ML20209B221
| ML20209B221 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/09/1999 |
| From: | Merrifield J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Vietticook A NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209B181 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-99-024-C, SECY-99-24-C, NUDOCS 9907060304 | |
| Download: ML20209B221 (3) | |
Text
,
NOTATION VOTE RESPONSE SHEET TO:
Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary FROM:
COMMISSIONER MERRIFIELD
SUBJECT:
SECY-99-024 - RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SAFEGUARDS PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT TASK FORCE (WITS 199800188)
Approved Disapproved Abstain Not Participating COMMENTS:
See attached comments.
AWW SIGNATiTRF '
-7 9
DATE Entered on "AS" Yes x
No l W e8Es agg2, CORRESPONDENCE PDR
/1070 Go bC[
r-I Commissioner Merrifield's comments The specific recommendt.tions proposed by the Safeguards Performance Assessment Task Force in SECY-99-024 are acceptable to a degree, but both the paper and the recommended actions are lacking some key components. Specifically (1) the paper does not adequately address the decisions that placed the NRC in the position it is in today and (2) the recommendations do not address potential future changes in the design basis threat. However, I can still support the recommendations of the paper with th6 modifications described below.
First, the paper states that the plants were licensed to satisfy the design basis threat in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(a). The SECY paper implies that the actuallicensing action was only a paper review for the design basis threat. When the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) revealed deficiencies in achieving the design basis threat, the staff stated that they could not require modifications to fix the deficiencies because a back-fit analysis would have to be conducted first. This implies that an actual physical check of the design basis is not adequate to say that the original paperwork review may not be accurate. This decision, as described in the paper, comes across as bureaucratic and not safety conscientious. This may not be what the staff meant to imply in the paper, but the paper should have been more specific '
as to the staff's reasoning. What complicates the issue is that apparently a policy decision was made to allow the licensee to increase their security measures well above what they committed to in the license as part of the OSRE. So the OSRE did not really evaluate if the minimum conditions described in the licensing process were adequate to protect against a design basis threat. But even under these circumstances, dAiencies were found. In addition, the security plan was reviewed during licensing against the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 (b) through (h).
But for some reason, not explained in the paper, the Regions were instructed to limit their inspection to the security plan. The inspectors were specifically instructed that they could issue no violations against 10 CFR 73.55(a), even though i+ was part of the Mensing basis of the plant. The' ' actions raise several questions that were not adequately addressed in the paper.
Why were the OSRE allowed to be conducted with security measures well above the licensing commitments without, at least, evaluating if the minimum licensing conditions are adequate?
This is of particular concern since licensees could remove the additional measures beyond their licensing basis at any time without even notifying the NRC. Why is requiring a plant to meet its originallicensing basis a back-fit? Why are the NRC inspectors not inspecting compliance for all of 10 CFR Part 73.55? The staff may have adequate responses to al; of these questions, but they were not in the SECY paper. At a minimum, an answer to these questions should be provided in the rulemaking package to satisfy recommendation 1 of the Safeguards Performance Assessment Task Force.
The actions recommended by the Safeguards Performance Assessment Task Force appear to adequately address the current problem before the staff. However, what the SECY paper does not address is the staff's plan for evaluating the adequacy of the design basis threat on a generic basis. What is the process for periodically evaluating the fundamental basis of the design basis threat and determining if a back-fit of a new design basis threat is necessary for all plants? It is riot a simple matter of saying a back-fit analysis will be conducted to see if new security requirements should be placed on licensees. Many elements of security are based on l
current threat conditions world-wide as rcported by the intelligence agencies (i.e., the size, power, and delivery method for explosive devices; number of insiders assumed in an evaluation)
}
and are not readily amenable to a standard back-fit analysis. The staff needs to commit to a procedure for generically evaluating the design basis threat and reporting to the Commission.
a At a minimum, the staff should periodically (perhaps yearly) request a closed Commission meeting to discuss the staff's current generic evaluation of the adequacy of the design basis
. threat requirements and recommendations for either maintaining or changing the current requirements.
y i
4 i