ML20209B038
| ML20209B038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1985 |
| From: | Selman M CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8702030506 | |
| Download: ML20209B038 (12) | |
Text
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WM VWJ Presusent f'
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
,1 Indian Point Station Broadway & Bleakley Avenue Buchanan. NY 10511 Telephone (914) 737-8116 January 28, 1987 f
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 i
Re: Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
Indian Point Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-247
Dear Sir:
Enclosed please find two (2) copies of Indian Point Unit No. 2 Changes, Tests and Experiments for the year 1985 as required by 10 CFR 50.59(b).
i Should you or your staff have any questions, please contact us.
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Very truly yours,.
1 Attachment
- C f
19.190.1.14.1 i
cc:
Dr. Thomas E. Murley j
Regional Administrator - Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 38 Buchanan, NY 10511 1
I l ADOCK050g.47 8702030506 87
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PDR R
CHANGES, TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS - 1985 Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
Indian Point Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-247 January 28, 1987 4
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Preface Discussed herein are summaries for written safety evaluations performed for changes at Indian Point Unit 2 completed in 1985.
These changes have been evaluated and determined to meet the following criteria as established by 10 CFR 50.59.
It has, therefore, been concluded that none of these changes represents an unreviewed safety question.
Criteria 1.
The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report has not been increased.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report has not been created.
3.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical speci-fication has not been reduced.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS ITEM TITLE 1.
Installation of Tool Racks for Burnable Poison Rod Assembly (BPRA) Handling Tool and Spacer Tool Inside the Spent Fuel Pool 2.
Construction of Administrative Facilities 3.
Replacement of Circulating Water Pumps Having Two-Speed Motors 4.
Installation of Accumulator Topping Pump System 5.
Installation of Test Connections to the Injection Lines of the Isolation Valve Eeal Water System (IVSWS) 6.
Replacement of Certain IVSWS Failed-Closed Valves with Fail-Open Valves 7.
Installation of Tool Room on 95' Elevation of Containment 8.
Operation and Dewatering of CNSI Mobile Demineralizer System per EH&S Procedure 4.200, Rev. 1 l
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l.
Installation of Tool Racks for Burnable Poison Rod Assembly (BPRA)
Handling Tool and Spacer Tool Inside the Spent Fuel Pool.
This modification involved the installation of a new rack, positioned and bolted on the west wall of the pool cask area.
It also involved the slight modification of the stop bar of the existing tool rack to store a new BPRA handling tool in the location previously assigned to the Rod Cluster Control Rod changing tool.
The installation of bolts to the concrete structure was performed in accordance t"
all applicable codes and specifications so as to not have any degrading effects on the structure or other existing system.
The rack installation was seismic Category I.
The modification also involved the temporary lowering of the spent fuel pool water level by approximately nine inches while the pool was completely isolated from the reactor cavity water inventory. This was performed under administrative controls including direct observation and in coordination with refueling and/or fuel shuffling procedures so as to have no impact on safety.
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2.
Construction of Administrative Facilities The purpose of the project is to provide permanent administrative facilities for various organizations at Indian Point.
The project involved the refurbishing of 10,000 ft2 of unused area in the Indian Point 1 Superheater Building at elevations 88'-
6",
105'- 6",
112'- 6" and 135'- 6" following the removal of retired superheater associated equipment from these areas.
The new facilities contain no safety related equipment and there is no safety related equipment in the surrounding area.
The loading on the building is reduced because of the equipment removal, therefore the response of the Superheater Building and the adjacent Control Building during a Safe Shutdown Earthquake is not adversely affected.
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s 3.
Replacement of Circulating Water Pumps Having Two-Speed Motors This modification involves the replacement of the main condenser one-speed motor circulating water pumps with pumps having two-speed motors thus enabling to take water from the river at two different flow rates.
This modification was performed in accordance with the Indian Point Unit No. 2 cooling tower settlement agreements.
The new pumps, which have the same configuration as the previous pumps, are located at the intake structure and have speed changing control panels installed near the pumps.
The circulating water pumps are non-safety related components and their postulated failure is compensated for by plant safety analysis / design features. The new pumps perforn the same function as the previous pumps while providing additional operational flexibility.
No safety related systens are affected by this modification.
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4.
Installation of Accumulator Topping Pump System A new pumping system has been installed in yprallel with the three safety injection pumps.
