PS 944B DPS 928A DPS 9288 '

DPS 929 I-Sec. Th (6) .

Sec. Tc (5)

Sec. AT I u i Sec. Water Flow _ ^

Pool Ic Loop A (3) .

Pool Tc Loop B (4)

Sec. Th Pool A (7) ,

Sec. Th Pri. A (8)

Rx Cond In N- '

Rx Cond Out l Pool Cond In ,

l Pool Cond Out  !;

Stack Gas i Stack Part. I Stack Iodine li"l l l

l Operator I

,i Reader I  !

Heat Balance By 3 Manual Calculation: l l

Rev. 7/30/85 App'd 119m 50 pia b l

l

PPROCESS DATA ,

Mode Date l

Time I Pri. Flow A '

l Prf. Flow B l Pool Flow A Pool Flow B Demin Flow A Demin Flow B Pri. Tc Pri. Th Pri. AT Pool T e Pool Th s Pool AT -

I South Wall ARMS West Wall ARMS North Wall ARMS lgE Fuel Storage ARMS Room 114 ARMS Bldg. Air Exh ARMS Rx. Bridge ARMS Fission Product __

Sec Water TAA Yellow TAA Rod Run-In TAA Green Rx Pressure Rx Tc Loop A Rx Tc LOOP 8 lI I

App'c WM. 50P/A-5c I Rev. 4/79 (Retyped only 7/30/55)

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NOTE: THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK l

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Rev. 6/80 App' d 4 v_. 50P/A-Sd

REACTOR ROUTINE PATROL Date:

' I

1. Time of start of patrol.

r ' 2. Time and date all charts.

L

3. Check ARMS trip settings.

[ 4 Visual check of entire pool.

5. Anti-siphon tank pressure. 36 psig 2 3 psi r

L 6. North iso door seal press. 18-28 psig

7. South iso door seal press. 18-28 psig
8. 5th level backup doors. Open l
9. 5th level detector reading. 0-3.5 mr/hr

{

10. 5th level trip point set. 3.5 mr/hr H
11. 16" iso viv A air pressure. 45-55 psig
12. Emerg compress on standby. c g g % open,
13. Containment hot sump pumps. Operable 14 Door 101 seal pressure. 18-28 psig l 15. BP Floor Cor.ditions normal .
16. Fuel Vault Locked
17. Inner airlock door seal press. 18-28 psig
18. Outer airlock door seal press. 18-28 psig
19. T-300 level. > 2000 gal.

~

20. T-301 level. < 6000 gal.
21. Labyrinth Sump Level < Alarm Pt.

3

22. RO Unit ON I Power RD Unit Temp / Pressure 28-28"C/190-200 psig/ ]
23. standby ]

Thermostat > 50'F ]

I 24. EG Rm. (Ba tt. check Wed mids.)

(EG OP switch to Auto J (Gas j sight glass )

Temp > 40*F T-300, 301 Room T he rmo s ta t > 55',F l l l I 25.

Thermostat > 40 F 1 l l l  ! 1 l

26. Rm. 114 Particulate filter AP < 2.5" H 2O On tne first routine patrol of tne day or the first patrol af ter a startup, crain all water from the anti-siphon system. If draining causes the pressure to drop significantly, return to the middle of the band (36 psig) and record the pressure here. If a condition or reading is normal, enter a "/" (for conditions) or the reading in the applicable box. If the con-I dition is abnormal, enter the condition or reading '.nd circle it. Explain all abnormal con-ditions or readings in the remarks.

REMARKS:

Rev. 7/30/63 App a %rm 50P/A-ea

T All locded except east l27. External Ocors

  • when sec on duty.

l

28. CT basin water level. 5-10"

! 29. Automatic Secondary Makeup Valve Open , 7

30. Acid day tank level. Visible
31. CT sump pumps. Operable
32. P-pump (s) running. l
33. Pump strainer AP. 0-7.0 psi 34 Discharge pressure.
35. Pump strainer AP. 0-7.0 psi
36. Discharge pressure.
37. Tunnel sump pumps. Operable
38. WT booster fan. Running cc/ min
39. Acid control and pH. QCj,jo0- ,
40. Blowdown control /cond. g ,5 g g / min
41. Fission Product Monitor Flow 95-105 cc/ min
42. Vlv control header pressure.90-120 psig
43. Pressurizer N2 supply press.90-100 psig I
44. Check Rm. 114 from door.
45. Deltech oil filter " red level" < 75% dark red and blowdown.
46. Seal trench. gn hump on days. =
47. Full N bottles. Total > 3 2
48. Bank A bottle press. > 250 psig
49. Bank B bottle press. > 250 psig
50. Bank on service. A or B
51. N header pressure. 135-145 p.si 2
52. Waste tank #3 level.
53. Waste tank #2 level.

54 Waste tank #1 level. g

55. Doors to Gt, xT's, Demin. Locked P l

Rm. 114 and CT Tunnel.

I 56. Time of Completion of Patrol.

57. Operatar Initials 1

[E REMARK 5:

SOP /A-8bE Rev. 7/30/d3 App'c p

I

- REVISION NUMBER.21 TO OCTOBER 1981 MANUAL l -

Page Number Date Revised SOP /VII-2 3/12/86 SOP /VIII-28 3/12/86 SOP /VIII-29 3/12/86 SOP /VIII-30 3/12/86 SOP /VIII-31 3/12/86 S0P/VIII-32 3/12/86 S0P/VIII-33 3/12/86 S0P/VIII-34 3/12/86 l

SOP /VIII-35 3/12/86 S0P/VIII-36 3/12/86 I

I I

I I

I I

I II 4 I -

[

L L

Section VII ]

I AUXILIARY SYSTEMS F

L VII.1 Reactor Power Calculator E The automatic power calculator uses an input signal from the L

primary and pool AT sumers and calculates a power heat balance p using analog type computer circuitry. The power level is read out continuously on a digital meter which gives the reactor power in megawatts. The flow signals used to calculate the power are input manually through a potentiometer built into the system for both pool and primary flows.

VII.l.1 Setting the Potentiometers The flow potentiometers are set at the fraction of total recorder flow that is being used. The primary flow recorder has a full scale reading of 2000 gpm for each loop, thus the total recorder flow available is 4000.

To detemine the pot setting, add the indicated flow in loops A and B and subtract the cleanup flow from this total .

This number is the total core flow. Divide the total core flow by 4000. The resulting fraction should be set into the pot.

The pool flow recorder has a full scale reading of 800 gpm for each loop and the pool cleanup flow is extracted before

[ the pool water flows through the heat exchangers. To detemine the pot setting for pool flow, add the indicated flow of

[ loops A and B and divide by 1600. The resulting fraction should be set into the pot.

[

[

Rev. IC/8I Aco'd 2 - -

SOP /VII-l

I VII.1.2 Checking Operability of Calculator The accuracy of the power calculator shall be checked daily after the first set of process data is taken provided steady state temperature conditions have been reached. This check is made by hand calculating the reactor power using the process instrumentation. The results of this calculation shall be recorded in the comments section of the process data log.

VII.2 Ventilation Exhaust System (EF-13/EF-14)

The ventilation exhaust system is required to be operable whenever containment integrity is required (Tech. Spec. 4.2.b). Exhaust fans EF-13 and EF-14 provide the driving force for the exhaust system. The normal exhaust fan lineup consists of EF-14 (the upper fan) running ]

with EF-13 in Standby. ]

V II .2.1 Fan Failure Alarm Abnormal conditions associated with the exhaust fans are annunciated by the Fan Failure Alarm System according to the following diagram.

' GREEN YELLOW BUZZER FAN CONDITIONS LIGHT FLASHER One fan running and the other in "AUT0". X One fan running and the other in ~0FF" x x of " HAND". E One fan running and no voltage to other X X E fan.

No f ans running with control power x x available.

One fan running, other in stanoby, but X X no flow (broken belt, etc.)

Both tans running due to loss of E control power. E Soth tans running but control power x x available.

Off gas high activity. X X 3/12/86 App'd lurm SOP /VII-2 Rev.

I

r 8. The vacuum pump shall be hooked up and started before ]

L the reactor is taken critical. The vacuum should be ]

applied slowly so that suction will not pull out the ]

filter parts. ]

9. A beamport radiation survey shall be completed after ]

the reactor is started up at 10 MW. ]

B. Adjustments to Beamport F Center Tube ]

[ The center tube shall only be adjusted with the reactor subcritical. Adjustments include changing the distance

]

]

the center tube is from the core and pulling or adding ]

{ parts from the center tube. ]

1. Take the reactor subcritical before adjusting the ]

center tube. s ]

2. If the center tube is moved, insure it is not closer ]

than 1/4 inch from being fully inserted. ]

3. After adjustments are made and vacuum restored, return ]

[ reactor to normal operations, and perform a Beamport F ]

radiation survey. ]

C. Removing Center Tube from Beamport F The center tubes may be very activated. Therefore, close ]

Health Physics assistance is required. Minimize the ]

number of personnel in Beamports D, E, and F areas while transferring the center tube.

[ 1. The center tube should be allowed to decay before moving from the beamport; preferably at least three days because of the sodium activity.

2. Place a plastic tube (s18 feet) over the center tube and tape the exposed end.
3. Af ter loosening the packing nut, pull the center tube back slowly; when it is within one to two feet of being fully withdrawn, attempt to gently close the ball valve (be careful not to score the valve or the center tube).
4. When the ball valve closes, stop withdrawing the center tube; close the surge tank line valve, then open tne vent and drain valves.

Rev. 10/81 App'd 3 SOP / Vill 27 1

5. Completely remove the center tube, pull the plastic tube over the end and tape.
6. Transfer the center tube to a beamport storage hole, log the change in the storage book, and survey around the storage hole.

g Cautions: E 9 e Insure center tube is not left fully inserted; allow at least'1/4 inch for thermal expansion.

  • After the center tube is inserted, verify the drain and vent valves are shut.

e To prevent a partially filled beam tube leaving a crack for radiation, be sure the vent tank has water in it.

  • To limit handling of a very radioactive filter tube, pull the tube back four feet and let it decay for > 2 days before withdrawing it. Have Health Physics coverage.

g e To limit tritium release, limit leakage of water. E e To prevent excessive personnel exposure, make sure filter parts are in tube and pushed forward to reactor end of filter tube. Apply vacuum slowly so that parts are not sucked up. Have Health Physics coverage on startup.

e Af ter startup, check Health Physics readings against previous readings with similar filters, e Make it a habit to stay out of beams, whether they are open or " closed".

, Note: The experimental can may be flooded or drained only when the reactor is shut down.

3 3

]

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Rev. 3/12/86 App'd kt%

I SOP /VIII-28 I

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VIII.4.5 Oraining, Evacuating and Flooding BP "B" Collimeter and Experimental Can The following procedures shall be used in filling, evacuating and draining the BP "B" collimeter and experimental can. All valve changes shall be made by reactor operations personnel.

A copy of this procedure shall be posted at the manifold.

A. Oraining the Experimental Can

1. Check all manifold valves closed.
2. Check vacuum valve BP-88 closed.
3. Check surge tank valves BP-B10 and BP-Bil open.
4. Open experiment can drain valve BP-B7.
5. Open experimental can outlet valve BP-B6 to drain as g much water from the lines as possible. The experi- E mental can water draining into the pipe trench may be extremely radioactive and consideration should be given to collecting and transferring it to the O.C.T.
6. Close experimental can drain and outlet valves, BP-87 .

and BP-86.

7. Close surge tank valves BP-B10 and BP-Bil.

B. Evacuating the Experimental Can

1. Check experiment can inlet, outlet and drain valves closed: BP-85, BP-86 and BP-87.
2. Check surge tank inlet valve BP-B10 closed.
3. Turn on vacuum pump located at mezzanine level.

Monitor the vacuum in manifold gauge.

4. Open vacuum valve marked BP-88.

Caution: If vacuum pump stops during reactor operation, 00 NOT restart the vacuum pump. An introduction of air into the experimental can cavity could result in a '

release of Ar-41 to the facility exhaust. The vacuum may be re-established 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> af ter the reactor is shutdown or when authorized by the Reactor Manager.

I Rev. 3/12/86 Aop'd i i,7m SOP /VIII-30 ]

I

I I C. Filling the Experimental Can

1. Close vacuum valve BP-B8.
2. Secure vacuum pump if not required for other services. '
3. Open experiment outlet valve BP-B6 to release vacuum.
4. Open surge tank inlet valve BP-B10 an.d vent valve BP-Bil.
5. Open experiment inlet valve BP-B5, adding water until water exits from experiment outlet line.
6. Close experiment outlet valve BP-B6, and continue to I fill surge tank to 1/2 full.
7. Close experiment inlet valve BP-BS.

D. Evacuating Converging Collimeter

1. Turn on vacuum pump.
2. Open isolation valve BP-89.

Caution: D_0 NOT evacuate the converging collimeter assembly unless the reactor has been shut down for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or when authorized by the Reactor Manager.

VIII.5 Handling and Release of Irradiated Samples VIII.5.1 General Responsibilities The Reactor Services Engineer shall coordinate the handling and shipping of all samples irradiated in the in-pool facilities.

He shall insure that the shipping container is in conformance with the applicable regulation and that all required shipping papers and documents are prepared in a timely manner.

The Services Engineer shall also coordinate the sample I handling with Health Physics personnel.

The Shift Supervisor shall have the responsibility of insuring that all irradiation records are complete. He will immediately notify the Services Engineer of any apparent discrepancies relating to the in-pool irradiations.

'I 9ev. 3/12/86 Acp'd j e 50P/VIII-31 ]

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L r

VIII.5.2 Sample Handling Procedures l \

Detailed procedures for the handling of various samples are I contained in the Health Physics Standard Operating Procedures.

