ML20207J442

Recommends That Commission Approve Notice of Final Rulemaking 10CFR 73, Safeguards Requirements for Fuel Facilities Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Snm

ML20207J442
Person / Time
Issue date:	09/06/1988
From:	Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
References
TASK-RIA, TASK-SE SECY-88-250, NUDOCS 8809150293
Download: ML20207J442 (100)

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September 6, 1988 SECY-88-250 (Affirmation)

For,: The Commissioners From: Victor Stello, Jr.

j Executive Director for Operations t

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Subject:

10 CFR PART 73 -- SAFEGUAR05 REQUIREMENTS FOR FUEL FACILITIES POSSESSING FORMULA QUANTITIES OF STRATEGIC SPECIAL NUCLEAR i MATERIAL

Purpose:

To obtain Commission approval of a notice of final rulemaking.

l Issue: Should the safeguards requirements set forth in Enclosure A be imposed at NRC-licensed fuel facilities possessing formula quant- l I ities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) to achieve

, fully adequate and essentially equivalent protection of SSNM

! between licensed and license exempt sectors?

Background:

The national goal of maintaining fully adequate and essentially equivalent safeguards systems for weapons-usable material in the licensed and license exempt sectors was first expressed in 1974.

The objective of providing like protection for SSNM was iterated in a number of National Security Council, Energy Research and Development Administration (now 00E), Department of Defense, and NRC communications. As a result, the NRC and 00E jointly con-ducted coordination reviews of safeguards requirements. Full details concerning the background of these reviews were provided to the Commission in SECY-84-337 dated August 23, 1984.

In SECY's memorandum of December 7, 1987, the Commission approved for publication proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 upgrading safeguards requirements for licensed fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM. The proposed rule was published December 31, 1987, in the Federal Register (52 FR 4941"). It was

Contact:

/.. Jamgochian, NP15 492-0360

5. Frattali, RES 492-3773 (3 [l,d- Dh -

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. The Commissioners 2 consistent with the Commission guidance provided in SECY's memo-randum to the EDO of June 8, 1987, entitled "NRC/00E Comparability Review of Findings of Safeguards Programs at Fuel Facilities" '

(CNSI).

) Upgrades were proposed in the following areas: (1) security  ;

system performance evaluation through tactical response exer-i cises, (2) night firing qualification for guards using ali ,

assigned weapons, (3) search of 100 percent of entering personnel and packages (for explosives, firearms, and incendiary devices),

(4) posting of armed guards at material access area (HAA) control points, (5) providing two separate physical personnel barriers ,

around the protected area, and (6) revision of the design basis threat at these fuel facilities to include land vehicles as a ,

i means of transportation by adversaries attempting to commit theft l

and the provision of countermeasures to prevent forcible vehicle ,

entry into the protected area. j Discussion: Letters of con:nent in response to the proposed rule were received S from six respondents: four from fuel facility licensees, one  ;

from the Department of Energy, and one from a manufacturer of

, fences who submitted specifications on a type of security fence >

i but did not provide any actual comments on the rule itself.

Public comments that did not result in changes to the proposed '

j

" rule are summarized and discussed in Enclosure A rather than in t this paper. A comparative text of the current regulations with this final rule is provided as Enclosure B.

1 Tactical Response Exercises: As a result of the comments, the i

staf f is recommending one substantive modification to the pro-i posed rule. The proposed rule would have required licensees to l

conduct a total of 13 tactical response exercises each year, that '

i would include three tactical response exercises per quarter (one l l for each eight-hour shift) plus one annual NRC-observed exercise.

i I

Half of the quarterly exercises and the annual NRC-observed exer- ,

cise would have included force on-force scenarios. The exercises a

would demonstrate the guard force state of readiness and test the effectiveness of the overall security system components. The i

1. . results would be used to determine whether additional training or i security system improvements are needed. '

i >

3 In consideration of the public comments received, the staff ,

, accepts that 13 exercises during the year may become less effec-tive over time due to their frequent repetition and reduced

]  !

i learning curves. Therefore, the staff recompends a reduction in '

i the number of required exercises. During the first year of licensee compliance with this rule, liceasees would be required i to hold one exercise per quarter per shift, half of which are to (

l be force-on-force. The NRC will observe one of the quarterly '

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The Commissioners 3 force-on-force exercises rather than require an additional annual exercise. The second year and thereafter, licensees would be required to hold one exercise per shift every four months, one-third of which will be force-on-force, with the NRC observing one of the force-on-force exercises, for a total of nine exercises per year. Licensees are to notify the NRC 60 days prior to the NRC-observed exercise.

The Comission explicitly requested solicitation of public-comment on the requirement for equipping Tactical Response Team (TRT) members with 9mm semiautomatic pistols or whether an equivalent weapon of choice should be left up to the licensee.

Only one comment (from a licensee) was received. It requested that the choice of weapon and weapon caliber should be left up to the individual licensee. The licensee believes that the NRC preference for Se 9mm semiautomatic pistol, as noted in the proposed rule, is based on the faulty conclusion that greater firepower (e.g., increased availability of rounds) equates with an enhanced ability to hit the target, and that the 9mm's larger magazine (up to 15 rounds) and more rapid action allows for faster discharge of rounds and therefore, also increases the hit probability. The licensee also. believes that other types of l

service revolvtrs can be equally justified and that after an  ;

in-depth evaluation of weapons and ammunition currently avail- l able, each licensee can determine which best meet the require- '

ments for its facility.

j The staff's rationale never included the conclusion that hit probability is increased by ose of the 9mm semiautomatic handgun.

I Increased hit probability is a result of the shooter's profi-l

' ciency achieved through proper training and practice. The staff's rationale for the requirement is based on the advantages of the weapon. The 9mm has less recoil than the .45 caliber, thus making it easier to control. Since it is easier to control, it may allow for increased accuracy. Further, in light of the growing trend among the criminal element worldwide toward the adoption of sophisticated automatic and semiautomatic weaponry, the 9mm provides added firepower which is considered necessary to counter the current threat while maintaining the necessary high degree of reliability and accuracy. Additionally, the semiauto-matic pistol is also much easier to load in the dark, in cold weather, or when under duress. In the event of an attack on a l facility by adversaries armed with somiautomatic weapons, TRT members equipped with standard six-round revolvers would need to reload ammunition long before the adversaries would. During reload, TRT responders could be exposed to deadly fire without defense. For these several reasons, the final rule retains the requirement that all TRT members be equipped with 9mm semiauto-matic pistols, with qualification and annual requalification in both day and night firing courses. The choice of model and manu-facturer is to be left up to the licensee.

i

The Commissioners 4 Under the proposed rule. the perimeter of the protected area of a fuel f.acility possesting formula quantities of SSNM would be required to have a dcable physical personnel barrier. The two barriers would be constructed and installed to ensure the ability i to assess an attempted penetration of the protected area perim-eter at the time of the occurrence and to delay attempts at

, unauthorized exit from the protected area. The present intrusion 1 detection systems required by NRC would be placed between these two barriers. The Commission explicitly requested the staff to solicit public comments on the security benefits of the second fence and solicit suggestions for cost-effective alternatives to the second fence that would protect SSNM at a level at least com-parable to the level of protection at DOE facilities. While awaiting public comments, the staff was directed to analyze and report to the Commission, as part of the final rulemaking pack-age, on the security benefits of a second fence and alternatives

~

to the second fence that might achieve at least comparable pro-tection at a cost of $1 million or less. i In the sole letter of comment regarding this proposed double barrier requirement, DOE recommended that the proposed changes be deferred until completion of a performance analysis of the exist-4 ing security system and the need for change has been determined, j' DOE pointed out that only very limited adversary delay time is provided by a perimeter fence, and the potential of a second perimeter barrier is realized only if designed to enhance assess-ment. Relative to the intrusion detection system, 00E proposed l revising the requirement to call for optimum use of the present ,

system and to leave the systems in their current locations until '

an evaluation of the usefulness of the present system through a  !

performance exercise is made.

1 i

The NRC recognizes th t 00E has not established a generic  !

4 requirement for two perimeter fences. However, all 00E facil- '

ities reviewed by the NRC/00E Comparability Review Group do have 1 double perimeter barriers. The NRC believes that the performance i standards achieved at these 00E facilities, which are met in part  :

by double fences, should be provided at comparable NRC-licensed I

! facilities.

} l The staff analysis on alternatives to the second fence and related

cost estimates are set forth in Enclosure C. The alternatives considered include (1) special measures for vault and work area i

protection, (2) use of additional guards, and (3) use of alterna- ,

tive barrier materials. The analysis concludes that the standard j 8-foot fence is the most cost-effective alternative.

Recommendations: That the Commission:

4 i 1. Approve the amendments set forth in Enclosure A for i publication in final form in the Federal Register, j i  :

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. I The Commissioners 5 3

2. Certify, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), that this  :

rule, if promulgated, will not have a significant economic l impact on a substantial number of small entities.

3. Note:

a. That the Environmental Assessment shows that the action proposed will not have a significant environmental impact (Enclosure 0).

t

b. That the Environmental Assessment (Enclosure D) and Regulatory Analysis (Enclosure E) will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

c. That the information collection requirements in this final rule have been approved by_the Office of Manage- ,

ment and Budget under approval number 3150-0002. ,

d. That the appropriate Congressional Committees will be ,

informed of the Commission's action (Enclosure F).

e. That a public announcement will be issued (Enclosure G). l l

f. That copies of the notice will be distributed by ARM l to affected licensees and other interested parties. j g.. That the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration will be informed of the certifi-cation and the reason for it as required by the Regula-tory Flexibility Act.

h. That the Office of the General Counsel has no legal objections.

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' The Commissioners 6 '

Schedulina: It is recommended that this paper be considered at an open session ,

and that this paper be placed in the Public Document Room on the '

day of i.he Commission meeting. Certain portions of the session may have to be closed.

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b,etor Stello! Jr. /

l Executive Directo_n.Jor' Operations ]

Enclosures-  !

4 A - Federal Register Notice of  !

Final Rulemaking B - Comparative Text

C - Analysis of Alternatives to -

a Second Fence 0 - Environmental Assessment

E - Regulatory Analysis i F - Draft Congressional Letter i G - Draft Public Announcement -

Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly J

to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Wednesday, September 21, 1988.

l' Commission Staff Of fice cormnents, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT Wednesday, September 14, 1988, with an  ;

information copy to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised c1 when comments may be expected.

i

, This paper is tentatively scheduled Zor affirmation at an Open Meeting during the Week of September 26, 1988. Please i

) refer to the appropriate Weekly Commission Schedule, when published, for a specific date and time. i DISTRIBUTION:

)j Commissioners i OGC OI OIA GPA l REGIONAL OFFICES l EDO -

I ACRS ASLBP l- ASLAP SECY l

L EtlCLOSURE A Federal Register Notice of Final Rulemaking 6

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR PART 73 Safeguards Requirements for Fuel Facilities Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its physical protection and security personnel performance regulations and its design basis threat for fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) to require protection equivalent to that in place at comparable Department of Energy (00E) fuel facilities. These changes have been prompted by a recent study that compared NRC's security requirements for SSNH with DOE's recently up-graded security system. The changes are also supported by findings from reviews of safeguards event reports, Regulatory Ef fectiveness Reviews, and inspection reports. The amendments provide greater assur-ance that physical protection measures at these fuel facilities can protect against theft. 1 EFFECTIVE DATE: Thirty days after publication in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Sandra Frattali, Division of Regulatory Applications, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone 1 Enclosure A

[7590-01] ,- ,'

(.101)492-3773; ur Kristina Z. Jamgochian, Division of Safeguards and Transportation, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301)492-0360.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

! In 1974, a national goal was established that nuclear weapons-usable material, whether in the licensed or license-exempt sector, should

! receive fully adequate end essentially comparable levels of protection.

l The objective of providing comparable protection for SSNM has been reiterated in a number of subsequent communications by the National 1

Security Council. Energy Research and Development Administration (now

! 00E), Department of Defense, and NRC. In consonance with this objective, t

{ reyiews have been conducted periodically by joint NRC/00E review teams.

j The findings from the most recent review (1986) indicated that'00E has placed increased emphasis on guard weaponry, training, and tactical response exercises and has upgraded some physical security measures. To maintain comparability with 00E as well as to respond to recent NRC security reviews, the NRC is amending its physical protection regulations for licensed fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of $$NH.

These amendments will provide greater assurance that security systems and security force apabilities at these facilities are comparable to those used by 00E. A remaining comparability issue relates to the use of deadly force by licensee guards. This issue is being addressed sepa-rately and is not covered by these amendments.

2 Enclosure A

[7590-01, On December 31,19u7, the NRC published in the Federal Register (52 FR 49418) e proposed rule for upgrading safeguards requirements for licensed fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM. The upgrades called for: (1) security system performance evaluation through tactic.al respcase exercises, (2) night firing qualification for guards using all assigned weapons, (3) search of 100 percent of entering per-sonnel and packages (for explosives, fircarms, and incendiary devices),

(4) posting of armed guards at MAA control points, (5) providing two separate physical personnel barriers a,ound the protected area, and (6) revision of the design basis threat at these fuel facilities +o inc;ude land vehicle use by adversaries attempting to commit theft and require the implementation of countermeasures to prevent forcible vehicle entry into the protected area. The comment period ended on March 30, 1988.

Summary of Public Comment I.etters cf comment were received from six respondents: four from fuel facility licensees, one from 00E, and one from a manufacturer of fences who submitted specifications on a type of security fence but did not comment on the rule itself. Copies of comment letters are available for public inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Roum at 1717 H Street NW. Washington, DC.

A summary of the public comments and their resolution follows. The comments are organized in the following categories:

1. Performance Evaluation Through Tactical Response Exercises and Tactical Response Teams (TRT)

2. Guard Force Weaponry 3 Enclosure A

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[7590-01] ,

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'3. Personnel, Package, and Material Entrance Search i

4. Protected Area Physical Barriers l

1. Performanen Evaluation Through Tactical Response Exercises and l

Tactical Response Teams  !

Under the proposed rule, affected licensees would conduct tactical  !

response exercises for each guard force shift on a quarterly basis. The l I

i exercises would demonstrate the guard force state of readiness and test' -

the effectiveness of delay mechanisms, alarm and communication systems, response times, deployment of response forces, firing skills (simulated),

ll f I and tactical maneuvers. The results would be used to determine whether I  ;

additional training or security system improvements are needed. The

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exercises are not intended to be viewed in terms of "pass" or "fail."

l The quarterly exercises could be of short duration, would have at least

! k one exercise per guard shift, and would cumulativcly represent the t

various lighting conditions during a 24-hour day. Each year, at least  !

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! two of the quarterly exercises for each shift would include force-on- t force scenarios. Also proposed was an additional, more extensive annual  ;

exercise to be ot, served by NRC representatives that would include force-  !

l on-force scenarios, i r

One letter of comment stated that quarterly exercises are more  !

frequent than necessary and requested a reduction in the number of exer-

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f cises to one per shift every four months. Another respondent requested f j that the NRC observe one of the quarterly force-on-force exercises rather i  !

l than have the licensee conduct a special annual exercis,e. A third (

f respondent requested clarification of the number of exercises and how 4

l much prior notice the NRC needed before the NRC-observed annual exercise. }

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4 Enclosure A

, , (7590-01] [

The NRC staff accepts that a routine of 13 exercises per year, seven l of which are force-on-force (based on a three-shift operation, one exer-cise per shift per quarter, plus one annual exercise) can, over time, become less effective due to their freque.*it repetition and reduced '

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1

learning curve. Therefore, this final rule is being modified to require '

i a licensee, during the first year of rule implementation, to conduct a-

total of 12 exercises (one exercise per quarter per shift), half of *hich f are to be force on-force. The NRC will observe one of the quarterly force-on-force exercises and will not require an additional annual ,

1 exercise. This reduces the number of exercises during the first year of i compliance to 12 for a three-thift operation. During the second year and i

each year thereafter, licensees will be required to conduct nine exer- I cises per year (one exercise per shift every four months), one-third of

which will be force-on-force, with the NRC observing one of the force- '

l on-foret exercises. The NRC is to be notified 60 days prior.to an I i  ;

j NRC-observed, force-on-force exercise so that possible scheduling con- l i

flicts can be resolved.  !

I i j This final rule requires licensees to establish a designated TRT l and replaces the current general requirement for an armed response force.

Creation of TRTs is expected to provide Fore highly motivated, profes-l sional, and effective organizations to respond to and prevent forceful 1 L attempts to remove SSNM frc:a licensee sites. This rule also requires j that TRT members have individually assigned, upgraded weaponry and an j item of uniform distinctive and different from that of the guard force l

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(e.g., cap, armband,etc.).

One licensee objected to the NRC replacing the term "armed response l personnel" with "Tactical Response Team." This licensee believed that i -

i 5 Enclusure A I

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[7590-01]. .

it should not be restricted in selection of a title, since the title /

designation of its tesponse force is changed periodically for security purposes. The NRC does not object to a licensee using different code names or changing code names for its TRT. When amending the security plan, however, a licensee shall use the term "Tactical Response Team."