This new Accumulatof Topping Pump System is designed to fill the accumulators rather than using the safety injection pumps No. 22 or No. 23 as has been done in the past.
This modification is intended to relieve the SI pumps from performing the routine task of maintaining proper water level in the ECCS accumulators.
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h The topping pump is a double-diaphravn type with a capacity Of 10gpm.
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S It is located in the Safety Injection'Gystem pump cage and is operated 7 [
y from a local key-locked push; button switch.
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, The supply line to the pump suction is a 1"-diameter pipe fron line
' No.'60.
Two manual isolation valves and a safety relief valve; are
' located in this line.
s The discharge line from the pump is a 3/4"-diar.eter' pipe from line No. 16. Mt is equipped with a safety relief valve, a pressure gauge, a manual isolation valve and two check valves.
The check valves prevent backflow in cose the safe.ty injection pumps are required for duty.
An ad'ditional check salve is 11 stalled at the discharge of the safety injection pump No.,j.2 to prevent backfjow through this pump when the toppi.ng system is used.
ud The ' topping pump with itsiassociated pi. ping and valves are capable of W
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'withritanding S Bafe shutdown earthquakes thus, there is no safety impact on theispfpty injection system.
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TheeiditihnalcheckvalveonN safety injection pump No. 22 and two J
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. discharge; check valves from the topping pump are part of the ASME Section XI Inservice Testing Program.
'Administrati controls to normally maintain the topping system in the isolated condition are in place.
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5.
Installation of Test Connections to the Injection Lines of the Iso-lation Valve Seal Water System (IVSWS)
This modification involves the addition of test connections to the IVSWS injection lines to provide an installed method of leak testing the IVSWS check valves without disassembling and reassembling the system each time.
Swagelok tee connections were installed between the isolation valve and check valve of each seal line with shut-off valves in the main seal line upstream of each check valve.
The tee was connected to a Swagelok globe valve backed up by a Swagelok cap.
For testing, the cap is removed, the test apparatus is connected and the shut-off valve is opened.
The additions, which were made to the same specifications and quality requirements as the existing system (Seismic Category I), improved the IVSWS reliability / testability without impacting safety.
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6.
Replacement of Certain IVSWS Failed-Closed Valves with Fail-Open Valves In 1984 a separate isolation valve seal water system header for the non-radioactive systems was added to prevent their contamination from radioactive systems by way of the IVSWS manifolds.
In 1985, the normally closed valves 1410, 1413, 3518 and 3519 which belong to the seal water supply for the non-radioactive systems were changed to operate on a fail-open mode rather than on a fail-closed mode.
This change of status improves system reliability by effecting pressurization of the system upon loss of pover/ instrument air to the IVSWS tank discharge valves.
In terms of safety, this is an improvement since the valves will now operate in a more conservative manner.
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7.
Installation of Tool Room on 95' Elevation of Containment A permanent 8' x 8' x 20' container was installed on the 95' elevation of the containment for tool storage.
The container is made out of heavy gauge steel and weighs, including a full load of tools, 14,000 lbs.
It was placed at a location where there was no equipment. An analysis showed that the container with tools can be supported under normal operating loads and Seismic I conditions by the steel beam supported flooring of the 95' elevation.
An additional analysis showed that due to the placement of the container and its weight, no significant movement of the container could take place during a seismic event.
Thus the container was not bolted or braced to the containment structure. There is deemed to be no safety impact on the containment structure or safety equipment due to the placement of this container.
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Operation and Dewatering of CNSI Mobile Demineralizer System Per EH&S Procedure 4.200, Rev. 1 This operation involved a new method for transfering and packaging spent resin using a mobile sluicable demineralizer system manufactured by CNSI.
In accordance with IE Circular 80-18, the following failure modes were evaluated to preclude a potential uncontrolled release to the environments spills of spent resin or influent water from the sluicable pressure vessels, the spent resin transfer line, or the high integrity container (HIC).
The evaluation considered the design features and testing to assure proper performance of the system, the personnel and procedural controls in place to deal with inadvertent malfunctions / spills, and that the postulated consequences of an inadvertent spill would be far below the IE Circular 80-18 guidelines.
Through the combination of equipment design barriers and administrative procedural controls, it was determined that the probability or consequences of an inadvertent release were not increased and that the possibility of an accident of a different type would not be created.
It was also determined that there would be no impact on the technical specifications or their bases by implementing this procedure.
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