ML20207H183
| ML20207H183 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/1988 |
| From: | Irving S IRVING, S.M. |
| To: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207H173 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8808240384 | |
| Download: ML20207H183 (1) | |
Text
-
ATTORN EY AT LAW 64s NAPOLEON SinEET Steplies M. Ireinag e TO ~ ~ e. <e.... ~.....
(so4) us..in July 25, 1988 Mr. Victor Stello, Jr.
Executive Director For Operations United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington D.C.
Re: Your letter of June 27, 1988 to Senator john Breaux
Dear Mr. Stello:
I have received a
copy of your letter to Senator Breaux responding to my complaint.
This is the first that I have heard from your agency concerning the matter so It was with great interest that this informaiton was received.
First, your letter does not address the question of the lag time to put the prompt notification system into operation in the event that there is a need to do so.
During off hours it appears that the activation of the system depends on a single individual who may have other duties.
To what extent is the security person assigned the duty of activiation of the system otherwise engaged?
This method is certainly not redundant. One must also wonder why the public was not notified about the deactiviation of the system.
As to the condensate water storage tank; the assumption that the soil absorption will prevent migration of the radionuclides is somewhat dubious.
There are drain grates leading to the storm water system all around this tank.
It would seem to be more in line with the laws of physics that the bulk of the material will i
go down the drain so to speak rather than into the soil.
It appears that the primary protection system in the event of the so failure of this tank (perhaps similiar to the event that has N@ogp already occurred referenced in my earlier letter) is the great i
assimilative capacity of the Mississippi River.
This must be 88 a comfort to the million or so citizens who drink the water from MO this river downstream.
TV Mo MO Sin -
yo u,,rs,
N@
bc
${r Me 1en M.
Irvin' ~
cc Senator Er aux O---003864
p 37@
' hun
]
UNITED STATES o
g 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIT JION o
5
<j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
.JUN 2 71998 j
l The Honorable John Breaux
)
United States Senate i
Washington, D. C.
20510 l
Dear Senator Breaux:
I am responding to your letter dated May 23, 1988, enclosing a letter from Mr. Stephen M. Irving, an attorney in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Mr. Irving requested that the Commission take imediate action to correct two conditions at the River Bend Station. Mr. Irving expressed concern regarding the necessity for manually activating the prompt notification system and the pott:ntial for the release of contaminated water from the condensate storage tank to East and West Creeks, Grants Bayou, and ultimately to the Mississippi River.
Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU), the licensee for the River Bend Station (RBS), is taking steps to improve the prompt notification system to reduce the inadvertent actuation of sirens in the Parishes that are participants in the emergency plan. Until recently, the emergency preparedness computer at River Bend Station was normally in the automatic mode.
In this mode all the sirens in a Parish could be manually activated without the concurrence of the RBS plant staff by pressing a button in the Parish emergency operations center (E0C).
This action sends a radio signal from the Parish transmitter to the siren coniputer transceiver located at the River Bend Station Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
In turn, the transceiver converted and transmitted the signal to activate the sirens in the Parish. This mode of operation was changed to minimize siren activations caused by spurious radiofrequency signals.
The computer transceiver at the EOF, now in standby mode, requires the concurrence l
of the RBS staff to switch it to automatic mode. Temporarily, this switching is done manually in the EOF by pressing a button. After declaring a General Emergency, the RBS Emergency Director will notify the emergency preparedness j
staff to place the computer in the automatic mode. The emergency preparedness staff is located in the same EOF building during nonnal shifts. During off-shifts, i
a security guard stationed in the same building will be notified by radio or telephone to do the same. We understand that both the emergency staff and the security guards have received hands-on training and have demonstrated their proficiency during drills.
By October 1988, GSU intends to install remote control hardware that will enable the Emergency Director in the Control Room to switch from standby to automatic mode. GSU had coordinated the above changes with the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency, the Parishes, and the State of Louisiana.
Other modifications that have been, or will be completed by October 1988 are:
Improved shielding and grounding of the electronic equipment at the Parish EOCs; modification for the 92 sirens to reduce their susceptibility to spurious radiofrequency signals; installation of an upgraded computer with the capability to provide a fully redundant siren control and monitoring systen; and complete testing of the associated hardware which will provide for "safe" failure modes to prevent inadvertent siren activation.
Of(S 5(I(2 2
The Honorable John Breaux The NRC staff concluded that these corrective actions should reduce the probability of spurious siren activations while providing an acceptable level of emergency notification.
The effects of the failure of the condensate storage tank and release of its l
contents were considered by the NRC staff during the review of GSU's application for an operating license for River Bend Station, Unit 1.
The staff's evalua-tion is contained in Section 15.7.3, Liquid Tank Failure Accident, Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of River Bend Station, NUREG-0989, May 1984. The staff conducted an independent evaluation of the consequences of component failures for radioactive-liquid-waste-components located outside the reactor containment building that could result in releases of liquid i
containing radioactive materials to the environs. The staff considered failure of the condensate storage tank directly after refueling, when it would contain the highest radionuclide inventory. This tank is outside and unprotected by a spill basin; its rupture would release 600,000 gallens onto the ground. The staff concluded that the radionuclide concentrations in the tank are sufficiently low so that when the high water absorption of the soil (which reduces the amount of water entering the Mississippi River) and the high dilution capability of the Mississippi River are taken into account, the resulting radionuclide concentrations at the nearest unrestricted drinking water source will be less than the 10 CFR Part 20 limits. Accordingly, the condensate storage tank was considered acceptable.
i In view of the above discussion, Mr. Irving's concerns have been addressed and no additional action beyond that which is ongoing is deemed necessary. Mr. Irving had further requested access to infomation produced in connection with the complaint. Enclosed is a recent NRC inspection report that andresses inadvertent actuation of emergency sirens.
Sincepplyp1 sipd W.
yiotoE St*114 Victor Stello, Jr.
Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
As stated DISTRIBUTION w/o enclosure:
Docket File NRC PDR w/cy of incoming Local PDR w/cy of incoming EDO # 003769 EDD Reading T. Murley/J. Sniezek F. Miraglia PD4 Reading D. Crutchfield L. Rubenstein OGC-Rockville GPA/CA V. Stello D.Mossburg,PMAS(ED0f003769) w/cy of incoming P. Shea W. Paulsonw/cy of incoming J. Calvo i
P. Noonan PD4 Green Ticket File
- See previous concurrences PDIV:LA* PDIV:PM*
REGIV*
PDIV:D*
TECH ED* OGC*
- DRSP:D PNoonan WPaulson:kb Everett JCalvo EShoemaker DCrutchfield i
06/14/86 06/ 0/88 g 9
06/15/88 06/15/88 06/15/88 06/17/88 06/20/8C ADP*
SQ R
ADR4*
E00 FMiraglia JS4 zek rkey LRubenstein VStello 06/20/88 06(}/88 06A/788 06/15/88 06/ /88
.,_g.
gjQ (
m N-s
, g#
" N M,.
V
)
Stephea M. Irring I
- g
- N -,i- # A -
a (q. J'1 e
~,_
28 ATTORN EY AT LAW
,o 645 N APOLEON STREET M '"
(
DATON ROUCE. LOUl$t ANA 70802 Mr. Victor Stello, Jr.
Executive Director For Operations United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.8Qf/d t
1, liilillliiilliiilliiilliiiiiilil
- -