I VIII.6 Response Procedures for the Nuclepore Irradiation Facility ]

l I The following procedures shall be used when responding to alarms ]

l for the Nuclepore Irradiation Facility. ]

f ]

VIII.6.1 Automatic system shutdown trip alarms require the following I action: ]

l A. Verify the film drive motor has stopped. ]

B. Verify the rabbit has retracted to the full out position. ]

l C. Time and date the film roll. ]

D. Notify the Nuclepore system technician. ]

l Those alarms are .as follows: 3

1. System failure alcrm ]
2. Large roll alarm ]

I

3. Take-up dancer alarm ]

l 4. Supply dancer alam ]

5. Gas system alann ]

l 6. Drive power alarm ]

I l VIII.6.2 Alarms having no automatic function require that you either ]

remedy the cause of the alarm or shut the system down. The ]

alarms are as follows: ]

A. High oxygen concentration alarm ]

1. Increase the helium flow. ]
2. If you are unable to immediately reduce 02 concentration, 3 shut down the system and withdraw the rabbit. Contact ]

the Nuclepore system technician. ]

Rev. 3/12 '96 App'd !Prim SOP /VIII-33 ]

I I

Helium supply alarm ]

B.

1. Place a new helium bank on supply.

]

2. If the alarm does not clear, shut down the system ]

and contact the Nuclepore system technician. ]

C. Alarm function failure alarm ]

1. Shut down the Nuclepore system and notify the Nuclepore ]

system technician. ]

]

0. PISH-S alarm
1. If the PISH-5 low alarm light is on at Cabinet B, shut ]

Awn the system and notify the Nuclepare system ]

E technician. ] W E. Small roll alarm

]

1. Note the time and prepare to shut down the system at the ]

prearranged interval specified by the Nuclepore system ]

technician. ]

F. Reactor of f-gas stack high activity

]

1. If the Nuclepare Irradiation Facility is suspected to be ]

the cause of the stack high activity alarm, secure the ]

system. Verify rabbit is fully retracted. ]

2. Notify Health Physics and Shif t Supervisor.

]

3. Contact the Nuclepare system technician. ]

NOTE: A comprehensive systems procedure and systems description ]

manual provided by the Nuclepore Company is located at the ]

system operating station for emergency reference. ]

I SOP /VIII-34 )

Rev. 3/12/86 App'd M A I

I'

. n h VIII.7 Thermal Column Door Operations VIII.7.1 Opening The Thermal Column Door NOTE: 00 NOT OPEN THERMAL COLUMN 000R WITH THE REACTOR CRITICAL

[ 1.

2.

Clear all obstructions from behind thermal column door.

Verify air off to Radiograph with Control Room.

3. Disconnect air supply line on thermal column door at the

{ snap fitting.

p 4. Verify Neutron Radiograph rotating aperture drive shaft

' pulled back and disconnected.

p 5. Preparation of Nuclepore Case:

L A. Decouple Nuclepore take-up shaft.

B. Remove alignment pins from shield box door.

C. Roll shield box cover as far back along track as possible. (NOTE: If thermal column door must be backed out further than this, attach shield box door lifting rig and move to south side of the platform using the building crane.)

f H D. Decouple Nuclepore drive shaft.

g E. Decouple Nuclepore rabbit drive. (NOTE: Remove rubber L grommet and store.)

F. Secure air to the Nuclepore equipment.

G. Disconnect PVC air lines to the drive roll.

6. Unstack shielding as necessary to allow free movement of the door.
7. Plug in thermal column door drive motors (2).
8. Back out thermal column door approximately six (6) inches.
9. Disconnect fcur (4) PVC lines connected to the top of the Nuclepore Irradiator Case.
10. With Health Physics coverage, open the thermal column door to the desired position.

Rev . 3_/l_2 /8_6, App'd g g,\ $0P/VIII-35 ]

b

I VIII.7.2 Shutting The Thermal Column Door

1. Shut the thermal column door far enough to allow the four (4) PVC lines to be reconnected to the Nuclepore Irradiator Case.
2. Reconnect the four (4) PVC lines.
3. Completely shut the thermal column door while monitoring to insure that the four (4) PVC lines do not become pinched off.
4. Verify the thermal column door open limit switch has cleared in the Control Room.
5. Verify Neutron Radiograph rotating aperture drive shaf t will mate properly. g NOTE: 00 NO ROTATE APERTURE E
6. Unplug the thermal column door drive motors.
7. Restack shielding on the top of the thermal column.
8. Connect the Radiograph air supply line to the regulator assembly.
9. Install the platform deck plates.
10. Nuclepore Experiment:

A. Recouple and lock Nuclepore drive roll.

B. Attach PVC air lines to the drive roll.

C. Install rubber grammet and attach rabbit drive mechanism.

D. Place shield box door back on rails and shut it. Pin door fully shut.

E. Recouple take-up spline coupling.

F. Open Nuclepore air supply valve and reset all tension control s.

G. Test run film.

H. Place the experiment in its desired operational mode in accordance with approved procedures.

11. Inform operators of the system status.

Rev. 3/12/86 App'd l@A SOP /VIII-36 ] ,

I-I i

E REVISION NUMBER 1 r Site Emergency Procedures Section (SEP)

L to EMERGENCY PROCEDURES Issued January 8,1985 L

Sec. No. Page No. Date Revised Sec. No. Page No. Date Revised SEP-1 1 6/24/85 SEP-10 1 (Orig.) 6/24/85 2 6/24/85 2 (Orig.) 6/24/85

[ 3 4

6/24/85 6/24/85 SEP-11 1 (Orig.) 6/24/85 (Orig.) 6/24/85 5 6/24/85 2 3 (Orig.) 6/24/85

[

t SEP-2 1 6/24/85 2 6/24/85 WORKSHEET E 1 (Orig.) 6/24/85

- 5 6/24/85 L 6/24/85 SEP-3 1 2 6/24/85 6 6/24/85

{

SEP-4 1 6/24/85 2 6/24/85 6 6/24/85 SEP-6 1 6/24/85 L

~

[

E

[

[

[ 11-5

L Page 8 of 5

{ ACTIVATION OF FACILITY EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION PROCEDURE I. FACILITY EMERGENCIES: ] '

1. The Facility Emergency Organization (FEO) s' 11 be activated as per the Fecility Emergency Procedures (FEP) for each FACILITY EMERGENCY ]

CLASSIFICATION:

a) Facility Evacuation

{ b) Reactor Isolation c) Fire d) Medical y e) Security [ SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION AS PER ]

L ,

10CFR50.34(c)] ]

s

2. In addition to the procedures for each FACILITY EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION, 3

{ an assessment of offsite consequences shall- be determined.

II. EMERGENCIES WITH POSSIBLE OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES:

c' L 1. The duty shif t supervisor or individual authorized to assume the Emergency Director position shall determine the need to activate the FE0 for emergencies with possible offsite consequences. This need will be based upon the action levels specified for the minimum classifica-tion, UNUSUAL EVENT. These action leve's are:

{ a. Report or observation of severe natural phenomenon.

b. Threats to or breaches' of security that have a significant potential ]

f for a radiological exposure of the staff or public approaching I rem ]

L whole body or 5 rem thyroid. ]

c. Concentration of airborne radioactivity at the stack monitor exceeding 3800 MPC when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
d. The projected concentration of airborne radiological effluents at ]

the distance corresponding to the nearest site boundary exceeding ]

10 MPC when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. ]

r e. Prolonged fire or explosion within the facility that can result in ]

L a release of radioactivity that would cause exposures of the public ]

or staf f apprcaching 1 rem whole body or 5 rem thyroid. ]

{ f. Other plant conditions exist that warrant assuring emergency person- ]

nel are available to respond to an emergency to prevent exposures of ]

1 rem whole body or 5 rem thyroid to the public or staff. ]

Rev. kti f App'dOk

[

m.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _

I SEP-1 (Cont'd) Page 2 of 5

2. The FE0 shall be activated by a paging system announcement, " ATTENTION, g THIS IS REACTOR CONTROL - ASSEMBLE THE FACILITY EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION." ] g Repeat page.
3. The FE0 shall assemble outside the control room except when the facility evacuation / reactor isolation horns sound, then the FE0 shall assemble in the facility front lobby.

4 The responsibility for EMERGENCY DIRECTOR shall be assumed.

Assumed by .

I

5. The EMERGENCY DIRECTOR shall assign an EMERGENCY C0ORDINATOR. ]

Assigned to .

6. IF the event occurs during non-normal working hours, assign a COMMUNICATOR to call persons on the EMERGENCY CALL LIST.

Assigned to .

7. Activate the Backup Emergency Command Centee (RPDB) by calling 882-7221 during regular working hours or af ter hours, contact the Watch Of fice to open the RPDB. This will be used as the exit point for all persons re-leased from site, so they can be monitored for contamination before release as per Procedure HP-20. A roster of all released persons will be maintained.

I I

Rev. tg [f App'd \

I I

I SEP-1 (Cont'd) Page 3 of 5

8. The EMERGENCY DIRECTOR shall: -
a. Evaluate the information provided by the individual activating the I FE0 to initially classify the emergency as per TABLE I, EMERGENCY CLASSES.

Time Basis Classification

b. Direct the actions detailed in the procedure for the appropriate emergency classification.

I UNUSUAL EVENT SEP-2 ALERT SEP-3 SITE AREA EMERGENCY SEP-4 I

I Rev. k fN ff App'd [ bht (

!I I

SEP-1 (Cont'd) Page 4 of 5 TABLE 1 ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSES Unusual Event

1. Report or observation of severe natural phenomenon.
2. Threats to or breaches of security that have a significant potential for a ]

radiological exposure of the staff or public approaching I rem whole body 3 or 5 rem thyroid. ]

3. Concentration of airborne radioactivity at the stack monitor exceeding 3800 MPC when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
4. The projected concentration of airborne radiological effluents at the ]

distance corresponding to the nearest site boundary exceeding 10 MPC when ]

averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. ]

5. Prolonged fire or explosion within the facility that can result in a ]

release 'of radioactivity that would cause exposures of the public or staff ]

approaching 1 rem whole body or 5 rem thyroid. ]

6. Other plant conditions exist that warrant assuring emergency personnel are 3 available to respond to an emergency to prevent exposures of I rem whole ]

body or 5 rem thyroid to the public or staff. ]

Alert

1. Concentration of airborne radioactivity at the stack monitor exceeding 19,000 MPC when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, l
2. The projected concentration of airborne radiological effluents at the ] g' distance corresponding to the nearest site boundary exceeding 50 MPC ] 3 when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. ]
3. Radiation levels at the distance corresponding to the nearest site ]

boundary of 20 mrem /hr for I hour whole body or 100 mrem thyroid dose. ]

4 Loss of physical control of the f acility. ]

5. Other plant conditions exist with a level of significance of a major ]

f ailure of f uel claddinc but primary and containment boundaries exist to ] gi reduce releases. ] E)

Ii I

l Rev.  % ,,,.e uw I

SEP-1 (Cont'd) Page 5 of 5

[ TABLE I (Cont'd)

ACTION LEVELS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSES F

L Site Area Emercency e 1. Concentration of airborne radioactivity at the stack monitor exceeding L 95,000 MPC when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

2. The projected concentration of airborne radiological effluents at the ]

I distance corresponding to the nearest site boundary exceeding 250 MPC ]

L when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. ]

3. Radiation levels at the distance corresponding to the nearest site 3 m boundary of 100 mrem /hr for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> whole body or 500 mrem thyroid dose. ]

- 4 Other plant conditions exist with a level of significance of major fuel ]

l damage and conditions that indicate actual or imminent failure of con- ]

tainment integrity and primary system integrity. '

] ,

L r

L

[

[

[

[

[

[

[ xev. @ wd Uh 1

- i

I Page 1 of 5 SEP-2 UNUSUAL EVENT PROCEDURE ACTIONS LEVELS:

E there is:

a. Report or observation of severe natural phenomenon,
b. Threats to or breaches of security that have a significant potential ]

for a radiological exposure of the staff or public approaching I rem )

whole body or 5 rem thyroid. (See REACTOR EMERGENCY PROCEDURE (REP-22) ]

c. Concentration of airborne radioactivity at the stack monitor exceed-ing 3800 MPC when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

NOTE: USE OVERLAY I TO DETERMINE EXTENT OF ACTIVITY FOR IODINE AND PARTICULATE. USE OVERLAY 11 TO DETERMINE E EXTENT OF GASEOUS ACTIVITY. g

d. The projected concentration of airborne radiological effluents at the ]

distance corresponding to the nearest site boundary exceeding 10 MPC ]

when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. ]

e. Prolonged fire or explosion within the facility that can result in a ] l release of radioactivity that would cause exposures of the public or ] 3 staf f approaching 1 rem whole body or 5 rem thyroid. ]
f. Other plant conditions exist that warrant assuring emergency personnel ]

are available to respond to an emergency to prevent exposures of 1 rem ]

whole body or 5 rem thyroid to the public or staff. ]

THEN at least an UNUSUAL EVENT condition exists.

IM"EDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Activate the Facility Emergency Organization (FE0), as per ACTIVATION OF F ACILITY EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION PROCEDURE if not already activated.
2. Operations shall provide information to the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR / EMERGENCY COORDINATOR.
3. If airborne activity is involved, continue with step 4 I not, go to step 7.

4 Time and date stack monitor charts for reference.

I nev. Ws' AWd h'YO

I SEP-2 (Cont'd) Page 2 of 5

5. Send operator to west tower with radiation monitor to:

NOTE: Communicate by intercom, since stack monitor is affected by portable radio RF.

a. Verify radiation background at stack monitor,
b. Verify control room readings.

I c. Mark initial needle positions on analog display with the time for future analysis if the control room display becomes inaccessible,

d. Verify flow rate through monitor is 7 + 1 SCFM.

~

If not, use Worksheet A to determli.e stack monitor values.

