ML20207L295
| ML20207L295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1999 |
| From: | Toelle S UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC) |
| To: | Paperiello C NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| GDP-99-0045, GDP-99-45, NUDOCS 9903180065 | |
| Download: ML20207L295 (123) | |
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1 ~SEC a oios so.rsy comp.nr March 1,1999 GDP 99-0045 Dr. Carl J. Paperiello Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Attentiom Document Control Desk U.S. Nuciear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP)
Docket No. 70-7001 Certificate Amendment Request - Criticality Accident Alarm System Audibility Upgrades
Dear Dr. Paperiello:
In accordance with 10 CFR 76.45, the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) hereby submits a request for amendment to the Certificate of Compliance for the Paducah, Kentucky, Gaseous Diffusion Plant (FGDP). USEC committed, in our November 5,1998 letter (Reference 1),
to submit the revised TSRs by February 26,1999 for NRC review and approval. This Certificate Amendment Request (CAR) proposes to revise the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) related to the audibility requirements for the Criticality Accident Alarm Systern (CAAS) at PGDP. This CAR also requests approval of a revision to a related section of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR).
Issues 46 and 50 described in DOE /OR-2026, Plan for Achieving Compliance with NRC Regulations at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (Compliance Plan), require plant modifications to ensure that the CAAS alarm horns are capable of being heard throughout the affected areas of the
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process buildings and to provide CAAS alarm horns for those unalarmed facilities within the
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evacuation area of CAAS-clustered buildings, respectively. To accomplish the Plan of Action associated with Compliance Plan Issues 46 and 50, a modification project is in progress to design g y /j/
f and install an upgraded CAAS alarm system to ensure adequate audibility throughout the process 1
buildings and for unalarmed facilities within the evacuation area of CAAS-clustered buildings. This upgraded system consists of new bu'Iding homs/ whistles and all neces.c ry support equipment such a
as conduit and wire, solenoids, air piping, control equipment, air corr. pressors, and air accumulators.
The CAAS modifrations also include installation of a dediested CAAS air supply system, removal / abandonment of the backup nitrogen bottles fo the local horns, and installation of electronic homs in some buildmgs, which require changes to the current CAAS TSRs. In addition, the SAR, the Applicability statement for each of the CAAS audibility TSRs, as well as the TSR Baset, are also being revised to reflect the CAAS audibility exclusion in permit-required confined 9903180065 990301 PDR ADOCK 07007001 3 8
PDR j f
6903 Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20817-1818 s<
Telephone 301-564-3200 Fax 301-564-3201 http://www.usec.com OfTices in Livermore, CA Paducah, KY Portsmouth, OH Washington, DC i
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' Dr. Carl J. Paperiello i
March 1,' 1999 GDP 99-0045, Page 2 spaces and cell housings associated with cells that are running, which the NRC granted in their December 4,1998 letter (Reference 2).
The detection portion of the existing CAAS, and associated TSRs, will not be modified as part of f
. this upgrade. The existing detector modules will be connected to the upgraded CAAS alarm homs/ whistles following installation and functional testing of the new horns. The time required to remove all building CAAS from service, connect the detector modules to the new horn system, perform the required surveillance tests for the new hom system, and put the new CAAS into service, necessitates that the implementation of the new CAAS be accomplished over several months. This 3
transition period will result in die existing CA.\\S being in operation in some buildings at the same time that the new CAAS is operational in other buildings necessitating CAAS audibility TSRs which address both the existing and new alarm systems.
At the conclusion of the CAAS modif:ation project, the current CAAS audibility TSRs will no longer be required. Upon transition of the final building to the new CAAS, USEC proposes to delete the current CAAS audibility TSRs f om the application. After d:letion of the current audibility TSRs, the TSRs will contain the current detection TSRs and the audibility TSRs which reflect the new CAAS. to this letter provides a detailed description and justification for the proposed SAR and j
TSR changes and a discussion of USEC's plan for implementing these changes during the transition j
from the current CAAS to the new system. Enclosure 3 is a copy of the revised TSR and SAR pages associated with this request. The above noted TSR pages and SAR pages A-2 of Chapter 1,
_ Appendix A,3.12-6,2-15b of Chapter 4, Appendix A, and 5.2-6 are provided for NRC review and i
- approval. The remaining pages contained in Enclosure 3 have been evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 76 68, have been determined not to require prior NRC review and approval, and are provided for information only. Enclosure 4 contains USEC's determination that the proposed changes associated with this Certificate Amendment Request are not significant.
This submittal is being made to correct minor page numbering and header deficiencies in Enclosure 3 of submittal GDP 99-0035 dated February 26,1999. This submittal replaces GDP 99-0035.
Since this CAR affects Compliance Plan actions which are required to be completed by January 18, 2000, a prompt review of this CAR. is requested. The amendment should become effective within 30 days ofissuance.
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Any questions related to this subminal should be directed to Marc Klasky (301) 564-3408.
Sincerely, S.A.
I f Steven A.Toelle i
Nuclear Regulatory Assurance and Policy Manager
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Dr. Carl J. Paperiello March 1,1999 GDP 99-0045, Page 3
References:
- 1. Letter from Mr. Steven A. Toelle (USEC) to Dr. Carl J. Paperiello (NRC),
" Certificate Amendment Request - Criticality Accident Alarm System Audibility Upgrades - Compliance Plan Issues 46 and 50," Letter No. GDP 98-0215, November 5,1998.
- 2. Letter from Dr. Carl J. Paperiello (NRC) to Mr. Steven A. Toelle (USEC),
"Paducah Request for Approval of an Exclusion from 10 CFR 76.89(a) for Criticality Accident Alarm System Audibility in Confmed Spaces and Cell Housings (TAC No. L32100)," December 4,1998.
Enclosures:
- 1. Oath and Affirmation
- 2. United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), Certificate Amendment Request, Criticality Accident Alarm System Audibility Upgrades, Detailed Description of Change
- 3. Certificate Amendment Request, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Letter GDP 99-0045, Removal / Insertion Instructions
- 4. United States Enrichm:nt Corporation (USEC), Certificate Amendment Request, Criticality Accident Alarm System Audibility Upgrades, Significance Determination 1
cc: Mr. Robert C. Pierson (NRC)
NRC Region III Office NRC Resident Inspector-PGDP NRC Resident Inspector - PORTS Mr. Randall M. DeVault (DOE)
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OATli AND AFFIRMATION 1, Steven A. Toelle, swear and affirm that I am the Nuclear Regulatory Assurance and Policy Manager of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), that I am authorized by USEC t
to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this Certificate Amendment Request for the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant addressing revisions to the Safety Analysis Report and Technical Safety Requirements described in USEC letter GDP 99-0045, that I am familiar with the contents thereof, and that the statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to i
the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
0 5..A.
Ia l
Steven A. Toelle t
i On this Ith day of March,1999, the individual signing above personally appeared before me, is j
known by me to be the ; son whose name is subscribed to within the instrument, and acknowledged that he executed the same for the purposes therein contained.
In witness hereofI hereunto set my hand and official seal.
J 2
I%in D. Johnson, ary Public State of Marylan, fontgomery County My commission expires June 1,2002.
GDP 99-0045 Page 1 of 7 United States Enrichment Corporation Certificate Amendment Request CAAS Audibility Detailed Description of Change 1.0 Change in CAAS Alarm System Description Descrintion of Change to CAAS Alarm System Compliance Plan Issues 46 and 50 require plant modifications to ensure that the CAAS alarm horns are capable of being heard throughout the affected areas of the process buildings and to provide CAAS alarm horns for those unalarmed facilities within the evacuation area of CAAS-clustered buildings, respectively. The modifications required to upgrade the CAAS audibility include the addition of new CAAS alarm building horns / whistles and associated equipment in the cascade process buildings, support facilities, and other buildings within the 12 RAD boundaries The project includes installing new air-powered horns, supplemented by electronic horns in areas such as control rooms, shops and locker rooms; a dedicated CAAS air supply system, including air accumulators for each building, compressors and associated piping; backup power supplies for the electronic horns; loss of power alarms; and associated support equipment including conduit, wire, solenoids, and control devices. A discussion ofthe existing CAAS system components and the r odifications made to each of these system components is provided.
SYSTEM COMPONENTS:
Local horns The existing horns, referred to as the local horns, are located adjacent to the radiation alarm detectors (clusters). The local horn alarm signal covers only the area in the vicinity the cluster. For areas such as the process buildings, this warning signal does not cover the entire building area. The modifications to the CAAS will ensure that the areas adjacent to all clusters will be provided warning signals from new building horns. Therefore, the cluster local horns will be abandoned in place or removed and will no lonar be credited for notifying plant personnel of the need to evacuate in the event of a criticality Building horns The existing building horns are air powered " Clarion" horns identical to the local horns. In order to provide an adequate warning signal in the process buildings, new building horns appropriately located and of sufficient number will be installed to provide an audible warning signal throughout
l GDP 99-0045 Page 2 0f 7 the affected building. The building horns / whistles to be installed will be of similar construction to the existing " Clarion" horns but will have two frequencies,497 Hz and 502 Hz.
The basis for the selection of the air horn / whistle frequencies is determined by two factors. First, the sound surveys of the building ambient noise has shown a " quiet" area in the 1/3 octave band with a center frequency of 500 Hz (approximately 15 db less than the noise level in the 800 Hz,1/3 octave band). If the frequeacy of the warning signal is located in this area, the warning signal is distinguishable by frequency as well as amplitude from the background noise. The second factor in selecting the 497 and 502 Hz frequencies is that the 5 Hz difTerence establishes a " beat" of 5 Hz that becomes noticeable in the vicinity of the horns, which adds another distinguishable characteristic to the warning signal. The addition of an adequate mtmber of horns of sufficient amplitude and a distinguishable frequency will provide audibility in the areas now deficient, including the areas adjacent to the clusters. Therefore, the existing " building homs" in the process buildings will be abandoned or removed.
Electronic horns Currently, electric horns are utilized in buildings C-709, C-710, and C-720. These horns have a frequency of 470 HZ and have a self-contained battery backup power supply. The CAAS modification project will utilize equivalen electric horns in areas such as the building area control rooms (ACR), maintenance shops, and locker rooms where the installation of air horns is impractical due to the high sound output level.
Air Supply System The existing air supply for the current "C arion" horns is provided by the plant air system. The plant air system which, in addition to supplying the CAAS homs, provides a source of air for other plant needs. To improve system performance and reliability and more closely control the air supply powering the air horns for the CAAS, a dedicated air supply system with air accumulators and air compressors is to be instated.
The motive force for the new air horns within a building will be supplied from a dedicated air supply system. New air piping will also be installed for each new air horn. The piping will be routed to a main air supply header which is then routed to an accumulator (air storage tank) located outside the building. The accumulator will consist of an air tank which is sized to provide the needed air capacity to supply the building horns for the required alarm duration.
The accumulators will be maintained at the required air pressure using air compressors located inside the building. The accumulators will be monitored for pressure such that when accumulator pressure drops to a point near the minimum pressure necessary to blow the air horns / whistles for at least two minutes, an alarm will be generated in the Central Control Facility (C-300).
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l GDP 99-0045 Page 3 of 7 When CAAS surveillances or post-maintenance testing is performed it will be necessary to sound all CAAS alarms in the affected area and ensure all hems / whistles are functional. This will deplete the CAAS accumulators below the pressure necessary to sound the air horns / whistles for the 120 second duration specified in the SAR. The tirne to recharge the accumulators above this pressure has been estimated at greater than five hours using the permanently installed compressors alone. To reduce this recovery time a temporary connection will be installed to allow the connection of a portable air compressor with enough capacity to recharge the accumulators in approximately one hour. This will reduce CAAS outage time necessary to perform surveillances and post-maintenance testing.
Loss of Power Alarm Monitoring for loss of power will be added to the circuits powering the homs/ whistles. Monitoring currently is not provided. This monitoring will provide an alarm for loss of power to the whistle / horn circuits locally in the alarmed building. Loss of power to the whistle / horn power circuit will result in an alarm at the C-300 CAAS console and will be indicated as a " Trouble" alarm associated with one of the clusters located in that building. This alarm will give immediate notification to operators ofloss of power to the horns / whistles which will result in inoperability of the CAAS in the affected area.
Descrintion of Changes to Snecific CAAS TSRs The following section provides a detailed description of the proposed TSRs for the modified CAAS.
1 TSR SR 2.1.4.5b-1,2.2.4.3b-1,2.3.4.7b-1,2.4.4.2b-1, and 2.6.4.1b-1: Since the CAAS local horns j
are being abandoned in place and their function is being replaced by new building air whistles and horns, the reference to local cluster homs is being deleted.
TSR SR 2.1.4.5b-2,2.2.4.3'o-2,2.3.4.7b-2,2.4.4.2b-2, and 2.6.4.1b-2: Since the nitrogen bottles are being removed and their function is being replaced by CAAS air accumulators, the requirement to verify nitrogen pressure is being replaced by a quarterly requirement to verify CAAS accumulator air pressure is greater than the minimum required to blow all horns in the area at their design pressure for at least 120 seconds. The specific accumulator supply pressure required to meet the 120 second requirement is specified in the surveillance requirements for each facility.
TSP. SR 2.1.4.5b-3: Since C-360 will now have electronic horns, a new surveillance will be added, to ensure that the condition of the battery backup to the electronic horns is sufficient to power the
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electronic horns for at least 120 seconds.
In addition, the TSR Bases associated with the above noted CAAS audibility TSRs are revised to reflect the changes described above.
GDP 99-0045 Page 4 of 7 Justification for the Change The proposed TSR changes are required to establish surveillance requirements for the new CAAS alarm systems as they are put in service in each of the facilities covered by the TSRs. The modifications made to the CAAS, and the resultmg changes to the TSRs, will increase the performance and reliability of the system.
Process areas in which activities will continue during a power outage are nther required to have emergency power supplies for W! alarm systems or be monitored continuously with portable instruments. Currently, electric homs are utilized in buildings C-709, C-710, and C-720. These horns have self-contained battery backup power supplies. These battery backup power suppWs for electronic horns are surveilled annually to ensure the capacity is sufficient to power the elcunnic horns.
All of the existing DC building horn solenoids in C-310, C-331, C-333, C-335, C-337, and C-337A are backed up by the cascade batteries which will ensure that they will remain operational for at least four hours ifoff-site AC power is lost. The upgraded DC building horn solenoids in these areas will have the same power supplies as the existing ones and therefore will have the same level of protection. The load drawn on the cascade batteries by the new building and electronic horns and air horn solenoids will have very little effect on their capacity. The current surveillance on the batteries to ensure battery voltage is more than suflicient to ensum the capacity of the backup power supply.
For C-360, backup power for the electric horns is provided by new uninterruptable power supply.
TSR 2.1.4.5b-3 has been added to require an annual surveillance to ensure their capacity is suflicient to power the electronic horns. This surveillance requirement is equivalent to existing surveillance requirements for electric horns in current TSR 2.6.4.lb-3.
After transitioning the last building to the new CAAS system, TSRs 2.1.4.5c,2.2.4.3c,2.3.4.7c, 2.4.4.2c, and 2.6.4.lc will no longer be necessary and will be removed from the application.
Likewise, SAR sections that describe the current CAAS system will be removed from the application. The deletion of TSRs 2.1.4.5c,2.2A.3c,2.3.4.7c,2.4.4.2c, and 2.6.4.1e and associated SAR material, pertaining to the current CAAS system, is acceptable since the text will no longer describe the functional CAAS system. Furthermore, the current CAAS system is being replaced by an upgraded CAAS system which will provide improved sym performance and reliability.
r GDP 99-0045 Page 5 of 7 2.0 Exclusion from CAAS Audibility Requirements in Confined Spaces and Cell Housings Associated with Cells that are Running-Description of Change The SAR and the Applicability statement for each of the new CAAS audibility TSRs are being revised to reflect the exclusion from CAAS audibility in permit-required confined spaces and cell housings associated with cells that are running. This exclusion request was previously provided by USEC in Reference 1 and granted by NRC in their December 4,1998 letter (Reference 2).
Specifically, revisions to Section 1.6 of Appendix A to SAR Chapter I and Section 2.5.1.3.3.b of SAR Chapter 4 Appendix A are being modified to note that PGDP takes exception to the requirement of ANSI /ANS 8.3-1986, Section 4.4.1, which requires the alarm signal to be of sufficient volume and coverage to be heard in all areas that are to be evacuated. The exception is taken for permit-requir.1 confined spaces and cell housings associated with cells that are running.
In these areas a " buddy system"is used to ensure personnel working in these areas are notified to evacuate in the event of an inadvertent criticality.
j Similarly, revisions to the discussions of the CAAS in SAR Sections 3.12.6.b and 5.2.2.5 are being proposed to ste e that audibility is not provided in permit-required confined spaces and cell housings associated with cells that are running. In these areas a " buddy system" is used to ensure personnel working in these areas are notified of alarms in order to evacuate.
The Applicability statements for TSR LCOs 2.1.4.5b,2.2.4.3b,2.3.4.7b, and 2.6.4.1b will also be revised to exclude areas in permit-required confined spaces. The Applicability statement for TSR LCO 2.4.4.2b will be revised to exclude areas in permit-required confined spaces and cell housings associated with cells that are running.
Only the TSR applicability statements for the new CAAS audibility TSRs re.luire this revision because the compensatory actions currently in place for the existing system under the Justification for Continued Operation in Compliance Plan Issue 46,i.e. manual activation of the building howlers following a CAAS alarm, have been shown to provide an adequate means of notification to personnel that may be working in these areas. However, upon completion of the CAAS upgrades, the building howlers will no longer be relied u}vn for CAAS notification and CAAS audibility in permit-required confined spaces and cell housings associated with cells that are running cannot be assured by solely relying on the CAAS horns themselves.
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GDP 99-0045 Page 6 of 7 L:ltification of Chance The " buddy system" proposed will provide an alternative means of notifying personnel within permit-required confined spaces and cell housings associated with cells iat are running of an inadvertent criticality. The" buddy system" requires that one person (an attendant) remain outside the area in contact with personnel (entrants)inside the area to notify them if a CAAS alarm occurs.
The " buddy system" is consistent with the current plant practice required by OSHA for confined i
space entries. The appropriate method of contact between the attendant and entrant (s) [e.g., visual, voice, radio, physical (via tether)] will be determined considering the work to be performed, the i
location of the work, and the personnel performing the work. For the cell housings, plant procedures will be revised to require the use of the " buddy system". Plant personnel will be trained on the revised procedures prior to implementation to ensure that the new requirements are understood.
4 As noted in Reference 2, the delay in notification introduced by use of the " buddy system" versus hearing a CAAS horn directly should be on the order of seconds. This delay would not result in an appreciable increase in the dose that would potentially be received by either the attendant or the entrants in the unlikely event of an inadverter.t criticality. In addition, the probability of an inadvertent criticality event is low based on the design features and administrative controls that have been implemented for activities involving fissile material.
3.0 Transition Plan forImplementing New CAAS Alarm System and Associated TSRs The current TSRs affected by these modifications are TSRs 2.1.4.5b,2.2.4.3b,2.3.4.7b,2.4.4.2b, and 2.6.4.lb. TSRs 2.2.4.3,2.4.4.2, and 2.6.4.1 cover multiple facilities within the same TSR.
Implementation of the CAAS modification will involve entering existing CAAS LCO conditions in the area being modified, disconnecting the existing relays and associated equipment for the local and building horns, connecting the new relays and associated equipment, and performing operability testing on the new CAAS. This operability testing will be performed using approved procedures and all acceptance criteria will be met prior to declaring the new CAAS operable. Because of the manpower needed to perform the modification and the adverse impact on plant operations of extended periods of CAAS inoperability, the final connection of the cluster detectors to the modified alarm system will be performed in only one area at a time. As a result, TSRs covering the new tipgraded CA AS must be in place at the same time as TSRs covering the existing system for the feed facilities (TSR 2.2.4.3), the enrichment cascade (TSR 2.4.4.2), and the non-cascade facilities (TSR 2.6.4.1).
Modified TSRs for the new CAAS will be implemented as 2.1.4.5b,2.2.4.3b,2.3.4.7b,2.4.4.2b, and 2.6.4.lb. Existing TSRs, pertaining to the existing CAAS system, will be identified as 2.1.4.5c,
l GDP 99-0045 Page 7 of 7 2.2.4.3c,2.3.4.7c,2.4.4.2c, and 2.6.4.1c. Existing TSRs will be modified to indicate that the current TSRs will be applicable until the new systems addressed in TSRs 2.1.4.5b,2.2.4.3b,2.3.4.7b, 2.4.4.2b, and 2.6.4.lb are declared operable. Once the upgrade project has.been completed and the new CAAS is operable in all of the buildings, the current CAAS audibility TSRs 2.1.4.5c,2.2.4.3c, 2.3.4.7c,2.4.4 2c, and 2.6.4.lc will be removed from the TSRs. USEC proposes to delete these TSRs as part of the CAR, upon transition of the last building to the new CAAS, since the current audibility TSRs will no longer be required.
Similarly, the description of the current CAAS will be retained in the various SAR sections which describe the CAAS while the description of the new CAAS is incorporated into those same sections.
This approach to the SAR revision is necessary since, depending upon the status ofimplementation of the modification, a desci;ption of both the new and the old CAAS is required to adequately represent the installed plant configuration in various buildings. Once the upgrade project has been completed and the new CAAS is operable in all of the buildings, the current description of the old CAAS system will be removed from the SAR.
References:
- 1. Letter from Mr. Steven A. Toelle (USEC) to Dr. Carl J. Paperiello (NRC),
Certificate Amendment Request - Criticality Accident Alarm System Audibility Upgrades - Compliance Plan Issues 46 and 50," Letter No GDP 98-0215, November 5,1998.
- 2. Letter from Dr. Carl J. Paperiello (NRC) to Mr. Steven A. Toelle (USEC),
"Paducah Request for Approval of an Exclusion from 10 CFR 76.89(a) for Criticality Accident Alarm System Audibility in Confined Spaces and Cell Housings (TAC No. L32100)," December 4,1998.
GDP 99-0045 Page 1 of 108 Certificate Amendment Request Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant a
Letter GDP 99-0045 Removal / Insertion Instructions Remove Pages Insert Pages APPLICATION FOR UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CERTIFICATION VOLUME 1 r
SAR Chapter 1, Appendix A SAR Chapter 1, Appendix A A-l/A-2, A-5/A-6 A-1/A-2, A-5/A-6 SAR Section 3.12 SAR Section 3.12 3.12-3/3.12-4 through 3.12-7/3.12-8 3.12-3/3.12-4 through 3.12-8a/3.12-8b SAR Section 3.15 SAR Section 3.15 3.15-5/3.15-6,3.15-11/3.15-12,3.15-13/3.15-14, 3.15-5/3.15-6, 3.15-6a/3.15-6b, 3.15-1 1/3.15-12 3.15-17/3.15-18,3.15-27/3.15-28,3.15-31/3.15-through 3.15-13b/3.15-11,3.15-17/3.15-18,3.15-32 through 3.15-35/3.15-36 18a/3.15-18b, 3.15-27/3.15-28, 3.15-28a/3.15-28b,3.15-31/3.15-32 through 3.15-36a/3.15-36b VOLUME 2 SAR Chapter 4, Appendix A SAR Chapter 4, Appendix A 1-3/1-4,2-5/2-6,2-9/2 10 through 2-2I/2-22,2-1 3/1-4,2-5/2-6,2-6a/2-6b,2-9/2-10 through 2-39/2-40,2-41/2-42,2-47/2-48 21/2-22,2-39/2-40,2-41/2-42,2-47/2-48 SAR Section 5.2 SAR Section 5.2 5.2-5/5.2-6 5.2-5/5.2-6
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GDP 99-0045 i
Page 2 of108 Certificate Amendment Request Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Letter GDP 99-0045 l
e Removal / Insertion Instructions i
(continued)
Insert Pages l
Remove Pages VOLUME 4 TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS I
Section 2.1 Section 2.1 2.1-24,2.1-25,2.1 26 2.1 -24, 2.1 -25, 2.1 -26, 2.1 -2oa *, 2.1 -26b', 2.1 -
26c' Section 2.2 Section 2.2 2.2-17, 2.2-18 2.2 17, 2.2-18, 2.2-18a, 2.2-18 b *, 2.2-18c
- n Section 2.3 Section 2.3 2.3-21, 2.3-22 2.3 21,2.3-22,2.3-22a*,2.3-22b*
Section 2.4 Section 2.4 2.4-19, 2.4-20 2.4-19,2.4-20,2.4-20a,2.4 20b*,2.4-20c' Section 2.6 Section 2.6 2.6-6,2_.67_2.6-8 2.6-6,2.6-7,2.6-8.2.6-9*,2.6-10* 2.6-11*
These pages to be removed from the TSRs (Volume 4) of the Application upon transition of the last building to the new CAAS audiblity TSRs.
