ML20209C023

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Ack Receipt of 870223 Response to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/86-40
ML20209C023
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/22/1987
From: Gagliardo J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Deddens J
GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
References
NUDOCS 8704280568
Download: ML20209C023 (2)


See also: IR 05000458/1986040

Text

_

_

______

_ _ _ _

'

-

APR 2 21337

In Reply Refer To:

Docket: 50-458/86-40

Gulf States Utilities

ATTN: Mr. James C. Deddens

Senior Vice President, (RBNG)

Nuclear Licensing

P. O. Box 220

St. Francisville, Louisiana

70775

Gentlemen:

Thar,k you for your letter of February 23, 1987, in response to our letter

and Notice of Violation dated January 23, 1987. We have reviewed your reply

and find it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation. We

will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future

inspection to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be

maintained.

Sincerely,

ottend sWned By

-

.

J. E. G63!!ardo

J. E. Gagliardo, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch

cc:

Gulf States Utilities

ATTN:

J. E. Booker, Manager-

River Bend Oversight

P. O. Box 2951

Beaumont, Texas

77704

Louisiana State University,.

Government Documents Department

Louisiana Radiation Control Program Director

bec:

(seenextpage)

PI

C:R

C:RP

1

sj\\

RBen

cs V PJa

JEGag

rdo

g

/t.;/8

'(4/

7

4/t/8

gh

j

e704280568 870422

DR

ADOCK 050

8

.

.

.

.

.

..

-

,

,,

,

2-

Gulf States Utilities

-

.

bec to DMB-(IE01)

I

bec distrib. by RIV:

i

RPB

DRSP

Resident Inspector

R. D. Mtrtin, RA

i

SectionChief(RPB/A)

D. Weist;, RM/ALF

MIS System

RSB

RSTS Operator

Project Inspector

R&SPB

R. Hall-

RIV File

,

4

I

i

8

4

k

'

a

4

,

e'

!

d

w

, - - , - - , -

, , -

,

w

- , , - - . .-

4-

+. . - .s

- - , .- . .

y

_

t

G

h

GULF STATES

UTILITIES COMPANY

I

AlvER GENQ 5f AtiCN

POST OS68Ct 804 220

$? pm ANCiSVILLE LOV'511NA 7077%

A#f A OCDE 53d

535 6094

346 sett

February 23, 1987

RBG-

25392

File Nos. G9.5, G15.4.1

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Document Control Desk

Washington, D.C.

20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1

Refer to:

Region IV

Docket No. 50-458/ Report 86-40

This

supplemental

letter

responds

to

the Notice of Violation

contained

in

NRC

Inspection

Report

No.

50-458/86-40

The

inspection

was

performed by Messrs. D. D. Chamberlain and W. B.

O

Jones

during

the

period

December

1-31,

1986

of

activities

authorized

by

NRC

Operating

License

NPF-47

for

River

Bend

Station.

Gulf States Utilities

Company's

(GSU)

response

to

Notice

of

Violation

8640-01,

" Failure

to

Follow

Surveillance

Test

Procqdure", i:s pro.vided.in the enclosed

attachment

pursuant

to

10CF-R'2.201

and

10CFR50.4.

, Notice of Violatien.

This completes GSU's response to the

.

Sincerely,

/

J. C. Deddens

Senior Vice President

River Bend Nuclear Group

Attachment

cc:

Mr. Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Region IV

611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000

Arlington, TX

76011

River Bend Resident Inspector

P.O. Box 1051

h

St. Francisville, LA

70775

-> J . s 1. - -

M_e.

M 'T V d " * VYS

FROM U?NRC RIVER BEND

04/17/87 10:50

P.

2

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

--

e

4

turIED IWW!lS OF AMERICA

NOCIERR MKKHA50RY G30ESSICN

Im dE T IDUISIANA

PARISH T NEST PELICIANE

In the Matter of

Dodoet Mos. 50-458

GIF SDGElS tFTILITIES (X3@ANY

(River Bend Station,

Unit 1)

AITIDAVIT

J. C. Deddens, being duly sworn, states that he is a Senior Vice

President of Gulf States Utilities Cmpany; that he is authorized on the

part of said Campany to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory

Ctamission the documents attached hereto; and that all such documents

are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and

belief.

