ML20209A759

Partially Withheld Osre Rept on 920309-12.Portions Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790)

ML20209A759
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	03/03/1992
From:	Dube R, Orrik D NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20209A765	List: ML20209A759 ML20212J358 ML20212J365
References
FOIA-99-80 NUDOCS 9907060141
Download: ML20209A759 (23)

Text

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DiC106URE U.S. NOCIEAR REGUIAITY CD ISSION OFFICE OF NOCEEAR REACIm REI;UIATICN P

NRC Inspection Repu.L: Operaticral Safeguards Ra=ycamie Evaluaticn License Nos: DPR-13, NPF-10, NPF-15 )

Docket: 50-206, 50-361, 50-362 Licensee:

Southern California Edison Ctmpany Facility Name:

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Statico Units 1, 2 & 3

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Inspection at: San Clanente, CA Inspection conducted: March 9-12, 1992 Inspection 'Amm:

David N. Orrik, Team Tmar, NRR t Michael S. Warren, Security SP'=-4=14=t, NRR zan-Shing Hsu, Nuclear Engineer, NRR

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Matthew D. Schuster, Senior Physical Security Sper ialiat,' R-V  ;

NRC Otnsultants: U.S Fu m uel i

Approved by: In-< d 3/ 7/ /92 Dav* N. Orrik, Team i m & P Date Signed ormance A=mc- uL Secticn Reactor Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Approved by: k v 3/ 3//92 Robert J. Dube, Chief Date Signed Perfonnance Accc-cs- ni Secticn .

Reactor Safeguards Branch -

Division of Reactor Irmpcction and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

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EDE F22uer SAN QOFRE NUC1 EAR GENERATDC SIATIm UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 OPEPATIGE SAFH30ARDS RESIGSE EVAIDATICH 6

.- r SAFH30ARD3 INFORMATICN DETERMDUd'ICH MADE BY 3d //92 Signatufe-Title-Office-Date

• Rcbert J. Duba, Chief Perforrance hd. Section Reactor Safeguards Beralcf1 Divisicri of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulaticx1 11 - violation of prote d sarements or sarecuanos twronwartow sEleet to civit /* T RIMINAL Peneltfes.

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OERATICHAL SAFDGUARN READINESS REVM I

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T.h2 IGC c: '.i?.ed an Operational Safeguards Respcnse Evaluaticn e (OSRE Sr.:them C:lifcInia FHiceri Cbtpany's San Onofre Nuclear Generating en Stati f_a Farch 9 thru:gh 12, 1992.

cheat 50 r.iles rarth of San Diego, California.'Ibe plant is located in Sc San Gnofre thit 1 is a Mrgase IMR with a licensed power of 1347 MYt.

C3 Units 2 ard 3 are ustica Engineering IHRs with a lice ~M pcwer output of 3390 Mit each .

One of the two pu.m of the OSRE, addressed in this Part I, was to e/aluate the licensee's ability to respcrd to an exte.rnal threat. 'Ihe general parferrance cbjective of 10 CFR 73.55(a) requires a licensee's physical protecticn ptwie.m to be designed to protect agamst the design basis threat of radiolcgical cabotage as stated in Section 10 CFR 73.1(a). Secticn 10 CER 73.55(h) ircitdes a requirenent that the licensee take iW4te wm=rres o t

reatralize a threat'by requirirg armed respcnse perr<nnel to inte.-p trMyes between vital areas ard any adversary attc::ptirg ent:y for the pnTose of radiological sabotage while concurrently requestirs assistan frm Iccal law e.nfo m rait agencies.

In carductire its evaluation, the QSEE team fccused en the interactions beteen cperations ard security in establishirg priorities for protection of equipaent and en the defensive strategies used .

1.1 EVAILTATICN FfmODOLOGY

-:0 h 'Ibe evaluation team consisted of a ruclear ergineer ard safeguards frus the Office of Nuclear Reactor offi the-res

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In cmductim this evaluatico, the OSRE tmm ocosidered a spectrtm of externa adversaries with varyim characteristics.

'Ibe lower range consisted of one dedicated iniividual.with no spu ial terrorist trainig, armed with a shoulder fired weaptn ard unremially available explosives to rtwwy safety P .

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'Ihe Wde was bounded by the characteristics of the design basis thmat for radiological sabotage specified in 10 CFR 73.1(a). .

