ML20207H695
| ML20207H695 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1986 |
| From: | Devincentis J PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| SBN-1115, NUDOCS 8607250046 | |
| Download: ML20207H695 (7) | |
Text
i hABR00KSTATION Enginsaring Offica June 13, 1986 Public Service of New Hampshire SBN-1115 T.F.
B4.2.7 NEW HAMPSHIRE YANKEE DIVISION United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Attention:
Mr. Stewart D. Ebneter, Director Division of Reactor Projects
References:
(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) USNRC Letter, dated May 28, 1986, " Inspection Report No. 50-443/86-14", S. D. Ebneter to R. J. Harrison Subj ect :
Response to Inspection Report No. 50-443/86-14
Dear Sir:
Our response to the violations repartu in the subject inspection is provided in Attachment 1, included herewith.
The corrective action completion dates, where applicable, are also provided therein.
Very truly yo rs, il/~5
[ John DeVincent.ie Director of Engineering Attachment cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List 8607250046 860613 l
PDR ADOCK 05000443 l
G PDR lE.'.l
,[f Seabrook Station Construction Field Office. P.O. Box 700 Seabrook, NH 03874
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Dicna Curran, Esquiro ()
C0lvin A. C sy l
H;rmon & Weics City Mints lj 2001 S. Street, N.W.
City Hall Suite 430 126 Daniel Street Washington, D.C.
20009 Portsmouth, NH 03801 l
Sherwin E. Turk Esq.
Stephen E. Merrill, Esquire l
Office of the Executive Legal Director Attorney General U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission George Dana Bisbee, Esquire l
Tenth Floor Assistant Attorney General Washington, DC 20555 Office of the Attorney General 25 Capitol Street Robart A. Backus, Esquire Concord, NH 03301-6397 116 Lowell Street P.O. Box 516 Mr. J. P. Nadeau Manchester, NH 03105 Selectmen's office 10 Central Road Philip Ahrens. Esquire Rye, NH 03870 Assistant Attorney General Department of The Attorney General Mr. Angie Machiros Statehouse Station #6 Chairman of the Board of Selectmen Augusta, ME 04333 Town of Newbury Newbury, MA 01950 Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Chairman, Board of Selectmen Mr. William S. Lord RFD 1 - Box 1154 Board of Selectmen Kennsington, NH 03827 Town Hall - Friend Street Amesbury, MA 01913 Carol S. Sneider Esquire Assistant Attorney General Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Department of the Attorney General 1 Pillsbury Street One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Concord, NH 03301 i
Boston, MA 02108 (ATTN: Herb Boynton)
Senator Gordon J. Humphrey H. Joseph Flynn, Esquire U.S. Senate Office of General Counsel Washington, DC 20510 Federal Emergency Management Agency (ATTN: Tom Burack) 500 C Street, SW Washington, DC 20472 Richard A. Hampe. Esq.
Hampe and McNicholas Paul McEachern, Esquire 35 Pleasant Street Matthew T. Brock, Esquire j
Concord, NH 03301 Shaines & McEachern 25 Maplewood Avenue l
Thomas F. Powers, III P.O. Box 360 Town Manager Portsmouth, NH 03801 Town of Exeter 10 Front Street Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
Exeter, NH 03833 Holmes & Ells 47 Winnacunnet Road Brentwood Board of Selectmen Hampton, NH 03842 "RFD Dalton Road Brentwood, NH 03833 Mr. Ed Thomas FEMA Region I Peter J. Mathews, Mayor 442 John W. McCormack PO & Courthouse City Hall Boston, MA 02109 Newburyport, MA 01950 Robert Carrigg Town office Atlantic Avenue North Hampton, NH 03862 y
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SBN-1115 v
ATTACRMENT 1_
NRC Violation 86-14-01 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII, requires that identification of items be maintained by sppropriate means throughout fabrication, erection, installation, and use.
Seabrook Station FSAR, Section 17.2.8.1, requires that component identification be maintained by physical means.
Contrary to the above:
a.
On March 18, 1986, proper identification of the serial number was not maintained by appropriate means for valve 1-SW-139.
The valve was mistagged with an erroneous ASME code data tag.
b.
On March 19, 1986, proper identification of the serial number was not maintained for diesel generator room ventilation fan motors DAH-FN-25A and B.
Both motors were identified by identical serial numbers on the manufacturer's data plate.
This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement II).
Response
a.
We concur that valve 1-SW-139 had improper identification.
b.
We have held discussions with Westinghouse Electric Corp-oration at Buffalo, NY, the manufacturer of the motors. We were informed that the serial numbers on motors in question were correct and not duplicative.
The Westinghouse system for motor serialization is shop order oriented; thus, during production when a new shop order is issued, the serial number sequence begins anew for that shop order. For example, in the case of the motors identified by the inspector, the shop order on the name plate was 77C-18588.