'

e-_

--

J. 4. Doddens

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Prblic in and for the

State and and Parish above named, this

day of bru6% 1h.

J

b lc !w W

u

1

[foanW.Middlebrooks

Notary Public in and for

West Feliciana Parish,

Louisiana

My Comnission is for Life.

FR0f1 USHRC RIVER BEND

04/17/87 10:50

P.

3

- _ _ .

.-

- -

__ ,

,

e

,

t

ATTACHMENT

RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION 50-45_8/8640-01

LEVEL IV

REFERENCE

Notice of Violation letter from J.

E.

Gagliardo to J. C.

Deddens

dated January 23, 1987.

REASON FOR THE VIOLATION

The

root

cause

was

determined

to

be

personnel

error.

The

procedure, Surveillance Test Procedure (STP)-209-0302, was

being

performed

to test the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) main

I

pump for operability in accordance with

Technical

Specification

l

4.7.3.b

and

4.0.5.

The

portion

of

the

procedure where the

violation

occurred

realigns

the

system

from

the

Condensate

Storage

Tank

(CST)

test

return

path to the minimum flow path

after completion of the pump flow test.

The test return

valves,

lE51*MOVF059

and

F022,

are

installed

in series and both were

required to be closed by step 7.4.29.

Step 7.4.30 verified

that

the

minimum

flow

valve

1E51*MOVF019

auto

opened

as

a

i

precautionary step to ensure the pump was not

operating

without

minimum flow.

l

The

next. step,

7.4.32,

(7.4.31

had been deleted by Temporary

Change Notice (TCN)) required

the

RCIC

pump

suppression

pool

suction valve,

lE51*MOVF031,

to be opened in preparation for a

check valve test.

The valve did not open as expected.

It was at

this

point

that- the

operator

at

the

controls

and the test

engineer realized that test return

valve

lE51*MOVF022

had

not

been

closed

as

required

by

Step

7.4.29.

1E51*MOVF031

is

interlocked not to open unless both IB61*MOVF059 and 1E51*MOVF022

are

closed.

This

ensures

there is no chance that suppression

pool water will be pumped to the CST even though the

closure

of

one of the valves will prevent it.

The

test

engineer

failed

to fully complete step 7.4.29 before

signing it off.

Possible

contributing

factors

are

discussed

below:

,

1

This

was

the

first

time

the test engineer performed this

-

particular STP.

This

engineer

was

certified

to

perform

In-Service

Tes.ing

(IST) pump and valve STPs and had in the

past performed numerous other pump

and

valve

STPS

without

incident.

Because

he had not performed this particular STP

before, he was briefed by the Process Systems Supervisor as a

precaution

prior

to

performing

the STP.

Because the test

A

methods and STP's for pump and

valve

In-Service

Inspection

1

(ISI)

testing

are

very

similar

and consistent, it is not

required to assign an engineer who has

previously

performed

the

STP.

Per

ASME

IWA

2300,

ANSI /ASME

N45.2.6-1978,

FROM USNRC RIVER BEND

04/17/87 10:51

P.

4

_ _ _ _ _

_

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. s s

.

4

ATTACHMENT (cont'd)

ANSI /ANS/ANS 3.1-1978, Reg Guide 1.8,

Reg

Guide

1.58,

and

Tech

Staff

Procedure

(TSP)-0001, the engineer was properly

qualified and certified to perform the STP.

It

is

believed

that

the

above

did

not

contribute

directly to the valve

error.

The communication techniques used by the

test

engineer

and

-

the

operator

at

the

controls

were

inadequate

to ensure

instructions given by the test engineer

were

fully

carried

out and confirmed step by step.

It is believed that the lack

of formal communications during the test contributed

to

and

led directly to the valve error.

It is the responsibility of

the test engineer to ensure proper communications

are

being

used during a test.'