'Ihe external design basis threat is defiaed as "A de6rmined violent external a m nit, attack by stealth ,

or %ve acticos, of several perscns with the following attrih+ae, assistance and equipnent: ,

(A) Well-trainsId (irx::ltuling ' military training and skill) and dedicated indivirinals, (D) inside assistance linich may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in a passive zule s'

provide information), an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit ,

disable alarms and cmmunications, participate in violent attack) , or both, (C) suitable weapons, up to ard includig hard-held autmatic weapons ,

equipped with silencers and having long rarge accuracy, (D) hand carried equip:ent, includig irrapacitatig agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or otherwise for destroying reactor, facility, trarmter, or cmtainer integrity or features of the safeguards system."

Ilowever, for the purposes of thd OSRE the teaPassumed that the role of a potential insider would be passiveprd limited to information about the location of and routes %

important+ safety equipnent.

in public <b'm=nt rocras. Much of this information would also be available

'Ihe team did not crnsider attack by stealth ard limited its cmsideration of rianaptive acts to those performed after overt penetration into the protected area.

'Ihe team a==ai that significant radiological release would be the objective of power reactor radiological sabotage ard used presention of significant core damage as an evaluation criterion.

'Ihis criterien makes adversary arv,a" more difficult ard nere ao:urately reflects significant public health and safety vital concerns than would a criterien of preventien of damage of any piece of equignent.

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. [ d) 'Ibe ervcluation began team arrived cm site. th a preliminary target analysis perfr m d before the-

'Ihis analysis marb use of informatica fra earlier reports' and emannications cm San Onofre, including the Regu!

Effectiveness Review I=v at i==wl in 1985, the' plant's Final S f t a e y Analysis Report (PSAR), the Facility Systems Analysis for San Onofre Unit Ice Alamos National Ird s 1, 2 & 3 by

.Lxy, and the Southern Onlifornia 1Miarn 0:mpany's

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Target Analyses for Unit 1, dated AuJust 16, 1990 October , and for Units 2 & 3, dated 22,1990. 'Ibe results were further analyzed by an NRR t eam webar, who identified several potential target sets ~which, if disabled to significant oore rharye. , would likely lead target sets with the licensee's operations staff to cxmfi e team's analysis the sets. and to determine whether additional targets. should o any of be adda Available arrir==nt whids could help to achieve ard o maintain h shutdown was added to target sets regardless ofn whether a been the eq designated as vital or safety grade, further cxmplicatire e task for a th hypothetical adversary.

prevent radiological release were also ccmsidered.In sczne

'Ihese target sets were .

used by table-top the team exercises. in selecting drills to be r*=arved and in cxmduc

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'Ihe team's initial effort on-site was to walk around ,the plant observirg potential protected area entry points, routes, and distances either to equipnent or to doors providing access to equipnentgetincluded sets.

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'Ibe team also noted the normal duty staticms of personnel who m participate in a contirgency respcmse and the locaticos where specia contingency response equipment was stored.

{ g) During the next two days the team r+r.atved five licensee In each drill, mock adversaries ran up to the protected area f ence; delayed to simulate penetrating into the protected area; and othen reach attempted t identified safety equipnent targets.

Aamvity personnel r+ded frcan their normal duty stations and attengted to interdict the adversaries .

Licensee drill controllers judged the autocane of adversaryr-reder engagements. 'Ihe i

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team did not actively psrticipate in the drills.

'Ihe team's irput for drills was limited to the selecticn of a target set, adversary characteristics ,

, and entry points at' the protected area perimeter. -

For one drill, the licensee selected an adversary force that errwadad the NRC's desipAll .

basis threa drills by the and team input parameters were within the so$pe aofy those licensee. used remn ll drill. A team ==her r+==W the licensee's critique of eacti

'the team also conducted six table-tcp drills.

external assaults. 'these drills sim0ated overt Ibr eacti exercise, team ==hars interviewed a licensee contingency response team leader.

An OSRE team ==har identified adversary characteristics, safety equipment. entry point into the protected area, and movement to

'Ibe response team lamaar indicated how the reding security officers would be deployed.

