ML20209A759

Partially Withheld Osre Rept on 920309-12.Portions Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790)

ML20209A759
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	03/03/1992
From:	Dube R, Orrik D NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20209A765	List: ML20209A759 ML20212J358 ML20212J365
References
FOIA-99-80 NUDOCS 9907060141
Download: ML20209A759 (23)

Text

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DiC106URE U.S. NOCIEAR REGUIAITY CD ISSION OFFICE OF NOCEEAR REACIm REI;UIATICN P

NRC Inspection Repu.L: Operaticral Safeguards Ra=ycamie Evaluaticn License Nos: DPR-13, NPF-10, NPF-15

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Docket: 50-206, 50-361, 50-362 Licensee:

Southern California Edison Ctmpany

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Facility Name:

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Statico Units 1, 2 & 3 Inspection at: San Clanente, CA Inspection conducted: March 9-12, 1992 Inspection 'Amm:

David N. Orrik, Team Tmar, NRR t

Michael S. Warren, Security SP'=-4=14=t, NRR zan-Shing Hsu, Nuclear Engineer, NRR

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Matthew D. Schuster, Senior Physical Security Sper ialiat,' R-V NRC Otnsultants:

U.S Fu m uel i

Approved by:

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d 3/ 7/ /92 Dav*

N. Orrik, Team i m & P Date Signed ormance A=mc-uL Secticn Reactor Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Approved by:

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Robert J. Dube, Chief Date Signed Perfonnance Accc-cs-ni Secticn Reactor Safeguards Branch -

Division of Reactor Irmpcction and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

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EDE F22uer SAN QOFRE NUC1 EAR GENERATDC SIATIm UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 OPEPATIGE SAFH30ARDS RESIGSE EVAIDATICH 6

.- r SAFH30ARD3 INFORMATICN DETERMDUd'ICH MADE BY 3d //92 Signatufe-Title-Office-Date Rcbert J. Duba, Chief Perforrance hd. Section Reactor Safeguards Beralcf1 Divisicri of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulaticx1 11 -

violation of d sarements prote sEleet sarecuanos twronwartow or to civit RIMINAL Peneltfes.

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SAN CNOPRE NUCEEAR GENERATING STATIN INIIS 1, 2, AND 3

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OPERATICNAL SAFEGUARDS RESKNSE EVAUATICN PART I OERATICHAL SAFDGUARN READINESS REVM I

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1.~ 0 R'RFCsE T.h2 IGC c: '.i?.ed an Operational Safeguards Respcnse Evaluaticn (OSRE Sr.:them C:lifcInia FHiceri Cbtpany's San Onofre Nuclear Generating Stati e

f_a Farch 9 thru:gh en 12, 1992.

cheat 50 r.iles rarth of San Diego, California.'Ibe plant is located in Sc San Gnofre thit 1 is a Mrgase IMR with a licensed power of 1347 MYt.

Units 2 ard 3 are C3 ustica Engineering IHRs with a lice ~M pcwer output of 3390 Mit each One of the two pu.m of the OSRE, addressed in this Part I, was to e/aluate the licensee's ability to respcrd to an exte.rnal threat.

'Ihe general parferrance cbjective of 10 CFR 73.55(a) requires a licensee's physical protecticn ptwie.m to be designed to protect agamst the design basis threat of radiolcgical cabotage as stated in Section 10 CFR 73.1(a).

Secticn 10 CER 73.55(h) ircitdes a requirenent that the licensee take iW4te wm=rres t reatralize a threat'by requirirg armed respcnse perr<nnel to inte.-p o

trMyes between vital areas ard any adversary attc::ptirg ent:y for the pnTose of radiological sabotage while concurrently requestirs assistan frm Iccal law e.nfo m rait agencies.

In carductire its evaluation, the QSEE team fccused en the interactions beteen cperations ard security in establishirg priorities for protection of equipaent and en the defensive strategies used 1.1 EVAILTATICN FfmODOLOGY

-:0 h 'Ibe evaluation team consisted of a ruclear ergineer ard safeguards frus the Office of Nuclear Reactor tion _(NRR)_ard_the_NRC's recicn_al_

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SAN ONOFRE 1, 2 & 3 I-2 s.

• {y In cmductim this evaluatico, the OSRE tmm ocosidered a spectrtm of externa

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adversaries with varyim characteristics.