The

STP

was

in

the

revision

process

to incorporate the

-

existing

temporary

changes

when

the

violation

occurred.

There

were

no

existing temporary changes to Step 7.4.29 in

which the valve error occurred.

The STP instructed the performer to close

two

valves

in

a

-

single

step.

It is not uncommon to perform two aut ;;ns in a

single step if a)

the actions are closely related.

b)

the

failure

to

perform

one

action

will

not adversely impact

safety or give a test

result

which

appears

valid

but

is

actually

invalid

and

c)

the

step

is

not

a

double

verification restoration step.

The

failure

to

close one of the test return valves in Step

7.4.29 reaulted only in the inability

to

perform

the

next

action

step.

The closure of the valves can be performed in

parallel, and either one will shutoff flow in the line.

The

engineer

failed

to fully read the step and confirm that the

step was

fully

implemented

prior

to

signing- it

off

as

complete.

Although

there were two actions in the step, the

performance of any single or double action step can

fail

if

the

performer does not fully read it, follow it, and finally

confirm it.

CORRECTI_VE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND THE RESULTS ACHIEVED

TCN #86-1947 was issued on 12/23/86 to change

Step

7.4.29

into

two separate steps.

Revision

2

of

STP-209-0302

was expedited and issued on 2/3/87

prior to the next performance on 2/5/87

[\\

Field Engineering personnel responsible for performing

ISI

pump

and

valve

STPs

attended

a

documented

departmental

training

session on

1/20/87.

The

major

subjects

covered

during

the

!

i

FROM USHRC RIVER BEND

04/17/87 10:52

P.

5

..

.

. _

__._-

,

4

ATTACHMENT (cont'd)

training

included

a

discussion

of

the

violation, corrective

actions, recent NRC questions on past

STP

performances,

proper

completion

of .

the

survei1>ance

Test

Scheduling

Completion / Exception Forms, recent changes in the Pump and

Valve

Test

Plan, proper communication techniques to use during testing

activities, etc.

Departmental training sessions

have

been

and

will

continue

to be given on an as-needed basis to ensure Field

Engineering

personnel

are

knowledgeable

of

the

latest

developments in their areas of responsibility.

CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO AVOID F_URTHER VIOLATIONS

In

addition to the corrective steps already discussed above, the

following is being taken:

Field Engineering is presently undergoing

-

a

reorganization.

It

is

intended

that

a

new

organization within

Field

Engineering will

take

responsibility

of

performing

Field

Engineering surveillance testing activities, including ISI of

pumps

and

valves.

Rather

than

using

numerous

system

engineers

to

perform

the tests, a small group of qualified

engineers and technicians will

perform

the

testing.

This

effort

was in the planning stages prior to the violation and

is progressing on an independent schedule.

,

.

ADM-0003, " Development, Control and Use.of. Procedures",

Step

-

6.7.1,

requires

all

QA applicable procedures in continuous

.

.use to be reviewed no less than every two years.

It

is

the

policy

of Field Engineering to revise a procedure within two

years as part of this review if a significant TCN against the

procedure

exists

and/or

if

significant programmic changes

need to be made to it.

It is also

the

policy

that

if

an

extensive

TCN

exists that could adversely affect the proper

performance of the procedure, the procedure shall be

revised

as

soon

as

possible.

The

subject

procedure

was in the

process of being revised when

the

violation

occurred.

To

expedite

the

revision

of the remaining procedures, the new

organization discussed above will establish this task as

one

of

its

top

priorities.

It

is

planned

that a qualified

engineer will be assigned full time to accomplish this task.

DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED

Corrective actions, other than the procedural revisions on

other

similar

STPs, have been completed.

Revisions on other STPs will

be completed prior to the respective two year review

limit.

In

A

most

cases,

this

will occur by the end of 1987.

The procedure

I

revisions

will

be

prioritized

according

to

the

number

and

complexity of the TCNs and then by the required review dates.

BEND

04/17/87 10:52

P.

6

TOTAL P.

6