ML20207Q887
| ML20207Q887 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1987 |
| From: | Lempges T NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| (NMP2L-1002), NUDOCS 8703100150 | |
| Download: ML20207Q887 (4) | |
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HlAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION /301 PLAINFIELD ROAD, SYRACUSE, N.Y.13212/ TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 March 5, 1987 (NMP2L 1002)
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Hashington, DC 20555 Re:
Nine Mile Point - Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410 Gentlemen:
Please find attached our formal response to the Notice of Violation dated February 4, 1987, accompanying Inspection Report No. 50-410/86-56.
Very truly yours, NIAGARA MOHAWK P0HER CORPORATION m
Vice President Nuclear Generation TEL/AZP/dmb (0134G)
Attachments cc: Regional Administrator, Region 1 Sr. Resident Inspector, H. A. Cock Ms. Elinor Adensam, Project Director ProjectFile(2)
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( f Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point - Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410 Response to Notice of Violation Violation (86-56-01)
Technical Specification LCO 3.9.2 requires that whenever the reactor is in the refueling mode, at least two Source Range Monitor (SRM) channels shall be operable and inserted to the normal operating level with one of the required SRM detectors located in the quadrant where core alterations are being performed and the other required SRM detector located in an adjacent quadrant.
If this LCO is not satisfied, the LCO Action Statement requires the immediate suspension of all operations involving core alterations.
Contrary to the above, between 8:05 p.m. and 11:58 p.m. on November 7, 1986.
while the reactor was in the refueling mode, core alterations were made in the C quadrant involving the loading of 19 new fuel bundles into the reactor, and during that time, the SRM channel for the C quadrant was inoperable in that its reactor scram function had been bypassed.
Response
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation has determined that the event described above represents a vloiation of Technical Specification Section 3.9.2.
This event was identified by NMPC and reported to the NRC in LER 86-05.
Corrective Actions On November 7, 1986 at 11:58 p.m. the Technical Specification violation was corrected by taking the Quadrant C SRM out of bypass.
Preventative Actions The Source Range Monitor channel check procedure N2-0SP-NMS@002 was revised to require independent verification by a second licensed operator that all required SRM channels are nct in bypass prior to completing the procedures.
Further, the entire shift involved in this event was reprimanded for their inadequate performance and reminded of their duties and responsibilities via memo from the Operations Superintendent.
Additional memos were sent to all Operations personnel to require diligence in attention to detall in order to prevent inadvertent violations or inadequate operations.
This event was discussed directly with the individual who failed to comply with the plant procedure, and disciplinary action was taken. All licensed reactor operators and senior reactor operators will be trained in the details of this event and the corrective actions taken.
The subject of this violation has been incorporated into our Lessons Learned Book.
Compilance Full compilance with Technical Specification requirements was achieved on November 7, 1986 at 11:58 p.m. when the quadrant C SRM was taken out of bypass.
Training with respect to the details of this event and the corrective actions taken is expected to be complete by the week of March 23, 1987.
Violation (86-56-02)
Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.6.b and Table 3.3.6.-l require that whenever the reactor is in the refueling mode, a minimum of two Source Range Monitor (SRM) downscale Rod Block Monitor (RBM) channels per trip function shall be operable.
If none of these channels are operable, the Technical Specification LC0 Action Statement requires that at least one of the Inoperable channels must be placed in the tripped condition within one hour.
Contrary to the above, between 1:10 a.m. and 3:35 a.m. on November 4, 1986, while the reactor was in the refueling mode, all four SRM downscale rod block channels were inoperable, and during that time, none of these channels were placed in the tripped condition.
Response
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation has determined that the event described above represents a violation of Technical Specification Section 3.3.6.b and Table 3.3.6-1, 3.d and a failure to recognize Technical Specification requirements.
This event was identifled by NMPC and reported in NRC in LER 86-02.
Corrective Action The SRM downscale rod block bypass jumpers were removed on November 4, 1986 at 3:35 a.m.
This restored the SRM Downscale Rod Block operability and compliance with Technical Specification requirements.
Preventive Action i
The Technical Specification Violation occurred while performing surveillance test N2-0SP-RMC-H@002, " Reactor Mode Switch Functional Test of Refuel Interlocks". A change notice to N2-OSP-RMC-H@002 has been issued to prevent i
similar occurrences and includes:
- 1) A caution statement to the Station Shift Supervisor to verify that all Technical Specification regelrements for operable Source Range Monitors are met (including control rod block instrumentation), 2) A table showing correct application points to bypass individual SRM downscale rod blocks, and 3) A section to record SRM condition (bypassed, jumpered, N/A).
A Technical Specification cross reference index has been developed to aid operators in finding all applicable Technical Specification requirements on a given system or major component.
i The subject matter of this violation has been incorporated into Operations Training and included in the Lessons Learned Book. A memo has also been issued to Unit 2 Operations personnel from the Station Superintendent reminding them to review and observe all Technical Specification requirements when preparing systems for surveillance testing.
Compliance Full compilance with Technical Specification requirements was accomplished on November 4, 1986 at 3:35 a.m. when the SRM Rod Block bypass jumpers were removed restoring operability.
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,i-2 Violation (86-56-03) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ll) requires'Yhat the' NRC be nottfled as soon as practical and in all cases, within four hours, of the occurrence of eny event that-results in the unplanned automatic actuation of the Reac obPro'tection' System.
Contrary to the above, at 12:42.a.m. on November 5, 1986, a high water level in the scram discharge instrumur.L volume actuated the Reactor Protection -
System causing a reactor scram; however, the NRC was not notified of this '
unplanned actuation.
Response
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation has~ determined that the event described a6oV3 -
represents a violation of 10 CFR50.72 (b)(2)(11).
'T Corrective Actions The event was terminated by submittal of Licenses' Event Report 85-01 ori December 5, 1986.-
Preventive Actiqns To ensure that each reportab'le Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation i's reported under 10 CFR 50.72, all Unit 2 licensed operators have been instructed by the Station Shift Supervisor to report each RPS actuation, as it occurs, as a. separate event.
The licensed operators will also receive training in 10 CFR 50.72 notifications to assure they are thoroughly adare of the reporting requirements. Additionally, the subject of this violation has been incorporated into the Lessons Learned Book.
Compilance t
NotificationoftheNuclearRegulatoryCommissionwasaccomplishebthroughLER 86-01 on December 5, 1936.
Training of the reportability requirements per 10 CFR 50.72 is expected to be completed by the week of March 23, 1987 i
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(0134G)
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