This licer..Je also objected to the proposed requirement that TRT members have a distinctive item of uniform It was the licensee's l

J experience that fostering a spirit of slitism among a small group of  ;

i.idividuals within the security force often only serves to create a I

schism and affects morale unfavorably. The NRC accepts that the estab-lishment of the TRT could have unfavorable effects on the morale of some personnel as foreseen by the licensee. However, these negative factors, if indeed they develop, are far less important than the need for a nighly effective response capability. Moreover, an elite group within the gdard force need not to be viewed negatively by the remaining guard force if '

presented properly. All members of a security force could be eligible to qualify as TRT members (as opposed to being singled out by the licensee).

Ideally, if all members of the security force qualify as LRT members, they can be rotated through the schedule on an equal basis, thereby alleviating the concern of creating a separate elitist group and making shift scheduling easier.

The licensee was al'3 concerned that a distinctive item of uniform could single out TRT members to an adversary. The NRC accepts this as a valid concern. However, the distinctive item could be small, such as a pin or badge, and not noticeable at a distance.

Under the proposed amendment, TRT members and guards who are eligible to be TRT members would have to successfully complete training in respon e 6 Enclosure A

. . [7590-01]

tactics. The training would be in addition to the individual training currentiv required in Appendix B to Part 73. No specific criteria or standards for the training in response tactics were provided with the proposed rule. A li o nsee respondent suggested that the NRC should establish minimum standards but that the standards or criteria should be adaptable to site-specific situations.

The NRC agr m with this suggestion. A Tactical Training Manual has been developed for licensee use. The material can be adapted and ,

used under a varlety of conditions and circumstances. The manual pro-vides viable approaches for licensees to use in structuring' site-specific tactical r sponse training programs, i

2. Guard Force Weaponry Under the proposed rule, all TRT members would be armed with 9mm semiautomatic pistols. Many major city law enforcement agencies, SWAT teams, and the U.S. military are shifting from revolvers to semiautomatic pistols in order to take advantage of sustained fire capability. These police upgrades respond to increased encounters with adversaries using more sophisticated weapons. After conducting a literature review and j discussing with various agencies their rationale for converting from i

revolvers to semiautomatic pistols, the NRC included in the proposed [

amendments a requirement for TRT members only (not other security force  !

i personnel) to be armed with 9mm semiautomatic pistols.

i The Commission explicitly solicited public comment on the require-  !

ment for equipping TRT. members with semiautomatic pistols and on whether '

the final choice of weapons should be left to the licensee. Only one ,

response (from a licensee) was received. It stated that the choice of l 1

7 Enclosure A l i

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[7590-01] , ,

l weapon and caliber of weapon should be left to the individual licensee.

This licensee believes that the NRC is justifying the requirement for a 9mm semiautomatic pistol on the faulty conclusions (1) that greater firepower (increased availability of rounds) equates with an enhanced 1

ability to hit the target, and (2) that he 9mm's larger magazine (up to 15 rounds) and more rapid action allows for faster discharge of rounds and increased hit probability. The licensee also stated that certain types of revolvers could be equally justified and that after an in-depth  !

evaluation of weapons and ammunition currently available, each licensee could best determine which meet the requiremants of the site.

The NRC's rationale for the requirement is based on the advantages of the weapon. The 9mm has less recoil than revolvers currently used, making it easier to control, and thereby allowing increased accuracy. In light of the growing worldwide trend among the criminal element toward the adoption of sophisticated automatic and semiautomatic weaponry, the 9mm provides added firepower considered necessary while maintaining the necessary high degree of reliability and accuracy. Additionally, the semiautomatic pistol is easier to load in the dark, in the cold, or when one is under stress. In the event adversaries armed with semiautomatic weapons attack a facility where TRT members are equipped with standard six-round revolvers, the TRT responders would need to reload ammunition long before the opponents would. During reloading, TRT responders could be exposed to deadly fire without defense. The ability to sustain fire is of major importance. This final rule requires that all TRT members be equipped with 9mm semiautomatic pistols, with qualificat'.on and annual requalification in both day and night firing courses. The choice of model and manufacturer is lef t to the licensee.

8 Enclosure A

, , [7590-01]

l l

The proposed rule required each TRT member be armed with a shoulder fired weapon, and at least one TRT member carry a .30 caliber or 7.62mm l l

rifle. The requirement for a heavier rifle would provide additional effectiveness against the use of land vehicles, which is now included in the design basis threat.

Letters of comment on this issue were received from two licensees.

One licensee did not agree with the large caliber weapon requirement and recommended that this option be left up to the licensee. The licensee asserted that a rifle of .30 caliber or 7.62mm will not imediately stop a vehicle and if that was NRC's intent, then nothing less than a

.50 caliber heavy machine gun would be needed. A second licensee requested an exemption from this requirement due to the configuration and limited size of its facility. This licensee was cor4cerned about various problems due to the proximity of high population areas and public reac-tion and, therefore, believed it unnecessary and dangerous to arm TRT members with large caliber rifles.

The aquirement that one TRT member carry a rifle of at least

.30 caliber or 7.62m is retained in the final rulemaking. The Commission believes that additional capability should be available to defend against adversaries in a vehicle attempting to penetra*e a protected area boundary.

The intent of this requirement is not to stop the vehicle immediately, but to disable adversaries inside the vehicle. Any site-specific consid-erations that licensees may have once this final rulemaking is effective should be dealt with on an individual basis through appropriate procedures.

Under the prnposed rule .TRT members on duty would be required to carry their individually assigned shotgun or semiautomatic, rifle, with one member carrying the .30 caliber or 7.62mm weapon. Two licensee 9 Enclosure A

[7590-01), ,'

respondents believed that the weapons need not be carried but should be readily availaole i.e. , kept at strategic locations throughout the facility. Both respondents noted that there were times when carrying shoulder fired weapons was not pract? cal and were concerned about the safety hazard invol"ed should the wtapon hava to be laid down (i.e.,

lunch,restrooms). Additional concerns weri that the weapons may be l l

functionally abused during the TRT members normal activities of climbing l ladders and maneuvering through close areas, or contaminated should the weapon have to be laid down while performing searches in material access areas.

The requirement for TRT members to carry their assigned shoulder fired weapons while on duty is included in this final rt;1a. The require-ment "to carry" is not to be interpreted to mean "hand carry" but to be on the person as in a shoulder sling. The normal duties of a TRT member I should. permit immediate response and, therefore, should not include routine searches at material access areas. Likewise, while on lunch break, a TRT member should be relieved by another TRT qualified security officer in order to avoid the need to lay the weapon down. The main rationale for TRT members to carry their assigned weapons is to permit l

immediate response, In the event of an adversary attack the time delay l

l caused by retrieving weapons from strategically located repositories could have an adverse inpact on the successful containment of the adversaries.

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3. Personnel, Package, and Material E1 trance Search Under the proposed amendments, search for explosives, firedras, and incendiary devices would be required of 100 percent of entering personnel 10 Enclosure A A _ _

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] and packages except for Federal, State, and local law enforcement per-  ;

sonnel on official duty. Also, under the proposed amendments, present exemptions would continue for those delivery and inspection activities r

specifically designated by the licensee and approved by the Commission-t

to be carried out within material access, vital, or protected areas for l r

i reasons of safety, security, or operational necessity.  !

3 One licensee respondent recommended that "Q" cleared armed security '

a l officers should be included in the exemption based on the fact that it j

could see no benefit in performing a prohibited article search on a '

security officer overtly carrying a weapon. In response, it is pointed .

2 out that of concern to the NRC is th-t issue of an insider attempting to l introduce not only firearms, but also explosives and incendiary devices j i  :

i inside a protected area. Under this criterion, although a security l l officer displays an authorized ha.vigun, searching the officer for explo-  !

i sives, incendiary devices, and unauthorized weapons is still necessary 1

before the officer enters a protected area. Accordingly, the proposed I i

search requirement is retained unchanged in the final rule. j

4. Protected Area Physical Barriers

! Under the proposed rule, the perimeter of the protected area of a .

j fuel facility possessing formula quantities of SSNM would be required to j have a double physical personnel barrier. The two barriers would be-s i

constructed and installed primarily to ensure the ability to assess an I l  !

j attempted penetration of the protected area perimeter at the time of the  !

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1 occurrence and secondarily to delay attempts at unauthorized exit from i i '

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[7590-01] . .

the protected area. The present intrusion detection systems required by NRC would be located between these two barriers.

In the sole letter of comment regarding the proposed requirement.

00E recommended that the proposed changes be deferred until a performance analysis of the existing secority system has been completed and the need for change has been determined. In its detailed comments, DOE stated that two perimeter fences are not a DOE requirement and that double fences, where they have been installed, are installed on the basis of the i

overall performance of all security systems at these sites. DOE pointed out that only very limited adversary delay time is provided by a perim-eter fence, and the potential of a second perimeter barrier is realized only if designed to enhance assessment. Relative to the intrusion detec-4 tion system, 00E proposed revising the requirement to call for optimum i

use of the present systems and leaving the systems in their current loca-tions until an evaluation of the usefulness of these present systems through a perfcrmance exercice is made.

The NRC recognizes that DOE his not established a generic require-ment for two perimeter fences. However, all DOE facilities reviewed by the NRC/00E Comparability Review Group do have double perimeter barriers.

The NRC believes that the performance standards achieved at these DOE facilities, which are met in part by double fences, should be provided j at comparable NRC-licensed facilities.

In guidance to affected licensees NRC makes clear that the intrusion I detection system and the inner barrier are to be positioned and con-structed to assure adequate delay after an intruder triggers an alarm.

The delay must be sufficient to permit a defender to determine positively whether the trigg2 ring was due to an intruder. The interrelationship of j

Enclosure A 12 t

, _ _ _ _ , ,_.____.y- .__._

. . (7590-01) the perimeter intrusion detection system and the double barriers is so close that it is essential to treat improvements to them simultaneously.

Therefore, it is necessary for the overall performance of the protection system that the double barrier system and intrusion detection system locations (and possible reinstallation) be designed in concert. For these reasons, the barrier requirement is retained in the final rule.

Other Changes: Weapons Qualification These amendments require night firing qualification and annual requalification by the security force and TRT members with all weapons assigned to them. This revises the current requirement for night familiarization firing only. Specified courses (included in Appendix H) for qualification and annual requalification with revolvers, shotguns, and rifles are added as requirements in this final rulemaking. Licensees i

may develop and submit for NRC approval a qualification course for day '

firing for 9mm semiautouatic pistols which TRT members must now carry.

Additionally, licensees may also substitute shoulder firing for hip fir-ing for the day shotgun qualification course contained in >?oendix B to Part 73 and reflect this change in their amended security plan. Licen-sees are required to retain the documentation of each qualification and requalification as a record Ytr three years af ter each qualification and requalification. Microfilm documents are acceptable.

Implementat ton Currently, under conditions of license, licensees carry out certain of the measures ca.lled for in the amendments, namely: (1) search of 100 percent of personnel and packages admitted to the protected area, 13 Enciosure A

l f7590-01] , , j 4 l (2) posting of armed guards at MAA control points, and (3) night firing i

j qualification for guards using all assigned weapons. Under the new  !

i amendments, each licensee will modify its physical security plan to show I 2

how all of tne new requirements would be carried out and will submit the  ;

plan to the NRC for approval within 180 days after the effectivt date of f

these amcndments. The license conditions listed earlier will be with--  !

drawn at the time that the corresponding comitments in the approved plan become effective. The licensee will carry out the various additional new t

comitments not already implemented by license conditions in the approved I plan comencing at various dates, ranging from 30 to 365 days after NRC f

i approval of the plan.  :

i l l l

! Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact l i ,

i  !

l The Comission has determined under the National Environmental- l i

Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Comission's regulations in Sub-  !

a ,

j part A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not be a f

major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human i

i l environment and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not  ;

4 l

required. These amendments affect neither the safety of operation nor i the routine release of, or exposure to, radioactivity from fuel facilities i

1

p)ssessing formula quantities of SSNH. Their only intent is to provide [

greater protection against the revised design basis threat and thus reduce the risks of theft of SSNM from these facilities. Of the six i l measures proposed, three have no identifiable environmental impact; i t

t l namely,, initiation of security system performance evaluations through l l ,

tactical team exercises, night firing qualification of guards using 'all i l 14 Enclosure A i I t

__ ._- _ . _ . _ _ _ - - _ - . - - _ _ _ , _. _..._ -__ _ _ - _-._-._L__ _ _ _ - _ - _ .

[7590-01]

assigned weapons, and posting of armed guards at MAA control points. The 100 percent search of entering personnel and packages would require installation of additional walk-through detection equipment which likely would require construction activities to expand or modify the existing building in which this equipment is located. The requirement regarding protected area personnel barriers would necessitate construction, on the licensee's property, of a second barrier. Finally, the installation of structures to prevent forcible vehicle entry would likely require the deployment of vehicle barriers which would be installed on the licensee's property at or near the protected area boundary at points accessible to vehicles. These construction activities at four current licensee sites and at any sites of future fuel facility licensees who require possession of formula quantities of SSPCI are considered to have a minor impact on the environment and support a finding that the final rule involves no significant environmental impact. The environmental assessment and find-ing of no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the f4RC Public Document Room,1717 H Street tN., Washington, DC 20555. Single copies of the environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact are available from Dr. Sandra D.

Frattali, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301)492-3773.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This rule amends information collection requirements that are subject

)

to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These 15 Enclosure A

[7590-01) , ,

i requirements were approved by tN Of fice of Manageirent and Budget under approval number 3150-0002.

Public reporting burden for this coilection of information is esti-mated to average 2.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> per response, including the time for reviewing Instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining l the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of informa-  !

tion. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect  ;

of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,

]

l DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch; and to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget.

Washington, DC 20503, j

Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this rule. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered

. by the Commission. The analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC 20555. Single

copies of the analysis may be obtained from Dr. Sandra 0. Frattali, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Researen, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, I

i Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301)492-3773.

! Regulatory Flexibility Certification f i

As required by the Regelatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.  !

605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this rule does not have a l i

16 Enclosure A  !

, , (7590-01]

significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities.

The rule affects four licensees who operate fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM under 10 CFR Parts 70 and 73. They are GA Technologies Inc., La Jolla, California; Nuclear Fuel Services, Erwin, Tennessee; Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia; and United Nuclear Corporation, Uncasville, Connecticut. The companies that own these ,

i plants are dominant in their service areas and do not fall within the scope of the definition of small entities set forth in S 605(b) of the

~

Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 or within the definition of Small j Business size standards set out in regulations issued by the Small l Business Administration at 13 CFR Part 121. I

Backfit Analysis 4

i The NRC has determined that the backfit r~le, 10 CFR 50.109, does not apply to this final rule and, therefore, a backfit analysis is not required since these amendments do not involve any provisions which would l impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1).

j) List of Subjects in 10 CFR Parts 2, 70, and 73 1

' 1 l

i Part 2 - Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Byproduct '

1 material, Classified information Environmental protection, Nuclear I materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Sex discrimina- l tion, Source material, Special nuclear material, Waste treatment and disposal.

i i

17 Enclosure A

[7590-01] . .

Part 70 - Hazardous materials-transportation, Nuclear materials, Packaging and containers, Penalty, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Scientific equipment, Security measures, Special nuclear material.

Part 73 - Hazardous materials-transportation. Incorporation by reference, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of 4

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act t j of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the '

following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 2, 70, and 73.  ;

PART 2--RULES OF PRACTICE FOR DOMESTIC LICENSING PROCEEDINGS T

The authority citation for Part 2 continues to read as

~

1.

l l follows:

j AUTHORITY: Sec. 161, 58 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841). L

2. In Appendix C of Part 2, footnote 4 to Table 1A is amended by

revising "(as defined in 10 CFR 73.2(bb))" to read "(as defined in

< 10 CFR 73.2)," l

3. In Appendix C of Part 2, footnote 10 to Supplement III is  !

i 4

revised to read "105ee 10 CFR 73.2 for the definition of ' formula  !

quantity.'"

i

4. In Appendix C of Part 2, footnote 11 to Supplement III is . i revised to read "11See 10 CFR 73.2 for the definition of 'special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance.'"

[

18 Enclosure A  !

(

, , (7590-01)

5. 'n Appendix C of Part 2, footnote 12 to Supplement III is revised to read "See 10 CFR Part 73.2 for the definition of 'special nuclear material of low strategic significance.'"

PART 70--00MESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

6. The authority citation for Part 70 continues to read as i follows:

AUTHORITY: Sec. 161, 58 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201);

sec. 201, C8 Stat.1242, as amended (42 J' S.C. 5841).

7. In S 70.22, paragraph (k) is amended by revising "as defined under S 73.2(x) and (y).of this chapter" to read "as defincd under S 73.2 of this chapter."

PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

8. The authority citation for CFR Part 73 is revised to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844).

Section 73.37(f) is also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 58a1 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 206, Pub. L.99-399 and sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949 (42 U.S.C. 2201(1)).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2273); SS 73.21, 73.37(g), and 73.55 are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat.

948, as amended (42 U.S.C.2201(b)); SS 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 19 Enclosure A

[7590-01]. .

73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, and 73.67 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and SS 73.20(c)(1), 73.24(b)(1), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37(f), 73.40(b) and (d), 73.46(g)(6), and (h)(2),

73.50(g)(2), (3)(iii)(B), and (h), 73.55(h)(2) and (4)(iii)(B), 73.70, 73.71, and 73.72 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended ,

(42 U.S.C. 2201(o)). l

9. In Section 73.1, paragraph (a)(2)(i) is revised to read as follows

l $ 73.1 Purpose and scope.