The other was shop order 77C-18589.
In both cases, the serial number is based on the date shipped plus a sequential number of manufacturing.
The first motor manufsetured for a specific shop order would be number -001.
Westinghouse is confident that the data on the nameplates is co r re ct.
S.O.
77C - 18588 Serial 8005-01-001 S.O.
77C -
18589 Serial 8005-01-001 Westinghouse is retrieving f rom the archives the documentation that will confirm their position.
We have discussed the situation with our receiving inspection people.
They are aware that Westinghouse equipment in some cases have identical serial numbers.
They then focus on the shop order number.
Based upon our subsequent investigation and review, we have concluded that a violation does not exist requiring corrective action. -
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SBN-1115
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ATTACHMENT 1 g
(Continued) 1 Corrective Action a.
Thirty-four (34) service water valves had their ASME Code data tags verified.
Since 1-SW-V-15 and 1-SW-V-23 had erroneous tags, Nonconformance Report (NCR) 74/3505, " Incorrect Code Data Plates on Service Water Valves Identified at Verification Walkdown" was issued to document and correct this discrepancy.
The NCR disposition directed that appropriate Code tags be attached to the three valves and witnessed by the ANI. Work was completed and signed off on the NCR on April 7, 1986.
b.
None required.
Corrective Action to Preclude Recurrence a.
The entire retag program has been reviewed resulting in the following action:
1.
A Corrective Action Request, Number 216, has been issued to assure that all open retags are addressed.
2.
Field General Construction Procedure (FGCP)-21, Retagging and Urgent Withdrawal of Plant Items as Parts is being revised to better control retagging of equipment, b.
None required.
Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved a.
It is expected that full compliance will be achieved by 06/25/86.
b.
No action required.
NRC Violation 86-14-02 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, states in part, " Activities af fecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings.... and shall be accomplished in accord-ance with these instructions, procedures or drawings".
a.
Seabrook Drawing No. 9763-F-310525 indicates that the Fuel Oil Day Tank Rooms in the Diesel Generator Building are Hazardous Areas, NEC Class I, Division 2, Group D.
This class requires conduit sealing to prevent communication of gases or vapors beyond the seal. Plant Specification No.
9763-006-249-7 indicates that the seals in these rooms are to be 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire seals.
Contrary to the above, on March 18, 1986, two 2" conduit penetrations were unsealed in the "B" Fuel Oil Day Tank Room.
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ATTACHMENT 1
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(Continu:d) b.
Seabrook Station Test Program Instruction No. TPI-ll, Sections 3.2 and 5.1, require a Work Request prior to disassembly of ASME components.
Contrary to the above, on March 14, 1986, four ASME components (support channels above Heat Exchanger No. RH-E-9B) were dis-assembled without a Work Request authorization. A Work Request authorizing gasket replacement on the heat exchanger did not authorize this work.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement II).
Response
a.
This violation was the result of an oversight due to the unique arrangement of the sleeves and exposed conduits in the B-Diesel Day Tank Room.
Since the conduits were not coupled to the sleeves, the "EYS" conduit fittings alone would not provide an adequate seal.
The A-Diesel Day Tank Room was checked and found to have the same configuration.
In addition, Engineering has reviewed other areas in the plant having similar (conduit "EYS" -
sleeve) arrangements and found the Day Tank Rooms to be the only areas with this problem.
As such this is an isolated condition not requiring corrective action to preclude recurrence.
b.
Startup Test Department Procedure TPI-11 ccquires that work be done in accordance with the scope of the work request.
If the work request scope is not adequate, either additional definition of the work or an additional work request is required.
Individuals involved in the implementation of time work request assumed that the removal of the supports was within the scope of the work request as it was necessary to renove the supports to implement the work request.
Corrective Action a.
In addition, to checking the A-Diesel Day Tank Room for adequate seals, an ECA (03/115973) was issued to provide proper instruc-tions for installing adequate seals in these two rooms. Adequat e 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire seals have been installed in these areas.
b.
1.
To assure correct reinsta11ation of the supports, Work Request RH-0714 and RH-0786 were issued and since completed.
2.
The individuals which were involved have been reinstructed in program requirements.
3.
It should be noted that the present Work Request Program is being replaced by the Station Operation Work Request Program.
It is presently being implemented on items that have been conditionally accepted and turned over to Station Staff (i.e. items which are statused as " CAT").
The target date for full implementation of the Station Operation Work Request Program is Coreload.
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SBN-1115 ATTACHMENT 1
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Corrective Action to Preclude Recurrence a.
None required.
b.
Startup Test Department Supervision and Lead Engineers have been instructed to comply with program requirements. The Station Operation Work Request Program is believed to have adequate controls to preclude recurrence.
Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved a.
Corrective action completed.
b.
Station Operation Work Request Program will be fully implemented at coreload.
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