6. If nuclides which are being released are in doubt, pull stack filters and analyze.

I 7. The EMERGENCY COORDINATOR shall evaluate the need to evacuate specific portions of the facility.

]

8. The EMERGENCY COORDINATOR shall appoint and have a surveillance team check ]

any areas evacuated in step 7, clear of personnel within 30 minutes.

I NOTE: EMERGENCY DIRECTOR approval required for any voluntary radiation exposure in excess of 10CFR20 limits. (Up to 100 rem for life-saving, up to 25 rem to prevent exposure to members of general public in excess of 1 rem whole body and 5 rem thyroid.)

9. The EMERGENCY DIRECTOR shall determine the need for EMERGENCY SUPPORT ]

ORGANIZATIONS and, if rieeded, activate them or place them en standby.

See Table II, EMERGENCY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS, NOTE: If 9-911 is called during any emergency, I contact the Of fice of University Relations.

I ~. w w s, I

Page 5 of 5 I

SEP-2 (Cont'd)

d. LABORATORIES (1) Determine which laboratory is the source of release, by checking radiation levels in quadrant exhaust ducting.

(a) Southwest Quadrant (b) Northwest Quadrant (c) Northeast Quadrant ACTIONS TO CONSIDER (1) Throttle flow from laboratory quadrant to reduce release rate to less than Techni:a1 Specification's limits.

(2) Area Evacuations SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. Change stack filters when chart reading exceeds 3 x 105 cpm. Reevaluate chart reading to determine if release rate is increasing / decreasing. Record time of filter changeout.
2. Evaluate results of correction and subsequent actions to determine need to escalate /de-escalate the emergency classification.
3. Keep record of actions and evaluations and time they were done for docu-mentation. Use procedure worksheets.

4 Notify NRC, Region III, that an UNUSUAL EVENT has occurred within one hour ]

af ter event is classified or reclassified. (See Worksheet C)

5. Notify American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) [203-677-7305] that an UNUSUAL EVENT ]

has occurred.

6. Notify State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) [314-751-2748] that an ]

UNUSUAL EVENT has occurred. ]

REC 0VERY ACTIONS:

1. Evaluate potential radiological effects to onsite and offsite personnel before returning access to specific areas effected by UNUSUAL EVENT energency.
2. Procedures shall be written and approved for handling significant recovery evolutions.

NOTE: During recovery operations, personnel exposures to radiation should be raintained within 10CFR20 limits.

Rev. zql{f App'd (0MW I

I Page 1 of 6 t i

SEP-3 ALERT PROCEDURE ACTIONS LEVELS:

E there is:

a) Concentration of airborne radioactivity at the stack monitor exceeding 19,000 MPC when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

NOTE: USE OVERLAY I TO DETERMINE EXTENT OF ACTIVITY FOR I IODINE AND PARTICULATE.

EXTENT OF GASEOUS ACTIVITY.

USE OVERLAY II TO DETERMINE b) The projected concentration of airborne radiological effluents ]

I at the distance corresponding to the nearest site boundary exceeding 50 MPC when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

]

]

c) Radiation levels at the distance corresponding to the nearest ]

site boundary of 20 mrem /hr for I hour whole body or 100 mrem ]

thyroid dose. ]

d) Loss of physical control of the facility. ]

e) Other plant conditions exist with a level of significance of a ]

I major failure of fuel cladding but primary and containment boundaries exist to reduce releares.

]

]

THEN at least an ALERT condition exists.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Activate the Facility Emergency Organization, as per ACTIVATION OF FACILITY EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION PROCEDURE, if not already activated.
2. Operations shall provide information to the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR / EMERGENCY COORDINATOR.
3. Time and cate stack nonitor charts for reference.

4 Shut dosin the reactor.

I Rev. k h KAWc NrW I

I SEP-3 (Cont'd) Page 2 of 6 l

5. Send operator to west tower with radiation monitor to-l NOTE: Communicate with intercom, since stack monitor is af fected by portable radio RF. j I
a. Verify radiation background at stack monitor. )
b. Verify control room readings.
c. Mark initial needle position on analog display with time for future analysis if control room display becomes inaccessible.

4 l

d. Verify flow rate through monitor to 7 + 1 SCFM. If not, use Worksheet A to determi,ne stack monitor values. -
6. Pull stack monitor filters and analyze.
7. Af ter determining radionuclide responsible and verifying concentrations greater than 19,000 MPC (a) secure EF-13 and ER-14; (b) secure RF2, SF2, RF1, SF1; (c) secure all individual vent fans.
8. The Et4ERGENCY COORDINATOR shall evaluate the need for a partial or total 3 l evacuation of the facility. W NOTE: For facility evacuations or northeast quadrant evacuation, l

have sample counting instrumentation removed to RPDB.

(Ge-Li detector and dewer; NUCLEAR DATA 66 computer)

9. The Ef tERGENCY C0ORDINATOR shall appoint and have a surveillance team ]

check areas evacuated clear of personnel within 30 minutes.

NOTE: Er1ERGENCY DIRECTGR approval reauired for any voluntary radiation I

exposure in excess of 10CFR20 limits. (Up to 100 rem for life-saving, up to 25 rem to prevent exposures to merbers of general public in excess of 1 rem whole body and 5 rem thyroid.)

10. Determine the need for EMERGENCY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS and, if needed, activate then or place them on standby. See TABLE 111, EMERGENCY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS.

I APE d dhn R e v . (- tg I

SEP-3 (Cont'd) Page 6 of 6

[ SUBSEOUENT ACTIONS: i

1. Evaluate results of corrections and subsequent actions to determine need to escalate /de-escalate emergency classification.

{

2. Keep record of actions and evaluations for documentation. Use Procedures and worksheets.
3. Notify NRC, Region III, that ALERT condition has occurred within one hour af ter event has been classified or reclassified. (See Work- 3

( sheet C) ] l

4. Notify American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) [203-677-7305] that ALERT condition has occurred.

{

I 5. Notify State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) [314-751-2748] that ALERT condition has occurred.

]

]

s RECOVERY ACTIONS:

l

1. Evaluate potential radiological effects to onsite and offsite I personnel before returning access to specific areas effected by ALERT emergency.

I 2. Procedures shall be written and approved for handling significant recovery evolutions.

NOTE: During recovery operations, personnel exposures to radiation I

l should be maintained within 10CFR20 limits.

l l

l l

l Rev. Mf(fApp'd (IP7h

Page 1 of 6 SEP-4 I

SITE AREA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE ACTIONS LEVELS:

E there is:

a) Concentration of airborne radioactivity at the stack monitor exceed-ing 95,000 MPC when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

NOTE: USE OVERLAY I TO DETERMINE EXTENT 0F ACTIVITY FOR IODINE AND PARTICULATE. USE OVERLAY II TO DETERMINE EXTENT OF GASEOUS ACTIVITY.

b) The projected concentration of airborne radiological effluents at the ]

- distance corresponding to the nearest site boundary exceeding 250 MPC ]

when averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. ]

c) Radiation levels at the distance corresponding to the nearest site ]

boundary of 100 mrem /hr for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> whole body or 500 mrem thyroid ]

dose. ]

d) Other plant conditions exist with a level of significance of major ]

fuel damage and conditions that indicate actual or imminent failure ]

of containment integrity and primary system integrity. ]

THEN a SITE AREA EMERGENCY condition exists.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Activate the Facility Emergency Organization, as per ACTIVATION OF FACILITY EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION PROCEDURE, if not already activated.
2. Operations shall provide information to the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR / EMERGENCY COORDINATOR.
3. Time and date stack monitor charts for reference.

4 Shut down the reactor.

Rev. ( tqk {f App'd V8fV\

L

[ SEP-4 (Cont'd) Page 2 of 6

[ 5. Send operator to west tower with radiation monitor to:

NOTE: Communicate by intercom, since the stack monitor is affected by portable radio RF. I

{

a. Verify radiation background at stack monitor.
b. Verify control room readings.
c. Mark initial needle position on analog display with time for future analysis if control room display becomes inaccessible.
d. Verify flow rate through monitor to 7 + 1 SCFM.

If not, use Worksheet A to determine stack monitor values.

s s

6. Pull stack monitor filters and analyze.
7. Af ter determining radionuclide responsible and verifying concentrations greater than 95,000 MPC (a) secure EF-13 and ER-14; (b) secure RF2, SF2,

[. RF1, SF1; (c) secure all individual vent fans.

( 8. The EMERGENCY COORDINATOR shall evaluate the need for a partial or total evacuation of the facility.

3 For facility evacuations or northeast quadrant evacuation,

{ NOTE:

have sample counting instrumentation removed to RPDB.

(Ge-Li detector and dewer; NUCLEAR DATA 66 computer)

9. The EMERGENCY COORDINATOR shall appoint and have a surveillance team ]

check areas evacuated clear of personnel within 30 minutes.

NOTE: EMERGENCY DIRECTOR approval required for any voluntary radiation exposure in excess of 10CFR20 limits.

[ (Up to 100 rem for life-saving, up to 25 rem to prevent exposure to members of general public in excess of I rem whole body and 5 rem thyroid.)

10. Determine the need for Ef'ERGENCY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS and, if needed, -

activate them or place them on standby. See TABLE IV, EMERGENCY SUPPORT

{ O R GANI Z AT 10':5.

( Rev. h ts,b' App'd (TO b

I SEP-4 (Cont'd) Page 6 of 6  !

I SUBSE00ENT ACTIONS:

1. Evaluate results of corrections and subsequent actions to determine need to escalate /de-escalate emergency classification.
2. Keep record of actions and evaluations for documentation. Use procedure and worksheets.
3. Notify NRC, Region III, that SITE AREA EMERGENCY condition has occurred within one hour af ter the event has been classified or reclassified.

(See Worksheet C)

4. Notify American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) [203-677-7305] that a SITE AREA EMERGENCY has occurred.
5. Notify State Emergency l'anagement Agency (SEMA) [314-751-2748] that SITE '

AREA EMERGENCY condition has occurred, s

]

REC 0VERY ACTIONS:

1. Evaluate potential radiological effects to onsite and offsite personnel before returning access to specific areas effected by the SITE AREA EMERGENCY.
2. Procedures shall be written and approved for handling significant recovery evolutions.

NOTE: During recovery operations, personnel exposures to radiation should be maintained within 10CFR20 limits.

I I

m. w we u.

Page 1 of 2 I SEP-6 EMERGENCY AIR SAMPLING PROCEDURE EQUIPf1ENT REQUIRED: portable ion chamber detector; portable air sampler ]

1. Create a sector map for sample location reference on Worksheet B. (See Sample Worksheet, Figure 1). Commence procedure for emergency air sampling at a point approximately 400 meters downwind of the reactor. This point will be the sector centerline.
2. Check the 22.5* sector from this point by surveying a distance 80 meters each side of the sector centerline at 400 meters. Commence the survey with an 3 ton chamber detector until significant reading above background is detected. ]

Then sample with portable air monitor and mark on sector map. Air sample as

, per Standard Operating Procedure HP-6, Air Sampling During Reactor Emergencies.

3. Continue sector survey by moving toward the reactor in a criss-cross pattern that roughly covers the sector; using the following guidelines:
a. At 300 meter radius; survey distance 60 meters each side of sector centerline.
b. At 200 meter radius; survey distance 40 meters each side of sector centerline.
c. At 100 meter radius; survey distance 20 meters each side of sector centerline.
4. Whenever significant' (quantity) reading above background is detected, sample with portable air sampler and mark location on sector map.
5. The survey will be complete when survey has reached 100 meter radius. Have portable sarples analyzed. Report findings and sector nap to Ef tERGENCY DIRECTOR for assessnent.

,ev. Mc ac w I

l Page 1 of 2 SEP-10 EMERGENCY DOSIMETERS FOR OFFSITE PERSONNEL PURPOSE:

This procedure provides for radiation dosimeters for offsite personnel responding to a call under the MURR Emergency Plan.

PROCEDURE:

The Emergency Coordinator will assign a person to issue self-reader pocket chambers (PC) and film badges to offsite personnel as they arrive at MURR.

A supply of PCs and film badges are maintained in the lobby at the reception desk. A second supply is ma'intained in the Health Physics Office gn top of the computer printer cabinet. A third source of PCs is the film badge racks in the hallway near the lobby. The PCs in the badge racks are assigned to individuals and these would be used only if the lobby and Health Physics Office supplies are inadequate. The film badges in the badge rack will not be assigned to of f-site personnel. If the two badge supplies are inadequate, only a PC will be assigned and Health Physics will issue a spare film badge as soon as possible.

Form SEP-10 Pocket Chamber and Film Badae Record will be stored at the reception desk and in the Health Physics Of fice. When PCs and film badges are issued to offsite personnel, the PC and badge identification will be recorded on the form. If time permits, other information indicated on the form will be recorded. In any case, when the PC and badge are returned to Health Physics, the remaining inf ormation will be recorded for permanent record and for evalua-tion by Reactor health Physics Of fice.

I Orig. 6/24/85 App'd ll %'s s

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Page 1 of 3 SEP-11 MONITORING PLANNED EXPOSURES IN EXCESS OF LIMITS IN 10 CFR 20 NOTE: THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR MUST APPROVE EACH VOLUNTEER TO EXCEED EXPOSURE LIMITS OF 10 CFR 20.

PURPOSE:

This procedure provides the guidelines for monitoring, dosimetry and records for persons who volunteer for life-saving and accident mitigating activities which could result in planned radiation exposures in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits.

GUIDELINES:

A. Emergency Exposure Guidelines

1. A volunteer may be authorized to receive up to 100 Rem to save human life.
2. A volunteer may be authorized to receive up to 2S Rem to save vital reactor equipment and/or to prevent radiation exposures to members of the general public in excess of the following Protection Action Guides (PAGs).

The Protective Actions for all classifications are based upon a PAG of I rem dose equivalent for whole body and S rem dose equivalent thyroid to members of the general public and MURR staf f on site.