(a)

t

]

(2) Theft or diversion of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material, i

(i) A determined, violent, external assault, attack by stealth, I

or deceptive actions by a small group with the following attributes, assistance, and equipment:

h (A) Well-trained (including military training and skills) and l dedicated individuals; l .

(B) Inside assistance that may include a knowledgeable individual  !

who attempts to participate in a passive role (e.g., provide inforcation),

an detive role (e.g. , f acilitate ent:ance and exit, disable alarms and

] communications, participate in violent attack), or both; 1

(C) Suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic l i weapons, equipped with silencers and h4ving effective long-range accuracy; i I  !

l (D) Hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying reactor, l 1

l 20 Enclosure A

. . (7590-01)

)

facility, transporter, or container integrity or features of the safe-

~

guards system; (E) Land vehicles used for transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment; and

! (F) The ability to operate as two or more teams.

n a a a *

) 10. In S 73.2, remove all alphabetical designators and place all l definitions in alphabetical sequence; paragraph (1) of the definition of l

]

"Special nuclear material of low strategic significance" is amended by 1

removing "$ 73.2(x)(1)" and inserting "paragraph (1) of the definition 1

] of strategic nuclear material of moderate strategic significance set out l

J in this section"; insert new definition, "Tactical Response Team," in proper alphabetical sequence; and revise paragraph (1) of the definition l for "Physical Barrier" to read as follows:

l l

[ -

l $ 73.2 Definitions.

• e a t l

I "Physical Barrier" means: (1) Fences constructed of No. 11 American  !

wire gauge, or heavier wire fabric, topped by three strands or more of f 1 '

barbed wire or similar material on brackets angled inward or outward  ;

! between 30* and 4S' from the vertical, with an overall height of not '

I less than eight feet, inc.luding the barbed topping; I l a a a a a i

I "Tactic 31 Response Team" means the primar: 6 response force for each i shif t which can be identified by a distinctive item of uniform, arrted '

i I

3 with bpecified weapons, and whose other duties permit immediate response. 1 I = = = $ a i >

21 Enclosure A l i

[7590-01) , ,

11. In S 73.46, paragraphs (b)(3)(i), (b)(4), (b)(6), (c)(1),

I (d)(4)-(6), (d)(9), and (h)(3) are revised and paragraphs (b)(7)-(9) and (i) are added to read as follows:

S 73.46 Fixed site physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures.

A A A A A 1

(b) Security organization. * *

• i (3) ***  ;

(i) Written security procedures which document the structure of the security organization and which detail the duties of the Tactical Response Team, guards, watchmen, and other individuals responsible for security.  :

i The licensee shall retain a copy of the current procedures as a record  !

until the Commission terminates the license for which these procedures t were developed and, if any portion of these procedures is superseded, retain the superseded material for three years after each change; and . ,

t 2 *

• A (4) The licensee may not permit an individual to act as a guard, watchman, Tactical Response Team member, or other member of the security organization unless the individual has been trained, equipped, and quali- I fled to perform each assigned se:urity duty in accordance with Appendix B of this part, "General Criteria for Security Personnel." In addition,  !

guards and Tactical Response Team members shall be trained, equipped, and qualified in accordance with paragraphs (b)(6) and (b)(7) of this i section. Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission, the licensee shall demonstrate the ability of the physical security personnel, whether lice.1see or contractor employees, to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities. Each guard, watchman,  ;

22 Enclosure A i

. . [7590-01]

Tactical Response Team member, or other member of the security organiza-tion, whether a licensee or contractor employee, shall requalify in accordance with Appendix B of this part, and, for guards and Tactical Response Team members, in accordance with paragraph (b)(7) of this sec- >

tion, at least every 12 months. The licensee shall document the results of the qualification and requalification. The licensee shall retain the documentation of each qualification and requalification as a record for  ;

three years after each qualification and requalification.

1

• A A A 1

(6) Each guard shall be armed with a handgun, as described in Appendix B of this part. Each Tactical Response Team member shall be i armed with a 9mm semiautomatic pistol. All but one member of the

~ i Tactical Response Team shall be armed additionally with either a shotgun I ,

or semiautomatic rifle, as described in Appendix B to this part. The l l .

1 remaining member of the Tactical Response Team shall carry, as an indi-

..l vidually assigned weapon, a rifle of no less caliber than .30 inches l or 7.62mm.

l (7) In addition to the qualification criteria of Appendix B of this part, guards and Tactical Response Team members shall qualify and requalify i annually for night firing with assigned weapons in accordance with Appen- l dix H of this part. The licensee or the licensee's agent shall document

I the results of weapons qualification and requalification for night firing. i The licensee shall retain the documentation of each qualification and ,

requalification as a record for three years after each qualification and 4

requalification.

(8) In addition to the training requirements contained in Appen-dix B of this part, Tactical Response Team members shall successfully i

complete training in response tactics. The licensee shall document the  !

f l 23 Enclosure A J -

i I

(7590-01] , ,

completion of training. The licensee shall retain the documentation.of training as a record for three years after training is completed.

(9) The licensee shall conduct Tactical Response Team and guard exercises to demonstrate the overall security system effectiveness and the ability of the security force to perform response and contingency plan responsibilities and to demonstrate individual skills in assigned team duties. During the first 12-month period following the date specified in paragraph (i)(2)(ii) of this section, an exercise must be carried out at least every three months for each shift, half of which are to be force-on-force. Subsequently, during each 12-month period commencing on the anniversary of the date specified in paragraph (i)(2)(ii) of this section, an exercise must be carried out at least every four months for each shif t, one third of which are to be force-on-force. The licensee shall use these exercises to demonstrate its capability to respond to attempts to steal strategic special nuclear material.

Luring each of the 12-month periods, the NRC shall observe one of the force-on-force exer-4 -

cises which demonstrates overall security system performance. The licen-see shall notify the NRC of the scheduled exercise 60 days prior to that exercise. The licensee shall document the results of all exercises. The licensee shall retain the documentation of each exercise as a record for three years after each exercise is completed.

(c) Physical barrier subsystems. (1) Vital equipment must be located only within a vital area, and strategic special nuclear material must te stored or processed only in a material access area. Both vital areas and material access areas must be located within a protected area so that access to vital equipment and to strategic special nuclear material requires passage through at least three physical barriers. The 24 Enclosure A

. . [7590-01]

l perimeter of the protected area must be provided with two separated l

physical barriers with an intrusion detection system placed between the two. The inner barrier must be positioned and constructed to enhance assessment of penetration attempts and to delay attempts at unauthorized l

l exit from the protected area. The perimeter of the protected area must l

l also incorporate features and structures that prevent forcible vehicle l

l entry. More than one vital area or material access area may be located within a single protected area.

t

= a e = a (d) Access control subsystems and procedures.

A A A A 2 (4)(1) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area. Identification and search of a '

individuals for fireirms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be made I and authorization must be checked at these points except for Federal, ,

State, and local law enforcement personnel on offirial duty and United ,

States Department of Energy couriers engaged in the transport of special nuclear material. The search function for detection of firearms, explo-sives, and incendiary devices must be accomplished through the use of detection equipment capable of detecting both firearms and explosives.

The individual responsible for the last access control function (control-ling admission to the orotected area) shall be isolated within a struc- l ture with bullet resisting walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and windows.  !

i (ii) When the licensee has cause to suspect that an individual is attempting to introduce firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices into a protected area, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down search (

of that individual. Whenever firearms or explosives detection equipment j i

l l 25 Enclosure A I

[7590-01] . .

at a portal is out of service or not operating satisfactorily, the licen-see shall conduct a physical pat-down search of all persons who would otherwise have been subject to search using the equipment.

(5) At the point of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area, all hand-carried packages except those carried by individuals exempted from personal search under the provisions of paragraph ~(d)(4)(1) of this part must be searched for firearms, explosives, c1d incendiary devices.

(6) All packages and material for delivery into a protected area must be checked for proper identification and authorization and searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prine to admittance into the protected area, except those Commission-approved delivery and inspec-tion activities specifically designated by the licensee to be carried out l I

within material access, vital, or protected areas for reasons of safety, security, or operational necessity, j

e n a a =

(9) The licensee shall control all' points of personnel and vehicle 1

access to material access areas, vital areas, and controlled access areas. At least two armed guards trained in accordance with the provi-sions contained in paragraph (b)(7) of this ser, tion and Appendix B of this part shall be posted at each material access area control point whenever in use. Identification and authorization of personnel and vehicles must be verified at the material access area control point.

Prior to entry into a material access area, packages must be searched for I

, firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. All vehicles, materials and packages, including trash, wastes, tools, and equipment exiting from a material access area must be searched for concealed strategic special 26 Enclosure A

(7590-01) l .

l nuclear material by a tears of at least two individuals who are not 1

authorized access to that material access area. Each individual exiting a material access area shall undergo at least two separate searches for concealed strategic specirl nuclear material. For individuals exiting an area that contains only alloyed or encapsulated strategic special nuclear l

material, the second search may be conducted in a random manner. l 1 * *

• n n (h) Contingency and response plans and procedures.

a a a a a (3) A Tactical Response Team consisting of a minimum of five (5) [

members must be available at the facility to fulfill assessment and L

response requirements. In addition, a force of guards or armed response personnel also must be available to provide assistance as necessary. .

The size and availability of the additional force must be determined on t I

the basis of site-specific considerations that could affect the ability of the total onsite response force to engage and impede the adversary  ;

force until offsite assistance arrives. The rationale for the total  ;

number and availability of onsite armed response personnel must be I I

l included in the physical protection plans submitted to the Commission for approval, i

4 4 A A A (i) Implementation schedule for revisions to physical protection plans, (1) By (180 days after the effective date of these amendments) each licensee shall submit a revised fixed site physical protection plan  !

to the Commission for approval. The revised plan must describe how the  !

licensee will comply with the requirements of paragraphs (b)(3)(i),

(b)(4),(b)(6),(b)(7),(b)(8),(b)(9),(c)(1),(d)(4),(d)(5),(d)(6),

l 1

27 Enclosure A I l

l

[7590-01] , ,' l (d)(9), and (h)(3) of this section. Revised plans must be mailed to the Director, Division of Safeguards and Transportation, U.S. Nuclear '

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

(2) Each licensee shall carry out the new commitments in the revised plan in accordance with the following schedule *

, (i) Commencing 30 days after Commission approval of the revised  !

plan for commitments related to paragraphs (b)(3)(1), (d)(4), (d)(5), '

(d)(6) and (d)(9) of this section.

(11) Commencing 60 days after Commission approval of the revised 4 plan for commitments related to paragraphs (b)(4), (b)(6), (b)(7),  !

, (b)(8), (b)(9) and (h)(3) of this section.

(iii) Commencing 365 days after Commission approval of the revised plan l t

for commitments related to paragraph (c)(1) of this section. '

I 12'. A new Appendix H is added to read as follows: ,

[See attached appendix.]

]

i i Dated at Rockville, MD, this day of 1988. ,

1 P j For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. .

\ '

]

t l Samuel J. Chilk, i i Secretary of the Comission, j l I I

l l  !

i i  !

l I

J 28 Enclosure A i

l ,

l

APPENDIN 84 MINIMUM QUALIFICATION CRITIRIA f 04 NIGNI FIRIC WAPON STAGE DISTAssC1 NO. a0Um05 TIM 1C POSITION TAaGli SCORIC LIGHTIC

@@Guu f or all courses-Revolver 1 7 yds 12 35 sec standing - no artificial S-27 Minians qualifying = 7CE .2 footcandles support. at center mass of target area.

2 15 yes 12 45 sec standing - no artificial support.

Seel- 1 7 yds 2

• clip 30 sec stand'ng - no artificial Minianas qualifying = 70E automatic support.

2 15 yds 2

• clip 40 sec standing no artificial si+ pert.

'HOTGum

, 1 25 yds 2 Rifled 30 sec Standing - strong shoulder S-27 Rifled 51eg:

Slugs (lead 2 slugs mits = strike area en target

> - chamtwr empty- (10, 9, 7) flee starts -

Commente firing.)

1 15 yes 5 Donele 00 10 sec Standing - strong shoulder B-27 Deiele De Suckshet:

l Dechshot (lead $rds Buckshot Hits in black = 2 pts

( - chamber empty- (Srds a 9 pellets /rd a 2 pts = 941 l  !!ae starts -

Cameence firing.) Minleum apsalifying = 70E l

l l RIFtE 1 25 yes 1 - Srd mag 45 sec Standing - Barricade e-27 2 25 yes 1 - Srd mag 45 sec Standing 3 25 yes I - Srd seg 45 sec Kneeling Miniense w 11fying = 701 4 25 yds 1 - Srd seg 45 sec Prone te0T[: All firing is to be done only at sight. the of night slaulation ceaulpeent during daylight is not allemable.

Use of site specific sighting devices (i.e. laser, etc.) should be included in tie licensee amended security plan for NAC appreval.

, I

j. . . .

I 1

t i k i

4 t 1  !

i 8

I 4

f 1 i 1 l 1  !

i  !

t i l

)  :

i [

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! i

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., i 1

(

l j ENCLOSURE B

l, Comparative Text I i

k i s I

f M

i ,

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! l r

i i  !

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COMPARATIVE TEXT PART 73--PHYSICAL PR0iECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS 8, The authority citation for Part 73 is revised to read as i follows:

TUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amarded, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 739 (41 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 12r U.S.C. 5841, 5844).

Section 73.37(f) is ai.. .. sed under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L.99-399 and sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949 (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.  ;

2273); SS 73.21, 73.37(g), and 73.55 are issued under sec.161b, 68 5 tat.

948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); SS 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, and 73.67 are issued under sec. 161i, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and SS 73.20(c)(1), 73.24(b)(1), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37(f), 73.40(b) and (d), 73.46(g)(6) and (h)(2), 73.50(g)(2),

(3)' ')(B), and (h), 73.55(h)(2) and (4)(iii)(B), 73.70, 73.71, and 73.72 are issued under sec. 161o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2201(c)).'

i

(

J

9. In Section 73.1, patagraph (a)(2) is revised to read as follows:

1

?

4 i

1 Enclosure B

~

)

S 73.1 Purpose and scope.

4 (a)

(2) Thef6 or diversion of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material.

(i) A datermined, violent, external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, by a small group with the following attributes, assistance, and equipment:

(A) Well trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals; (B) Inside assistance [which] that may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in a passive role (e.g., provide information), an active role (e.g. , facilitate entrance and exit, disable  ;

alarms and communications, partir.ipate in viol'nte attack), or both; (C) Suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held auton'.atic weapons, equipped with 3'lencers and having effective long-re.nge accuracy; (D) Hand-cartfed equipment, including' incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying reactor, facility, transporter, or container integrity or features of the 2

safeguards system; [and]

(E) Land vehicles used for transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment; and (F) The ability to operate as two or more teams.  ;

l

10. In Section 73.2, remove all alphabetical designators and place  !

t all definit'. ions in alphabetical sequence; insert new definition, "Tactical  !

t 2 Enclosure B i

Response Team," in proper alphabetical sequence; and revise paragraph (1) of the definition for "Physical Barrier" to read as follows:

S 73.2 Definitions.

• A A A "Physical barrier" means:

(1) Fences constructed of No. 11 American wire gauge, or heavier wire fabric, topped by three strands or more'of barbed wire or similar material on brackets angled inward or outward between 30' and 45' from the vertical, with an overall height of not less than eight feet, includ-ing the barbed topping; A A A A A .

"Tactical Response Team" means the primary response force for each shift which can be identified by a distinctive item of uniform, armed with specified weapons, and whose other duties permit immediate response.

• A A A

13. In Section 73.46, paragraphs (b)(3)(i), (b)(4), (b)(6), (c)(1),

(d)(4)-(6), (d)(9) and (h)(3) are revised and paragraphs (b)(7)-(9) and (i) are added to read as follows: ,

t S 73.46 Fixed site physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures.

A A A A A Security organization.

i A A A A (3) 3 Enclosure B

- , . . .. l -<--r ,n.. - - - - -- - - - - - , -- .-- ,- , -------.,r ..

(i) Written security procedures which document the structure of the security organization and which detail the duties of the Tactical Response Team, guards, watchmen, and other individuals responsible for security [--and]. Th6 licensee shall retain a copy of the current proce-dures as a record until the Commission terminates the license for which these procedures were developed and, if ary portion of these procedures is superseded, retain the superseded y terial for three years after each change; and

• a a a n (4) The licensee [shail] may not permit an individual to act t.s a guard, watchman, [ armed-response persen) Tactical Response Team member, or l other member of the security organization unless the individual has been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform each assigned security duty l l

in accordance with Appendix B of this part2 "General Criteria for Secu-l l

l tity Personnal." In addition, guards and Tactical Response Team members  !

l shall also be trained, equipped, and qualified in accordance with pars-graphs (b)(6) and (b)(7) of this section. Upon the request of an author-ized representative of the Commission, the licensee shall demonstrate the ability of the physical security personnel, whether licensee or contrac-ter empicyees, to ca.ry out their assigned duties and responsibilities.

Each guard, watchman. [ armed respense person] Tactical Response Team member, or other member of the security organization, whether a licensee or cor. tractor employee shall requalify in accordance with Appendix B of this part, and for guards and Tactical Response Team members in accord- {

ance with taragraph (b)(7) of this section, at least every 12 months.