'Ibe lower range consisted of one dedicated iniividual.with no spu ial terrorist trainig, armed with a shoulder fired weaptn ard unremially available explosives to rtwwy safety wri ent

'Ihe Wde was bounded by the characteristics of the design basis thmat for P

radiological sabotage specified in 10 CFR 73.1(a).

'Ihe external design basis threat is defiaed as "A de6rmined violent external a m nit, attack by stealth or %ve acticos, of several perscns with the following attrih+ae, assistance and equipnent:

(A) Well-trainsId (irx::ltuling ' military training and skill) and dedicated indivirinals, (D) inside assistance linich may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in a passive zule s

provide information), an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit disable alarms and cmmunications, participate in violent attack)

, or both, (C) suitable weapons, up to ard includig hard-held autmatic weapons equipped with silencers and having long rarge accuracy, (D) hand carried equip:ent, includig irrapacitatig agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or otherwise for destroying reactor, facility, trarmter, or cmtainer integrity or features of the safeguards system."

Ilowever, for the purposes of thd OSRE the teaPassumed that the role of a potential insider would be passiveprd limited to information about the location of and routes %

important+ safety equipnent.

Much of this information would also be available in public <b'm=nt rocras.

'Ihe team did not crnsider attack by stealth ard limited its cmsideration of rianaptive acts to those performed after overt penetration into the protected area.

'Ihe team a==ai that significant radiological release would be the objective of power reactor radiological sabotage ard used presention of significant core damage as an evaluation criterion.

'Ihis criterien makes adversary arv,a" more difficult ard nere ao:urately reflects significant public health and safety concerns than would a criterien of preventien of damage of any piece of vital equignent.

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'Ibe ervcluation began team arrived cm site.

th a preliminary target analysis perfr m d before the-

'Ihis analysis marb use of informatica fra earlier reports' and emannications cm San Onofre, including the Regu Effectiveness Review I=v at i==wl in 1985, the' plant's Final S f t Report (PSAR), the Facility Systems Analysis for San Onofre Unit a e y Analysis Ice Alamos National Ird

.Lxy, and the Southern Onlifornia 1Miarn 0:m s 1, 2 & 3 by Target Analyses for Unit 1, dated AuJust pany's

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16, 1990, and for Units 2 & 3, dated October 22,1990. 'Ibe results were further analyzed by an NRR t identified several potential target sets ~which, if disabled eam webar, who to significant oore rharye.

, would likely lead target sets with the licensee's operations staff to cxmf analysis and to determine whether additional targets should be adda e team's the sets.

Available arrir==nt whids could help to achieve ard maintain h

. o any of shutdown was added to target sets regardless of whether the eq o

designated as vital or safety grade, further cxmplicatire th n

a been hypothetical adversary.

e task for a prevent radiological release were also ccmsidered.In sczne

'Ihese target sets were used by the team in selecting drills to be r*=arved and in cxmduc table-top exercises.

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'Ihe team's initial effort on-site was to walk around the plant potential protected area entry points, routes, and distances either to

, observirg equipnent or to doors providing access to equipnent included in tar

'Ibe team also noted the normal duty staticms of personnel who m get sets.

participate in a contirgency respcmse and the locaticos where specia contingency response equipment was stored.

{ g) During the next two days the team r+r.atved five licensee In each drill, mock adversaries ran up to the protected area f simulate penetrating into the protected area; and then attempted t ence; delayed to identified safety equipnent targets.

o reach Aamvity personnel r+ded frcan their normal duty stations and attengted to interdict the adversaries drill controllers judged the autocane of adversaryr-Licensee reder engagements. 'Ihe i

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I_4 tu) team did not actively psrticipate in the drills.

'Ihe team's irput for drills was limited to the selecticn of a target set, adversary characteristics entry points at' the protected area perimeter.

, and For one drill, the licensee selected an adversary force that errwadad the NRC's desip basis thre drills and team input parameters were within the so$pe of those remn ll All by the licensee.

a y used A team==her r+==W the licensee's critique of eacti drill.

'the team also conducted six table-tcp drills.

'these drills sim0ated overt external assaults.

Ibr eacti exercise, team==hars interviewed a licensee contingency response team leader.

An OSRE team==har identified adversary characteristics, entry point into the protected area, and movement to safety equipment.

'Ibe response team lamaar indicated how the reding security officers would be deployed.

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'Ibe r@aie team landar and the OSRE team seuer s then estimated the time required for the adversaries to rea h

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designated targets ard the response officers to reach interdicting c

haead on the actual locations of the r5gading office positions, rs at the time of the exercise.