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SAR-PGDP April 15,1998 Rev.24 Appendix A Applicable Codes, Standards, and Regulatory Guidance This Appendix lists the various industry codes, standards, and regulatory guidance documents which have been referenced in certification correspondence. The extent to which PGDP satisfies each code, standard, and guidance document is identified below, subject to the completion of applicable actions I
required by the Compliance Plan.
j 1.0 American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 1.1 ANSI N14.1, Uranium Hexaflouride - Packaging for Transport,1990 Edition PGDP satisfies the requirements of this standard, except for those portions superseded by Federal Regulations, with the following clarifications:
New cylinders and associated valves - Entire standard Cylinders and valves already owned and operated by PGDP that were not purchased to meet this edition of the standard - Satisfy only Sections 4,5,6.2.2 - 6.3.5,7, and 8 of the standard.
Cylinders purchased prior to 1990 were manufactured to meet the version of the ANSI standard or specification in effect at the time of the placement of the purchase order.
Section 5.2.1 - For U.S. Department of Transportation 7A Type A packaging, satisfy U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) evaluation document DOE /RL-96-57, Revision 0, Volume 1, which supersedes DOE /00053-H1.
Tinning of cylinder valve and plug threads: ANSI N14.1 - 1990 requires the use of ASTM B32 50A, a 50/50 tin / lead solder alloy described in the 1976 and previous editions of the ASTM standard. Cylinder valve and plug threads are tinned with solder alloys meeting the requirement: of ASTM B32. Tinning is performed with nominal 50% tin alloy or with a mixture of alloys with nominal tin content from 40% to 50%, with a lower limit of 46% tin in the mix.
See SAR Sections 3.7.1 and 4.3.1.5 and the basis statements for TSR Sections 2.1.4.8,2.2.4.6, and 2.3.4.16.
1.2 ANSI /ANS 2.8, Determining Design Basis Flooding at Power Reactor Sites,1981 Edition The extent to which PGDP satisfies the requirements of this standard will be determined as part of the SAR Upgrade activity.
For references to this standard, see SAR Section 2.4.3.
1.3 ANSI /ANS 3.1, Selection, Qualification, and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants,1987 Edition i
PGDP satisfies only the following section of this standard:
Section 4.3.3 - The qualifications of the Radiation Protection Manager identified in SAR Section 6.1 satisfy the requirements of this section of the standard.
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SAR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO) 1.4 ANSI /ANS 3.2, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants,1994 Edition The extent to which PGDP satisfies the requirements of this standard is outlined in SAR Section 6.11.1 and Appendix B to SAP 'ection 6.11.
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1.5 ANSI /ANS 8.1, Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations With Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors, 1983 Edition PGDP satisfies the requirements of this standard.
I For references to this standard, see SAR Sections 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.3, 5.2.3.2, 5.2.4.1, and Table 6.9-1.
1.6 ANSI /ANS 8.3, Criticality Accident Alarm System,1986 Edition he recommendations of this standard were used as guidance only for the design of the CAAS. PGDP satisfies the requirements of this standard with the following exceptions:
Section 4.4.1 - The CAAS alarm is not audible in all permit-required confined spaces and cell housings associated with cells that are running. A " buddy system" is used to ensure personnel working in these areas are notified of alarms in order to evacuate.
Section 4.4.2 - An alarm signal with a complex sound wave or modulation is not provided.
Section 4.5.3 - Emergency power supplies for AQ and NS alarm systems are not provided.
A battery backup serves as the backup power supply for the cluster and local nitrogen horn (for the existing system). For the new system the local horns have been replaced by building horns which have battery backup power supplies.
Section 5.3 - The CAAS is not designed to withstand seismic stresses.
For references to this standard, see SAR Section 3.12.6, Section 2.5.1 of Appendix A to Chapter 4, and the basis statements for TSR Sections 2.1.4.5, 2.2.4.3, 2.3.4.7, 2.4.4.2 and 2.6.4.1.
1.7 ANSI /ANS 8.7 (N16.5), Guide for Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Storage of Fissile Material,1975 Edition PGDP satisfies the requirements of this standard with the following exceptions / clarifications:
Section 4.2.6 - Fire protection systems are installed throughout the process buildings where flammable liquids are used in operating equipment. Individual cell housings do not contain fire protection systems.
A-2
1 SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO) 1 2,0 American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 2.1 ASME NQA-1, Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities,1989 Edition
~
PGDP satisfies the requirements of this standard, including Basic and Supplementary Requirements, with exceptions and clarifications identified in the Quality Assurance Program Description. See also SAR Sections 6.6.13,6.8.1, and 6.8.2 and Section 7.5 of the Emergency Plan.
2.2 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,1995 Edition PGDP satisfies the following sections of this code as clarified below:
dection VIII - PGDP satisifies the requirements of Section VIII for the edition in effect at the time of fabrication of the following pressure components and systems: freezer / sublimer, condenser /reboiler, accumulator, autoclave, cell coolant condenser, nitrogen system (relief devices only), air system and dryer, cell coolant pressure relief, CAAS air accumulators, and l
UF, cylinders except that UF cylinders do not have pressure relhf devices.
Section IX - PGDP satisifies the requirements of Section IX for the components identified above for Section VIII.
For references to this code, see SAR Sections 3.2.3, 3.2.S.8, 3.3.4.5.1, 3.6.7.7. 3.7.1, 4.3.3.1.2, 4.3.4.1.2, Chapter 4 Appendix A Section 2.5.1.2, and the basis statements for TSR Sections 2.1, l
2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.
3.0 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1 3.1 NFPA 10, Portable Fire Extinguishers,1989 Edition As described in SAR Section 5.4.3, the requirements of this standard were used as guidance only in determining the size, selection, and distribution of portable fire extinguishers. PGDP will satisfy the requirements of this standard for modifications to the plant except as documented and justified by the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ).
i For references to this standard, see SAR Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.3.
i 3.2 NFPA 13, Sprinkler Systems,1989 Edition As described in SAR Section 5.4.1.1, the process buildings meet the definition of Ordinary Hazard Occupancies (Group 2) as stated in this standard and the fire protection system exceeds the sprinkler discharge of 0.15 gpm/sq. ft. for this type of occupancy. PGDP will satisfy the requirements of this standard for modifications to the plant except as documented and justified by the AHJ.
For references to this standard, see SAR Sections 3.3.5.12,5.4.1, and 5.4.1.1.
A-5
SAR-PGDP April 15,1997 Rev.8 3.3 NFPA 15, Water Spray Systems,1990 Edition PGDP will satisfy the requirements of this standard for modifications to the plant except as documented and justified by the AHJ.
~
For references to this standard, see SAR Section 5.4.1.
3.4 NFPA 24, Private Fire Service Mains,1992 Edition PGDP will satisfy the requirements of this standard for modifications to the plant except as documented and justified by the AHJ.
For references to this standard, see SAR Section 5.4.1.
3.5 NFPA 25, inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems,1995 Edition The 90-second response time criteria for the C-300 fire alarm is consistent with the requirements of this standard. See the basis statements for TSR Sections 2.3.4.8 and 2.4.4.5.
3.6 NFPA 30, Flammable Liquids,1990 Edition As described in SAR Section 5.4.1.1, the requirements of this standard are used as guidance only for procedures used to handle flammable liquids. PGDP will satisfy the requirements of this standard for modifications to the plant except as documented and justified by the AHJ.
For references to this standard and year, see SAR Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.1.1.
3.7 NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code,1996 Edition The 90-second response time criteria for the C-300 fire alarm is consistent with the requirements of this standard. See the basis statements for TSR Sections 2.3.4.8 and 2.4.4.5.
3.8 NFPA 101, I.ife Safety Code,1991 Edition PGDP uses the requirements of this standard as guidance only for the review of emergency egress paths.
For references to this standard, see SAR Section 5.4.1.2.
3.9 NFPA 232 (and 232 AM), Standard for the Protection of Records,1986 Edition As described in SAR Section 6.10.1.8, there are several acceptable methods for the storage of permanent records. If the NFPA 232 (or 232 AM) method of storage in 2-hour-rated containers is used, any exceptions to this standard will be documented and justified by the AHJ.
A-6 l
SAR-PGDP October 31,1998 Rev.29 3.12.2.S Emergency Conununication System Personnel involved in the handling of plant emergencies use radio units with individual or combined access to the operations, maintenance, or security repeater networks. Key supervisory personnel, such as the shift superintendent, have access to radio units that operate on the three networks. Most emergency vehicles are equipped with security and operations network radio units since both networks are used durin, emergency situations.
A single side band (SSB) radio is provided for emergency communication with DOE-Oak Ridge Operations (ORO), and scanners are available to monitor local law enforcement networks. Radios pennit emergency communication with the Kentucky State Police.
The plant is also a station point for NAWAS (Federal Emergency Management Agency's National Warning System). Telephones along with other necessary equipment for NAWAS are located in the C-200 and C-300 buildings.
3.12.3 Public Address System The plant utilizes a Public Address System which provide voice communications to the plant site. A Hi-Low tone on this system is used in an emergency to signal personnel to listen to the subsequent Public Address announcement.
All paging is initiated from the C-300 CCF and the C-200 Control Center and is distributed by the transmission of audio and control voltage through underground and overhead cable. The C-200 system l
is a slave to the C-300 master control. These voltages are distributed to each building where they supply signals to drive a building amplifier and associated speakers. Some buildings have individual local public address systems with supervisory override from C-300. The C-720 building has four different local systems while the C-200, C-340, C-400, and C-410/420 buildings all have local systems.
3.12.4 Data Conununications Several miscellaneous telecommunications systems are in use throughout the plant. These systems are operated for the transmission or reception of signals, writings, images, or sounds. These include systems such as facsimile transmission devices, data communications devices, cryptographic devices, the virtual address extend (VAX) system, intercom systems, and programmable calculators (to be used as computer terminals via telephone circuits).
In addition to these methods of data communication previously mentioned, a vacuum tube system is utilized between the ACR and their power supplying switchyard to provide rapid transport of permits. The C-720 building also uses one of these systems between the stores and work order area.
3.12-3
1 i
i SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
I 3.12.5 Process Building Evacuation Alarm System The plant utilizes horns or howlers in the process buildings to signal building evacuation. The horns and howlers are also used to signal personnel where the Public Address System and Hi-Low tone may not
' be audible (such as the process buildings).
3.12.6.a Criticality Accident Alarm System (Existing Configuration) l 7
The criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) is designed to detect gamma radiation levels that would l
result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and to activate the building evacuation alarms and l
alarms in the Central Control Facility (CCF). The system consists of radiation instrument assemblies. An i
instrument assembly consists of three individual instruments connected so that an alarm state on two of the three instruments in an assembly will cause a radiation alarm. The radiation assembly is referred to as a
" cluster" while any one of the three instruments which compose the cluster is designated a " detector i
module." The radiation alarms do not prevent a criticality. They do, however, mitigate the consequences to personnel in the immediate area by providing audible alarms which will warn personnel to evacuate the area immediately and prevent reentry into the area until an all-clear is given by the incident commander.
The clusters are installed in buildings containing special nuclear material except where a criticality safety analysis has been performed that demonstrates that a criticality could not occur. There are a total of 35 permanent clusters. Criteria for when these detector modules are required are established by the Nuclear Criticality Safety Section. Requirements as specified in American National Standards Institute standard ANSI /ANS-8.3 were used to determine the surveillance practices. Current cluster locations are listed in Table 3.12-1. Figure 3.12-1 shows a simplified schematic of the horn / beacon control circuit for air operated alarm horns.
Where possible, these detector locations provide for areas of overlapping coverage such that coverage is maintained even when a single cluster unit is unavailable. The TSRs for each facility specify the actions required when complete coverage is lost. These actions may include time requirements for repair of the lost clusters, use of a portable CAAS unit, shutdown of the affected area, or mitigative actions which reduce the potential for a criticality.
The portable CAAS units are similar in design and function to the permanent clusters. In addition to being used when permanent clusters are inoperable, these portable units may be used in situations where temporary conditions create the potential for a criticality, snc' as monitoring fissile v aste storage areas.
Additionally, the C-720 facility was recently identifieu, requiring coverage whenever converter maintenance is performed and the portable unit will be used if necessary until a permanent cluster is installed.
1 A building which does not contain special nuclear material as previously described but would be affected by a criticality occurring in an alarmed building is provided with alarms which are slaved to the alarmed building.
3.12-4
SAR-PGDP October 31,1998 Rev.29 When a cluster goes into alarm, it activates the building ovacuation horn, the cluster's plant air or nitrogen evacuation horn (where applicable), the external red beacon lights, and the audible and visual l
alarms on the master control console in the CCF, Building C-300.
Each cluster is designed to operate independently of the 120 VAC power supply for a minimum of four
~
hours. The clusters consist of three detector modules which alarm when a gamma dose-rate of 10 milliroentgen per hour (mR/hr) above background is detected. Each module has an internally generated signal to maintain a constant operational check of the detection circuits. This " background" is adjusted to a predetermined value on the front panel meter. Any detected radiation will add to the meter reading.
The 10 mR/hr-type instrument consists of three detect,r modules, each module is identically calibrated to l
provide an output at a predetermined radiation dos cate. The outputs of these modules are connected into a voting logic matrix such that at least two moQes, or under some faulted conditions one module, must alarm to give a criticality incident alarm. 'Ib circuit of the detector module has been designed to provide instrument sensitivity to a preselected ".4diation dose-rate delivered within a short period of time, but insensitive to a radiation field below a predetermined threshold value. Therefore, the instrument is capable of detecting a nuclear incident and providing an alarm to those locations which have received significant radiation dosages, but self-adjusts to compensate for minor fluctuations in background. The critical incident detector has been designed to exhibit the highest degree of reliability. The alarm modules do not have external adjustments and cannot be used for quantitative measurements. A feature has been incorporated to provide a trouble alarm on the C-300 radiation alarm console whenever any of the following occurs:
Line power failure Module removal Cable separation i
Loss of nitrogen pressure (where applicable)
Increased or decreased manifold pressure (where applicable)
)
Loss of signal at a detector module Indication of radiation detection by only nne detector module When the CAAS goes into alarm, associated building horns (air-powered and electronic) and warning lights external to the building are energized automatically. Air-powered local horns are supplied by plant air with the exception of the AC and AD clusters in C-746-Q, which are completely nitrogen powered.
In the event of a loss of plant air, each local horn has a ni'rogen backup system to sound the horns.
l Nitrogen bottles are replaced when the pressure is less than 900 psig. A standard nitrogen bottle at a pressure of 900 psig will sound the horn for more than 120 seconds. Some evacuation horns are supplied from plant air and may be turned off from the CCF.
Other evacuation horns are electronic (C-709, C-710, C-720, and C-720M). The #1, 2, and 3 ponable l
clusters are also electronic. The electronic horns have a self-contained battery backup power supply. The alarm instrumentation is designed to actuate at the 10-milliroentgen level, and provides an alarm indication in the C-300 CCF.
Slaved buildings are buildings located within the 12 Rad radius from a CAAS alarmed building or area and that are equipped with a plant air or nitrogen operated horn unit similar to the unit described above, or an electronic evacuation horn that produces a similar sound. Slaved building horns are located in Buildings C-709, C-310A, C-420, and C-720-M. Building C-709 is slaved from Building C-710; Building l
C-310A is slaved from Building C-310; Building C-420 is slaved from Building C-400; and Building C-720-M is slaved from Building C-409.
3.12-5
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO)
When a cluster enters an alarm condition, the evacuation and criticality alarm horn units in buildings slaved to that detector module are also activated.
As previously mentioned, the C-300 CCF radiation alarm console panel is designed to give alarm indications and locations. The panel displays a map with indicating lights showing the condition of the alarm system. Controls for resetting the alarm units, individual building alarm horn lockouts, and devices for remote sounding of the building alann horns are part of the design.
If the detector modules are in alarm condition, the 10 mR/hr (red) light illuminates and a memory light (blue) locks in.
After the incident commander has acknowledged the radiation alarm, the detector modules may be reset. Other building evacuation horns may be energized for complete personnel evacuation. The memory light must be reset with a key.
3.12.6.b Criticality Accident Alarm System (New Configuration)
The criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) is designed to detect gamma radiation levels that would result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and to activate the building evacuation alarms and
]
alarms in the Central Control Facility (CCF). The system consists of radiation instrument assemblies. An instrument assembly consists of three individual instruments connected so that an alarm state on two of the i
three instruments in an assembly will cause a radiation alarm. The radiation assembly is referred to as a
" cluster" while any one of the three instruments which compose the cluster is designated a " detector module.' The radiation alarms do not prevent a criticality. Rey do, however, mitigate the consequences to personnel in the immediate area by providing audible alarms which will warn personnel to evacuate the
]
area immediately and prevent reentry into the area until an all-clear is given by the incident commander.
Audibility is not provided for areas in permit-required confmed spaces and cell housings associated with cells that are running. A " buddy system" is used to ensure personnel working in these areas are notified of alarms in order to evacuate.
The clusters are installed in buildings containing special nuclear material except where a criticality safety analysis has been performed that demonstrates that a criticality could not occur. There are a total of 35 permanent clusters. Criteria for when these detector modules are required are established by the Nuclear Criticality Safety Section. Requirements as specified in American National Standards Institute standard ANSI /ANS-8.3 were used to determine the surveillance practices. Current cluster locations are listed in Table 3.12-1. Figure 3.12-la shows a simplified schematic of the horn / beacon control circuit for air operated alarm horns.
Where possible, these detector locations provide for areas of overlapping coverage such that coverage is maintained even when a single cluster unit is unavailable. He TSRs for each facility specify the actions required when complete coverage is lost. These actions may include time requirements for repair of the lost clusters, use of a portable CAAS unit, shutdown of the affected area, or mitigative actions which reduce the potential for a criticality.
4 3.12-6
m SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
The portable CAAS units are similar in design and function to the permanent clusters. In addition to being used when permanent clusters are inoperable, these portable units may be used in situations where temporary conditions create the potential for a criticality, such as monitoring fissile waste storage areas.
A building which does not contain special nuclear material as previously described but would be m
affected by a criticality occurring in an alarmed building is provided with alarms which are slaved to the alarmed building.
When a cluster goes into alarm, it activates die building evacuation horns, the external red beacon lights, and the audible and visual alarms on the master control console in the CCF, Building C-300.
Each cluster is designed to operate independently of the 120 VAC power supply for a minimum of four hours. The clusters consist of three detector modules which alann when a gamma dose-rate of 10 milliroentgen per hour (mR/hr) above background is detected. Each module has an internally generated signal to maintain a constant operational check of the detection circuits. This " background" is adjusted to a predetermined value on the front panel meter. Any detected radiation will add to the meter reading.
The 10 mR/hr-type instrument consists of three detector modules, each module is identically calibrated to provide an output at a predetermined radiation dose-rate. The outputs of these modules are connected into a voting logic matrix such that at least two modules, or under some faulted conditions one module, must alarm to give a criticality incident alarm. The circuit of the detector module has been designed to provide instrument sensitivity to a preselected radiation dose-rate delivered within a short period of time, but insensitive to a radiation field below a predetermined threshold value. Therefore, the instrument is capable of detecting a nuclear incident and providing an alarm to those locations which have received significant radiation dosages, but self-adjusts to compensate for minor fluctuations in background. The criticality accident detector has been designed to exhibit the highest degree of reliability. The alarm modules do not have external adjustments and cannot be used for quantitative measurements. A feature has been incorporated to provide a trouble alarm on the C-300 radiation alarm console whenever any of the followmg occurs:
Line power failure Module removal i
Cable separation Loss of air accumulator supply pressure (where applicable)
Loss of signal at a detector module Indication of radiation detection by only one detector module Loss of power to horn circuits (where applicable)
External temperature below cluster's specified minimum operating temperature (where applicable)
When the CAAS goes into alarm, associated building horns (air-powered and electronic) and warning lights external to the building are energized automatically. Air-powered horns are supplied by the CAAS air accumulators The accumulators are air tanks which provide the needed air capacity to blow all of the horns to be supplied for a minimum of two minutes. The accumulators are maintained at a pressure of approximately 150 psig. The supply to the whistles is maintained at the whistle design pressure necessary to blow the horns. The accumulators are filled by an air compressor located inside the associated building. The accumulators are monitored for pressure such that the compressors automatically recharge at a certain 3.12-6a
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) pressure. At a lower pressure, an alarm is generated in the Central Control Facility (C-300). The air compressor installation is designed such that quick removal and replacement can be accomplished with a spare compressor should replacement become necessary. When CAAS surveillances or post-maintenance testing is performed it is necessary to sound all CAAS alarms in the affected area and ensure all horns are functional. This depletes the CAAS accumulators below the pressure necessary to blow the air whistles i
for two minutes. The time to recharge the accumulators above this pressure has been estimated at greater than five hours using the permanently installed compressors alone. To reduce this recovery time a temporary connection is installed to allow the connection of a portable air compressor with enough capacity to recharge the accumulators in approximately one hour. This reduces CAAS outage time necessary to perform surveillances and post-maintenance testing.
In shop areas, offices, area control rooms, and other enclosed areas, electronic horns are installed.
These horns are actuated from the same relays that energize the air whistle solenoids. The power supply to the electronic horns is the same as that for the air whistle solenoids. These power supplies will be backed up by the cascade batteries or uninterruptable power supplies. The portable clusters also have i
electronic horns.
s Monitoring of the power to the whistle and horn circuits is provided which actuates a C-300 cluster trouble alarm if this power is interrupted.
Slaved buildings are buildings located within the 12 Rad radius from a CAAS alarmed building or area and that are equipped with an air operated horn unit similar to the unit described above, or an electronic evacuation horn that produces a similar sound. The slaved building horns are actuated by the cluster or clusters which provide detection coverage for that area.
When a cluster enters an alarm condition, the evacuation and criticality alarm horn units in buildings slaved to that detector module are also activated.
As previously mentioned, the C-300 CCF radiation alarm console panel is designed to give alarm mdications and locations. The panel displays a map with indicating lights showing the condition of the alarm system. Controls for resetting the alarm units, individual building alarm horn lockouts, and devices j
for remote sounding of the building alarm horns are part of the design.
if the detector modules are in alarm condition, the 10 mR/hr (red) light illuminates and a memory light (blue) locks in.
After the incident commander has acknowledged the radiation alarm, the detector modules may be reset. Other building evacuation horns may be energized for complete personnel evacuation. The memory light must be reset with a key.
3.12.7 Argon Gammagraph Radiation measurement systems consisting of sensitive argon gammagraphs, are also placed at strategic points in the plant. The gammagraph supplies a continuous record of the background gamma radiation and will assist the incident commander in detennining conditions in the area immediately following a criticality incident. The argon gammagraph is a radiation rate measuring instrument which utilizes an ionization chamber to telemeter information continuously to recorders in the ACR and CCF radiation alarm consoles.
This instrument will switch automatically in four ranges, and indicate the ranges with colored lights both 3.12-6b
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) locally and at the C-300 CCF radiation alarm console. The argon gammagraphs are not identified as a TSR system since they only record a radiation or criticality incident.
3.12.8 References a
1.
K/PS-1056, First Article Evaluation Testing of the NRC Criticality Alarm Clusters, dated May 1985.
3.12-6c
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO) l Blank Page 3.12-6d
r SAR-PGDP October 31,1998 Rev.29 Table 3.12-1. Listinst of cluster lac =*lons.
Buildine Clusters Location C-310 H,
Cell floor, central area, Col. D-11 G
Ground floor, loading room, Col. C-1lY C-310A slave Actuated from C-310 C-331 J.
Cell floor, Col. H-10 f
K.
Cell floor, Col. Y-10 L
Ground floor, mop surge drum room Col. W-16 j
C-333 Z,
Cell floor, Col. S-9Y i
AJ Ground floor, Col. MA !
C-333A AA, I West, Col. MC-50 l
AB 1 East, Col. N-50 C-335 A,-
Cell floor, Col. H-10 i
B, Cell floor, Col. Y-10 C.
Ground floor, atop surge drum room Col. X-16 l
AF Cell Floor, Col. J-21 C-337 T,
Cell Floor, Col. T-9Y U,
Cell Floor, Col. T-25Y V,
Cell Floor, Col. T-41Y i
W.
Cell Floor, Col. G-9Y v
X, Cell Floor, Col. CalY Y,
Ground Floor, Col. Ga-27 l
AK Cell Floor, Col. G-25Y f
C-337A N
Ground Floor, Col. N-51 C-360 R.
Central area, Col. E-3 S
South Wall, Col. AB-3 J
C-400 D.