[Such-requalifications-shali-be-documented.) The licensee shall document the results of the qualification and requalification. The licensee shall 4 Enclosure B

[7590-01]

retain the documentation of each qualification and requalification as a record for three years after each qualification and requalification.

(6) Each guard [and-armed-response-force-armament-maintained-onsite]

shall [incinde] be armed with a handgun [s], [ shotguns--and-semiantematic  ;

rifles-] as described in Appendix B [te] g this part. Each Tactical Response Team member shall be armed with a 9mm semiautomatic pistol. All -

i but one membe' of the Tactical Response Team shall be armed additionally with either a shotgun or' semiautomatic rifle, as described in Appendix B to this part. The remaining member of the Tactical Response Team shall I

carry, as an individually assigned weapon, a riflo of no less caliber

t than .30 inches-or 7.62mm.

3 (7) In addition to the qualification criteria of Appendix B of this part, guards and Tactical Response Team members shall qualify and requalify annual,1y for night firing with assigned weapons in accordance with Appendix H of this part. The licensee or the licensee's agant

shall document the results of weapons qualification and requalification I

for night firing. The licensee shi.11 retain the documentation of each qualification and requalification as a record for three yearc after each qualification and requilification, i (8) In addition to the training requirements contained in Appen-  !

dix 8 of this part, Tactical Response Team members shall successfully complete training in response tactics. The licensee shall document the completion of trai_n_i_ng. The licensee shall retain the documentstion of  ;

training as a record for three years after training is completed.

l (9) The licensee shall conduct Tactical Response Team and guard j i

j exercises to demonstrate the overall security system effectiveness and

4 5 Enclosure B

- . . - . , ~ , . - , _ - - - , ,._ , , - - . ,, .._.-- - .. , , - , . , , - , , _ , . _ . _ . , - . - . _ . . - . - - . . . - . . - . -

e the ability of the security force to per'orm response and contingency plan responsibilities, and to demonstrate individual skills in assigned team duties. During the first 12-month period following the date speci-fled in paragraph (i)(2)(ii) of this section, an exercise must be carried out at least every three months for each shift, half of which are to be force-on-force. Subsequently, during each 12-month period commencing on the anni /ersary of the date specified in paragraph (i)(2)(ii) of this section, an exercise must be carried out at least every four moriths for each shift, one third of which are to be force-on-force , The licensee shall use these exercises to demonstrate its capability to respond to attempts to steal strategic special nuclear material. During each of the 12-month periods, the NkC shall observe one of the force-on-force exercises which demonstrates overall security system performance. The licensee shall notify the NRC of the scheduled exercise 60 days prior to that exercise. The licensee shall document the results.of all exercises.

The licensee shall retain the documentation of each exercise as a record for three years after each exercise is completed, t (c) Physical barrier subsystems. (1) Vital equipment (shali] must be located only within a vital area, and strategic special nuclear material (shail] must be stored or processed only in a material access area. Both vital areas and material access areas [shali] must be located within a l protected area so that access to vital equipment and to strategic special nuclear material requires passage through at least [twe] three phycical barriers. The perimeter of the protected area must be provided with two separated physical barriers with an intrusion detection system placed between the two. The inner barrier must be positioned and constructed to enhance assessment of penetration attempts and to delay attempts 6 Enclosure B l

at unauthorized exit from the protected area. The perimeter of the pro-tected area must also incorporate features and structures which prevent forcible vehicle entry. More than vae vital area or material access area may be located within a single protected area.

A A

• A A (d) Access control subsystems and procedures.

a a

• a m

(4)(i) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area.. Identification and search of all ,

individuals for firearms, explosives, and incendisry devices, [shaii]

must be made and authorization [shali) must be checked at (such] these points, except for Federal, Stata, and local law enforcement personnel on official duty and United States Department of Energy couriers engaged in the transport of special nuclear material; [need-not-be-searched; ti c e n s e e - e m p l oy e e s - h a v i n g- a n- N R E- c r-U ni te d- S t a^.e s- B e p artme nt-o f- Ene rgy access-acthorization-shali-be-searched-at-ienst-cc-randem-basis-] The search ftuction for detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiaty devices must be accomplished through the use of detec'; ion equipment capable of detecting both firearms and explosives. Tae ia'*<idual responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) shall be isolated within a structure with bulle'.

resisting walls, doors, :eiling, floor, and windows.

(ii) When the licensee has cause to suspect that an individual is attempting to introduce firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices into a_p_r_otected area, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down search of that individual. Whenever firearms or explosives detection equipment at a portal is out of service or not operating satisfactorily, the l

i 7 Enc'.osure B

licensee shall' conduct a physical pat-dowti search of all persons who would otherwise have been subject to search using the equipment. ,

(5) At the point of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area, all hand-carried packages [shali) except those carried by indi-viduals exempted from personal search under the provisions of paragraph (d)(4)(i) of this part [shali] must be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. [Except-those pockages-carried-by persens-having -

an-NRC or-BGE secess-aetherizatien-which-shali-be-swarched-on-a-randem basis-when-the person-carrying-them-is-selected- for-search-]

(6) All packages and material for delivery into [thej a protected area [shali] must be checked for proper identification and authorization and searched [en-a-randem-basis] for firearms, explosives, and incendiery devices prior to adtrittance into the protected area, except those Commission-approved delivery and inspection activities specifically desig-nated by the licensee to be carried out, within material access, vital, or protected areas for reasons of safety, security, or operational necessity.

A A A A A (9) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access to material access areas, vital areas and controlled access areas.

At least two armed cuards trained in accordance with the provisions con-tained in paragraph (o)(7) of this section and Appendix B of this part shall be posted at each material access area control point whenever in use. Identification and authorization of personnel and veH eles [shaii]

must be [made] verified [snd-setherizatien-checked] at [sech] the mate-rial access area control point [s]. Prior to entry into a material access area, packages [shali] must be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. All vehicles, materials and packages, including 8 Enclosure B

~

4 1

trash, wastes, tools and equipment exiting from a material access area

[shali] must be searched for concealed strategic special nuclear material by a team of at least two individuals who are not authorized access to that material access area. Each individual exiting a material access area shall undergo at least two teparate searches for concealed strategic special nuclear material. For individuals exiting an area that contains ,

only alloyed or encapsulated strategic special nuclear material, the second search may be conducted in a random manner.

A A R A A (h) Contingency and response plans and procedures.

A A A A A (3) A Tactical Response Team consisting of' a minimum of five (5)

(geards-shali] members must be available at the facility to. fulfill assessment and response requirements. In addition 2a force of guards or armed response personnel also (shail] must be available to provide assistance as necessary. The size and availability of the additional force [sheli] must be determined on the basis of site-specific considera- -

tions that could affect the ability of the total onsite response force to engage and impede the adversary force until offsite assistance arrives.

The (ressen] rationale for (determining] the total number and availaoil-ity of onsite armed response personnel (shail] must be included in the

l physical protection plans submitted to the Commission for approval.

A A A A A (i) Implementation schedule for revisions to physical protection

, plans. (1) By (180 days after the effective date of these amendments) l each licensee shall submit a revised fixed site physical protection plan to the Commission for approval. The revised plan must describe how the l

9 Enclosure B l

. ~ . . . . - - - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _

licensee will comply with the requirements of paragraphs (b)(3)(i),

(b)(4), (b)(6), (b)(7), (b)(8), (b)(9), (c)(1), (d)(4), (d)(5), (d)(6),

(d)(9), and (h)(3) of this section. Revised plans must be mailed to the Director, Division of Safeguards and Transportation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 0" 20555.

(2) Each licensee shall carry out the new commitments in the revised plan in accordance with the following schedule:

(i) Commencing 30 days after Commission approval of the revised plan for commitments related to paragraphs (b)(3)(i), (d)(4), (d)(5),

l (d)(6) and (d)(9) of this section.

(ii) Comnencing 50 days after Commission approval of the revised plan for commitments related to paragraphs (b)(4), (b)(6), (b)(7), '

(b)(8), (b)(9) and (h)(3) of this section. [

(iii) Commencing 365 days af ter Comraission approval of the revised plan for commitmer.ts related to paragraph (c)(1)'of this section. i

12. A new Appendix H is added to read as follows:

[See attached appendix.)

P

)

l l

i 1 l

i 10 Enclosure B 9

-n . - -. .,m -, g- , - ~ ~ > ~---,------,-,-,w,-e~. - - - - -- - -,

. ~

APPENDIX H MINIMUM QUALIFICA110N CRITERIA FOR NIGHT FIRING LEAPON STACE DISTAMCE NO. ROUNDS TIMING POSITION TARGET SCORING l lGlilNG hANDCUN for all courses.

Revolver 1 7 yds 12 35 se. standing - no artificial B-27 Minimum qualifying = 70% .2 footcandles support. at center mass of target area.

2 15 yds 12 45 sec standing - no artificial support.

Semi- 1 7 yds 2 + clip 30 sec standing - no artificial Minimum qualifying = 70%

automatic support.

2 15 yds 2 + clip 40 sec standing - no artificial support.

SHOTGUN 1 25 yds 2 Rifled 30 sec Standing - strong shoulder B-27 Rifled.5 lug:

Slugs (Load 2 slugs Hits = strike area on target

- chamber empty- (10, 9, 7)

Time starts -

Commence firing.)

1 15 yds 5 Double 00 10 sec standing - strong shoulder B-27 .)ouble 00 Buckshot:

Buckshot (Load Srds Buckshot Hits in black = 2 pts .

- chamber empty- (5rds x 9 pellets /rd x 2 pts = 9C Itse starts -

Commence firing.) Minimum qualifying = 70%

RIFLE 1 25 yds 1 - Srd mag 45 sec Standing - Barricade B-27 2 25 yds 1 - Srd mag 45 sec Standing 3 25 yr:s 1 - Srd mag 45 sec Kneeling Minimum qualifying = 70%

4 25 yds 1 - Srd mag 45 sec Prore NOTE: All firing is to be done only at n!ght. Use of night simulation equir e 9t during daylight is not allossable.

Use of site specific sighting devices (i.e. , laser, etc. ) should be is.cluded in the licensee amended security plan for NRC approval.

e a

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6 ENCLOSURE C Analysis of Alternatives to a Second Fence I

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. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES TO A SECOND FENCE General In a Staff Requirements memorandum dated December 7,1987 the Commission approved proposed changes to physical protection requirements for NRC-licensed fuel facili-ties and directed the staff to undertake several additional actions. One of these was tc solicit corruents on the security benefits of a second fence and suggestions for coat effective alternatives that might achieve protection of the SSNM com-parable to that at DOE facilities. The staff was also directed to analyze and report as part of the final rulemaking package the security benefits of a second

' fence and to report alternatives costing $1 million or less that would provide comparable protection.

Public Coments Public coments on the proposed amendmelts dici not include any that were specific to the security benefits of a second feice. Neither were there any public coments regarding cost-effective alternatives vor the second fence. One responder offered i an improved fence barrier which he represents comercially. This fence barrier is considerably higher as well as mo e expensive than the standard fence barrier cited in the proposed amendments.

Security Benefits of Second Personnel Fence The primary security function of the second fence is to provide a temporary delay on the movement of individuals fror; the point where they have triggered an alarm of the intrusien detectiorf system. By delaying such movement there is an increased assurance that guards performing remote assessment of alarms can observe individuals at the time they are making an intrusion and recognize them as being unauthorized. This delay may also allow the guards making the assess-ment to initiate an immediate armed response from their tower guard posts. A secondary benefit is that the second fence prevents an insider from throwing special nuclear material from inside the facility to an accomplice outside.

Finally, the second fence prevents authorized personnel within the facility u from inadvertently crossing into a detector's zone and triggering a false alarm.

Alternatives t Detection and assessment systems at the facility perimeter provide security i

decision makers with information regarding the intrusion which is essential to

! determining whether to launch a response. If alarms are not immediately identi- '

fied as indicating an unauthorized entry, the area that has to be searched for l indicators of intrusion becomes very large with the passage of time, and negative searches are inconclusive regarding whether or not an intrusion *ctually took place. The detection system, and hence the possibility of deter tion, should be at the perimeter boundary to provide the response force as much time as possible before the introders can reach the desirable material. If the srea protected by I the alarm and barrier cystem it reduced, there is less time and space for the

protective force to intervene although the area to be searened for indicators of

ntrusion would be smaller.

I 1

If covert entry into a facility cannot be detected with acceptable assurance, the material must be protected by measures that are effective in spite of the detection deficiencies. For material which is located in vaults this protection could take the form of equipment or devices which would provide entry delays

, that are longer than guard response times to the vaults. For material located in work areas long delays cannot be provided although active or passive defense techniques are possible, at least in principle. One possibility is the use of techniques that would be activated automatically by attempts, at intrusion or by personnel in the work area. Examples are cold smoke, noxious fumes, incapacita-ting gases and foam which render it difficult to approach the material. The use of such agents where personnel are working, however, raises serious problems in administration, e.g. testing, liability ar.d false alarm consequences, Accord-ingly, their use is not considered to be a legitimate option.

Armed escort of the material at all times while outside of a vault is possible and would be similar to what is required during transportation between facilities.

Alternatively, instead of escorting the SSNM while it is outside of a vault, it would be possible to provide an increased guard force continuously patrolling each sector of the perimeter and responding directly to each indication of an intrusion. This alternative could be implemented by modifying the intrusion detection system at the perimeter tc trigger local as well as a remote alarms. .

If local alarns were provided, response to an intrusion could be rapid enough f to oppose adversaries at or near the perimeter. Ore undesirable feature of '

using local guards to assess alarms would be that the patrolling guards might be silently eliminated. Another problea is that of maintaining adequate vigilance on the part of the guards.

If the determination is made that there are no viable alternatives to a barrier -

of some type, the question of alternatives becomes one of determining the most  ;

cost effective barrier available. Among barriers other than fences which were considered are two that are made of rolls of wire. A barrier of General Furpose '

Barbed Tape Obstacle (GPBT0) comprised of various numbers of rolls is one example.  ;

It is anticipcted to be as effective as a fence, possibly more so, though the cost '

is higher. Barbed Tape Concertina (BTC) is a second obstacle material that is somewhat more effective than a fence, though again at a higher cost. Another

+

barrier that is more effective than the standard eight foot fence at slightly higher cost is a twelve foot fence. This barrier appears appropriate for some '

locations where the nominal 20 foot clear zone between barriers cannot be provided.

The costs of GPBTO, BTC, 12 foot and 8 foot fences are given in the accompanying ,

table as well as the cost of a modest increase in guard forces. l 1 On the basis of the foregoing information, it appears that the eight foot fence I

is the most cost effective alternative for assuring that potential intruders are delayed long enough to be identified as intruders.

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l TEN YEAR COST OF BARRIER ALTERNATIVES FOR A 5,000 FOOT PERIMETER SITE

' (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS) i i ANNUAL OPERATIONS BARRIER INITIAL COST AND MAINTENANCE 10 YEAR _ TOTAL COST j

! STANDARD 8' FENCE i

9 $15 PER FOOT $ 75 0 $75

~

12' FENCE 9 $20 PER FOOT $100 0 $100 i

i GENERAL PURPOSE BAR8ED TAPE

, OBSTACLE 3 MOUNDS j OF 6 ROLLS 9 104.40 PER FOOT $522 $26 $782 (5% annual replacement) i i

i BARBED TAPE CONCERTINA 10 HORIZONTAL ROLLS 9 $24 PER FOOT $120 $12 $240 j (10% annual

' replacement)

FOUR PATROLS CCVERING

1250' 0F PERIMETER

$75 to $215 $350 to $1,200 $3,575 to $12,215 i EACH (15-25 total l

guards) 4

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[

s ENCLOSURE D Environmental Assessment I

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ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSixNT AtlD FItiDING OF NO SIGNIFICAtlT IMPACT For Arendments to 10 CFR 73 Safeguards Requirements for Fuel Facilities Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material (SSNM)

The Commissior, has determined, under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Part 51, that promulghtion of the amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 will not have a significar t ,

effect on the quality of the human environment and that, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required. This determination is based on an environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact performed in accordance with the procedures and criteria in Part 51, "Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions," as publisFed in the Federal Register, Ma'rch 12, 1984 Part 51 is the f4RC's regulation for assuring appropriate environmental consideration of licensing and regulatory actions. Generally, under Part 51 any licensing or regulatory action will fall within 1 of 3 classes. One class of actions consists of those which require an environmental impact statement.

The criteria for and identification of this class of actions are given in (51.20. The class of actions includes matters such as issuance of a j construction permit or operating license for a ruclear power plant. Another class of actions consists of those eligible for categorical exclusion following a Commission declaration that the category of actions does not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. The criteria for and identification of licensing and regulatory actions eligible for categorical exclusion are given in $51.22. Amendments to Commission

, _ _ _ _ _ . , _ . _ _ , . _ . .v-. -- .- _ , _ . _ - . , _ _ , _

k regulations which are corrective, or of a minor or nonpolicy nature and do not ,

substantially modify existing regulations, fall within this second class of actions. [

The third class of licensing and regulatory actions, for purposes of ,

environmental considerations, enmprises those actions which are neither i identified in $51.20 is requiring an environmental impact stateinent nor identified in 151.22 as qualifying for categorical exclusion from preparation ,

of an environmental impact statement or assessment. The criteria for and identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessments ara given in 151.21. The proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 I regarding safeguards requirements for fuel facilities possessing formula j

! quantities of SSNM satisfies the requirement of 951.21 and, accordingly, the  !

j assessment below has been prepared.

i  !

