ML20207N370

Comments on Draft Final Proposed Rules 10CFR50.73, LER Sys & 50.72, Notification of Significant Events. Second Sentence of 50.73(a)(4) Should Be Revised to Read as Stated

ML20207N370
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/13/1982
From:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Deyoung R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
Shared Package
ML20204G677	List: ML20204G673 ML20207N311 ML20207N370 ML20207N393 ML20207N435 ML20207N455
References
FOIA-86-729 NUDOCS 8701140170
Download: ML20207N370 (3)

Text

/* ggs (UElSS I # o, UNITED STATES 8 n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION B E REGION lli G, '[ 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD g ,8 GLEN ELLYN,lLLINOIS 6C137 December 13, 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR: R. C. DeYoung, Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM: James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator

SUBJECT:

REVIEW OF DRAFT FINAL RULE CHANGE TO 50.72

" NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS" AND DRAFT FINAL PROPOSED RULE 50.73 " LICENSEE EVENT REPORT SYSTEM" (AITS F03053182)

We have reviewed draft final proposed rule 50.73, " Licensee Event Report System" and draft final rule changes to 10 CFR 50.72 " Notification of Significant Events" and have the following comments:

Comments on 50.73

1. The rule should require the licensee to provide the NRC the same 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> report currently provided to the State at the termination of activation of the emergency plan. Region III feels this is imperative because the report presently provided to the State invariably results in dialogue between the State and the NRC about the event.

2. The rule should clearly specify to whom the LER should be reported, distri-bution of copies of the report, timeframes for the report, and reporting method (e.g., facsimile, telegraph, telephone, etc.).

3. The second sentence of 50.73(a)(4) should be revised to read, " Actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and*is part of the pre-planned sequence during (i) surveillance testing, (ii) normal operation or (iii) NRC required startup testing need not be reported." This change will eliminate LERs that document actuations of ESF equipment required by startup tests that are required by the NRC. Also, the Basis for Changes should be revised to agree with 50.73(a)(4) as prepared and not vice versa (i.e., The 50*. power criterion should be deleted).

4. 50.73(a)(5)(1) should clarify whether safe shutdown condition refers to hot shutdown, cold shutdown, or both.

5. 50.73(a)(6) needs clarification. As currently written it appears that an LER would not be required for an accident if a train or channel of a system designed to mitigate that initiator has not been defeated by the same initia-tor.

6. 50.73(a)(7) does not address airborne iodine and particulate releases.

We recommend that a section be added to address these releases.

8701140170 870109 PDR FOIA REPKA96-729 PDR

% J

~

f~77

%ay R._C.-DeYoung 2

7. Regarding 50.73(a)(7)(c),_in order to clarify the dilution allowed for liquid releases we recommend additional wording as follows: "...(see 10 CFR Part 70, Appendix B, Note 1) at the point of release from the facility to the receiving water..."

8. We assume that Regulatory Guide 1.16 " Reporting of Operating Information-Appendix A Technical Specifications C.2" and NUREG-0161 " Instructions for Preparation of Data Entry Sheets for Licensee Event Report (LER) File" will be revised to be consistant with and provide clarification of 50.73 in its final form.

Comments on 50.72 4

1. 50.72(a) must be modified to be consistent with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV. C in that all four emergency classes must be included or 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.C must be changed to be consistent with new 50.72(a). It should be noted that the Note associated with this paragraph is not accurate with respect to 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

2. 50.72(b)(2)(iv) is an item that occurs often after a plant trip on a PWR.

The activity spike usually occurs several hours after the plant trip and-therefore two notifications will frequently occur as a censequence of the same event. It is our opinion that an lodine spike subsequent to a reactor trip where no other clear indicators of fuel cladding degradation exists warrants no additional notification. -

3. 50.72(b)(3) would result in a notification each time a tornado watch or severe thunderstorm watch is called in the area of the site. We recommend

, that such natural phenomena only be reported when they result in activation of the emergency response plan. If 50.72(a) is modified as we suggest, it would provide reporting of such matters.

4. The examples given in 50.72(b)(5) are not adequate by themselves to require notification. The intent should be that a major loss of communications systems / plant indication system used in the emergency plan should require notification. If 50.72(a) is modified as we suggest, this section can be eliminated.

5. Regarding 50.72(b)(6):

. The text is missing some words in the second sentence. That sentence should be revised to agree with the second sentence of 50.72(b)(6) as stated in the " Text of Final Rule".

. With respect to " exclusion of personnel access due to toxic or radio-active gaseous releases," eliminate the word " gaseous" so as to in-clude consideration of airborne iodine and particulate and liquid incidents which exclude personnel access.

t -

l R. C. DeYoung 3

. We interpret this section to exclude personnel contaminations and building evacuations which do not threaten the safe operation of the plant. This interpretation does not appear to agree with the " Basis."

6. Regarding 50.72(c)(1), we suggest it be eliminated since the IIR required by 50.73(a)(2) provides sufficient reporting. As the 50.72(c)(1) is written, it would result in a barrage of unnecessary phone calls during refueling outages when the 18 month (outage) technical specification surveillances, local leak rate tests, steam generator tube plugging, etc., are being per-formed.

7. The second sentence ot 50.72(c)(2) should read, " Actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, thct results from and is part of (1) the preplanned sequence during surveillance testing, (ii) normal operation, or (iii) NRC required startup testing need not bc reported."

8. Two clarifications are desirable for 50.72(c)(3). First, it should be clear whether the " safety function" in the opening paragraph refers to the total safety function or to a loss of redundancy. (Reference Footnote of supple-ment I of the Enforcement Policy). Second, 50.72(c)(3)(1) should be clear as to whether safe shutdown is intended to mean hot shutdown, cold shutdown, or both.

9. Regarding 50.72(c)(4):

. It does not address airborne iodine and particulate releases. We recommend that a section be added to address these releases.

. In order to clarify the dilution allowed for liquid releases in Section (4)(111), we recommend additional wording as follows: " . . . (see 10 CFR Part 70, Appendix B, Note 1) at the point of release from the facility to the receiving water..."

10. Examples should be given under 50.72(c)(6) for clarity.

We would be happy to discuss our comments with you further, if you desire.

OrigIncl cigned by Jarc.as G. Keppler James G. Keppler Regional Administrator cc: J. H. Sniczek, IE Regional Administrators, RI, RII, RIV, RV J. Heltemes, AEOD F. Hebdon, AEOD E. L. Jordan, IE W. R. Mills, IE

. W. Weiss, IE RI RII RIII RI RIII RIII RII i egor/jp pe 'llq bM'.

Walker eyes oy(h) St5eeter dpessarp$p K gg jlQfsir/82 13fp/g* gDf gavis

/ WM /8* S//o/ro J