Test loop area, Col. D-10 E
Spray booth area, Col. C-4 C-409 P,
Decontamination Booth Col. B-9 i
AE South Wall, Col. C-8 C-420 slave Actuated from C-400 C-709 slave Actuated from C-710 C 710 AM ist Floor Hall, Col.1 3 AN ist Floor Hall, Col. G-3 AP Lab Room #80 AQ lst Floor Hall, Col. C-5 AR 1st Floor Hall, Col. C-8 C-720 AL Ground floor, Col. K-13 C-720-M slave Actuated from C-409 C-746-Q AC, Center Wall, West AD Center Wall East C-310 Argon Gammagraph Cell floor, central area, Col. D-11 Ground floor withdrawal room, Col. F-2 C-331 Argon Gammagraph Cell floor, control area, Col, W-17 C-335 Argon Gammagraph Cell floor, control area, Col. V-18 C-400 Arron Gammacranh Central area. Col C-7 3.12-7 j
m,-
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 i
RAC 98C149 (RO) 2 r-------
10lR IM IM I
DETECTOR DETECTOR DETECTOR I
[ CLUSTER UNIT l
CtfMEL CHMEL CHWEL l
1 1
I g
l WHERE l
ALARM I
PLANT AIR AP LICABLE t-__gg
____a VA-1 1d i
LEGBS:
LOCAL HORN---I h l
(L) WlaIIM RAM CEIET CONTROL BOX L._ _.:
LOCAL HORN OlRIC) RADIATIm R.M SYSTEM (DELE NITROGEN 120 VAC y,
g BUILDING g (L ) '
i ei
u BEACONS i etmumISI A
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i.f -
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OTTER CLUSTER '#TS I
\\p g3 g 'i BUILDING
'i P'
&g} HORNS l
(
r EASC)
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EN l
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HORN " PERM. OFF" SET I
c, x
'--8 HORN CONTROL SWITCH NOTE: TITLES SHOWN IN " " ARE LABELS VISIBLE ON THE PANELS OR COMPONENTS j
Figure 3.12-1. Simplified schematic of horn / beacon control circuit. (Existing Configuration) l 3.12-8 i
-l
~
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO) ~
i a
a h
i in un vo mn in un e
i DETECTOR DETECTOR DETECTOR 8
5 CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL CLUSTER UNIT i
6 l
l Lo siv t
ALARM i
I i
M ATRIX BUILDING g BEACONS LEGEND:
- (L) RADIATION ALARM CASINET N I (RASC) RADIATION ALARM UGHTS' SYSTEM CONSOLE 21 R E S E T",
Vh-Y SUILDING i
3 ELECTRONIC
\\
HORNS CONNECTION FROM OTHER CLUSTER UNITS 120 VAC 128 VdC b
(RASC) s PRESSURE NC REG ULATORS 60 PSI
,g,,
CAAS AIR "PERMIS SIVEgWa c
ACCUM ULATORS
(RASC)
.av:
q HORN ERM.OFF" i
's ESET i
N HORN I'
CONTROL SWITCH NOTE: TITLES SHOWN IN " " ARE LABELS VISIBLE l
ON THE PANELS OR COMPONENTS 3
1 i
Figure 3.12-la. Simplified schematic of horn / beacon control circuit (New cot.fguration) i 3.12-8a 4
I g
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO) l 3
i 8
i i
Blank Page l
1 1
l l
1 3.12-8b 1
i j
j SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO) j Boundary The systen boundaries include:
- 1. UF, detector heads located at:
- a. the heated housings
- b. piping trench
- c. feed piping along wall
- d. thejet station
- 2. The associated alarms and alarm circuitry 3.15.1.1.6.a Criticality Accident Alarm System (Existing Configuration) l 0 Function The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is used to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimum critical ~ty accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs.
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
Boundarv The system boundaries for the CAAS cluster unit include:
l
- 1. Gamma detector channel l
- 2. Cluster logic module
- 3. Cluster housing t
l The bounded components of the alarm horn include:
4
- 1. Local horn j
- 2. Nitrogen regulator l
- 3. Air to nitrogen solenoid valves i
j
3.15-5 4
a 4
4
--->.-c
l SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 f
RAC 98C149 (RO) i
-5.
Piping from the nitrogen bottle and solenoid valve to the horn j
- 6. Backup battery for the cluster i
- 7. Trouble relays associated with loss of power and loss of air / nitrogen pressure j
a
- 8. Nitrogen supply l
The system boundaries for the Radiation Alarm Cabinet in each building include:
- 1. Relay from the clusters
- 2. Relay to actuate the building / slave lights and horns
)
1
- 3. Plant air system, back to the isolation valves
- 4. Building / slave lights and horns
- 5. Power supply for the building / slave lights and honu (120 Volt), back to the first breaker The system boundaries for C-300 include:
- 1. 48 volt power sup91y from the radiation alarm annunciator cabinets (A and B)
- 2. Loss of power relays
- 3. Loss of power indication on the C-300 console 4.
Building horn control switch 3.15.1.1.6.b Criticality Accident Alarm System (New Configuration)
O Function The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS)is used to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a j
criticality accident occurs.
j See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
Boundary The system boundaries for the CAAS cluster unit include:
i
- 1. Gamma detector channel I
i
- 2. Cluster logic module j
- 3. Cluster housing 3.15-6
= _ _ - _ ___
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) 4.
Backup battery for the cluster
- 5. Trouble relays associated with loss of power to radiation alarm clusters The system boundaries for the Radiation Alarm Cabinet and Building Horn Relay Cabinet in each building include:
- 1. Relay from the clusters
- 2. Relays to actuate the building / slave lights and horns f
- 3. Loss of horn power relay and indicator light 4.
Power supply for the building / slave lights and horns (120 Volt), back to the first breaker Tne system boundaries for the CAAS Air Accumulator System include:
- 1. Air accumulators and relief valves on accumulators
- 2. Air piping from accumulator to pressure regulators
- 3. Accumulator low pressa.. 9tch, pressure indicator, and alarm 4.
Isolation and check valves in flow path between accumulators and pressure regulators The system boundaries for the building horns and lights includes.
- 1. Building / slave air horns
- 2. Building / slave electronic horns
- 3. Building / slave lights 4.
Building / slave air horn solenoids
- 5. Air piping between pressure regulators and building / slave air horn solenoids
- 6. Air piping between air horn solenoids and building / slave air horns
- 7. Pressure regulators i
The system boundaries for C-300 include:
- 1. 48 volt power supply from the radiation alarm annunciator cabinets (A and B) l
- 2. Loss of power relays
]
- 3. Loss of power indication on the C-300 console 4.
Building horn control switch l
3.15-6a
i SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) 3.15.1.1.6.1 Portable CAAS O Function For buildings that require permanent CAAS coverage, a portable CAAS can be used on a temporary i
basis until the permanent CAAS is installed. These portable units can also be used when a permanent CAAS is out of service. The portable CAAS functions to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs. These portable units are equipped with an electric horn. When used in this manner, the portable CAAS are connected to the building alarm system (the building lights and horns and the C-300 alarm).
4 I.
A portable CAAS may also be used for off noral conditions in areas where there is no requirement for permanent CAAS, but a temporary need exists for portable CAAS coverage until the conditions are i
returned to normal (e.g., a truck containing fissile material in an outdoor area). When used in this manner, the portable CAAS will not be tied to a permanent building alarm system, but the portable CAAS alarm will be audible in all areas requiring immediate evacuation.
i See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
3.15-6b
i SAR-PGDP April..:,1998 Rev.24
- 6. Air operated UF vent valve
- 7. Air operated R-ll4 bypass valve.
i On the RCW loop, the boundary includes:
i
- 1. Air operated pump flow control valve
- 2. Air operated 3-way RCW valve l
4
- 3. Air operated RCW flow control valve l
- 4. Associated circuitry to position the valves.
l Of these valves, only the R-ll4 by-pass valve fails to the desired position.
3.15.1.2.4 Intermediate Gas Removal High Temperature Control System i
O Function The IGR High Temperature Control System limits the trap temperature co prevent an igmtion source for a destructive reaction.
i See Section 3.3.6.7 for a description of this system.
Boundan-The system boundary includes:
- l. Thermocouples
- 2. Trip circuitry j
- 3. Air operated inlet and outlet block valves
- 4. Air operated inlet flow control valves.
All of the valves fail closed upon loss of air, isolating the traps. In case of a power loss, the multipoint j
recorders will be disabled, and the inlet gas valves to the traps will automatically fail closed. Since loss of air or power will isolate the traps, the support systems do not need to be bounded.
3.15-11
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO) 3.15.1.2.5.a Criticality Accident Alarm System (Existing Configuration) l O Fametion The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is used to detect the elevated levels of ganuna radiation that result form the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs.
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
B2undarv The system boundaries for the CAAS cluster unit include:
- 1. Gamma detector channel
- 2. Cluster logic mo6le
- 3. Cluster housing.
The bounded components of the alarm horn include:
- 1. Local horn
- 2. Nitrogen regulator
- 3. Air to nitrogen sole toid valves
- 5. Piping from the nitrogen bottle and solenoid valve to the horn
- 6. Backup battery for the cluster
- 7. Trouble relays associated with loss of power and loss of air / nitrogen pressure
- 8. Nitrogen supply i
The system boundaries for the Radiation Alarm Cabinet in each building include:
- 1. Relay from the clusters
- 2. Relay to actuate the building / slave lights and horns.
- 3. Plant air system, back to the isolation valves 4.
Building / slave lights and horns 3.15-12
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO)
- 5. Power sujply for the building / slave lights and horns (120 Volt), back to the first breaker.
The system boundaries for C-300 include:
- 1. 48 volt power supply from the radiatior, alarm annunciator cabinets (A and B) 2 2.
Loss of power relays
- 3. Loss of power indication on the C-300 console 4.
Building horn control switch.
3.15.1.2.5.b Criticality Accident Alarm System (New Configuration)
O Function The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is used 'o detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation l
that result form the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs.
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
Boundarv The system boundaries for the CAAS cluster unit include:
- 1. Gamma detector channel
- 2. Cluster logic module
- 3. Cluster housing.
4.
Backup battery for the cluster
- 5. Trouble relays associated with loss of power to radiation alarm clusters The system boundaries for the Radiation Alarm Cabinet and Building Horn Relay Cabinet in each building include:
1.
Relay from the clusters 2.
Relays to actuate the building / slave lights and horns
- 3. Loss of horn power relay and indicator light 4.
Power supply for the building / slave lights and horns (120 Volt), back to the first breaker The system boundaries for the CAAS Air Accumulator System include:
- 1. Air accumulators and relief valves on accumulators
- 2. Air piping from accumulator to pressure regulators 3.15-13
. _ _. _.. _. _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _. _. ~. _ _ _... _
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
' 3. Accumulator low pressure switch, pressure indicator, and alarm i
- 4. Isolation and check valves in flow path between accumulators and pressure regulators The system boundaries E r the building horns and lights includes:
a
- 1. Building / slave air horns
- 2. Building / slave electronic horns
- 3. Building /slavelights
- 4. Building / slave air horn solenoids
- 5. Air piping between pressure regulators and building / slave air horn solenoids
- 6. Air piping between air horn solenoids and building / slave air horns
- 7. Pressure regulators The system boundaries for C-300 include:
- 1. 48 volt power supply from the radiation alarm annunciator cabinets (A and B)
- 2. Loss of power relays
- 3. Loss of power indication on the C-300 console 4.
Building horn control switch.
3.15.1.2.5.1 Portable CAAS O Function For buildings that require permanent CAAS coverage, a portable CAAS can be used on a temporary basis until the permanent CAAS is installed. These portable units can also be used when a permanent CAAS is out of service. The portable CAAS functions to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimum criticality t.ccident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs. These portable units are equipped with an electric horn. When used in this manner, the portable CAAS are connected to the building alarm system (the building lights and horns and the C-300 alarm).
A portable CAAS may also be used for off normal conditions in areas where there is no requirement for a permanent CAAS, but a temporary need exists for portable CAAS coverage (e.g., a truck containing fissile material in an outdoor area). When used in this manner, the portable CAAS will not be tied to a permanent building alarm system, but the portable CAAS alarm will be audible in all areas requiring immediate evacuation.
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
3.15-13a
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
Boundary The system boundaries for the portable CAAS unit include:
- 1. Gamma detector channel
- 2. Cluster logic module
- 3. Cluster housing 4.
Associated circuitry
- 5. Local electric horn
- 6. Backup battery for the cluster and horn
- 7. Connecting cable to connect to the building system 3.15-13b
F SAR-PGDP May 31,1996 Rev.3 3.15.1.3 Withdrawal Facilities Q systems for the C-310 and C-315 withdrawal facilities are listed be;ow.
3.15.1.3.1 UF, Release Detection System - Normetex Pump O Function The UF release detection system provides the means to detect a UF release. The system function is to automatically shutdown the Normetex pump and close the discharge valve to decrease the system pressure and end the release.
See Section 3.5.2.1 for a description of this system.
Boundary The system boundaries include:
1.
UF. detector heads located above the Normetex pump discharge valve, expansion joint, pump housing, pump flange
- 2. Associated circuitry to trip the pump and close the discharge valve. The associated circuitry includes a programmable logic controller (and software) that determines whether pump trip is required and provides the trip signal.
- 3. Alarms and associated alarm circuitry.
3.15.1.3.2 UF, Release Detection System - Withdrawal Station Low Voltage System O Functian The UF. release detection system provides the means to detect a UF release. The system function is to detect a UF. release, and to automatically isolate the withdrawal position, limiting the release quantity.
See Sections 3.4.7 and 3.5.7 for a description of this system.
Boundary The system boundary includes:
- 1. UF detector heads located above each withdrawal position
- 2. Liquid drain line block valves, air operated
- 3. The cylinder valve 3.15-14
_m._
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
Boundarv l
The system boundary includes:
- 1. Differential pressure sensor
- 3. Associated interlocks on the air supply to the scale cait.
The scale carts fail safe upon loss of air.
3.15.1.3.7.a Criticality Accident Alarm System (C-310) (Existing Configuration) l O Function The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is used to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs.
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
Boundary The system boundaries for the CAAS cluster unit include:
- 1. Gamma detector channel
- 2. Cluster logic module
- 3. Cluster housing.
The bounded components of the alarm horn include:
- 1. Local horn
- 2. Nitrogen regulator
- 3. Air to nitrogen solenoid valves
- 5. Piping from the nitrogen bottle and solenoid valve to the horn
- 6. Backup battery for the cluster 3.15-17
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
- 7. Trouble relays associated with loss of power and loss of air / nitrogen pressure
- 8. Nitrogen supply The system boundaries for the Radiation Alarm Cabinet in each building include:
a
- 1. Relay from the clusters
- 2. Relay to actuate the building / slave lights and horns.
- 3. Plant air system, back to the isolation valves
- 4. Building / slave lights and horns
- 5. Power supply for the building / slave lights and horns (120 Volt), back to the first breaker.
The system boundaries for C-300 include:
- 1. 48 volt power supply from the radiation alarm annunciator cabinets (A and B)
- 2. Loss of power relays
- 3. Loss of power indication on the C-300 console 4.
Building horn control switch.
3.15.1.3.7.b Criticality Accident Alarm System (C-310) (New Configuration)
O Function The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is used to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the. minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs.
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
Boundary The system boundaries for the CAAS cluster unit include:
- 1. Gamma detector channel
- 2. Cluster logic module
- 3. Cluster housmg.
)
- 4. Backup battery for the cluster
- 5. Trouble relays associated with loss of power to radiation alarm clusters 3.15-18
.. 7
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO)
The system boundaries for the Radiation Alarm Cabinet and Building Horn Relay Cabinet in each building include:
- 1. Relay from the clusters
- 2. Relays to actuate the building / slave lights and horns
- 3. Loss of horn power relay and indicator light 4.
Power supply for the building / slave lights and horns (120 Volt), back to the first breaker The system boundaries for the CAAS Air Accumulator System include:
- 1. Air accumulators and relief valves on accumulators
- 2. Air piping from accumulator to pressure regulators
- 3. Accumulator low Pressure switch, pressure indicator, and alarm 4.
Isolation and check valves in flow path between accumulators and pressure regulators The system boundaries for the building horns and lights includes:
- 1. Building / slave air horns
- 2. Building / slave electronic horns 3 Building / slave lights 4.
Building / slave air horn solenoids i
- 5. Air piping between pressure regulators and building / slave air horn solenoids
]
- 6. Air piping between air horn solenoids and building / slave air horns
- 7. Pressure regulators The system boundaries for C-300 include:
- 1. 48 volt power supply from the radiation alarm annunciator cabinets (A and B)
- 2. Loss of power relays
- 3. Loss of power indication on the C-300 console 4.
Building horn control switch.
3.15-18a
)
_ _..___ _.._ _.. _.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _.. _ - _. -. _. ~ _. _.. _. _ _. _. _ _
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
'3.15.1.3.7.1 Portable CAAS O Function For buildings that require permanent CAAS coverage, a portable CAAS can be used on a temporary basis until the permanent CAAS is installed. These portable units can also be used when a permanent CAAS is out of service. The portable CAAS functions to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs. These portable units are equipped with an electric horn. When used in this manner, the portable CAAS are connected to the building alarm system (the building lights and horns and i
the C-300 alarm).
A portable CAAS may also be used for off normal conditions in areas where there is no requirement for a permanent CAAS, but a temporary need exists for portable CAAS coverage (e.g., a truck containing
)
fissile material in an outdoor area). When used in this manner, the portable CAAS will not be tied to a permanent building alarm system, but the portable CAAS alarm will be audible in all areas requiring immediate evacuation.
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
Boundary l
l The system boundaries for the portable CAAS unit include:
i 1
i i
l i
j i
i
)
3.15-18b 4
i j
I
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO)
- 3. Associated interlocks on the air supply to the scale cart.
The scale carts fail safe upon loss of air.
3.15.1.4.9.a Criticality Accident Alarm System (Existing Configuration) l O Function l
The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is used to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs.
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
j i
Boundan i
The system boundaries for the CAAS cluster unit include:
- 1. Gamma detector channel
- 2. Cluster logic module i
- 3. Cluster housing i
The bounded components of the alarm horn include:
- 1. Local horn
- 2. Nitrogen regulator
- 3. Air to nitrogen solenoid valves
- 5. Piping from the nitrogen bottle and solenoid valve to the horn
- 6. Backup battery for the cluster
- 7. Trouble relays associated with loss of power and loss of air / nitrogen pressure
- 8. Nitrogen supply The system boundaries for the Radiation Alarm Cabinet in each building include:
- 1. Relay from the clusters 3.15-27
_. _ _ __ ~-
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) l
- 2. Relay to actuate the building / slave lights and horns
- 3. Plant air system, back to the isolation valves 4.
Building / slave lights and homs
- 5. Power supply for the building / slave lights and horns (120 Volt), back to the first breaker The system boundaries for C-300 include:
- 1. 48 volt power supply from the radiation alarm annunciator cabinets (A and B)
- 2. Loss of power relays 3.
Loss of power indication on the C-300 console
- 4. Building horn control switch 3.15.1.4.9.b Criticality Accident Alarm System (New Configuration)
O Function The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is used to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs.
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
Boundary The system boundaries for the CAAS cluster unit include:
- 1. Gamma detector channel
- 2. Cluster logic module
- 3. Cluster housing 4.
Backup battery for the cluster
- 5. Trouble relays associated with loss of power to radiation alarm clusters The system boundaries for the Radiation Alarm Cabinet and Building Horn Relay Cabinet in each building include:
- 1. Relay from the clusters
- 2. Relays to actuate the building / slave lights and horns
- 3. Loss of horn power relay and indicator light 3.15-28
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO) 4.
Power supply for the building / slave lights and horns (120 Volt), back to the first breaker The system boundaries for the CAAS Air Accumulator System include:
- l. Air accumulators and relief valves on accumulators
- 2. Air piping from accumulator to pressure regulators
- 3. Accumulator low pressure switch, pressure indicator, and alarm 4.
Isolation and check valves in flow path between accumulators and pressure regulators The system boundaries for the building horns and lights includes:
- 1. Building / slave air horns
- 2. Building / slave electronic horns
- 3. Building / slave lights 4.
Building / slave air horn solenoids
- 5. Air piping between pressure regulators and building / slave air horn solenoids 6.
Air piping between air horn solenoids and building / slave air horns j
1 7.
Pressure regulators The system boundaries for C-300 include:
- 1. 48 volt power supply from the radiation alarm annunciator cabinets (A and B)
- 2. Loss of power relays
- 3. Loss of power indication on the C-300 console 4.
Building horn control switch 3.15.1.4.9.1 Portable CAAS O Function For buildings that require permanent CAAS coverage, a portable CAAS can be used on a temporary basis until the permanent CAAS is installed. These portable units can also be used when a permanent CAAS is out of service. The portable CAAS functions to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimur criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs. T hese portable units are equipped with an electric horn. When used in this 3.15-28a
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO) manner, the ponable CAAS are connected to the building alarm system (the building lights and horns and the C-300 alarm).
A portable CAAS may also be used for off normal conditions in areas where there is no requirement for a permanent CAAS, but a temporary need exists for portable CAAS coverage (e.g., a truck containing fissile material in an outdoor area). When used in this manner, the portable CAAS will not be tied to a permanent building alarm system, but the portable CAAS alarm will be audible in all areas requiring immediate evacuation.
I See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
Boundary q
The system boundaries for the portable CAAS unit include:
i 1.
Gamma detector channel
' 2.
Cluster logic module l
3.
Cluster housing
]
4.
Associated circuitry 1
3.15-28b i
SAR-PGDP May 31,1996 f
Rev. 3 5.
Automatic rail chocks are provided on the outboard side of the platform to prevent rolling of the scale cart during movement of the platform. The levelator has an interlock switch with the operating floor scale cart to prevent scale cart movement unless the elevator is in the up position.
The system boundary for the elevator includes:
1.
Hydraulic lift 2.
Hydraulics 3.
Key lock for the elevator, the interlock on the elevator doors to prevent opening when the elevator floor is not level with the floor 4.
Deadman switch to prevent scale cart movement.
i 3.15.1.4.14 UF. Cylinders O Function Cylinders utilized to contain UF. have been designed, built and tested to ANSI N14.1 and a prescribed minimum volume specified in USEC-651. 'Hiis ensures safe containment of UF. during transport, sampling, feeding, filling, and storage and to prevent a release of liquid UF. The issue of fail 6
safe is not applicable to this system.
The 2S and 1-kg cylinders are not included as Q due to their small size. These cylinders are l
classified as AQ.
See Section 3.7.1 for a description of this system.
Boundarv i
The system boundary includes:
1.
Cylinder
]
2.
Cylinder valve 3.
Cylinder plug The cylinder valve protector has been identified as AQ.
i
)
3,15-31 j
I SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) 3.15.1.4.15 UF. Pigtails O Function
)
UF. cylinder pigtails are designed to safely transfer liquid UF. from a parent cylinder to a sample manifold or a daughter cylinder during transfer operations.
See Section 3.6.1 for a description of this system.
Boundan*
The system boundary includes:
1.
Pigtail assembly, including the tubing, adapter, and gaskets.
3.15.1.4.16 C-360 Liquid UF. Transfer Piping and Valves O Function The function of the piping and valves is to safely contain, sample, and transfer liquid UF.6 See Section 3.6.1 for a description of this system.
1 i
i Boundary l
The boundary includes:
1.
Transfer lines from the pigtail on the parent cylinder through the drain manifold to the pigtail for l
the daughter cylinder, the header, and sampling lines to the sample cabinet.
i 2.
Isolation valves, evacuation isolation valves, and transfer line isolation valves.
l l
3.15.1.5 Chemical Facilities s
Q systems in the decontamination systems are listed.
l 3.15.1.5.1.a Criticality Accident Alarm Systems (Existing Configuration) l j
O Function l
The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is used to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs.
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
3.15-32
?
.-c.
r' SAR-PGDP '
May 31,1996 Rev.3 Boundan' The system boundaries for the CAAS cluster unit include:
1.
Gamma detector channel 2.
Cluster logic module 3.
Cluster housing.
The bounded components of the alarm horn include:
1.
Local horn 2.
Nitrogen regulator 3.
Air to nitrogen solenoid valves -
4.
Pressure switches for the horn manifold and the nitrogen bottle 5.
Piping from the nitrogen bottle and solenoid to the horn 6.
Backup battery for the cluster 7.
Trouble relays associated with loss of power and loss of air / nitrogen pressure 8.
Nitrogen supply The system boundaries for the Radiation Alarm Cabinet in each building include:
1.
Relay from the clusters 2.
Relay to actuate the building / slave lights and horns 3.
Plant air system, back to the isolation valves 4.
Building / slave lights and horns 5.
Power supply for the building / slave lights and horns (120 Volt), back to the first breaker The system boundaries for C-300 include:
1.
48 volt power supply from the radiation alarm annunciator cabinets (A and B) 2; Loss of power relays 3.15-33
. _ -. - ~ -. _ _ - -
6 i
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) 3.
Loss of power indication on the C-300 console f
i 4.
' Building horn control switch 3.15.1.5.1.b Criticality Accident Alarm Systems (New Configuration) f O Function The Criticality Accident' Alarm System (CAAS) is used to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs.
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
j Boundary The system boundaries for the CAAS cluster unit include:
l 1.
Gamma detector channel i
2.