The required contents of an environmental assessment, set out in 651.30, t 4

are as follows: .

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l i  ;

651.30 Environmental assessment.

l (a) An environmental assessment shall identify the proposed action and

) include:

i l (1) A brief discussion of: .,

! (i) The need for the proposed action;  !

(ii) Alternatives as required by section 102(2)(E) of NEoA; 4 5 (iii)Theenvironmentalimpactsoftheproposedactionand l i alternatives as oppropriate; and

{

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l 2

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t d

(2) A list of agencies and persons consulted, and identification of sources used.

The following coments respond to the specific requirements of $51.30.

Need for Action The rulemaking amends Pa; t 73 of the CoTrnission's regulations, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials." The intent of this rulemaking is to provide greater assurance that, at fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM, the physical protection measures can protect against the design basis threat. The primary subjects of the amendments involve (1) security system performance evaluation through tactical response team exercises, (2) night firing qualification for guards using all assigned weapons, (3) search of 100 percent of entering personnel and packages, (4) posting of armed guards at material access area control points, (5) providing two separated protected area barriers, and (6) revision of the design basis threat applicable to thef t of SSNM to include adversary use of a land vehicle and the measures required to prevent forcible vehicle entry into the protected area. The need for these improved safeguards requirements is l

based on findings made in SECY-87-28 (CNSI), "NRC/00E Comparability Review Team '

Findings of Safeguards Programs at Fuel Facilities."

The amendments to Part /3 will directly affect four current fuel '

facility licensees and any future applicants for fuel facility lic.nses l involving poss'ession of formula quantities of SSNM. Of the current licensees -- GA Technologies Inc., La Jolla, California; Nuclear Fuel Systems Erwin, Tennessee; Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia; and United l

. 3

Nuclear Corporation, Uncasville, Connecticut -- only the first is a commercially oriented facility. The GA facility, which provides fuel for the only high er.riched uranium commercial reactor in the country, is currently in a storage only mode.

Alternatives Secticn 102(2)(E) of NEPA provides that agencies of the Federal Government shall "study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended

courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources." The objective of these amendments is to provide greater assurance that the safeguards measures at ,

these specific fuel facilities are capable of providing adequate protection against a revised design basis threat. This objective can be achieved by maintaining fully adequate and essentially equivalent safeguards systems in licensed and license-exempt sectors. The changes in safeguards requirements proposed in this rulemaking have been prompted by determinations, based upon a recent classified (CNSI) study (SECY-87-28), which compared NRC's security requirements with the Department of Energy's (DOE's) recently upgraded security sys tems. This classified study also considered and rejected the efficacy of F

cther changes in safeguards requirements in light of their value in providing "comparability." No appropriate alternatives were identified beyond the six measures addressed in the proposed amendments which would accomplish the desired comparability in safeguards requirements between licensed and license-exempt facilities.

Environmental Impacts 4

The amendments will affect neither the safety of operation nor

]

the routine release of or exposure to radioactivity from the fuel facilities -

possessing formula quantities of SSNM. The amendments are only intended to_ provide greater protection against the design basis threat and thus l j reduce the risks of theft of strategic special nuclear material from these

! facilities. Exposures of the public to radiation or radioactive materials will not be affected.

)

The primary intent of the amendments is to improve the physical protection  :

i of SSNM. Six measures are proposed: (1) initiation of security system i

]

performance evaluations through tactical response team exercises, (2) the night fir'ing qualification of guards using all assigned weapons, (3) 100 percent search of entering personnel and packages, (4) posting of armed L

guards at material access area control points, (5) provision of twa separate i protected area personnel barriers, and (6) the installation of measures to prevent forcibie vehicle entry into protected areas. Of these six measures, measures (1), (2), and (4) have no identifiable environmental impacts.

Measures (2), (3), and (4) have been imposed on current fuel facility licensees through license conditions.

1 l The 100 percent search of entering personnel and packages requires  !

4 installation of additional walk-through detection equipment which require j construction activities to expand or modify the existing building in which this  :

equipment is located. The Commission previously directed that implementation of this requirement be accomplished through appropriate license amendments, i The requirement regarding protected area personnel barriers necessitateu construction, on the license 6's property, of a second barrier (e.g. fence) 4 i i

5 t i

---,,-,-,m-_ -..,,,-,n.,.,, w, , - , _ , ,,v,,, ,, - - .--. , , .__.-,,,-4 e , , . . ., --, - , , - . . ., , - - - , , ,.m-,,--,,---..,.-,,-,,.,,-.-, . - -

" within the current protected area. Finally, the installation of measures to prevent forcible vehicle entry will likely require the deployment of vehicle barriers which would be installed on the licensee's property at or near the protected area boundary at points accessible to vehicies. These construction ,

activities at potentially four current licensee sites and at any sites of  !

future fuel facility licensees who require possession of formula quantities  :

1 of SSNM are considered minor in nature and support a finding that the  !

amendments involve no significant environmental 9apact. l a

l  !

During development of the amendments, the Commission staff has  ;

consulted with the affected licensees regarding the implementation of the  :

~

three measures imposed through license amendment.

l l

r Determination of Need for Environmental Impact Statement

[

j Section 51.31 provides that upon completion of an environmental

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assessment, the appropriate NRC staff director will determine whether to prepare an environmental impact statement or finding of no significant impact .

I on the proposed action. Th'e Executive Director for Operations has determined l that the environmental assessment adequately supports a finding that the amendment will have ..o significant environmental impact. Accordingly, the f I

Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impsct statement for l this rulemaking. The amendments will not significantly affect safe operation  ;

1 of the affected facilities nor the routine release of or exposure to l i

radioactivity from the facilities, i

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i ENCLOSURE E Regulatory Analysis i

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REGULATORY ANALYSIS SAFEGUARDS REQUIREMENTS FOR FUEL FACILITIES POSSESSING FORMULA QUANTITIES OF STRATEGIC SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL 10 CFR 73 L

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. . l EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

1 This regulatory analysis describes the impacts of proposed reforms to the safeguards requirements of fuel facilities possessing formula quantitites of strategic special nuclear material. These changes will ensure that weapons- l i

usable material will receive comparable protection, both in the licensed and license-exempt sectors. ,

The estimated cost impacts to industr/ of implementing the proposed reforms at i four licensees is $4.2 million with annual operating costs of $2.1 million per v j year. The breakdown of the cost in thousands of dollars is at follows- i 1

i Implementation Annual Operating

! Topic Cost (thousands Cost (thousands i

of dollars) of dollars) i Tactical Response i Team Exercises 317 612  !

Nine-Millimeter Handguns 234 (a) [

l Heavy-Caliber Rifle 39 14 Night Qualification 183 183 4

Entry Search 1,356 720 Armed Guards at Material Access Areas 39 513

. i Double Physical  !

Barriers 1,505 (a) l Revised Design Basis Threat 531 20 l (a) No additional costs are expected to result from the proposed amendments.  !

The expected cost impacts to the NRC are expected to be $321,000 for implementa- i

.) tion and $6,700/ year for annual operation.

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CONTENTS PAGE SUPNARY............................................................... iii

1. INTR 000CTION..................................................... 1 1.1 Description................................................. 1 1.2 Background And Justification Of Proposed Action............. 2 1.3 Affected NRC Licensees...................................... 2

2. PROBLEM DEFINITION............................................... 4 2.1 Proposed Actions............................................ .

2.1.1 Guard and Tactical Response Team Exercises........... 4 2.1.2 Weapons Standardization and Night Qualification...... 4 2.1.3 Personnel and Parcel Search.......................... 5 2.1.4 Armed Guards at Material Access Area Control Points.. 5 2.1.5 Physical Barriers at the Protected Area Perimeter.... 5 2.1. 6 Revised Design Basis Threat.......................... 6

2. 2 Statutory Considerations and Al ternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2.1 -Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authority.............. 6 2.2.2 Need for Environmental Assessment.................... 7 2.2.3 Relationship to Other Existing or Proposed Regulations........................ ............... 7 2.2.4 Alternatives......................... ............... 7 3.

CONSEQUENCES..................................................... 8 l l

3.1 Cetts and Benefits of Industry Implementation and Operation. 8 3.1.1 Guard and Tactical Response Team Exercises........... 9 3.1.2 Weapons Standardization and Night Qualification...... 12 3.1.3 Personnel and Parcel Search.......................... 17 3.1.4 Armed Guards at Material Access Area Control Points.. 19 3.1.5 Double Physical Barriers at Protected Area Perimeter. 22 3.1.6 Revised Design Basis Threat.......................... 25 3.2 Impacts on the NRC.......................................... 29 3.3 Impact on 0thers............................................ 30 4.

REFERENCES....................................................... 31

5. TABLES

1. Initial TR1 Training and Exercise Costs, 2.

Do11ars.................

Annual TRT Training and Exercise Costs, Do11ars..................

10 12

3. 9mm Pistol Implementation Co'ts, Do11ars......................... 14

4. Heavy Caliber Rifle Implemen.ation Costs, Do11ars,............... 15

5. Night Firing and Qualification Costs,

6. Implementation Costs For 100% Search, Do11ars.................... 16 Do11a's.................... 19 iv

CONTENTS (Continued)

5. TABLES (Continued) PAGE

7. Annual Operating Cos ts for 100% Search, Do11ars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

8. Armed Guards at MAA Control Points Cost Do11ars............ 23

9. Fence Costs, Do11ars...............,......,.................... ...

... 24

10. Additional Physical Barrier Implementation Costs, Dollars. . . . . . . . 26

11. Cost to Protect Against the Revised Design Basis Threat, Dollars.

28

12. Impacts on NRC Fror Rule Implementation Do11ars................. 30

6. APPENDIX APPENDIX A........................................-....................

A-1 Reference Costs............................... ...

A-1

............. A-1 A-2 Concertina Barrier................................ ............ A-3 A-3 Razor Tape Barrier................................. ....... .... A-5 A-4 Additional Guards..........................................

.... A-6  !

7. TABLES A-1 Estimated Alternate Physical Barrier  !

Costs...................... A-1 l A-2 Reference Fencing Costs........................................ A-2 A-3 Concertina Barrier A-4 Razor Tape Barrier Costs........................................ A-4 Costs........................................

A-6 A-5 Training Armed Guards for Site Perimeter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-8 A-6 Annual Costs for Armed Guards at Site Perimetee................. A-8 I

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1. INTRODUCTION '

The United States government has established that strategically significant quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material, whether in the licensed or license-exempt sector, should receive essentially comparable protection. l Toward this end, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing amendments to regulations governing protection of fuel facilities possessing i formula quantities of strategic spuial nuclear material (SSNM).  !

1.1 Description The following upgrades in physical protection and security personnel l performance regulations are being considered:  !

• security system performance evaluation through Tactical Response Team (TRT) exercises i

• use of 9-mm semiautomatic handguns for all TRT personnel

• equipping each TRT with a rifle of at least 0.30 caliber (or 7.62 mm) e night firing qualification for security personnel using all assigned j weapons

• 100 percent search of entering personnel and packages 1

• posting of armed guards at material access area (MAA) control points 7 p

• construction of two separate protected area fences

• revision of the design basis threat at these fuel facilities, to include the use of land vehicles by intruders and implementation of noasures to i prevent forcible vehicle entry into the protected arer.

These amendments would increase assurance that physical protection and security forces are capable of protection & gainst the design basis threat ...;e -hanges

would fulfill the NRC's stated goal of equivalent levels of sec 'Hu  %

i sie U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-controlled fuel facil;'.n +- NRC-e ela d fuel installations.

1 1.2 " :karound and Justification of Proposed Action  !

4 l The goal of comparable protection was established in National Security Decision  ;

Memorandum (NSDM) 254 (April <.7, 1987) (see Ref. 1). The goal was also voiced ,

in communications by the National $ecurity Council (NSC), 00E, the Department  ;

1 of Defenst '0o0), and the NRC.

i In conformance with NSDM 254, comparability reviews were conducted at DOF-and l

NRC-licensed facilities by a joint NRC/00E comparability assessment team, i These reviews indicated that DOE has placed increased emphasis on guard I

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l wea;Snry, training, and tactical response exercises and has upgrao a some physical security measures. Reviews of NRC safeguards event reports, regula-  ;

tory effectiveness reviews, licansing actions, and inspection reports indicate a need to further enhance physical protection measures at NRC-licensed fuel  !

facilities. "

4 To maintain c.omparability with 00E, and to support these internal NRC security [

4 reviews, the NRC directed its staff to amend the physical protection regulations (

, fo.* fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM. These amendments,  :

i described in Chapter 2, would provide assurances that security systems and security force capabilities are strengthened and made more uniform.

I Chapter 3 explains the specic consequences of the proposed rule changes  !

for affected industrial facilities and the NRC.  ;

1.3 nffected NRC Licensees  ;

, The proposed amendment to 10 CFR 73 will potentially impact four NRC licensees.

i !he four facilities are Dabcock und Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia; United i i Nuclear Corporation, Uncasville, Connecticut; Nuclear Fuel Services, Erwin, *

Tennessee; and GA Technologies, an Diego, California. Of these, GA is currently not operating but may operate in the future.

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2. PROBLEM DEFINITION Section 2.1 of this chapter first offers a detailed discussion of the proposed actions. Alternatives to implementation of these changes are aiscussed in Section 2.2.

2.1 Proposed Actions 3

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73, deals with the security  ;

. and protection af SSNM. The amendments discussed in this section are being '

! proposed to improve security at NRC licensed fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM.

l 2.1.1 Guard and Tactical Response Team Exercises .

t Quarterly and annual exercises for guards and TRTs are proposed for affected

! locations. Quarterly exercises could last as little as 1 to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, including i i

pre-briefing and post-action activities. All shifts are required to partici-J} pate in at least one exercise per quarter, and the four exercises should cumula-i tively represent the typical conditions encountered during a 24-hour day. The I anr.ual exercise could fulfill one of the quarterly exercise requirements cnd t would be observed by NRC representatives, j i

The exercises are intended to demonstrate the level of readiness and training of guards and TRT members, By testing the TRTs, these exercises would indicate i

{ if additional training is needed. In 3ddition, the use of tactical exercises  ;

I would show if physical security system improvements are required. j l

2.1.2 Weapont Standardization and Night Qualification a

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) While revolvers could be used by guards performing duties other than those of a l 1 TRT member, a 9-mm semiautomatic pistol is .roposed for each TRT member. This i action is based upon the recognition that the 9-mm pistol is more effective i

than revolvers, which fire slower and have lower round capacities. Each TRT ,

! member would continue training with the standard .223-caliber semiautomatic '

{ assault rifle and an assault shotgun. In addition, at least one member of the [

TRT would be trained and armed with a heavy rifle, minimum .30-caliber (or 7.62-mm), to provide additional effectiveness against heavily armed adversaries in vehicles. These requirements for improved weapons are consistent with j

a recent nationwide police upgrades, based upon increased encounters with ,

j adversaries using saphisticated weapons. Because of the need to prepare for .

night responses, courses for night firing of all weapons classes would be man-  !

dated. Also, all personnel would requalify annually with all assigned we pons, ,

demonstrating both night firing ability and familiarity with weapons.  !

' L3 De,rlonnel ana Parcel Search l t.wrent regulations require only random searches of personnel and their hand-  ;

j carried packages, as long as the individual is an employee with NRC or DOE l access authorization. Starches of incoming parcels, suc5, as mail and other  !

, packages and materials that are not hand-carried, are also raridom. The pro-

] pnsed amendments would require *. hat all entering personnel and packages be l searched for weapons and explosives. Delivery and inspection activities .

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l specifically designated by the licensee and approved by the NRC for reasons o' safety, security, or operational N eessity are presently exempt and will remain exempt. Federal, State, and locai law enforcement personnel on official duty

, are exempted from search requirements.

I 2.1.4 Armed Guards at MAA Control Points As part of their overall security program some facilities have stationed armed i g e.rds at all MAA control points, in place of unarmed watchmen. The proposed  !

amendments would require that all facilities adopt those measures, manning all i MAA control points with armed guards, increasing deterrence and enhancing ,

responsiveness to adversary attack, 1 2.1.5 Physical Barriers at the Protected Area Perimeter  !

All fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM would be required to  ;

have two physical personnel barriers at the protected area perimeter. These  ;

barriers would be constructed high enough and separated by enough distance to allow security personnel time to assess attempted penetration and to delay ~

i attempts at unauthorized exit from the protected area. Installation of intru-sion detection devices, assessment aids, and any other monitoring equipment l i

that might be appropriate would be provided for. A guidance document un the  !

, two physical barriers is being developed by the NRC staff and will be issued i j separately. ,

i l j 2.1.6 Revised Decian Basis Threat r 4

q The design basis threat contained in 10 CFR Subsection 73.1(a)(2) would be j i amender to include use of land vehicles by potential adversaries to breach r

perimeter barriers and to transport personnel and their equipment. The NRC i considers the modification of the design basit threat to be a necessary measure '

i reflecting the possible use of land vehicles by potential adversaries. The

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amended threat statement does not include use of aircraft, watercraft, special purpose land vehicles, or the transportation of large amounts of explosives l onto or near the site. L I Installation of barriers at or near the protected area boundary is an effective i

countermeasure to the change in the design basis threat. Information on types  :

of structures and materials demonstrated to be effective in denying entry to i wheeled vehicles may be found in NUREG/CR-4250 (see R1f. 2) or ~The Barrier -

j Technology Handbook (Sand 77-0777) (see Ref. 3).

j 2.2 Statutory Considerations and Alternatives i 2.2.1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authority ,

1 1 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, provides authority for the NRC to i j prescribe regulations designed to protect the public health and minimize danger to life or property, as described in Subsection 161(b).

