ML20207K833
| ML20207K833 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1988 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207K828 | List: |
| References | |
| FRN-53FR28286 NUDOCS 8810170049 | |
| Download: ML20207K833 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES l
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NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION sn i
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLSAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMEN? NO. 54 TO FACILITY OPERAT!!iG LICENSE f4PF-35 AliD AMENDHENT N0. 47 TO FACILITY OPERAT!!1G LICENSE NPF-52 DUKE POWER COMPAfiY, ET AL.
l CATAWBA fiUCLEAR STATION,, UNITS 1 AND 2 D_0CKET fiOS. 50-413 AND 50 414
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated July 11, 1988, Duke Puwer Company, et al. (the licensee) i l
proposed amendments to tne operating licenses for Catawba Nuclear Station, l
Units 1 and 2, which would revise Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3-10 l
"Accident Monitoring Instrunentation." The changes are to recuce the Total Number of Channels in the Table for the: (a) Auxiliary Feedwater Fluw Rate, (b) PORY Position InJicator, and (c) PORV Block Valve Positicn Indicator.
The first two changes would reduce the total nun:ber of channels from 2 to 1 for Catawba Units 1 and 2, and the third change would reduce it from 2 to 1 for Unit 1 on,y.
For Unit 2, the third change was approved in license amendtrents 46 and 39 issued on June 1,1968, for Catwabe Units 1 and 2, respectively.
2.0 MALUATI0fi The auxiliary feedwater flow rate and PORY position-indicator channels are classified as Type D variables and fall under the Category 2 definition as presented in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Pcwer Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Condi'. ions During and Following on Accident," Revision 2, December 1980.
The licensee has determined that the applicable requirements for this instrur.entation are satisfied by the single channel per steam generator and single channel per va ve arrangement l
that is proposed to be placed in the TSs.
For the auxiliary feedwater flow rate (variable D-20. RG 1.97), the licensee stated that Catawba has four QA Condition 1 auxiliary feedwater ilow transmitters, one pxr steam generator, c.onitoring flow froia all auxiliary feedwater pumps to each steem generator.
The indicated range is 0-600 gpm for a system design flow of 500 gpm. This instrumentation is powered from Class 1E busses.
Environmental qualification is described in thi. Catawba FSAR, Section 3.11 and the fiUREG 0588 submittal.
Seismic qualification is cescribed in the Cotowba FSAR, Section 3.10.
For the PORV position indicator (variable D-10, RG 1.97), the licensee stattd that the FORVs are provided with control switches on the rain control boards.
Actual volve position is provided by QA Condition 1 limit switches on the 8010170049 0010064y3 DR ADOCK O i
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- I valves to operate both Closed-Not Closed, and Open-Not Open control switch indicating lights.
These valves and their control switch indicating lights are poWured from Class IE busses. Additional indications are provided by the computer.
Environnental qualification of the limit switches is described in j
the Catawba Nuclear Station FSAR, Section 3.11 and the NUREG 0588 submittal.
Seismic qualification of the limit switches is described in the Catawba FSAR, j
Section 3.10.
Based on its review, the staff finds that the reduction in the total number of channels for Catawba Units 1 and 2 auxiliary feedwater flow rate and the PORV i
position indicator from 2 channels to 1 channel is in accordance with the recomn=ndations provideo in RG 1.97 and, therefore, is acceptable.
For the PORY l
block valve position indicator, the licensee stated in its May 26, for each 1988, submittal i
that one channel of safety related position indication is provided l
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block valve by mearis of control room indicating lights associated with the valve i
control switch.
Each block valve has a second non-safety related position indication channel which was provided in the design for maintenance 6nd test purposes but was not intenced to be used as accident monitoring instrumentation nur relied upon during an accident.
No credit was taken for this non-safety j:
indication in the design of the syste:n ur in any accident analyses.
l RG 1.97 does not include any recornmendations for PORY block valve position i
indication. There are no other requirearnts for two channels of indication per
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PORV block valve. The Catawba Final Safety Evaluation Report does not i
include a second channel for indication, l
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Based on its review, the staf f agrees with the licensee's assessment and finds t
that the reduction in the total number of channels for Catawba Unit 1 PORY I
block valve position indicators from 2 halve to 1/ valve is acceptable.
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3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
7 These amencments it volve changes to the installation or use of facility com-ponents located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendrents involve no significant increase in j
the amounts, and no sigr.ificant change in the types, or any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumuletive occupational exposure.
The NRC staff has made a determination t.% t j
the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been i
no public connent on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the j
eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
1 Pursuant to 10 CFR'51.22(b) no envirunrental impact statement or environmental j
assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
I 4.0 _ CONCLUSION The somission "ade a proposed determination that the emendments involve no significant hazards considerattun which was published in the Federal Register j
(53 FR 28286) on July 27, 1988.
The Comission consulted with the state of i
South Carolina, ho public contents were received, and the state of South j
Carolina did not have any cumments.
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, We have concluded, based on the considerations <115 cussed obove, that:
(1) there is reosunable assur6nce that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the aroposed manner, and (2) such activitits will be conducted in compliance with tae Comission's regulations, and the issuorice of these air,enon.ents will riot be iniinical to the conunun defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Ccntributor:
K. Jabbour, PDII-3/DRP-I/II Dated:
October 6, 1988 l
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