ML20207J871
| ML20207J871 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/1986 |
| From: | Thadani A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Connecticut Light & Power Co, Northeast Nuclear Energy Co (NNECO), Western Massachusetts Electric Co |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207J874 | List: |
| References | |
| DPR-65-A-114, TAC 61560 NUDOCS 8701080629 | |
| Download: ML20207J871 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION c
D e E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20565
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l NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY THE WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-336 MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 114 License No. DPR-65 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
l A.
The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), dated September 26, 1986 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set l
forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by l
I this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
I 0701080629 061219 gDR ADOCK 05000336 PDR 1
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Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.114, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W
Ashok.'Thadani, Director PWR P oject Directorate #8 Division of PWR Licensing-B
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
December 19, 1986 l
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-i ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 114 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 DOCKET NO. 50-336 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain a vertical line indicating the area of changes.
The corresponding j
overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.
Remove Page Insert Page 3/4 9-3 3/4 9-3 3/4 9-3a 3/4 9-3b B 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-1 4
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REFUELING OPERATIONS DECAY TIME
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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.3.1 The reactor shall be subcritical for a minimum of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel, e
APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.
ACTION:
With the reactor subcritical for less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure ves.sel.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.3.1 The reactor shall be detenmined to have been subcritical' for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> by verification of the date and time of subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel.
1 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-3 Amendment No.114
REFUELING OPERATIONS DECAY TIME LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.3.2 At least two trains of the spent fuel pool cooling system shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
tiODES 5 and 6 with the most recent 1/3 core offload
- decayed less than 504 hours0.00583 days <br />0.14 hours <br />8.333333e-4 weeks <br />1.91772e-4 months <br /> from subcriticality. This specification is not applicable if Shutdown Cooling is being used to cool the spent fuel pool.
ACTION:
With the above conditions not satisfied:
a.
Immediately initiate actions to restore both trains of spent fuel pool cooling, and b.
Within one hour, suspend all fuel movement in the spent fuel pool, and c.
Within one hour, isolate the spent fuel pool cleanup demineralizers.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.3.2 Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to fuel movement into the spent fuel pool, and every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> thereafter while this specification is applicable, verify that two trains of the spent fuel cooling system are OPERABLE.
- For the purposes of this specification, the most recent 1/3 core offload is defined as the fuel bundles discharged at the end of the most recent fuel cycle. This specification does not apply to partial mid-cycle discharges resulting from defective or damaged fuel if the total decay heat load on the spent fuel pool cooling system resulting from such a discharge is less than the total decay heat load of the spent fuel pool at 504 hours0.00583 days <br />0.14 hours <br />8.333333e-4 weeks <br />1.91772e-4 months <br /> after sub-criticality of the most recent 1/3 core offload.
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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-3a Anendment No.114
REFUELING OPERATIONS DECAY TIME "k
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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION s,
3.9.3.3 The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 5 or 6 until the most recent 1/3 core offload
- in the spent fuel pool has decayed for greater than 504 hours0.00583 days <br />0.14 hours <br />8.333333e-4 weeks <br />1.91772e-4 months <br /> from subcriticality.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6 with the most recent 1/3 core offload
- decayed less than 504 hours0.00583 days <br />0.14 hours <br />8.333333e-4 weeks <br />1.91772e-4 months <br /> from subcriticality.
l ACTION:
With the above conditions not satisfied, immediately initiate actions to i
restore the reactor to MODE 5 or 6.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREf1ENTS 4.9.3.3 Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to entry into MODE 4, verify that the most recent 1/3 core offload
- has decayed for greater than 504 hours0.00583 days <br />0.14 hours <br />8.333333e-4 weeks <br />1.91772e-4 months <br /> from sub-criticality.
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- For the purposes of this specification, the most recent 1/3 core offload is defined as the fuel bundles discharged at the end of the most recent fuel cycle. This specification does not apply to partial mid-cycle discharges resulting from defective or damaged fuel if the total decay 4
.. beat load on the spent fuel pool cooling system resulting from such a discharge is less than the total decay heat load of the spent fuel pool at 504 hours0.00583 days <br />0.14 hours <br />8.333333e-4 weeks <br />1.91772e-4 months <br /> after subcriticality of the most recent 1/3 core offload.
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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-3b Amendment No.114
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t REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS
,3 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.4 The contaimnent penetrations shall be in the following status:
a.
The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts or the outage equipment door is installed, I
b.
A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, and c.
Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:
1.
Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, manual valve, or special device, or 2.
Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge valve.
APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movemeht of irradiated fuel within the contaimnent.
ACTION:
With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.4 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be either in its isolated condition or capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment - purge valve within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to the start of and at least once per 31 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment by:
a.
Verifying the penetrations are in their isolated condition, or b.
Testing the containment purge valves per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.3.1.2.
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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-4 AmendmentNo.$@,gg,98
3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 1
3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that:
- 1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the beren dilution incident in the accident analyses.
3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.
3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radio-active decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
The requirement for two trains of spent fuel pool cooling to be OPEPABLE for 504 hours0.00583 days <br />0.14 hours <br />8.333333e-4 weeks <br />1.91772e-4 months <br /> after subcriticality for the most recently discharged 1/3 core ensures that high water temperature will not degrade resin in the spent fuel pool demineralizers and that the temperature and humidity above the pool are compatible with personnel comfort and safety requirements. The shutdown cooling (SDC) system is a high capacity system.
One train of the SDC is sufficient to cool both the core and the spent fuel pool should a failure occur in the spent fuel pool cooling system.
The requirement for the reactor to remain in MODE 5 or 6 until the most recent 1/3 core offload has decayed 504 hours0.00583 days <br />0.14 hours <br />8.333333e-4 weeks <br />1.91772e-4 months <br /> ensures that alternate cooling is available during this time to cool the spent fuel pool should a failure occur in one train of the spent fuel pool cooling system.
3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.
3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during fuel or CEA movement within the reactor pressure vessel.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. 72, 114 -
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REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.6 CRANE OPERABILITY - CONTAINMENT BUILDING The OPERABILITY requirements of the cranes used for movement of fuel 4
assemblies ensures that: 1) each crane has sufficient load capacity to lift a fuel element, and 2) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.
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3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING
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The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a 4
fuel assembly and CEA over irradiated fuel assemblies ensures that no more than the contents of one fuel assembly will be ruptured in the event of a fuel hand-i-
ling accident. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed i
in the accident analyses.
3/4.9.8 SHUTDOWN COOLING AND COOLANT CIRCULATION j
The requirement that at least one shutdown cooling loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat 1
and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140*F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution incident i
and prevent boron stratification.
The requirement to have two shutdown cooling loops OPERABLE when the refuel pool is unavailable as a heat sink ensures that a single failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop will not result in a complete loss of decay heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel water level at or above the vessel flange, the reactor vessel pit seal installed, and a combined available volume of water j
in the refueling pool and refueling water storage tank in excess of 370,000 gallons, a large heat sink is readily available for core cooling. Adequate I
time is thus available to initiate emergency procedures to provide core cooling in the event of a failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop.
3/4.9.9 and 3/4.9.10 CONTAINMENT RADIATION MONITORING AND CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION SYSTEM l
The OPERABILITY of these systems ensures that the containment purge valves will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within j
the containment. The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to restrict the l
release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.
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3/4.9.11 and 3/4.9.12 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE POOL WATER LEVEL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth i
is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10%. iodine gap activity released from l
the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-2 Amendment No. H, 71 m
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