1 i 2.2.2 Need for Environmental, Assessment I

i The Commission has determined, under the National Environmental Policy Act of l 1959, as amended, and the Comission's regulations in 10 CFR Part 51, that

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promulgation of the proposed amendment of 10 CFR Part 73 will not have a sig-nificant effect on the quality of the human environment a~i that, therefore, an (nvironmental impact statement is not required. This determination is based on an environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact, performed in accordance with the procedures and criteria in Part 51, "Environmental Protec-tion Regulations for Domes i: Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions," as publisiled in the Federal Rt_ister on March 12, 1984. ,

2.2.3 Relationship to Other Existing or Proposed Regulations There .re no apparent potential conflicts or overlaps with other NRC

.egulations or policies nor with other agencies' regulations or policies, These regulations are being amended to improve the NRC's program for the i protection of weapons-usable nuclear material at fuel cycle facilities i possessing formula quantities of SSNM and to maintain comparability with the i DOE's recently upgraded program.

2.2.4 Alternatives j

An alternative to these rule changes would be to issue license conditions, orders or policy statements. However, it is the policy of the NRC to regulate the industry through rulemaking in order to allow public participatian.  ;

Therefore, the NRC has chosen to amend the existing regulations and to issue '

further guidance, as appropriate. For some elements of this proposed rule, there are several options for the actual method of implementation. Alterna-tives for specific components of the rule are discussed in Section 3.

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3. CONSEQUENCES The NRC's primary concern is to regulate the nuclear industry 50 as to promote the common defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public and of the workers employed in the nuclear industry. In the context of this analysis, promoting the common defense and security includes providing assurance that weapons-usable material cannot be diverted or stolen. This chapter discusses the expected costs and benefits associated with adopting proposed modifications intended to provide that assurance. These impacts are assessed as differentials, using the current requirements as a baseline.

The most significant effects are expected to be those associated with industrial implementation and operation costs, as well as development and implementation ersts to the NRC. The impacts on operators of fuel facilities are discussed in Section 3.1; on the NRC, in Section 3.2; and on others, in Section 3.3.

3.1 Costs and Benefits of Industry Implementation and Operation This section details the costs that are expected to be incurred by industry to implement.the proposed measures. Such costs cov r purchase and installation of equipment, additional training, new facilities, etc. This section also discusses the costs involved with operating the systems once thty are in place; and expenses resulting from extra labor, repairs and maintenance, and purchase of supplies, etc.

Visits to the three operating licensees were conducted to understand site-specific conditions. In cases where the licensees identified hardware currently i'1 use, the costs of similar materials were used. In the case of construction and labor costs, the cost of prior work was factored into the cost estimates shown here. Other construction or equipment costs presented in this section were derived using prices supplied by manufacturers through catalogs or telephone quotes, or were calculated using standard cost-referarice manuals such as Means Construction Cost Oata (see Ref. 4) or Richardsen's Rapid Cost Estimation Manual (see Ref. 5). In addition, each licensee provided estimates of the labor hours required to implement and operate each provision of the amendments. In those cases where personnel were required to perform tasks in addition to their regular duties, overtime salaries were applied. All cost estimates shown in this chapter are given in calendt.r year 1988 dollars (Fiscal Year 1989 doliars).

3.1.1 Guard and lactical Responst N m Exercises The NRC does not currently require performance evaluations of security personnel through response exercises. However, the amendments of 10 CFR Part 73 would require each site to conduct quarterly tactical training exercises for all shifts, including an annual, NRC-observed exercise for on-duty security personnel.

These performance tests are among the best means to determine the response and delay times assential to a successful defense, as well as to assure that the overall plant security system will adequately meet the design basis threat.

The NRC is providing guidance to licensees for tactical training, as well as 1

scenarios and evaluations usaful in conducting drills. Information on conducting guard and tactical response team exercises is provided 'n the document.

HURES/CR 5,31 TacticaLExercise Planning Handbook (Telfair, Houl, Klingelhoefer and Leonard, 1Hb) (see Pef. 6), and NUREG/CR 5072, Tactical Exercise Reference Manual (Telfair u ti. LW8) (see Ref, 7).

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The cost for the TRT training and the tactical response team exercises is shown '

in Tabit 1. For purposes of estimating costs, it was assuned that licensees would use a laser engagement system such as Multiple Integrated Laser Engage- ,

ment Systems (MILES). The total estimated cost to completely outfit and .

initially train TRTs and familiarize the guards with MILES equipment for all '

four locations is $316,916. The estimated annual cost for the first year is i

$611,599 per year to provide training for the TRTs, to conduct the exercises l and to provide equipment for these exercises. For the second and subsequent l years the annual cost is $405,803, i The initial costs are those incurred for general training and familiarization 1

with the MILES equipment for all guards; additional training in tactics for TRT -

personnel; rental of HILES equipment for familiarization and an initial training

, exercise; nurchase of blank ammunition for reserve and familiarization; purchase  ;

j of radios and other miscellaneous equipment; and conduct of an initial training exercise.

j For the first year, the annual costs are assumed to be those incurred for quarterly exercises for each shift, including one exercise to be observed by  :

i the NRC. For purposes of this estimate, two of the quarterly exercises would i be perfo*med with MILES equipment and two without. Therefore, six quarterly j exercises would be performed with MILES equipment and would require an  ;

] adversary team and a shadow force. The primary difference betweer, the annual

• l and the quarterly exercises with the MILES equipment is the longer duration of  !

the exercise window for the annual exercise. For exercises involving MILES

• equipment, a shadow force will be drawn from an off-duty shift to cover actual i security requirements. An adversary team will be determined by tha. exercise ,

j scenario which takes into account the design basis threat. Each exercise [

] would involve an exercise coordinator, exercise evaluators, and exercise >

j controllers. For quarterly non force-on-force exerciset. the shadow 1 force would not be required. For the second year, the exercises would be  ;

i performed once every four months, with one of the exercises being observed by I the NRC. The number of exercises would be nine per year. For the purpose of  !

the cost estimation, three (one third). of the exercises are assumed to be l j conducted with MILES equipment.

l l Annual costs for the TRT training allow for 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> per person. The actual k l training will vary from site to site and will depend on the ability of the 3 site to integrate the TRT training with other duties of patrol. Training for {

TRT personnel would address tactics, weapons proficiency and physical t conditioning. In addition, a0versaries for the exercises would generally be  !

selected from TRT personnel and would receive additional training specific to  :

the adversary roles and tactics. Practice firing for LILES equipment would be  !

j conducted twice a year on a volunte=- :m is for al. guards. The practice with (

the MILES equipment is assumed to coincice with the rental of the MILES equipment for the exercises.

l 3.1.2 Weapons Standardization and Night (ualification 4

l Under the proposed regulat' as, each TRT member would train with the 9mm j semiautomatic pistol, a standard .223-caliber semi-automatic assault rifle, w l l an assault shotgua. In addition, one member of the team would be armed with a l 1 heavy rifle, at least .30-caliber (7.62-mm), providing additionat effectiverass i 7 l I

= _-. .. -. - . _ . - _ -- - _ - . - - -. ..

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! Table 1. Initial TRT training and exercise costs, dollars  :

Item 8&W UNC NFS CA  ;

I MILES Rental Cost 36,000 16,000 16.000 16,000 t

Ammunition and Pyrotechnics 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 l Equipment Purchases 4,800 4,800 4,600 4,800 i Range Pantal 1,750 1,000 1,000 1,250 i

1 Initial Guard Training.

l No. of Personnel 115 63 63 75  :

4 Hourly Wage Rate X 19.31 X 21.07 X 15.12 X 32.03 (Average) [

! 5 i Hours Trainino X8 X8 X8 X8  ;

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Total Labor Cost 17,765 10,619 7,620 19,218  ;

4 TRT Initial Training: l 1

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) No. of Personnel 25 30 30 25 1'

Hourly Wage Rate X 19.31 X 21.07 X 15.12 X 32.03 .

Hours Trainino X 40 X 40 X 40 _ X 40

{ Total Labor Cost 19,310 25,284 18,144 32,030  !

t Instruction & Supervision 2,088 1,960 1,960 2,808 i Planning and Control 3,840 4,469 4,467 5,928 Adversary Training 4,200 4,700 3,400 7,200

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Initial Exercise:  ;

I j No. of Personnel 18 18 18 18  !

j Hourly Wage Rate X 19,31 X 21.07 X 15.12 X 32.03

Hours X 12 X 12 X 32 l X 12  ;

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l Total Labor Cost 4,U1 4,551 3,266 6,918 i h

j TOTAL $77,124 $76,583 $63,857 $99,352 1 -

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4 i against heavily armed adversaries in vehicles. The proposed regulations also require that all guards and the members of the TRT complete an annual night j firing course using assigned weapons and that the licensees maintain scoring

records, i

, Table 2. Annual TRT training and exercise costs, dollars (

) Item 8&W UNC NFS GA L l

l j Equip.nent Rental 96,000 96,000 96,000 96,000 l t

Second year 48,000 48,000 48,000 48,000 l ,

Ammunition 850 850 850 850  ;

2 I Range Rental 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 '

j Annual TRT Training: I No. of Personnel 25 30 30 25  ;

i' Hourly dage Rate x 19.31 x 21.07 x 35.12 x 32.03 i Hours Training per TRT x 40 x 40 x 40 x a0

Total Labor Cost 19,310 25,284 18,144 32,030 i Instruction & Supervision 3,907 4,547 4,547 6,132 Quarterly Exercise w/ MILES  !

No. of Personnel 18 18 18 18 c Hourly Wage Rate x 19.31 x 21.07 x 15.12 x 32.03 i Hours per Exercise x6 x6 x6 i

x6 ,

j Total Labor Cost 2,085 2,276 1,633 3.459 Instruction & Supervision 250 250 308 275

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j Planning and Control 440 492 353 747 i 1 Total per Exercise 2,775 3,018 2,294 4,4P.1 ,

i Exercise w/o MILES '

) No. of Personnel 6 6 6 6 '

j Hourlf Wage Rate x 19.31 x 21.07 x 15.12 x 32.03

Hours per Exercise x4 x4 x4 x4

, l j Labor Cost 463 506 363 769  ;

I i Planning and Control 112 148 156 - 208

! Total per Exercise 595 654 519 977 -

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Table 2. (Continued)

I +.em B&W UNC NFS GA Annual Obseived Exercise:

No. of Personnel 18 18 18 18 g Hourly Wage Rate x 19.31 x 21.07 x 15.12 x 32.03 Hours x 12 x 12 x 12 x 12 Labor Cost / Exercise 4,171 4,551 3,266 6,918 l Instru: tion & Supervision 1,500 1,500 1,850 1,650 Planning and Control 1,320 1,475 1,060 2,242 f 1

Total 6,991 7,525 6,167 10,810 TOTAL First Year $144,871 $153,191 $139,599 $173,938 (12 exercises)

TOTAL Second Year 5 95,537 $ 96,137 $ 90,824 $123,305 1

(9 exercises) 1 3.1.2.1 Weaponry 1

i The affected facilities have guard forces with members assigned to respond to emergencies during a shift. The guard forces are equipped with assault t j

~ rifles, shotguns, revolvers and a sniper rifle. To implement the proposed rule *, i each site would establish a dedicated response force, the TRT. Each member of the TRT would be provided with a 9-mn semiautomatic pistol, and each team would j have a rifle of at least .30-caliber (7.62-mm).  :

l A 9-mm pis".o1 may cost as much as the $1600 Sig-Sauer P210, or as little as the  !

Smith & Wesson or Colt semiautomatics, which sell for $500. The Berreta 92SBF, i used by the U.S. Army and many American police forces, sells for about $620 and i is used as the typical weapon for this analysis. The cost of acquiring pistols ,

l i for all TRT members at these locations, equipping them with holsters and badges, and providing reserve ammunition i s shown in Table 3. Included in the cost

! i j of pistol acquisition are spares.

l Each licensee would train its forces to use the new pistols, and provide

! classroom instruction and firing range qualification courses. This training ,

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time, assumed to be in addition to regular duties, would vary, for site-specific reasons from 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br />. Four heura of range time, needed for  ;

l familiarintior, and scored qualification, are assumed to be standard at all  :

licensees.

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i The total cost of implementing this portjon sf the rule, including pistols, equipment, reserve and training ammunition, and instruction, is $170,600 for i the operating facilities and $231,011 for all four facilities. Because security personnel currently qualify annually witt. their assigned weapons, no additional i '

annual operating costs would result from this rule. -

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Table 3. 9-mm implementation costs, dollars

. Item B&W UNC NFS GA No. of Weapons 30 24 36 30

@ $620 x 620 x 620 x 620 x 620 Weapons Cost 18,600 14,880 22,320 18,600 Reserve Amunition 12,700 10,150 15,230 12,700 Equipment (a) 4,400 4,150 4,650 4,200 Range Rental 1,250 1,000 750 1,500 Training:

No. of Personnel 25 20 30 30

! Hourly Wage Rate x 19.31 x 21.07 x 15.12 x 32.03 .

H_ours Training x 28 x6 x7 x 12

Total Labor Cost 13,517 2,528 3,175 11,531 Instruction & Eupervisien 3,700 3,300 2,500 4,680 Amunition - Familiarization 10,600 8,500 12,700 10,200 and Qualifying Rounds l TOTAL $64,480 $44,508 $61,325 $63,411 '

i' (a) Equipment includes holstert, spare clips, discharge barrels, identifying .

caps / badges / arm bands e

1 Heavier caliber rifles, at least .30-caliber (7.62-mm), are also required under the proposed amendrents. These weapons may be very costly, such as the .308-caliber  !

Sig AMT, priced at $2800. However, prices for other rifles of the .30-caliber l

(7.62-en) minimum bore are generally around $900. The Israeli-manufactured >

Galil, featuring tritium-light night sights and ambidtxtrous-handling folding i stock, is battle tested and functions under adverse weather conditions, humidity i 1 arid heavy dust. This weapon, priced at $940, is used as the typical heavy rifle i for this cost analysis. Tne costs of training ten individuals at each site and  :

of acquiring five weapons with accompanying equipment, are shown in Table 4. '

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The total implementation cost of the .30-caliber riflu reeuirement at the operating i j licensees would be $28,535, and would be $39,027 for all tour licensees. Because  ;

security personnel are not currently armed with these weapcns, annual qualification l

and training would be needed. The annual cost of the .30-caliber rifle require- l

ment for training, irstruction and supervision, and range rental would be l

approximately $13,600 for the four licensees.  ;

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Table 4 Heavy-caliber rifle implementation costs, dollars Item B&W UNC NFS GA No. of Weapons 5 5 5 5

@ 5940 x 940 x 940 x 940 x 940 Weapons Cost 4,700 4,700 4,700 4,700 Reserve Ammunition 400 400 400 400 Equipment 400 400 400 400 Rar.ge Rental 250 250 250 250 Training:

No. of Personnel 10 10 10 10 Hourly Wage Rate x19.31 x21.07 x15.12 x 32.03

Hours Training x7 x, 7 x7 x7 Total Labor Cost 1,352 1,475 1,05B 2,242 Instruction & Supervision 1,500 1,500 1,850 1,650 Ammunition - Familiarization 850 850 850 850 and Qualifying Rounds

, TOTAL C'. ,4 5 2 $9,575 $9,508 $10,492

This ruling could be implemented at a slightly lower capital cost if the snicer rifles currently owned by some licensees were used to satisfy this requirement.

3.1.2.2 Night Qualification with Assigned Weapons Currently, guards at NRC-licensed facilities train in night firing for familiarization only, with no standard by which to measure effectiveness.

Standardized training and qualification in this area would prepare the guard force to more effectively respond in the event of an incident occurring at night.

All security personnel would receive an initial period of classroom instruction and one nighttime qualifying session on the range, using only those weapons assigned to them. Because TRT personnel are required to train with all weapons, additional training and qualification time will be required for those individuals assigned to TRT duty. ,

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l Qualification courses would begin with familiarization firing. All personnel i

would then qualify with handguns by firing 30 to 60 rounds. TRT sembers would  ;

further qualify by firing 40 rounds with rifles and S rounds with shotguns. As  ;

shown in Table 5, the total cost of ieplementing this rule is approximately  !

12 1

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$182,870 for all four facilities. These training measures would also involve annual operating costs of approximately $182,870 for all four facilities.

Table 5. Night firing and qualification costs, dollars Item B&W UNC NFS GA Guard Qualification: I Training:

No. Guards Trained 115 63 63 75 Hourly Wage Rate X 19.31 X 21.07 X 15.12 X 32.03 Hours Training X4_ X6 X6 X6 Total Con 8,883 7,964 5,715 14,414 TRT Qualification:

No Members Trained 25 30 30 25 Hourly Wage Rate X 19.31 X 21.07 X 15.12 X 32.03 Hours Training X8 X8 X8 X8 Total Cost 3,862 5,057 3,629 6,406 Ammunition - Qualifying 23,470 15,900 18,500 19,000 Rounds Supplies 250 200 200 200 Instruction & Supervision 8,400 10,700 7,390 8,010 Range Fees 4,450 4,320 2,950 3,000 TOTAL. $49,315 $44,141 $38,384 $51.030 3.1.3 Personnel and Parcel Search The proposed rule requires that 100 percent of entering personnel and packages be searched for tirearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. Safeguards event l reports end regulatory effectiveness reviews have indicated that the current i

5 percent randos search of employees is not an effective deterrent and cannot provide high tssurance that a concealed weapon or explosive will be detected.