Cluster logic module j
3.
Cluster housing 4.
Backup battery for the cluster 5.
Trouble relays associated with loss of power to radiation alarm clusters The system boundaries for the Radiation Alarm Cabinet and Building Horn Relay Cabinet in each building include:
1.
Relay from the clusters 2.
Relays to actuate the building / slave lights and horns 3.
Loss of horn power relay and indicator light 4.
Power supply for the building / slave lights and horns (120 Volt), back to the first breaker The system boundaries for the CAAS Air Accumulator System include:
1.
Air accumulators and relief valves on accumulators i
2.
Air piping from accumulator to pressure regulators i
3.
Accumulator low pressure switch, pressure indicator, and alarm 3.15-34
i l
l SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) 4.
Isolation and check valves in flow path between accumulators and pressure regulators The system boundaries for the building horns and lights includes:
1.
Building / slave air horns 2.
Building / slave electronic horns i
3.
Building / slave lights 4.
Building / slave air horn solenoids 1
5.
Air piping between pressure regulators and building / slave air horn solenoids 6.
Air piping between air horn solenoids and building / slave air horns 7.
Pressure regulators The system boundaries for C-300 include.
1.
48 volt power supply from the radiation alarm annunciator cabinets (A and B) 2.
Loss of power relays 3.
Loss of power indication on the C-300 console 4.
Building horn control switch 3.15.1.5.1.1 Portable CAAS O Function For buildings that require permanent CAAS coverage, a portable CAAS can be used on a temporary basis until the permanent CAAS is installed. These portable units can also be used when a permanent CAAS is out of service. The portable CAAS functions to detect the elevated levels of rmma radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel ia the event that a criticality accident occurs. These portable units are equipped with an electric horn. When used in this manner, the portable CAAS are connected to the building alarm system (the building lights and horns and the C-300 alarm).
s A portable CAAS may also be used for off normal conditions in areas where there is no requirement for a pennanent CAAS, but a temporary need exists for portable CAAS coverage (e.g., a tmck containing fissile material in an outdoor area). When used in this manner, the portable CAAS will not be tied to a permanent building alarm system, but the portable CAAS alarm will be audible in all areas requiring immediate evacuation.
3.15-34a
i e
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.'
Boundary The system boundaries for the portable CAAS unit include:
1.
Gamma detector channel 2.
Cluster logic module
~ 3.
Cluster housing 4.
Associated circuitry 5.
Local electric horn 6.
Backup battery for the cluster and horn i
7.
Connecting cable to connect to the building system 3.15.1.6 Waste Management Q systems in radioactive waste management activities are listed.
1 3.15-34b
r~~
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) 3.15.1.6.1.a Criticality Accident Alarm Systems (Existing Configuration) l O Fundio n The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is used to detect the elevated levels of gamma a
radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event l
that a criticality accident occurs.
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
Boundary The system boundaries for the CAAS cluster unit include:
l.
Gamma detector channel 2.
Cluster logic module f
3.
Cluster housing j
The bounded components of the alarm horn include:
1.
Local horn 2.
Nitrogen regulator 3.
Air to nitrogen solenoid valves 4.
Pressure switches for the horn manifold and the nitrogen bottle 5.
Piping from the nitrogen bottle and solenoid valve to the horn 6.
Backup battery for the cluster i
7.
Trouble relays associated with loss of power and loss of air /ns.rogen pressure 8.
Nitrogen supply.
The system boundaries for the Radiation Alarm Cabinet in each building include:
1.
Relay from the clusters 2.
L Relay to actuate the building / slave lights and horns 3.
Plant air system, back to the isolation valves 3.15-35
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO) 4.
Building / slave lights and horns 5.
Power supply for the building / slave lights and horns (120 Volt), back to the first breaker The system boundaries for C-300 include:
n l.
48 volt power supply from the radiation alarm annunciator cabinets (A and B) 2.
Loss of power relays 3.
Loss of power indication on the C-300 console 4.
Building horn control switch.
3.15.1.6.1.b Criticality Accident Alarm Systems (New Configuration)
O Function The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is used to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs.
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
Boundary The system boundaries for the CAAS cluster unit include:
1.
Gamma detector channel 2.
Cluster logic module 3.
Cluster housing 4.
Backup battery for the cluster 5.
Trouble relays associated with loss of power and loss of air / nitrogen pressure The system boundaries for the Radiation Alarm Cabinet and Building Horn Relay Cabinet in each building include:
1.
Relay from the clusters 2.
Relays to actuate the building / slave lights and horns 3.
Loss of horn power relay and indicator light 4.
Power supply for the building / slave lights and horns (120 Volt), back to the first breaker 3.15-36
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
The system boundaries for the building horns and lights includes:
1.
Building / slave electronic horns 2.
Building / slave lights The system boundaries for C-300 include:
1.
48 volt power supply from the radiation alarm annunciator cabinets (A and B) 2.
Loss of power relays 3.
Loss of power indication on the C-300 console 4.
Building horn control switch.
3.15.1.6.1.1 Portable CAAS O Function For buildings that require permanent CAAS coverage, a portable CAAS can be used on a temporary basis until the permanent CAAS is installed. These portable units can also be used when a permanent i
CAAS is out of service. The portable CAAS functions to detect the elevated levels of gamma radiation
{
that result from the minimum criticality accident of concern and warn plant personnel in the event that a criticality accident occurs. These portable units are equipped with an electric horn. When used in this manner, the portable CAAS are connected to the building alarm system (the building lights and horns and the C-300 alann).
A portable CAAS may also be used for off normal conditions in areas where there is no requirement for a permanent CAAS, but a temporary need exists for portable CAAS coverage (e.g., a truck containing fissile material in an outdoor area). When used in this manner, the portable CAAS will not be tied to a permanent building alarm system, but the portable CAAS alarm will be audible in all areas requiring immediate evacuation.
See Section 3.12.6 for a description of this system.
j Boundary The system boundaries for the portable CAAS unit include:
1.
Gamma detector channel 2.
Cluster logic module 3.
Cluster housing 4.
Associated circuitry 5.
Local electric horn 6.
Backup battery for the cluster and horn 7.
Connecting cable to connect to the building system 3.15-36a
SAR-PGDP February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO) f 4
Blank Page i
i l
3.IS-36b
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SAR PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
Table 1.1-1. Plant areas affected by HAUP (excluding CAAS) i i
Building Description Physically Operationally No.
afTected affected C-310 Purge and Product Building Yes Yes C-310-A Product Withdrawal Building No Yes C-331 Process Building Yes Yes C-333 Process Building Yes Yes C-333-A Feed Vaporization Facility No Yes l
C-335 Process Building Yes Yes l
C-337 Process Building Yes Yes l
C-337-A Feed Vaporization Facility No Yes l
C-360 Toll Transfer facility Yes Yes C-400 Decontamination / Cleaning Facility Yes Yes C-409 Stabilization Building (New Yes Yes Decontamination Building)
C-710 Technical Services Building Yes Yes l
C-720 Maintenance and Stores Building No Yes l
C-720-C Converter Repair Shop No Yes C-728 Motor Cleaning Facility No Yes C-745 Product Cylinder Storage Yards (all)
No Yes C-746-E Scrap Metal Storage Yard No Yes C-746-0 UF, Drum Storage Building Yes Yes l
Table 1.1-2. Plant areas associated with changes in CAAS (Existing Configuration) l Building No.
Description l
l C-310 Product Withdrawal Building l
C-331 Process Building C-333 Process Building C-333-A UF. Feed Facility C-334 Process Building l
C-337 Process Building l
C-337-A UF Feed Facility C-360 Toll Transfer and Sampling Building C-400 Decontamination / Cleaning Facility C-409 Lbilization Building (New Decontamination Building)
C-710 Technical Services Building C-720 Maintenance and Stores Building C-720-C Converter Repair Shop C-728 Motor Cleaning Facility C-746-0 UF, Drum Storage Building 1-3
t 1
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 l
RAC 98C149 (RO)
{
}
Table 1.1-2a. Plant areas associated with changes in CAAS (New Configuration) l f
Building No.
Description l
C-3 '. 0 Product Withdrawal Building C-331 Process Building l
C-333 Process Building C-333-A UF. Feed Facility C-335 Process Building C-337 Process Building C-337-A UF. Feed Facility C-360 Toll Transfer and Sampling Building C-400 Decontamination / Cleaning Facility C-409 Stabilization Building (New Decontamination Building)
C-331/335 Tie Line UF. Tie Line C-71';
Technical Services Building C-720 Maintenance and Stores Building C-720-C Converter Repair Shop C-728 Motor Cleaning Facility C-337/360 Tie Line UF. Tie Line C-746-0 UF Drum Storage Building l
1-4
- = - -. -
SAR PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) 2.5 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS / FEATURES 2.5.1 Criticality Accident Alarm System p
The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) is used for warning plant personnel of a criticality incident. The system is designed to detect gamma radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal that will i
alert personnel to evacuate the areas that are potentially affected.
A block diagram of the overall system configuration is depicted in Fig. 2.5-1. In addition to the devices described in the figure one other type of detector is associated with the system. This detector is identified as the argon gammagraph detector. This detector and its logic was not changed or affected by the changes for the HAUP and will not be discussed. For more information on these devices and their functions, refer to Sect. 3.12.7 of the PGDP SAR.
The CAAS was significantly affected by the HAUP due to the additional areas requiring criticality alarm coverabe. The entire system will be described and reviewed for acceptability.
2.5.1.1 Principal Design Basis and Criteria The primary input (i.e., principal design criteria) for the CAAS is ANSI /ANS 8.3. The following design criteria support the present bases for CAAS at PGDP.
2.5.1.1.1 Text Deleted j
2.5.1.1.2 ANSI /ANS 8.3 1.
Gamma radiation detectors shall be capable of detecting a criticality that produces an absorbed dose in free air of 20 rads ofcombined neutron and gamma radiation at an unshielded distance of 2 m from the fissionable material within 60 seconds. Areas where this requirement is not met must have adequate justification for not providing alarm coverage. It should be noted that this requirement is not applicable to areas containing material less than 1 wt % 2"U.
i 2.
The systera shall automatically initiate an evacuation alarm signal within one half second of the alarm setpoint being exceeded. The building evacuation alarm system shall be capable of being manually activated from a central remote location.
3.
Text Deleted 4.
The system shall remain in an alarm condition after initiation regardless of radiation levels returning to normal until a manual reset of the alarm has been accomplished. Reset capability shall be limited i
in access to preclude inadvertent reset and shall be located outside the area to be evacuated.
5.
Process areas in which activities will continue during a power outage shall have emergency power supplies for alarm systems or such activities shall be monitored continuously with portable instruments.
6.
The system shall be designed to preclude inadvenent initiation signals to the extent practical to provide system credibility.
2-5
- - - -... ~ - - - - -.. - -
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 l
RAC 98C149(RO) 7.
The system shall be designed to provide an indication of system malfunctions for alerting personnel of maintenance requirements.
8.
A means shall be provided to test the response and performance of the system (excluding the sounding of the alarm) without causing an evacuation alarm. In addition, the portions of the system not affected by the test shall still remain functional.
)
9.
'In system shall provide sufGeient information to the Central Control Facility (CCF) to allow implementation of site emergency response procedures for criticality accidents; this information shall be provided independent of off-site ac power for a minimum of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
- 10. The alarm signal shall be for immediate evacuation purposes caly and of sufHeient volume and coverage to be heard in all areas that are to be evacuated.
I1. The CAAS shall remain operable in the event of seismic shock equivalent to the site-specine design basis es>thquake or the equivalent value speciGed by the Uniform Building Code.
Each of these criteria will be addressed in Sect. 2.5.13 by illustrating how the system meets the requirements.
2.5.1.2.a System Description (Existing Configuration) l The CAAS is primarily divided into three categories for description. These three areas are the local m system, building alarm system, and the Building C-300 CCF alarms and controls. The local alarm i
system includes the individual cluster unit detectors that provide detection capability for the entire system.
The cluster unit detection system actuates both visual and audible alarms in the affected area (s). The personnel alarms that would be activated consist of:
a local hot p ontinuous high pitched blast) actuated by plant air or by nitrogen or an electrcnic horn, building horns (air or electric),
red rotating or strobe beacons located on the outside of buildings, and an audible and visible alarm on the Building C-300 CAAS control panel.
The local and building horns produce a loud, distinctive sound and are used as an en ergency signal for immediate evacuation of all personnel from the building or area.
)
Due to the signincant number of changes in this system, the local and building alarm system will be described first. Once the basic concept has been established, each building or area will be discussed in detail to provide information on the specific conHguration and how the system is arranged.
2.5.1.2.b System Description (New Configuration)
The CAAS is primarily divided into three categories for description. These three aree are the local alarm j
system, building alarm system, and the Building C-300 CCF alarms and controls. The local alarm system includes the individual cluster unit detectors that provide detection capability for the entire system.
The cluster unit detection system actuates both visual and audible alarms in the affected area (s). The personnel alarms that would be activated consist of:
2-6
l l
l 1
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 l
RAC 98Cl49 (RO) building horns (air or electric),
red rotating or strobe beacons located on the outside of buildings, and an audible and visible alarm on the Building C-300 CAAS control panel.
i The building horns produce a loud, distinctive sound and are used as an emergency signal for immediate j
evacuation of all personnel from the building or area.
The building alarm system will be described first. Once the basic concept has been established, each building or area will be discussed in detail to provide information on the specific configuration and how the system is arranged.
2.5.1.2.1 Local alarm system (Existing Confguration Only, New Configuration Will Remove Local i
Alarm System)
The local alarm system consists of three major devices: the cluster unit, the local junction / horn control box, and the alarm horn. The cluster unit sends the required input to the building alarm system and to the CCF. The individual local alarm units are located throughout the plant as indicated on Fig. 2.5-2. C-710 and C-720 do not have a specific local horn.
l l
l 2-6a
i SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98C149(RO)
Blank Page 2-6b
7 SAR-PGD!
Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO)
Each detector channel has three possible states: normal, fault alann, and radiation alarm. Pre-determined values of fault alarm and radiation alarm are selected to provide annunciation if the unit falls outside the normal operating range (10 mR/hr radiation). In the normal state, the meter on the front panel of the detector channel indicates a pre-determined normal background reading on the upper scale, and no other alarm indicators are activated if something in a detector channel fails and causes the signal level to drop to a fault 4
alarm point, the detector channel will go into the fault state, actuating the FAULT ALARM light on the front panel. If a detector channel goes into the fault state, the cluster logic module will detect it, then activate an i
audible alarm and turn on a trouble light at the CAAS console in the CCF. Radiation levels of 10 mR/h or more above the background reading will exceed the cluster unit's alarm setpoint, and the cluster unit will go into the alarm state. In this state, the RAD ALARM light on the front panel of the detector channel will turn on.
In addition to providing space for mounting the three detector chanaels and the cluster logic module, the cluster unit housing also provides electronic connections from each detector channel to the cluster logic module. Also mounted on the back of the cluster unit housing is the cluster unit housing / mother board assembly. This assembly provides power supply connections to each detector channel, a connection slot for the cluster logic module printed circuit board, and connections to cable connectors slots J2,33, J5, and J7 on the cluster unit housing.
If only one detector channel goes into the alarm state, the cluster logic module considers it a malfunction and generates a trouble alarm on the CAAS console at CCF. If two detector channels go into alann at the same time, the cluster logic module considers it genuine and generates a radiation alarm. If two detector channels are already in the fault state and the third detector channel goes into alarm, the cluster logic module generates a radiation alarm.
To summarize, a radiation alarm will recur if two or more (any two) detector channels go into the alarm state or if only one goes into the alarm stat < while the other two are in the fault state. All other combinations of abnormal states will cause a fault alaro.
A radiation alarm signal generated b the above sequence not only turns on the RAD ALARM light on 3
the detector channel but also turns on the ALARM light on the cluster logic module and the 10-mR indicator light or strobe on the CAAS console. In addition to the panel alarm light indicators, a radiation alarm signal activates red rotating or strobe beacons located on the exterior of the affected building, and a group of evacuation horns located in the affected area along with any applicable slave horns.
The cluster logic module for all detector assemblies was replaced with the cluster logic module developed for K-25 alarm system application. The new module operates in the same manner as the original logic module with the exception that two output circuits are available for functional redundancy. The voting logic for detector channel input is identical to the previous module. There are two channels of output relays, K4 and K5. An analysis' was performed on the new module to determine the capability to meet the single failure requirements. The results indicated that the logic gates and the relays met the functional single failure requirements. The primary reason for this change is to provide additional protection against single failure in the individual cluster units.
Local horn alarm description (Existing Configuration Only, New Conaguration Will Remove Local IIorn Alarm)
Local horn alarms are located at each of the cluster unit installations except at C-710 and C-720. The local horns are either electronic or are actuated by plant air during the normal operating mode and by nitrogen (N ) from a dedicated cylinder as a backup if the plant air pressure decreases below a preset value. An 2
exception to the above statement does exist. Plant air is not available in Building C-746-Q: therefore, a dual N cylinder manifold serves as the primary source and a single N cylinder serses as the backup for each of 2
2 the two clusters in this building. C-710 and C-720 have all electric horns with no dedicated local horn.
2-9
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49(RO)
'Ihe air-operated local horn alarm consists of a clarion horn, a compressed nitrogen gas cylinder, and a local hom control box which is electrically connected through ajunction box to components located in the cluster unit. A simplified electrical schematic of the circuit is shown in Fig. 2.510.
The local horn control box is normally mounted on a wall or column just below the cluster unit and junction box; the nitrogen supply, a 2200-psig cylinder, is secured on the floorjust below the local horn control box. The horn is mounted several feet higher than the local horn control box. Fig. 2.5-1 I shows a typical field installation of the local horn alarm system unit.
The local horn control box contains a nitrogen pressure regulator, three pressure switches (SSA, SSB, and S6), a double solenoid four-way valve to control pressure to the horn, a plant air connection with a backflow check valve, a switch and test socket to accommodate a test / control unit, a terminal block for electrical connections, and miscellaneous hardware. Fig. 2.5-10 shows the electrical schematic circuit, and Fig. 2.5-12 shows the component layout and connections in the local horn control box. Clusters which are located in an outdoor environment are equipped with a low temperature alarm (TSLL-129). The TSLL-129 alarm contacts (when installed) are in series with SSA, SSB and S6 and will initiate a CLUSTER TROUBLE alarm in C-300 if the external temperature of the cluster approaches the cluster's specified minimum operating temperature.
A pressure regulator regulates the nitrogen pressure at 5 psi below plant air pressure but not higher than 80 psig which is required to provide the necessary sound level from the horn. Pressure switch S5 monitors the regulator pressure through the trouble circuit. One pair of S5 contacts (SSB) is set to open on decreasing pressure at approximately 75 psig, and the other set of contacts (SS A) is adjusted to open on I
increasing pressure at approximately 135 psig. Pressure switch S6 on the supply cylinder is set to open at or before 900 psig on decreasing pressure. The two pressure switches are connected electrically to give a "FAU~LT ALARM" indication at the cluster unit and a " CLUSTER TROUBLE" alarm at the CAAS console if the pressure being measured exceeds the prescribed limits.
Solenoid valve VA1 is pilot operated so that inlet pressure aids the plunger movement. For the valve to open, the OFF coil must not be energized, the ON coil must be energized, and there must be at least 10 psig of pressure from the output of the regulator. To reset or close valve val after it has been actuated or out of service, the ON coil must be without power and the OFF coil must be energized while there is pressure (10 psig or more) in the valve. Some pressure must be present for the reset action, so a slight loss ornitrogen may be associated with resetting the solenoid valve.
A local horn control box failure is expected to manifest itself as one of the following: outleakage from the high-pressure side of the box, which is signaled by a " CLUSTER TROUBLE" alarm at the CAAS console; seat leakage of the cylinder gas regulator causing a pressure increase in the low-pressum part of the local horn control box, which actuates a " CLUSTER TROUBLE" alarm at the CAAS console; or failure of the solenoid valve to either open or close when energized.
The local horn can be reset by two methods. The first method involves manually moving the piston of solenoid valve VA-1. This manipulation is done by removing the end caps and pushing the pistons to the reset position. The second method is by connecting a Reset Module, which has a red push-button switch, to Pins 13 and 14 of Test Connector J-3 on the cluster unit housing. This Reset Module is available in each building from maintenance personnel. The module was designed and fabricated by the PGDP Instrument Maintenance Department. The module resets the alarm by depressing the switch and applying 24-V de to the OFF solenoid and resetting the valve.
The nitrogen supply cylinder is capable of delivering nitrogen to the horn for at least two minutes should the plant air system fail. This would provide sufficient warning to personnel in the affected area.
2.5.1.2.2.a Building alarm system (Existing Configuration) l Figure 2.5-1 is an overall layout drawing of the cluster locations and connections of the basic components of the CAAS. Each covered area contains building homs that provide audible warnings inside the buildings. Rotating or strobe red beacons located on the outside of the affected buildings serve as a visible waming not to enter the building. Local radiation alarm cabinets (RACs) to which the outputs of all the cluster units in the alarmed area 2-10
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A April 15,1998 Rev.24 are connected. The changes made to this system include providing additional alarms and beacons and inputs to the existing building alarms from individual cluster units. In addition, the piping to the existing horns was increased in diameter to provide more air flow to the horns for better sound and coverage. The method of operation of the buildir.g alarm system,(i.e. horns and lights) was not changed. The existing building alarm system is described in Sect. 3.12.6 of the SAR.
l The RACs are located in the primary building that they support. These cabinets are the routing point for all local cluster unit inputs to the building alarms and the CCF. The building homs are either electronic or are air-or nitrogen-operated horns and are located in each building to sound an evacuation alarm should the local cluster units detect a criticality. *lhe beacons are rotating or strobe lights located at various locations on/in the l
]
building to provide a visual signal of the alarm condition.
Radiation alarm cabinet The RAC contains control relays that, in conjunction with other control circuits in the Radiation Alarm Annunciator Cabinet and the CAAS console, provide the warning signals and related operator controls for CAAS. The relays that control operation of the building horns and rotating or strobe beacons for a particular l
building (or area) are located in the RACs of that building. Fig. 2.5-14 is a simplified schematic of the relay control circuits.
Fig. 2.5-14 illustrates the three detector channels' connection to an alarm logic matrix located in the cluster logic module within the cluster unit. The output of the matrix goes to control circuits.in the local horn control box and to alarm control relay circuits in the RAC. The alarm control relays in the building's RAC controls the operation of the building horns and rotating or strobe beacons. When the cluster unit is exposed l
to a radiation level that is higher than 10 mR/h above background, an alarm signal from the cluster unit energizes relay Z, which in turn energizes relays W and Y. Relays W and Y energize the building horns and beacons, respectively. A horn control switch on the CA AS console at the CCF can be moved to the OFF position to ettergize relay X to turn off the building homs. The beacons cannot be turned oft from the CAAS console because of a holding circuit for relsy Y. The beacons are turned off by pushing the BUILDING LIG11TS RESET switch on the RAC located in the same building as the beacons. Actuating this switch breaks the holding circuit for relay Y. The horn control switch can also be positioned at either ON or AUTO. At the ON position, the building horns can be activated; however, the llORN PERMISSIVE switch must be in the ON position for the horns to be energized. In the AUTO position (normal position), the horns and beacons are actuated automatically when an alarm signal is received from a cluster unit through the action of relay Z.
Each cluster unit will have relays W, X, and Z, but there will be only one relay Y for each building RAC.
Relay Y turns on the outside beacons and will operate if any cluster unit within the designated warning zone goes into alarm (see Fig. 2.5-14).
Field wiring connects the CAAS console at C-300 to the cluster units, the warning devices, and Ue RAC i
located in each building; the wiring is channeled through two radiation alarm master terminal cabinets located in the basement of Building C-300. The terminal connections in these master terminal cabinets are configured to allow connection flexibility in the CAAS. This flexibility derives from the capability to interconnect in the master terminal cabinet relay contacts associated with the chister relays to the desired horn and beacon control relays located in the RACs.
Building evacuation horns 1
The building horns are located in strategic locations throughout the building to pmvide an audible alarm signal upon initiation from the local cluster units. The building horns are similar to the electronic or air-operated local alarm horns in their operation. The solenoid valves that open to provide air to the building i
horns are similar to the local hom solenoids with the exception that they operate from either 120 V ac or 125 l
V de power from the 2-11 i
l
r SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) local distribution within the building they support. The local horn solenoid valves are operated with 24 V dc.
Table 2.5-1 is a summary of cluster unit locations and the associated building alarms they support.
De building horns can be manually controlled by the horn control switch operating in conjunction with the HORN PERMISSIVE switch, both of which are located on the CAAS console in Building C-300. These switches are also used to disable the building horns during testing or maintenance to prevent unwanted alarm signals.