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'Ibe r@aie team landar and the OSRE s then estimated the time required for the adversaries cto rea h )

designated targets ard the response officers to reach interdicting positions, haead on the actual locations of the r5gading office exercise. rs at the time of the

. .: 8 g 'Ihe team used its target set analysis ard the results of the drills to evaluate the licensee's efforts at establishing priorities for protection of equipnent; the ability of responding officers to arrive at suitable interdicting positions in thnply fashion, in sufficient numbers , and appropriately armed and equipped; and the licensee's defensive or strate deployment of response officers and equipnent.

'Ibe team evaluated how drills were being defensive used both as a trailling tool aid as a means of self-audit of th strategy.

tactical movement, tr=nand, cua.wl, and trumnticaticos'!he via.=d as a pass / fail test. .

'Ibe drills were not

[U) Team members also interviewed several mamrity officers re i

deadly force at' the site. se of A bruad sgcwJm of possible cxxitingencies was used, to assure that force would not be used unm==rily in situations that ,

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' M CNOFRE 1, 2 & 3 I-5 did not threaten the health ard safety of irdiviaiala or the public general ard that aw&wriate force would be used if r===ry, in situaticos s su those diame= din NRC Information Notice 10. 89-05, "Use of Deadl Guards Protecting Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiologimi S b a o age."

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.Ihe team interviewed M s m of the training staff ard r*=% =: Jeral

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'the purpose was to evaluate the aw&wslateness of the training available, ard ard e.xperience of the training staff, the' facilities {

the techniques ard frequency of training employed to assure I that ocritingency response ph&mmel are Mified to execute the responsibilities assigned to them, as required by 10 CPR Part 73

, Appendix B.

2.0 EVAIIRTION

( t>) In the hrved drills the aa,wity force das..:, Luted o bring the ability substantial armed intruders.response assets to bear quickly ard effectivelye against s notable licensee efforts: 'Ihe OSRE team concluded that this was a result of s evaluating its protective needs ard developing an eff,ective strategy; training ard exercising the respcnse force rea and' thoroughlyf'idid posting ard equipping the r+=ie force a w +riately.  !

'Ihehility.

M team identified several " Strengths" of the ocritingency e res casse 2.1 SKURITY MANAGDENT (SIRE 2CIH)

( U) While on site, the OSRE team noted several things o be which we evidence of =

asw'trity mana p =uL team.

Lug y manac.o=it involvement and support ard of an effec In particalar, the OSRE team was ivaad with the general ocaapetence and positive attitude of respu me personnel and with state of asw'irity ocmtingency training, especially in realistic an-site training.- ,'Ibe overall protective strategy was sound and evidenced gent dili cocperative Design work organization. between security and c5eraticms and the Nuclear En INFUDRTIb*** -

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i 2.2.2 Results of Drills

-cantingency K different drills.critical equipent set was used in eadt of the five site In all five drills, the 2ncxt adverM-es were interdicted

.,and prevented from sin 11ating the destructitm of a cceplete Sin 11ated destruction of' egti writ in the drillso would n t h l

release of radioactivity or any rbmwje to the reactor core ave led to any.

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[N) 'Ibe secord drill cn 'Dey assumed three adversari capabilities of the design basis threat. es with the full si::ulated penetratirq the perimeter en the west side next tin th split ard proceeded to two targets. o Unit one. 'Ibey gate ard were interdicted by four armed respcodersTwo adversar .

sirulated forcibly enterirg another fence ugate ard was j d'Ibe thi ged irfazdicted there by ane armed responder who had excellent p csiticn. I

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In the secord drill cr1 Wednesday, adversaries assumed to hav g) e the mphility of the design basis threat simulated penetratire the perimter u an the so side enroute to a sirgle tartyet in Unit 'Ihree'.

Before they even left the I fence, two adversaries were jtrked interdicted by an rarmd J respe d er called an scene by a passity watchran.

'Ibe third adversary tried several routes to react 1 the target. After a few minutes, the adverrary was interdicted of the rany amod response officers respcniiry to Unit 'Ihree - .

s (U) Prior to the actual drills, the team crntrted six sirulated drill s with resinnsearea.

protected team leaders usirg the 3-D plant rock-up ard plan views of the All six tire-line, table-top drills assumd adversaries with the full capabilities of the design basis threat.

Six different target sets were used, only two of whicf1 were used in the full scale ccntirgency drills .