In addit' ion, there is piesently no means in place to guard against weapons I hidden in hand-carried packages or containers that cannot be readily opened or otherwise effectively searched by direct observation. By correcting these weaknesses, the proposed 100 percent search requirement increases protectien against an insider and achieves comparability with the 100 percent search of entering personnel and packages required at DOE facilities.

13

To comply with the amended rule l'censees will be obliged to add several new inspection lanes at each facility. These lanes generally consist of:

• Walk-through detectors for metals and explosives. The Ion Track Instrument Corporation's model was used as the standard for this cost analysis, at a cost of $33.200 each, including freight and installation.

• Pedestrian traffic controls, such as turnstiles, which cost $3000 each.

• Guardt to operate the inspection equipment and prevent forcible entry.

Each facility will likely hire and train additional personnel. It was assumed that each facility will send the new guards to a local law enforce-ment academy.

• Hand-held metal detect.rs to back up the walk-through machines. These units cost $250 each.

In addition to the new lanes, each licensee will probably instc11 a single screening machine to provide x-ray detection of weapons in inceming parcels and packages. For this analysis, a built-in model costing $53,500 after freight and setup, was used. On-site personnel will maintain and repair the new machines, so the licensee, will send two maintenance personnel to classes offered by the equipment manufacturers.

Also, in additinn to the requirements of the comparability rule, the NRC has  !

determined that searches of hand-carried packeges for explosives should be carried out witn an explosive detector. This search must be integrated with the other search activities at the control point and therefore the cost of the necessary instruments is included 16 this cost analysis.

As shown in Table 6, B&W will add five inspection lanes and nine guards. In addition to the standard equipment mentioned above, B&W will monitor the inspet-tion and entry area witt, closed circuit television, adding approximately $100,000 to the cost of the expansion. Engineering, quality assurance and contract sup-port are included in the offort, as well as guard; and escorts used to monitor the construction a:tivities. A seven week training course at the local police academy costs $5820 each for the new guards.

UNC will add three inspection lanes, with seven additional guards required. In addition to the cost for standard equipmeat, labor, and training, UNC will incur an additional cost of $11.200 for a portable explosives detector.

NFS will add two lanes, with three additional guards needed. Equipment, labor and training costs, as well as the cost of a portable explosives detector, are sumarized in Table 6.

The tntal cost of implementing this amended ruling at the three operating 1ccations is $1,355,740. The fourth facility was using 100% search at the time thtt the facility operations were suspended and no additional costs are antici-pated. The annual costs for salaries of the additional guards, equipment opera-tion, and maintenance, shown in Table 7, are $719,949.

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l 3.1.4 Armed Guards at Material Access Area Control Points  ;

Current NRC regulations permit the use of watchmen (by definition not necessarily armed) at MAA entry / exit control points. However, NRC has determined that using armed guards at or near MAA portals and vaults strengthens protection against Table 6. Implementation costs for 100% search, dollars Item B&W UNC NFS Inspection Lanes Added 5 3 2 Entry Building Expansion 3,600 sq. ft 3,200 sq. ft 2,200 sq. ft

@ 550/ square foot X 50 ,X 50 X 50 Total 180,000 160,000 110,000 .

Walk-Through Exolosives Detectors 5 3 2 9 533,200 X 33,200 X 33,200 X 33,200 Total 166,000 99,600 66,400 Turnstiles 5 3 2 9 53,000 X 3,000 X 3,000 X 3, s.f '

Total 15,000 9,000 6,000 Hand-Held Metal Detectors 20 12 8

@ 5250 X 250 X 250 250 X_

Total 5,000 3,000 7,000 Hand-Held Explosives 5 3  ?

Detectors @ 5558 X $58 X 558 X 558 Total 2,790 1,674 1,116 Package X-Ray Machine 53,500 53,500 53,500 Other Equipment 100,000 11,200 10,200 Labor:

Engineering 22,800 21,200 15,750 Contracts 2,470 1,800 1,550

, Guards and Escorts 17,000 18,960 13,600 Haintenance Personnel 4,350 4,350 4,350 Training:

1 Added Guards 9 7 3 X 5,820 X 6,750 X 6,150 t Total 52,380 47,250 18,450 i TOTAL 5621,290 5431,534 5302,916 15  ;

r Table 7. Annual operating costs for 100% search, dollars B&W UNC NFS i Equipment Maintenance (a) 8,000 4,800 3,200 I Guard Salaries:

Added Guards 9 7 3  :

Hourly Wage X 19.31 X 21.07 X 15.12 i Hours per year (240 deys) X 1920, X 1920 X 1920 t l Total Wages 333,677 283,181 87,091 TOTAL $341,677 $287,981 $90,291 d

(a) Manufacturer's repair contracts. '

l' adversaries. Therefore, the proposed amendment requires the ute of trained, armed guards at each MAA portal whenever the effected area is being used. The

! regulations state that it is acceptable to arm these guards with revolvers, as

} they are not assigned to TRT duty. However, it is likely that these guards would i

also use the 9-mm pistol, simply to maintain uniformity, and costs have been completed with that assumption, 1

Implementation of this rule will require that the two watchmen currently used

! at each MAA control point be armed and trained, as well as two replacements et J each facility. All licensees would provide weapons for two personnel at each control pcint, covering operating shifts only, and would retain spare wea-l pons. Each site already uses watchmen at the MAA control points and the t

reforms require that only armed guards be used. It is assumed that watchmen 7

already receive security force training and would only need weapons training and '

1 qualification. GA would not be affected by this regulatory change.

UNC has

unarmed watchien, but only while they are waiting for security clearances and

} weapons qualification. UNC does not use these watchmen at MAA control i' j points. An issue that has not been addressed in the cost estimates is that

some of the watchmen may not be able to qualify to be armed guards. In such  !

j cases new guards would need to be hired, trained and qualified.

. l 4

d In addition, three hours of classroom instruction and four hours of range training would be needed to qualify these personnel to carry weapons. As

] shown in Table 8, the estimated cost to are and train all watchesn at the

] two licensees is $39,120. Because all portals are currently controlled, the only addt'.ional annual expenses resulting from this rule are the cost of

) annual weapons qualification, instruction and ameunition and the pay

dif ferential between guards and watchmen. The annual cost due to the pay j differential is approsisately $512,813.

4 l 3.1.5 Double Physical Barriers at Protected Area Perimeter i

All fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM would be required to have double physical personnel barriers at the protected area perimeter. These fences must be high enough and separated by enough distance to allow assessment

16

_ _ _ _ - __ ._- _ _ - ~ . _ _ . _.

of attempted penetration of the perimeter and to delay attempts at unauthorized exit from the protected area thereby allowing guards and Tris adeauate time to respond. Specifically, the outer fence must be at least eight feet high, and the inner fence must also be at least eight feet high. Typically, these fences will be separated by a 20-foot graded and graveled space, which will be monitored by intrusion detection systems.. In those sections where buildings form part of the perimeter, the buildings may constitute a personnel barrier if the roof of the building is protacted with a barbed topping such as razor wire.

Vehicle entrances must be protected with vehicle traps, to be discussed subse-quently, and remotely operated double gates, which are not open simultaneously.

Construction of the double fencing will have varied impacts on the licensees.  !

The fact that the second barrier must delay intrudert, long enough to assure l accurate assessment of an intrusion moes installation of a twelve foot fence an attractive option. Therefore, costs for 12-foot inner fences are given  ;

i in Table 9 as well as the standard 8-foot fence. At B&W, approximatel 5000 feet of existing fence must be moved to form the outside barrier.y An additional 2500 feet of existing fence may be raised to the 12-foot height, while approximately 2500 feet of new fence must be added to form the inside ,

j barrier. j i

In addition, it should be noted that B&W will install a new microwave intrusion detection system at the same tima, even though this is not a direct requirement of this rule. It is estimated that this riw system will cost approximately

$62,400, l

The UNC facility will move 5000 feet of existing fence to the outside perimeter, ins, tall 5000 feet of new 12 foot fencing and construct several vehicle traps.

Table 8. Armed guards at MAA control points, costs, dollars i B&W KFS l

Total Number of Watch _ men 12 12 11 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> in Training / duly X 7 X 1920 X 7 X 1920 hours0.0222 days <br />0.533 hours <br />0.00317 weeks <br />7.3056e-4 months <br /> per year Hourly Rate X 12.00 X 12.00 X 11.19 X 11.19 Total Training Labor 1,008 276,480 862 236,333 Ammunition-and Equipment 6,168 5.663 Instruction 3,700 2,500 i Weapons Purchased (*) 16 15 l 9 $620 X 620 X 620 9,920 9,300 TOTAL $20,796 $276,480 $18,324 5236,333 (a) Weapons are purchased for all guards, with four spares.

17

h The NFS facility will move 3200 feet of existing ferce to the outer perimeter and will probably raise approximately 1000 feet of current fence to 12 feet.

An additional 3080 feet of new 12-foot fence will be added to the inner  :

barrier.

I GA Technologies will move approximately 1000 feet of the current fence and will '

raisa the remainder. Additional fence will be added inside the existing fence.

On top of the building, a cornoination of a fence and razor ribbon will be used .

, to complete the second barrier.

Table 9. Fence costs, dollars B&W UNC NFS GA 4

! Outside Fence (8 ft.)

Existing Fence Moved, Ft. 2,500 5,000 3.200 1,000 Gst per linear foot X 12 X 15 X 15 x 15 i

Total Cost 30,000 75,000 48,000 15,000 Add Fence, Ft. 2,500 1,000 1,000 1,000 S

Cost per linear foot X 12 X 15 X 15 X 15 -

fotal Cost 30,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 Inside Fence (12 ft.)

Existing Fence Raised, ft. 2,500 None 1,000 1,000 Cost per linear foot 9.5 9.5 X X X 9.5 '

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Total Cost 23,750 9,500 9,500 New 12 ft. Fence, ft. 2,500 5,000 0,080 2,000 Cost per linear foot X 20 X 20 20 X X 40 l Total Cost 50,000 100,000 61,600 80,000 i Vehicle Traps 10.200 6,800 3,400 3,400 Temporary Fencing 6,000 15,000 2,100 900 TOTAL $119,950 $196,800 $124,600 $108,800 Part of the perimeter is close to other site buildings, storage a,'eas for process i' chemicals, and delivery access points. Therefore, it may not be possible to alter the plant layout to provide 20 feet of separation between the two fences.

I Additional surveillance measures will be used and building doors adjacent to f

that part of the fence will be monitored, l

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. l As shown in Table 10. considerable site work will be required in addition to erecting fences. B&W site work is an estimated $175,000 for regrading its patrol road, moving or adding light poles to the perimeter, moving existing intrusion monitors and installing surveillance cameras. In addition, all of these con-struction activities trust be observed by facility guards and any construction inside of the perimeter will require armed escorts, an extra expense.

UNC site work costing $359,481 includes regreding the patrul road and separation area, adding razor ribbon to walls on the perimeter, and moving and adding light poles. UNC will move several existing intrusion detection system monitors, add new monitors to cover the expanded perimeter, install surveillance cameras, and construct a ten-foot-high retaining wall along 600 feet of the perimeter.

Because most of this construction and equipment initallation will be performed inside of the existing perimeter, UNC's costs 40 provide armed escorts for con-struction crews and to inspect incoming material shipments will be much higher than corresponding costs at other sites.

"5 site work includes regrading the separation area and the patrol road, moving several light poles to the new perimeter, moving the microwave system, and adding surveillance cameras.

1he total cost of all fencing, site preparation, and labor at all facilities is

$1,505,278. No incremental annual costs are expected, as the perimeter is already patrolled e'id maintained at each site.

3.1. 6 Revised Design Basis Threat The design basis thr.Jt would be amended to includa use of land vehicles to transport personnel and to breach perimeter barriers. To protect against the revised design basis threat, the following protective measures would be implemented-

• ?lacement of hydraulically operated wed " barricades at all entrances regularly used for vehicle traffic, he iafter referred to as "primary entrances." Typical devices cost $39.250 each, including freight, instal-lation and expenses incurred to trair maintenance personnel.

• Placement of manually operated, reinforced, bollard barricades at all entrances that are usable but are not used on a regular basis, referred to as "1.econdary entrances." This equipment ccsts $8500 each, including freight, installation and maintenance training.

• Installation of vehicle cables and supports on the entire protected area perimeter, outside of the regular physical personnel barriers. A standard cost of $10 per linear foot is applied, including supports, setting posts in concrete and insta11ation.

Reinforcement of the vehicle cables in all sectors of the perimeter readily accessible from any road ay. This reinforcement will be accomplished with cone ete vehicle barriers (Jersey Bounces). A standard cost of $20 per linear foot is applied, including reinforcement posts, cables to connect the bounces, and installation.

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e Table 10. Additional physical barrier irplementation costs, dollars Item B&W UNC NFS GA Move Existing Intrusion N/A 2,800 9,200 400 Detectors Additional Intrusion 62,400 9,600 4,800 9,600 Detectors Grade /Graval Separation N/A 30,000 24,000 1,200 Area Move Surveillance Cameras 2,000 4,000 8,000 6,000 Additional Surveillance 32,000 32,000 32,000 64,000 l t

Cameras Site Preparation Regrade Patrol Road 67,000 25,000 20,000 5,000 Razor Ribbon 750 3,000 2,250 7,500

, Light Poles Moved 14 10 None 4 each X 1,000 r 1,000 X 1,000 l Total Cost 14,000 10,000 4,000 New light Poles None 25 14 8 each X 2,500 X 2,500 X 2,500 1

Tota' Cost 62,500 35,000 20,000 l Othe* 8,000 30,200(a) None 82,000(b) i Support Labor Guards 21,672 75,981 26,808 9.907 Engineering & QA 40,660 74,400 11,520 31,480 i TOTAL $2a8,482 $359,481 $257,988

$156.677 (a) Cost of a 10-foot high retaining wall and train gates for second fence.

(b) Cost of door sensors and surveillance devices adjacent to building and process chemical storage areas, i

20

As shcwn in Table 11, the total cost to implement these measures is $530,710.

The cost estimates for labor assume that these measures would be implemented in conjunction with the implementation of the additional physical barriers, If the measures to protect against the revised design basis threat for the vehicles are implemented separately, than the costs would be higher due to the duplication of effort for gates and surveillance. B&W would spend about $148,320 to protect nne primary entrance and two secondary entrances, as well as completely ring the perimeter with vehicle cable and reinforce 2000 feet of the perimeter that adjoin roadways. Personnel costs include engineering, quality assurance and

. purchahing support, as well as guards to observe installation.

UNC would spend about $190,970 to protect two primary entrances, completely ring the perimeter with vehicle cable, and reinforce 3000 feet of the perimeter that adjoin a roadway.

NFS would spend about $126,130 to protect one primary entrance and two secondary entrances, is well as completely ring the perimeter with vehicle c.ble, rein-forcing 1350 feet of the perimeter that adjoin a roadway. Engineering, quality assurance and purchasing support would also be provided, as well as guards to observe installation of the devices.

..A would spend about $65,290 to protect one primary entrance and reinforce the perimeter that adjoins roadways. The GA facility is located next .to a hill and there are embankments between the parking lots and the facility. Solutions to the barrier requirements are therefore highly site specific. Because mainte-nance personnel are already employed by the facilities, no additional maintenance costs will result from this rule.

3.2 Impacts on the NRC The NRC would send three individuals to each of the sites to review all physical implementation measures resulting from the proposed amencment. In addition, the NRC would send three individuals to each of the sites to monitor the initial training exercises. Travel expenses and per diem costs for these five-day trips ara shown in Table 12. A contracted consultant is used to develop guidance fo: '.he NRC and the licensees on developing and implementing an exercise pro-gram. The estimated cost for this contractor is $300,000. Implementation of this rule will cost the NRC 3321,000, as shown in Table 12.

Each licensee performs exercises to test parts of the facility protection system. The NRC has developed NUREG/CR 5081 (see Ref. 6), and NUREG/CR 5172 (see Ref. 7) to provide guidance for and to assure consistency among licensee training and exercise programs. After the rule has been implemented, the NRC will send three individuals to each site to observe the yearly TRT exercises.

Annual NRC travel and per diem costs are estimated to be $6500 for the three operating facilities. When the fourth facility is operational, an additional

$2,200 per year would be it,curted.