The building horns are controlled by relays energized by an alarm signal from the cluster unit (s) located in the affected area. These relays are located in the RAC associated with the affected building / area. The building evacuation horns are either electronic or are actuated by plant air or nitrogen. Slave building horns are located in buildings that do not have a cluster unit but where evacuation of plant personnel is required w hen a cluster unit in the affected area of coverage is activated. C-333/C-333A and C-337/C-333A have additional slaved homs, refer to Table 2.5.1 for more information.
Beacons The red rotating or strobe beacons are operated in the same manner as the horns for the building except that relay Y provides the initiation. Tne beacons, mounted on the exterior of the monitored building, can be turned off after an alarm or a test by using the key-operated BUILDING LIGHTS RESET switch located on the RAC in the affected building. These lights are powered from a local 120 V ac source within the affected building.
2.5.1.2.2.b Building alarm system (New Configuration)
Figure 2.5-la is an overall layout drawing of the cluster locations and connections of the basic components of the CAAS. Each covered area contrJ...s building horns that provide audible warnings inside the buildings. Rotatirig or strobe red beacons located on the outside of the r Sc!ed buildings serve as a visible m.
- ng not to enter building Local radiation alarm cabinets (RACs) >crve as a central location to which the outputs of all the cluster units in the alarmed area are connected. The existing building alarm system is described in Sect. 3.12.6 of the SAR.
The RACs are located in the primr.ry building that they support. These cabinets are the routing point for all local cluster unit inputs to the building alarms and the CCF. The building horns are either electronic or are air-operated horns and are located in each building to sound an evacuation alarm should the local cluster units detect a criticality. The beacons are rotating or strobe lights located at various locations on/in the building to provide a visual signal of the alarm condition.
The CAAS building horn system has been upgraded in these areas to provide greater alarm signal audibility and system reliability. The system consists of air accumulators which contain an adequate supply to blow the air whistles for a minimum of two minutes. The pressure in the accumulators is maintained at approximately 150 psig. Air piping routes the air from the accumulators to the air whistles through pressure regulators and solenoid valves. The pressure regulators maintain the air pressure to the whistles at approximately 80 psig which is their design operating pressure, The solenoid valves operate to turn the whistles on and off. In addition to the air whistles, electronic horns have been installed in some low noise areas. The following description of these components details their operation and analyzes their possible failures.
To provide an adequate warning signal level in the process buildings, a suflicient number of air whistles have been appropriately located. The air whistles are actually two whistles mounted as a single assembly having two frequencies,497 Hz and 502 Hz. These frequencies were selected because sound level surveys have shown a lower background level in the 1/3 octave with a center frequency of 500 Hz. This allows the alarm signal to be distinguishable by fregeuncy as well as amplitude from the background noise. Also, the 2-12
l SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO) 5 liz difference (502 vs. 497 liz) establishes a " beat" of 5 llz that is noticable in areas around the air whistles. This adds another distinguishable characteristic of the warning signal. The addition of an adequate number of horns with sufficient signal amplitude and a distinguishable frequency provide audibility in the areas now deficient, including the areas of the clusters. This removed tFe necessity for local horns so they have been disconnected and abandoned in place or removed. In areas such as the building area control rooms
=
(ACR), maintenance shops, locker rooms, and C-746Q, where the installation of air w histles was impractical due to the amplitude of the whistle signal at large distances, electronic horns were installed which have a frequency of 470 IIz. The most likely failure mode of the air whistles is an obstruction of the Cow path causing a degraded output signal. The most likely failure mode of the electronic horns is an electronic component failure causing the hom to fail to produce the required output signal. Failure of the air whistles i
and electronic horns is protected against by performing quarterly functional testing to detect any component degradation prior to failure and identify any failures of components which have occurred. These components are then replaced and retested prior to declaring the system operable.
The building air whistles and electronic horns are actuated by two W relays which energize the horn ON solenoids and electronic horns. All of the horns are energized by either of the W relays if any cluster in the area initiates an alarm signal. This redundancy ensures the horns will actuate even ifone of the relays fails. The building air whistles are deenergized by dud X relays which energize the horn OFF solenoids.
'The W and X relays are located in new Building lloin Relay Cabinets (except in C-333A, C-360, and C-746Q) located adjacent to the. Radiation Alarm Cabinets in each building. In C-333A, C-360 and C-746Q the W and X relays are located in the Radiation Alarm Cabinet. The possible failure modes of these relays are contact failure or coil failure which would prevent the horns from being actuated. These failures are protected against by providing two relays which can perform the same function independently and by performing quarterly functional testing to detect any component degradation prior to failure and identify any failures of components which have occurred. These components are then replaced and retested prior to declaring the system operable, The Building florn Relay Cabinets in each building also contain a loss of power relay and indicating light. The purpose of this relay and light is to provide an alarm signal upon a loss of power to the CAAS building F <ns. The alarm signal is indicated by a cluster trouble alarm at C-300 and a loss of power light inside m : ding Horn Relay Cabinet. The possible failure modes of these components are contact failure, coil fa?., o Se lamp buming out. Any of these failures would prevent an alarm signal, due to intermption of powv to the building horns, from producing a C-300 cluster trouble alarm or a visible alarm at the Building llorp Relay Cabinet. These failures are protected against by performing quarterly functional testing to detect any coniponent degradation prior to failure and identify any failures of components which have
)
occurred. These con ponents are then replaced and retested prior to declaring the system operable.
The air whistles are actuated by four-way double acting solenoid valves which are actuated by 120 VAC or 120 VDC. For the valve to open, the OFF coil must not be energized, the ON coil must be energized, and j
there must be at least 35 psig of pressure from the output of the regulator. To reset or close the valve after it has been actuated or out of service, the ON coil must be without power and the OFF coil must be energized i
while there is pressure in the valve. The ON coils are energized by the above mentioned W relays and the l
OFr: coils are energized by dual X relays. These solenoid valves are housed in solenoid panels which are located in the vicinity of the air whistles that they serve. The possible failure modes of the solenoid valves are a stuck solenoid, a coil failure, piping leaks, or valve leaks. Any of these failures could cause loss of proper air Dow to the whistle resulting in a degraded output signal and loss of air resulting in failure of the horns to blow for the required time at the required flow rate. These failures are protected against by performing preventive maintenance of the solenoids and by performing quarterly functional testing to detect any component degradation prior to failure and identify any failures of components which have occurred.
l 2-12a
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO)
These components are then replaced and retested prior to declaring the system operable. Also, leakage is protected against by a pressure switch installed on the air header between the accumulators and the pressure regulators which sends in a low pressure alarm if the system pressure falls below a set pressure which is slightly above the accumulator pressure limit for 2 minute operation of the air whistles.
o..
The air supply from the air accumulators to the air w histles is controlled by individual pressure control valves which maintain supply pressure to the air whistles at their design pressure of approximately 80 psig i
from the accumulator supply which is at approximately 150 psig. These control valves are located in the air line between the accumulators and each solenoid valve. These control valves are spring loaded, diaphragm actuated valves. The valves are opened by spring pressure and closed by control air pressure, therefore they fail open on loss of control air pressure. The safety function of the pressure control valves and is to provide flow control and isolation over all expected system pressures. The possible failure modes of the pressure control valves are sticking of the valve and valve leakage. These failures could result in improper supply pressure to the whistles which could cause inadequate output sound from the horn and failure of the system to sound the horns for the required two minutes. These failures are protected by the procurement and dedication process of the components as Q items. Also, the system is tested quarterly to detect any component degradation prior to failure and identify any failures of components which have occurred and the valve settings are checked annually. These components are then replaced and retested prior to declaring the system operable.
The power for the air whistles is supplied from a dedicated air supply system. The piping is routed to a main air supply header which is then routed to an accumulator (air storage tank) located outside of the building. The accumulators are maintained at a pressure of approximately 150 psig. The supply to the whistles is maintained at the whistle design pressure necessay to blow the horns,80 psig. The minimum pressure in the accumulators necessary to blow the ho: ns for a minimum of two minutes is dependent on the capacity of the accumulators. The accumulator capaci y can be changed by taking one or more tanks out of service for maintenance or inspection. Maintainiag the minimum pressure, based on the number of accumulators in service, above that necessary to blow all the horns for a minimum of two minutes ensures that suflicient air capacity is available. The accumulators are designed to fulfill the requirements of Section Vill, Division 1, of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. They have a maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) of 175 psig at 150 F. They are connected to a common header which runs inside of the building. Local pressure and temperature indicators are installed at the tanks for monitoring. The accumulators each have a pressure relief valve which is set to relieve at 175 psig. An overpressure condition in the accumulators could be caused by a failure of the compressor control system preventing the compressor from turning off at its high pressure cutout. The relief valves are designed to relieve pressure to prevent accumulator pressure from exceeding 110% ofits MAWP when filling at the compressor flow rate. The possible failure modes of the accumulators are fracture or rupture. This is protected against by fabrication and testing of the accumulators in accordance with ASME code requirements and pressure relief valve protection. The possible failure modes of the pressure relief valves are sticking of the valve open or shut, valve structure failure, spring failure, and orifice obstruction.
These failures are protected against by performing preventive maintenance on the relief valves and by performing pre-installation testing and inspection of the valves. Also, system leakage is protected against by a pressum switch installed on the air header between the accumulators and the pressure regulators which sends in a low pressure alarm if the system pressure falls below a set pressure which is slightly above the accumulator pressure limit for 2 minute operation of the air whistles. Isolation valves are availaMe to isolate one or more of the accumulators from the system to perform corrective or preventive maintenance as necessary, 2-12b
i i
l SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) i The accumulators are filled using an air compressor located inside the building. The input to the air compressor is from the plant air system at 90 psig nominal pressure. The output is directly into the accumulator. The accumulators are monitored for pressure such that the compressors recharge the accumulators at approximately 150 psig and turn off at approximately 160 psig. If the system falls below a set pressure which is slightly above the accumulator pressure limit for 2 minute operation of the air whistles, a cluster trouble alarm is generated in the Central Control Facility (C-300). The air compressor installation is designed such that quick removal and replacement can be accomplished with a spare compressor should replacement become necessary. When CAAS surveillances or post-maintenance testing is performed it is necessary to sound all CAAS alarms in the affected area and ensure all horns are i
functional. This depletes the CAAS accumulators below the pressure necessary to blow the air whistles for two minutes. The time to recharge the accumulators above this pressure has been estimated at greater than five hours using the permenantly installed compressors alone. To reduce this recovery time a temporary connection is installed to allow the connection of a portable air compressor with enough capacity to recharge the accumulators in approximately one hour. This reduces CAAS outage time necessary to perform surveillances and post-maintenance testing.
The Radiation Alarm Cabinet (RAC) and Building Horn Relay Cabinet (BHRC) contains control relays that, in conjunction with other control circuits in the Radiation Alarm Annunciator Cabinet and the CAAS console, provide the warning signals and related operator controls for CAAS. The relays that control operation of the building horns and rotating or strobe beacons for a particular building (or area) are located in the RACs and BHRCs of that building. Fig. 2.5-14a is a simplified schematic of the relay control circuits.
Fig. 2.5-14a illustrates the three deector channels' connection to an alarm logic matrix located in the cluster logic module within the 9ter.ait. The output of the matrix goes to alarm control relay circuits in the RAC and BHRC. The alarm cor. trol relays control the operation of the building horns and rotating or strobe beacons. When the cluster unit is exposed to a radiation level that is higher than 10 mR/h above background, an alarm signal from the cluster unit energizes relay Z, which in turn energizes relays W and Y. Relays W and Y energize the building horns and beacons, respectively. A horn control switch on the CAAS console at the CCF can be moved to the OFF position to energize relay X to turn off the building horns. The beacons cannot be turned off from the CAAS consol because of a holding circuit for relay Y.
The beacons are tumed off by pushing the BUILDING LIGHTS RESET switch on the RAC located in the same building as the beacons. Actuating this switch breaks thr holding circuit for relay Y. The horn control switch can also be positioned at either ON or AUTO. At the ON position, the building horns can be activated; however, the HORN PERMISSIVE switch must be in the ON position for the horns to be energized. In the AUTO position (normal position), the horns and beacons are actuated automatically when an alarm signal is received from a cluster unit through the action of relay Z. Each cluster unit will have a i
Z relay but there will be only one relay Y and two X and Z relays for each building RAC/BHRC. The W and X relays are located in the BHRC (except in C-333 A, C-360, and C-746Q where they are in the RAC) and the Y and Z relays are located in the RAC. Relay Y turns on the outside beacons and the W and X relays operate the building horns if any cluster unit within the designated warning zone goes into alarm (see Fig.
2.5-14a).
Field wiring connects the' AS ( onsole at C-300 to the cluster units, the warning devices, the RAC, and the BHRC located in each bu.a..:g; the wiring is channeled through two radiation alarm master terminal cabinets located in the basement of Building C-300. The terminal connections in these master terminal cabinets are configured to allow connection flexibility in the CAAS. This flexibility derives from the capability to interconnect in the master terminal cabinet relay contacts associated with the cluster relavs to the desired horn and beacon control relays located in the RACs and BHRCs.
2-12c i
i l
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO)
The building horns can be manually controlled by the horn control switch operating in conjunction with l
the HORN PERMISSIVE switch, both of which are located on the CAAS console in Building C-300. These switches are also used to disable the building horns during testing or maintenance to prevent unwr.nted alarm signals.
4 Slave building horns are 1 :ated in buildings that do not have a cluster unit but where evacuation of plant personnel is required when a cluster unit in the affected area of coverage is activated, refer to Table 2.5.la for more information.
Clusters which are located b an outdoor environment are equipped with a low temperature alarm (TSLL-129). The TSLL-129 alarm contacts (when installed) will initiate a CLUSTER TROUBLE alarm in C-300 if the external temperature of the cluster approaches the cluster's specified minimum operating temperature.
Beacons The red rotating or strobe beacons are operated in the same manner as the horns for the building except that relay Y provides the initiation. The beacons, mounted on the exterior of the monitored building, can be i
turned off after an alarm or a test by using the key-operated BUILDING LIGHTS RESET switch located on the RAC in the affected building. These lights are powered from a local 120 V ac source within the affected buildmg.
2.5.1.2.3 Central control facility Changes were also made in C-300 for the CAAS. These changes and their descriptions are provided in Sect. 2.5.2.
2.5.1.2.4 Spare equipment it will be necessary to take the local alarm horns out of service to perform testing and/or maintenance on a periodic basis. In addition, some failure within these components is expected to occur. Therefore, portable alarm units will be available for quickly locating to an existing area to allow continued operation in accordance with the TSRs. These units will be similar to the existing units with the exception that they will be portable to allow maneuverability. The portable clusters are equipped to be operated as standalone units or replacements for a fixed : luster. For details on operability requirements, refer to the TSRs.
2.5.1.3 System Analysis The system analysis will address each point of the criteria in the same sequence they are provided in Sect.
2.5.1.1. The analysis will show how the system meets the specific requirements and/or provide justification for not meeting the requirements.
The CAAS is required to provide coverage ofareas in accordance with Sect. 4.2 of ANSI /ANS 8.36. The range of detection for each cluster is based on the minimum accident of concern indicated in ANSI /ANS 8.3.
The individual plant areas requiring coverage during normal and abnormal operations were identified. Fig.
2.5-2 indicates the individual clusters that are provided to detect a criticality accident. Plant areas that may contain enriched material greater than or equal to I wt % 2"U during nonroutine operating conditions will require a minimum ofone CAAS unit to be stationed in each area where the material will be processed. NCS will be required to approve the location of the alarms before operation.
2-12d
sAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO) 2.5.1.3.1 Criteria 1-11 In Building C-333, the only area provided with permanent coverage from the cell floor units is the area of Unit 6. As indicated in Table 2.6-1, the assay gradient for 5 wt % "5U would generally have a top assay of about 0.8 wt % 2"U for a 0.2 wt % "U tails in all of Building C-333. Although there are some variations 2
with this configuration and assay level, nonnal operation in this facility will generally be less than I wt % 2"U with the exception of Unit 6 which could slightly exceed I wt % 2"U. Therefore, only Unit 6 (highest assay area) will be protected by a local alarm unit during all modes of operation. Although the production within this ponion of the cascade is expected to be in the I wt % 2"U range and less, the potential for feeding up to j
5 wt % "U is provided in C-333-A. His feed would bypass the entire C-333 cascade provided the feed assay 2
level exceeded the level for C-333 enrichment. The feed line is maintained in a gaseous state, which will provide one method of criticality control (i.e., density). In addition, the moderation within the system is controlled by maintaining system integrity and the temperature and pressure within acceptable ranges as indicated in Sect. 2.6.2.3. The cell floor is provided with coverage by use of the cluster unit AJ even though it is located on the ground floor. Based upon this analysis, Building C-333 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
In Building C-331, the areas with some overlapping coverage include units 3 and 4. These two units could potentially contain uranium enriched greater than or equal to I wt % "U. The remaining two units are 2
very low assay during normal operation due to their primary roles as strippers in the enrichment process. The remaining parts of the building are similar to the configuration for Building C-333. Therefore, the same justification is applicable to the remaining areas of C-331. Based upon this analysis, Building C-331 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
In Building C-335, the areas provided with redundant some overlapping coverage include units 2,3, and
- 4. These units could potentially contain uranium enriched greater than or equal to I wt % "U. The remaining 2
unit is very low assay during normal operation due to its primary role as a stripper in the enrichment process.
The remaining parts of the building are similar to the configuration for Building C-331. Herefore, the same justification is applicable to the remaining areas of C-335. Based upon this analysis, Building C-335 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
2.5.1.3.2 Text Deleted i
2.5.1.3.3.a C-331, C-333, C-335, and C-337 (ground floors) (Existing Configuration) l He ground floor of buildings C-331, C-333, C-335, and C-337 has detection coverage with one cluster unit located on the ground floors and additional coverage provided by cell floor cluster units.
In building C-337, each unit has CAAS coverage with some areas of overlapping coverage. The remaining parts of the building are similar to the configuration for Building C-333. Based upon this analysis.
Building C-337 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
Building C-310 has two clusters with some areas of overlapping coverage. Based upon this analysis.
Building C-310 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
The building tie lines have criticality coverage as described in PGDP document KY/G-578 " Criticality Accident Alarm Coverage of the Interbuilding Tie Lines at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant".
Building C-333A has two clusters with overlapping cover *p-lXage. Based upon this analysis, Building C-333-A has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
Building C-337A has one cluster with overlapping coverage form C-337. Based upon this analysis.
Building C-337A has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
Building C-360 has two clusters of overlapping coverage. Based upon this analysis, Building C-360 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
2-13
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A October 31,1998 Rev.29 Building C-400 has two clusters with some areas of overlapping coverage. Based upon this analysis, Building C-400 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
Building C-409 has two clusters ofoverlapping coverage. Based upon this analysis, Building C-409 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
Building C-710, a laboratory facility, has five clusters and Building C-720, a maintenance facility, has one cluster. C-720 has single cluster coverage only. As with all cluster units it has three detectors along with a ftmetionally redundant logic module for sending input to the building alarm system. Based on this analysis, i
this is acceptable for current operations.
I Building C-746-Q East, has one cluster and is used as a waste storage facility. As with all cluster units, each has three detectors along with a functionally redundant logic module for sending input to the building alarm system. Based upon this analysis, Building C-746-Q East has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for I
storage.
Therefore, the coverage requirement oferiteria I has been met. The CAAS provides coverage of all these areas by selecting the setpoint for initiation in accordance with ANSI /ANS 8.36 The coverage area is calculated based upon the setpoint of 9.5 to 10.5 mR/h.
The cluster units were designed to meet the requirement of one-half second response time. This requirement verified by field testing to ensure system functionality. Figure 2.5-14 illustrates the method of initiating the building alarm horns from C-300 by placing the HORN CONTROL SWITCH in the ON position and by having the HORN PERMISSIVE SWITCH in the ON position. This meets Criterion 2 as specified in Sect. 2.5.1.1.
Once an individual cluster unit detects and outputs an alarm condition, the alarm signal is sealed in to prevent inadvertent reset when radiation levels return to less than alarm conditions. This can be seen by reviewing Fig. 2.5-6. The alarm is generated when the output from logic gates U3C 4011 and U3D 4011 or
]
USC 4011 and USD 4011 cause tiansistor Q2 or Q3 to allow sufficient current through the K4 and KS relays to initiate the alarm. Logic gates U3C 4011, U3D 4011, U5C 4011, and USD 4011 are arranged in a " flip-flop" coafiguration (logic memory) that remains in the alarm state until the logic reset signal is generated either locally or from C-300. In addition to the individual cluster units, the local alarm horns will remain in the alarm state after the cluster unit has been reset until the local reset circuit is applied to the horn control box as illustrated on Fig. 2.5-10 or until the nitrogen is depleted if plant control air is lost. The building alarm horns i
I are maintained in the alarm condition by the local clutter until the cluster unit is reset or the building horn is reset via the HORN CONTROL SWITCH being placed in the OFF position within C-300 (see Fig. 2.5-14).
The building alarm lights require reset at the respective building RAC. Therefore, all alarm circuits are sealed in once the initiation has occurred until a specific manual reset action has occurred. All of these devices can be reset from a remote location with the exception of the local horns. The basis for not having remote reset capability for the local alarms is to avoid the potential of an alarm being terminated prematurely by local personnel. Based on this review, the CAAS meets the intent of the requirements of Criterion 4 stated in Sect.
2.5.1.1.
As indicated in the description provided in Sect. 2.5.1.2.1, the clusters are equipped with a direct current (de) battery backup with a design rating of four hours upon loss of ac power to the cluster unit. This supply will supply sufficient power to all necessary components within the system to actuate the local alarm without ac power. In addition to being independent of electrical power, the local alarm horn can operate for a minimum of two minutes without plant control air. The two-minute time frame is sufficient to meet the requirement stated in Sect. 4.4.1 of ANSI /ANS 8.3 that says the alarm signalis for immediate evacuation purposes only. The nitrogen supply is capable of delivering the design rate of flow to the clarion horn by proper operation of the backflow check valve and the pressure switches within the local horn control box. This meets the requirements of Criterion 5 as stated previously.
Criterion 6 states that the system shall be designed to preclude inadvertent initiation signals from being generated (i.e., false alarms) to the extent practical. This requirement has been met by providing a logic circuit that requires a minimum of two detector channels to provide an alarm output to the logic board simultaneously (except when two detectorr e already in a faulted condition). Individual component failures from the detector 2-14
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 i
RAC 98Cl49 (RO) circuit to the building alarm system could cause spurious operation of the system. However, past operational history has shown this portion of the system to be reliable in preventing spurious alarms within the system.
Therefore, based upon the detection logic and past operational experience, the system configuration meets the j
applicable criterion.
Section 2.5.1.2.1 previously described the self4esting capability of the individual detector channel by the function of the LED light source within the assemblies. This meets the requirements for indication of system malfunctions for the detector channels (Criterion 7). In addition to this capability, the power supply circuits are monitored with appropriate alarm indication within C-300 as well as the local horn control boxes as described previously. In addition to the relf-monitoring of the system, periodic testing of the ystem is also 1
performed as described in Sect. 5 to verify proper system operability.
Test circuits and switches are located throughout the system to allow for system verification as described in Sect. 5. In addition, local alarms will remain operational as long as the individual alarm is not being tested.
These local alarms will still send input to the building alarms during these conditions unless the building alanns have been disabled before the test. The individual detector channels have their own test circuit along with the cluster logic module. The building alarm system can be tested by the HORN CONTROL SWITCH as previously described. Therefore, the system meets the testability requirement specified in Criterion 8.
As described in Sect. 2.5.2, all of the alarms and fault conditions are displayed in C-300. Section 2.5.2 gives a detailed evaluation of this requirement (Criterion 9) for the CAAS.
Criterion 10 is one of the most difficult portions of the system to verify by analysis ANSI /ANS 8.3-1986, Seu. 4.4.1, requires that the alarm signal shall be for immediate evacuation purposes nnh and of sufficient volume and coverage to be heard in all areas that are to be evacuated. Those areas that do not have sufficient volume to be audible are being addressed under the PGDP Compliance Plan.
The following acceptance criteria were developed using approved industry standards and are used by PGDP to verify compliance with ANSI /ANS 8.3,1986 CAAS audibility requirements:
- 1) Ensure the broadband CAAS alarm signal is at least 10 dB above the maximum expected broadband background noise, if this criterion cannot be met, go to step 2.
- 2) Ensure the 1/3 octave 500 Hz CAAS alarm signal is at least 13 dB above the maximum expected 1/3 octave 500 Hz effective masked threshold. If this criterion cannot be met, go to step 3.
- 3) Expose a minimum of ten people, representing a cross section of the plant population's age and hearing capability, to the alarm signal and ensure each of the test subjects can hear the alann signal.
This test is repeated five times and the results are satisfactory if each of the test subjects hear the signal each time they are exposed.
If any of the above criteria are met, the CAAS meets the CAAS audibility requirement of ANSI /ANS 8.3, 1986.
