ML20207L016
| ML20207L016 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1986 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-86, REF-PT21-86-272-000 ANPP-37253-EEVB, DER-86-10, PT21-86-272, PT21-86-272-000, NUDOCS 8607300164 | |
| Download: ML20207L016 (6) | |
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Arizona Nuclear Power Project g 3 3 1 7 PH 12: E h P o. BOX 52034 e PHOENIX ARIZONA 85072-2034 July 11, 1986 ANPP-37253-EEVB/LAS /DRL'-92 P11 '
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 1
Attention:
Mr. D. F. Kirsch, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1, 2, 3 Docket Nos. 50-528, 529, 530
Subject:
Final Report - DER 86-10 A 50.55(e) and 10CFR21 Condition Relating to Saturation of Radiation Monitoring Instruments File 86-006-216; D.4.33.2
Reference:
(A) Telephone Conversation between R. C. Sorenson and T. R. Bradish on March 12, 1986 (Initial Reportability -
(B) ANPP-36076, dated April 11, 1986 (Interim Report -
(C) ANPP-36760, dated June 4, 1986 (Time Extension -
Dear Sir:
Attached is our final written report of the Deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e) referenced above. The 10CFR21 evaluation is also included.
Very truly yours,
\\
k E O<cu.t nh E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
l Executive Vice President Project Director EEVB/DRL/jle Attachments cc: See Page 2 8607300164 860711 g
gDR ADOCK 05000528 8
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i ANPP-37253-EEVB/LAS/DRL-92.11 July 11, 1986 DER 86 Final Report Mr. D. F. Kirsch Acting Director Page Two cc:
Mr. J. M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 A. C. Gehr (4141)
R. P. Zimmerman (6295)
Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 circle 75 Parkway - Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339
ANPP-37253-EEVB/LAS/DRL-92.11 July 11, 1986 DER 86 Final Report Mr. D. F. Kirsch Acting Director I
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FINAL REPORT - DER 86-10 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)
ARIZONA NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT (ANPP)
PVNGS UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 I. Description of Deficiency Kaman Instrumentation Corporation notified ANPP on February 22, 1986, of a possible defect in the operation of their noble gas radiation monitors (Project Tag Nos. JSQNRU-142, JSQNRU-144 and JSQBRU-146), Model KMG-HRH with Detector Model KDGM-HR, Part No. 952397-003. Kaman advised that the monitors could saturate at 1x 103 micro-curies per cc, which is two (2) decades below full scale (Reference 1).
The saturation occurs in the software and not in the electro-mechanical portion of the monitor (Reference 2).
These monitors are used in the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) to detect high radiation in the Condenser Vacuun System Exhaust (RU-142), Plant Vent (RU-144), and Fuel Building (RU-146).
RU-142, RU-144, and RU-146 are Post Accident Monitors and perform no safety function.
RU-146 is part of RMS's Safety -Related Monitoring System and performs a safety function, however, this monitor performs no essential safety feature actuation.
Evaluation A)
Investigations, Tests, Analyses ANPP verified this condition by testing Unit 1 and 2 monitors (Reference 1).
Test results show the monitors saturated at 3 x 104 micro-curies per cc.
Kaman requested additional testing of the monitors, using the procedures delineated in Reference Two (2).
Subsequent site testing by ANPP on Unit 2 Radiation Monitor RU-142, showed a saturation level of approximately 1.3 x 104 micro-curies per cc.
Only Unit 2, RU-142, was tested since all high-range radiation monitors for Units 1, 2 and 3 are identical.
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B)
Safety Assessment The required upper range for these monitors in micro-curies per cc i
is as follows:
RU-142 RU-144 RU-146 Specification (Instr. Data Sheets) 1 x 105 1 x 105 1 x 105 FSAR, Table 11.5 1 x 105 1 x 105 1 x 105 NUREG 0737, Table II.F.1-1 1 x 105 1 x 104 1 x 103 Regulatory Guide 1.97 1 x 105 1 x 104 1 x 103 j
Even though the monitors do not meet specification requirements (based on the lower site-tested saturation level of 1.3 x 104 micro-curies per cc), both RU-144 and RU-146 neet regulatory requirements.
Since RU-142 does not meet regulatory requirements, a calculation was performed for the worst case credible accident, and it showed that the maximum - concentration of radiation that RU-142 must detect is below its saturation level.
Under the worst case credible accident scenario, the conservatively calculated maximum radioactivity level that RU-142 can be expected to detect is 2.8 x 103 micro-curies per cc (Reference 5).
This unlikely accident scenario assumes that some type of initiating accident occurs (e.g.,
LOCA) concurrent with a major steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) such that all the gap activity (total noble gases and iodine) is released to the secondary side.
In addition,100% of all gap activity is assumed to be exhausted from the condenser vacuum pump and gland seal within the immediate
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vicinity of RU-142.
J The 2.8 x 103 micro-curies per cc is well within the range that monitor RU-142 is capable of detecting prior to potentially saturating at 1.3 x 104 micro-curies per cc.
Furthermore, this monitor is not required for safe plant shutdown and does not perform any safety-related function.
This monitor is required for post-accident monitoring per the requirements of NUREG-0737 and Regulatory Guide 1.97.
C)
Units 1 and 2 Operations This condition is not safety significant, so continued operation in Units 1 and 2 poses no safety hazard.
D)
Root Cause The root cause of this Deficiency is an oversight on the part of j
Kaman Engineering in not specifying the correct software changes when enhancement modifications for the Detector were done per DCP SN-SQ-030 in 1984.
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E)
Transportability This condition is not transportable to other monitors, because only RU-142, RU-144, and RU-146 use Betector Model KDGM-HR (Part No.
952397-003).
No other type of Detector has been enhanced / modified by Kaman.
II. Analysis of Safety Implications Based on the above, this condition is evaluated as ~ Not Reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR Part 21 since the existing condition, if left uncorrected, would not have constituted a significant safety condition.
III. Corrective Action Kaman will supply new software to raise the saturation level for Detector Model KDGM-HR (Part No. 952397-003) above the design basis level of 1 x 105 micro-curies per ec.
This modification will be done for Units 1,
2, and 3 to ensure that the 'sonitors will meet the required upper range. No FSAR change is required.
'Ihe modification will be tracked by EER 86-SQ-102 (Reference 6).
Work in Units 1 and 2 will be completed during, or prior to the first refueling outage for each Unit. Work in Unit 3 will be completed prior to issuance of an operating license.
References 1.
EER 86-SQ-039, February 27, 1986 2.
MIC 254021, Kaman Intter to BPC, March 24, 1986 3.
KI-GEN-86-001, Kaman Letter to NRC, February 27, 1986 4.
ANPP-00003-LEB-96.40 (ANPP Intter to Kaman, May 22, 1986) 5.
Bechtel Calculation No. 13-NC-SQ-002, Rev. 0 6.
EER 86-SQ-102, June 9, 1986 i
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