21 A

Table 11. Cost to protect against the revised design basis threat B&W UNC NFS GA Primary Access Protection: ,

No. of Primary Access 1 2 1 1 Points Delta Barricades @ X 39,250 X 39,250 X 39,250 X 39,250

$39,250 Total Cort 39,250 78,500 39,250 39,250 Seconda y Access Protection:

No. of Secondary Access 2 None 2 None Points Delta Bo11ards @ X 8,500 X 8,500

$8,500 Total Cost 17,000 17,000 Vehicle Cable Total Perimeter, ft. 5,000 5,000 4,080 1,000 0 $10/ foot X 10 X 10 X 10 X 10 Total Cost 50,000 50,000 40,800 10,000 l

Reinforcemel's Perimeter Reinforced 2,000 3,000 1,350 600 9 $20/forst X 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 Total Cost 40,000 60,000 27,000 12,000 1

l Support Labor l Engineer 4 QA 1,700 2,040 1,730 3,250  :

Purchas'ng 370 430 350 790

\

TOTAL $148,320 $190,970 $126,130 $65,290

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Table 12. Impacts on NRC from rule implementation, dollars Travel:

Two Trips to All Facilities 8 Cost per trip X 450 NRC Personnel per Trip X 3 Total Travel Expense 10,800 Per Diem:

Two Trips to All Facilities 8 Lengths of Trips', days X 5 Cost per Day A S:-

NRC Personnel per Trip X 3 Total Per Diem Expense 10,200 Contracted Effort: 300,000 Total NRC Costs $321,000 3.3 Impact on Others The benefit to the public is the strengthened protection of weapons-usable' material against theft. No negative impacts on the public have been identified.

23 1 1

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4. REFERENCES I

1. National Security Council, "Domestic Sefeguards," "National Security 1 Decision Memorandum 254, April 27, 1987." .

2. Adame, K. G., and Roscoe, 8. J., Vehicle Barriers: Emphasis on Natural Features, NUREG/CR-4250, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, O.C., 1985. '

l l 3. Sandia National Laboratory, Barrier Technolony Handbook, SAND 77-0777, '

1978.

4

! 4. Mahone V. D., Means Construction Cost Data, R. S. Means Company, Inc.,

! Kingstv., Massachusetts, 1987, i t j 5. Richardson Engineering Services, Richardson's Rapid Cost Estimation ,

,. Manual. San Marcos, California, 1987. -

l

6. Telfair, W. D., D. A. Moul, J. W. Klingelhoefer., and W. R. Leonard,  !

Tactical Exercise Plannina Handbook, NUREG/CR-5081. U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. ,1988.

i l 1 7. Telfair, W. D., D. . Moul, J. W. Klingelhoefer, K. M. Jourjevich and  ;

i W. R. Leonard, Tactical Exercise Reference Manual. NUREG/CR-5172, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory commission, Washingt .i. D.C. ,1988.

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9 APPENDIX A ALTERNATE PHYSICAL BARRIER CONCEPTS A.I. INTRODliCTION Double physical barriers at the protected area perimeter to delay intruders and enhance detection have been considered. It is assumed that the intrusion oetec-tion system has been installed between the two barriers. Three options are considered in this appendix as an alternative to the second fence described in Section 2.3. These options are: ten parallel horizontal rolls of barbed con-certina tape, a general purpose barbed tape obstacle in mounds of six rolls each, or the use of additional guards. It is assumed that the barriers discussed here are installed as the inner barrier to delay the advertary entering the site after triggering the intrusion detection system, thereby allowing time for protective forces assessment. It is further assumed that vehicle barriers are located at or outside of the outer fence, so that an adversary breaching the perimeter must carry any breaching aids to be used on the inner barrier.

The present value cost for each of the alternatives may be estimated using a discount rate of 10 percent and an expected operating lifo of 20 years. the estimated costs for each of these alternatives, as will be discussed in the following sections, are:

Table A.1 Estimated Alternate Physical Barrier Costs, thousands Implementation Annual Present Value Cost (thousands Cost (thousands Cost (thousands Topic of dollars) of dollars) of dollars)

Eight Foot Fence 241 241 Twelve Foot Fence 412 412 Cencertina Tape 513 80 1,198 Razor Tape 1,887 36 2,196 Additional Guards 420 2,518 21,915 A.1.1 _ Reference Costs Table A.2 shows the referencs cost for the eight and twelve foot fences, as described in Section 3.1.5. Site preparation costs for the second physical barrier and for the asternativas are assumeo to be identical and can therefore be omitted when comparing costs. The primary difference between the eight and twelve foot fences is that for adding a secor.d eight foot fence, the placement is relatively straightforward. The twelve foot fence is, however, placed as the inside fence and may require moving existing fences or adding new fence on the outer fence perimeter. The total cost (not including site preparation) for the twelve foot fence for the four facilities is $412,100 as compared to

$241,200 for adding an eight foot fence. The cost differential for the twelve foot fence as compared to the eight foot fence is $170,900.

A.1

Table A.2 Reference fencing costs, dollars B&W UNC NFS GA l Iteo Lynchburg, VA Montville, CT Erwin, TN San Diego, CA l

Add Fence, ft. 5,000 5,000 4,080 3,000' Cost per linear foot 12 15 15 15 l

TOTAL FOR 8' TENCE $ 60,000 $ 75,000 $ 61,200 $ 45,000 l

Alter Outside Fence (8 f t.) r Existing Fence Moved, ft. 2,500 1,000 1,000 NONE Cost per linear foot x 8 x 8 x 8 l Total Cost 20,000 8,000 8,000 Add Fence, ft. 2,500 1,000 1,000 1,000 Cost per linear foot x 12 x 15 x 15 x 15 Total Cost 30,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 Inside Fence (12 ft.)

E.~isting fence Itaised, f t. 2,500 1,000 1,000 1,000 Cost per linear foot x 9.5 x 9.5 x 9.5 x 9.5 ,

Total Cost 23,750 9,500 9,500 9,500 Now 12 ft. Fence, ft. 2,500 5,000 3,080 2,000 Cost per linear foot x 20 x 20 x 20 x 40 Total tost 50.000 100,000 61,600 80.000 TOTAL $117,500 $107,000 $B8,600 $99,000 Apart from costs, another criterion for comparing the alternatives is the delay time. For each of the barriers discussed below, the delay time .

i exceeds the delay time for the standard eight foot fence.

A.1.2 Concertina Barrier Barbed tape concertina consists of cylindrical-shaped coils 36 inches in diameter and 50 feet long. It may be affixed to the top of a standard security fence, attached vertically to the fence, or installed horizontally on the ground. In the application described here, the barbed tape concertina is installed horizontally on the ground in parallel rows as an alternative to the standard security fence.

Each coil is assumed to consist of a single coil with a diameter of 36 inches.  :

Use of concertina installed on the grour.d is more effective as a delay mechanism A.2

when installed inside the perimeter fence, because the adversary would need to carry br6 aching aids over the outer fence and through the intrusion detection fields.

The delay of the stancard fence is exceeded by installing ten rows of barbed tape concertina horizontally on the ground.

The cost of barbed tapt ranges from less than $1.00 to several dollars per foot for the n aterial. Installation costs per foot are about equal to the cost of the material. 'ne cost used in this analysis is $2.40 per foot for materials and installatinn.

Barbed tap < concertina poses a potential hazard to passing plant personnt' as compared to a standard security fence. Even if the barbed tape concertina is used ra r aan the inside fencing, it may be necessary to install a fence to keep plo, ,ersonnul from acc1 dental contact with the barbed tape concertina.

Such a fei need rot meet the same standards for iieight and strength as the fence ' cated i the analysis for the proposed rule. These fences or per-sonnel .eparat would only ue required adjacent.to personnel walkways, 3

vehicle access points and storage ateas.

Table A.3 shows the cost of the concertina barrier. The totsi cost is

$513,320 for the four facilities. The cort differentia' as compared to the eight foot standard security fence is an increase oi 4272,120.

Additional main' nce costs for the concertina barrier would consist of cleanup, replacetent of damaged tape ana repair of tienwns. Clear.up would require approximately 16 man-hours per quarter to remove leaves and trash and to apply a herbicide to control weeds. A defeliant is expected to ce applied annually at a cost of $0.10 per square foot to a path ten feet

+

wide under the tape. Barb (1 tape concertina is susceptible to encironmental conditions and has a life expectancy of three to twenty years. For t:

' purposes of the cost estimates here, the assumed life expectancy is 10 years with 10 percent of the tape replaced each year. The expected annual costs are $80,465 per year for the four facilities.

A .1. 3 Razor Tape Barrier General purpose barbed tape obstacle (GPBTO) is somewhat similar to concertine barrier except that it has a double spiral and Ic9ger barbs. The example coil has a length of 66 feet and diameter of 30 inches. Each coil is assumed to consist of a double coil with the outer coil having a diameter of 36 inches and

' the inner coil having a diameter of 24 inches. When installed in ground appli-cations, the rolls are anchored to the ground with stakes spaced 5 to 22 feet apart depending on the local winds. A delay greater than that of a standard eight foot fence could be achieved using three mounds of six coils each. The cost for materials and tilstallation is assumed to be $5.80 per foot of co" or

$104.40 for the three mounds.

As with a concertina barrier, a problem to be addressed in the installation of GPBTO is to separate the tape f rcm personnel traf fic in order te prevent injuries. In considering the tape as an alternative to the in;erior fence, the I b nsee should consider meth9ds to seperate the personnel traffic from the tape in order to prevent injury. Other problems to be addressed in the operat- l ing costs include removal o' tran that blows in and the removal of grasses and I weeds that grow up under the tape. Grasses and weeds may be controlled by the l

A.3

Table A.3 Concertina barrier costs, dollars B&W UNC NFS GA Itea Lynchburg, VA Montville, CT Erwin. TN San Diego, CA Alter Outside Fence (8 ft.)

Existina /ence Moved, ft. 5,000 2,000 2,000 1,000 Cost per linear foot x 8 x 8 x 8 x 8 Total Cost 40,000 16,000 16,000 8.000 Ten Parallel Coils Materials, ft. 5,000 .5,000 4,080 3,000 Cost per linear foot x 24 x 24 x 24 x 24 Total Cost 120,000_ 120,000 97,920 72,000 Personnel Separator, ft. 1,000 1,500 600 Cost per linear fact 800 E, 6 x 6 x 6 6 Total Cost 6,000 9,000 3,600 4,800 TOTAL INITIAL COSTS $166,000 $145,000 $117.520 $84,900 Annual Costs Replacement Tape ft. 50 500 Cost per linear foot 408 300 x (. x 24 x 24 x 24 Total Cost 12,000 12,000 9,792 7,200 Defoliaat 9,000 9,000 7.344 5,400 Total Material Cost 21,000 21,000 17,136 12,600 Personnel, hours 64 64 Cost per hour 64 64 x 17.36 x 20.00 x 15.94 x 24.64 Total s;ibor Cost 1,944 2,240 1,785 2,760 TOTAL AshbAL COSTS $22,944 $23,240 $18,921 $15,360 A.4

i use of pavement or gravel underneath the tape or by the use of soil sterilants or defeilant agents.

Table A.4 shows the costs for the Razor tape barrier. The total cost is

$1,806,552 for the four facilities. The cost differential is $1,565,352 compared to the standard security fence. The annual costs are similar to those discussed in Section A.2 and are $36,289 per year.

A.4 Additional Guards Rather than providing a second fence or one of the alternate barriers, a facility potentially could choose to deploy additional guards. This option is difficult to evaluate as fence and guards are generally used for different functions. Therefore, the costs contain significant uncertainty. The minimwn costs can, however, be estimated. It is assumed that the purposes of fencing include: 1) delay adversaries af ter triggering the intrusion detection system long enough for the guards to assess the event and 2) reduce the occurrence of intrusion detection system false alarms due to pesiing plant personnel. Addi-tional guards posted at the perimeter would provide reduced response time, increased surveillance and control of passing plant personnel. It is assumed that five shi'ts are needed to provide continual coverage and to allow for absences.

The minimum number of guards required to provide surveillance of the perimeter is two per shift if they can be placed at oppocite corners of a square peri-meter. For the actual facilities, the minimum number would vary from three to five guards per shift due to irregularities in the perimeter fencing, buildings, entry points, and terrain variations. The estimates of the number of guards at each facility are based on having enough guards to provide complete surveillance of the perimeter. The labor rates do not include guards for rotation and breaks, which are assumed to be handled by the existing guard force. Add!"

tionally, the actual number is likely to be significantly greater than that shown because nominally each guard should not he expected to cover 6pproxiraately 1200 feet of perimeter.

The costs to train the alditional guards that would be needed are shown in Table A.S. It hac been assumed that each guard would require seven weeks of training and indoctrination at the facility before performing duties. The total cost for the four facilitiet, is $480,402. This represents an increase of

$239,202 as compared to the costs for the eight foot fence.

The annual operating costs are shown in Table A.6. The total annual cost for guard time is an increase of $2,517,848 per year for the four facilities as compared to annual costs for the fencing. Additionally, these guards would require equipment repair and maintenance, training and weapons qualification.

An additional cost to be addressed is the addition of supervisor for the added guards. Assuming that one supervisor is needec for each twelve guards, then each site would need an additional two or three supervisors, who would also assi.t in instruction, at an initial cost of $274,074 for the four facilities and an annual cost of $496,416.

A.5

Table A.4 Razor tape barrier costs, dollars B&W UNC NFS GA Item Lynchburg, VA Montville, CT Erwin, TN- San Diego, CA Alter Outside Fence (8 ft.)

Existing Fence Moved, ft. 5,000 2,000 2,000 NONE Cost per linear foot x 8 < 8 x 8 Total Cost 40,000 16,000 16,000

• ihree Six Coil Mounds 4

Materials, ft. 5,000 5.000 4,080 3,000 Cost per linear foot x104.40 x104.40 x104.40 x104.40 l Total Cost 522,000 522,000 425,952 313,200 l l

i Personnel separator, ft. 1,000 1,500 600 800 Cost per linear foot x 6 x 6 x 6 x 6 Total Cost 6,000 9,000 3,600 4,800 TOTAL INITIAL COSTS $568,000 $547,000 $445,552 $318,000 Annual Costs l

Defoliant 9,000 9,000 6,560 2,000

. i Personnel, hours 112 112 112 112 Cost per hour x 17.36 x 20.00 x 15. 94 x 24.64 .(

lsbar Cost 1,944 2,240 1,785 2,760 TOTAL ANNUAL COSTS $10,944 $12.240 $8,345 $4,760 t

A.6

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l Table A.5 Training armed guards for site perimeter, r.osts, dollars  !

I Item B&W UNC NFS GA l

l Number of Observation Points 3 4 3 5 Number of Shifts 5 5 5 5 Total Number of Guards 15 20 15 25 i Starting Hourly Rate 12.00 11.22 11.19 24.64 Hours Training l X 280 X 280 X 280 X 280 .

6 Total Training Labor 50,400 62,832 46,998 172,480 i Amunition and Equipment 7,686 10,976 7,686 12,743 Instruction 7,073 6,464 9,660 28,904 l Weapons Purchased (*) 15 20 15 25 9 5620 X 620 X 620 X 620 X 620 1

9,300 12,40b 9,300 15,500  :

TOTAL $74,459 $102,672 $73,644 $229,627 (a) Weapons are purchased for all guards. '

Table A.6 Annual costs for armed guards at site perimeter, costs, dollars i l

Item g&w gi,u; gp g g4 l Total Number of Guards i 15 20 15 25 Hourly Rate efter Training 12.60 14.84 13.46 i

Hours per Year 24.64  !

X 1920 X 1920 X 1920 X 1920 l Total Labor 362,880 569,856 387,648 1,182,720 Ammunition and Equipment 2,614 3,452 2,614

< 4.290 l Instruction 202 470 276 826 l TOTAL $365,696 5573,778 $390.538 51,187,836 A.7

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ENCLO5URE F 1

1 Draft Congressional Letter 1,

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i ORAFT C0flGRESS10NAL LETTER

Dear Mr. Chairman:

l Enclosed for your information is a Federal Register Notice for the publication  ;

! of a rule on safeguards requirements for fuel facilities possessing formula qtantities of strategic special nuclear material. The Nuclear Regulatory ,

1 Ccmission (NRC) is amending its physical ~ protection and security personnel l l performance regulations for these facilities to a level equivalent to that at  !

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comparable Department of Energy (DOE) fuel facilities. The changes to enhance  ;

i NRC's safeguards requirertents are the result of a recent study which compared J

NRC's requirements with DOE's recently upgraded security system and are

] supported by findit,p made from reviews of NRC's Regulatory Effectiveness l Reviews, safeguar h event reports, licensing actions, and inspection reports.

l The findings have led to the proposed strengthening of safeguards requirerents i in the following areas: (1) security system performance evaluation through l

! tactical response team exercises, (2) night firing qualification for guards using all essigned weapons, (3) search of 100 percent of entering personnel i and packages, (4) posting of armed guards at material access area control (

I points, (5) provision of an additional physical personnel barrier around the

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protected area, and (6) revision of the design basis threat to include j possible use of a land vehicle by postulated adversaries and implementation of j measures to prevent forcible vehicle entry into the protected area.

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2 The amendments would provide greater assurance that physical safeguards at

, fuel facilities possessing formula quantities of SSNM can provide the capability to protect against the design basis threat.

4 i The rule will become effective 30 days after publication. The requirements

! specified in items (2), (3), and (4) have been implemented with the cooperation of the affected licensees and licenses have been. appropriately

! amended. The licensees will have 6 months to submit plans to implement j requirements (1),(5)and(6). These plan amendments are required to i be effective within 365 days of approval.

1 Sincerely, l

Eric S. Beckjord, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research i

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Enclosure:

Federal Register Notice cc: Ranking Minority Henbers

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! ENCLOSURE G Draft Puolic Anneur. cement l

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