PlP repost number PlP:45-89-0043, Improve Maintenance and Afonitoring ofRadiation Alarm System",
documented that the present system could not be proven to meet Criterion 11. This section requires that the system remain operable in the event of a seismic ahock equivalent to the site specific design basis earthquake or the equivalent value specified by the Uniform Building Code. The CAAS does not meet seismic qualifications. Specific exceptions to ANSI /ANS 8.3 criteria are listed in SAR Section 1.6.
2.5.1.3.3.b C-331, C-333, C-335, and C-337 (ground floors) (New Configuration)
The ground floor of buildings C-331, C-333, C-335, and C-337 has detection coverage with one cluster unit located on the ground floors and additional coverage provided by cell floor cluster units.
In building C-337, each unit has CAAS coverage with some areas of overlapping coverage. The remaining parts of the building are similar to the configuration for Building C-333. Based upon this analysis, Building C-337 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
Building C-310 has two clusters with some areas of overlapping coverage. Based upon this analysis, Building C-310 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
The building tie lines have criticality coverage as described in PGDP document KY/G-578 " Criticality Accident Alarm Coverage of the Interbuilding Tie Lines at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant".
2-15
1 SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
Building C-333 A has two clusters with overlapping coverage. Based upon this analysis, Building C-333-A has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
Building C-337A has one cluster with overlapping coverage form C-337. Based upon this analysis, Building C-337A has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
Building C-360 has two clusters of overlapping coverage. Based upon this analysis, Building C-360 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
i Building C-400 has two clusters with some areas of overlapping coverage. Based upon this analysis, Building C-400 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
Building C-409 has two clusters of overlapping coverage. Based upon this analysis, Building C 409 has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for operation.
Building C-710, a laboratory facility, has five clusters and Building C-720, a maintenance facility, I w one cluster. C-720 has single cluster coverage only. As with all cluster units it has three detectors along we a functionally redundant logic module for sending input to the building alann system. Based on this analysis, this is acceptable for current operations.
Building C-746-Q East, has one cluster and is used as a waste storage facility. As with all cluster units, each has three detectors along with a functionally redundant logic module for sending input to the building alarm system. Based upon this analysis, Building C 746-Q East has adequate permanent CAAS coverage for j
storage.
Therefore, the coverage requirement ofcriteria 1 has been met. He CAAS provides coverage of all these areas by selecting the setpoint for initiation in accordance with ANSI /ANS 8.3'. The coverage area is calculated based upon the setpoint of 9.5 to 10.5 mR/h.
The cluster units were designed to meet the.aquirement of one-half second response time. This i
requirement is verified by field testing to ensure system functionality. Figure 2.5-14a illustrates the method of initiating the building alarm horns from C-300 by placing the HORN CONTROL SWITCH in the ON position and by having the HORN PERMISSIVE SWITCH in the ON position. This meets Criterion 2 as specified in Sect. 2.5.1.1.
Once an individual cluster unit detects and outputs an alarm condition, the alarm signal is sealed a. to prevent inadvertent reset when radiation levels return to less than alarm conditions. This can be seen by reviewing Fig. 2.5-6. Tie alarm is generated when the output from logic gates U3C 4011 and U3D 4011 or USC 4011 and U5D 4011 cause transistor Q2 or Q3 to allow sufficient current through the K4 and K5 relays to initiate the alarm. Logic gates U3C 4011, U3D 4011. USC 4011, and USD 4011 are arranged in a " flip-flop" configuration (logic memory) that remains in the alarm state until the logic reset signal is generated either locally or from C-300. The building alarm horns are maintained in the alarm condition by the local cluster until the cluster unit is reset and the building hom is reset via the HORN CONTROL SWITCH being placed in the OFF position within C-300 (see Fig. 2.5-14a). The building alarm lights require reset at the respective building RAC. Therefore, all alarm circuits are sealed in once the initiation has occurred until a specific manual reset action has occurred. All of these devices can be reset from a remote location. Based on this review, the CAAS meets the intent of the requirements of Criterion 4 stated in Sect. 2.5.1.1.
As indicated in the description provided in Sect. 2.5.1.2.1, the clusters are equipped with a direct current (de) battery backup with a design rating of four hours upon loss of ac power to the cluster unit. This supply will supply sufficient power to all necessary components within the system to actuate the building horns without ac power. In addition to being independent of electrical power, the building horns can operate for a minimum of two minutes. The two-minute time frame is sufficient to meet the requirement stated in Sect.
4.4.1 of ANSI /ANS 8.3 that says the alarm signal is for immediate evacuation purposes only. This meets the requirements of Criterion 5 as stated previously.
Criterion 6 states that the system shall be designed to preclude inadvertent initiation signals from being generated (i.e., false alarms) to the extent practical. This requirement has been met by providing a logic circuit that requires a minimum of two detector channels to provide an alarm output to the logic board simultaneously (except when two detectors am already in a faulted condition). Individual component failures from the detector circuit to the building alarm system could cause spurious operation of the system. However, past operational history has shown this ponion of the system to be reliable in preventing spurious alarms within the system.
2-15a
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO)
PROPOSED Therefore, based upon the detection logic and past operational experience, the system configuration meets the applicable criterion.
Section 2.5.1.2.1 previously described the self-testing capability of the individual detector channel by the function of the LED light source within the assemblies. His meets the requirements for indication of system malfunctions for the detector channels (Criterion 7). In addition to this capability, the power supply circuits are monitored with appropriate alarm indication within C-300. In addition to the self-monitoring of the system, g
periodic testing of the system is also performed to verify proper system operability.
Test circuits and switches are located throughout the system to allow for system verification.. The individual detector channels have their own test circuit along with the cluster logic module. The building alarm system can be tested by te HORN CONTROL SWITCH as previously described. Herefore, the system meets the testability requirement specified in Criterion 8.
As described in Sect. 2.5.2. 11 of the alarms and fault conditiens are displayed in C-300. Section 2.5.2 gives a detaileci evaluation of this requirement (Criterion 9) for the CAAS.
Criterion 10 is one of the most difficult portions of the system to verify by analysis. ANSI /ANS 8.3-1986, Sect. 4.4.1, requires that the alarm signal shall be for immediate evacuation purposes sly and of sufficient volume and coverage to be heard in all areas that are to be evacuated. Paducah takes exception to this in permit-required confined spaces and cell housings associated with cells that are running. In these areas a
" buddy system" is used to ensure personnel working in these areas are notified of alarms in order to evacuate.
The following acceptance criteria were developed using approved industry standards and are used by PGDP to verify compliance with ANSl/ANS 8.3,1986 CAAS audibility requirements:
- 1) Ensure the broadband CAAS alarm signal is at least 10 dB above 1e maximum expected broadband background noise. If this criterion cannot be met, go to step 2.
- 2) Ensure the 1/3 octave 500 Hz CAAS alarm signal is at least 13 dB above the maximum expected 1/3 octave 500 Hz effective masked threshold, if this criterion cannot be met, go to step 3.
- 3) Expose a minimum of ten people, representing a cross section of the plant population's age and hearing capability, to the alarm signal and ensure each of the test subjects can hear the alarm signal.
This test is repeated five times and the results are satisfactory if each of the test subjects hear the signal each time they are exposed.
If any of the above criteria are met, the CAAS meets the CAAS audibility requirement of ANSI /ANS 8.3, 1986.
PIP report number PlP:45-89-0043, Improve Maintenance and Monitoring ofRadiation <flarm System",
documented that the present system could not be proven to meet Criterion 11. This section requires that the system remain operable in the event of a seismic shock equivalent to the site specific design basis earthquake or the equivalent value specified by the Uniform Building Code. The CAAS does not meet seismic qualifications. Specific exceptions to ANSl/ANS 8.3 criteria are listed in SAR Section 1.6.
2.5.1.4.a CAAS Safety Class Equipment and Instrumentation (Existing Configuration) l The CAAS is designated a safety system. The core of the CAAS is the radiation detection cluster unit, the alarm hom control box, and the local alarm hom which are installed throughout PGDP where fissionable material is handled and a non-trivial risk of a criticality exists. Rese devices must function in order to initiate
[
a prompt evacuation of personnel from the area of detection in the event of an inadvertent criticality.
The following are the components of the CAAS which are identified as safety system components:
building CAAS horns and lights (lights are not safety system components in C-710 and associated
+
facilities) 2-15b
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) l gamma criticality monitors (cluster):
l l
- three detectors, one common control panel; alarm horn control box (where applicable):
one nitrogen regulator (where applicable),
- two pressure switches (where applicable),
one air to nitrogen control valve (where applicable).
alarm cabinet (relay matrix):
I control relays (W, Y, and Z relays),
local alarm horns.
2.5.1.4.b CAAS Safety Class Equipment and Instrumentation (New Configuration)
Volume 1, Section 3.15 details the boundary descriptions for the Criticality Accident Alarm System.
2.5.2 Central Control Facility Provisions and Features 2.5.2.1 System Description At the radiation alarm system console, the operator can identify cluster units in an " ALARM" or
" TROUBLE" state, silence alarms, test and turn on building horns, and disable alarms.
The radiation alarm system console is located in C-300 (CCF). Portions of the radiation alarm system console front panel are shown in Fig. 2.5-15. Ponion "A" of Fig. 2.5-15 is a plot plan that depicts the alarm indicators and controls associated with each cluster unit. Figure 2.5-16 shows a grouping ofindicator lights and control switches, all of which are common to the radiation alarm system console. The functions of the components shown in Fig. 2.5-15, portions "A, " "B," and "C " are discussed below.
A group ofindicators and switches provide indications and controls for one cluster unit. This cluster unit plot plan is shown in portion "A" of Fig. 2.5-15.
1.
10-mR Alarm Light The red 10-mR light comes on, along with the console horn, when a criticality alarm signal is received from the related cluster unit. After the alarm condition is over, this light is reset by pushing the CL RESET (cluster reset) switch, which turns off the 10-mR light and resets the logic in the cluster unit (see Sect. 2.5.1).
2.
Memory Light This light is part of the MEMORY /CL RESET combination as shown in Fig. 2.5-15, portion "A." When a criticality event signal is received, the red 10-mR and blue MEMORY lights come on and the red 2-R light comes on if conditions so warrant. Reset of the 10-mR light is discussed in Item 1; however, after the criticality event is over and no alarm signal is being received from the cluster unit, the MEMORY light will remain ON until the console operator actuates the MEMORY RESET switch located in the common indicators and controls section (see Fig. 2.5-15, portion "B").
3.
CL (Cluster) Reset Switch The CL RESET switch is pushed to reset the lo3,ic in the cluster unit and turn off the 10-mR light at the radiation alarm system console when a criticality event is over.
2-16
i l
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) l 4.a Cluster Trouble Light (Existing Configuration) l i
This light comes on when an abnormal condition is in the system. This indicates trouble at the 10-mR cluster,2-R cluster, local horn control box, or other electrical system problems.
4.b Cluster Trouble Light (New Configuration)
This light comes on when an abnormal condition is in the system. This indicates trouble at the 10-mR cluster, accumulator air system, or other electrical system problems.
5.
Building Horn On i
This light indicates that the evacuation horns located in the building covered by the associated cluster unit have been turned on from the control room by moving the horn control switch (CS-310 in Fig. 2.5-15, portion "A") to ON after the HORN PERMISSIVE switch (Fig. 2.5-15, portion "B"), located in the common indicators and controls section, has been turned ON.
6.
Building Horn Locked Out This light comes on when the console operator has disabled the circuit that energizes the building horns j
in the area covered by the associated cluster unit. The console operator disables the horn circuit by moving the horn control switch (Fig. 2.5-15, portion "A") to the OFF position.
7.
Horn Control Switch (CS-310 in Fig. 2.5-15, po-tion "A")
The horn control switch has three positions which are OFF AUTO, and ON. In the OFF position, the building horns are locked out as described in Item 5. In the AUTO position, the building horns and the red beacons are automatically turned on in the area covered by the associated cluster unit when a criticality alarm is received from the cluster unit. In the ON position, building horns can be manually turned on in the area covered by the cluster unit if the HORN PERMISSIVE switch is in the ON position.
A group ofindicators and switches located on the lower right side of the console provides common indications and controls for all cluster unit systems. These indicators and controls are shown in Fig. 2.5-15, portion "B."
The functions of these lights and switches are described below:
1.
Direct Current Power Failure A loss of 48 V de power to the system causes this light to come on.
2.
Ac Power Failure A loss of 120 V ac power causes this light to come on if 48 V de power is available.
3.
Horn Permissive On This light comes on when the HORN PERMISSIVE switch is moved to the ON position. In this position, the console operator can turn on the building horns in the area covered by the associated cluster unit (s) by turning the horn control switch to ON.
2-17
F SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A October 31,1998 Rev.29 4.
Horn Permissive oft This light comes on when the HORN PERMISSIVE switch is moved to the OFF position. In this condition, the console operator cannot tum on the building homs by positioning the horn control switch to ON.
{
i 5.
Horn Permissive j
This switch function was explained in Steps 3 and 4.
6.
Alarm Silence This switch silences the audible (bell, buzzer, etc.) alarm signals existing at the radiation alarm system console.
7.
System Test This switch tums on all annunciator alarms, console MEMORY lights, and audible alarms to test their electrical operation.
8.
Memory Reset The MEMORY light on the control, which indicates present or past existence of a criticality event, is not automatically tumed off when the criticality event is over and the criticality alarm signal no longer exists.
The MEMORY light must be turned off by the console operator using the key-operated MEMORY RESET switch.
If the building has an argon gammagraph alarm on the console, an alarm will sound and a light on the panel will indicate a radiation alarm when the Argon Gammagraph in the field senses radiation. A HIGH i
LEVEL RANGE RESET switch resets the alarm lights after a criticality event is over. The overall pictorial layout of the radiation alarm system console is shown in Fig. 2.5-16 and Fig. 2.5-17.
l 2.5.2.2 System Analysis The changes made for HAUP in the CCF were primarily to support the major additions oflocal clusters and their associated input to the building alarm system. The hazards involved were mainly of the electrical hazard. Some failure modes could be created within the CAAS. However, these are evaluated in Sect. 2.5.1.
Based upon this evaluation, no additional requirements were addressed.
2.5.2.3 Safety Features and Controls Although none of this equipment is specifically required to perform a function to detect and/or alarm should an actual criticality incident occur, the equipment connected to the system will be operated in such a manner as to ensure it does not prevent the required portions of the system from actuating should an alarm actually be required.
As required, design features for safety, administrative controls, and surveillances were developed to support operation at enrichments up to 5.5 wt % 2"U. These safety features are listed below.
2-18
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49(RO) 2.5.2.3.1 Text Deleted 2.5.2.3.2.a Surveillance Requirements (Existing Configuration) l d
2.
Annual verification of operability of the detector units shall be performed using a radiation source.
3.
Quarterly verification oflocal alarm operability shall be performed. This testing shall include verification that nitrogen pressure is greater than 900 psig, battery test, and applying a back pressure on the check valve at the nitrogen / plant air interface to ensure operability ofthe check valve. The nitrogen system tests are not required where nitrogen backup is not required.
4.
Quarterly verification of building alarm operability shall be performed. This testing shall include verification that nitrogen pressure is greater than 900 psig. battery test, and applying a back pressure on the check valve at the nitrogen / plant air interface to ensure operability of the check valve. The nitrogen system tests are not required where nitrogen backup is not required.
5.
An integrated test of the entire CAAS shall be performed on an annual basis in accordance with ANSI /ANS 8.3, Sect 6.4.
2.5.2.3.2.b Surveillance Requirements (New Configuration) 2.
Annual verification of operability of the detector units shall be performed using a radiation source.
i 3.
Accumulator air pressure is greater than that necessary to sound the horns for at least two minutes, a battery test, and the horns are sounded to verify their functionality.
4.
An integrated test of the entire CAAS shall be performed on an annual basis in accordance with ANSI /ANS 8.3, Sect 6.4.
i
,I 2-19
.,~. - -
l SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO)
Table 2.5-1. Criticality clusters and building alarms (Existing Configuration) l Building
- Local Notes W
clusters / alarms l
C-310/310-A G and H Local horns with building horn.
C-331 J. K. and L Local horns with building horn.
C-333 Z and AJ Local horns with building horn.
C-333-A AA and AB Local horns with building horn. Either cluster will also actuate building horns in C-333 C-335 A. B. C. and AF Local horns with building horn.
C-337 T, U, V, W, X, Y, Local horns with building horn. Cluster N in C-and AK 337-A will actuate building horns in C-337.
Clusters V and X in C-337 will also actuate a l
building horn in C-337-A C-337-A N
Local horns with building horn. Cluster N in C-337-A will actuate building 3 horns in C-337.
C-360 R and S Local horns with building horn.
C-400 D and E Local horns with building horn.
C-409 P and AE Local horns with building horn.
C-710 AM, AN, AP, AQ, Building horns.
AR C-746-0 AC and AD Local horns with building horn.
C' 770 AL Buildine hom.
)
l I
l 2-20
l SAR PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO)
Table 2.5-la. Criticality clusters and building alarms (New Configuration)
I j
Building Clusters / alarms Notes l
C-310/310-A G and H Building horns and lights.
l C-331 J, K, and L Building horns and lights. Clusters will also actuate horns and lights associated with the C-331/335 tie line.
C-333 Z and AJ Building horns and lights. Either cluster will also actuate horns and lights at C-333A.
C-333-A AA and AB Building horns and lights. Either cluster will also actuate building horns and lights in C-333 C-335 A, B, C, and AF Building horns and lights. Clusters will also actuate horns and lights associated with the C-331/335 tie line.
C-337 T, U, V, W, X, Building horns and liglas. Cluster N in C-337-A will Y, and AK actuate building horns in C-337, Clusters V and X in C-337 will also actuate building horns and lights in C-337-A C-337-A N
Building borns and lights. Cluster N in C-337-A will actuate building horns and lights in C-337 and horns
)
and lights associated with the C-337A/360 tie line.
i C-360 R and S Building horns,and lights.
l j
C-400 D and E Building horns and lights. Either cluster will also actuate building horns in C-420.
C-409 P and AE Building horns and lights.
l l
C-710 AM, AN, AP, Building horns.
AQ.AR C-746-0 AC and AD Building horns and lights.
l l
C 770 AL Buildine horn l
2-20a
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO)
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SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Apyndix A February 26,1999 j
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2-39
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A April 15,1998 I
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Fig 2.5-11. Installation details oflocal horn alarm system for air operated alarm horns.
(Existing configuration, New configuration will remove Local horn alarm system.)
l 2-41
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appcudix A April 15,1998 i
Rev.24 i
i Blank Page 2-42
SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) 1 r--------,
10E 10E 10m I
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" ARE LABELS VISIBLE ON THE PANELS OR COMPONENTS Fig 2.5-14. Simplified schematic of horn / beacon control circuit. (Existing Configuration) l 2-47
3 SAR-PGDP Chapter 4, Appendix A Februar > 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO) l l
a 7._.______________.__.._____
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Fig 2.5-14a. Simpiined schematic of horn / beacon control circuit. (New Configuration) 2-48
SAR-PGDP April 15,1998 Rev.24 Each completed NCSA is issued as a controlled document. The permanent NCSAs are maintained in a controlled manua! which is issued to the personnel who need access to the NCSAs. The temporary NCSAs are issued to the appropriate personnel performing the temporary operation. Approved NCSEs/NCSAs are qual!!y records and are handled according to the plant's Document Control and Records Management Program described in Section 6.10.
The NCSA/NCSE process provides assurance that operations will remain suberitical under both normal and credible abnormal conditions. Any operations that do not comply with the double contingency principle are documented in NCSEs and Section 4.4.
There are three operations which do not meet the double contingency principle. These are product cylinder oper9tions, operation of the enrichment cascade, and removal of large cascade equipment (e.g.,
compressor, convertor, G-17 valve, e:c). These operations have been evaluated to be safe and are described in the accident analysis. Summaries of the accident scenarios associated with the operation of the enrichment cascade and the removal of enrichment cascade equipment are presented in SAR Section 4.4.1.1. The accident scenarios associated with UF product cylinder operations are discussed in SAR Section 4.4.3.4. Additional details concerning the accident scenarios associated with these three operations are provided in Appendix A to SAR Chapter 4, The System Safety Analysis (SSA) for the PGDP Higher Assay Upgrading Project. Sections 2.6.2.3, 2.6.2.7.9, and 2.9 of the SSA specifically discuss the 4
operation of the enrichment cascade and maintenance activities associated with removal and servicing of enrichment cascade equipment. Sections 2.6.2.5 and 2.6.2.6 of the SSA discuss the UF product withdrawal facilities and cylinder handling requirements.
4 There are TSRs to ensure controls are in place for those operations identified above which do not meet double contingency. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 of the TSRs list controls for operation of the enrichment cascade and for removal and maintenance of enrichment cascade equipment, respectively. Section 2.3 of the TSRs provides the controls associated with ensuring moderation control for the product cylinders.
i New operations and operations other than those identified as not meeting the double contingency prmciple in Section 4.4 shall comply with the double contingency principle. In the event future operations are found to not comply with the double contingency principle, Section 4.4 will be modified to address this issue and will be reviewed and approved as described in Section 6.3.
Emergencies arising from unforeseen circumstances can present the need for immediate action. If NCS expertise or guidance is needed immediately to avert the potential for a criticality accident, direction will be provided verbally or in writing. Such direction can include a stop work order or other appropriate instructions. A NCSA or other form of documentation will then be prepared to justify the actions taken once the emergency condition has been stabilized. This documentation shall be prepared within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> following the stabilization of the emergency condition.
5.2-5
l 2 -
SAR PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) 5.2.2.4 Design Philosophy and Review Designs of new fissile material equipment and processes must be approved by the.NCS Section before in;plementation and will include the use of favorable geometry or engineered controls on mass, moderation, volume, concentration, interaction, or neutron absorption, as the preferred approach over the y
use of administrative controls. Advantage will be taken for the nuclear and physical characteristics of process equipment and materials provided control is exercised to maintain them.
The preferred design approach includes two goals. The first is to design equipment with NCS independent of the amount of internal moderation or fissile concentrations, the degree of interspersed moderation between units, the thickness of reflectors, the fissile material density, and the fissile material chemical form. The second is to minimize the possibility of accumulating fissile material in inaccessible locations and, where practical, to use favorable geometry for those inaccessible locations. The adherence to this approach is determined during the preparation and technical review of the NCS evaluation performed to support the equipment design. This preferred design approach is implemented through adherence to plant NCS procedures.
Fissile material equipment designs and modifications are reviewed to ensure that favorable geometry and engineered controls are used to advantage. Administrative limits and controls will be implemented in NCSAs to satisfy the double contingency principle for those cases where the preferred design approach cannot be met.
5.2.2.5 Criticality Accident Alarm System Coverage A CAAS is provided to alert personnel if a criticality accident should occur. The system utilizes a distinctive audible signal to notify personnel in the affected area and initiate evacuation, thereby reducing personnel exposure to emitted radiation. Audibility is not provided in permit-required confined spt.ces and e
cell housings associated with cells that are running, In these areas a " buddy system" is used to ensure personnel working in these areas are notified of alarms in order to evacuate.
i At PGDP, the CAAS detects gamma dose rate. The system uses clustered detectors. Each cluster contains three scintillation detectors. Activation of any two of the three detectors in a cluster will initiate evacuation alarms. The failure of any major component of the system will result in a notification that indicates the need for corrective maintenance. A more detailed discussion o.' the physical function of the CAAS system is provided in Section 3.12.6.
Operations involving fissile material are evaluated for NCS prior to initiation. The need for CAAS coverage is considered during the evaluation process. Coverage is provided unless it is determined that coverage is not required and that finding is documented in the NCSE. For example, areas containing no more than 700 g of "'U,50 g of"'U in any square n,eter of floor or grotmd area, 5 g of"8U in any
)
10-liter volume, or areas having material that is either packaged and stored in compliance with 10 CFR 71 or specifically exempt according to 10 CFR 71.10, can be shown by evaluation not to require 7 Arm coverage. Areas that do not contain any operations involving uranium enriched to I wt % or higher usU and 15 g or more of"5U do not require an NCSE and are not required to have CAAS coverage. 10 CFR 76.89(a) authorizes USEC to " describe for the approval of the Commission defined areas to be excluded from the monitoring requirement." This submittal to the NRC "must describe the measures that will be used to ensure against criticality including kinds and quantities of material that will be permitted and 5.2-6
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR TOLL TRANSFER AND SAMPLING FACILITY C-360 2.1.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.1.4.5 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM LCO 2.1.4.5b: Criticality accident alarm shall be operable (audible).
APPLICABILITY:
In areas where the maximum foreseeable absorbed dose in free air exceeds 12 rad,' except areas in permit-required confined spaces. This LCO is applicable when the new criticality accident alarm system supplied by air accumulators is operable.
ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time l
A. Area does not have an A.1 Implement the following for areas, equipment, or immediately audible criticality processes where a criticality accident could result accident alarm.
in a maximum foreseeable dose exceeding 12 rad in the area of inaudibility and LCO 2.1.4.5a applies.
