ML20207S629
| ML20207S629 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 03/16/1987 |
| From: | Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Fraley R Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 8703200111 | |
| Download: ML20207S629 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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.I wAs6HNGTON, D. C. 20666 March 16,1937 I
Docket No. 50-412 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Raymond F. Fraley, Executive Director Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) l FROM:
Lester S. Rubenstein, Director l
PWR Project Directorate #2 1
l Division of PWR Licensing-A
SUBJECT:
ADDITIONAL AND UPDATED RESPONSE TO ACRS LETTER DATED NOVEMRER 13, 1985, REGARDING BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2 By memorandum dated February 20, 1986, the staff responded to the subject ACRS letter. The memorandum addressed two of the three issues the ACRS requested the staff to follow-up.
Following is an updated status of these three issues.
Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)
In its February 20, 1986, letter the staff reported that a preliminary review of the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Topical Report WCAP-10698. " Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis Methology to Detennine Margin to Steam Generator Overfill" had been performed. The WOG has since submitted a second topical report, WCAP-11002 " Evaluation of Steam Generator Overfill Due to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident." The staff performed a concurrent detailed review of both topical reports and requested additional information. The responses have I
been received and have been reviewed by the staff.
A meeting with the WOG SGTR Subgroup was held on January 14, 1987. The staff indicated that while the thermal and hydraulic (TAH) and systems analysis methodology was acceptable, the staff questioned the assumed operator action times, considering them too optimistic. The staff also questioned use of steam generator level as the primary indication of SGTR, including identification of the ruptured SG. The staff will meet with W to go over the SGTR Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS) to determine the validity of the action times and primary indication assumed.
In the event that the staff concludes that the operator action times are too optimistic, the staff may further conclude that SG overfill is part of the design basis SGTR scenario.
In WCAP-11002, the F0G submitted an offsite dose analysis which assumes a stuck open SG safety valve (SV) as a result of liquid relief, since the SVs are only designed for steam relief. However, the analysis is based on "best estimate" assumptions.
If the staff concludes that overfill is part of the design basis SGTR scenario, the staff may require use of conservative (Chapter 15) assumptions for offsite dose calculations in the event of a stuck open SV due to liquid relief.
Assuming these issues can be resolved in a timelv manner, the staff expects to issue a generic SER in June 1987, two months after the proposed Reever Valley Unit 2 fuel load date.
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1 Raymond F. Fraley 4 The staff expects that, if approved, the generic analysis, enhanced by the plant-specific'infomation requested, will meet the SGTR accident analysis requirements. The staff review may also lead to revised SGTR emergency response guides and procedures.
Alternate Pipe Rupture Protection (Application of Leak-Before-Rreak Criteria to certain Stone and Webster-Supplied Piping)
As indicated in the February 20, 1986, memorandum, the staff plans to brief the ACRS on review results of this issue. A Metal Component Subcommittee meeting has been proposed for March 26, 1987. The staff has completed review of this issue and the results have been published in SER Supplement 4 (March 1987).
Decay Heat Removal System Seismic Design The ACRS recommended that the applicant evaluate the " seismic capability of
'the emergency AC power supplies, DC power supplies, and small equipment such
-as actuators and instrument lines that are part of the decay heat removal system to assure that adequate safety margin exist." In a letter dated January 9, 1986, the applicant stated that the BVPS-?. decay heat removal system is designed as a seismic Category I system. However, the applicant did not quantitatively address the safety margins of equipment as requested by the ACRS.
For all' seismic Category I systems, components, equipment and their support, the staff has reviewed their seismic qualification in accordance with Standard Review Plan sections 3.9.2 and 3.10.' The qualification methods and procedures, including testing and analyses, have been evaluated to ensure design adequacy to maintain their safety function during and after earthquake events up to and including the SSE. See SER supplement 4 for the detailed report by the Seismic Qualification Review Team.
lester S. Pubenstein, Director PWR Pro,iect Directorate #2 Division of PWR Licensing-A DISTRIBUTION Docket File NRC PDR PD#2 Reading Local PDR PTam DMiller BMann RLobel Shou GBagchi RHernan
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Raymond F. Fraley,
The staff expects that, if approved, the generic analysis, enhanced by the plant-specific information requested, will meet the SGTR accident analysis requirements. The staff review may also lead to revised SGTR emergency response guides and procedures.
Alternate Pipe Rupture Protection (Application of Leak-Before-Break Criteria to Certain Stone and Webster-Supplied Piping)
As indicated in the Februarv 90, 1986, memorandum, the staff plans to brief the
.ACRS on review results of this issue. A Metal Component Subcommittee meeting has been proposed for April 2,1987. The staff has completed review of this issue and the results have been published in SER Supplement 4 (March 1987).
Decay Heat Removal System Seismic Design The ACRS recommended that the applicant evaluate the " seismic capability of the emergency AC power supplies, DC power supplies, and small equipment such as actuators and instrument lines that are part of the decay heat removal rystem to assure that adeouate safety margin exist." In a letter dated
.lanuary 9, 1986, the applicant stated that the RVPS-2 decay heat removal system is designed as a seismic Category I system. However, the applicant did not quantitatively address the safety margins of equipment as requested by the ACRS.
For all seismic Category I systems, components, equipment and their support, the staff has reviewed their seismic cualification in accordance with Standard Review Plan sections 3.9.2 and 3.10. The qualification methods and procedures, including testing and analyses, have been evaluated to ensure design adequacy to maintain their safety function durino and after earthquake events up to and including the SSE. See SER supplement 4 for the detailed report by the Seismic Qualification Review Team.
Lester S. Rubenstein, Director PWR Pro,iect Directorate #2 Division of PWR Licensing-A DISTRIBilTION Decket File PD#2 Reading PTam DMiller BMann RLebel Shou GBagchi RHernan
- SEE PREVIOUS CO CURRENCE LA: PAD #2 PM:P
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TOSR PD:PADA2 PMiller PTam BMann RLobel Shou GRagchi RUcrnan LRubenstein P/25/87 3/ /87 3/{/87 2/25/87 3/ /87 3/ /87 3/ /87
Raymond F. Fraley The staff expects that, if approved, the generic analysis, enhanced by the plant-specific information requested, will meet the SGTR accident analysis requirements. The staff review may also lead to revised SGTR emergency response guides and procedures.
Alternate Pipe Rupture Protection (Application of Leak-Before-Break Criteria to Certain Stone and Webster-Supplied P'iping)
As indicated in the February 20, 1986, memorandum, the staff plans to brief the ACRS on review results of this issue. A Metal Component Subconcittee meeting has been proposed for April 2,1987 The staff has completed review of this issue and the results have been pt:lished in SER Supplement 4 (March 1987).
Decay Heat Removal System Seismic Desian The ACRS recommended that the applicant evaluate the " seismic capability of the emergency AC power supplies, DC power supplies, and small equipment such as actuators and instrument lines that are part of the decay heat removal system to assure that adequate safety margin exist." In a letter dated January 9, 1986, the applicant stated that the BVPS-2 decay heat removal system is designed as a seismic Category I system. However, the applicant did not quantitatively address the safety margins of eoutpment as requested by the ACRS.
For all seismic Category I systems, components, equipment and their support, the staff has reviewed their seismic qualification in accordance with Standard Review Plan sections 3.9.2 and 3.10.
The qualification methods and procedures, including testing and analyses, have been evaluated to ensure design adequacy to maintain their safety function during and after earthquake events up to and including the SSE. See SER supplement 4 for the detailed
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