ML20207K358
| ML20207K358 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1986 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8701090398 | |
| Download: ML20207K358 (3) | |
Text
s DUKE POWER GOMPANY P.O. BOX 33180 CHARLOTTE, N.O. 28242 HAL 15. TUCKER nuenon -
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December 17, 1986
- Dr. J.' Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta St. NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370
Reference:
NRC/0IE Inspection Report 50-369/86-28, 50-370/86-28
Dear Dr. Grace:
As a result of additional review, please find attached a revised response to Violation 369, 370/86-28-01, Failure to Report, Severity Level V.
Please note that in the original response to the violation, dated December 5,1986, Duke Power denied Example 1 of the violation; Duke Power now admits the violation. Bars in the right margin indicate where changes have been made in the response.
Very truly yours, l//4
/
/
Hal B. Tucker JBD/152/jgm Attachment xc:
Mr. W.T. Orders
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NRC Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station
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- DUKE POWER COMPANY l
McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION j-REVISED RESPONSE TO VIOLATION IN INSPECTION REPORT i
50-369/86-28 AND 50-370/86-28 l
Violation 369/86-28-01 and 370/86-28-01, Severity Level V 10CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (ii), as implemented by Duke Power Company Procedure
-RP/0/A/5700/10, requires that any event or condition that results in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS), be reported to the NRC as soon as practical and, in all i
cases,'within four hours of the occurrence.
.10CFR 50.72 (b) (B) as implemented by Duke Power Company Procedure RP/0/A/5700/10 4
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' requires that any deviation from the plant's technical specifications authorized pursuant to 50.54 (x) be reported to the NRC as soon as practical and, in all cases, within one hour of the occurrence.
Contrary to the above:
1 1.
On August 27, 1986, the NRC Operations Center was not notified of a Unit 2 ESF (Auxiliary Feedwater System) actuation within the required four-hour time j
period.
2.
On September 2, 1986, the NRC Operations Center was not notified of a i
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deviation from plant technical specifications on McGuire unit I as authorized j
pursuant to 50.54 (x).
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Response
1.
Admission or denial of the alleged violation:
A.
Duke Power admits the violation occurred as stated.
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B.
Duke Power admits to a deviation from procedure but not from plant Technical Specifications and believes that the violation should be j
reworded. Duke admits the NRC should have been notified.
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2.
Reason for violation:
A.
'The initiating event was a manual reactor trip due to a loss of feedwater to S/G 2D.
Operators manually started the auxiliary feedwater
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(CA) pumps to supply the S/Gs. This was clearly the proper action to take instead of waiting for an automatic CA initiation.
I At the time of the NRC notification of the reactor trip, the shift supervisor was not aware that one 'of the CA pumps had auto started.
Prior to this incident, operators had not been instructed that a manual start of CA was considered an ESF actuation. The shift supervisor and shift engineer do not recall discussions with the NRC inspector j
concerning the reportability of the CA actuation.
Followup notification j
was made three hours and forty eight minutes following the initial notification, which was four hours and thirty eight minutes following i
the initiating event (reactor trip).
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s: B.
At the time of the September 2,1986 incident, reactor operators and supervisor's had very little time in which to decide whether or not to
-block the safety inja tion signal. LThe unit was in Mode 3 and personnel safety was foremost... heir minds at this time. No previous training had expressly forbid blocking this signal in this situation. The 50.54(x) notification requirement was not very specific in this instance.
3.
Corrective steps which have been taken and-the results achieved:
A.
A followup call was made notifying the NRC of the CA auto start.
B.
The safety valve reseated, precluding the need for safety injection.
The Superintendent of Operations met with all shift personnel to discuss the philosophy of blocking safety injection signals.
4.
Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations:
A.
In the future, unplanned manual starts of ESF equipment will be considered reportable. Changes will be made to the operator training program to include this information.
B.
The Nuclear Production Department (NPD) will generate a policy statement for all Duke Power nuclear stations concerning the blocking of safety injection signals.
5.
Date when full compliance will be achieved:
A.
Changes to the operator training program will be completed by 4/1/87.
B.
The NPD will generate a policy statement by 3/1/87.