A.1.1 Discontinue movement of cylinders containing UF.
enriched to 2 I wt % "U.
2 AND A.I.2 Complete the current transfer and/or sampling operation and place transfer or sampling autoclaves processing cylinders containing UF, enriched to z 1 wt % 2"U in Mode 2.
AND A. I.3 Roll cylinders containing UF. enriched to a I wt
% 2"U with valves not in the 12 o' clock position to place the cylinder valve in the 12 o' clock l
position.
AND A. I.4 Discontinue movement of uranium enriched to 2 I wt % "U.
2 add A.2.1 Evacuate area of inaudibility applicable to this Immediately LCO.
AND A.2.2 Restrict access to area evacuated in A.2.1.
AND A.3 Provide personnel allowed into the area that would immediately be restricted under Action A.2.1 with an alterna'.c means of criticality alarm notification, such as a device that will alarm on sensing a 10mr/hr dose rate, or a rada in constant communication with the Central Control Facility.
J B. Area does not have an B.1 Restore criticality accident alarm to operable Prior to reinitiating audible criticality status.
activities accident alarm.
TSR 1.6.2.2d is not applicable.
2.1-24
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 i
RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR TOLL TRANSFER AND SAMPLING FACILITY C-360 2.1.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION
[
2.1.4.5 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
?'
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency l
SR 2.1.4.5b-1 Test the CAAS and building horns.
Quarterly l
SR 2.1.4.5b-2 Verify that the CAAS air accumulators supply Quarterly i
pressure to the building horns is at least 125 Psig.
SR 2.1.4.5b-3 Verify that the condition of the battery backups Annually to the electronic horns is sufficient to power the horns for at least 120 seconds.
)
BASIS:
The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident. This sys 41 is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal which will alert persor_ael to move from those work areas which are potentially affected. Audibility is not provided for areas in permit-required confined spaces. A " buddy system" is used to ensure personnel working in these areas are notified of alarms in order to evacuate. One person remains outside the area and maintains communication with personnel in the area. Evacuation of the area of inaudibility and restricting access to those areas will eliminate the potential for increased consequences due to personnel not hearing an alarm. The design of the system, three detection modules per cluster, provides protection for criticality events even with partial losses of required equipment. The CAAS provides detection coverage in most areas by using an overlapping pattern of individual cluster units. Criticality concerns with the C-360 facility are associated with movement of fissile materials. The action items maintain the facility in steady state operations to limit the potential for these concerns to the extent possible. The alarm signal is provided by sounding building horns which sound upon a signal from any cluster. Providing another means of coverage (i.e., portable detector / alarm, personal alarm device, etc.), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of the loss of alarm will establish protection. [SAR Chapter 4, Appendix A, Section 2.5.1.1.2, SAR 5.2.2.5, ANSI /ANS 8.3]
a The CAAS air accumulators provide for 120 seconds of horn actuation when at their minimum acceptable pressure of 125 psig. Electronic horns are also installed in some areas. These horns have battery backup power supplies which will provide for at least 120 seconds of horn actuation even if off-site power is lost.
2.1 25
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98Cl49 (RO)
SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR TOLL TRANSFER AND SAh1PLING FACILITY C-360 2.1.4 GENERAL LIhflTING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.1.4.5 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARhl SYSTEh! (continued)
BASIS (continued):
Requiring the cylinders be rotated to place the cylinder valve in the 12 o' clock position ensures that if the outage continues long enough that UF solidifies in the affected cylinder (s), the cylinder valve will be above the surface of the solid.
The quarterly surveillance of the CAAS building horns consists of placing the cluster in the test mode with a keyswitch, and manually causing two detector modules to generate radiation readings above the alarm setpoint. The cluster electronics determines that this meets the high radiation alarm criteria and propagates a high radiation alarm signal to the rest of the system. This signal activates the high radiation alarm light and bell in C-300 and activates the building CAAS horns and lights. Each hern and light is qualitatively verified to be operating. This test is a horn and light functional test and each module combination is tested to generate the high radiation signal.
2.1-26
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR TOLL TRANSFER AND SAAIPLING FACILITY C-360 2.1.4 GENERAL LIh11 TING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.I.4.5 CRITJCALITY ACCIDENT ALAR 51 SYSTEh!
2 LCO 2.1.4.5c: Criticality accident alarm shall be operable (audible).
l APPLICABILITY:
In areas where the maximum foreseeable absorbed dose in free air exceeds 12 rad and the new system described in LCO 2.1.4.5b has not been declared operable.
ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time A. Area does not have an A.1 Implement the following for areas, equipment, or immediately audible criticality processes where a criticality accident could result accident alarm.
in a maximum foreseeable dose exceeding 12 rad in the area of inaudibility and LCO 2.1.4.Sa applies.
A.1.1 Discontinue movement of cylinders containing UF.
2 enriched to 2 I wt % "U.
M A.I.2 Complete the current transfer and/or sampling operation and place transfer or sampling autoclaves processing cylinders containing UF. enriched to a 2
1 wt % ' U in Mode 2.
M A.1.3 Roll cylinders containing UF. enriched to a I wt
% "U with valves not in the 12 o' clock position to place the cylinder valve in the 12 o' clock position.
M A.1.4 Discontinue movement of uranium enriched to a I 2
wt % "U.
M A.2.1 Evacuate area of inaudibility applicable to this immediately LCO.
M A.2.2 Restrict access to area evacuated in A.2.1.
M A.3 Provide personnel allowed into the area that would immediately be restricted under Action A.2.1 with an alternate means of criticality alarm notification, such as a device that will alarm on sensing a 10mr/hr dose rate, or a radio in constant communication with the Central Control Facility.
B. Area does not have an B.1 Restore criticality accident alarm to operable Prior to reinitiating j
audible criticality status.
activities accident abtrm.
TSR 1.6.2.2d is not applicable.
2.1-26a
_ - = - -
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR TOLL TRANSFER AND SA51PLING FACILITY C-360 2.1.4 GENERAL LI51ITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION j
2.1.4.5 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALAR 51 SYSTE51 (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRE 51ENTS:
Surveillance Frequency j
i SR 2.1.4.5c-1 Test the CAAS, local cluster horns and Quarterly l
building horns.
SR 2.1.4.5c-2 Verify that the nitrogen supply pressure to the Quarterly l
l cluster horns is at least 900 psig.
BASIS:
1 i
The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident. This system is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal which will alert personnel to
{
move from those work areas which are potentially affected. Evacuation of the area ofinaudibility and restricting access to those areas will eliminate the potential for increased consequences due j
to personnel not hearing an alarm. The design of the system, three detection modules per cluster, provides protection for criticality events even with partial losses of required equipment. The CAAS provides detection coverage in most areas by using an overlapping pattern of individual cluster units. Criticality concerns with the C-360 facility are associated with movement of fissile materials. The action items maintain the facility in steady state operations to limit the potential j
for these concerns to the extent possible. The alarm signal is provided by sounding a local horn associated with each individual cluster and building horns which sound upon a signal from any i
cluster. Providing another means of coverage (i.e., portable detector /altrm, personal alarm device, etc.), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of the loss of i
alarm will establish protection. [SAR Chapter 4, Appendix A. Section 2.5.1.1.2, SAR 5.2.2.5 ANSI /ANS 8.3]
i
{
The nitrogen bottles which backup plant air for the local cluster horns are standard glinder size 1 A (1.55 ft',9 x 51 inches) and provide for 120 seconds of horn actuation when at their minimum acceptable pressure of 900 psig.
i Requiring the cylinders be rotated to place the cylinder valve in the 12 o' clock position ensures that if the outage continues long enough that UF, solidifies in the affected cylinder (s), the cylinder l
valve will be above the surface of the solid.
The quarterly surveillance of the CAAS, local cluster horns and building horns consists of placing the cluster in the test mode with a keyswitch, and manually causing two detector modules to generate radiation readings above the alarm setpoint. The cluster electronics determines that this meets the high radiation alarm criteria and propagates a high radiation alarm 2.1-26b
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR TOLL TRANSFER AND SAMPLING FACILITY C-360 a
2.1.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION i
2.1.4.5 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
BASIS (continued):
signal to the rest of the system. This signal activates the high radiation alarm light and bell in C-300, causes the local cluster to sound and activates the building CAAS horns and lights. Each i
horn and light is qualitatively verified to be operating. This test is a horn and light functional test and each module combination is tested to generate the high radiation signal.
l 4
2.1-26c
TSR-PGDP P' > POSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) i SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR UF FEED FACILITIES (C-333-A AND C-337-A) 2.2.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2.4.3 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
LCO 2.2.4.3h: Criticality accident alarm shall be operable (audible).
APPLICABILITY:
In areas where the maximum foreseeable absorbed dose in free air exceeds 12 rad, except areas in permit-required confined spaces. This LCO is applicable when the new criticality accident alarm system supplied by air accumulators is operable.
I ACTIONS Condition Required Action Completion Time l
A.
Area does not have an A.1 Implement the following for areas, equipment, or Immediately audible criticality processes where a criticality accident could result accident alarm.
in a maximum foreseeable dose exceeding 12 rad in the area of inaudibility and LCO 2.2.4.3a or 2.4.4.2a applies.
A.1.1 Discontinue movement of cy5linders containing 2
UF. enriched to a I wt %
U.
M A. I.2 Place autoclaves processing cylinders containing i
I UF. enriched to a I wt % "U in Mode 2.
M A.1.3 Perform Required Actions A.l.1 through A.I.6 of TSR 2.4.4.2b.
M A.I.4 Discontinue movement of uranium enriched tc, a I wt % "U.
M A.2.1 Evacuate area of inaudibility applicable to this immediately LCO.
M A.2.2 Restrict access to area evacuated in A.2.1.
M A.3 Provide personnel allowed into the area that Immediately would be restricted under Action A.2.1 with an alternate means of criticality alarm nr>tification.
such as a device that will alarm on sensing a 10 mr/hr dose rate, or a radio in constant communication with the Central Control Facility.
B.
Area does not have an B.1 Restore criticality accident alarm to operable status.
Prior to reinitiating audible criticality activities accident alarm.
TSR 1.6.6.2d is not applicable.
2.2-17
r TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) l SECTION 2.2 '
. SPECIFIC TSRs FOR UF, FEED FACILITIES (C-333-A AND i
C-337-A) 2.2.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION f
2.2.4.3 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency
-l SR 2.2.4.3b-1 Test the CAAS and building horns.
Quarterly l
SR 2.2.4.3b-2 Verify that the CAAS air accumulator supply Quarterly pressure to the building horns is greater than or equal to that necessary to sound all building l
horns for at least 120 seconds based on the number of accumulators in service. (Note: The air accumulator supply for C-333-A is in C-333 and the supply for C-337-A is in C-337.)
Number of accumulators in service Minimum oressure 4
137 psig 3
143 psig BASIS:
The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident. This system is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal v.~nich will alert personnel to move from those work area which are potentially affected. Audibiiity is not provided for areas l
in permit-required confined spaces. A " buddy system" is used to ensere personnel working in these areas are notified of alarms in order to evacuate. One person reriains outside the area and maintains contact with personnel in the area. Evacuation of the area of inaudibility and restricting access to those areas will eliminate the potential for increased consequences due to personnel not hearing an alarm. The design of the system, three detection modules per cluster, provides protection for criticality eve,nts even with partial losses of required equipment. The CAAS provides detection coverage m most areas by using an overlapping pattern of individual cluster units. Criticality concerns with the feed facilities are associated with movement of fissionable materials. The action items maintain the facility in steady state operations to limit the potential for these concerns to the extent possible. The alarm signal is provided by sounding building horns which sound upon a signal from any cluster. Providing another means of coverage (i.e., portable detector / alarm, personal alarm device, etc.), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of the loss of alarms will establish protection. [SAR Chapter 4, Appendix A, Section 2.5.1.1.2, SAR 5.2, ANSI /ANS 8.3]
2.2-18
~.
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR UF FEED FACILITIES (C-333-A AND 3
6 C-337-A) j 2.2.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION l
(
2.2.4.3 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
BASIS (continued):
The CAAS air accumulators provide for 120 seconds of horn actuation when at their minimum acceptable pressure based on the number of accumulators in service. The air accumulator supply for C-333-A is in C-333 and the supply for C-337-A is in C-337.
The quarterly surveillance of the CAAS building horns consists of placing the cluster in the test mode with a keyswitch, and manually causing two detector modules to generate radiation readings above the alarm setpoint. The cluster electronics determines that this meets the high radiation alarm criteria and propagates a high radiation alann signal to the rest of the system. This signal activates the high radiation alarm light and bell in C-300 and activates the building CAAS horns and lights. Each horn and light is qualitatively verified to be operating. This test is a horn and light functional test and each module combination is tested to generate the high radiation signal.
l 2.2-18a
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR UF, FEED FACILITIES (C-333-A AND C-337-A) 2.2.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2.4.3 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
LCO 2.2.4.3c: Criticality accident alarm shall be operable (audible).
l APPLICABILITY:
In areas where the maximum foreseeable absorbed dose in free air exceeds 12 rad and the new system described in LCO 2.2.4.3b has not been declared operable.
ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time A. Area does not have A.1 Implement the following for areas, Immediately an audible criticality equipment, or processes where a criticality
{
accident alarm.
accident could result in a maximum foreseeable dose exceeding 12 rad in the area of inaudibility and LCO 2.2.4.3a or 2.4.4.2a applies.
A.I.1 Discontinue movement of cylinders 235 containing UF enriched to a I wt %
U.
M A.I.2 Place autoclaves processing cylinders containing UF enriched to a I wt % : U in 35 Mode 2.
M A. I.3 Perform Required Actions A.1.1 through A.I.6 of TSR 2.4.4.2c.
l M
A.I.4 Discontinue movement of uranium enriched 235 to a I wt %
U.
M A.2.1 Evacuate area of inaudibility applicable to immediately this LCO.
M A.2.2 Restrict access to area evacuated in A.2.1.
i S
j A.3 Provide personnel allowed into the area that Immediately would be restricted under Action A.2.1 with an alternate means of criticality alarm notification, such as a device that will alarm 1
on sensing a 10 mr/hr dose rate, or a radio in constant communication with the Central Control Facility.
B.
Area does not have B.1 Restore criticality accident alarm to operable Prior to reinitiating an audible criticality
- status, activities accident alarm.
TSR 1.6.6.2d is not applicable.
2.2.I 8b
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR UF, FEED FACILITIES (C-333-A AND C-337-A) 2.2.4 GENERAL LB11 TING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2.4.3 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARh! SYSTEA!(continued)
)
f SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency j
SR 2.2.4.3c-1 Test the CAAS, local cluster horns and Quarterly l
building horns.
SR 2.2.4.3c-2 Verify that the nitrogen supply pressure to the Quarterly l
cluster horns is at least 900 psig.
BASIS:
The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident, This system is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal which will alert personnel to move from those work areas which are potentially affected. Evacuation of the area of inaudibility and restricting access to those areas will eliminate the potential for increased consequences due to personnel not hearing an alarm. The design of the system, three detection modules per cluster, provides protection for criticality events even with partial losses of required equipment. The CAAS provides detection coverage in most areas by using an overlapping pattern of individual cluster units. Criticality concerns with the feed facilities are associated with movement of fissionable materials. The action items maintain the facility in steady state operations to limit the 2
potential for these concerns to the extent possible. The alarm signal is provided by sounding a local horn associated with each individual cluster and building horns which sound upon a signal from any cluster. Providing another means of coverage (i.e., portable detector / alarm, personal 3
alarm device, etc.), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of the loss of alarms will establish protection. [SAR Chapter 4. Appendix A, Section 2.5.1.1.2, SAR 5.2, ANSI /ANS 8.3]
The nitrogen bottles which backup plant air for the local cluster horns are standard cylinder size 1 A (1.55 ft',9 x 51 inches) and provide for 120 seconds of horn actuation when at their minimum acceptable pressure of 900 psig.
The quarterly surveillance of the CAAS, local cluster horns and building horns consists of placing the cluster in the test mode with a keyswitch, and manually causing two detector modules to generate radiation readings above the alarm setpoint. The cluster electronics determines that this meets the high radiation alarm criteria and propagates a high radiation alarm signal to the rest of the system. This signal activates the high radiation alarm light and bell in C-300, causes the local cluster to sound and activates the building CAAS horns and lights. Each horn and light is qualitatively verified to be operating. This test is a horn and light functional test and each module combination is tested to generate the high radiation signal.
2.2-18c
I TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.7 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
LCO 2.3.4.7b: Criticality accident alarm shall be operable (audible).
APPLICABILITY:
In areas where the maximum foreseeable absorbed dose in free air exceeds 12 rad, except areas in permit-required confined spaces. This LCO is applicable when the new criticality accident alarm system supplied by air accumulators is operable.
ACTIONS:
Condition Reauired Action Completion Time l
A.
Area does not have A.1 Implement the following for areas, equipment, or Immediately an audible processes where a criticality accident could result in criticality accident a maximum foreseeable dose exceeding 12 rad in alarm.
the area of inaudibility and LCO 2.3.4.7a applies.
J A.1.1 Discontinue movement of cylinders containing UF, enriched to aI wt % 235U.
S
\\
A.I.2 NaF traps comaining uranium enriched to a I wt %
2'8U shall not be handled.
M 235 A.I.3 Waste containing uranium enriched to 2 I wt % U shall not be transported.
1 M
A.I.4 Discontinue maintenance activities that require breach of containment of equipment containing uranium enriched to a 1 wt % "U.
M 235 A.I.5 Cylinder Filling with UF enriched to a I wt % U will be discontinued. [In-progress cylinder filling cycle (s) may be completed, stopped, and/or re-started as necessary. Normal operation of withdrawal compressors, condensers, and accumulators is not restricted by this action.]
M A.I.6 Perform Required Actions A.I.1, A.I.2, A.I.3, A.I.4, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.3, B.1 of TSR 2.4.4.2b.
A.2.1 Evacuate area ofinaudibility Immediately M
A.2.2 Restrict access to the area of inaudibility.
M A.3 Provide personnel allowed to enter the area of Immediately inaudibility with an alternate means of criticality alarm notification such as a device that will alarm on sensing a 10mr/hr dose rate, or a radio in constant communication with the Central Control Facility.
B.
Area does not have B.1 Restore criticality accident alarm to operable status.
48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> an audible (effective when NRC criticality accident TSR 1.6.6.2d is not applicable.
assumes regulatory alarm.
authority) 2.3-21 1
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITIIDRAWAL FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.7 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued) 3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency l
SR 2.3.4.7b-1 Test the CAAS and building horns.
Quarterly l
SR 2.3.4.7b-2 Verify that the CAAS air accumulator supply Quarterly pressure to the building horns is at least 129 psig.
BASIS:
The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident. This system is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal which will alert personnel to move from those work areas which are potentially affected. Audibility is not provided for areas in permit-required confined spaces. A " buddy system" is used to ensure personnel working in these areas are notified of alarms in order to evacuate. One person remains outside the area and maintains contact with personnel in the area. Evacuation of the area of inaudibility and restricting access to those areas will eliminate the potential for increased consequences due to personnel not hearing an alarm. The design of the system, three detector modules per cluster, provides protection for criticality events even with partial losses of required equipment. The CAAS also provides detection coverage in most areas by using an overlapping pattern of individual cluster units. Criticality concerns with the product withdrawal facility are associated with the movement of fissionable materials. The action items maintain the facility in steady state operations to limit the potential for these concerns to the extent possible. The alarm signal is provided by sounding building horns which sound upon a signal from any cluster. Providing another means of coverage (i.e., portable detector / alarm, personal alarm device, etc.), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of the loss of alarms will establish protection. [SAR Chapter 4, Appendix A, Section 2.5.1.1.2, SAR 5.2, ANSI /ANS 8.3]
The CAAS air accumulators provide for 120 seconds of horn actuation when at their minimum acceptable pressure of 129 psig. Electronic horns are installed in some areas. These horns have battery backup power supplies which will provide for at least 120 seconds of horn actuation even if off-site power is lost.
The quarterly surveillance of the CAAS building horns consists of placing the cluster in the test mode with a keyswitch, and manually causing two detector modules to generate radiation readings above the alarm setpoint. The cluster electronics determines that this meets the high radiation alarm criteria and propagates a high radiation alarm signal to the rest of the system. This signal activates the high radiation alarm light and bell in C-300 and activates the building CAAS horns and lights. Each horn and light is qualitatively verified to be operating. This test is a horn and light functional test and each module combination is tested to generate the high radiation signal.
2.3-22
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.7 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
LCO 2.3.4.7c: Criticality accident alarm shall be operable (audible).
l APPLICABILITY:
In areas where the maximum foreseeable absorbed dose in free air exceeds 12 rad and the new system described in LCO 2.3.4.7b has not been declared operable.
I ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time A.
Area does not have A.1 Implement the following for areas, equipment, or immediately an audible processes where a criticality accident could result criticality accident m a maximum foreseeable dose exceeding 12 rad alarm.
in the area of inaudibility and LCO 2.3.4.7a applies.
A.l.1 Discontinue movement of cylinders containing UF.
2 enriched to aI wt % "U.
M A.I.2 NaF traps containing uranium enriched to a I wt %
2"U shall not be handled.
M A.1.3 Waste containing uranium enriched to aI wt %
2"U shall not be transported.
M A.1.4 Discontinue maintenance activities that require breach of containment of equipment containing 2
uranium enriched to 21 wt % "U.
M A.I.5 C linder Filling with UF. enriched to a I wt %
23 7 U will be discontinued. [In-progress cylinder filling cycle (s) may be completed, stopped, and/or re-started as necessary. Normal operation of withdrawal compressors, condensers, and accumulators is not restricted by this action.]
M A.1.6 Perform Requireu Actions A.I.1, A.1.2, A.I.3, A.I.4, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.3, B.1 of TSR 2.4.4.2c.
l m
A.2.1 Evacuate area of inaudibility Immediately M
A.2.2 Restrict access to the area of inaudibility.
M A.3 Provide personnel allowed to enter the area of Immediately inaudibility with an alternate means of criticality I
alarm notification such as a device that will alarm on sensing a 10mr/hr dose rate, or a radio in constant communication with the Central Control Facility.
B.
Area does not have B.1 Restore criticality accident alarm to operable 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> an audible status.
(effective when NRC criticality accident assumes regulatory alarm.
TSR 1.6.6.2d is not applicable.
authority) 2.3-22a i
i
1 TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITIIDRAWAL FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIAIITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.7 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALAR 51 SYSTEAI (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.4.7c-1 Test the CAAS, local cluster horns and Quarterly l
building horns.
SR 2.3.4.7c-2 Verify that the nitrogen supply pressure to the Quarterly l
cluster horns is at least 900 psig.
BASIS:
The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident. This system is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal which will alert personnel to move from those work areas which are potentially affected. Evacuation of the area ofinaudibility and restricting access to those areas will eliminate the potential for increased consequences due i
to personnel not hearing an alarm. The design of the system, three detector modules per cluster, provides protection for criticality events even with partial losses of required equipment. The CAAS also provides detection coverage in most areas by using an overlapping pattern of individual cluster units. Criticality concerns with the product withdrawal facility are associated with the movement of fissionable materials. The action items maintain the facility in steady state operations 1
to limit the potential for these concerns to the extent possible. The alarm signal is provided by sounding a local horn associated with each individual cluster and building horns which sound upon a signal from any cluster. Providing another means of coverage (i.e., portable detector / alarm, personal alarm device, etc.), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of the loss of alarms will establish protection. [SAR Chapter 4, Appendix A, Section 2.5.1.1.2, SAR 5.2, ANSI /ANS 8.3]
The nitrogen bottles which backup plant air for the local cluster horns are standard cylinder size 1 A (1.55 ft',9 x 51 inches) and provide for 120 seconds of horn actuation when at their minimum acceptable pressure of 900 psig.
The quarterly surveillance of the CAAS, local cluster horns and building horns consists of placing the cluster in the test mode with a keyswitch, and manually causing two detector modules to generate radiation readings above the alarm setpoint. The cluster electronics determines that this meets the high radiation alarm criteria and propagates a high radiation alarm signal to the rest of the system. This signal activates the high radiation alarm light and bell in C-300, causes the local cluster to sound and activates the building CAAS horns and lights. Each horn and light is qualitatively verified to be operating. This test is a horn and light functional test and each module combination is tested to generate the high radiation signal.
2.3-22b
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.4 SPECIFIC TSRS FOR ENRICHMENT CASCADE FACILITIES 2.4.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.4.4.2 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM LCO 2.4.4.2b: Criticality accident alarm shall be operable (audible).
APPLICABILITY:
In areas where the maximum foreseeable absorbed dose in free air exceeds 12 rad, except areas in permit-required confined spaces and celi housings associated with cells that are running. This LCO is applicable when the new criticality accident alarm system supplied by att accumulators is declared operable.
