ML20209B342
| ML20209B342 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1986 |
| From: | Heltemes C NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | Rossin A NUCLEAR SAFETY ANALYSIS CENTER |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209B180 | List: |
| References | |
| AEOD-C602, NUDOCS 8609080216 | |
| Download: ML20209B342 (3) | |
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August 20, 1986 Dr. A. David Rossin, Director AE0D/C602 Nuclear Safety Analysis Center 3412 Hillview Avenue P. O. Box 10412 Palo Alto, California 94303
Dear Dr. Rossin:
Subject:
Case Study Report--Operational Experience -Involving Turbine Overspeed Trips Following resolution of peer review comments received from INPO, the Terry Corporation, and various NRC offices, the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data has finalized its case study report on operational experience involving turbine overspeed trips in light water reactors. We have enclosed a copy of our final report for your information and use as you may deem appropriate.
This study was performed in response to action item 8(f) of the actions directed by the ED3 to respond to the NRC staff investigations of the June 9, 1985 event at Davis-Besse. A total of 128 turbine overspeed t.ip events involving AFW, HPCI and RCIC systems were reviewed. Overspeed trips of AFW turbines were found to be relatively widespread and one of the major causes for loss of operability or unavailability of AFW systems. This study concludes that the dominant attributed causes of AFW turbine overspeed trips are speed control problems associated with the governor, and trip and reset problems associated with the trip valve and overspeed trip mechanism. The governor speed control problems involve:
(1) slow response of the governor during quick startup, (2) entrapped oil in the Woodward Model PG-PL governor speed setting cylinder, (3) incorrect governor setting, and (4) water induction into the turbine. The trip and reset problems stem from the complexfty of reset operations and a lack of trip position indication. These problems are primarily the result of inadequate performance by plant personnel, inadequate procedures, and insufficient design considerations.
The enclosed case study report contains several specific recommendations aimed at addressing the root causes of the reported failures. These recommendations are currently being reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff.
A copy of the final case study report and this letter are being placed in the Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20555.
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Dr. A. David Rossin 2-If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact Chuck Hsu of my staff. Mr. Hsu can be reached at (301) 492-4443.
Sincerely, wspedW C.J. W A C. J. Heltemes, Jr.,. Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
Enclosure:
As Stated DISTRIBUTION:
PDR AE0D SF AE0D CF R0AB SF ROAB CF CHsu MChiramal SRubin WLanning KBlack MWilliams.
FHebdon CHeltemes DHumenansky, OCM i
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- See next sheet for previous concurrence OFC
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- SC:ROAB
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- NAME : CHsu:as
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- DATE
- 8/15/86*
- 8/15/86*
- 8/15/86*
- 8fu)/86
- 8/40/86 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Dr. A. David Rossin If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact Chuck Hsu of my staff. Mr. Hsu can be reached at (301) 492-4443.
C. J. Heltemes, Jr., Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
Enclosure:
As Stated DISTRIBUTION:
POR AE00 SF AE0D CF ROAB SF R0AB CF CHsu MChiramal SRubin WLanning KBlack MWilliams FHebdon CHeltemes
- BC:ROAB
- DD:AE00
- D:AEOD 0FC
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DATE : 8//t'/86 8/[5/86
- 8/ /86
- 8/ /86
- 8//f/86 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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- g er CHAIRMAN CAReed LRobinson 11 Springer SSchuyler DXasun IE I; MSS SECY OCA DGrinsley ED0 R/F The Honorable George H. W. Bush President of the United States Senate Washington, D. C.
20510
Dear Mr. President:
In accordance with the provisions of Section 207(a) of Public Law 96-295 of June 30, 1980, enclosed is the report on the nondisclosure of Safeguards Information by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the quarter ending June 30,~1986.
Sinc rely, i
T o as M. Roberts Acting Chairman
Enclosure:
As Stated (Originated by CAReed:ADf-i/DRR) 7
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The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Washington, D. C.
20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
In accordance with the provisions of Section 207(a) of Public Law 96-295 of June 30, 1980, enclosed is the report on the nondisclosure of Safeguards Info'rmation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the quarter ending June 30, 1986.
Sin
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I mas Rober Acting Chairman
Enclosure:
As Stated
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION QUARTERLY REPORT ON N0NDISCLOSURE.0F SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of specific types of Safeguards Information. This section also directs the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to prescribe such regulations as necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards Information. NRC's regulations implementing Section 147 were published in the Federal Register on October 22, 1981 (46 FR 51718). The attachment to this report identifies the specific types of information, documents, and reports that are protected from unauthorized disclosure.
Section 147 also requires that the NRC report on a quarterly basis the Commission's application during that period of every regulation or order prescribed or issued under this section. During the period April 1, 1986 thr'ough June 30, 1986, the NRC did not withhold any Safeguards Information from public disclosure under the provisions of the implementing regulations.
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t ATTA'CHMENT IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC TYPES OF INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE 1.
Physical Protection at Fixed Sites Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to the protection of facilities that process formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and power reactors.
Specifically:
(i)
The composite physical security plan for the nuclear facility or site.
(ii)
Site specific drawings, diagrams, sketches, or maps that substantially represent the final design features of the physical protection system.
(iii)
Details of alarm system layouts showing location of intrusion detection devices, alarm assessment equipment, alarm system wiring, emergency power sources, and duress alarms.
(iv)
Written physical security orders and procedures for members of the security organization, duress codes, and patrol schedules.
(v)
Details of the on-site and off-site communications systems that are used for security purposes.
(vi)
Lock combinations and mechanical key design.
(vii)
Documents and other matter that contain lists or locations of certain safety-related equipment explicitly identified in the document as vital for purposes of physical protection, as contained in physical security plans, safeguards contingency plans, or plant specific safeguards analyses for production or utilization facilities.
(viii)
The composite safeguards contingency plan for the facility or site.
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(ix)
Those portions of the facility guard qualification and training plan which disclose features of the physical security system or response procedures.
(x)
Response plans to specific threats detailing size, disposition, response time, and armament of responding forces.
(xi)
Size, armament, and disposition of on-site reserve fcrces.
(xii)
Size, identity, armament, and arrival times of off-site forces committed to respond to safeguards emergencies.
2.
Physical Protection in Transit Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or Natienal Security Information relative to the protection of shipments of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and spent fuel.
Specifically:
(i)
The composite transportation physical security plan.
(ii)
Schedules and itineraries for specific shipmentr,.
(Routes and quantities for shipments of spent fuel are not withheld from public disclosure. ScheJules for spent fuel shipments may be released 10 days after the last shipment of a current series.)
(iii)
Details of vehicle inmobilization features, intrusion alarm devices, and connunication systems.
(iv)
Arrangements with and capabilities of local police response forces, and locations of safe havens.
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Details regarding limitations of radio-telephone com.nunications.
(vi)
Procedures for response to safeguards emergencies.
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3.
Inspections, Audits, and Evalutions Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to safeguards inspections and reports.
Specifically:
Portions of safeguards inspection reports, evaluations, audits, or investigations that contain details of a licensee's or applicant's physical security system or that disclose uncorrected defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities in the system.
Information regarding defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities may be released after corrections have been made. Reports of investigations may be released after the investigation has been completed, unless withheld pursuant to other authorities, e.g., the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).
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