ML20207F702
| ML20207F702 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1988 |
| From: | Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207F700 | List: |
| References | |
| 2.206, DD-88-13, NUDOCS 8808230172 | |
| Download: ML20207F702 (12) | |
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. 00-88-13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Thomas E. Murley, Director In the Matter of CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING Docket Nos. 50-440 COMPANY, ET AL. 50-441 (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, (10CFR2.206)
Units 1&2)
DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 INTRODUCTION On January 9, 1987. Energy Probe and the Western Reserve Alliance (Petitioners) filed with the Commissioners of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conrnission (NRC) a Petition requesting the immediate suspension of the opera-ting license for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, et al.1/ (Licensees) because of alleged safety defi-ciencies particularly in the area of pipe clamps. The Petition also requests that an independent design review be conducted to evaluate the design of pipe clamps used at Perry because of the alleged deficiencies with regard to these i
components. The Petition further requests that a special independent inspection team be assembled to review the allegations raised in the Petition including alleged programatic deficiencies in design control and quality assurance / quality control at the Generic Electric (GE) facility in San Jose, California, which could potentially affect GE components supplied to all power plants including l
1/ Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company is authorized to act as agent for Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania Power Company, and I
the Toledo Edison Company and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation, and maintenance of the facility.
88082301'3 880s14 PDR ADCJK 3500044o O PDC
, 2 the Perry facility. The Petition alleges that these latter concerns had been brought to the attention of the NRC by the Government Accountability Project (GAP) in its letters of October 5,1985 and October 24, 1986. The Petition seeks imediate removal from the Perry plant of any defective or inappropriate GE components described in those letters.
The Petition further alleges impropriety on the part of the NRC and the Licensees specifically with regard to the consideration given by the NRC to an earlier Petition submitted by Western Reserve Alliance pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206.
involving the Perry facility. That Decision discussed the seismic adequacy of the Perry facility in light of the January 31, 1986 earthquake near the facility. The Director's Decision in that matter, D0-86-4, was issued on March 18, 1986.2/ The January 9, 1987 Petition alleges fraud in the preparation of that Director's Decision and refers to an investigation by the Office of Investi-gations that documents this fraud. The Petition requests withdrawal of that Director's Decision because of fraud in its issuance.
On March 5,1987, the Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor
- Regulation acknowledged receipt of the Petition. He informed the Petitioners that the Petition would be treated under 10 CFR 2.206 of the Comission's regu-lations and that a fonnal decision would be issued within a reasonable time.
l Notice of receipt of the Petition was published on March 11, 1987 in the l
2/ Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, et al. (Perry Nuclear Power i
Plant, Units 1 & 2), DD-86-4, 23 NRC 211 (1986) l l
3 Federal Register (52 FR 7504). The Acting Director further informed the Petitioners that the Petition provided an insufficient basis to take immediate action as requested in the Petition, specifically, shutdown of the Perry facility.
The Acting Director also addressed the Petitioners' allegations regarding documented fraud in the preparation of an earlier Director's Decision. Being unaware of any investigation that called into question the earlier Director's Decision, the Acting Director declined to withdraw that Decision on the basis of information contained in the Petition.
A Petitioner (Western Reserve Alliance) responded to the Acting Director's March 5, 1987 letter by letter dated April 1, 1987. The Petitioner amended the January 9, 1987 Petition by correcting a reference to the NRC office the Petitioner believed held documentation of alleged fraudulent investigations by NRC inspectors, that is, the Office of the Inspector and Auditor (OIA), rather than the Office of Investigetions (01) as stated in the original Petition.
The NRC staff has completed its review of each of the Petitioners' specific concerns noted above. My formal decision in this matter follows.
DISCUSSION A. Pipe Clamp concerns
! The Petitioners allege deficiencies in the design, manufacture, and installation of pipe clamps furnished by Western Piping & Engineering Company (WPE) for ASME Code Class 1 and safety-related piping systems at the Perry
4 plant. Specifically, the Petition alleges violations of the design and fabri-cation criteria for the pipe clamps specified in Subsection NF of ASME Code Section III which is required by 10 CFR Part 50. The ASME Code states that the design of the pipe clamps must be certified by a professional engineer cognizant in his discipline. The Petitioners allege that, in the case of the WPE pipe clamps, the engineer who certified the design was not a licensed engineer in California, the State in which he was practicing, nor was he licensed in the discipline that covered pipe clamp design (mechanical engineering) since the engineer was a licensed structural engineer.