..: 8 g 'Ihe team used its target set analysis ard the results of the drills to evaluate the licensee's efforts at establishing priorities for protection equipnent; the ability of responding officers to arrive at suitable of interdicting positions in thnply fashion, in sufficient numbers

, and appropriately armed and equipped; and the licensee's defensive strate deployment of response officers and equipnent.

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'Ibe team evaluated how drills were being used both as a trailling tool aid as a means of self-audit of th defensive strategy.

tactical movement, tr=nand, cua.wl, and trumnticaticos'!he

'Ibe drills were not via.=d as a pass / fail test.

[U) Team members also interviewed several mamrity officers re i

deadly force at' the site.

se of A bruad sgcwJm of possible cxxitingencies was used, to assure that force would not be used unm==rily in situations that INFWWEICH ***

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' M CNOFRE 1, 2 & 3 I-5 did not threaten the health ard safety of irdiviaiala or the general ard that aw&wriate force would be used if r===ry, in situaticos su public those diame= din NRC Information Notice s

10. 89-05, "Use of Deadl Guards Protecting Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiologimi S b a o age."

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t ::.pnmi training tactiniques.

'the purpose was to evaluate the aw&wslateness of the training ard e.xperience of the training staff, the' facilities

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available, ard the techniques ard frequency of training employed to assure I

that ocritingency response ph&mmel are Mified to execute the responsibilities assigned to them, as required by 10 CPR Part 73

, Appendix B.

2.0 EVAIIRTION

( t>) In the hrved drills the aa,wity force das..:, Luted the ability substantial response assets to bear quickly ard effectively against s o bring armed intruders.

'Ihe OSRE team concluded that this was a result of s e

notable licensee efforts:

evaluating its protective needs ard developing an eff,ective strategy; training ard exercising the respcnse force rea and' thoroughlyf'idid posting ard equipping the r+=ie force a

'Ihe team identified several " Strengths" of the ocritingency res casse w +riately.

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( U) While on site, the OSRE team noted several things which we evidence of = Lug manac.o=it involvement and support ard of an effec o be y

asw'trity mana p =uL team.

In particalar, the OSRE team was ivaad with the general ocaapetence and positive attitude of respu me personnel and with state of asw'irity ocmtingency training, especially in realistic an-site training.-,'Ibe overall protective strategy was sound and evidenced dili cocperative work between security and c5eraticms and the Nuclear En gent Design organization.

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2.2.2 Results of Drills

- K different critical equipent set was used in eadt of the five site cantingency drills.

In all five drills, the 2ncxt adverM-

.,and prevented from sin 11ating the destructitm of a cceplete es were interdicted Sin 11ated destruction of' egti writ in the drills would n t h l

release of radioactivity or any rbmwje to the reactor core ave led to any o

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'Ibe secord drill cn 'Dey assumed three adversari capabilities of the design basis threat.

es with the full si::ulated penetratirq the perimeter en the west side next tin th split ard proceeded to two targets.

o Unit one. 'Ibey gate ard were interdicted by four armed respcodersTwo adversar sirulated forcibly enterirg another fence gate ard was j d'Ibe th there by ane armed responder who had excellent p u ged irfazdicted csiticn.

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In the secord drill cr1 Wednesday, adversaries assumed to hav e the mphility of the design basis threat simulated penetratire the perimter an the so g) side enroute to a sirgle tartyet in Unit 'Ihree'.

u Before they even left the fence, two adversaries were jtrked interdicted by an armd respe d J

scene by a passity watchran.

r er called an

'Ibe third adversary tried several routes to react 1 the target. After a few minutes, the adverrary was interdicted the rany amod response officers respcniiry to Unit 'Ihree -

of Prior to the actual drills, the team crntrted six sirulated drill s

(U) s with resinnse team leaders usirg the 3-D plant rock-up ard plan views of the protected area.

All six tire-line, table-top drills assumd adversaries with the full capabilities of the design basis threat.

Six different target sets were used, only two of whicf1 were used in the full scale ccntirgency drills

'Ibe rock adversaries could rot sfrulate Mmblirg a ccrplete set of t any of these drills.

artyets in Sirulated destruction of egai rent in the drills would t

not have led to any release of radioactivity.

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SANh0FRE1,2&3 000 I-9 In the first sirulat$k, table-top drill, three adversaries jtz: ped frm bU delivery trudc over the corrrete wall and chain link fence near the east a

Vehicle W e Portal.