ACTIONS-Condition Required Action Completion Timg l
A.
Area does not A.1 Implement the following for areas, equipment, or Immediately have an audible processes where a criticality accident could result in a criticality maximum foreseeable dose exceeding 12 rad in the area accident alarm.
of inaudibility and LCO 2.4.4.2a or 2.2.4.3a applies.
A.I.1 Discontinue cell maintenance activities that require breach of the containment boundary of cells containing UF.
enriched to a I wt % 23'U.
M A.I.2 Monitor temperatures / pressures in the cascade cells containing UF, enriched to 2 I wt % 23'U hourly to maintain UF, in the gaseous state.
M 235 A.I.3 Waste containing uranium enriched to = I wt % U shall not be handled.
M A.I.4 Wet air pumps shall not be used for evacuation of cells containing UF. enriched to a I wt % 23*U.
M A.I.5 Monitor temperature and pressure of gurce drums con,taining UF enri,ched to a I wt % '3'O hourly to maintam mventory m gaseous state.
M A.I.6 Place freezer /sublimers containinf 5 or F/S 6.
UF enriched to 21 wt 235
% U in mode F/S 3, F/S 4, F/
M A.I.7 Perform P.cquired Actions A.I.1 and A.I.2 of TSR 2.2.4.3b.
M A.I.8 When implementing these actions in C-310, perform Required Actions A.I.1, A.I.2, A.I.3, A.I.4, A.I.5, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.3, and B.! of TSR 2.3.4.7b.
M A.2.1 Evacuate area of inaudibility.
Immediately M
A.2.2 Restrict access to area evacuated in A.2.1.
M A.3 Provide personnel allowed into the area that would be immediately restricted under Action A.2.1 with an alternate means of criticality alarm notification such as a device that will alarm on sensing a 10mr/hr dose rate, or a radio in constant communication with the Central Control Facility.
B.
Area does not B.1 Restore criticality accident alarm to operable status.
48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> have an audible (effective when criticality TSR 1.6.2.2(d) is not applicable.
NRC assumes accident alarm.
regulatory authority) 2.4-19
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) j SECTION 2.4 SPECIFIC TSRS FOR ENRICHMENT CASCADE FACILITIES 2.4.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.4.4.2 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
l Surveillance Frequency l
SR 2.4.4.2b-1 Test the CAAS and building horns.
Quarterly l
SR 2.4.4.2b-2 Verify that the CAAS air accumulator supply Quarterly pressure to the building horns is greater than or equal to that necessary to sound all building j
horns for at least 120 seconds based on the number of accumulators in service.
C-3a3/C-337 I
Number of accumulators in service Minimum pressure 4
137 psig 3
143 psig i
i C-331/C-335 Number of accumulators in service Minimum pressure 2
129 psig C-331/C-335 Tie Line Number of accumulators in service Minimum oressure 1
121 psig BASIS:
The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident. This system is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal which will alert personnel to move from those work areas which are potentially affected. Audibility is not provided for areas in permit-required confined spaces and cell housings associated with cells that are running. A
" buddy system" is used to ensure personnel working in these areas are notified of alarms in order to evacuate. One person remians outside the area and maintains contact with personnel in the area.
Evacuation of the area of inaudibility and restricting access to those areas will eliminate the potential for increased consequences due to personnel not hearing an alarm. Criticality concerns with the cascade involve freeze-out of UF and moderator introduction._ The action items maintain the cascade in steady state operations to limit the potential for these concerns to the extent possible. Ceasing the movement of fissile waste prevents a criticality associated with waste storage. The design of the system, three detector modules per cluster, provides protection for criticality events even with partial losses of required equipment. The alarm signal is provided by sounding building horns which sound upon a signal from any cluster. Providing 2.4-20
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.4 SPECIFIC TSRS FOR ENRICHMENT CASCADE FACILITIES 2.4.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.4.4.2 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
BASIS (continued):
another means of coverage (i.e., portable detector / alarm, personal alarm device, etc.), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of inaudibility will establish protection.
[SAR Chapter 4, Appendix A, Section 2.5.1.1.2, SAR 5.2, ANSI /ANS 8.3]
The CAAS air accumulators provide for 120 seconds of horn actuation when at their minimum acceptable pressure based on the number of accumulators in service. Electronic horns are also installed in some areas. These horns have battery backup power supplies which will provide for at least 120 seconds of horn actuation even if off-site power is lost.
The quarterly surveillance of the CAAS building horns consists of placing the cluster in the test mode with a keyswitch, and manually causing two detector modules to generate radiation readings
)
above the alarm setpoint. The cluster electronics determines that this meets the high radiation alarm criteria and propagates a high radiation alarm signal to the rest of the system. This signal activates the high radiation alarm light and bell in C-300 and activates the building CAAS horns and lights. Each horn and light is qualitatively verified to be operating. This test is a horn and light functional test and each module combination is tested to generate the high radiation signal.
1 l
T 1
2.4-20a
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.4 SPECIFIC TSRS FOR ENRICIBIENT CASCADE FACILITIES 2.4.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.4.4.2 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM LCO 2.4.4.2c:
Criticality accident alarm shall be operable (audible).
(
1 APPLICABILITY:
In areas where the maximum foreseeable absorbed dose in free air exceeds 12 rad and the new system described in LCO 2.4.4.2b has not been declared operable.
4 ILCTIONL Condition Required Action Completion Time A.
Area does not A.1 Implement the following for areas, equipment, or Immediately have an audible processes where a criticality accident could result in a criticality maximum foreseeable dose exceedin 12 rad in the area accident alarm.
of inaudibility and LCO 2.4.4.2a or 2.4.3a applies.
A.I.1 Discontinue cell maintenance activities that require breach of the containment boundary of cells containing UF.
enriched to a I wt % "U.
2 M
A.I.2 Monitor temperatures / pressures in the cascade cells containing UF, enriched to a I wt % "U hourly to 2
maintain UF. m the gascous state.
M A.I.3 Waste containing uranium enriched to a I wt % "U shall not be handled.
M A.I.4 Wet air pumps shall not be used for evacuation of cells containing UF enriched to 2 I wt % "U.
2 M
A.I.5 Monitor temperature and pressure of surge drums containing UF. enriched to 2 I wt % "U hourly to 2
maintain mventory in gaseous state.
M A.I.6 Place freezer /sublimers containing UF. enriched to a I wt
% "U in mode F/S 3, F/S 4, F/S 5 or F/S 6.
2 M
A.I.7 Perform Required Actions A.l.1 and A.I.2 of TSR 2.2.4.3c.
l M
A.I.8 When implementing these actions in C-310, perform Required Actions A.I.1, A.I.2, A.I.3, A.I.4, A.I.5, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.3, and B.1 of TSR 2.3.4.7c.
l M
A.2.1 Evacuate area of inaudibility.
Immediately M
A.2.2 Restrict access to area evacuated in A.2.1.
M A.3 Provide personnel allowed into the area that would be immediately restricted under Action A.2.1 with an alternate means of criticality alarm notification such as a device that will alarm on sensing a 10mr/hr dose rate, or a radio in constant communication with the Central Control Facility.
B.
Area does not B.1 Restore criticality accident alarm to operable status.
48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> have an audible (effective when criticality TSR 1.6.2.2(d) is not applicable.
NRC assumes accident alarm.
regulatory I
authority) 2.4-20b
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 i
RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.4 SPECIFIC TSRS FOR ENRICIBIENT CASCADE FACILITIES 2.4.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.4.4.2 CRITICALITY ACC?)ENT ALARM SYSTEM (coatinued)
SURVEILLANCE REOU1pfENTS:
' aveillance Frequency SR 2.4.4.2c-1 Test the CAAS, local cluster horns and Quarterly l
building horns.
SR 2.4.4.2c-2 Verify that the nitrogen supply pressure to the Quarterly l
cluster horns is at least 900 psig.
BASIS:
The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident. This system is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal which will alert personnel to move from those work areas which are potentially affected. Evacuation of the area of inaudibility and restricting access to those areas will eliminate the potential for increased consequences due to persennel not hearing an alarm. Criticality concerns with the cascade involve freeze-out of UF.
i and moderator introduction. The action items raaintain the cascade in steady state operations to limit the potential for these concerns to the extent possible. Ceasing the movement of fissile waste prevents a criticality associated with waste storage. The design of the system, three detector modules per cluster, provides protection for criticality events even with partial losses of required equipment. The alarm signal is provided by sounding a local horn associated with each individual cluster and building horns which sound upon a signal from any cluster. Providing another means of coverage (i.e., portable detector / alarm, personal alarm device, etc.), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of inaudibility will establish protection. [SAR Chapter 4, Appendix A, Section 2.5.1.1.2, SAR 5.2, ANSI /ANS 8.3]
The nitrogen bottles which backup plant air for the local cluster horns are standard cylinder size 1 A (1.55 ft',9 x 51 inches) and provide for 120 seconds of horn actuation when at their minimum acceptable pressure of 900 psig.
i l
The quarterly surveillance of the CAAS, local cluster horns and building horns consists of placing the cluster in the test mode with a keyswitch, and manually causing two detector modules to generate radiation readings above the alarm s:tpoint. The cluster electronics determines that this meets the high radiation alarm criteria and propagates a high ediation alarm signal to the rest of 4
the system. This signal activates the high radiation alarm li$ and bell in C-300, causes the local cluster to sound and activates the building CAAS horns and lights. Each horn and light is qualitatively verified to be operating. This test is a horn and light functional test and each module f
combination is tested to generate the high radiation signal.
2,4-20c
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR CAAS (NON-CASCADE FACILITIES) 2.6.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS 2.6.4.1 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
LCO 2.6.4.1h:
Criticality accident alarm shall be operable (audible).
~
APPLICABILITY:
In areas in the facilities listed in 2.6.4.la where the maximum foreseeable absorbed dose in free air exceeds 12 rad, except areas in permit-required confined spaces. This LCO is applicable when the new criticality accident alarm system with air accumulators and/or electronic horns has been declared operable.
ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time A. Area does not have an A.1 Discontinue operations with humediately audible criticality accident fissionable material.
alarm.
AND A.2.1 Evacuate area ofinaudibility Immediately AND A.2.2 Restrict access to the area of inaudibility.
AND A.3 Provide personnel allowed into the Immediately area that would be restricted under Action A.2.1 with an alternate means of criticality alarm notification such as a device that will alarm on sensing a 10mr/hr dose rate, or a radio in constant communication with the Central Control Facility.
B.
Area does not have an B.1 Restore criticality accident alarm to Prior to audible criticality operable status.
reinitiating accident alarm.
activities TSR 1.6.2.2d is not applicable.
l 2.6-6
TSR-PGDP PROPOSE 7 February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR CAAS (NON-CASCADE FACILITIES) 2.6.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS 2.6.4.1 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency
(
SR 2.6.4.lb-1 Test the CAAS and building horns.
Quarterly l
SR 2.6.4.lb-2 Verify that the CAAS air accumulator supply Quarterly pressure to the building horns is greater than or equal to that necessary to sound all building i
horns for at least 120 seconds based on the i
number of accumulators in service.
C4%
3 Number of accumulators in service Minimum oressure i
2 125 psk l
1 145 psig C-409 Number of accumulators in service Minimum pressure 1
125 psig 4
SR 2.6.4.lb-3 Verify that the condition of the battery backups Annually to the electronic horns are sufficient to power the horns for at least 120 seconds.
7, i
BASIS:
4 The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident. This system is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal which will alert personnel to move from those work areas which are potentially affected. Audibility is not provided for areas i
in permit-required confmed spaces. A " buddy system" is used to ensure personnel working in these areas are notified of alarms in order to evacuate. One person remains outside the area and maintains contact with perscnnel in the area. Evacuation of the area of inaudibility and restricting access to those areas will eliminate the potential for increased consequences due to personnel not hearing an alarm. The design of the system, three detector modules per cluster, provides protection for criticality events even with partial losses of required equipment. The CAAS also provides detection coverage in most areas by using an overlapping pattern of individual cluster units. Criticality concerns with the listed facilities are associated with the handling of fissile materials. The action items maintain the facility in steady state operations to limit the potential for these concerns to the extent possible. The alarm signal is provided by sounding building horns which sound upon a signal from any cluster. The building horns for C-709 and C-710 are configured in two separate networks, either of which can independently 2.6-7 I
1 TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO) w SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR CAAS (NON-CASCADE FACILITIES) 2.6.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS 2.6.4.1 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
BASIS (continued):
sound the required evacuation signal. The building horn configuration in C-709 and C-710 allows the CAAS for those buildings to remain operable even when one of the independent horn networks is temporarily out of service. Providing another means of coverage (i.e., portable detector / alarm, personal alarm device, etc.), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of the loss of alarms will establish protection.
Facilities containing criticality accident alarm systems (other than those covered by TSR Sections 2.1-2.4) include C-400, C-409, C-710, C-720, C-720M, C-720K, C-720R, C-720S, C-720-C, C-728, and C-746-Q-1. [SAR Chapter 4, Appendix A, Section 2.5.1.1.2, SAR 5.2, ANSI /ANS 3.3]
The CAAS air accumulators provide for 120 seconds of hocn actuation when at their minimum acceptable pressure based on the number of accumulators in service. Electronic horns are also installed m some areas. These horns have battery backup power supplies which will provide for at least 120 seconds of horn actuation even if off-site power is lost.
i The quarterly surveillance of the CAAS building horns consists of placing the cluster in the test mode with a keyswitch, and manually causing two detector modules to generate radiation readings above the alarm setpoint. The cluster electronics determines that this meets the high radiation alarm criteria and propagates a high radiation alarm signal to the rest of the system. This signal activates the high radiation alarm light and bell in C-300 and activates the building CAAS horns and lights. Each horn and light is qualitatively verified to be operating. This test is a horn and light functional test and each module combination is tested to generate the high radiation signal.
l J
i 2.6-8
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED Febmary 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR CAAS (NON-CASCADE FACILITIES) 2.6.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS 2.6.4.1 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
LCO 2.6.4.Ic:
Criticality accident alarm shall be operable (audible).
l APPLICABILITY:
In areas in the facilities listed in 2.6.4.la where the maximum foreseeable absorbed dose in free air exceeds 12 rad and the new system described in LCO 2.6.4.lb has not been declared operable.
ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time A.
Area does not have an A.1 Discontinue operations with Immediately audible criticality fissionable material.
accident alarm.
AND A.2.1 Evacuate area ofinaudibility Immediately AND A.2.2 Restrict access to the area of inaudibility.
AND A.3 Provide personnel allowed into the hanediately area that would be restricted under Action A.2.1 with an alternate means of criticality alarm notification such as a device that will alarm on sensing a 10mr/hr dose rate, or a radio in constant communication with the Central Control Facility.
B.
Area does not have an B.1 Restore criticality accident alarm to Prior to audible criticality operable status.
reinitiating accident alarm.
activities TSR 1.6.2.2d is not applicable.
2.6-9
-~
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR CAAS (NON-CASCADE FACILITIES) 2.6.4 GENERAL LIh1ITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS 2.6.4.I CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALAR 51 SYSTEh!(continued)
SURVEILLANCE REOUIRENfENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.6.4.1c-1 Test the CAAS, local cluster horns and building Quarterly l
horns.
SR 2.6.4.1c-2 Verify that the nitrogen supply pressure to the Quarterly l
cluster horns is at least 900 psig.
SR 2.6.4.1c-3 Verify that the condition of the battery backups Annually l
to the electronic horns are sufficient to power the horns for at least 120 seconds.
j BASIS:
The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident. This system is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal which will alert personnel to move from those work areas which are potentially affected. Evacuation of the area of inaudibility and restricting access to those areas will eliminate the potential for increased consequences due to personnel not hearing an alarm. The design of the system, three detector modules per cluster, provides protection for criticality events even with partial losses of required equipment. The CAAS also provides detection coverage in most areas by using an overlapping pattern of individual cluster units. Criticality concerns with the listed facilities are associated with the handling of fissile materials. The action items maintain the facility in steady state operations to limit the potential for these concerns to the extent possible. The alarm signal is provided by sounding building horns which sound upon a signal from any cluster, and by sounding in some locations a local horn associated with each individual cluster. The building horns for C-709 and C-710 are configured in two separate networks, either of which can independently sound the required evacuation signal. The building horn configuration in C-709 and C-710 allows the CAAS for those buildings to remai;. >perable even when one of the independent horn networks is temporarily out of service. Providing another means of coverage (i.e., portable detector / alarm, personal alarm device, etc.), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of the loss of alarms will establish protection.
Facilities containing criticality accident alarm systems (other than those covered by TSR Sections 2.1-2.4) include C-400, C-409, C-710, C-720, C-720M, C-720K, C-720R, C-720S, C-720-C, C-728, and C-746-Q-1. [SAR Chapter 4, Appendix A, Section 2.5.1.1.2, SAR 5.2, ANSI /ANS 8.3]
The nitrogen bottles which backup plant air for the local cluster horns are standard cylinder size 1 A (1.55 ft),9 x 51 inches) and provide for 120 seconds of horn actuation when at their minimum acceptable pressure of 900 psig.
2.6-10
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED February 26,1999 RAC 98C149 (RO)
SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR CAAS (NON-CASCADE FACILITIES) 2.6.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS 2.6.4.1 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
BASIS (continued):
The quarterly surveillance of the CAAS, local cluster horns and building horns consists of placing the cluster in the test mode with a keyswitch, and manually causing two detector modules to generate radiation readings above the alarm setpoint. The cluster electronics determines that this meets the high radiation alarm criteria and propagates a high radiation alarm signal to the rest of the system. This signal activates the high radiation alarm light and bell in C-300, causes the local cluster to sound (where applicable) and activates the building CAAS horns and lights. Each horn and light is qualitatively verified to be operating. This test is a horn and light functional test and each module combination is tested to generate the high radiation signal.
e l
l 2.6-11
GDP 99-0045 Page1of4 United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
Certificate Amendment Request CAAS Audibility Upgrades Significance Determination Tne United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) has reviewed the proposed changes associated with this Certificate Amendment Request and provides the following Significance Determination for consideration.
f i
1.
No Sienificant Decrease in the Effectiveness of the Plant's Safety. Safecuards. or Security Programs This Certificate Amendment request involves changes to TSR and SAR pages to reflect l
modifications to the Criticality Accident Alarm System. These modifications are necessary to "nsure that the CAAS alarm horns / whistles are capable of being heard throughout the affected areas of the process buildings and to provide CAAS alarm horns for those unalarmed facilities within the evacuation area of CAAS-clustered buildings, respectively. As a result of these modifications, changes to the TSR basis statements and surveillance requirements for CAAS audibility are required. In addition, these modifications will not provide for r audible CAAS in permt-required confined spaces and cell housings associated with e's that are running. Consequently, this Certificate Amendment also requests NRC review of.ne TSR and SAR changes required to permit the use of a " buddy system" in lieu of an audible CAAS in
)
these areas. The NRC has previously reviewed this issue and granted an exclusion to the 10 CFR76.89 requirement to maintain and operate a criticality monitoring and audible alarm system in all areas of the facility.
Neither the changes for the CAAS modification nor the changes to reflect the CAAS exclusion request are addressed in the plant safeguards or security programs contained in Volume 3 of the Application for United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Certificate for the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. With regard to the criticality safety program, the changes to the CAAS will improve the performance and reliability of the CAAS and have been shown not to diminish the effectiveness of the CAAS system. The fact that the CAAS will not be audible in permt-required confined spaces and cell housings associated with running cells has previously been addressed in an exclusion request and granted by NRC. Therefore, this exclusion will not result in an undue risk to public health and safety, common defense and security, or the environment. As a result, the effectiveness of the plant's safety, safeguards, and security programs is unaffected by this certificate amendment.
4 l
GDP 99-0045 Page 2 of 4 2.
No Sienificant Change to Any Conditions to the Certificate of Comnliance None of the Conditions to the Certificate of Compliance address the modifications to the CAAS, the use of a " buddy system" in lieu of an audible CAAS in permit-required confined spaces and cell housings associated with running cells, or the resulting SAR and TSR changes.
t Thus, the proposed changes have no impact on any of the Conditions to the Certificate of Compliance.
3.
No Significant Change to Any Condition of the Anproved Comnliance Plan The proposed changes, when complete, will satisfy the required actions for Compliance Plan Issues 46 and 50. Therefore, the CAR does not involve a change to any condition of the approved compliance plan.
4.
No Significant Increase in the Probability of Occurrence or Consecuences of Previousiv Evaluated Accidents The CAAS is not used to prevent an accident. Its purpose is to mitigate the consequences to personnel in the immediate area of a criticality by providing audible alarms which will warn personnel to evacuate the area. The modifications to the CAAS, the use of a " buddy system" in lieu of an audible CAAS in permit-required confined spaces and cell housings associated with running cells, and the resulting SAR and TSR changes will not increase the probability of occurrence of a criticality accident.
The modifications to the CAAS will increase the performance and reliability of the CAAS which will minimize the consequences of a criticality accident. The use of a " buddy system" in lieu of an audible CAAS in permt-required confined spaces and cell housings associated with running cells will not significantly increase the consequences of a criticality accident to a worker or an attendant in one of these areas as described below:
The " buddy system" provides a method by which the attendant is in contact with entrants into these areas and would be directed to notify the entrants if a C.'
S alarm occurs and to initiate evacuation. The delay in notification introduced by the uuddy system" versus hearing a CAAS horn directly wot.ld be on the order of seconds. This delay would not result in an appreciable increase in the dose that would potentially be received by the attendant or the entrants in the unlikely event of an inadvertent criticality. In addition, the NRC has previously reviewed this change and granted an exclusion to exclude cell housings and confined spaces from the 10 CFR 76.89(a) requirement to maintain and operate a criticality monitoring and audible alarm system for all areas of the plant.
7 GDP 99-0045 Page 3 of 4 5.
No New or Different Type of Accident The CAAS is only used to mitigate the consequences of a criticality accident which has been previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report. No new or different type of accident has been revealed as a result of these changes.
6.
No Significant Reduction in Margins of Safety The modifications to the CAAS are enhancements that will increase the performance and reliability of the CAAS which will minimize the consequences of a criticality accident.
Consequently, there is no reduction in the margin of safety.
7.
No Significant Decrease in the Effectiveness of any Procram or Plans Contained in the Certificate Annlication For the reasons discussed in the response to Item 1 above, there will be no significant decrease in the effectiveness of any Program or Plan contained in Volume 3 of the Certification Application.
8.
The Pronosed Changes do.not Result in Undue Risk to 1) Public Health and Safety. 21 Common Defense and Security. and 3) the Environment This Certificate Amendment request involves changes to TSR and associated SAR pages to reflect modifications to the Criticality Accident Alarm System. These modifications are necessary to ensure that the CAAS alarm horns / whistles are capable of being heard throughout the affected areas of the process buildings and to provide CAAS alarm horns for those unalarmed facilities within the evacuation area of CAAS-clustered buildings. As a result of these modifications, changes to the TSR basis statements and surveillance requirements for CAAS audibility are required. in addition, these modifications will not provide for an audible CAAS in permt-required confined spaces and cell housings associated with cells that are running. Consequently, this Certificate Amendment also requests NRC review of the required TSR changes required to permit the use of a " buddy system" in lieu of an audible CAAS in these areas, i
As discussed in Item 4, the modifications to the CAAS will not significantly increase either the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed event. In addition, no new accidents associated with this change have been identified. The modifications to the CAAS system will improve the performance of the CAAS horns / whistles from an audibility standpoint and increase the reliability of the air supply to the horns / whistles. These improvements enhance the CAAS and have no adverse impact on the consequences of a criticality accident.
Therefore, the proposed TSR and SAR changes do not result in an undue risk to public health and safety or to the environment.
The proposed changes will have no impact on the common defense and security because the proposed changes do not modify the plant safeguards or security program.
a
GDP 99-0045 Page 4 cf 4 9.
No Change in the Types or Significant Increase in the Amounts of Any Effluents that Mav be Released Offsite As discussed in item 4 above, these changes will not result in a significant increase in the 4
probability ofoccurren:e or consequences of a criticality accident. Therefore, there will be no change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.
- 10. No Significant Increase in Individual or Cumulative Occunational Radiation Exoosure This proposed TSR change modifies the TSRs to reflect installation of the upgraded CAAS system. The CAAS is not used to control or minimize occupational radiation exposures or to comply with 10 CFR 20. Therefore, this change does not relate to controls used to minimize occupational exposures.
I1. No Significant Construction Imoact The proposed changes revise the TSR and SAR to reflect modifications associated with the CAAS upgrade. Therefore, there is no significant construction impact.
- 12. No Significant Increase in the Potential for Radiological or Chemical Conseauences from Previousiv Analyzed Accidents As discussed in Item 4 above, these changes will not result in a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of a criticality accident. In addition, no new i
accidents associated with this change have been identified. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the potential for radiological or chemical consequences from previously analyzed accidents.
i I
b_