The Petitioners further argue that critical parts of the pipe clamps are in violation of the ASME Code because they were improperly exempted by the manufacturer from the Code requirements for design, materials, and fabrication.
These parts are the clamp snoe (the part between the pipe and load bar), load nut washers, and jam nuts. The Petitioners also argue that the installation instructions to ensure compliance with the clamp preload (torque) requirements are in error, causing an installed preload that is double that intended.
Therefore, the resulting load, which is significantly greater than the design load, could result in unanalyzed stresses in the pipe wall unaccounted for in the design which, in turn, could lead to pipe burst.
67 September 30, 1986, the NRC issued IE Inspection Report No. 99900302/86-01 summarizing an inspection conducted by the NRC on August 11-12, 1986 of the WPE facility in San Francisco, California. The purpose of the inspection was to examine WPE records related to allegations concerning the qualification i
of personnel performing certification activities for pipe clamps and materials supplied by WPE. Areas examined during the inspection included quality assurance .
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5 and engineering records related to the above allegations. The inspection con-sisted of an examination of representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.
During the inspection, the inspector determined that the engineer certifying pipe clamps manufactured by WPE was not a registered Professional Engineer in the State of California. However, the engineer in question was properly regis-tered as a Professional Engineer in the States of Pennsylvania and New York, which satisfies the ASME Code requirement for registration in at least one state of the United States or province of Canada. In addition, the NRC staff considers that a licensed structural engineer is qualified to make the certifications required by the ASME Code and that the certifying discipline is not limited to mechanical engineering.
Further, as discussed in the inspection report, no instances were found where the clamps failed to meet the requirements of the ASME Code for certifica-tion, manufacturing, and testing specified on the purchase orders reviewed for certain U.S. nuclear power plants. In addition, no failures to meet the requirements of the ASME Code were found in representative records for similar pipe clamp:; supplied by WPE to customers procuring clamps for unspecified U.S.
facilities and for foreign nuclear plants. No items of nonconformance with pur-chase specifications were identified.
With regard to Petitioners' allegations that critical parts of the pipe clamp were in violation of the ASME Code, Petitioners have provided no specific facts as a basis for this allegation as required by 10 CFR 2. E 6(a). As stated above, the qualifications of the WPE Professional Engineer to provide certifica-tions was found adequate by the NRC staff. This engineer has certified that the pipe clamps in question meet the ASME Code requirements for design, fabrica-
- tion and materials.
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, 6 As further stated above, no instances were found during the NRC inspection at WPE where pipe ciamps failed to meet the requirement of the ASME Code speci-fied on the purchase specifications for certification, manufacture and testing.
No items of nonconformance with purchase specifications were identified. An earlier inspection of the WPE facility by the NRC in May 1982 documented in Inspection Report No. 99900302/82-01 dated July 28, 1982 failed to identify any deficiencies or nonconformances with respect to control of fabrication processes at WPE. Given these acceptable inspection findings and the lack of any factual basis in Petitioners' allegations, the staff has no basis to conclude that the pipe clamps in question were improperly exempted from Code requirements for design, material certification or fabrication as alleged by the Petitioners.
The Petitioners also allege that installation instructions for the pipe clamps in question are in error. The clamps in question are sometimes called stiff pipe clamps to differentiate them from conventional pipe clamps, which have been used for many years in high-pressure piping applications. As reported in Board Notification 82-105A (Reference 1.b. of the Petition), the NRC staff had then concluded that these relatively new clamps could result in localized -
piping stresses significantly higher than the stresses from conventional pipe clamps. Piping designers who were accustomed to neglecting these localized
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stresses because they were low magnitude stresses might also neglect the higher stresses associated with those new clamps. For this reason, the NRC staff issued IE Infonnation Notice No. 83-80 to all licensees of nuclear power facilities on November 23, 1983, calling attention to this possibility to assure that increased stresses associated with stiff pipe clamps were properly considered in the design.