'Ibe rock adversaries could rot sfrulate Mmblirg a ccrplete set any of these drills.

of t artyets in Sirulated destruction of egait rent in the drills would not have led to any release of radioactivity.

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I-9 bU In the first sirulat$k, table-top drill, three adversaries jtz: aped frm delivery trudc over the corrrete wall and chain link fence near the east Vehicle W e Portal.

'! heir weapcris were hidden in order to delay the use of weapons by tower pu.muel and arad respcx1ders.

However, nM r+ders were iMiately deployed ard four were in position to interdict the

, adversaries wh 5tw. hen l used explosives to breach a vital area door to their

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I L u)ri8 'Iho team drew the follcwing corrlusions frcn corrb?M i ctrerving drills, the physical layout of the plant nterviews ard contingency response perrainel ard equiprnt. , ard the locaticn of (q 1.

Besconse Naknim and Strateav (STRDUIH)

'Ihe team noted the excellent support that roviMhadbybeen the p Nuclear Engineering Design Organizaticm (NEDO) i  !

critical equip:ent and by operaticns for both planningn the iden contingency strategy and drilla. and executicn of the active involvement by key operaticos peh i'Ibe team wa

'Ibe critique of cne drill resulted in both operati n drill critiques.

irdeperdently dcVising alternate protective strat cns ard security would have been effective in protecting against the siegies, any of wh atte::pt.

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'Ibe ' drills obcerved irdicated that the gy deviseddefensiveby strate security for protecting against an external advercary he with t characteristics of the NRC design basis threat was sound .

In the five

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neity force were skillful ard aggressive'Ibe mock adve.h fran the

'Ibe team felt that they prwided the licensee armed respcose force with a gocd, realistic yardstick by which to assess their respcnse mphility.

good judgements durire drills. Ctntrollers made Twm Icarned appeared to be properly implementedLicensee ap e

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[U) As evidernd in the drills, ccrzard, ccntrol ard micatirns was a pcsitive elment of San Onofre's response capability .

hrd ard control fashicn. perscnnel coordinated response efforts ineaa'rd pcnitiv quick For example, resp:rding officers were quick oy to frun redepl assigned respcnse positicms to new positicos relative to the n locatico of the adver. aries. ovement ard

'Ibe micaticms between responseo ~ fficers were also eff ective. 'Ibey were observed using their radios to aid in maneuvering .

'Ibeir high-speed raneuvering in the crnfines of the plant was greatly e midui by th i rucently acquired throat micrghanes. i

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'Ibe consistently gocx1 perfomance of respanse officers wa retivated ard well-trained eity force. s evidence of a well convincing because of the high quality of the orce.

ucck-adverraryj Mditionally, th6iicensee had been providig respcns contractor-assisted training in respcnse tactics gained frczne officers with e within the irdustry. relevant work irportant elements in the trainirg and rativaticn of th'Ihe officers. e licensee security It appeared that drills were uscd effectively as angtraini tool.

'Ihe scenarios romally used by the licensee covered , ard scatie eyrwaca, the full spectrum of characteristics of the design b asis threat. 'Ibe 3-D plant rock-up was ccmsidered a valuable asset in develcping so::urity strategy.

caductim tire li nes and Team members were irpressed with the Mesa Trainirg Om l within c1cce pruximity to the plant. p ex which was located buildirgs, tanks, r,tairways, etc., that were taken fru th'Ihis fencx n

inside the cceplex to simulate site conditions e site ard stored limited to the multiple integrated laser ergagemnt systTrainirg in this cc s (Mins) and red O

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4 to the training program ard can be very effecti'Ihese appeared to identify weaknesses. With MIIES ve in helping naragement to transmitters which, when activated by blank an, site weapons w infrared energy, simulati g the effects of livminition, fire pulses of code sensors located on all drill participantsereceive annunition. th Detectors or alerting participants to the accuracy ofe erwhd lawr pulses I

the shot by m l eans of audio alarns which can indicate either a " hit" orDrill . a "near miss "

ocritrollers utilized laser ccritroller guns to terminate or activate l adversary-respander engagenents ensuring a more realisti awr "Sinunitico" c encx)unter.

licensee hardguns for rocan clearingseexercises n plans are for force en force close quarter z ng paper targets.

rynhmt bet Future outfitted with protective clothirg. Ween indivh h 14 feet, shots approximate the acx21rrracy ges.