'! heir weapcris were hidden in order to delay the use of weapons by tower pu.muel and arad respcx1ders. However, nM r+ders were iMiately deployed ard four were in position to interdict the adversaries wh 5tw. hen used explosives to breach a vital area door to their l

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L u)ri8 'Iho team drew the follcwing corrlusions frcn corrb?M i ctrerving drills, the physical layout of the plant nterviews ard contingency response perrainel ard equiprnt., ard the locaticn of Besconse Naknim and Strateav (STRDUIH)

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'Ihe team noted the excellent support that had been p Nuclear Engineering Design Organizaticm (NEDO) i roviM by the critical equip:ent and by operaticns for both planningn the iden contingency strategy and drilla.

and executicn of the active involvement by key operaticos peh i'Ibe team wa

'Ibe critique of cne drill resulted in both operati n drill critiques.

irdeperdently dcVising alternate protective strat cns ard security would have been effective in protecting against the siegies, any of w atte::pt.

mulated sabcfg

'Ibe ' drills obcerved irdicated that the defensive strate security for protecting against an external advercary with t gy devised by characteristics of the NRC design basis threat was sound he In the five oy 9

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In particular) the drills chadiated that the licensee'

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pre-positicnirg of resporra officers, weapcns,J s

ard harderxd posts in key '

areas within the plant prwida:1 an braiately available respcnse mphility.

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Erstense 'Ibam Performnce Durira Drills (STREiUIH)

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In general, armed respon5ers nomd tactically, used goed weap discipline, ard used cover ard calent intelligently cns performance of response officers was evidence of a well activate

'Ibe good well traincd security force.

neity force were skillful ard aggressive'Ibe mock adve.h fran the

'Ibe team felt that they prwided the licensee armed respcose force with a gocd, realistic yardstick by which to assess their respcnse mphility.

Ctntrollers made good judgements durire drills.

Twm Icarned appeared to be properly implementedLicensee ap e

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As evidernd in the drills, ccrzard, ccntrol ard mi pcsitive elment of San Onofre's response capability catirns was a control perscnnel coordinated response efforts in a pcnitiv hrd ard fashicn.

e a'rd quick For example, resp:rding officers were quick to redepl assigned respcnse positicms to new positicos relative to the n oy frun locatico of the adver. aries.

ovement ard

'Ibe micaticms between response ~ fficers were also eff o

were observed using their radios to aid in maneuvering ective. 'Ibey raneuvering in the crnfines of the plant was greatly midui by th

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rucently acquired throat micrghanes.

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2.3 fnTrDGENCY RESIWSE TRAINDU (SEDUN) l

'Ibe consistently gocx1 perfomance of respanse officers wa i

retivated ard well-trained eity force.

s evidence of a well convincing because of the high quality of the ucck-adverrary j Mditionally, th6iicensee had been providig respcns orce.

contractor-assisted training in respcnse tactics gained frczne officers with within the irdustry.

relevant work irportant elements in the trainirg and rativaticn of th'Ihe officers.

e licensee security It appeared that drills were uscd effectively as a traini

'Ihe scenarios romally used by the licensee covered ng tool.

the full spectrum of characteristics of the design b

, ard scatie eyrwaca, plant rock-up was ccmsidered a valuable asset in caductim tire li asis threat. 'Ibe 3-D develcping so::urity strategy.

nes and Team members were irpressed with the Mesa Trainirg Om l within c1cce pruximity to the plant.

p ex which was located buildirgs, tanks, r,tairways, etc., that were taken fru th'Ihis fencx inside the cceplex to simulate site conditions e site ard stored n

limited to the multiple integrated laser ergagemnt systTrainirg in this cc s (Mins) and red O

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to the training program ard can be very effecti'Ihese appeared to 4

identify weaknesses. With MIIES ve in helping naragement to transmitters which, when activated by blank an, site weapons w infrared energy, simulati g the effects of livminition, fire pulses of code sensors located on all drill participants receive th e annunition. Detectors or alerting participants to the accuracy of the shot by m e erwhd lawr pulses I

which can indicate either a " hit" or a "near miss "

eans of audio alarns utilized laser ccritroller guns to terminate or activate l Drill ocritrollers adversary-respander engagenents ensuring a more realisti awr "Sinunitico" licensee hardguns for rocan clearing exercises c encx)unter.

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plans are for force en force close quarter rynhmt bet z ng paper targets. Future outfitted with protective clothirg.