Subsequently, the NRC staff requested that the Licensees provide specific infonna-tion on the use of stiff pipe clamps at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, by letters dated March 19, 1984, February 19, 1985, and April 24, 1985.
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I The Licensees responded to those requests by letters dated October 1, 1984, March 18, 1985, and June 14, 1985, respectively. The NRC staff has reviewed the information submitted by the licensees and determined that no further action is required because the Licensees have adequately addressed the concerns described in IE Information Notice No. 83-80 in the use of stiff pipe clan.ps at the Perry facility. These include the preload effect on pipe stresses. On the basis of the staff's review of this issue, the information on pipe clamp deficiencies proferred in the Petition is not sufficient to warrant suspension of operation of the Perry facility or an indepandent design review to address the allegations of pipe clamp deficiencies at that facility. +
B. QA/QC Concerns at the GE San Jose Facility The Petitioners allege concerns that there are potentially serious progrannatic deficiencies in the design control and quality assurance / quality control (QA/QC) at the GE facility in San Jose, California. Petitioners refer to a letter from the Government Accountability Project (GAP) to the NRC of October 5, 1985 as the main basis for their allegations. In its 1985 letter, GAP alleged that programmatic deficiencies had been identified by a former GE employee. After concluding that GE was not being responsive to the issues raised, a GAP consul-tant conducted a review and analysis of information which had been provided to GAP. The GAP letter also alleged possible violations by GE of the Commission's 4
reporting requirements in 10 CFR Part 21. GAP made documents concerning these allegations available for NRC review in February 1986. In March 1986, NRC obtained copies of the documents referred to, including a copy of the report prepared by the GAP consultant.
After obtaining the records from GAP. the NRC conducted interviews with the former employee by telephone and in perstn in San Jose in April 1986. The NRC then
l 8 l began a nries of inspections at the GE San Jose facility which are discussed in greater detail below. Results of the inspections and status of the allega-tions review were periodically discussed with GAP by the NRC. The allegations encompassed a variety of concerns including independent design verification, training, adequacy of procedures and deferred verification.
The nature of QA/QC deficiencies identified in the allegations relates to the degree of documentation associated with the followup of previously identified deficiencies. As stated and characterized by the former GE employee, he is not aware of any hardware issues and his concern is primarily related to the alleged breakdown in GE's documentation.
The NRC addressed the allegations presented by the former GE employm and GAP's consultant by conducting numerous inspections at the San Jose facility to review and followup the items identified in the GAP consultant's review of the former GE employee's work record. Specifically, inspections were conducted in July 1986, April 1987, August 1987, November 1987, and February 1988. The results of these inspections are documented in NRC Inspection Reports Nos.
99900403/86-01, 87-01, 87-03, 87-06, and 88-01, respectively. The inrpections consisted of an e:: amination of procedures and representative retards, interviews with personnel, and observations by the NRC inspectors. At the conclusion of the inspections, there were no unresolved items remaining. During the course of the inspections, several items of nonconformance we;e identified. These generally involved failure to provide or maintain adequate documentation as required by quality assurance procedures including failure to process Deferred Verification
! Status Change Notices, inability to retrieve an Engineering Work Authorization, failure to document delays in completion of Corrective Action Reports and other l
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. 9 minor nonconfonnances. Inspection Report No. 99900403/88-01, provides a detailed description of the NRC staff's resolution of all items identified in the GAP letters of October 5,1985 and October 24, 1986. These NRC inspection efforts failed to identify any substantive safety concerns with GE equipment and failed to identify any noncompliance with the reporting provisions of 10 CFR Part 21.
In addition to the specific attention the NRC has given to QA/QC concerns at the GE San Jose facility, Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that licensees and applicants for a license or construction permit be responsib;e for the establishment and implementation of a separate quality assurance program applica-b'e to their components. The specif M requirements of the quality assurance program are described in Appendix B and include such things as (1) control of .
purchased material, equipment, and services to ensure conformance with procure-ment documents; (2) identification and control of naterials, parts, and compon-ents by heat number, part number, or other appropriate means to prevent the use ofincorrectordefectivematerialorcomponents;and(3)conductofplannedand periodic audits as necessary to verify compliance with all aspects of the qual-ity assurance program. Followup actions, including reaudit of deficient areas, are to be taken when indicated.