of live ca t idAt rennmm allowed realistic tactical scenarios, sila11atig the stres'Ihese trai engagements.

s of actual 2.4 WEAPDNS 'GAINDG (SEDUDI)

Wmp,ns $1ning included well reccgnized appropriate for the type of close erg %ds which oculd, specialize emtr in a contirgency design basis threat. involving external adversaries with capabiliti es attributed to the manipulation drills, stress shooting scenarios'Ihese includ ,

1 nultiple targets, night familiarizaticri firig and re, target di= riminaticx1l i

acticmary targets. 'Ihe addition of perimeter tower sinulators provided s a reali ti teaching marksmanship from towers and hardened c training aid for ard experience of the training staff included post locations.

extensiv 'Ihe backgrourd forte military combat experience and was chamad e military ard small trainirs which is useful for contingency situatiexcellent ons.

for the type of

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{h 'Ibe W purpose o' f the 05RE was to contirme to assur e that safeguards masures do not adversely affect the safe operaticos of the plant 10GR 73.55(d)(7)(ii) requires a licensee to design th Section to Wte the potential need for rapid ingress ore amaas Rd.ml system egress of indivirb ia during conditicns.

emergency conditions or situations that could l ead to srau.pey

(()} 'Ibe 05RE team momham interview e d th superintendents, and auxiliary eqti e security manager, operations shift respectively. Pnarzt operators for Units 1 and 2, safety equip throughout the plant.During this review, e team discussions were to assure that both ess ama to and egrDe objec frta the protected area and vital areas would be g%

L in 'an emergency situation ard that cecurity radio transmMicos would ,not interfere cperations. with plant

( Q} ' CSRE team was to provide refresher traininge yto interfaces. operaticos s safeguards

'Ibe film prwided general backgrourd i and details affect plant operaticos. on site specific inaacures to . assure safeguards meurn es do_not

. tool. 'Ihe tan ctosid ered the film an excenent training A.

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. ?Li during this review. 'Ihis was ckaudrated by the potential fire awayency cn M arch 11,

'lhe fire truck was rapidly anowed throtx3h the vehicle gate, while arrrd security officers respcxded to the vehicle

"' w t. rovided gate perrennel. Minutes later a security guard delivered the badgesapcy to a:v No tire delay was hrved is kesing the saapcy vehicle through the security awa wiel gate.

(vj Both security supervisory perscnnel ard operaticnse staff o appear d t trderstand that the plant manager ard operations shift superinterdent had the authority to order routine security prrrwhnes to be byp* in rgency.

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'Ibe-team ccrcitrini that effective provisicns were ine plac to assure the plant.that safeguards me would not adversely affect safen operatio of (u) 'Ihe amn control systs h not use an anti p protected areas.

w M dk feature for vital ard Although a security cxrputer failure or a defective card or card reader could cause an entry delay, the operators estirated e that th worst-case delay would be less than 2 minutes.

For Unit 1, rest of operaticos staff carried a sck of override keys for ,

radiation, and operaticos controlled area doccs, except keys for hig radiaticn ard contairninated areas v.xld be kept by the health phy staff.

For Units 2 and 3, scxne shi'.t equipaent operators carried e overrid keys; the other operations staff did not normally carry cuerride ys. 'lhcre ke are also-ten sets of ovez' ride karys available in both centrol rooms in case

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. 9,R O OFRE 1, 2, 3 ON so

' .II - 3 gy emergency. D.1 ring an a 5 otritzol system failure, security would de liver ten more sets of override keys to each ocritrol room .

Operators could also gain

&w amn w iate by key. calling security to dispatd1 a VA patrol e officer wit

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are located conveniently for requestirg a area.

assista s en

[()) For gwrel safety, all vital and other =9mity areas cx id b l xt e e W by use of dcor knobs irrespective of the ay cmtrol system status .

The team didexit.

to not ' find any location where a persco could be trapped with out a safe way j

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Cammunications

[(jj Arcas whidi contain equipnent sensitive to radio frequency i t \

n erference or electrunagnetic signals in those locaticris.

interfererce have been Fosted tosmittirq prohibit radio tran  !

((/ /I No safety

/ safeguards connunication problems udre identified i

security officer. a .

In general,  !

i y safety egdrment identification (rather than door numbers) when twmnticatiry their l 1 ons to each other.

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