ML20207T122
| ML20207T122 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1987 |
| From: | Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Dewease J LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8703230218 | |
| Download: ML20207T122 (2) | |
See also: IR 05000382/1986033
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:' . s In Reply Refer To: j Docket: 50-382/86-33 AfA R 1 g g tti i Louisiana Power & Light Company s ATTN: J. G. Dewease, Senior Vice President ' huclear Operations , N-80 317 Baronne Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Gentlemen: Thank you for your letter of March 9,1987, in response to our letter and Notice of Violations 382/8629-02 and 382/8629-03 dated February 2,1987. We have reviewed your reply and find it responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation. We will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspecticn to determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintained. Sincerely, ., . ,. ..; and ud . jg, li, i8.%O f( g J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch cc: Louisiana Power & Light Company ATTN: G. E. Wuller, Onsite Licensing Coordinator P. O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 Louisiana Power & Light Company ATTN: N. S. Carns, Plant Manager P. O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 n f) y flI) ,.: j' W hRPB/C O!RPB # PI t' BABreslau:cs 6GLlonstable 'PJEGagliardo /ep,L 3/4/87 3/t1/87 3/Q/87 /Pj /p P"28!M !?8sege, PDR
p - - . .. s Louisiana Power & Light Company -2- Middle South Services , . ATTN: .Mr. R. T. Lally P. O. Box 61000 New Orleans, Louisiana 70161 Louisiana Power & Light Company ATTN: K. W. Cook, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs Manager 317 Baronne Street P. O. Box 60340 New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Louisiana Radiation Control Program Director bectoDMB(IE01) bec distrib. by RIV: RPB D. Weiss, RM/ALF RRI R. D. Martin, RA Section~ Chief-(RPB/C) DRSP R&SPB RSB MIS System Project Inspector RSTS Operator R. Hall RIV File l , , , - - , _ _ _ . , _ -- . .. --_ ..___ __.-__, _- ,,- __ ,__,_. ,, .., , --, ,
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EiNsvsYIU March 9, 1987 W3Pd7-0576 A4.05 QA ( U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission f%]@gg '!g ATTN: Document Control Desk r t -- i, Washington, D.C. 20555 . p . ' 8WI I i 1987 f' - Subject: Waterford 3 SES f p Docket No. 50-382 -- !S - License No. NPF-38 L_ NRC Inspection Report 86-29 -j Attached is the Louisiana Power and Light Company (LP&L) response to the NRC Violations 8629-02 and 8629-03 identified in Inspection Report No. 86-29. If you have any questions on the response, please contact G.E. Wuller, Operational Licensing, at (504) 464-3499. Very truly yours, ( K.W. Cook Nuclear Safety and j Regulatory Affairs Manager ' KWC:KLB:ssf cc: R.D. Martin, NRC Region IV G.W. Knighton, NRC-NRR J.H. Wilson, NRC-NRR NRC Resident Inspectors Office E.L. Blake W.M. Stevenson l Yk ,>90\\ "AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER" {{.7b 0$( ..
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W3P87-0576 Shoot I cf 3 - LP&L Response To Violation Nos. 8629-02 and 8629-03 VIOLATION N0 y129 -02 Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.10.1.1.c requires, in part, that each valve in the !Jow path of the Fire Suppression water system that is not secured in po:sition shall have its position verified as correct as least once per 31 days. In order to meet this requirement plant procedure OP-903-054 Revision 6 " Fire Protection Valve Lineup Check." is performed to verify the position of all Fire Suppression water system valves that are not secured in place. Contrary to the above, the NRC inspector on November 20, 1986, noted that fire suppression' water system flow path valves FP-601A and FP-601B were not secured in position and their positions were not verified every 31 days as required. This is a Severity Level IV violation. 1 RESPONSE (1) Reason for the Violation The two fire suppression system containment isolation valves were originally classified as locked valves since their manual operators are in fact locked. Therefore these valves were not included in Procedure OP-903-054, however, since the manual operator is locked in the disengaged position it does not actually hold the valve open so T.S. 4.7.10.1.1.c was not being met. (2) Corrective Action That Has Been Taken Operations has changed Procedure OP-903-054 so that valves FP-601A and FP-601B are now included on the line up check list. The change was implemented on November 20, 1986. (3) Corrective Action To Be Taken l No further action deemed necessary. (4) Date When Full Compliance Was Achieved November 20, 1986 . i ! , - _ _ . , . . . . . - - - _ _ . . . __ . -, . . . - - ., .. . . - . . . . . - . . - . . . ._ - - _ _ . - . _.-. -_
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8 * W3P87-0576 . Sh:ct 2 cf 3 . VIOLATION NO. 8629-03 Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.b requires that written procedures covering the implementation of refueling activities be estsblished and implemented. NE-1-001 Revision 4, "New Fuel Shipping Container Operations," is a procedure that details accomplishment of a portion of the refueling operations. Section 10.5 of NE-1-001 requires that the independent support clamp of the tool-supported fuel assembly be loosened and removed. Contrary to the above, on November 4, 1986, the support clamp for fuel assembly LAD-001 (the unsupported fuel assembly) was loosened and removed while fuel assembly LAD-212 was the fuel assembly supported by the handling tool. This is a Severity Level IV violation. RESPONSE (1) Reason for the Violation After the successful inspection and storage of about 56 fuel assemblies, the engineer and mechanic involved had become complacent with the process. Both personnel were cognizant of their ' responsibilities but were not concentrating on the task. As a result, the reason for the incident was personnel error. l (2) Corrective Action That Has Been Taken Immediate corrective actions included a discussion with fuel handling and inspection personnel and the assignment of a third engineer. During the talk by the Reactor Engineering and Performance Department Head, the fuel inspection personnel were reminded to stay alert and ! l concentrate on the task. It was stressed that the Fuel Handling ' Supervisor was in charge of the entire operation. In order to allow the Fuel Handling Supervisor to be cognizant of all activities, a third engineer was assigned to operate the Spent Fuel Handling Machine. Therefore, there was an engineer to supervise the inspection and container handling, an engineer to operate the Spent Fuel Handling Machine and the Fuel Handling Supervisor to oversee all operations. Further instructions were also issued by the Reactor Engineering and l Performance Department head to prevent recurrence. During the remainder of fuel receipt, the manlift was placed adjacent to the fuel bundle to be handled. If the bundle to be grappled was altered, the man 11ft was moved to accommodate the change. In addition, the engineer verbally designated the bracket to be removed prior to any action by the mechanics. The engineer would then assure the correct bracket was removed as well as having actively supervised the evolution.
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. Attcchment to = ./d ' W3P87-0576 Shact 3 of 3 . To ensure these practices are continued during future fuel receipt operations, NE-1-001 has been revised. The procedure specifies that the Fuel Handling Supervisor will not have any concurrent duties when fuel movement is in progress. In addition, a procedural step was enhanced to require the manlift be placed next to the bundle to be removed from the strongback. An independent verification has also been added to ensure the correct single support bracket is being removed. These changes should eliminate the possibility of a similar event in the future. (3) Corrective Action To Be Taken This incident will be discussed in the post outage critique. No further corrective action is needed. (4) Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved April 30, 1987 l , i }}