Ween indivh h 14 feet, shots approximate the acx21 racy of live ca t idAt rennm allowed realistic tactical scenarios, sila11atig the stres'Ihese tra rr ges.

engagements.

s of actual 2.4 WEAPDNS 'GAINDG (SEDUDI)

Wmp,ns $1ning included well reccgnized appropriate for the type of close erg %ds which oculd, specialize contirgency involving external adversaries with capabiliti emtr in a design basis threat.

es attributed to the manipulation drills, stress shooting scenarios'Ihese includ nultiple targets, night familiarizaticri firig and re, target di= riminaticx1 1

i addition of perimeter tower sinulators provided a reali ti acticmary targets.

'Ihe teaching marksmanship from towers and hardened s c training aid for ard experience of the training staff included extensiv post locations. 'Ihe backgrourd forte military combat experience and was chamad e military ard small trainirs which is useful for contingency situatiexcellent for the type of ons.

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SAN WOFRE NOCURR GENERATDG mATIm m1Ts 1, 2 Ano 3 ONWAL SAFBIRRDS RESPNSE EVAUATIm PARr II l

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'Ibe W purpose ' f the 05RE was to contirme to assur o

masures do not adversely affect the safe operaticos of the plant e that safeguards 10GR 73.55(d)(7)(ii) requires a licensee to design th Section to Wte the potential need for rapid ingress ore amaas Rd.ml system during emergency conditions or situations that could l egress of indivirb ia conditicns.

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'Ibe 05RE team momham interview d th e

superintendents, and auxiliary eqti e security manager, operations shift respectively.

Pnarzt operators for Units 1 and 2, safety equip throughout the plant.During this review, team e

discussions were to assure that both ama to and egrDe objec area and vital areas would be g%

ess frta the protected L in 'an emergency situation ard that cecurity radio transmMicos would,not interfere with plant cperations.

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CSRE team was to provide refresher training to operaticos s interfaces.

'Ibe film prwided general backgrourd i e y safeguards and details on site specific inaacures to. assure safeguards meurn affect plant operaticos.

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'Ihe tan ctosidered the film an excenent training

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'Ihis was ckaudrated by the potential fire awayency cn M e ls at T.

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'lhe fire truck was rapidly anowed throtx3h the vehicle gate, while arrrd security officers respcxded to the vehicle gate

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Minutes later a security guard delivered the badges to a:v rovided perrennel.

No tire delay was hrved is kesing the saapcy vehicle apcy through the security awa wiel gate.

(vj Both security supervisory perscnnel ard operaticns staff appear d t trderstand that the plant manager ard operations shift e

o superinterdent had the authority to order routine security prrrwhnes to be byp* in an eme rgency.

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Vital Area Acmss aM D2res_s Entry to vital areas is rmhi under scx:e ersspey cperaticn pr San Orofre.

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'Ihe amn control systs h not use an anti pw M dk feature for vital ard protected areas.

Although a security cxrputer failure or a defective card or card reader could cause an entry delay, the operators estirated that th worst-case delay would be less than 2 minutes.

e For Unit 1, rest of operaticos staff carried a sck of override keys for radiation, and operaticos controlled area doccs, except keys for hig radiaticn ard contairninated areas v.xld be kept by the health phy staff.

For Units 2 and 3, scxne shi'.t equipaent operators carried overrid keys; the other operations staff did not normally carry cuerride ke e

are also-ten sets of ovez' ride karys available in both centrol rooms in case ys. 'lhcre i

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oso 9,R O OFRE 1, 2, 3 ON so

.II - 3 gy emergency.

D.1 ring an a 5 otritzol system failure, security would d li ten more sets of override keys to each ocritrol room e ver gain amn by calling security to dispatd1 a VA patrol officer wit Operators could also

&w w iate key.

are located conveniently for requestirg assista e

{

s en a area.

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For gwrel safety, all vital and other =9mity areas cx id b use of dcor knobs irrespective of the ay cmtrol system status xt e e W by did not ' find any location where a persco could be trapped with The team to exit.

out a safe way j

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[g)

C.

Cammunications

[(jj Arcas whidi contain equipnent sensitive to radio frequency i t n erference or

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electrunagnetic interfererce have been Fosted to prohibit tran signals in those locaticris.

smittirq radio

((/ I No safety / safeguards connunication problems udre identified

/

In general, i

security officer. a (rather than door numbers) when twmnticatiry their l y safety egdrment identification 1

ons to each other.

G 9

4

• • p RDS ON **

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4 a s

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