E. Personnel Selection Considerations

1. Individual is a v".lunteer (preferably 45 years or older).
2. Individual is familiar with the radiological consequences of emergency radiation esposures.
3. Women of childtjearing age shall not take part (Reg. Guide 8.13).

Orig. 6/24/85 App'd l{bte I

SEP-11 (Cont'd) Page 2 of 3 C. Self-reader Dosimeters and Locations Type Range mr Ldcation PC 0 - 200 Receptionist Desk - Lobby PC 0 - 200 Health Physics Office PC 0 - 200 Film Badge Racks PC 0 - 200 Emergency Lockers PC 0 - 200,000 Health Physics Office, (Instrument Cabinet in Health Physics Closet) 415A 0 - 9999 Health Physics Office, (Instrument Cabinet in Health Physics Closet)

NOTE: PC = Self-reader Pocket Chamber 415A = XETEX-415A Digital Dosimeter PROCEDURE:

NOTE: Although it is preferable to perform and document the step,s presented below prior to emergency workers receiving the exposure, the situa-tion (e.g., life saving measures) may require the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR to verbally authorize the exposure and ensure completion of docu-mentation when time permits.

1. Ensure that the dose rate in the task area is known or measurable.
2. Ensure that volunteer has assigned film badge.
3. Complete Worksheet E giving careful attention to item C considerations.

4 Assign the volunteer a self-reader pocket chamber or equivalent immediate readout monitor wita a range double the anticipated total exposure for the assignment.

5. The Emergency Director or a delegate shall obtain the exposure recorded by the readout device at a frequency that assures adequate control to prevent exposures in excess of the planned limits for the volunteer,
a. The exposure received at each reading shall be recorded on Worksheet E.

FOLLOWUP:

1. Expedite processing of volunteer's film badge to verify total exposure as indicated by self-reading dosimeters.

Orig. 6/24/85 App'd VfM .

SEP-11 (Cont'd) Page 3 of 3

2. If individual's dose equivalent exceeds any 10 CFR 20 limits, they should be examined by a physician to determine the need, extent and nature of medical surveillance or treatment.

REPORTING RE0VIREMENTS:

Complete reporting requirements of 10 CFR 20.403.

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I Orig. 6/24/85 App'd UsTM

E WORKSHEET E F

L RECORD AND AUTHORIZATION OF PLANNED EXPOSURES EXCEEDING LIMITS IN 10 CFR 20

[ A. Emergency Exposure Authorization:

EMERGENCY DIRECTOR DATE

{

B. Volunteer Signature:

DATE C. Record of Exposure Measured by Dosimeters

1. Name
2. Exposure limit assigned for the job - mrem, b 24 Hour Dos. Dos. Unused Comment 24 Hour Dos. Dos. Unused Comment Time Type mr mr Time Type mr mr E

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Orig. 6/24/85 App'd \MhA

L E

REVISION NUMBER 2 Site Emergency Procedures Section (SEP) f~ to

' EMERGENCY PROCEDURES Issued January 8,1985 I

j Section Name Date Revised EMERGENCY CALL LIST Rev. 11/11/85 l

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f y v n m m m cm rm rm rm ra cm rm rm rm m EMERGENCY PROCEDURE EMERGENCY CALL LIST Health Phys,ics__ _ _ _ _ _ _ Operatio,ns Emergency Support Organizations

_ Phone No. Phone No. Phone No.

O. Olson 8/4-816/ M. Evans 698-2450 UMC Police 882-7201 R. Stevens 442-2539 K. Beamer 696-3540 J. Ernst 874-2710 R. Kitch 443-4273 Columbia Fire Department 911 R. 00 hey 443-5448 C. Kribbs 682-3980 ]

UM Hospital and Clinics T. Seeger 875-8656 Ambulance 882-6128 J. Baskett 874-0695 or 911 Director's Office Phone No. Walk-in 882-8091 R. M. Brugger 445-6580

9. M. Alger 445-4775 UMC Health Physics (Office) 882-7221 Or. Phil Lee 445-5275 Jamison Shotts 474-2194 Op,er,a t i ons _

Reactor Chemistry David Spate 657-9450 Phone No. Phone No.

.l. C. IkKibben 442-6728 J. Carni 445-7848 Office of University Relations 882-4591 W. A. Meyer 474-7368 S. Langhorst 474-7383 See Public Information Procedure for other C. Edwards 443-7529 S. Morris 445-4217 R. Hultsch 442-6653 V. Spate 657-9450 phone numbers. (SEP-7)

W. Bahnhoff 449-4502 J. Swallow 874-4049 State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) 314-751-2748 C. Anderson 696-5506 B. Bezenek 445-5680 NRC, Region III 312-790-5500 .

l V. Jones 445-2543 N. Tritschler 474-6214 American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) 203-677-7305 B. Barker 445-2530 G. Gunn 443-2970 K. Henke-Christopher 474-7317 B. Herleth 875-1731 M. Kilfoil 474-6285 M. Randolph 474-4171 ]

T. Schoone 474-6416 e M. Wallis 443-8764 T. Warner 442-4953 B. Zychlewicz 875-6671 Rev. 6/9/86 App'd h8/k

REVISION NUMBER 3 I Site Emergency Procedures Section (SEP) to EMERGENCY PROCEDURES Issued January 8,1985 i Sec. No. Page No. Date Revised ,

l SEP-7 1 6/27/86 ]

SEP-7 2 6/27/86 SEP-7 3 6/27/86 SEP-7 4 6/27/86 l

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SEP-7 PUBLIC INFORMATION PROCEDURE NOTE: The Office of University Relations (UR) shall be activated to handle

{ the release of public information as required in the ALERT or SITE AREA ]

EMERGENCY procedures; whenever offsite emergency assistance is re- ]

quested via 911; or whenever deemed appropriate by the EMERGENCY ]

DIRECTOR.

A. INITIAL RELEASE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION ]

[ 1. The Emergency Status Report shall be completed and approved by the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR.

2. a) During normal University office hours, activate the Office of University Relations (UR) by calling 882-4591. ,

b) At other times, call the following list of UR staff in order until ]

one of the individuals listed is reached ( g their spouse, children, etc.).

(1) Bob Mussman (314)-445-9852 (2) Phil Leslie (314)-474-6592 ]

7 (3) Bud Carlson (314)-474-6534 L (4) Larry Myers (314)-443-5325 (5) Bonita Eaton (314)-474-5629 (6) Frank Fillo (314)-442-3269

3. Read the Emergency Status Report as approved by the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR to the UR staff member and answer any questions concerning definitions,

{ terms, units, etc.

Record other questions that the UR staff member may have. Enter the

4. ]

name of the UR staff member contacted and give the completed report to ]

the EMERGENCY COORDINATOR to be kept with the records of the EMERGENCY. ]

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I SEP-7 (Cont'd) Page 2 of 4 ]

5. The UR staff member contacted should verify a call concerning cn ]

emergency at the University of Missouri Research Reactor by calling 882-4211 or 874-4119 and ask to speak to a member of the Facility Emergency Organization (FEO). If the person answering the phone does not know who is in the FEO, then ask for anyone from the Director's Office, Operations, Health Physics, or Reactor Chemistry groups. The g individuals in these groups are listed below in alphabetical order. g Af ter verifying the person's identity by asking for his social security number, the emergency call can be verified.

VERIFICATION LIST FOR MURR EMERGENCIES Name Soc. Sec. No. Name Soc. Sec. No.

Don Alger 528-50-9243 Rolly Hultsch 310-28-6077 Chuck Anderson 482-60-2538 Vernon Jones 445-50-5089 m Brian Barker 479-78-5324 Mike Kilfoil 489-70-8048 g Joe Baskett 497-68-9262 Ron Kitch 323-36-9745 Kenneth Beamer 499-48-7148 Sue Langhorst 490-54-6123 Barry Bezenek 501-46-7402 Charlie McKibben 497-52-1248 E Bill Bohnhoff 496-78-1752 Walt Meyer 490-54-6682 E Rita Bonney 235-58-0578 Steve Morris 490-48-7841 Robert Brugger 524-30-8143 Orval Olson 500-14-5477 g James Carni 235-74-9541 Mike Randolph 487-72-5873 3 g Ron Dobey 226-84-0357 ] Tony Schoone 387-60-1679 Debbie Duffen 486-58-4204 ] Tom Seeger 119-32-9461 Chester Edwards John Ernst 313-40-1527 500-56-4321 Vickie Spate Ray Stevens Jim Swallow 521-70-1567 519-68-3856 495-66-3206 l

Christine Errante 486-60-4236 Mac Evans 499-38-7797 Nolan Tritschler 494-48-3635 E Greg Gunn 494-50-0718 Mike Wallis 486-60-4549 5 Karl Henke-Christopher 535-56-9166 ] Tim Warner 498-56-1829 Bill Herleth 500-56-8294 Bill Zychlewicz 319-52-6685 I

6. UR personnel contacted will determine the need for staffing and equipping ]

an emergency information center and will call in the required staff and ] E arrange for necessary facilities at 400 Lewis Hall. ] E

7. UR personnel will inform news media and others of the public, as neces- ]

sary, of the emergency. ]

8. If possible, a UR staff member will be sent on site to assist the ]

EMERGENCY DIRECTOR with the release of information. ]

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Rev. 5/27/86 App'd hh\

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I SEP-7 (Cont'd) Page 3 of 4 ]

I B. SUBSEQUENT RELEASE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION ]

The nature of the emergency and the required response (fast or slow ]

moving) may affect the release of subsequent information. ]

1. If time permits, fill out an EMERGENCY STATUS REPORT for each release ]

of information. ] I

2. If time does not permit filling out an EMERGENCY STATUS REPORT for each ]

release of information, the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR may verbally approve ]

information to be released by the UR staff personnel on site. ]

3. UR will provide updates on information concerning the emergency to the ]

general public and media at periodic intervals or as it becomes available ]

from the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR. ]

4. In the event of injury to personnel, the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR will be ]

responsible for contacting relatives. UR staff will not release names ]

I of injured personnel until cleared to do so by the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR and only after relatives or next of kin have been notified.

]

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UR will continue its operations until the emergency is officially ]

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terminated by the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR cr until emergency information services are deemed to be no longer necessary.

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I 6. Following the termination of the emergency, UR will arrange a meeting between emergency officials and the news media. UR will also conduct a critique of its activities and will seek feedback from the media and

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public on the effectiveness of its procedures. ]

C. RECORDS AND EMERGENCY LIST VERIFICATIONS ]

I 1. All EMERGENCY STATUS REPORTS shall be maintained by the EMERGENCY ]

DIRECTOR or EMERGENCY C0ORDINATOR as a permanent record of the emergency. ]

2. The UR staff call list and the MURR verification list will be reviewed ]

l and revised annually to keep the names and numbers current. ]

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Rev. 5/27/86 App'dj(/Oth I

SEP-7 (Cont'd) Page 4 of 4 ]

EMERGENCY STATUS REPORT Date: ]

UR STAFF MEMBER CONTACTED: 3 THIS (IS/IS NOT) A DRILL

]

A. DESCRIPTION OF EMERGENCY

1. What happened and where specifically did it happen? ] I (i.e. reactor containment or laboratory building) ]

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2. When did it happen? ]
3. Why/how did it happen? ]

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4. Releases, if any, of radioactive material onsite or offsite? ]

I B. EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT ]

1. Extent of damaget and/or injuries? ]

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2. Extent of external danger to general public? ]

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3. Actions taken to protect the general public? ]
4. Emergency classification declared? ]

C. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ]

1. When will more details be available?
2. When can media speak with EMERGENCY DIRECTOR 7 Filled in by: _

Approved by: E LMERGLNCY DIRLG10R 3 Time Date Rev. 5/27/86 App'd hM I

REVISION NUMBER 4 I Site Emergency Procedures Section (SEP) to EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

(

Issued January 8,1985 Section Name Date Revised EMERGENCY CALL LIST Rev. 6/9/86 I

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R M D FV R R R fV R C EMERGENCY PROCEDURE EMERGENCY CALL LIST Health Phys _i,cs Operations _ Emergency Support Organizations Phone No. Phone No. Phone No.

O. Olson 874-8167 M. Evans 698-2450 UMC Police 882-7201 R. Stevens 442-2539 K. Beamer 696-3540 J. Ernst 874-2710 R. Kitch 443-4273 Columbia Fire Department 911 R. Dohey 443-5448 C. Kribbs 682-3980 ]

UM Hospital and Clinics T. Seeger 875-8656 Ambulance 882-6128 J. Baskett 874-0695 or 911 Director's Office Phone No. Walk-in 882-8091 R. ft. Rrugger 445-6580 D. ft. Alger 445-4775 UMC Health Physics (Office) 882-7221 Or. Phil Lee 445-5275 Jamison Shotts 474-2194 Operations Reactor Chemistry David Spate 657-9450 Phone No. Phone No.__

J. C. McKibben 442-6728 J. Carni 445-7848 Office of University Relations 882-4591 W. A. Meyer 474-7368 S. Langhorst 474-7383 See Public Information C. Edwards 443-7529 S. Morris 445-4217 Procedure for other R. Hultsch 442-6653 V. Spate 657-9450 phone numbers. (SEP-7)

W. Bohnhoff 449-4502 J. Swallow 874-4049 State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) 314-751-2748 C. Anderson 696-5506

8. Dezenek 445-5680 NRC, Region III 312-790-5500 V. Jones 445-2543 N. Tritschler 474-6214 American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) 203-677-7305 B. Barker 445-2530 G. Gunn 443-2970 K. llenke-Christopher 474-7317 B. lierleth 875-1731 ft. Kilfoil 474-6285 fi. Randolph 474-4171 ]

T. Schoone 474-6416 M. Wallis 443-8764

f. Warner 442-4953 B. Zychlesicz 875-6671 Rev. 6/9/86 App'd [//M/k

l REVISION NUMBER 1 Facility Emergency Procedures Section (FEP)

I to EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

!ssued January 8,1985 Section Number Page No. Date Revised l

Facility Emergencies 1 7/3/85 2 7/3/85 3 7/3/85 FEP-1 1 7/3/85 2 7/3/85 I 3 4

5 7/3/85 7/3/85 7/3/85 6 7/3/85 FEP-2 1 7/3/85 2 7/3/85 3 7/3/85 I 4 7/3/85 FEP-3 1 7/3/85 l

FEP-4 1 7/3/85 7/3/85 I 2 3

4 7/3/85 7/3/85 5 7/3/85 I

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'I E Page 1 of 3 FACILITY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE FACILITY EMERGENCIES FACILITY EMERGENCIES are classified as follows:

I A. FACILITY EVACUATION - Emergencies of any type which require all personnel in the Facility to leave the premises.