The Licensees have a quality assurance program in effect at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. During its review of the application for an operating license for the Perry facility, the NRC staff reviewed the program and found it acceptable. The staff's review is documented in NUREG-0887, "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Perry Nuclear Power Plant Units I and 2,"
dated May 1982, and Supplements 1, 3, 4, and 7 to that report dated August 1982, April 1983. February 1984, and November 1985, respectively, i
. 10 The Licensees' quality assurance program requires that implementing procedures and instructions encompass detailed controls for (1) translating codes, standards, regulatory requirements. Technical Specifications, and engineering and process requirements into drawings, specifications, procedures, and instructions; (2) developing, reviewing, and approving procurement documents, including changes; (3) prescribing all quality-related activities by documented instructions, proce-dures, drawings, and specifications; (4) issuing and distributing approved documents; (5)purchasingitemsandservices;(6)identifyingmaterials, parts,andcomponents; (7) performing special processes; (8) inspecting and testing materials, equipment, processes, or services; (9) calibrating and maintaining measuring and test equipment; (10) handling, storing, and shipping items; (11) identifying the inspection, test, and operating status of items, (12) identifying and correcting or disposing of nonconfoming items; (13) correcting conditions adverse to quality; (14) preparing and raintaining quality assurance records; and (15) auditing activities that affect quality.
The Licensees' procurement and administration quality section (1) revidws and approves procurement documents; (2) maintains a program for approval, audit, and surveillance of suppliers; (3) perfoms receipt inspections; and (4) provides non-destructive examination service and administrative support for the department.
In accordance with the NRC staff-approved quality assurance program and method-ology, the Licensees have performed periodic audits at the GE San Jose facility to verify that the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 have been met
.with regard to components provided by GE. Although required to perform these i
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11 audits at 3 year intervals, the Licensees have been performing them far more frequently, at approximately 1 year intervals. No significant deficiencies were noted with respect to QA/QC for the Perry Nuclear Power Pitnt providing assurance that GE components for the Perry facility are adequate.
In addition, it should be recognized that hardware provided to the Perry facility by GE that can affect safe operation and shutdown of the facility has had to undergo required pre-operational testing and periodic surveillance testing providing additional assurance that this equipment will function properly.
Based on the Licensees' quality assurance program in effect at the Perry fa:ility, the staff's review and acceptance of that program, both the Licensees' and the NRC staff's findings resulting from audits and inspections conducted at the GE San Jose facility, and the acceptable results from testing GE componer:is, the Petitioners' requests, insofar as they relate to a removal of defective or inappropriate GE components from the Perry nuclear plants as identified in GAP letters of October 5,1985 and October 24, 1986 and establishment of a special independent inspection team, are denied.
C. Alleged Fraudulent Activity by NRC Investigators The Petitioners allege that the NRC is in possession of documented evidence within either the Office of Investigations or the Office of the Inspector and Auditor concluding that reports issued by the Licensees and the NRC concerning Western Reserve Alliance's February 4, 1986 Petition pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 were created in a fraudulent manner and that these reports were used as a basis for denial of that Petition. The Petitioners request, on the basis of these allegations, that the Director's Decision denying that Petition be withdrawn.
12 As stated in the Director's March 5,1987 letter acknowledging receipt of the January 9,1987 Petition, the Director was unaware of am investigation (emphasis added) that called into question an earlier Director's Decision.
However, in response to the Petition, the Petitioners' allegations were referred to the Office of the Inspector and Auditor (OIA) for appropriate action. OIA undertook an investigation of this matter. kiy office has been informed that the investigation has been completed, and no evidence of NRC fraudulent activity or wrongdoing as alleged by the Petitioners has been substantiated.
CONCLUSION None of the concerns identified by Petitioners raise substantial health and safety issues which would warrant the initiation of show cause proceedings. The specific relief requested by the Petitioners such as license suspension, an independent design review of pipe clamps, and a special independent inspection team to review the allegations in the Petition is not warranted by the informa-tion presented in the Petition. Accordingly, Petitioners' requests are denied. ,
As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Comission for the Commission's review.
. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wh;T2 $
Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 14thday of August 1988.