B. REACTOR ISOLATION - Emergencies limited to the reactor containment building which require all personnel in the

! g containment to leave containment.

g ,

C. FIRE - Emergencies which may or may not involve A or B and which may require personnel to leave the premises.

MEDICAL - Emergencies involving injury to personnel but I D.

which may or may not involve situations A, B or C. These injuries may but do not necessarily involve radiation exposure or radioactivity contamination.

E. SECURITY - Emergencies involving (1) the actual thef t of I special nuclear material and/or the sabotage of the facili-ty or (2) an attempt or threat of thef t or sabotage will be handled by the procedures outlined in the Reactor Security Procedures. [ SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION as per 10CFR50.34(c)]

I Emergencies A and B are announced by a continuous sounding of I the horns located throughout the Facility. There is no dif-ference in the sound of the horns for a Facility evacuation or for a reactor isolation, however, only those horns in the con-tainment sound when a reactor isolation occurs. Fires not I associated with A or B above will be announced over the public address system with appropriate instructions for all personnel.

Security emergencies may result in the manual initiation of an evacuation to clear all personnel from the building.

lI Rev. 7/3/85 App'd OD I

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d FEP - Description of Radiation Alarms and Personnel Response Facility Staff Personnel Non-Staff Personnel Response Response Armilble location Type of Alarm System Responsible for Alarm location of Sensors Execute reactor isolation Execute reactor isolstic

a. Fhnual Switch in Throughout llorn 8 ! plan
1. Isolation Systen plan Control Poon Containment
b. Air plenin (AMO (fifth level)
c. Reactor bridge (AJ50
d. Air plenin BU monitor Erecute facility Esecute facility
a. Control Room Throughout llorn a $ evacuation plan
2. Evacuation System evacuation plan
b. Front lobby Facility Cause lopediate area to Vacate centstrrent; Variable in Containment local Bell be vicated and notify Notify Reactor
3. Gas Ibnitor (portable)

Reactor Operations Operations Vacate contsirrent; Bell and red light Cause innediate area to Notify Reactor

4. Particulate Ibnitor Variable in Containment Local be vecsted and notify Reactor Operations Operations
5. Area Radiation bbnitor Vacate imediate ares
a. South wall-BP Floor local; Control Rm Bu:rer and red light
  • Cause innediate he vacated eres to and notify (ADQ
b. West wall-BP Floor 11estth Ihysics
c. North wall-BP Floor
d. Fuel Storage Room
e. Ileat Exchanger Room
6. ILind and Foot Ibnitors thin Corridor and Buzter and red light Notify ifealth Ihysics 6 Notify liestth rhysics e Personnel Airlock Door local d
  • Bell or buzzer and red light in Control Room a Flashing red light near containment entrance Control Room anntsiciator buzzer and light t Af ter normal herking hours, notify Reactor Operations 2

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Rev. 7/3/85 App'd IdMN\ w E $ @ g g g

E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E EMERGENCY CALL LIST


. --- ..eOpra t i o n s.---------. E.mergency Support Organizations

. Heal th Phy s.ic s, .

0. Olson 874-8167 M. Evans 698-2450 UIC Police 882-7201 R. Stevens 442-2539 D. Peeler 698-2883 J. Ernst 874-2710 K. Beamer 696-3540 Columbia Fire Department 911 R. Ki tch UM llospital and Clinics T. Seeger 875-8656 Ambulance 882-6128 K. DeLucca 443-6282 or 911 Director's Office J. Daskett 874-0695 Phone No. Walk-in 882-8091 R. M. Brugger 445-6580 D. M. Alger 445-4775 UMC Health Physics Dr. Phil Lee 445-5275 Jamison Shotts 474-2194 Op.e.r _a . t_i.o n s ___-- _ .

Rea

.._c to_r_ C hem i_s_tr_y David Spate 657-9450 p

J. C. ficKibben 442-6728 S. Langhorst 474-7383 Office of University Relations 882-4591 W. A. Meyer 474-7368 V. Spate 657-9450 See Public Information C. Edwards 443-7529 J. Carni 445-7848 Procedure for other R. Ilul tsch 442-6653 S. tiorris 445-4217 , phone numbers. (SEP-7)

W. Bohnhoff 449-4502 State Emergency Management H. Tritschler 474-6214 Agency (SEMA) 314-751-2748 B. Dezenek 445-5680 C. Anderson 696-5506 NRC, Region III 312-790-5500 V. Jones 445-2543 American Nuclear Insurers G. Gunn 443-2970 (ANI) 203-677-7305

11. Kil foil 474-6285 T. Schoone 474-6416 J. Swallow 874-4049 B. llerleth 875-1731 D. Zychlewicz 875-6671 M. Wallis 443-8764 K. Henke-Christopher 474-7317 T. Warner 442-4953 B. Barker 445-2530 F D. Flemming 443-2821 "3 w

O Rev. 7/3/85 App'd N8\ m

I Page 1 of 6 FEP-1 FACILITY EVACUATION PROCEDURE NOTE: An assessment of offsite radiological consequences shall be determined. 3 This assessment may require escalating emergency response to a site g emergency procedure (UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT or SITE AREA EMERGENCY).

ENTRY CONDITIONS:

1. The Facility Evacuation alarm is actuated manually from two locations:

(a) the reactor control room, and (b) the lobby control center.

2. Situations that may warrant FACILITY EVACUATION include:

(a) Security emergencies, such as a bomb threat.

(b) A major facility fire.

(c) Whenever airborne radioactivity is expected to exceed 5 MPC throughout the facility.

(d) This procedure may be used as part of a Site Emergency Procedure (SEP).

(e) Other conditions occur that the Shift Supervisor determines warrant personnel evacuation from the facility.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

l The following events result from a Facility evacuation alarm:

1. The reactor scrams.
2. The containment ventilation system isolation doors close.
3. The containment exhaust isolation valves close.

4 The facility horns sound.

5. The flashing red light exterior to the containment personnel g l

airlock door is energized. g Rev. 7/3/85 App'd IhM I

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ll FEP-1 (Cont'd) Page 2 of 6 l I. PERSONNEL WITH PREASSIGNED TASKS (Facility Emergency Organization Members)

( A. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

The responsibility for the overall direction in the event of an emergency shall rest with the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR.

In the event of a Facility evacuation during normal working hours, the i following people shall report to the reactor lobby: the Facility Director, Associate Director, Reactor Manager, Manager of Reactor Health Physics, Machine and Electronics Shop Supervisors, and Duty Shif t super-visor.

I -

The responsibility for EMERGENCY DIRECTOR shall be assumed. The EMERGENCY DIRECTOR shall ascertain the avail, ability of personnel required l to execute the emergency plan and shall appoint an EMERGENCY COORDINATOR.

l He shall investigate the cause of the alarm and the magnitude of the l

incident, and shall direct those activities necessary to correct the emergency situation. Af ter the emergency is terminated, he shall direct the procedures necessary to restore normal operation.

The EMERGENCY C0ORDINATOR shall ascertain that the reactor containment

! building and Facility laboratories have been vacated and secured. He shall maintain a roster of all ptesons released from the site by the

,I EMERGENCY DIRECTOR. If the pneumatic blower system was in use during the emergency, he shall insure that the samples being irradiated are returned to the laboratory and then have the blowers secured at the local lighting panel (#32). He shall insure a record of the events I following the emergency is maintained.

The DUTY OPERATOR shall perform the following tasks before leaving containment: (Do NOT attempt to correct any abnormalities at this l time.)

A. Verify that the reactor has scrammed as indicated by the i ns trunentation.

t I B. Verify that all shim rods have bottomed as indicated by the console lights.

I C. Verify that the containment has sealed as indicated by the I

ventilation door and the exhaust valve lights.

Rev. 7/3/85 App'd (if0$

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I FEP-1 (Cont'd) Page 3 of 6 D. Ensure all personnel are cleared from 5th, 4th, 3rd, and 2nd levels of the containment building and exit via personnel airlock doors.

E. If the ASSISTANT DUTY OPERATOR is not known to be in containment, I

the DUTY OPERATOR shall also ensure that all personnel are cleared a from the beamport floor. g He shall report to the EMERGENCY COORDINATOR and advise him of the status l W

of the reactor.

i The ASSISTANT DUTY OPERATOR shall ascertain that all personnel are cleared from the beamport floor area and exit personnel airlock doors.

t He shall report to the EMERGENCY C0ORDINATOR in the lobby control center.

If on routine patrol and not in the containment building, he shall proceed directly to the lobby control center.

MANAGER OF HEALTH PHYSICS shall proceed to the lobby control center and establish the radiation-safe condition of the area. He shall estab-lish a hot-cold change area, assemble and prepare for use special Health Physics equipment, and perform radiation and contamination surveys. He shall evaluate the extent of radioactive contamination and/or radiation exposure received by personnel in the Facility at the time of the inci-dent. He shall advise the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR of measures to be taken to control and to clean up radioactive contamination which may have resulted from the incident.

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The MACHINE SHOP SUPERVISOR or in his absence one of the Machine Shop l personnel shall secure the laboratory ventilation fans. He shall establish that the mechanical equipment room and the below-grade areas i

exterior to the containment are vacated and secured. He shall report to the EMERGENCY COORDINATOR in the lobby control center. l I.

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I FEP-1 (Cont'd) Page 4 of 6 I The EMERGENCY DIRECTOR shall appoint a COMMUNICATOR to notify auxiliary organizations which have been made aware of these emergency procedures and perform other communicative functions required. The following telephone numbers may be of assistance in the performance of these I duties:

University Police / Watchman's Office, UMC 882-7201 Radiation Safety Office, UMC 882-7221 Dr. Philip Lee, 2 Research Park Dev. Bldg.

Emergency Room, UM Hospital & Clinics, UMC 882-8091 I NOTE: When determined appropriate by the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR, the evacuation horns may be silenced by opening breaker 15 on the emergency lighting panel located in the north inner corridor next t'o the emergency power transfer I swi tch.

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l FEP-1 (Cont'd) Page 5 of 6 II. PERSONNEL WITHOUT PREASSIGNED TASKS:

(Staff other tnan Facility Emergency Organization members)

A. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

1. Upon hearing the evacuation alarm, personnel shall proceed to points beyond the area bounded by the outer perimeter of the reactor labora-tory building.
2. TOUR GUIDES shall be responsible for the safe evacuation of visitors in their charge from the Facility in accordance with the evacuation routes in this plan. VISITORS shall be monitored by Health Physics E Technicians as per HP-20 before being released to leave the site. g
3. EXPERIMENTERS who are conducting experiments in the containment area shall render their experimental apparatus safe for unattended operation. They shall be responsible for the safe evacuation of visitors in their charge from the facility in accordance with the ,

evacuation routes in this plan.

4. EVACUATION ROUTES (See the map of the routes on page 6.):

A. All personnel within the containment building will exit the containment building and proceed through the east door of the laboratory building and then go to the upwind parking lot.

B. All laboratory personnel, support personnel, and guests exterior to the containment building will leave the facility through the nearest exit (north, east, or south doors) and then proceed to 3 the upwind parking lot. g

5. Once outside, personnel shall note the wind direction indicator at the top of the containment building east tower and proceed to the upwind parking lot.

B. SUBSE0 VENT ACTIONS:

1. All staff personnel shall remain on standby, unless released by WNRGTNCY DIRECTOR, to provide the special services that may be required to restore normal operation.
2. All staff personnel shall be monitored by Health Physics Technicians

'as per procedure HP-20 before being released to leave the site.

3. A roster of g released personnel will be maintained by the I

EMERGENCY COORDINATOR.

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Page 6 of 6

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EVACUATION ROUTES, RESEARCH REACTOR FACILITY Rev. 7/3/85 App'd M M I .

I Page 1 Of FEP-2 REACTOR ISOLATION NOTE: An assessment of offsite radiological consequences shall be determined.

I This assessment may require escalating emergency response to a site emergency procedure (UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT or SITE AREA EMERGENCY).

ENTRY CONDITIONS:

1. A Reactor Isolation is automatically initiated by either of two radia-tion monitors in the containment air exhaust plenum or a radiation 3 monitor on the reactor bridge. They are activated at levels greater g than 1 decade above background.
2. A Reactor Isolation may be activated manually at the reactor control, '

console.

3. Shutdowns that may warrant REACTOR ISOLATION include: )

(a) A prolonged fire within containment.

(b) Whenever airborne radioactivity levels are expected to exceed 5 MPC in containment.

(c) This procedure may be used as part of a Site Emergency Procedure (SEP).

(e) Other conditions occur that the Shif t Supervisor determines warrant personnel evacuation of containment.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS:

The following events result from a Reactor Isolation alarm:  !

1. The reactor scrams.
2. The containment ventilation system isolation doors ~close.
3. The containment exhaust isolation valves close.

I 4 The containment horns sound.

5. The flashing red light exterior to the containment personnel airlock door is energized.

Rev. 7/3/85 App'd k l

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FEP-2 (Cont'd) Page 2 of 4 I. PERSONNEL WITH PREASSIGNED TASKS:

(Facility Emergency Organization members)

The following shall report to the lobby control center during normal working i hours: Reactor Manager, Reactor Operations Engineer, Shif t Supervisor, Duty l Operator, Reactor Services Engineer, Reactor Physicist, Plant Engineer, Manager of Health Physics, Machine and Electronics Shops Supervisors.

The responsibility for EMERGENCY DIRECTOR shall be assumed. The EMERGENCY DIRECTOR shall ascertain the availability of personnel required to execute the emergency plan. He shall investigate the cause of the alarm and the magnitude of the incident. He shall appoint an EMERGENCY C0ORDINATOR.

If in the opinion of the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR the extent of the emergency is sufficient to warrant evacuation of the facility, he shall actuate the alarm and the facility evacuation plan shall be executed. After the emergency is terminated, he shall direct the procedures necessary to restore normal opera tion.

(L, The EMERGENCY COORDINATOR shall establish that containment is vacated and secured. He shall maintain a roster of all persons released from the site by the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR. If the pneumatic blower system was in use during the emergency, he shall insure that the samples being irradiated are returned to the laboratory and then have the blowers secured at the local lighting panel (#32). He shall assist the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR as required and insure a record of the events following the emergency is maintained.

The DUTY OPERATOR shall perform the following tasks before leaving contain-ment. (Do NOT attempt to correct any abnormalities at this time.)

A. Verify that the reactor has scrammed as indicated by the instrumentation.

B. Verify that all shim rods have bottomed as indicated by the console lights.

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h C. Verify that the containment has sealed as indicated by the ventilation p door and the exhaust valve lights.

D. Ensure all personnel are cleared from 5th, 4th, 3rd and 2nd levels of the containment building and exit via personnel airlock door.

Rev. 7/3/85 App'd \

l FEP-2 (Cont'd) Page 3 of 4 I

E. If the ASSISTANT DUTY OPERATOR is not known to be in containment, the DUTY OPERATOR shall also ensure that all personnel are cleared from the beamport floor.

He shall report to the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR and advise him of the status of the reactor.

The ASSISTANT DUTY OPERATOR shall ascertain that all personnel are cleared g from the beamport floor area and exit via personnel airlock doors. He shall 5 inform the Manager of Health Physics of the emergency. He shall then position himself at the outer personnel airlock door and allow only authorized entry into the containment area.

The MANAGER OF HEALTH PHYSICS shall proceed to the lobby control center. He shall establish a hot-cold change area, assemble and prepare for use of special Health Physics equipment, and perform radiation and contamination surveys. He shall evaluate the extent of radioactivi'ty contamination and/or 3 radiation exposure received by personnel in the containment at the time of the incident. He shall determine if the Radiation Safety Officer should be 5

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notified. He shall advise the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR of measures to be taken to control and to clean up radioactive contamination which may have resulted from the incident.

A COMMUNICATOR appointed by the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR shall advise the laboratory personnel of the isolation emergency by means of the public address system. The folicwing statements shall be read two (2) times:

"Your attention please - Your attention please.

A reactor isolation has occurred. All non-involved personnel shall keep clear of the main corridor g and the lobby." 5 The COMMUNICATOR shall perform communicative functions for the EMERGENCY E DIRECTOR. The following telephone numbers may be of assistance in the g performance of these functions:

Traffic Safety and Security Office, UMC 882-7201 Radiation Safety Office, UMC 882-7221 Emergency Room, UM Hospital & Clinics, UMC 882-8091 NOTE: To facilitate communication once reentry into the containment building has been made and proper radiation surveys are con-ducted, the isolation horns may be silenced by means of a switch on the back of the control console in the Control Room.

Rev. 7/3/85 App'd \bM I

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I FEP-2 (Cont'd) Page 4 of 4 I

I II. PERSONNEL WITHOUT PREASSIGNED TASKS:

(Staff other than Facility Emergency Organization members)

I A. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS:

I 1. Upon hearing the REACTOR ISOLATION alarm, personnel in containment shall exit through the personnel airlock door to the front lobby.

2. TOUR GUIDES shall be responsible for the safe evacuation of visitors in their charge from the containment and exit via the east door.

VISITORS shall be monitored by Health Physics Technicians as per HP-20 before being released to leave the site.

3. EXPERIMENTERS shall render their experimental apparatus safe for I unattended operation. They shall be responsible for the safe evacuation of visitors in their charge to the lobby. They shall

' inform the EMERGENCY DIRECTOR if adjustments need to be made to their equipment upon reentry.

B. SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS:

1. All staff personnel shall remain on standby, unless released by the EMERCDICYlTRECTOR, to provide the special services that may I be required to restore normal operation.

All staff personnel shall be monitored by Health Physics Technicians 2.

as per procedure HP-20 before being released to leave the site.

3. A roster of all released personnel will be maintained by the I EMERGENCY C0076INATOR.

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Page 1 OI 1 I

FEP-3 I

FIRE PROCEDURE

1. Any individual discovering fire shall notify reactor control (213) of fire, giving nature and location of fire. The Shif t Supervisor will activate the FACILITY EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION by page system and provide warning to stay clear of fire location.
2. SHIFT SUPERVISOR will call (9-911) to notify Columbia Fire Department.
3. EMERGENCY DIRECTOR will investigate the fire and determine steps to minimize hazard to both personnel and property.

NOTE: An assessment of offsite radiological consequences shall be determined. This assessment may require escalating emergency response to a site emergency procedure' (Unusual Event, Alert).

4. The EMERGENCY DIRECTOR may contact the OFFICE OF UNIVERSITY RELATIONS to I

handle public information, if appropriate.

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5. If the fire cannot be put out immediately with local fire extinguishers - the reactor WILL be shutdown to focus on fire.
6. Secure EF-13 and EF-14.
7. Secure ventilation supply and exhaust fans and close all fire doors.

i 8. If the fire is in containment and cannot be immediately brought under control, initiate reactor isolation.

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I Page 1 of 5 FEP-4 MEDICAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURE Injuries which may or may not involve radiation exposure and/or radioactivity contamination are classified as follows by the UMH&C Radiation Disaster Plan.

I 1. External Radiation - The individual who has received whole or partial body external radiation may have received a lethal dose of radiation but he is no hazard to attendants, other patients or the environment. He is no different I than the radiation therapy or diagnostic X-ray patient.

2. Inhalation or Ingestion - Another type is the individual who has received internal contamination by inhalation or ingestion. He is no hazard to attendants, other patients or the environment. Following cleansing of minor amount of contaminated material deposited on the body surface during airborne I exposure, he is similar to the chemical poisioning case such as lead. His body wastes should be collected and saved for measurements of the amount of nuclides to assist in determination of appropriate therapy.
3. External Contamination - External contamination of body surface and/or I clothing by liquids or by dirt particles presents a third type, with problems similar to vermin infestation. Surgical isolation technique to protect attendants and cleansing to protect other patients and the hospital environ-ment must take place to confine and remove a potential hazard.
4. External Contamination Complicated By a Wound - Care must be taken not to cross-contaminate surrounding surfaces from the contaminated wound and vice I versa. The wound and surrounding surfaces are cleansed separately and sealed off when clean. When crushed dirty tissue is involved, early preliminary wet debridement following wound irrigation may be indicated. Further debridement I and more definitive therapy can await sophisticated measurement and consulta-tion guidance.

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I FEP-4 (Cont'd) Page 2 of 5 See UMH&C RADIATION DISASTER PLAN (5 or more patients) to determine the plan they will need to implement:

Plan A - Walk In Patients Plan B - 1 to 4 Patients Plan C - 5 or More Patients Upon discovery that an accident has occurred, the following action is to be taken:

A. If the area in which the accident has occurred is a "high radiation area" with an exposure dose rate of 100 mR/hr or more, or is suspected 3 to be such an area, move the victim quickly and carefully to a location 5 at which the exposure dose rate is 5 mR/hr or less if the victim can be moved without harm. Evacuate all personnel from the accident area and provide first aid to the victim.

B. Call the Heal'th Physics Manager at 882-4211. If he is not available, E call the Radiation Safety Office, UMC, at 882-7221. E C. Notify the Reactor Operator in the Control Room.

ACCIDENT INVOLVING PHYSICAL INJURY Upon arrival at the accident scene, Health Physics will take the following action:

A. Assess the severity of the radiation injury and classify the injury.

B. If necessary, close off and seal the accident area and turn off the ventilation to that area.

C. Notify the Emergency Room, UMH&C. at 882-8091, and arrrange for medical care either at the Facility or at UMH&C.

D. If initial treatment is to be administered at the UMH&C arrange for transportation by the UMH&C ambulance, 882-6128, the Facility vehicle, or commercial ambulance service.

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L FEP-4 (Cont'd) Page 3 of 5 ,

{ E. If initial treatment is to be administered at the Facility by a representative of the UMH&C, attend the accident victim, keep him comfortable, and render first aid as required.

F. Survey all personnel who may have been contaminated in the accident.

Provide first aid as required.

G. Provide decontamination of the accident victim, if possible, and all f other persons found to be contaminated.

H. Save all samples of clothes, jewelry, etc. Label the samples with l name, time and date.

l l I. Notif / the Facility Director and the Radiation Safety Officer.

J. Evaluate the radiation dose received by carefully reconstructing tne accident. This assessment is more detailed than that required in item A above and may be deferred until af ter the care of the accident victim is transferre'd to the attending physician.

Contamination and/or Radiation Exposure without Physical Injury l

CONTAMINATION l If immediate emergency cleaning of contaminated person's skin cannot reduce level to 1 mR/hr By or 1000 dpm alpha, they should be sent to the RPDB for I

l further health physics evaluation and/or decontamination.

Assure that one of the following persons will be at the RPDB to assist in j

evaluating the need to move the person to the U'4H&C. (Orval Olson, Phil Lee, J. Schotts, D. Spate. )

RADIATION If a person has an estimated 10 REM 2xposure to any part of the body or whole body, send to RPDB for further medical / health physics evaluation.

Rev. 7/3/85 App'd lhhd

FEP-4 (Cont'd) Page 4 of 5 I

Transportation Routes to the UMC Hospital and Clinics A. Injuries which do not involve contamination of the surface of the body E shall be taken directly to the emergency entrance of the UMH&C for 5 treatment in the Emergency Room (see Figure FEP-2).

I B. Injuries which do involve extensive contamination of the surface of the body shall be taken to the dock area at the rear of the UMH&C. From there, the accident victim will be taken to rooms M162-163, Cadaver Room (sometimes called the Medical School Morgue), located in the immediate vicinity of the dock entrance (see Figure FEP-2).

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Rev. 7/3/85 App'd \M I

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Page 5 of 5 3

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I REVISION NUMBER 2 Facility Emergency Procedures Section (FEP) to I EMERGENCY PROCEDURES Issued January 8,1985 I Page No. Date Revised Section Number Facility Emergencies 3 6/9/86 I

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m W W W W W W W W W M M M M W W W FACILITY EMERGENCY PROCEDURE EMERGENCY CALL LIST Health Physics Operations Emergency Support Organizations Phone No. Phone No. < Phone No.

O. Olson 874-8167 M. Evans 698-2450 UMC Police 882-7201 R. Stevens 442-2539 K. Beamer 696-3540 J. Ernst 874-2710 R. Kitch 443-4273 Columbia Fi re Departmer.t 911 R. Dohey 443-5448' C. Kribbs 682-3980 ]

UM Hospital and Clinics T. Seeger 875-8656 Ambulance 882-6128 J. Baskett 874-0695 or 911 Director's

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Office Phone No. Walk-in 882-8091 R. M. Brugger 445-6580 D. M. Alger 445-4775 UMC Health Physics (Office) 882-7221 Dr. Phil Lee 445-5275 Jamison Shotts 474-2194 Operations Reactor Chemistry David Spate 657-9450 Phone Fo. Phone No.

J. C. McKibben 442-6728 J. Carni 445-7848 Office of University Relations 882-4591 W. A. Meyer 474-7368 S. Langhorst 474-7383 See Public Information C. Edwards 443-7529 S. Morris 445-4217 Procedure for other R. Hultsch 442-6653 V. Spate 657-9450 phone numbers. (SEP-7) i W. Bohnhoff 449-4502 J. Swallow 874-4049 State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) 314-751-2748 C. Anderson 696-5506 B. Bezenek 445-5680 NRC, Region III 312-790-5500 V. Jones 445-2543 N. Tritschler 474-6214 American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) 203-677-7305 B. Barker 445-2530 G. Gunn 443-2970 K. Henke-Christopher 474-7317 B. Herleth 875-1731 M. Kilfoil 474-6285 M. Randolph 474-4171 ] 8 T. Schoone 474-6416 "3 M. Wallis 443-8764 u, T. Warner 442-4953 o B. Zychlewicz 875-6671 -*

us Rev. 6/9/86 App'd M s

L SECTION III REVISIONS TO THE HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT 1 July 1985 through 30 June 1986 HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REPORT (original July 1,1965)

1. Table 9.2 INSTRUMENT CUBICLE DEVICES. (p. 9-7)

Deleted Item #5, Area Radiation and Process Recorder

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L 2. Section 9.7.1 Area Radiation Monitoring System (p. 9-20)

Changed the sentence "The information from each of the remotely located detectors is displayed on panel meters and is recorded on a multipoint radiation recorder on the control room instru-ment panel" to "The information from each of the remotely located detectors is displayed on panel meters on the control room instrument panel."

3. Section 9.7.2 Fuel Rupture Monitoring System (p. 9-21)

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Deleted the sentence "The output of this latter circuit is fed r to the multipoint radiation recorder."

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~ 4. Section 9.7.4 Secondary Coolant Monitoring System (p. 9-22)

L Deleted section 9.7.4 paragraph and replaced it with: "A scintillation detector is installed in the return leg of the secondary piping. The output of the scintillation detector is

{ fed into a log-count-rate meter. This instrument provides a high radiation alarm to the annunciator."

5. Figure 9.3. Instrument Cabinet h Deleted reference to "multipoint recorder" in instrument block #5.
6. Section 11.10 Records (p. 11-12)

Deleted reference to " area radiation" under list of items

{ with strip chart records. s E

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E SECTION fy PLANT AND SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS 1 July 1985 through 30 June 1986 I OCTOBER 1985 Modification 85-7: This modification is designed to reduce the exhaust fan motor starting current that must be supplied by the emergency generator upon the loss of site electrical power. A centrifugal clutch (Eaton Model D66SFM) has been added to the motor shaft of exhaust fan, EF-14, in order to improve the emergency generator's ability to assume the elecrical load.

The exhaust ventilation system will not be affected by this modification.

A failure of the clutch would be similar to a broken drive belt. These conditions would be annunciated by the fan failure alarm system in the control room and would alert the control room operator to take corrective action.

I JANUARY 1986 I Modification 85-8: This modification to the Regulating Rod offset mechanism was made to gain access to the 30 graphite reflector region below the previous offset mechanism. The offset mechanism replaced was a Mod I design identical to a control blade offset mechanism with the pull tube block and base pad extending over the graphite zone of the reflector. The modified offset mechanism is con-structed with the barrel and base pad moved away from the pressure vessel 5-1/2" further than the old offset. This results in having all of the offset mechanism assembly, except the offset blade arm, outside the graphite element outer radius.

The construction of both the new and old offset mechanism are essentially the same, with the exception of the length of the offset arm that holds the regulating blade. To prevent accidental bumping or hooking of the offset arm, a shield has been installed as part of the offset mechanism.

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MARCH 1986

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Modification Package 86-1: This modification replaced the original 30 graphite wedges installed in positions SA and 5B with elements of new design that can be utilized as irradiation facilities.

hch new reflector element accommodates one 1.25" 0.0. sample irradiation position and one 5-1/2" nominal diameter sample irradiation position. The con-

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struction materials of the base elements are aluminum and Nuclear Grade II graph-ite. These materials, the construction techniques and the testing procedures meet or exceed the original design specifications. An additional .150 thick wall of cadmium was wrapped around the 5-1/2" diameter irradiation tube in a seal welded f cavity. The objective of the cadmium is to reduce the thermal neutron activation of the samples that run in this position and to reduce the reactivity effect of inserting arjd removing a sample holder.

I These elements were replaced on separate dates so that the reactivity charac-tistics of each could be measured. Measurements of the reactivity effect of insert-l ing and removing sample holders were also performed. The new reflector element for position SA was installed March 11, 1986, and the new element for position SR was l installed July 10, 1986.

MAY 1986 l

Modification 85-6: This modification removed the area radiation monitor l (ARM) sixteen point recorder. This recorder had become increasingly unreliable, had no source of repair parts, and exhibited electrical loading problems that af-fected other instrumentation. There are no longer any suppliers for this recorder that would interface with the existing Area Radiation Monitor.

The Hazards Summary provides no justification for the ARMS recorder beyond the creation of historical records documenting the readings of the Area Radiation Monitors, the secondary coolant monitor and the fission product monitor. The multipoint recorder performed a valuable function during earlier years of operation IV-2 I ,

L when the reactor was left secured and unattended on weekends. Since the reactor L

now operates continuously, the manual recording of the Area Radiation Monitors, T

E secondary coolant monitor and the fission product monitor by reactor operators at two hour intervals should prove sufficient to provide records of these readings.

This modification relates only to the method of creating the records of the

[ Area Radiation Monitors readings. The Area Radiation Monitor, its indications in u

the control room and its functions remain unchanged by this modification. The F

l recorder has no connection to the safety system and is not referenced in the MURR technical specifications, l

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E SECTION V NEW TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS 1 July 1985 through 30 June 1986 I

New experimental programs during this period are as follows:

RUR-117 EXPERIMENTER: S. A. Werner/W. Yelon DESCRIPTION: An addendum was added to the RUR authorizing three new experiments at Beamport "C" replacing the Fourier Time-of-Flight experiment which was authorized February 8, 1971. The three new experiments are variations on existing experiments at Beamport "B", Reamport "D", and Beamport "E". Two setups are neutron diffraction experi-ments and one is a neutron interferometry experiment.

These experiments called for the replacement of the I existing collimator with a collimator similar to that utilized previously in Beamport "B" and Beamport "E".

RUR-249 EXPERIMENTER: R. M. Brugger DESCRIPTION: An addendum was added to the RUR authorizing the use of a depleted Uranium-238 filter to isolate an epithermal neutron flux suitable for use in Neutron Capture Therapy.

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L SECTION VI

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SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACTIVITIES I 1 July 1985 through 30 June 1986

1. SNM Receipts: A total of 27 new fuel elements were received from Babcock and Wilcox (B & W), Lynchburg, Virginia. Five of these had been fabricated by I Atomics International, our previous supplier.

Grams Grams

,I Shipper Elements U U-235 l

22,394 20,859 I B&W M0145, M0146, M0147, M0148, M0149, M0204, M0205, M0206, M0207, M0208, M0209, M0210, M0211, M0212, M0213, M0214, M0215, M0216, l M0217, M0218, M0219, M0220, M0221, M0222, M0223, M0224, M0225

2. SNM Shipments: A total of 24 spent fuel elements were shipped to Westinghouse I Idaho Nuclear Company, Inc., Idaho Falls, Idaho for reprocessing.

I Shipper Elements Grams U

Grams U-235 MURR M070, M077, M088, M0100, M0102, M0104, 16,149 14,075

)I M0123, M0124, M0126, M0128. M0129, M0130, M0131, M0150, M0152, M0154, M0155, M0156, ~

M0157, M0160, M0161, M0162, M0164, M0165

3. Inspections: There were no routine safeguards inspections conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Region III office during the time period 1 July 1985 to 30 June 1986. The MURR Special Nuclear Material Control Pro-cedures were reviewed by the Procedures Review Subcommittee (of the Reactor Advisory Committee) as per the annual requirement.

4 SNM Inventory: As of 30 June 1986, MURR was financially responsible for the following 00E owned amounts:

Total U s = 42,598 grams Total U-235 = 38,042 grams Included in these totals are 36 grams of U and 34 grams of U-235 non-fuel, 00E owned. In addition to these totals, MURR owns 156 grams of U and 74 grams of U-235. All of this material is physically located at the MURR.

VI-1

Fuel elements on hand have accumulated the following burnup as of 30 June 1986:

I Fuel Element Accumulated Fuel Element Accumulated Fuel Element Accumulated Number Megawatt Days Number Megawatt Days Number Megawatt Days M058 149.56 M0136 146.41 M0207 86.14 M0103 149.56 M0137 148.49 M0208 79.01 M0105 147.06 M0138 146.41 M0209 86.14 M0106 148.75 M0140 148.49 M0210 79.01 M0107 147.06 M0141 73.30 M0211 38.38 M0108 148.75 M0142 145.25 M0212 45.48 M0109 146.85 M0144 145.25 M0213 38.38 146.85 M0145 96.70 M'0214 45.48 I M0111 M0112 147.66 M0146 114.92 M0215 27.70 33.58 M0113 149.23 M0147 96.70 M0216 M0114 147.66 M0148 114.92 M0217 40.35 M0115 149.23 M0149 73.30 M0218 33.58 M0116 147.06 M0200 120.56 M0219 23.48 M0117 147.06 M0201 134.29 M0220 31.47 M0122 145.84 M0202 120.56 M0221 23.48 M0125 148.64 M0203 134.29 ,

M0222 31.47 M0127 148.53 M0204 72.80 M0223 27.70 M0132 147.52 M0205 40.35 M0224 9.38 l

M0133 130.66 M0206 72.80 M022' 9.38 l

M0134 147.52 M0135 130.66 Average Burnuo 4 10 .82 MWD I .

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I VI-2

SECTION VII REACTOR PHYSICS ACTIV! TIES 1 July 1985 through 30 June 1986

1. Fuel Utilization: During this period, the following elements reached their licensed burnup and were retired.

Serial Number Final Core Date Last Used MWDs 149.56 I M058 M0103 M0105 85-57 85-57 85-46 10-17-85 10-17-85 9-05-85 149.56 147.06 85-50 9-26-85 148.75 I M0106 M0107 M0108 85-46 85-50 9-05-85 9-26-85 1-02-86 147.06 148.75 146.85 M0109 85-73 M0111 85-73 .

1-02-86 146.85 M0112 85-73 1-02-86 147.66 M0113 85-72 12-26-85 149.23 147.66 I M0114 M0115 M0116 85-73 85-72 86-7 1-02-86 12-26-85 2-06-86 149.23 147.06 86-7 2-06-86 147.06 I M0117 M0122 M0125 85-49 85-49 9-23-85 9-23-85 11-07-85 145.84 148.64 147.52 M0132 85-62 I M0134 M0136 M0137 85-62 86-14 86-15 11-07-85 3-20-86 3-27-86 147.52 146.41 148.49 l 146.41 M0138 86-14 3-20-86 M0140 86-15 3-27-86 148.49 M0142 86-16 3-31-86 145.25 M0144 86-16 3-31-86 145.25 Due to the requirement of having less than 5 kg of unirradiated fuel in possession, initial criticalities are obtained with four new elements or fewer as conditions dictate. A core designation consists of eight fuel elements of which only the initial critical fuel element serial numbers are l

listed in the following table. To increase operating efficiency, fuel ele- ,

ments are used in mixed core loadings. Therefore, a fuel element fabrication core number is different from its core load number.

VII-1 I

I '

Fabrication Serial Initial Core Initial Core No. No. Load Number Operating Date 36 M0133 A-63 12-20-84 37 M0135 A-63 12-20-84 37 M0141 85-56 10-07-85 38 M0145 85-43 8-08-85 38 M0146 85-46 8-29-85 8-08-85 I 38 38 38 M0147 M0148 M0149 85-43 85-46 85-56 8-29-85 10-07-85 41 M0200 85-30 6-13-85 41 M0201 85-32 6-20-85 41 M0202 85-30 6-13-85 41 M0203 85-32 6-20-85 41 M0204 85-57 10-10-85 41 M0205 86-9 2-13-86 41 M0206 85-57 10-10-85 41 M0207 85-63 11-07-85 42 M0208 85-63 11-07-85 42 M0209 85-63 11-07-85 M0210 85-63 11-07-85 I 42 42 42 M0211 M0212 85-73 85-73 12-30-85 12-30-85 42 M0213 85-73 12-30-85 I 42 42 M0214 M0215 M0216 85-73 86-25 86-10 12-30-85 5-15-86 2-20-86 43 I 43 43 43 M0217 M0218 M0219 86-9 86-10 86-20 -

2-13-86 2-20-86 4-17-86 86-22 4-24-86 I 43 43 43 M0220 M0221 M0222 86-20 86-22 4-17-86 4-24-86 43 M0223 86-25 5-15-86 I 44 44 M0224 M0225 86-31 86-31 6-12-86 6-12-86 I 2. Fuel Shipping: Twenty-four spent fuel elements were shipped from MURR to Westinghouse Idaha Nuclear Company, Inc., Idaho Falls, Idaho. The identi-1 I fication numbers of these elements are:

! 'I M070 M0123 M0131 M0157 M077 M0124 M0150 M0160 M088 M0126 M0152 M0161 M0100 M0128 M0154 M0162 M0102 M0129 M0155 M0164 M0104 M0130 M0156 M0165 VII-2

3. Fuol Procurement: Babcock and Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia is MURR's curr:nt

{ fuel assembly fabricator. This work is contracted with the U. S. Department b of Energy and administered by E G & G Idaho, Idaho Falls, Idaho. As of 30 June 1986, twenty six fuel assemblies fabricated by B & W had been i

received and used in cores at 10 MW.

4. Licensing Activities: A request for an increase in Special Nuclear Material Inventory under our Facility License submitted in December,1982 is pending, 7

u A revision to Technical Specifications 4.4.d requiring two operating paral-lel pool pumps submitted in February,1982 is pending. A request for an

[

increase in the possession limit for depleted uranium, dated May,1986 is pending.

r- 5. Reactor Characteristic Measurements: Seventy three refueling evolutions L

were completed. An excess reactivity verification was performed for each

[ refueling and the average excess reactivity was 3.1%. MURR Technical Specification 3.1(f) requires that the excess reactivity be less than 9.8%.

~

Reactivity measurements were performed for 10 evolutions to verify l

reactivity parameters for the flux trap. Nine shim and regulating blade calibrations were performed.

f A physical inspection of the following fuel elements was performed to verify the operational parameters.

l M0103 from Core 33 during September 1985 M0112 f rom Core 34 during September 1985 All measurements were within operational requirements.

1 I VII-3

I SECTION VfIf

SUMMARY

OF RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS RELEASED TO THE ENVIRONMENT Sanitary Sewer Effluent 1 July 1985 through 30 June 1986 Descending Order of Activity Released Nuclide Amount (Ci) Nuclide Amount (C1) Nuclide Amount (Ci)

H3 1.49E+00 Sc46 1.04E-04 Ga72 1.36E-05 Ba139 1.36E-01 Re186 9.64E-05 In115M 1.33E-05 S35 1.88E-02 Cd109 8.36E-05 Hf181 1.24E-05 Na24 1.61E-02 Sm153 6.61E-05 Rul06 7.55E-06 Cr51 9.95E-03 Tc9MM 6.12E-05 Zr95 7.44E-06 P32 2.69E-03 1132 6.12E-05 Br82 4.65E-06 As77 1.79E-03 Mo99 5.25E-05 Ag108M 3.77E-06 Zn65 1.40E-03 Cel44 4.58E-05 Hg203 3.20E-06 Cu64 1.37E-03 Re188 4.53E-05 1131 3.17E-06 W187 1.11E-03 Cd115 4.20E K42 3.13E-06 Co60 8.58E-04 Pa233 3.25E-05 Sn113 2.93E-06 Cs137 7.30E-04 In116M 3.18E-05 CoS7 2.84E-06 Sb124 5.09E-04 Gd153 2.77E-05 Na22 2.57E-06 Tm170 4.09E-04 Rul03 2.40E-05 Au196 2.39E-06 Mn56 3.51E-04 1133 2.37E-05 Ru97 2.23E-06 Rh105 2.78E-04 Eu152 1.55E-05 As76 2.17E-06 Fe59 2.17E-04 Ba131 1.48E-05 Zn69M 1.27E-06 Mn54 1.27E-04 Ir192 1.42E-05 Cs134 1.11E-06 Ag110M 1.24E-04 Ba133 1.41E-05 Sb122 1.05E-04 CoS8 1.36E-05 I

VIII-1 l

l Stack Effluent 1 July 1985 through 30 June 1986 Descending Order of Activity Released l

Nuclide Amount (Ci)

Ar41 6.38E+02 H3 9.43E+00 Cl38 2.15E-03 1133 8.40E-04 1135 6.30E-04 1131 5.62E-04 1128 2.78E-04 1134 2.55E-04 K40 2.12E-04 As77 2.07E-04 Hg197 1.80E-04 1132 1.59E-04 Xe135M 1.30E-04 I

I I VIII-2 t

[ SECTION IX

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEYS 1 July 1985 through 30 June 1986 Environmental samples are collected two times per year at eight locations 7

and analyzed for radioactivity. These locations are shown in Figure 1. Soil and L

vegetation samples are taken at each location. Water samples are taken at three of the eight locations. Results of the samples are shown in the following tablec.

{

1. Sampled during October 1985.

Detection Limits Matrix Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium Water 1.02 pCi/l 2.59 pCi/l 114 pCi/l 16.7 pCi/ml Soil

  • 1.01 pCi/g 2.59 pCi/g 3.4 pCi/g ----

Vegetation

  • 1.25 pCi/g 3.17 pCi/g 6.0 pCi/g 16.7 pCi/g

{

  • Gamma and tritium analyses are based on wet weights, a & B analyses are based on dried weights.

Determined Radioactivity Levels Vegetation Samples Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) 1-V-28 < 1.25 10.92 < 6.0 < 16.7 2-V-28 < 1.25 20.84 < 6.0 < 16.7 7

L 3-V-28 < 1.25 27.07 < 6.0 < 16.7 4-V-28 < 1.25 11.16 < 6.0 < 16.7 5-V-28 < 1.25 10.47 < 6.0 < 16.7 6-V-28 < 1.25 16.21 < 6.0 < 16.7 7-V-28 < 1.25 23.05 < 6.0 < 16.7 10-V-28 < 1.25 17.22 < 6.0 < 16.7 IX-1

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l Figure 1. MURR Environmental Program Sample Stations i NOTE: September 1983 Cf ty sewerage plants at stations 8 and 9 closed. All waste water now processed at City Waste Treatment Facility at station 10. i

p Determined Radioactivity Levels L Soil Samples Sample Alpha Beta Gamma

[ (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) 1-S-28 < 1.01 12.14 6.5 2-S-28 < 1.01 12.37 5.5 3-S-28 < 1.01 7.32 5.4 4-S-28 < 1.01 3.69 4.0

[ 5-S-28 < 1.01 9.03 5.8 6-S-28 1.39 5.92 6.8 L 7-5-28 < 1.01 13.59 7 .1 F 10-S-28 < 1.01 27.12 7.3 L

Determined Radioactivity Levels Water Samples Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) 4-W-28 < 1.02 7.72 < 114 < 16.7 6-W-28 < 1.02 7.51 - < 114 < 16.7 r 10-W-28 < 1.02 7.62 < 114 < 16.7 L

2. Sampled during April 1986.

Detection Limits Matrix Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium

{ 150 pCi/1 15.8 pCi/mi Water 0.45 pCi/l 1.77 pCi/l Soil

  • 0.25 pCi/g 0.97 pCi/g 1.75 pCi/g ----

Vegetation

  • 1.49 pCi/g 5.85 pCi/g 3.58 pCi/g 4.1 pCi/g
  • Gamma and tritium analyses are based on wet weights, a and 8 analyses are based on dried weights.

IX-3 J

Determined Radioactivity Levels Vegetation Samples Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) 1-V-29 < 1.49 18.59 < 3.58 < 4.1 l 2-V-29 < 1.49 16.92 < 3.58 < 4.1

{ < 3.58 < 4.1 3-V-29 < 1.49 32.67 b 4-V-29 < 1.49 23.03 < 3.58 < 4.1 5-V-29 < 1.49 15.15 < 3.58 < 4.1 6-V-29 < 1.49 20.15 < 3.58 < 4.1 7-V-29 < 1.49 23.74 < 3.58 -

< 4.1

{ 21.70 < 3.58 < 4.1 10-V-29 < 1.49 b Determined Radioactivity Levels Soil Samples Sample Alpha Beta Gamma

[ (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) 1-S-29 < 0.25 10.14 5.96 l

2-S-29 0.38 10.22 4.16 l 3-S-29 0.34 7.05 - 4.41 4-S-29 0.78 6.84 2.78 l

5-S-29 0.46 10.31 3.44 6-S-29 < 0.25 3.06 1.14 l

7-S-29 < 0.25 9.61 4.42 l 10-S-29 0.46 7.16 4.99 Determined Radioactivity Levels l Water Samples Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) l 4-W-29 < 0.45 9.16 < 150.0 < 15.8 6-W-29 < 0.45 2.39 < 150.0 < 15.8 10-W-29 < 0.45 6.66 < 150.0 < 15.8 IX-4

Environmental samples were also collected around Sinclair RAD WASTE Facility at four locations. Soil and vegetation samples were taken at each location. Re-sults of these samples are shown in the following tables.

1. Sampled during October 1985.

Detection Limits

[ ' Matrix Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium Soil

  • 1.01 pCi/g 2.59 pCi/g 3.4 pCi/g ----

E L Vegetation

  • 1.25 pCi/g 3.17 pCi/g 6.0 pCi/g 16.7 pCi/g

-

  • Gamma and tritium analyses are based on wet weights, a & 8 analyses are based on dried weights.

Determined Radioactivity Levels Vegetation Samples Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g)

{

SF-1-V2 < 1.25 11.49 < 6.0 < 16.7 SF-2-V2 < 1.25 5.26 < 6.0 < 16.7 SF-3-V2 < 1.25 6.65 < 6.0 < 16.7 e SF-4-V2 < 1.25 23.56 < 6.0 < 16.7 e

Determined Radioactivity Levels

{ Soil Samples F Sample Alpha Beta Gamma L (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g)

SF-1-S2 < 1.01 12.49 7.6 SF-2-S2 < 1.01 9.54 7.1

[ SF-3-S2 < 1.01 12.33 7.1 SF-4-S2 < 1.01 10.36 7.1 F

IX-5

W

2. Sampled during April 1986.

Matrix Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium Soil

  • 0.24 pCi/g 0.95 pCi/g 1.68 pCi/g ----

Vegetation

  • 1.01 pCi/g 3.99 pCi/g 3.68 pCi/g 4.18 pCi/g
  • Gamma and tritium analyses are based on wet weights, a & S analyses are based on dried weights.

{

Determined Radioactivity Levels Vegetation Samples

{ Sample Alpha Beta Gamma Tritium (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g) (pCi/g)

SF-IV3 < 1.01 19.02 < 3.68 < 4.18 SF-2V3 < 1.01 11.94 < 3.68 < 4.18 SF-3V3 < 1.01 18.65 < 3.68 < 4.18 1

l SF-4V3 < 1.01 21.10 < 3.68 < 4.18 Radiation and Contamination Surveys i

The following table gives the number of surveys performed during FY 85-86.

Radiation Surface Contamination Air Samples l

1985 July 22 17 25 August 26 18 23 September 34 27 20 l October 41 30- 22 November 28 26 26 December 27 22 17 l

1986 January 43 32 21 l

February 41 30 20 March 58 50 21 April 40 29 22 May 51 41 22 June 35 26 21 TOTALS 446 348 260 Seventy-four (74) Radiation Work Permits were issued during the year.

IX-6 I

Miscellaneous Items The number of Radiation Work Permits increased from 44 during 1984-85 to 74

[ for the current year. This was due primarily to an increased emphasis by Health Physics to use Radiation Work Permits. A Health Physics procedure defining their use was issued July 16, 1985.

A new Health Physics procedure was issued to provide planning and radiation control for operations with anticipated personnel exposure exceeding one-third a

[ limit stated in 10CFR20.101.

Health Physics procedure #4, HANDLING RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL IN MURR P00L, was revised during the year to update the format.

Health Physics purchased an IBM XT personal computer (PC) in September 1985.

7 L

Health Physics record-keeping is in the process of being transferred to the PC.

[ MURR shipped 21 barrels of radwaste to Barnwell in a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensed cask, CNS-21-300, on November 21, 1985.

Reactor Health Physics was audited by the University Central Administration Radiation Safety Officer in April,1986. No significant problems were indicated in the report.

[ Several MURR staff members participated in a one day training exercise given by the Columbia Fire Department which included emergency breathing apparatus train-ing and operations in a special building where fires created temperatures up to 1500 F. In case of a fire at MURR, firemen would need MURR personnel to guide them in the facility.

[ Several pieces of equipment and procedures were put into use which contri-buted to the MURR ALARA effort.

1. The use of personal " beeper" type personal radiation monitors was instituted. It is estimated 1.5 manrem/ year can be avoided as a

{

result of these monitors.

IX-7

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

l I 2. In the Radioisotopes Applications laboratories, two additional glove l

boxes have been added. Two of the four boxes in use have been shielded with a lead sheet. A number of specialized tools for handling beta l emitters (e.g. Y-90) are currently being tested. All of the equipment will significantly reduce hand and upper body exposure for procedures now in development.

3. Neutron Activation Analysis personnel built a special lead brick and lead glass cave to store curie amounts of isotopes needed in high specific activity (e.g. a Ci Se-75 or Zn-65). The special storage eliminates the need to have more than one current experiment in a fume hood at one time.

I 4. A special study of sample handling by Reactor Services personnel resulted in procedure changes at the Hot Cell which prevents a manrem per year of wholebody exposure.

5. A machine to open large sample irradiation cans (5" diameter x 10" high) automatically in a controlled air cabinet prevents both a spread of I activated aluminum grinding particles and approximately 10 manrem per year.

I I

IX-8 I

M M M M M SECTION X

SUMMARY

OF RADIATION EXPOSURES TO FACILITY STAFF, EXPERIMENTERS AND VISITORS 1 July 1985 through 30 June 1986

1. Largest single exposure and average exposure are expressed in millirem.
2. Minimal exposure is defined to be gamma < 10 mrem; beta, < 40 mrem; neutron < 20 mrem.
3. M. E. = Number of monthly units reported with minimal exposure.
4. A. M. E. = Number of monthly units reported with exposure above minimal.
5. A. E. = Average mrem reported for all units above minimal.
6. H. E. = Highest mrem reported for a single unit for the month.

PERMANENT ISSUE FILM-BADGES Beta, Gamma, Neutron Wholebody Badges:

JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE ME 69 67 71 76 101 85 100 106 70 199 206 105 AME 84 69 67 75 43 61 57 47 74 51 59 72 AE 85 119 67 81 102 72 72 66 70 71 82 61 HE 430 310 240 340 320 280 690 230 510 250 390 220 Beta and Gamma Wholebody Badges:

JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE ME 52 54 51 55 66 62 67 70 49 123 129 65 AME 6 8 8 13 3 7 4 3 11 6 6 14 AE 23 34 23 17 30. 24 25 10 28 53 43 19 HE 80 150 60 50 70 70 40 20 190 210 150 30 TLD Finger Rings:

JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER . JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE ME 41 48 46 57 59 50 61 60 46 153 153 61 AME 46 38 45 41 39 47 38 45 49 47 47 67 AE 255 215 287 288 200 276 337 202 359 249 341 578 HE 1760 1740 1290 1620 770 985 4170 1290 1620 1880 2850 23560*-

  • During the year a SOP-HP22 Committee to Review Unplanned, Unusual Radiation Exposure was activated for three separate exposure events. Over exposures did not occur for two of the events. The third event is still under investigation at this time.

X-1

M M M M SPARE ISSllE FILM-BADGES Beta, Gamma, Neutron Wholebody Badges:

JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER N0" EMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRllARY MARCH APRIL MAY JllNE ME 40 39 43 33 39 41 43 38 37 80 90 14 AME 9 7 4 11 8 5 3 8 4 10 2 3 AE 31 41 28 51 43 50 83 45 115 51 10 33 HE 150 150 60 360 130 80 180 260 390 230 10 50 Beta and Gamma Wholebody Badges:

JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANilARY FEBRllARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE ME 29 29 29 32 32 34 32 32 30 48 64 20 AME 3 3 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 AE 13 53 15 20 0 0 0 0 0 138 0 0 HE 20 130 30 20 0 0 0 0 0 220 0 0 TLD Finger Rings:

JULY AllGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRllARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE ME 11 18 16 12 6 8 18 21 17 47 42 4 AME 8 2 5 8 22 6 6 2 4 19 6 4 AE 355 785 112 264 471 82 218 1800 730 578 593 1085 HE 1760 1490 230 730 2000 180 550 2410 1590 2200 1490 3410 DOSIMETERS JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE ME 6 3 6 4 4 12 3 9 12 3 2 8 AME 83 55 55 58 60 57 65 61 61 72 70 67 AE 83 65 62 75 100 61 60 49 55 45 85 57 HE 390 325 240 340 440 255 295 285 420 270 350 415 X-2

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -