ML20207C451
| ML20207C451 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/18/1988 |
| From: | Beyea J, Sholly S, Thompson G MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-I-STATE-020, OL-I-STATE-20, NUDOCS 8808090226 | |
| Download: ML20207C451 (157) | |
Text
UNITFD STATFS NUd FAR RFGULAiORY COMMISSION.
MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL O
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD',
In the Matter of:
)
)
EVIDENTIARY HEARING:
)
)
DOCKET:
50-443-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
50-444-OL
)
0FFSITE EMERGENCY NEW HAMPSHIRE, et at
)
PLANNING
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
O LOCATION:
CONCORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE DATE: May 16 through 20, 1988
==..==================a.......-=============
0 HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION ossederaspwees 1220 L Street N.W., Seite 600 WasMaston, D.C. 20005 8808090226 800518 (292) 6M PDR ADOCK 05000443 G
F 5 sk-zP tW L :i.i Umt UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CFFICL U-
- Ter v DOCKEilNG A ' Levt[
Before Administrative Judges:
Ivan W.
Smith, Chairperson Gustave A.
Linenberger, Jr.
Dr. Jerry Harbour
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Docket Nos.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
50-443-444-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL.
)
(Off-site EP)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
April 25, 1988
)
O COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C.
SHOLLY ON THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. JAN BEYEA ON POTENTIAL j
RADIATION DOSAGE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS THAT FORM THE BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, AND DR. GORDON THOMPSON ON POTENTIAL RADIATION RELEASE SEQUENCES NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0!!'.1:G' l
D &tflo. M
~6 Offici:1Exb.No. d Q..--
t, m matter of SM 08 b Department of the Attorney General IDENTIFIED C
Commonwealth of Massachusetts m.t RECElVED _
One Ashburton Place
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Boston, MA 02108-1698 (617) 727-2265 OC___ mE Adr usanw m-I r
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(Testimony of Sholly, and Beyea and Thompson on Sheltering)
O TABLE OF CONTENTS I
Pace I.
IDENTIFICATION OF WITNESSES.
y II.
CONTENTIONS 9
III.
OVERVIEW 10 IV.
SYNOPSIS OF WASH-1400 SURRY ANALYSIS 13 V.
USE OF WASH-1400 RESULTS IN_HUREG-0396 16 VI.
USE OF WASH-1400 INSIGHTS IN SETTING EPZ DISTANCES 22 VII.
CQRCLUEION REGARD.ING THE TECHNICAL BASES FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING 25 VIII. RADIATION _ RELEASES ERQM REERESENTATIVE ACCIDENTS WITHIN THE PLANNING SPECTRUM 27 IX.
RAD.IATION_ DOSES.lEOM REPHESENTATIVE ACCIDENTS W11HIN THE PLANNING SPECTRUM 54 X.
PWR-1 RELEASES AT SEABROOK 73 O
l
-A-
i O
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before Administrative Judges:
Ivan W.
Smith, Chairman Gustave A.
Linenberger, Jr.
Dr. Jerry Harbour
)
)
In the Matter of
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW
)
Docket Nos.
)
50-443-444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
(Off-site EP)
)
April 25, 1988
)
O COMMONWe^LTH or MASS ^CHus=TTs TzsTIaoar or STEVEN C. SHOLLY ON THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. JAN BEYEA ON POTENTIAL RADIATION DOSAGE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS THAT FORM THE BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, AND DR. GORDON THOMPSON ON POTENTIAL RADIATION RELEASE SEQUENCES I.
IDENTIFICATION OF WITNESSES Q.
Please state your names, positions, and business addresses.
i A.
(Sholly) My name is Steven C. Sholly.
I am an Associate Consultant with MMB Technical Associates of San Jose, California.
A.
(Beyea) My name is Dr. Jan Beyea, I am the Senior
{
Energy Scientist for the National Audubon Society in New York
()
City.
A.
(Thompson) My name is Dr. Gordon Thompson.
I am 7,
Executive Director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Q.
Briefly summarize your experience and professional qualifications.
A.
(Sholly) I received a B.S.
in Education from Shippensburg State College in 1975 with a major in Earth and Space Science and a minor in Environmental Education.
I have seven years experience with nuclear power matters.
In particular, for four and one-half years I was employed by the Union of Concerned Scientists where I worked on matters related to the development of emergency plans for commercial nuclear power plants and the application of probabilistic risk assessment (pRA) to the analysis of safety issues related to commercial nuclear power plants.
I have been a consultant with i
MHB Technical Associate for two years, during which time I have been involved in a variety of projects related to the safety i
and economics on nuclear power plants, including the evaluation of severe accident issues for light water nuclear power plants generally, and for the Seabrook Station, Unit 1, specifically.
I have testified as an expert witness in proceedings before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other bodies, including the safety hearings on Indian Point Units 2 and 3 (Docket Nos. 50-247-SP and 50-286-SP), the licensing hearings on Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 50-413
()
and 50-414), and the licensing hearings on the Shoreham Nuclear -
Power Station, Unit 1 (Docket No. 50-322-OL-3).
I have also
()
provided expert testimony before the Sizewell B Public Inquiry in the United Kingdom.
I have served as a member of a peer review panel on regulatory applications of PRA (NRC raport NUREG-1050), as a member of the Containment Performance Design Objective Workshop (NRC report NUREG/CP-0084), as a member of the Committee on ACRS Effectiveness, and as a panelict at the Severe Accident Policy Implementation External Events Workshop, Annapolis, Maryland (presentation on seismic risk assessment, 1987; forthcoming Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report).
The details of my education, experience, and professional qualifications are included in my resume, which is contained in attachments to this testimony.
()
(Beyea) I received my doctorate in nuclear physics from i
Columbia University in 1968.
Since then I have served as an Assistant Professor of physics at Holy Cross College in Worcester, MA; as a member for four years of the research staff of the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton University; and, as of May 1980, as the Senior Energy Scientist for the National Audubon Society.
While at Princeton University, I worked with Dr. Frank von Hippel to prepare a critical quantitative analysis of attempts to model reactor accident sequences.
The lessons learned from this general study of nuclear accidents and the computer codes written to model radioactivity releases were then applied by me O
l 1
l l
to specific problems at the request of governmental and (1) l non-governmental bodies around the world.
I have written major reports on the safety of specific nuclear facilities for the president's Council on Environmental Quality (TMI reactor), for the New York State Attorney General's Office (Indian point),
for the Swedish Energy Commission (Barsebeck reactor), and the state of Lower Saxony (Gorbleben Waste Disposal Site).
I have also examined safety aspects of specific sites for the California Energy and Resources Commission, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office and the New York City Council.
While at princeton, I wrote a computer program useful for reactor emergency planning for the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.
This program, appropriately modified, has been used for some of the calculations presented in this testimony.
After joining the National Audubon Society, I continued to work as an independent consultant on nuclear safety issues.
I participated in a study, directed by the Union of Concerned Scientists at the request of the Governor of pennsylvania, concerning the proposed venting of krypton gas at Three Mile Island.
The U.S.C. study, for which I made the radiation dose calculations, was the major reason the Governor gave for approving the venting.
I participated in the international exercise on consequence modelling (Benchmark Study) coordinated by the Organization for
{)
Economic Cooperation & Development (O.E.C.D.).
Scientists and
-4
P engineers from fourteen countries around the world calculated radiation doses following hypothetical "benchmark" releases using their own consequence models.
Participants from the United States, in addition to myself, included groups from l
Sandia Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Batelle Pacific-Northwest, and Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc.
I also f
served as consultant from the environment community to the N.R.C.
in connection with their development of "Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plants."
At the request of the Three Mile Island Public Health Fund, I supervised a major review of radiation doses from the Three i
Mile Island Accident.
This report, "A Review of Dose i
Assessments at Three Mile Island and Recommendations for Future l
(
Research" was released in August of 1984.
Subsequently, I organized a workshop on TMI Dosimetry, the proceedings of which were published in early 1986.
In 1986, I developed new dose models for the Epidemiology Department of Columbia University.
These models are being used to assess whether or not the TMI accident is correlated with j
i excess health effects in the local population.
The new i
computer models account for complex terrain, as well as time varying meteorology (including changes in wind direction).
1 Insights gained from this project have been applied to the Seabrook situation.
i In addition to reports written about specific nuclear t
facilities, an article of mine on resolving conflict at the i ?
i
Indian Point reactor site, an article on emergency planning for reactor accidents, and a joint paper with Frank von Hippel of Princeton University on failure modes of reactor containment systems have appeared in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
l I have also prepared risk studies covering sulfur emissions from coal-burning energy facilities.
And I have managed a i
project that analyzed the side effects of renewable energy sources.
I regularly testify before congressional committees on energy issues and have served on several advisory boards set up by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment.
I currently participate in a number of ongoing efforts aimed at promoting dielogue between environmental organizations and industry.
I was assisted in the early stages of my studies of Seabrook by Brian Palenik, who has worked with me on other reactor studies in the past.
In subsequent answers to questions, I will use the pronoun, "we,"
to describe our collective efforts.
However, all work was carried out either by me or under my direct supervision.
Brian Palenik received his Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering degree with honors from Princeton University.
While an undergraduate at Princeton, Mr. Palenik worked with me on "The Consequences of Hypothetical Major Releases of Radioactivity to the Atmosphere from Three Mile Island"--my report to the President's Council on Environmental Quality.
O 6-
After graduation, Mr. palenik joined the staff of National
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Audubon's policy Research Department.
While there, he and I wrote, "Some Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Indian Point and Their Implications for Emergency planning," as part of our testimony before the Nuclear Regulstory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, July 1982.
Mr. palenik is currently a graduate student in the Civil Engineering Department at M.I.T.
A complete resume is included in the attachments to this i
testimony.
(Thompson)
I received a ph.D in applied mathematics from j
Oxford University in 1973.
Since then I have worked as a consulting scientists on a variety of energy, environment, and international security issues.
My experience has included technical analysis and presentation of expert testimony on issues related to the safety of nuclear power facilities.
In 1977, I presented testimony before the Windscale public Inquiry in Britain, addressing safety aspects of nuclear fuel reprocessing.
During 1978 and 1979, I participated in an international scientific review of the proposed Gorleben nuclear fuel center in West Germany, this review being sponsored by the government of Lower Saxony.
Between 1982 and 1984, I coordinated an investigation of safety issues relevant to the proposed nuclear plant at Sizewell, England.
This plant will have many similarities to O ]
the Seabrook plant.
The investigation was sponsored by a group
()
of local governments in Britain, under the aegis of the Town and Country planning Association.
This investigation formed the basis for testimony before the Sizewell public Inquiry by myself and two other witnesses.
From 1980 Fe 1985, first as a staff scientiut and later as a consultant, I was associated with the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), at their head office in Cambridge, MA.
On behalf of UCS, I presented testimony in 1983 before a licensing board of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), concerning the merits of a system of filtered venting at the Indian point nuclear plants.
Also, I undertook an extensive review of NRC -
research on the reactor accident "source term" issue, and was
()
co-author of a major report published by UCS on this subject (Sholly and Thompson, 1986).
Currently, I am one of three principal investigators for an emergency planning study based at Clark University, Worcester, MA.
The object of the study is to develop a model emergency plan for the Three Mile Island nuclear plant.
Within this effort, my primary responsibilities are to address the characteristics of severe reactor accidents.
My other research interests include:
the efficient use of energy; supply of energy from renewable sources; radioactive waste management; the restraint of nuclear weapons proliferation; and nuclear arms enritol.
J hsve written and made public presentations in esc
.se areas.
t
--- s m.w. - - m
At present, I am Executive Director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies, Cambridge, MA.
This organizaticn is devoted to research and public education on the efficient use of natural resources, protection of the environment, and the furtherance of international peace and security.
A detailed resume is included in the attachments to this testimony.
II.
CONTENTIONS Q.
To what contentions does your testimony refer?
A.
(All) Town of Hampton revised contention VIII, SAPL revised contention 16 and NECNP contention RERP-8.
These contentions and their bases are set out in full in.
Our testimony also addresses matters raised in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) June 4, 1987 "current" position on these contentions.
In addition, our testimony bears on aspects of other contentions in this proceeding.
Q.
What is the purpose of your testimony and how does it relate to the specific contentions cited here?
A.
(All) These three interrelated contentions and the FEMA position on them all concern the issue of protection from radiological releases of the beach populations in the vicinity of the Seabrook Plant.
Our testimony first describes the O
9-
standard guidance used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(
(NRC) and FEMA for the initiation and duration of radiological releases to be considered in emergency planning.
Then, and using postulated accidents at Seabrook consistent with the spectrum of accident scenarios called for in the NRC guidance, the testimony estimates and describes the radiation dosages which could affect the beach populations near the Seabrook Plant site.
The testimony as a whole demonstrates that NHRERp Rev. 2 is fundamentally flawed and is of no real or practical use because the beachgoing public in the vicinity of the Seabrook plant will not be adequately protected in the event of an emergency.-
In particular, this testimony shows that because of the size of
()
the beach population in the immediate vicinity of the plant site, the long evacuation times, and the lack of effective sheltering, many thousands of individuals will die, suffer serious injuries or face the prospect of increased likelihood of cancer if one of any number of the accidents required to be planned for by the NRC occurs.
Thus, because of the radiation dosages that would reach the beach population, there in no reasonable assurance that NHRERP Rev 2 can and will be implemented to provide adequate protection to the public in the event of an accident.
III.
OVERVIEW Q.
please summarize your portion of this testimony.
A.
(Sholly) My testimony describes the technical basis for the current NRC emergency planning rules.
The testimony 10 -
-~
discusses the use in the NRC reports NUREG/CR-1311, NUREG-0396, and NUREG-0654, of the risk assessment results for the Surry Unit 1 plant (as set forth in the NRC report WASH-1400) to derive dose-distance relationships for a spectrum of accidents, including severe accidents beyond the design basis of light water nuclear power plants.
The testimony further describes the nature of that spectrum of accidents, including release characteristics, release frequencies, and uncertainties.
Finally, the testimony describes how the risk-based insights from the surry Unit I risk assessment were utilized by the NRC to arrive at the generic emergency planning zone distances and other guidance contained in the rules and in the applicable NRC guidance documents (including NUREG-0654, Rev. 1).
A.
(Beyea) The situation around the Seabrook Nuclear power plant is unusual in the context of emergency planning for nuclear plants, because large populations make use of nearby beaches in the summertime.
In order to determine the extent of protection afforded the summer beach population by current emergency plans, we have modelled the radiation doses to the population that would follow releases of radioactivity from the Seabrook plant.
A range of releases has been studied, i
patterned after the range used in the NRC's report, NUREG-0396.
In NUREG-0396, a set of generic accident sequences (pWR1-pWR9) were defined that apply to pressurized water reactors like the Seabrook plant.
These sequences span the entire range of physically-plausible release scenarios, making them useful for assessing, at least on a theoretical basis, the..
ef f ectiveness of eme."r :,ty plans.
For my testimony, we have chosen accident sequences that are similar to the NRC's generic i
versions, but which take into account reactor-specific differences at Seabrook.
In order to understand the conditions under which the population woi.ld not be protected from "early death" (death within 60 days of the release), doses were modelled for these release categories using a range of weather parameters, plume rise heights, and dose contribution assumptions.
The results indicate that the potential consequences of severe accidents increase greatly during the summer months, due to the increased 1
population in the area and the unique conditions of a beach release:
Beach-goers caught in the open would not be shielded from radiation, and could be expected, by our calculations, to receive doses as much as five times higher than generally considered in nuclear emergency planning.
This means that certain accident releases, not normally projected to cause early fatalities, are projected to do so in the Seabrook case.
As a result, it is necessary to consider a range of accident scenarios, from those with very small releases to those with very large releases.
In addition to the risk of early death, we have considered other potential accident consequences, including delayed cancer incidence.
These potential outcomes dominate the risk for accident releases in classes PWR4-PWR9.
The proximity of the reactor to an unshielded summer beach population makes the Seabrook case a special and difficult one
- 12
for emergency planning.
The doses that would be received following a range of releases at the Seabrook site, with emergency plans in effect, are higher than doses that would be received at most other sites in the complete absence of emergency planning.
Our results demonstrate that, with current plans, the immediate safety of the beach population is threatened for a wide range of releases and meteorological conditions.
For the accidents studies in our testimony, many thousand of people could re'eive life-threatening doses.
A.
(Thompson) The issues I address are:
(1)
The potential for an atmospheric release, similar to -
that designated as PWR1 in the Reactor Safety Study, to occur from a steam explosion or high-pressure melt ejection event.
(2)
The range of variation of two parameters which affect plume rise during a "PWRl-type" release, specifically the location of containment breach and the thermal energy release rate for the plume.
(3) The potential for "PNR1-type" releases to contain greater amounts of certain isotopes, such as those of ruthenium, than other categories of releases.
IV.
SYNOPSIS OF WASH-1400 SURRY ANALYSIS Q.
Please identify and describe the nature of the NRC report WASH-1400.
A.
(Sholly) WASH-1400 (N.C. Rasmussen, et al.,
Reactor Safety Study:
An_&11essment of Accident Risks in U.S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
~ 13 -
Commission, WASH-1400, NUREG-75/014, October 1975) represents a
(
probabilistic risk assessment of two nuclear power plants, i
namely Surry Unit 1 and peach Bottom Unit 2.
The report consists of a Main Report and eleven Appendices.
WASH-1400 t
represents the first comprehensive application of probabilistic risk assessment methods to the analysis of the risks posed by commercial nuclear power plants.
That is, WASH-1400 includes system analyses, source term estimates, and accident consequence estimates.
In the parlance of the NRC's ERA Procedures Guide, WASH-1400 is a Level 3 pRA of two plants.1#
Q.
please briefly describe the Surry Unit I nuclear power plant and compare its design with that of Seabrook Station, Unit 1.
A.
(Sholly) The Surry Unit I nuclear power plant is a three-loop, Westinghouse pressurized water reactor with dry, subatmospheric containment.
The Surry Unit 1 plant has a design thermal power level of 2441 megawatts, and entered i
commercial operation in December 1972.
Surry Unit 1 is operated by Virginia power Corporation under operating license DPR-32, issued on May 25, 1972.
Seabrook Station Unit 1 is a four-loop, Westinghouse pressurized water reactor with a large, 1/
Jack W. Hickman, et al., ESA PROCEDURES GUIDE:
A Guide t.
tht_ERLf2Imance of Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear i
Enyar Plants, American Nuclear Society and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, prepared for the U.S.
i Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR 2300, January 1983, pages 2-2 to 2-3.
{
14
dry containment.
Seabrook has a design thermal power level of
(
3650 megawatts.
Q.
Please summarize the results of the WASH-1400 analysis of the Surry Unit 1 plant.
A.
(Sholly) The WASH-1400 report calculated a median core melt frequency for Surry Unit 1 of about 5 x 10-5 per reactor-year (or about 1 in 20,000 per reactor-year).A' The NUREG-1150 analysis estimated the core melt frequency for Surry j
to be 2.6 x 10-5 per reactor year.
ERA, NUREG-1150, draft, page 3-2.
The dominant accident sequences for Surry Unit 1 which contributed to this core melt frequency are identified along with their estimated sequence frequencies in Table A, which is attached to this testinauy.
WASH-1400 also defined nine release cateoories or source terms which defined the release characteristics and release frequencies for Surry Unit 1.
These release categories were designated PWR-1 through PWR-9.
Release categories PWR-1 through PWR-7 correspond to
{
2/
The Surry core melt frequency estimate in WASH-1400 has been cited as several different values.
For instance, the NUREG-1150 report cites a value of 4.6 x 10-5 per reactor year.
Egg M.L. Ernst, et al., Reactor Risk Reference Document, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-ll50, Vol.
1, "Main Report", draft for comment, February 1987, page 3-12 (hereinafter "NUREG-1150 draft).
A technical report supporting NUREG-1150 cites 4.4 x 10-5 per reactor-year.
- Sam, Robert C. Bertucio, et al., Analysis of Core Damace Frecuency EIQm_1pternal Events Surry Unit 1, Sandia National Laboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-4550, SAND 86-2084, Vol.
3, November 1986 page V-68.
In fact, as indicated in Attachment 3 to this testimony, if one adds the point estimate frequencies for the WASH-1400 dominant accident sequettes, one obtains a core melt frequency of 1.2 x 10-4 per reactor-year. _ - -
core melt accidents.
Release Categories PWR-8 and PWR-9 are i
non-core melt accidents, and are roughly equivalent to the design basis accident with (PWR-8) and without (PWR-9) contsinment spray operation.
The Surry release catagories are described and their characteristics and eetimated frequencies defined in Table B, which is attached to this testimony.
Many of the WASH-1400 release categories (especially PWR-1 through PWR-4) could result in significant ground contamination offsite should accidents leading to such releases occur.
v.
USE OF WASH-1400 RESULTS IN NUREG-0396 Q.
Please identify and describe NUREG-0396.
A.
(Sholly) NUREG-0396 (Task Force on Emergency Planning, P_Lannino Basis for the Development of State and Local EggIg ucy ResRDnst_ Elans in Supoort of Llaht Water Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, December,
\\
1987), set a revised planning basis for commercial nuclear power plants.
In essence, NUREG-0396 concluded that a spectrum of accidents should be used in developing a planning basis.A' J/
H.E. Collins, B.K. Grimes & F. Galpin, et al., Elanning Basis for the Develooment of Stata_And Local Emeroency Reapanig Plans _in_jiupport of Licht Water Nuclear Poxer Plants. Task Force on Emergency Planning, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, December 1978, page 24 (hereinafter "NUREG-0396").
16 -
1 NUREG-0396 recommended the establishment of two generic emergencv planning zones (EpZs) for nuclear power plants; a plume exposure pathway EpZ about 10 miles in radius and an ingestion exposure pathway Ep2 about 50 miles in radius.
These EpZs were designated as "the areas for which planning is recommended to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect t' a public in the event of an accident."A' A significant part of the basis for these planning zone distances was derived from accident consequence analyses (sp3cifically dome-distance calculations) using the WASH-1400 release categories and frequencies fcr Surry Unit 1.
Q.
please describe how the WASH-1400 results for Surry Unit I were utilized in NUREG-0396.
A.
(Sholly) The Task Force on Emergency Planning, which wrote NUREG-0396, utilized the Surry Unit 1 results f&om WASH-1400 to perform consequence calculations to "illustrate the likelihood of certain offsite dose levels given a core melt accident."E#
While the Task Force members debated various aspects of the WASH-1400 report and considered its results to have limited use for plant-and site-specific factors, it was judged to provide "the best currently available source of information on the relative likelihood of large accidental 1/
Id. at 11.
5/
Id. at 6.
17 _
releases of radioactivity given a core melt event."E#
(
WASH-1400 results for Surry were also utilized to provide guidance concerning the timing of radiological releases resulting from core melt accidents, and the radiological characceristics of such releases.2/
The planning basis distance, the time dependent characteristics of potential releases and exposures, and the kinds of radioactive materials that can potentially be released to the environment were identified by the Task Force as the three planning basis elements needed to scope the planning effort.A#
WASH-1400 results for Surry Unit 1 were used to define all three of the planning basis elements in NUREG-0396.
Q.
Please describe the rationale used by the Task Force in establishing the size of the EpZs recommended in NUREG-0396.
A.
(Sholly) The Task Force on Emergency Planning considered a number of possible rationales, including risk, probability, cost effectiveness, and the accident consequence spectrum.
Following a review of these rationales, "The Task Force chose to base the rationale on a full spectrum of accidents and corresponding consequences tempered by probability considerations."E The rationale used by the 1/
Id. at 6, 2/
Id. at 18-23.
a/
Id. at 8.
1/
Id. at 15. -
=.
lask Force in establishing the EpZ planning distances is more fully described in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0396.
Q.
please dese (be the spectrum of accidents considered by the Task Force in NUREG-0396.
A.
(Sholly) The Task Force on Emergency planning considered a complete spectrum of accidents, including those discussed in environmental reports prepared by utilities as part of the operating license review (the so-called Class 1 through Class 8 accidents), accidents postulated for the purpose of evaluating plant design (design basis accidents in the Final Safety Analysis Report), and the spectrum of accidents identified in the WASH-1400 report.
The Task Force concluded that the Class 1 through Class 8 accident discussions in environmental reports were too limited in scope and detail to be useful in emergency planning, and instead relied on design basis accidents and the WASH-1400 release categories, 10/
Q.
please describe specifically how the Surry Unit I results from WASH-1400 were used by the Task Force.
A.
(Sholly) Concurrently with the operation of the Task Force, a report was being prepared for the NRC by Sandia Laboratories (now Sandia National Laboratories) which examined offsite emergency response measures for core melt accidents.
1H/
Id. at 1-4....
This report, designated SAND 78-0454, was published in June
(
1978.11' The Sandia report grouped the WASH-1400 release categories for Surry Unit 1 into "Melt-Through" and "Atmospheric" release groups (based on the location of containment failure identified for the WASH-1400 release categories).
Surry release categories PWR-1 through PNR-5 consist of accidents in which the containment was concluded to fail directly to the atmosphere as a result of structural failure or containment isolation failure.
These release categories were grouped into the "Atmospheric Release" class.
Surry release categories pWR-6 and PNR-7 consist of accidents in which the containment base was penetrated by core debris.
These release categories were grouped into the "Melt-Through Release" class.
The likelihood of the "Atmospheric" and "Melt-Through" classes were estimated by summing the probabilities of the contributing WASH-1400 release categories; "Atmospheric" releases were estimated to have a frequency of 1.4 x 10 per reactor-year,
~
and "Melt-Through" relearas were estimated to have a frequency
-5 of 4.6 x 10 per reactor-year.12#
11/
David C. Aldrich, Peter E. McGrath & Norman C. Rasmussen, Examination of Offsite Radiolooical Protective Measures for Nuclear Reactor Accidents Involvina Core Melt, Sandia Laboretories, prepared for the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SAND 78-0454, June 1978 (hereinafter "SAND 78-0454").
This report was reissued as NUREG/CR-ll31 in October 1979 following the Three Mile Island accident.
12/
Id. at 43.
The characteristics of these release classes were then used g
as input to the WASH-1400 accident consequence code, referred to as CRAC (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences).
The calculations were carried out using meteorological data from one reactor site and an assumed uniform population density of 100 persens per square mile.11#
The CRAC code calculations implemented for the Sandia study used hourly weather data for one year and 91 accident start times (a four day, thirteen-hour shift was assumed to take place for each start time; this results in each hour of the day being represented in 24 samples and a total of 91 samples are taken from one year's data).1A#
The wind direction is assumed to be held constant during and following the release; other weather changes are modeled as indicated in the data.1E#
A revised model of
)
public evacuation (ultimately implemented in CRAC2, an improved version of the code) was also used.II#
The most frequently cited curve in NUREG-0396 which was derived from the Surry Unit 1 risk study results is a curve which plots the probability of whole-body dose versus 11/
I-
- 36.
11/
A,
.rding to a recent Brookhaven National Laboratory report, weather data from a typical year for New York City were used in calculations.
Ega, W.T.
Pratt & C. Hofmayer, et al.,
Inchnical Evaluation of the EPZ Sensitivity Study for Stabrook, Brookhaven National Laboratory, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 1987, page 6-2.
11/
Aldrich, et al., suora note 11, at 37-39..
16/
Id. at 59.
21 -
distance.
(This curve, Figure 1-11 from NUREG-0396, is attached to this testimony as part of Table C).
The curves on this figure were not calculated directly by the CRAC code, however.
As explained in a recent Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) report, these curves were interpolated.
BNL used the newer CRAC2 code to recalculate the dose vs. distance curves.
The results of these calculations are shown in Table D, which is attached to this testimony (this calculation is only for the 200 rem whole-body curve).
Q.
What results from the Sandia study were used in NUREG-03967 A.
(Sholly) NUREG-0396 contains a series of figures which are drawn from the Sandia report.
These figures are Figures 1-11 through 1-18.
These figures are reproduced as Table C, attached to this testimony.
VI.
USE OF WASH-1400 INSIGHTS IN SETTING EPZ DISTANCES Q.
Please describe the insights from NUREG-0396, Figures 1-11 through 1-18, that were drawn by the Task Force on Emergency Planning.
A.
(Sholly) The Task Force derived a number of insights from figures 1-11 through 1-18.
These insights were set forth in terms of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (epa)
"protective Action Guide" (PAG) doses.
PAGs are expressed in units of radiation dose (rem) which "represents trigger levels or initiation levels, which warrant pre-selected protective
- 22
4 actions for the public if the projected (future) dose received f
by an individual in the absence of a protective action exceeds the PAG."12#
The EPA PAGs used by the Task Force were those for whole-body exposure and thyroid exposure.
These PAGs have a range of 1-5 rem whole-body and 5-25 rem to the thyroid.
According to EPA guidance, the lower dose in the PAG range is to be used if "there are no major local constraints in providing protection at that level, especially to sensitive populations."
If local constraints make the lower value impractical to use, in no case should the higher value be exceeded in determining the need for protective action.II#
Based on the figures, the Task Force concluded that given a core melt accident, there is about a 70% chance of exceeding the whole-body PAG doses at two miles, a 40% chance of exceeding the whole-body PAG doses at ten miles.
Similarly, given a core melt accident, there is a near 100% chance of exceeding the 10-rem thyroid PAG dose at one mile, about an 80%
chance at ten miles, and about a 40% chance at 25 miles.
Based in significant part of these observations, the Task Force recommended that EPZs of 10 miles be established for the plume exposure pathway and 50 miles 1E' for the injection exposure 12/
Collins, et al., suora note 3, at J.
lA/
Office of Radiation Programs, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-520/1-75-001, September 1975, Revised June 1980, page 2.5.
11/
Collins, et al.,
supra note 3, at 1-41 and 1-43. -,
pathway.AE' i
Q.
Please describe how NUREG-0396 is related to the NRC's emergency planning regulations.
A.
(Sholly) In October 1979, the Commission endorsed a policy of having a "conservative emergency planning policy in addition to the conservatism inherent in the defense-in-depth philosophy," and stated that a 10-mile plume EPZ and a 50-mile injection EpZ should be established around each nuclear power plant.AA' Subsequently, these EPZs were codified in the NRC emergency planning rule when the final rule was adopted in 1980.AA Indeed, NUREG-0396 is explicitly referenced in the final rule.11#
NUREG-0654, which provides detailed guidance for the preparation and evaluation of radiological emergency plans for nuclear power plant accidents, also references the NUREG-0396 report.
NUREG-06S4 states that the 10-mile radius plume EPZ was based primarily on four considerations:AA#
10/
Id. at 1-37, 1-41, and 1-43.
11/
Federal Reaister 61123, 23 October 1979.
11/
Federal Reaister 55402, 55406, 55411, 19 August 1980.
11/
10 CPR Part 50, Appendix E, Section 1, fn 2.
11/
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiolooical Emeroency Resoonse Plans _End Preparedness in Suoport of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.
1, November 1980, page 12.
- 24
a.
projected doses from the traditional design I
basis accidents would not exceed Protective Action Guide levels outside the zone; b.
projected doses from most core melt accidents would not exceed Protective Action Guide levels outside the zone; c.
for the worst core melt accidents, immediate life threatening doses would generally not occur outside the zone; d.
detailed planning within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in the event that this proved necessary.
Quite clearly, two of these four considerations (i.e.,
considerations "b"
and "c", above) are derived from the NUREG-0396 evaluation of doses from core melt accidents (which is based on the Surry analysis in WASH-1400).
In addition, NUREG-0654 guidance on the timing and duration of releases and radiological characteristics of the releases is also derived from the NUREG-0396 evaluation of core melt accidents (which is based on the Surry analysis in WASH-1400).
VII.
CONCLUS_IDtLEEGARDING THE TECHNICAL BASES FOR D4ERGENCY PLANNING i
Q.
What is your conclusion concerning the degree to which the NRC's emergency planning requirements are based.on the analysis of Surry in WASH-14007 A.
(Sholly) It is evident, based on the above, that the current planning basis in NRC emergency planraing regulations for nuclear power plants is substantially bas 63 on dose / distances insights derived from the risk assessment of n.
(
Surry performed in WASH-1400.
Thus, the"spectrum of accidents" which were considered in establishing the EPZ distances in the NRC emergency planning rules explicitly included core melt accidents (up to and including those core melt accidents which were predicted to result in early containment failure and a large radiological release to the environment).
A site-specific analysis which examines dose-distance relationships based on similar accidents would therefore provide useful information concerning the effectiveness of offsite emergency planning measures for the Seabrook site.
Q.
Have you reviewed the release categories utilized by -
Dr. Jan Beyea in his calculations as set forth in his testimony in this proceeding?
A.
(Sholly) Yes.
Q.
Are the release categories utilized by Dr. Beyea consistent with the spectrum of releases utilized by the NRC in setting the technical basis for the emergency planning zones?
A.
(Sholly) Yes, Dr. Beyea's release categories art very similar to the PWR-1 through PWR-9 release categories utilized in the NUREG-0396 report, which sets forth the technical basis for the NRC's emergency planning zones.
Q.
Does this conclude your testimony?
A.
(Sholly) Yes.
VIII.
RADI AllON RELEASES _FE0fi_REEEESENTATIVE
(
ACCIDENTS WITHIN THE PLANNING SPECTRUM Q.
Dr. Beyea, before presenting the results of your calculations, describe in general terms how radioactive 1
material is released to the environment and dispersed.
A.
(Beyea) For a large release of radioactive material to occur following an accident, a "release pathway" from the reactor core to the environment is required.
(Eng testimony of l
Steven Sholly.)
One set of these pathways is generated by failure of the reactor's pressure vessel followed by failure of the containment building surrounding the vessel due to overpressurization.
Researchers have outlined some, though no.t all, possible sequences and conditions for these failures.
Other pathways include releases occurring through a containment penetration system.
Massive steam generator failure due to aging steam generator tubes might lead to a large release through the secondary cocling system.
A so-called check-valve failure could connect the containment directly to the environment.
If a large release of radioactive material to the environment occurs, the material will leave the reactor as a "plume" of gases, aerosols and water droplets.
Most of the large releases discussed in our testimony are assumed to occur i
over a period of thirty to sixty minutes; a few are assumed to take longer. -.
This escaping plume will rise to a height which is dependent on such variables as 1) the amount of heat released in the accident, 2) the weather condition existing at the time, and
- 3) whether or not the release takes place at the top or bottom of the structure.
As will be shown later, there is no satisfactory formula that predicts the magnitude of plume rise.
The plume will be carried by the prevailing wind.
Under the action of wind fluctuations and other weather conditions, the plume will spread in both the horizontal and vertical directions, so that the average concentration of radioactive material in the plume will decrease with time as it travels away from the reactor.
(See Figure I).
After a short time, the expanding edge of the plume will "touch" ground, and the non-gaseous radioactive aerosols will be dispersed along the ground, on vegetation, buildings, cars, people, etc.
The rate at which material is removed from the plume, referred to as the deposition rate or "velocity", will also cause the concentration of material in the plume to decrease with time.
For the most energetic release categories, particularly the steam explosion categories which cause rapid rise of gases into the atmosphere, there is the possibility that escaping water vapor may condense to significant amounts of (radioactive) rain.
The plume may disperse radioactive material along the ground for more than a hundred miles if there is no reversal of wind direction.
Much of the area where the plume has passed -_.
l WIND DIRECTION i
REACTOR INVISIBLE CLOUD OF MOVING RADIOACTIVITY j
l REGION OF DEPOSITED R ADIC ACTIVITY TOP VIEW OF PLUME FIGURE I
will be contaminated for decades and "permanent" evacuation of
{
(
the original population will be required there.
In addition, as much as 10 percent of the material will be resuspended by the action of wind and blown about in succeeding weeks.21' The area of contamination will increase, causing residents who i
live outside the initial plume path to be exposed to radiation.
Immediately after the release, the plume will be visible, due to the escape of large amounts of cloud-forming water droplets.
As the plume travels downwind and as the water droplets evaporate, the plume will most likely disappear from view, making it impossible for anyone without instruments to know where radioactivity is heading.
Q. How does the population receive radiation doses?
A. The population in the area under the plume would receive radiation doses via three dose pathways.AE' most (See Figure II):
- 1) From external radiation received directly from the radioactive plume itself.
(In the 11/
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, (Washington, D.C., WASH-1400 or NUREG-75/014, 1975).
The Reactor Safety Study assumed a 50 percent retention rate for radioactivity deposited on vegetation.
(See Appendices E and K)
Although most of this loss is probably caused by subsequent rain, experimental data indicates that removal begins immediately after deposition.
This initial loss must be due to wind action.
Ten percent removal by wind seems a reasonable estimate.
11/
Egg Volume VI of WASH-1400, supra.._.
r,C CLOUD IS INVISIBLE g T y 0',
EXCEPT CLOSE TO
_y REACTOR EFFECTIVE RELEASE
+~ %'
~
HEIGHT f7
+m REGION OF CLOUD
/'
DOSE, GROUND DOSE,
S'~
'
- kN AND INHALATION 4
~
~
D REGION OF b
b
/
CLOUD DOS E
h _
REACTOR RADIOACTIVITY STICKS TO GROUND i
i SIDE VIEW OF RADIOACTIVE PLUME FIGURE U s.
---m
- m
most uerious accidents, the main part of the
(
plume is projected to pass by very quickly, within one half to one hour, well before any significant evacuations of beach populations could occur.)
- 2) From radiation received following inhalation.
The inhalation pathway would be the most important contributor to the thyroid dose.
It could also be the major contributor to early health effects for accident sequences in which large quantities of ruthenium are released (PWR-1 type releases),
i.e. steam explosion or high-pressure melt ejection.
- 3) From radiation received from material deposited on the ground or other surfaces (cars, skin etc.).
It is this "ground dose" which would usually be the most important contributor to early fatalities because it would continue after the plume has passed.
Even if ovacuation is too slow to prevent inhalation of radiation, evacuation is still needed after the plume passes by to stop the accumulation of "ground dose"; the faster the evacuation, the lower the total "ground dose".
We have concentrated on these three pathways in our testimony, using standard methodology to calculate doses whenever.
)
1 l
possible.
Because generic models do not consider beach l
situations, it was necessary to make special calculations for contributions to ground dose not normally considered in accident computer codes, but which are of special concern to unshielded beach populations.
For instance, beach users caught in the plume would likely receive significant doses from radioactivity deposited on their skin and hair.
Other important dose pathways exist for persons not under the original plume.
These include inhalation and ground dose from resuspended and redeposited radioactivity.
(As has been stated earlier, as much as 10 percent of the plume's material may be resuspended within a few weeks.)12/
Also of concern is radiation from contaminated vehicles and personal possessions brought to emergency reception centers.
- Finally, 1
doses are also possible though ingestion of contaminated food j
or water.
Q.
In what units are doses measured?
A.
(Beyea) Doses to organs or to the whole body are i
measured in "rems," an indication of the amount of biologically-damaging energy absorbed by tissue or bone.
The units are useful because a dose in rems can be used to project i
the likelihood that an exposed person will be injured.
21/
WASH-1400, auna. lj
Q.
What are the dose levels that enter into your i
j calculations?
)
A.
(Beyea) The health consequences of radiation depend upon the magnitude of the dose received.
Radiation doses to the whole body on the order of 100 rems or higher J
--doses that occur relatively close to the plant--may lead to immediate sickness (e.g.,
nausea) and "early death."
At a dose of 125 rems for example, 50 percent of exposed persons would suffer from nausea.11 Although not fatal by itself, nausea and vomiting should be considered in emergency planning--especially in estimating evacuation times.
It is quite conceivable that outbreaks of nausea could precipitate panic in an evacuating population, thereby interfering with an orderly escape.
"Early death," a technical term in the radiological health field, refers to death within sixty days of exposure to a given dose.
The threshold for early deaths is between 100 and 200 rems to the whole body, while the probability of early death increases with increasing dose and changes with "supportive" medical treatment.AA#
In accordance with standard practice, 11/
See Volume VI of WASH-1400.
11/
In this proceeding, we do not testify as expert witnesses in the biological effects of radiation.
Instead, we have relied on standard references to convert doses to health effects.
"Supportive" treatment is defined in the Reactor Safety Study Appendix VI, as such procedures as reverse isolation, sterilization ot all objects in patient's room, use of laminar-air-flow systems, large doses of antibiotics, and transfusions of whole-blood packed cells or platelets.
32'-
1 we have taken 200 rem as a reference dose to indicate the onset j
I of significant probability of early death.
Q.
How have you modelled the plume movement and dose pathways?
A.
(Beyea) The plume movement and the three major dose 1E pathways discussed previously have been modelled by us in several computer programs.
The programs have been checked against other consequence codes in use around the world.11' The original programs have been cited in other reports,11' la/
The major sources of radiation that contribute to early death or delayed cancer are inhaled radioiodine, as well as external radiation (whole-body gamma) from the plume and from contaminated ground.
In the case of pWR1 releases, there are situations where inhaled isotopes such as ruthenium can cause pulmonary syndrome, leading to early death.
i 31/
International Exercise in Consequence Modelling (Benchmark Study), sponsored by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.), Nuclear Energy Agency, 38 Boulevard Suchet, 75016 paris, France.
12/
Jan Beyea, program BADAC-1, "Short-Term Doses Following a Hypothetical Core Meltdown (with Breach of Containment)"
(1978), prepared f.or the New Jersey Department of Environmental protection.
Jan Beyea and Frank von Hippel, "Some Long-Term Consequences of Hypothetical Major Releases of Radioactivity to the Atmosphere from Three Mile Island," report to the president's Council on Environmental Quality, Center for Environmental Studies, princeton University, (1979), Appendix E.
A detailed discussion of the basic dose calculations used in these programs can be found in the Appe4. dices of "A Study of the Consequences of Hypothetical Reactor Accidents at Barseback," Jan Beyea (Stockholm:
Swedish Energy Commission, 1978).
(footnote continued)..
while some modifications have been made for this study.11'
(
It was not necessary for these proceedings to use our most recent set of programs which directly include time-varying weather such as changing wind speed and changing turbulence.
In the Seabrook beach case, doses are so high that these smaller probability events do not dominate the risk.
The dose to the population caught directly in the plume for the release categories under consideration has been calculated by these programs as a function of time after release for a range of weather conditions and for a range of model parameters.
Ranges of model parameters were used because the appropriate values of parameters are currently uncertain.
The basic modelling used is similar to the approach taken by radiological protection agencies around the world, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the New Hampshire Department of Public Health.AA' (footnote continued)
Brian palenik and Jan Beyea, "Some Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Indian Point and Their Implications for Emergency Planning," direct testimony on behalf of Now York State Attorney General, Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), New York Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG), New York City Audubon Society, before NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, July, 1982.
11/
For this study, we have used appropriate dose scaling factors, as discussed in detail later, to include dose contributions from material deposited directly on the cars and skin of evacuees.
11/
D.V.
Pergola, R.B Harvey, Jr., J.G.
Parillo, "SB Metpac, A Computer Software Package Which Evaluates the Consequences of an Off-Site Radioactive Release Written for the Seabrook Station Site at Seabrook, New Hampshire" (Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Framingham, Mass., May 1986). -
The only specialized aspects of our calculations involve t
the following:
1)
Radiation shielding:
Radiation shielding factors for cars used in the 1975 Reactor Safety Study have l
been updated to account for changes in car construction that have been made to improve fuel economy in the intervening years.
2)
Accounting for dispersion over water.
Certain beach sites, like Seabrook, have water between them ano the reactor.
We have made adjustments for decreased dispersion using standard methodology.AE 3)
Radioactivity deposited on vehicle surfaces:
In '
some of our calculations, we have accounted for radioactivity that would be deposited on cars caught in the plume.
This radioactivity could cause a significant dose to riders and should not be ignored.
4)
Radioactivity deposited on the skin and clothing of beach-goers:
In some of our calculations, we have accounted for radioactivity that would be deposited on beach occupants while standing either on the beach, in parking lots, or outside their cars waiting for traffic to move.
Although not generally a major 11/
In such a case (Seabrook Beach), we have shifted dispersion parameters by one stability class.
Egg footnote 39..
effect to be considered at other sites, we have found I
that the dose from skin contamination is significant at Seabrook because of the large beach population that could be caught outdoors.
Because doses from contaminated skin and vehicles have not to our knowledge been considered in past consequence modelling, our calculations have been presented with and without their inclusion.
Their impact is to increase, in comparison to other sites, the number of meteorological conditions during which early death would occur.
Q.
In what ways have your calculations taken into account the uncertainties in the current state of consequence modelling?
A.
(Beyea)
Plume Rise The treatment of plume rise due to therma 1 buoyancy i
illustrates the current uncertainty that exists in dose calculations due to inadequate knowledge of model parameters.
Since calculated doses can be very sensitive to whether or not the edge of the plume has "touched" ground, knowledge of the initial rise of the plume can be critical for projecting doses.
Yet, lack of understanding, both experimental and theoretical, about plume rise makes prediction of this parameter difficult.
Figure III shows the enormous range in airborne concentration of radioactivity (and therefore inhalation and ground doses) predicted for the same release of radioactivity -.
?
l 1
by modellers from different countries under one set of weather conditions.AE#
Most of this range arises because of different predictions of plume rise.
These results from the international exercise in consequence modelling demonstrate that dose predictions from a particular computer code may be highly uncertain within about 20 miles from the reactor if based on one set of model parameters.
(Output from the computer codes used to develop our testimony were included in this consequence modelling exercise.)
If a range of weather conditions is examined, the range of i
doses predicted by different computer codes shows much less of a spread.
It is for this reason that we considered a range of-weather conditions in this study rather than relying exclusively on predictions using one set of model parameters.
The dose ranges used in our testimony fall well within the full range given in Figure III.
At Seabrook, plume rise is a critical issue only for the PNRl-type releases.
The other releases are not characterized i
by sufficient thermal bouyancy to make it an issue.
11/
Figure III has been taken from S. Vogt, CNSI Benchmark Study of Consequence Models, International Comparison of Models Established for the Calculation of Consequences of Accidents in Reactor Risk Studies, Comparison of Results Concerning Problem 1. SINDOC(81) 43. _ _ _
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Deposition Velocity
(
A range of deposition velocities has not been examined in this testimony.
(Deposition velocity governs the rate at which radioactive material deposits on surfaces).
Like plume rise, this parameter is also uncertain, but does not have a critical impact on any of our calculations.
For simplicity we have used a mid-range value of 1 cm/sec.Al#
Sea Breezes Because of the complexity involved in modelling sea breezes, we have treated them qualitatively.
To obtain an understanding of the sea breeze phenomenon, it is useful to begin with a simple case, where the inland wind speed is very -
low.
A circulating cell structure would result from daytime l
heating of the land, extending many miles over both land and water.1E#
I In this example, the wind would blow toward the reactor away from the beach, yet radioactivity would still reach the beach for either Icw-rising or high-rising plumes, as radioactivity became entrained in the cell and circulated j
within it.
However, in this scenario, because it would take several hours for the radioactivity to reach the beach, it is 12/
A complete discussion of this parameter can be found in the Barseback Study, supra.
1H/
C.S. Keen, "Sea Breezes in the Complex Terrain of the Cape Peninsula," in Third Conference Meteoroloov of the Coastal Zone (American Meteorological Society, Boston, Mass., January 1984, pp. 129-134). _.
~ _ - -
l
not possible to say, without detailed study, whether or not the radioactivity would arrive before the beach goers had left.1E' In many other sea-breeze cases, the inland wind would be too strong to ignore.
The resulting structures can be very complex, either causing plumes to rise above the beach and reduce doses or to slow plumes down, producing higher doses.
If the inland wind is very strong, it will eliminate the cell structure entirely or drive it offshore.
In general, turbulence at the beach should increase under sea breeze conditions, leading to the possibility that above-ground plumes will be brought quickly to the ground (fumigated) once the region of excess turbulence has been reached.
The possibility must be considered that a moisture-laden plume could produce its own rain, following rapid mixture with cold, turbulent sea air that would be filled with salt particles capable of nucleating water droplets.
Rain would be 13./
W.A. Lyons, "Lectures on Air Pollution and Environmental Impact Analysis," American Meteorological Society, Boston, Mass., 1975.
San. Alan, S.J. Mass and P.R.
- Harrison, "Dispersion Over Water:
A Case Study of a Non-Buoyant Plume in the Santa Barbara Channel, California," in Joint Conference on Applications of Air Pollution Meteoroloay, Nov. 29-Dec.
2, 1977 (American Meteorological Society, Boston, Mass., pp. 12-15).
Sam also, S. Barr, W.E. Clements, "Diffusion Modeling:
Principles of Application," in Atmosoheric Science and Power Pinduction, (Report DOE / TIC-27601, Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.,
- 1984,
- p. 613).._
1 i
extremely serious for the beach goers, because unusually large
(.
amounts of radioactivity would be carried to ground level along with the drops.
In considering the various meteorological combinations that could occur, it is possible to find some conditions that increase doses at the beach and some conditions that decrease doses--sometime during the course of the same day.
In light of this variation, we have assumed that our calculations without sea breeze effects represent a mid-range j
case.
Q.
What are the characteristics of the release types you have considered and why have you chosen to use them?
A.
(Beyea) Because the number of possible accident sequences is very large, it would be prohibitive to perform consequence calculations for every possibility.
- Instead, following standard practice, we have picked surrogate release 1
categories that are intended to span the range of possibilities.
As mentioned in the summary, releases have been chosen that generally fall into the release categories used in NUREG-0396, but which take into account site-specific differences.
The basic reference documents utilized relating to site-specific accident sequences at the Seabrook Plant are
- 1) the Licensee's Seabrook Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA),AE' and the review of the PSA carried out by analysts 10/
Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Asnessment, 6 volumes, December, 1983.
at Brookhaven National Laboratories for the NRC.AI#
1 In our study, we have generally accepted the Brookhsven recommendations, although for completeness we have ransejered some PSA categories without modification.
In such cases, we l
have included them as part of our generic release categories.
In the release categories used for our testimony, we have picked one specific sequence to define the release magnitude for 1
each category.
However, it is important to bear in mind that the probability of the category is not the probability of the l
specific accident analyzed.
The true probability is the sum of 1
the probabilities of all accident sequences, known or unknown, that have similar release magnitudes.
- 1. Category 1 (PWRl-type): Early Containment Failure with Core oxidation.
This category is represented by an "S1" sequence as defined in l
the Seabrook (PSA).
Also included in this category is a high-pressure melt ejection sequence.
One of the questions raised by the Brookhaven review of the PSA concerns the assumed rate at i
which heat would be released during an accident--a variable which governs plume rise.
The PSA assumes uniformly high values.
In i
particular, for the S1 case, the PSA assumes such a high release of thermal energy that the plume passes high overhead, causing relatively low doses to the beach population, according to 11/
M. Khatib-Rahbar, A.K. Agrawal, H. Ludewig, W.T.
- Pratt, "A Review of the Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment:
Containment Failure Modes and Radioloc'7al Source Term," Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, Long
- land, prepared for U.S. NRC, draft, September, 1985.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, (Washington, D.C., WASH-1400 or NUREG-75/014, 1975).._
4 conventional consequence models.
As indicated i
by Gordon Thompson (at p.
76 infra) it will not i
be possible to resolve this discrepancy since a large range of heat rates is possible, ? pending on the dynamics of the accident.
Because the Brookhaven assumption on heat rates represents a mid-range value in the spectrum found by i
Thompson, we have used it in our calculations of doses from S1 releases, recognizing that the actual doses could be significantly higher or lower.
4
- 2. Category 2 (pWR2-type):
Severe Containment Bvoass.
We include in this category an "S6V-total" sequence as defined by analysts at Brookhaven.
In this release category, a direct pathway to the atmosphere is opened as a result of contaimnent bypass.
43% of radioiodine, 43%
of radiocesium, and 40% of radiotellurium in the core are projected to escape.
In addition to the "interfacing systems accidents" used to define this accident in the
{
PSA, we include in this category thermally-induced steam generator tube failures.
We also specifically analyze the PWR2 release overpressurization scenario utilized in the Reactor Safety Study and NUREG-0396.
Note that this release category is generally similar to the preceding rapid bypass category represented by S6V-total.
- 3. Category 3 (PWR3-type)
Slow Containment By.p. ass.
The Seabrook PSA modelled a containment bypass release as a "puff" release in which radioactivity is assumed to escape at different times, for periods of varying duration.
We refer to this release category in the Tables with the notation used in the PSA to labe) the first and most dangerous puff (S6V-1).
Brookhaven, in its review of the PSA assumed radioactivity would be assumed to escape over a period of one hour.
For our testimony, we have made consequence calculations using both sets of assumptions.
S6V-total in Category 2 represents the Brookhaven approach; S6V-1 in Category 3 represents that taken in the PSA.
- 42
- 4. Category 4: (PWR4-PWR9 -types)
The less severe accidents utilized in NUREG-0396 are grouped in this category.
Although such accidents can cause d.ses in excess of protective action guidelines and can increase dolayed cancer risks in exposed populations, they are not generally projected to lead to early health affects.
A summary of the characteristics of the first three release categories is given in Table 1.
Q.
What special characteristics around Seabrook affect the consequences of a release there?
A.
(Beyea) Our investigation of the consequences of releases of radioactivity at Seabrook concentrates on the summer months.
The potential consequences, especially with respect to early death from a serious accident at the Seabrook plant, increase greatly during these months due to a large summer population in the area.
These summer residents, day visitors, etc. increase the exposed population, and by I
increasing the evacuation time necessary to clear the area, they increase the potential time exposure.
Furthormore, the consequences to a beacn area population may be greater than the consequences to an inlard population under similar conditions due to a lack of shielding avrmally provided by buildings.
The addition of increased consequences due to material deposited directly on the skin of a beach population must also be considered for the Seabruok plant.
Taken togethei these factors make summer release scenarios at Seabre.'> worthy of _ _ __
l TABLE 1 RELEASE PARAMETCRS
(
PWR1 P 'a R 2 P _'.; ;.
S; SoV-total RSS sev.
Steam Containment Over-Contat.. sn-Explosion Bypass Pressurtzation Byp3ss Warning Time 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.7 i
Release Duration thes) 0.5 1.0 0.5
'.0 Release Tt=e (hrs) 1.4 2.5 2.5 2.2 Energy Release Rate P
(mtilton BTU /hr) 520 low
- 170 cw*
Plume Rise (=)**
200-850 30 80-300 10 Release Fraettons Noble Gases
.94
.97
- 0. 90
..i Iodine 75
.43 0.7 Cestum
.'5
.43 0.5 T e. u r t u.-
.40 0.3 Bart.
.0?3
.049 0.06 l
Ru tnen t Ja
.46
.033 0.02 4.
1 l
La n t na n tde s
.0029
.0053 0.004 220;.
l
- Brookha/en
- 4. :;euta a much lower release ratto than does tne 3+ se r:.
FSA.
However, tne p.ute rise is ;ow i n botn cases.
- Calcuiattana f-4t.a-..;ty classes A-E.
Plu?.e rise varies.cithin 4.-
because of dLife: - - -
vind speeds.
Vsrtations for 36V releases are tney can be tincred.
For a r. Si release, the following va.ucs appiy, Wind Speed i
Stactitty C; ass se:
4 mise:
9
./se:
4 A-D B50 m 440 233 -
1 E
350 230 230
-y
.--+,,rw-pw.
-.4
r---
e.---..-t--.,,r,,
-....r w,-e,-.m,,e, e
y
--9._,.
--+-.m.
tr-
- +.
y e+4-.w,,
eg.
u ;.
..=:.
l special consideration, and we have included them in our t
investigation of the potential consequences of accidents at Seabrook.
Figure IV shows the location of the Seabrook beaches.
It should be noted that for the most severe accident categories considered, as will be discussed below, doses are so far above threshold for overcast conditions, that early deaths are possible at any time of the year.
Nevertheless, the number of people who would die would increase greatly during the summer.
Furthermore, intermediate accidents--those that would usually not cause early deaths--would be expected to cause early deaths at tile beaches.
In other words, during the summer, there is a much wider spectrum of accidents that can cause ear;y fatalities.
Q.
What are the essumptions behind the evacuation times you have used?
A.
(Beyea) At some point during the operation of a reactor, the nuclear facility operator (NFO) may notify the appropriate state and local officials of an "unusual event,"
an occurrence that may lead to an eventual release of radioactivity.
Depending on the seriousness of the event or of following events, a higher emergency level may be reached.
The NFO may eventually recommend, in consultation with officials and technical support staff, that an evacuation is necessary of all or part of the surrounding population.
The appropriate l
- 44
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T' CURE 'V: SEA 5R00K A:D ARIA LEACHES
- .c. __
_-..a q
local officials, who may or may not have rect 2ived prior warning, are then notified, and the emergency warning system j
i will presumably be activated as soon as possible.
Time elapses between an initial indication to the operator and the moment state and local officials begin notification of the population, CONSAD (a consulting firm to FEMA) estimated this time to take 19-78 minutes during the day and 50 minutes AA' at night.
Their review of historical data shows these kinds of estimates can range from one to many hours for a range of natural disasters and false alerts.
Our work here assumes 45 minutes.
In addition, some time will be needed to actually notify the population that an evacuation is needed.
We take 15 minutes for this time, so that evacuation is assumed to begin one hour (45 plus 15 minutes) after the decision is made to evacuate.
We also assume that the NFO receives an indication of a pending release before the release.
This warning time is taken as 18 minutes for a steam explosion, one hour for a rapid containment bypass (S6V-total), one hour for a PWR-2 release, and 1.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> for a slow containment bypass (S6V-1).
These are the assumptions made by the analysts (Brookhaven, Seabrook pSA, Reactor Safety Study) who devised the release categories 12/
CONSAD Research Corporation, "An Assessment of Evacuation Time Around the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station," June 20, 1980; revised June 23, 1980, p.
2.7-2.9. i
,-n
c-
studied.
When the one hour delay involved in starting the actual evacuation is accounted for, the results are as follows.
1 Steam explosion: evacuation starts 42 minutes after i
radioactivity begins escaping, pWR-2 and rapid containment bypass (S6V-total):
evacuation starts at the same time as radioactivity begins to escape.
Slow containment bypass (S6V-1):
Evacuation starts 42 minutes before radioactivity begins to escape.
The evacuation time estimates themselves are based on assumptions about conditions during the evacuation, the state of readiness of an evacuation systeli, etc.
These assumptions vary, leading to differences in evacuation times.
The evacuation times for five earlier studies of a Seabrook area evacuation are listed in Table 2.
Some of the evacuation times in the table for a two mile radius (and five mile radius) appear to be for a selective evacuation from within that radius.
We have used five hours as a representative estimate for beach site evacuation.
Current emergency plans at Seabrook call for notification of beach populations at an earlier stage in an accident than i
for the general population.
However, for pWRl-pWR3 categories, there is doubt as to how much time would actually be gained by this procedural modification.
Although we have not taken credit for extra warning time to the beach population, our results can be easily modified to do so.
It is only necessary to relabel the evacuation time assigned to our tables.
In _____
- u. - - _.. -.
I' TABLE 2 SEABROOK EVACUATION CLEAR TIME IiTIMATE3 #'
SUMMER DAY SCENARIO b) c)
d) e)
e RADIUS DEGREES HMM Vorhees Maguire NRC XLD')
0-2 360 4:50 5:10 t
4:40 0-3 180 East 5:20 0-5 340 5:50
!.10-5:40 6:20 0-10 360 6:05 5:10-6:10 0
11:25 6: 40 a) Time (Hours: minutes) for the population to clear the indicated area after nottftcation.
"Preliminary Evscuation Clear Time Estimates for Areas Near des.
b)
Statlan," HMM Do:ument No. C-90-024A, HMM As socia te s, Inc.,
May.
1960.
l c) "Tana; Repert, Estimate of Evacuatton Times." Alan M.
Verheek As3 0 tat 6s, Ju~y.f50.
dl " E,. e r :j e n : y P l a n n t r. ; Zor evacuation.. ear Timo Istina es C.E.
Ma wi re,
Inc..
Teoruary 1953.
e' "An Independu.: Assessment of Eva cua tion Time Estimates t:e a P a n,:
Populatton Scenatto in the Emergency Plan.tng Zone Of the.i e s o r : o -
Nuclear Power Sta: Lon,"
M.P.
Mueller, et 41, Pactft: !!a r.h"e s t j
Laboratory. NUREG'CR-2903 PNL-4230.
f) "Evacuation Plan Update. Progress Rep rt No.
3,"
KLD Ass;:: stes.
a
Br:adway, Hu..t a n it : n Station. NY !!?46. Jar.uaray 20, 133..
'so.e 19, Scenacto IA.
Tnese cal cu la tion s refer to the beach populat.:n, out asau a tne entire five mile populatton ts evtcuated effletally and that 21 of the pepa.stion tryond five miles evacuates s pon tan eous ly.
It is farther assumed that evaches are at Son of capacity and that c'ffte ta.' s attempt to notify tne cea:h population at the site Alert stage.
i strutes before a General Stte emergency is called.
To make taese esttmates consistent with the assumptions used in our cal:ulattens, i
?.tnutes snould ce added to tne numbers snown.
On the ctner hand..:
minuter should be subtracted to avoid double counting the delay associated witn notifying ceach occupants, whtch is already L..: lu de d
- n the KLD time e s t ima t r e.
w
(
other words, if beach populations are assumed to begin evacuating 15-minutes earlier than normal, the equivalent evacuation time in our calculations would be 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> minus 15 minutes, not 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
According to testimony by Thomas Adler in this proceeding, actual evapuation times from the contaminated area would be much, much longer.
Some of the persons exposed in an accident will therefore likely receive larger doses than presented in our tables.
Our tables, therefore, lead to conservative estimates of the numbers of persons exposed to possible early
- death, i
Q.
Is the population around Seabrook subjected to possible "early death" for releases during the summer?
A.
(Beyea) We have investigated the conditions under which the nearest beach population, at 2 miles and 4 miles, might be exposed to doses at a threshold level for early death (200 rem) for the release categories discussed previously.
According to standard references (Egg Moeller, et al.)AA#
At i
200 rem, a few percent of exposed persons would die within a two month period, a few percent of women under 40 would be 43/
J.S.
- Evans, D.W. Moeller, D.W.
Cooper, "Health Effects Model for Nuclear power Plant Accident Consequences Analyses," (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., NUREG/CR-4214, 1985) The "LD50" for nausea is given as 1.4 Gy in Table 1.3, page II-29.
1.4 Gy equals about 125 rem.
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.,
1980.
permanently sterilized, and a few percent more would develop
(
cataracts.
Table 3 illustrates some of our findings for 2 miles.
Weather stability class, wind speed, and the time it would take for the beach population to receive a 200 rem dose under those conditions are listed.
We have found these estimates for two sets of assumptions.
The first set assumes that all the population is inside cars when the release occurs so that skin and clothes do not get contaminated.
Doses are also reduced because of the partial shielding provided by the car from the radioactivity on the ground.
The fractional decrease in dose from shielding, here referred to as a ' dose scaling factor", is calculated to be.53.78 for this set of assumptions.
The time it takes for a person in a car waiting within the plume to receive a 200 rem dose is then listed in the table.
We assume that vehicles remain stalled in traffic within contaminated ground and then move rapidly out of the area once the roads are cleared at the end of five hours.
We also assume that a person once evacuated receives no additional dose once outside the plume path.
On the basis of our consideration of a Seabrook-type evacuation, we have decided to also use a second set of assumptions.
Some of the population will not have reached their vehicles before plume passage.
(Maguire, for example, assumes up to an hour for the beach population to "mobilize" _
TABLE 3 EXPOSURE OF 2-MILE BEACH POPULATION" f
TO RISK OF EARLY DEATH ON A SUMMER AY (SKIN AND CAR DEPOSITION NOT INCLUDED)
Time in Heurt t: Reach Risk of t
200 R-m Early Death?
l Stab-
atnd PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 iltty Spetd S6V-Sl S6V-Class (m/se:)
S6V-1 A
2
- 14. -21 18.
->24
>24 50%
N N
chance A
4 20.
->24
>24
>24 N
N 1
A 8
>24
>24
>24 N
N B
2
>24 5.
-7
>24 Y
N B
4 9.5-14
- 13. -19
>24 N
N B
8 1,.
-21
>24
>24 N
N C
2
>24
<1
- 19. -24 Y
N C
4
>24 2.6-3.7
>24 Y
N C
8 7.7-12 8.3-12
>24 N
N 1
0 2
>24
<1 5.
7.0 25%
Y Y
chance D
4
>24
<1
- 12. -17 Y
N D
8
>24 1.
1.5
- 24 Y
N l
a) The population two miles from the plant, but not directly across the lagoon.
Times would be shorter f or populations with water between them and the reac to'r d ue to reduced d is pe rs io ns.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shtelded from contaminated ground by their vehicles.
Ground shielding factors are assumed to range from 0.53 to 0.78, depending on the type of automobtle.
See Ques tion 13 for f urthe r de ta ils.
c) Pasquill stability class.
d)
"Y" tndicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A question mark by.an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-ram threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hou r evacuation time may be suspect.
If the plume rises high, as at Chernobyl, the populatio n will be protected against early death for this release.
Otherwise, the populat ion will be exposed to risk of early death.
(Bo th the thermal release rate and the plume rise equation a re uncertain.
See text of question 12 for discussion of probab111ttes in table.)
itself for an evacuation.)AA#
Of those that do reach their vehicles before plume passage, some will leave their windows open and some will not enter their cars until traffic starts to move.
Thus, some of the population will have radioactive material deposited directly on their skin and hair.
We refer to the dose from this material as a "skin deposition" dose.
Similarly, we take into account material deposited directly on cars in the plume and the dose resulting from this material (a "car deposition" dose).
For this second set of assumptions, we have estimated that the dose to a person shielded by a car, but exposed to both skin deposition and car deposition doses, would be 1.0 to 1.3 i
times the dose to an unshielded person exposed to a plane of contaminated ground (see below).
The dose scaling factor range is thus 1.0-1.3.
Results using this range are shown in Table 4.
A great deal of information is contained in Tables 3, 4 and similar Tables to be presented later.
Consider, for example, D-stability conditions.
Note that the times shown refer to "clearing" time, that is the time for the last person in the area to be evacuated.
But even a 1-hour evacuation time, which i
might apply to the earliest evacuees, is insufficient to keep 11/
C.E. Maguire, Inc., "Emergency Planning Zone Evacuation Clear Time Estimates," February 1983. ~
TABLE 4 CXPOSURE OF 2-MILE BEACH POPULATION" TO RISK OF EARLY DEATH ON A SUMMER OAi INCLU*ES DOSE FROM SKIN & CAR DEPOSITION b)
Time in Hours to Reach Risk of 200 Rem a
Ear;7 Death?")
Stab Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 ility Speed S6V-Class (m/sec)
_,)
S.6V-
__, )
S1 total S6V-1 S1 tot.
S6V-1 A
2 8.2-11 11-14
>24 50%
N N
chance A
4
- 12. -15
>24
>24 N
N A
8
>24
>24
>24 N
N B
2
- 19. -24 3.1,
>24 Y
N B
4 5.5-7.3 7.8-10
>24 N?
N B
S 8.4-11 17.4-23
>24 N
N C
2
>24
<1
- 12. -15 Y
N J
4
>2, 1.7-2
>24 Y
N C
B 4.4-5.9 5.
-6.5
>24 Y
N i
D 2
>24
<1 3.5-4.2 25%
Y Y
chance D
4
>24
<1 7.6-9.6 Y
N?
D 9
>24
<1 17.4-22.5 Y
N a) The population two miles from the plant, but not directly across the lagoon.
Times would be shorter for populations with wate r between them and the reactor due to reduced dis pe rs io ns,
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles.
They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive materia l deposited on the car and directly on the individual.
The effective ground shielding factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type of automobile.
See Question 13 for further details, c) Pasqutil stability class.
di "Y" indt:ates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death thresnold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reacned.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
o) If the plume rises high, as at Chernobyl, the popula t io n will be protected against early dea th for this release.
Otherwise, the population wtil be exposed to risk of early death.
(Both tne thermal release rate and the plume rise equation are uncertain.
Se
~
doses below 200 rem for an S6V-Total release.
On the other j
l hand, the first of the evacuees to leave during an S6V-1 release would escape a 200-rem dose.
If the time to reach a 200-rem dose shown in the tables is compared with a 5-hour evacuation time, one arrives at a "yes/no" indication of whether or not the population at 2 1
miles is exposed to risk of early death.
This is noted in the last ser of columns in each table.
Some of the entries are marked with a question mark.
A question mark indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached early in the evacuation.
In such cases, a 5-hour evacuation time calculated from traffic models may be optimistic.
Because we were unable to
{
determine a quantitative estimate of the likely delay in evacuation that would result from cases of nausea, we have not been able to do more than indicate uncertainty.
Note that no entries are shown in the Tables for a PWR-2 release.
The results turned out to be so similar to, or worse than, the SV6-total release that it was not necessary to include separate entries.
Several caveats about the tables should be kept in mind, especially when exposure of the population is indicated.
First of all, risk of early death is much higher for persons very close to the plant where doses reach high levels very rapidly. - _ - _ _ _ _
\\
j Second, we have not looked at slower wind speeds for the i
various stability classes nor have we examined changing weather conditions.
Both of these situations can lead to higher doses.
Thus, Tables 3 and 4 do not include the worst possible weather conditions but only the most probable.
l A third caveat is that, while D conditions generally j
represent overcast days, we have not looked at actual precipitation conditions that sometimes catch populations on the beach.
The time for a dose to reach 200 rem is greatly decreased in this case (for the same wind speed) due to the increased deposition of radioactive material.
Evacuation "ime is also increased.
On the other hand, overcast conditions in the morning would deter people from coming to the beach.
The lower populations would mean reduced clear time estimates.
Recall, however, that there is a multi-hour underestimate of clear times in our work for most of the beaches (see Adler).
In any case, doses tend to be so high under D-conditions for the S6-V total release that reduced clear times are insufficient to provide protection.
The same is true for the S1 release for low thermal release rates and low plumes rise.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the population's exposure may be increased if the shown evacuation times are, for whatever reason, longer than assumed here..
l i
In any case, the results of Tables 3 and 4 can be combined a
with weather frequency data (Table 15) to show that for the S6V-total release which represents the severe-containment-bypass categories, if the 2-mile beach population is downwind, it will be exposed to risk of early death under meteorological conditions that would be expected to occur abt oc 70-75% of the time.
In contrast, the results in Tables 3 and 4 for the slow-containment-bypass release, S6V-1, indicate that the population at 2 miles is generally not exposed to early death for this release.
Surprisingly, the SI-steam-explosion release, which represents the largest release of all, in some circumstances might causes fewer problems for the beach population at 2 miles than the PNR-3 type release.
The reason for this is that the projected plume rise may be so great, as occurred at Chernobyl, that the plume passes high over the nearby populations.
We estimate a 50-percent chance that this will be the case for A, B and C stability condi ions and a 75-percent chance during D l
conditions.
Our rationale is that the height to which any radioactive plume rises is uncertain, as was discussed earlier.
Should the true plume rise be a factor of two less than the mid-range value predicted by standard plume rise formulas, which is within the range of uncertainty (see Fig. 5), early __.
Figure 5 I
VARIATION IN PLUME RISE ACCORDING TO SOME WELL-KNOWN FORMULAS i
100eo l~y$/
s*
r e
too g
- ~
to t
to too 2000
%. h The vertical line at Q =150 megawatts corresponds to an II h
release.
At this heat rate, the spread in predictions made by different formula is about a f actor of two.
The graph has been taken from G.A.
Briggs, "Plume Rise Predictions"'in Lectures on Air Pollution and Environmental Imoact Analyses, American Meteorological Society, 45 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. 02108 U.S.A.,
1975.
We quote frem page 60: "It is no wonder that so many plume rise formulas have been developed.
What is particularly distressing is the degree to which they diverge on predicting JLh for a given source and given conditions."
~
deaths f rom external gamma exposures become f requent for A, B,
and C stability classes.
It should also be borne in mind that the pHR-1 releases are projected to include copious amounts of isotopes that can give high lung doses.
Thus, 1-day lung dose can contribute to early death when whole body dose is below 200 rem.
When these factors are all included, the combined uncertainty is so broad that it is a toss up (50%) as to whether or not early deaths would occur following an S1 release for A, B,
and C stability classes.
As for D-stability class, two independent events must conspire to produce early deaths:
j i
both the heat rate must be low and a low plume rise formula must be correct.
As a result, we estimate that there is a 25%
chance that doses will exceed 200 rem to the whole body or the equivalent 1-day lung dose under D-stability class for this i
release.
It should also be recognized that a real accident may be less severe than the SI-case assumes.
Paradoxically, because of lower plume rise, a small breach of containment following a steam explosion could be more severe than a large breach as far as nearby populations are concerned.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that turbulent interaction with the sea breeze and/or condensation of radioactive rain could bring radioactivity down to ground level.
An enormous amount of radioactivity would be passing.-.
overhead; even a relatively weak meteorological process, one normally not considered in reactor accident dispersion modelling, could couple the upper air with air at ground level, causing high doses.
Note that we have not shown results for release classes pWR4 through pWR9.
Although these releases can cause doses in excess of protective action guides, they rarely lead to doses in excess of 200 rem.
Doses for those categories are dominated by noble gases, so that ground deposition can be ignored.
As a result, the dose ends after plume passage.
Without effective sheltering, the only emergency measure that has any impact on -
doses for these release classes is pre-olume evacuation.
IX.
RADIAT10REQSES FR0!LBEEEESENTATIVE ACCIDENTS WITHIN THE PLANNING SPECTRUM Q.
How were your dose scaling factors obtained?
A.
(Beyea) The basic dose scaling factor, with car and skin deposition ignored, was calculated to have a range of 0.53-0.78, assuming that an evacuee is inside a car in the plume deposition area.
This range represents an updating of the 0.4-7 shielding factor range used in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).
Cars are lighter today (and will be more so in the future) compared to the 1975-vehicles analyzed in the Reactor Safety Study.
Assuming that vehicles involved
- 54
in an evacuation will be 30% lighter than 1975 vehicles,AE# the appropriate shielding factor range turns AE#
out to be 0.53-0.78 The relative contribution of various doses, including car and skin deposition doses, can be obtained as follows.
Dose per unit time (Relative to dose from a flat, contaminated plane):il/
A) to person standing on contaminated beach, parking lot, road, etc.
1.0 X Sgsf/
B) Dose inside car from contaminated ground 1.0 X Scil /
11/
Due especially to the decrease in the amount of steel used in U.S.-built cars, the material weight of U.S. cars dropped 15% between 1975 and 1981 and is projected to drop another 15% by 1985.
(Table 4.3, p.
122, Transportation Energy Data Book, edition 6, G.
Kulp, M.C. Holcomb, ORNL-5883 (special), Noyes Data Corporation.)
11/
Shielding varies exponentially with mass per unit area.
Thus (.4)*7 - 0.53; (.7) 7 - 0.78.
12/
In the absence of detailed calculations, we assume that absorption effects in air can be handled by neglecting all absorption at distances less than 100 meters and by treating absorption beyond 100 meters as total.
Thus, we replace the exact problem of a contaminated plane of infinite extent by a finite circular surface of radius 100 meters.
Since the integral over the disk turns out to be logarithmic with radial distance, the total dose is insensitive to the cutoff distance chosen.
These calculations are conservative since they ignore ground scattering effects which increase relative doacs from deposition close to the receptor.
Deposition is assumed to proceed uniformly on any external surface regardless of the surface's orientation.
Thus, a square centimeter of ground is assumed to receive the same contamination as a square centimeter of skin.
13/
Shielding factor, Sg - 0.47-0.85.
Eat footnotes 26 and 60.
11/
Shielding factor, Sc - 0.53-0.78.
Ste footnotes 26 and
- 60. _ _.
C) Dose inside car from radioactivity deposited on outside of vehicle
.22 X Sc 12/
D) Dose inside car from radioactivity deposited on inside of vehicle with open windows
.04
.251/
E) Dose from skin contaminated while outside vehicle
.3512/
F) Dose from skin contaminated while inside vehicles with open windows
.1711/
in/
Based on numerical integration over an idealized automobile, deposition is assumed to take place on the underside of the vehicle as well as on the top surface.
11/
This case would occur 1) if windows had been left open, or 2) if evacuees reached their vehicles and opened windows before plume passage were complete.
The low number corresponds to low wind speeds; the high number corresponds to high wind speeds.
12/
An estimate of the relative contribution of skin contamination to the total dose can be obtained by replacing the complex shape of the human body with a set of bounding geometric surfaces:
- 1) sphere:
the dose rate at the center of a sphere contaminated with N curies of radioactivity per square centimeter is 43% of the dose rate 1 meter above a circle of 100 meter radius that has also been contaminated with N curies per unit area.
Although a cylindrical model would be more accurate, the results will not differ by a large amount, as shown below.
- 2) right circular cylinder:
numerical integration in the case l
of a cylinder with radius 1/10th of the length indicates that the average centerline dose is approximately 17%
greater than the sphere center dose discussed previously.
For a cylinder with radius 1/Sth of the length, the average centerline dose is slightly less than the sphere cast.
1 The results of these rough calculations suggest that direct contamination of people must make a significant contribution to the total dose.
We take the numerical relationship to be 35%, that is, the skin contribution is assumed to be 35% of the dose from contaminated ground.
11/
We take this dose to be half of the value for a person standing in the open, assuming that half of a person's surface area 1
is pressed against a seat and, therefore, not subject to deposition. '
l l
The total dose can be obtained by multiplying each of the j
above dose components by the amount of time spent under each set of conditions.
Unfortunately, there are a number of time parameters that must, in principle, be specified to calculate a dose precisely.
Rather than make a complex model, we have chosen to simplify the calculations by ignoring a number of effects that should tend to cancel:
- 1) We ignore the finite duration of the plume, that is, we assume radioactivity is deposited instantaneously.
This is equivalent to adding 30 minutes to the evacuation clear time for S6V releases, 15 minutes for the S1
)
release.
- 2) We ignore doses from skin and car received after f
evacuees reach reception centers.
This neglected dose should compensate for the above sim* 11fication.
- 3) In cases when skin contamination is assumed to take place, we assume that at least some evacuees remain outside vehicles during the entire time that the plume passes.
This appears to be a reasonable assumption, given the fact that traffic will be stalled and it will be uncomfortable inside vehicles that do not have air l
conditioning.
- 4) In cases when car deposition is included, we assume that a significant number of evacuees who leave their vehicles to cool off (while waiting for traffic to move) will stand next to, or lean on, a contaminated vehicle..
The net result is that we numerically calculate doses to 4
beachgoers in one of two ways:
When skin deposition is neglected, we assume that the last group of evacuees remains inside or close to cars, stalled in traffic, while exposed to contaminated ground.
Doses do not begin to accumulate until the wind carries the plume to the vehicle.
Doses continue to accumulate until the clear time is reached, at which point evacuees are assumed to leave contaminated ground instantaneously and exit their vehicles.
When skin deposition is not neglected, evacuees are assumed to receive the above dose plus the dose from skin contamination that is accumulated up until the clear time.
These assumptions lead to an effective dose shielding factor range of 1.0-1.3, when skin contamination is included, and a range of 0.65-0.95 when it is not.
In our judgment, the net effect of these simplifications is to underestimate the high end of the dose spectrum.
Tables 10, 17, and 18 (to be presented later) were calculated for winter populations, which are initially indoors.
In these cases we have assumed cloud and inhalation sheltering factors of around 0.75.
We have also assumed, for simplicity, a building shielding factor range that is idantical to the automobile case (0.53-0.78).
Q.
How many people are located near the plant?
A.
(Beyea) The size of the beach area population around Seabrook is uncertain.
One estimate of this population has been made by public Service of New Hampshire and is found in Figure 6.
Although its accuracy is uncertain, this estimate.. -
tiosag
[6289 1 N
33,3 m
NNW 4264 NNE 1234 33658
(
l15101 EM NW HE 1414 12900 10 wites 1185 216 342 WNW
[ 8254l 1224 so22 ENE 3624 371
[;m z 6052 0
{
731
)
627 1425 4
ir6 W
2919 4154 O
O
[
'W
'77 5147 W
lvea ]
f
- f, 4 0
7431 9707 2194 0
NbN 2853 1329 ESE licesi 2963 L427-)
11191 0
{41:1]
401 14274 6303
[21134 5
A I
I o*'i ' io"CiU' ""'"*"
[is e ?4 i POPULAil0N [0TALS 8 tMO. Mik E S pwhfion TOTAL Wills I k 7'j [f[0 02 27596 02 4suye 2s 60237 -i ;
o.s 88133 S 10 mooA1 1
0 10 178094 l
10-B 47632 l
0 - 5, _
225726
~
Figure 6 Scenarios 3 and 4:
Sum.ar Weekday Population 10-52
does indicate that a substantial nun.ber of people are located within two miles of the plant.
Estimates by other witnesses in t
this proceeding are much higher.
i The number of persons who would be located within a plume obviously varies not only with wind direction but also with stability class and distance from the plant.
At two miles the i
plume could be viewed as being between a 29-wedge (A stability
{
class) and a 13-wedge (D stability class)EA# compared to the 22.5 population wedges in the table.
Q.
How large are doses likely to be and how do they l
compare with doses that would be received at other sites?
A.
(Beyea) In order to gain a better appreciation of the-higher risk faced by the beach population (higher than that faced by residents at comparable distances at other sites for
)
comparable releases), we present a series of Tables that show radiation doses likely to be received under various scenarios.
Table 8 shows the highest-risk case, which applies to the Seabrook beach population that is separated from the reactor by a lagoon.
(Because plumes disperse less over water, the plume is more concentrated by the time it reaches the population than had it traveled over land.)
The doses shown apply to a person assumed to leave the contaminated area after 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
The doses are truly enormous for the S6V-Total release.
(Note that a SCO-rem dose has a 51/
Wedges are assumed to have plume widths of 3 times the horizontal dispersion coefficient. -.
H TA?"
DOSES RECEIVED ON A SUMMER DAY BY HIGHEST-RISK POPULATION ON SEABROCK 3 (SKIN & CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED) i Dose 5 Hrs After 3
Evacuation starts Risk of j
(In Rem)
Early Death?")
l Stab C Wind FWR1 PWR2 PWR3 iltty Speed S6V-S6V-Class (m/see)
S1
total S6V-1 51'3 tot.
$6V-!
A 2
63-74 230-270 (50 N
Y N
A 4
160-190 120-150 (50 N7 N7 N'
A B
120-140 65
- /4
<50 N7 N
N B
2 (50 580-6 35-96 N
Y N
B 4
<50 320-380 48-55 N
Y N
B S
190-220
- 70-2C.
(50 Y
Y N
C 2
(50 1600-1900 230-270 N
Y Y
C 4
900-1100 130-150 N
Y N
C B
490-590 70-93 N
Y N
D 2
2700-3200 379-448 N
Y Y
D 4
1600-1900 222 264 N
Y Y
D e
B40-1000 120-143 N
Y N?
al Th pcpulation at 2 mt. with bay water between reac.or and beacn.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their vehteles.
They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive matertal deposited on tne car and l'rectly on the individual.
The effeettve ground shteldtng factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type of automobtle.
See Question 13 for further details.
c) Pasqut: 1 stability class.
Dispersion parameters were shifted by one stability class to account for reduced dtspersion over water.
(See W.A. Lyons. "Turbulent Otffusion and Pollutant Transport in Shoreline Enytronments", in Lectures on Air Pollution and E t.v t r o nme n t a l Impact Analyses. American Meteorological Soctety, 45 Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02108, (1985).
Pages 141, 142, and espee ta lly rigu re 25 on Page 149.)
d)
"Y" t.dtcates exposure to a 200-rem dose or htqher.
An evacuotton time of 5 nours ts assumed.
A question mark by an entry l a d t t. s t e s snat even though doses do not reach the 200 rem,early deatn thresnold. the 100-rem threshold for nausea has oeen reacned.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation tt.se may be suspect, of Assuming mtd-range plume rase.
mortality rate greater than 70%.)
As discussed below, doses exceed the threshold for meteorological conditions that hold 93% of the time.
The doses for an S6V-1 release are smaller than for S6V-Total, but still exceed threshold for meteorological conditions that hold about 33% of the time.
Doses shown for the high-rising S1 release have been calculated using a standard plume rise formula, so they almost always remain below threshold.
(However, as mentioned earl-ier, the occurrence of a low-rising plume is expected frequently.
For this reason, we continue to list probability values under the yes/no columns in Table 8 that indicate whether or not there is a risk of early death.)
Not all of the 2-mile beach population is separated from the reactor by water.
Table 9 shows the results for populations separated by land.
The doses are still extraordinarily high for the S6V-Total release, but are significantly less serious for an S6V-1 release.
It is of interest to compare these results with doses that would be accumulated at the median reactor site around the United States.
The results are shown in Table 10.
We have taken 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for the evacuation clear time within 2 miles, based on an NRC estimate of the median time.EE#
11/
T. Urbanik II, "An Analysis of Evacuation Time Estimates Around 52 Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, NUREG/CR-1856 (1981),
Vol.
I, Table 10 p.
- 21. 1
TABLE 9
(
DOSES RECEIVED ON A SUMMER DAY BY 2-MILI SEACH PCPULATI)N (SKIN & CAR DEPOSITION DOSE NCLUDED)
Dese 5 Hrs After Evacuation starts,)
Risk of (In Rem)
Early Death?
Stcb " Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 titty Speed S6V-S6V-Cicss (m/see)
It ' '
total S6V-1 51*'
tot.
S6V-1 A
2 122-143 95-110
<50 N
N N
A 4
92-109 50-59
<50 N
N N
A 8
53-62
<50
<50 N
N N
B 2
63-74 230-270
<50 N
Y N
B 4
160-190 120-150
<50 N?
N?
N B
8 120-140 65-76
<50 N
N N
2
<50 580-680 85-98 N
Y N
C 4
<50 320-380 48-55 N
Y N
C S
100-220 170-200
<50 Y
Y N
D 2
<50 1600-1900 230-270 N
Y Y
l D
4
<50 900- 100 130-150 N
Y N
l 0
6
<50 490-590 70-83 N
Y N
l a) The population two miles from the plant, but not directly across the lagoon.
51 Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be parttally shielded i
from contaminated ground by their vehicles.
They are assumed to estet"e a dose ecmponent from radtoactive ma t e r ta l d e po s't te d o n the car and directly on the individual.
The effeettve ground 4
snoriding factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type of aut. moot'e.
See Question 13 for f urthe r d e ta ils.
c) Pasquill stability class.
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuatt;n tine of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A question mark by an entry andteatas that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death thresnold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the assumed 5-%ou r evacua tton ttee may be suspect, j
o) Assuming mid-range plume rise.
l l
l l
l l
l TABLE 10 DOSES RECEIVED BY 2-MILE POPULATION l
AT A MEDIAN REACTOR SITE IN THE UNITED STATES (CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED)
Dose 1.5 Hrs After b)
Ivacuation Starts Risk of d)
-(In Rem)
Early Death?
Stab #' Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 111ty speed 56V-S6V-
__,)
__,)
Class (m /s e c )
S1
- otal S6V-1 Si tot.
S6V-!
A 2
53-60
<50
<50 N
N N
A 4
<50
<50
<50 N
N N
A 8
<50
<50
('
N N
N B
2
<50 95-110 N
N N
B 4
71-82 52-58 (50 N
N N
3 9
52-61
<50
<50 N
N N
C 2
<50 220-250 450 N
Y N
C 4
<50 130-140
<50 N
N?
N C
B 79-91 67-76
<50 N
N N
D 2
<50 540-610 77-37 N
Y N
i 0
4 320-370
<50 N
Y N
D 8
170-200
<50 N
Y N
al The population two miles from the plant.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated g rou'. 3 b y b u t id in gs and their vehicles.
They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive matertal deposited on the car, but they are not assumed to have had their skin contaminated.
The effective ground shielding factors range from 0.65 to 0.95, depending on the type of automobile.
Cloud and Inhalation shielding factors are taken to be 0.75.
See Question 13 for furtner desatis, c) Pasqutil s'..:tlity class.
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evscuatton time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A question mark by an entry t nd t :s te s that even thoug5 doses do not reach the 200-rem ea rly dea th threshold, the l i.) - r e m threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the eSivmed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
o) Assuming a mid-ra :ge plume rise.
Table 10 shows that doses, even for S6V-Total, get very I
high only for two meteorological conditions (D-stability, wind speeds 2 and 4 meters /second).
Doses for the other releases never rise above early-death threshold.
In general, doses at these other sites are less than one-fifth the doses for the highest-risk Seabrook beach case.
Q.
Are the beach populations beyond two miles exposed to risk of early death during a summer day?
A.
(Beyea) Yes, certainly for an S6V-Total release.
Tables 11 and 12 show the calculated results for beach populations at 4 miles and an evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
Note that the beach population is not protected for a low-rising SI-release either.
Additional insight into how far from the reactor threshold doses are likely to occur for an S6V-Total release can be gained from examining Table 13.
It shows early death radii for D-stability class and a five-hour evacuation time.
This means that an individual remaining in the plume at a radius given in the last column of the table for five hours under the given weather conditions will receive at least a 200-rem dose.
These are the individuals who have not been able to evacuate earlier due to traffic congestion, etc.
It should be-noted, however, that individuals at this radius who have evacuated earlier may still receive a 200-rem dose due to the continuing dose contribution from material deposited on their skin and car.
Similarly, individuals beyond the early death radius for a 61 -
TABLE 11 DOSES RECEIVED ON A SUMMER DAY BY 4-MILE BEACH POPULATION"'
(.
(SKIN AND CAR DEPOSITION DOSES INCLUDED)
Dose 3 Hrs After b)
Evacuation Starts RLsk of d)
(In Rem)
Early Death?
Stab # Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 tlity Speed S6V-S6V-Class (m/sec)
Si,)
3 total S6V-1 S1 tot.
S6V-1 A
2 61-71 48-55
<50 N
N N
A 4
<50
<50
<50 N
N N
A 8
<50
<50
<50 N
N N
B 2
82-96 59-69
<50 N
N N
B 4
64-75
<50
<50 N
N N
B 8
<50
<30
<50 N
N N
C 2
<50 160-1t-
<50 N
N?
N C
4 98-120 3'
.10
<50 N
N N
C S93-110 52-61
<50 N
N N
D 2
<50 540-640 77-89 N
Y N
O 4
<50 340-410 50-58 N
Y N
D s
(50 190-230
<50 N
Y N
a) Tne population 4 miles from the plant.
b) Pe-sons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded fecm contaminated ground by their vehicles.
They are assumed to recetve a dese component from radioactive material deposteed on t.. e car and directly on the indtytdual, The effective g round shteiding factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type of automobLle.
See Question 13 for further detatis, c) Pasqutil stabtitty class.
d)
"Y" Indtettes exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A question mark by an entry indicates
- nat even though doses do not reach the 200 rem early death tnreshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect, e) Assuming a mid-range plume rise.
TABLE 12 EXPOSURE OF 4-MILE BEACH POPULATICN"' TO RISK OF EARLY DEATH ON A S i
(SKIN & CAR DEPOSITION DOSES INCLUDED) b)
Time in hou rs to Reach Risk of I
200 Rem d)
Seab
- ,' Wind Early Death?
PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 ility Speed S6v-S6v-Class (m /s-c )
S1*'
~
total S6V-1 S1' tot.
S6V.
A 2
19-24 23.
->24
>24 N
N N
A 4
>24
>24
>24 N
N N
A 8
>24
>24
>24 N
N N
B 2
13-17
- 18. - 23
>24 N
N N
3 4
18-24
>24
>24 N
N N
B 8
>24
>24
>24 N
N N
C 2
>24 5.4-6.7 12-15 N
Y N
C 4
11-14 10.5-13.5 23->24 N
N N
C 8
12-15 21.6->24
>24 N
N N
D 2
>24
<1 3.5-4.2 N
Y Y
D 4
>24 1.7-2 6.8-8.6 N
Y N?
D e
>24 4-5.2 14-18 N
Y N
a) ?e popu.atten 4 miles from the plant.
b) Persons caught in the plume are ossemed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles.
They are assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive material deposited on the car and directly on the individual.
The effective ground shieldt g factors range from 1.0 to 1.3, depending on the type of automobile.
See Question 13 for f urthe r details, c) Pasquill stability class.
d)
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-r,em dose or higher.
An evacuation I
time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early dea th t h r e s ho ld, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In sucn cases, the assumed 5-hou r evacua tion time may be suspect.
Assuming a m.d-range plume rise.
given set of conditions are not necessarily protected fiam a
(
200-rem dose, because we have not accounted for the doses they might receive outside the plume from skin and car deposition material.
i As noted previously, if evacuation times for the beaches beyond 2 miles are longer than 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, as is documented by Adler, the consequences of these releases for a given set of conditions will be more serious.
The early death radii will be larger and many more people will be exposed.
Q.
How would a summer evening scenario affect your results?
A.
(Beyea) There is evidence that there would still be a' l
substantial population on or near the beaches on summer evenings.
Although evacuation times might be reduced due to a smaller evacuating popula' ion, it is not clear that this reduction would be enough to ensure that no early deaths occurred in the population--especially since night-time plumes are mora concentrated a.id therefore are more dangerous.
In order to investigate the consequences of a summer evening scenario, we have obtained an estimate from our model of the doses at 2 miles which would be received for typical evening weather scenarios assuming a clear time of 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
We have assumed, in contrast to the summer scenario, that the population is wearing more clothes and could remove them after exposure to reduce the sxin deposition dose.
While it is very uncertain how much this would reduce the skin deposition dose, _
1 i
\\
we have also assumed for simplicity that removing clothes would i
i eliminate it, including the contribution from contaminated I
hair.
We have still assumed a dose component from material deposited on cars.
(The dose scaling factor range for this scenario becomes.65.95)
The results of our model are shown in Table 13a.
The time to reach 200 rem is usually one hour or less for the S6V-total release, which means that any reduction of evacuation times during the evening is not going to protect the population for this release category.
Q.
How frequently do the various weather conditions occur?
A.
(Beyea) The frequencies of the Pasquill stability classes, as reported in the SB 1&2, ER-OLS,EN# are given in Table 14.
The frequencies of the A,B, and C stability classes increase during the summer months, with C the most frequent of the three.
D and E are the dominant stability classes.
Although not indicated in the Table (which is based on 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> data), C and D stability classes would probably dominate during daytime hours because the E, F,
and G stability classes tend to occur primarily in the evening or early morning hours.
l The consequences during C, D, and E classes are all serious in terms of early death.
Consequences would also be serious in/
public Service of New Hampshire, "Seabrook Station -
Units 1 & 2, Environmental Report, Operating License Stage,"
Figure 2.1-19...
i l
(
TABLE 13 EARLY DEATH RADII FOR A 5-HOUR EVACUATION TIME ON A SUMMER DAY S6V-TOTAL RELEASE EARLY DEATH STABILITY WIND SPEED RADIUS CLASS (m/sec)
(miles)"
B 2
2-3 B
4 1-2 B
8 1-2 i
C 2
3-4 C
4 2-3 C
8 1-2 0
2 7-8 D
4 6-7 D
8 4-5 a)
An individual in the plume at this radius under the given conditions will receive, assuming a five-hour clear time, at least a 200 rem dose.
Individua'Is at this radius who hsve evacuated earlier may still receive at least a 200 rem dose due to the continuing dose contribution f rom material deposited on their sein and car.
Ind iv id ua l s at f arther distances may still receive 200 rem doses due to skin and car deposition doses after leaving the plume.
A dose scaling factor range of 1.0-1.3 is assumed.
This is equivalent to assuming 1) that some individuals are caught in the open during plume passage, 2) that the last to evacuate are stuck in traffic and t
spend the full five hours in contaminated ground, and 3) that all doses cease after five hours.
See Question 13 for f urthe r de tails.
TABLE 13a DOSES RECEIVED ON A SUMMER EVENING BY TWO-MILE BEACH POPULATION' (CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED, NOT SKIN DOSE) t Dose 3 Hrs After b)
Evacuation starts Risk of d)
I (In Rem)
Early Death?
Stab- ' Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 111ty Speed S6V-S6V-Class (m/sec)
S1*'
total S6V-1 S1*'
tot.
S6V-1 0
2
<50 820-970 120-140 N
Y N
D 4
480-560 72-81 N
Y N
D 8
260-310
<50 N
Y N
E 2
1300-1600 200-220 N
Y Y
E 4
790-950 120-130 N
Y N
E B
430-520 64-73 N
Y N
- 4) The population 2 miles from the plant, not directly across the lagoon.
Doses would be higher should the plume be bl> wing over the lagoon.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by their vehicles.
They are assumed to receive a dose co=ponent from radioactive material deposited on the car.
No skin dose is included on the assumption that j
a) clothes keep radioactivity from reaching skin; and b)that clothes are discarded once evacuees enter their cars.
The effective ground shielding factors range from 0.65 to 0.95, depending on the type of automobile.
See Question 13 for further details.
c) Pasquill stability class.
d)
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In i
such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
e) Assuming a mid-range plume rise.
1
I TABLE 14 FREQUENCY OF PASQUILL STABILITY CLASSES AT SEABROOK(a)
( Va lu e s in 4 of Time)
Month A
B C
D E
F G
Apr 1979 1.27 2.11 3.80 49.65 29.40 7.88 5.91 May 1.20 2.86 4.82 52.86 26.51 5.27 6.48 Jun 2.92 6.69 12.26 39.83 25.49 6.13 6.69 Jul 4.90 6.94 11.56 29.12 28.84 12.65 5.99 Aug 2.91 4.71 9.97 43.07 26.59 7.34 5.40 Sep 1.25 7.64 11.81 30.69 27.36 10.83 10.42 Oct 0.81 2.96 5.79 39.30 34.05 10.09 7.00 Nov 0.0C 0.56 4.76 43.92 34.83 9.37 6.57 Dec 0.00 0.41 2.70 47.03 41.35 5.81 2.70 Jan 1960 0.13 1.88 6.59 51.88 30.38 5.78 3.36 Feb 0.44 2.03 5.37 50.36 34.69 5.66 1.45 Mar 10.68 1.64 5.34 43.15 24.66 6.03 8.49 Yearly 2.22 3.37 7.00 43.31 30.38 7.76 5.87 a)
Period of Record:
April 1979 March 1980.
Stabiltty class calculated using 43'-209' delta temperature.
Source:
SB 1&2, ER-OLS, Table 2.3-24.
l TABLE 15 JOINT FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTI': OF WIND SPEED. AND STABILITY CLASS FOR SEABROOK11 (209-FOOT LEVEL)51 APRIL '79 - MARCH '80 Stability Class Wind speed (mph)
Wind Speed (m/sec)
% Within Clas A
<4
<1.8 1.04 4-7 1.8-3.1 8.85 8-12 3.6-5.3 31.77 i
>12
>5.3 58.33 B
<4
<1.8 1.03 4-8 1.8-3.1 10.65 8-12 3.6-5.3 42.:7
>12
>5.3 46
.5 C
<4
<1.8 2.29 4-7 1.8-3.1 1 7. 5 '.
8-12 3.6-5.3 36.5:
>12
>5.3 43.6 0
<4
<1.8 3.34 4-7 1.0-3.1 17.92 8-12 3.6-5.3 36.70
<12
>5.3 42.03 E
<4
<1.8 4.57 4-7 1.8-3.1 16.78 8-12 3.6-5.3 44.32
>12
>5.3 34.33 a) Source:
SB 142, ER-OLS, Table 2.3-27.
b) Frequency distribution would vary with measurement level and season.
for F and G conditions though we have not considered them.
Our results are not based on an infrequently occurring weather scenario.
The distribution of wind speeds within the stability classes is given in Table 15.EI' Note that these distributions are not disaggregated by season, and the summer distribution might be different.
Although the frequency data given in Tables 14 and 15 are not precisely applicable to earlier tables, it is possible to use the information to make a rough assessment of the probability that the population would not be protected from early death should a severe release occur with the wind blowing toward a beach.
For instance, it was indicated in Table 9 that for an 56V-total release, the 2-mile beach population on a summer day was not protected from early death under C and D conditions.
These meteorological conditions are likely to occur 75% of the time during summer days.EE' The probability is even higher for the highest-risk Seabrook beach population
-- around 93%.
Q.
What about the S6V-1 release?
12/
New Hampshire Emergency Response Plan, Rev.
2.,
Vol.
6, p.
10-52, la/
This' assumes that C and D stability classes occur with a 75% probability on a summer day (E, F,
and G do not occur during the day and about one half of the D percentages in Table 14 occur at night.)
- 64
A.
In this case, a similar analysis suggests that j
doses exceeding threshold would occur about one-third of the time for the highest-risk population at Seabrook beach, if it were downwind.EA#
Q.
How many people would be contaminated during a summer release?
A.
(Beyea) It must be recognized that, based on Tables 6,
9, and 11, thousands of people might be exposed to life-threatening doses should a release occur on a summer day.
In order to put some bounds on the health consequences to a beach area population, we have done a simple calculation of the number of people who might be contaminated due to a release at Seabrook.
An unknown fraction of this number would receive doses at or above 200 The others might suffer a range of consequences, from rem.
nausea within a few hours to cancer many years in the future.
The lower bound to this limit is zero; that is, with enough warning time, it is possible that no one will be contaminated.
The maximum number of persons contaminated within ten miles i
12/
The S6V-1 column in Table a indicates that the early l
death threshold would occur for 1) D stability class and wind speeds of 2 and 4 m/sec, and 2) C stability class and wind speeds around 2 m/sec.
According to Table 15, the D wind speeds would occur'60% of the time, while the C wind speeds would occur 18% of the time.
The net result, based on the data for summer months in Table 14, is a 28% chance of early death threshold under D conditions and a 5% chance under C conditions. -
during an accident on a summer weekday is listed in Table 16, i
for a law estimate of weekday population taken from New Hampshire Seabrook plan.
(See testimony of other experts in this proceeding for an explanation of why the actual population may be considerably higher.)
The table shows a range of between 10,000 and 23,000 people who may be exposed, l
The table assumes no one within ten miles will have had sufficient time to evacuate before passage of the plume.
The purpose of the table is basically to show the size of the population that may be of immediate concern--those persons
)
within ten miles who will know they may have been exposed, later will presumably learn that they have been exposed, and eno will wonder what the potential consequences will be.
The maximum number is so large that it is questionable whether medical facilities will be adequate to treat those seeking treatment.
Q.
Is the population exposed to "early death" during other times of the year?
A.
(Beyea) Yes.
We prepared Tables 17 and 18 in a manner similar to those for a summer day beach scenario and found that the population is not always protected from "early death" (200 rem) at two and four miles for the rapid bypass sequence, S6-V total, although the population is protected for other sequences considered.
For those tables we examined evacuees who would take about three hours to evacuate as shown in Table 19.
During plume -
(
TABLE 16 VARIATION IN POPULATION EXP_OSED IN SSE SECTOR WITHIN 10-MILES ON A SUMMER WEEKDAY PLUME ANGLE #)
STABILITY CLASS AT 5 MILES (d eg r ee s )
MAXIMUM EXPOSED POP UL A T IO:
A 26 23,000 B
20 18,000 C
15 13,000 0
11 10,000 a) Assumes a plume angle of three times the horizon ta l dispe r sion cceffacient.
b) Calculated as the population in the SSE sector (20,000) a c co rd in g to figure 6 multipi.ed by the ratio of plume angle to 22.5 degrees.
ML.imum population could be zero if the wind'were blowing towards the ocean and there were sufficient warning time of a release.
-. -, - - ~
,-w.
TABLE 17 i
DOSES RECEIVED AT 2 MILES ON AN OFF-SEASON WEEKDAY" (CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED)
Dose 3 Hrs After b)
Evacuation starts Risk of d)
(In Rem)
Ea rly Dea th?
Stab #' Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 ility Speed S6V-S6V-Class (m/sec)
S1' total S6V-1 51'
~
tot.
S6V-1 A
2 62-73 48-55
<50 N
N N
A 4
47-56
<50 N
N N
A 8
<50 N
N N
8 2
110 *40 N
N N
{
B 4
83-94 62-72 N
N N
B 8
60-73
<50 N
N N
C 2
<50 270-320 N
Y N
C 4
<50 150-180 N
N?
N C
S93-110 81-94 N
N N
D 2
<50 690-940 97-120 N
Y N
D 4
<50 410-490 59-68 N
Y N
D 4
<50 220-270
<50 N
Y N
al The resident population two miles from the plant.
b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded fram contaminated ground by buildings and theit vehicles.
They a.
assumed to receive a dose component from radioactive matertal d e ::o s t t ed on the car.
The effective ground shielding f ac to rs ra ge from 0.65 to 0.95, depending on the type of automobile.
Cl.2d and inhalation shielding factors are taken to be 0.75.
See Question 13 for further details, c) Pssquill stability class.
d)
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.i s assumed.
A question mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reached.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
e) Assumes mid-range plume rise.
passage, residents were assumed to be inside buildings with cloud and inhalation shielding factors of 0.75.
We assumed a ground-dose scaling factor of 0.65-0.95, implying that the evacuees were in cars within the plume, and that'the cars had radioactive material deposited on them.
No skin deposition dose was assumed.
Although Table 17 shows several "unprotected" cases for the rapid bypass sequences at two miles, it should be noted that the actual doses above threshold would be considerably higher in the summer time.
Doses to the highest-risk beach population would be about four times as high as those projected for an off-season accident.
(At four miles the corresponding ratio would be two to one.)
As a result of these higher doses, the total number of injuries would be greater in the summer even if the exposed populations were the same.
Furthermore, because the population during the off-season scenarios is smaller than for summer scenarios, fewer people would receive radiation doses during off-season scenarios.
Therefore, there would be less of a chance that medical facilities would be overwhelmed, and more of a chance that most of those exposed to doses about 200 rem would receive the "supportive" medical treatment that would be needed to raise the early death threshold above 200 rem.
This would be particularly important for the 4-mile case shown in Table 18.
Q.
What difficulties are associated with reducing the health consequences of a large release at Seabrook? -..
I TABLE 18 DOSES RECEIVED AT 4 MILES ON AN OFF-SEASON WEEKDAY" (CAR DEPOSITION DOSE INCLUDED)
Dose 3 Hrs After b)
Evacuation Starts Risk of (In Rem)
Early Death?
Stab C Wind PWR1 PWR2 PWR3 ility speed S6V-S6V-Class (m/sec)
ST * '
total S6V-1 31 ' '
tot.
S6V-1 A
2
<50
<50
<50 N
N N
l A
4 N
N N
A 8
N N
N B
2 N
N N
B 4
N N
N B
8 N
N N
C 2
78-92 N
N N
C 4
50-58 47-55 N
N N
C 9
47-56
<50 N
N N
D 2
<50 240-290 N
Y N
D 4
160-190 N
N?
N D
6 93-100 N
N N
a) The resident population f ou r miles from the plant, b) Persons caught in the plume are assumed to be partially shielded from contaminated ground by buildings and their vehicles.
They are assumed to receive a dose component f r'o m radioactive material deposited on the car.
The effective ground shielding factors range from 0.65 to 0.95, depending on the type of automobile.
Cloud and inhalation shielding f actors a re taken to be 0.75.
See Question 13 for further details, c) Pesquill stability class.
d)
"Y" indicates exposure to a 200-rem dose or higher.
An evacuation time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
A questton mark by an entry indicates that even though doses do not reach the 200-rem early death threshold, the 100-rem threshold for nausea has been reachad.
In such cases, the assumed 5-hour evacuation time may be suspect.
e) Assumes mid-range plume rise.
(
TAB LE 19
- l SEABROOK EVACUATION CLEAR TIME ESTIMATES OFF-SEASON WEEKDAY SCENARIO
)
1 RADIUS DEGREES HMM Vorhees#'
Maguire NRC*
0-2 360 3:10
\\
0-5 360 3:10 0-10 360 4:30 3:40 3:00 6: 45 a) Time (Hcurs: minutes) for the population to clear the indicated area af-notification.
bi "Preliminary Evacuation Clear Time Estimates for Areas Near S e ab rook i
Station," HMM Document No. C-80-024A, HMM Associates, Inc.,
May 20, 1960.
c) "Final Report. Estimate of Evacuation Times," Alan M.
Vorhees &
Associates, July 1980.
d) "Emergency Planning Zone Evacuation Clea r Time Estimates,"
C.E. Maqu;re. l Inc.,
February 1983.
e) Letter to Mitzte Solberg, Emergency Preparedness Development Branch.
U.:
N.R.C.
from A.E. Desrosiers, Health Physics Te chnology Se c tio n,
- Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratortes, August 20, 1982.
4
,-r--
n a
A.
(Beyea) Limited options exist for reducing the severity I
of accidents at Seabrook.
None of the extraordinary emergency measures that we, or other nuclear analysts have been able to devise are likely to eliminate or effectively reduce the serious radiation doses that would result from a range of releases at Seabrook.
(A)
Possibility of reducino skin and car deposition dose.
Our work here has shown that skin and car deposition doses could make important contributions to the total dose to an individual, but no consideration has been given to reducing these doses in emergency planning.
We have considered whether or not extraordinary emergency measures could be taken to protect against them.
For instance, evacuees could be instructed to leave the evacuation vehicle as soon as possible, to shower (skin and hair) as soon as possible, and perhaps to remove hair with scissors.
Automated car spraying devices could be installed near important beach exit points in an attempt to remove some of the material from cars as soon as possible, thus reducing doses to the occupants.
The effectiveness of various methods for removing radioactive aerosols from skin, hair, and cars must be investigated, however, before credit can be taken for them.
The logistics of washing every car in the beach area would be formidable and would likely add to _.
evacuation times.
(Removal of aerosols is complicated by the fact that radioactive aerosols attach themselves too f
strongly to clean surfaces to be removed easily.
On the other hand, the fraction depositing on dirty or oily surfaces could be removed at the same time as dirt and oil were removed.)
All these measures, if they worked, could be helpful in reducing the number of delayed cancers that would show up in later years.
However, their implementation would not change the significance of our tables with respect to early health effects.
This is because post-evacuation doses are not even considered in our calculations and because not all cars could.
be decontaminated.
Also, populations are not protected, even when car deposition doses are excluded.
B) Possibility of rolvino on shelters.
In principle, one way to reduce the chances of early death occurring in the beach population would be to provide shielding by means of sheltering, especially from ground dose, while people wait for roads to clear.
However, shelters would only be useful if they are suitably massive, which seems doubtful in this case.EE Serious questions exist as to whether they ED/
Z.G.
Burson and A.E.
profio, "Structure Shielding from i
Cloud and Fallout Gamma Ray Sources for Assessing the Consequences of Reactor Accidents," EG & G, Inc., Los Vegas, Nev., EGG-1183-1670. 1 l
would actually be used by a majority of the population.
As is indicated by the testimony of other experts in this proceeding, sheltering is not a realistic option for the beach populations.
The possibility of having beach occupants shield themselves by immersing themselves in ocean water has been rejected by us because of the low temperature of the water.
On the other hand, it would be physically possible for exposed persons to partially shield themselves from ground dose by covering themselves with sand prior to evacuation.
However, the notion that people will wait away from their cars buried in the sand or immersed in the water while traffic congestion clears seems grotesquely unrealistic.
C) Possibility of evacuatino on foot or by bike.
The beach population might be instructed to walk out of the area.
If the release has occurred, has blown towards the beaches, and has been confined to a relatively narrow area, this might be the best strategy to reduce doses from a theoretical nuclear physics perspective.
In this way, no one would wait within the plume area accumulating doses from the radioactive material on the ground or on cars.
Our calculations show that a person walking out in certain circumstances would have received, about five hours after the release, between a 30 to 40% lower dose than a person who has....
l l
remained in a car within the plume while trying to evacuate.II#
However, chis type of forced march strategy flounders when faced with no: mal human behavior.
providing bicycles for beachgoers might be a strategy since it would offer the hope of relatively rapid escape.
l Nevertheless, it is not clear what percentage of beachgoers would utilize the bikes and what the traffic impact would be.
In fact, access to bikes might increase the disorderliness of the evacuation.
For example, consider those beachgoers who opted for driving (with or without official permission), only to return for bicycles after being stuck in traffic for an hour or so.
Their abandoned automobiles cculd well block traffic for those remaining.
Certainly no credit could be given in emergency planning for reliance on bicycles without a i
full-scale test of the process.
Yet, a convincing test would be impossible.
How could a test reliably simulate the stress and fear that would be generated in a real accident?
)
11/
We calculated the dose to an individual on the beach who waits for about one and a half hours after the release (dose scaling factor of 1.35), who then leaves the plume, but accumulates doses from skin deposition (dose scaling factor.35).
We also calculated the dose to an individual in a car within the plume, accumulating doses from the plume on skin and car deposition material (dose scaling factor of 1.0-1.3).
By comparino the doses for about five hours after the release, we found a 30-40 percent lower dose for those individuals walking out.
D) possibility of ore-distributino potassium iodide.
The value of pre-distributing potassium iodide near nuclear power plants has been discussed by us previously.
- However, pre-distribution will not work for a transient beach population, unless the authorities are willing to hand out tablets every day to everyone who visits the beaches.
- Also, potassium iodide would be of limited usefulness for the high-dose scenarios that would develop at Seabrook beaches.
Q, What about the probability of the releases discussed in your testimony?
A.
(Beyea) pWRl-pWR9 releases are estabu shed by NUREG-0396 as the spectrum of releases that must be considered-in emergency planning for nuclear power plants.
The NRC took the probability and credibility of these accidents classes into account in developing NUREG-0396.
Every emergency plan, therefore, must address the entire range of these releases, and should also examine the site-specific equivalent of these generic releases.
Q.
What is your overall assessment of the doses that might be delivered at Seabrook?
A.
(Beyea) The summer Seabrook situation is the worst-case I have ever examined in connection with emergency planning or hypothetical reactor accidents.
The doses that would be received following a range of releases at the Seabrook site, l
)
even with the proposed emergency plans in effect, are higher l
l
- 72
than doses that would be received at most other sites in the complete absence of emergency planning.
Q.
Dr. Beyea, does that complete your testimony?
A.
(Beyea) Yes, it does.
X.
PWR-1 RELEASES AT SEABROOK Q.
Dr. Thompson, what is the basis for your statements in your testimony?
A.
(Thompson) As mentioned earliet, I have co-authored a review (Sholly and Thompson, 1986) of various "source term" issues.
This review was current through mid-1985.
I used that review and the documents cited within it as a l
basis for my statements.
In addition, I have studied a variety of more recent documents, which collectively form the remaining basis for my statements.
These more recent documents include the draft NRC report NUREG-ll50 (NRC, 1987a) and the documents generated as a result of a January 1987 technical meeting sponsored by the NRC (Kcuts, 1987; NRC 1987b).
(See attached references.)
Q.
Please describe the potential for a "PWRl-type" release.
A.
(Thompson) The Reactor Safety Study (NRC, 1975) described the PWR1 release category as being "characterited by a core meltdown followed by a steam explosion on contact of molten fuel with the residual water in the reactor _..
vessel."
More recent work has identified the potential for i
a similar release through a different mechanism--high-pressure melt ejection.
In this case, molten core material is expelled from the reactor vessel under pressure of steam and gases within the vessel.
Q.
Where might the containment breach occur during an accident sequence leading to a "PNR l-type" release?
A.
(Thcmpson) For either steam explosion or high-pressure melt ejection sequences, the location of the breach cannot be predicted.
The breach might occur anywhere from the bate of the containment wall to the containment dome.
In addition, a co-existing bypass pathway could lead to some release through buildings adjacent to the main containment building.
Q.
Please describe the range of thermal energy release rates which could be experienced during a "PWR l-type" release.
(Thompson) This range is illustrated by Figure 7, A.
which is drawn from the Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PLG, 1983).
For present purposes, release category S1 is relevant.
The table shows that the estimated energy release rate for this release category could vary from 21,000 million BTU per hour to 60 million BTU per hour, according to the size of the containment leak area.
Present knowledya of containment failure modes is - _.
TABLE 11.6-4.
ENERGY RELEASE RATES FOR RELEASE CATEGORIES ST, ET, 5R. AND 54V 9
Energy Release Rate (10 8tu/hr)
Release Energy Rei ased Blowdown Duration Category (10 Btu) 10 Seconds! f2 Minutes 10 Minutes 30 Minutes 1 Hour 3T 0.58 21 3.5 0.35 0.12 0.06 i
g IT 1.26 25 7.6 0.76 0.25 0.13 i
e i
3R 2.0 70 12 1.2 0.4 0.2 54V 1.6 57 9.6 0.96 0.32 0.16 2
Leak Area (ft )
250 25 2.5 1
0.5 i
Equivalent Diameter 18 6
1.8 1.1 0.8 (feet)
? ?-
c -
~5 C
N so j
.. e sJ G
5 t
5 i
l l
l such that the energy release rate cannot be predicted within this range, and perhaps within a wider range.
Q.
Please describe the potential for "PWR l-type" releases to be relatively enriched in certain radioactive isotopes?
j A.
(Thompson) In Appendix VI of the Reactor Safety Study 1
(NRC, 1975), release category pWR1 is shown as having a relatively large release fraction for the ruthenium group of radioactive isotopes--40% for this release category as opposed to 2% for release category PWR 2.
Such an enhanced release is predicted to occur because of the physical and chemical behavior of a steam explosion event.
More recent studies have-shown that a high-pressure melt ejection event could also lead to enchanced release of certain isotopes including those of ruthenium, molybdenium and tellurium, l
Q.
Mr. Thompson, does this complete your testimony?
A.
(Thompson) Yes, it does.
i 4
4 4
e
i TO TEST 1 MONY OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY TABLE A SURRY DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES. WASH-im The WASH 1400 analysis of Surry Unit 1 identified tweNo acodo which dominated the estimated median core melt frequency of 5 x 10 5 per reactor year.
1/
These tweNe accident sequences, their designations, and ther est frequencias are described below. 2/
Secuence TMLB' - This sequence is a station MM sequence (a loss o offsite power fo80wed by the fasiure of onsde AC power and the failure t power within about three hours). WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of TMLB' at 3 x 104 per reactor year. 2/ f/
1/
tt we be noted that I the p of these twehe esquences are sur men frequency is 1.24 x 10 per reactor year. WASH 1400 obtahed the 5 x to per reactor yea by a Monte cMo sampung technious, the penteders of wm:h are nm espedef vefue tus been eted wedety, and is therelere used here tar reference purposes. y de 2/
Racerer, a new risk unsaamert for Suny Une 1 was performed for en dra 1150. A-Als* Mee cs Daerment The ful medts of the new Surry 1 PRA are documerned in Robert C. Senudo, et aL. Aashes d care one==aa fr==ce Fw !,. i ! h A s 2, Sanes Nedr.ned Lt.r~.
% prepared for the U.S. Nudeer Regulatory Commamen.
NUMEG/CR 4660, SAM *', Vp 3, November 1988. TNs study estimated the frequency of core met at 2.8 x 10 indudng 'sesmal evente* euch as earthquakes, Goods, tres, etc.
esquensee TMQ, TWWQ, and $f were found not to need to core melt.Other WASH 1400 along uWe somrad rrAirsad accident sequences. A ta sumnWstes Wie reeuks of the tower study is prtMded as art addendum to ashtt Coff9ENBeII purposes, l
N.C. it::
'*n at aL, Ma**w Sannv %*r An ^ - ^ i,-.; d k:'da Cc.i--.xi ! Nudaar >%r* PJaag, U.S. Nudeer RegWoory Commension, WASH-Minks in U.S.
75/014, Oceober 1975, 'Mam Maport,' page St.
sequentse have an aggregets core mes frequency sotkristed at 9J x t0
,. 3 Robert C. Bertucio, et at, Anaurs d care Damnee rmev h Inc.m! hm Sancia per rescaer year. ft$,
,,...--n
.----_,--_n,.,,
42 Sectuanen TML - This sequence is a transmit other resultn by a loss of main feedwater, with a failure of auxdiary feedwater.
the frequency of sequence TML at 6 x 104 WASH 1400 estmated t
per reactor year. U g/
secuence V - The V sequence represents an 'intersystem the failure of the low pressure hjection system check vanes. T of the low pressure injection system piping outside of the co e
release from this core melt accident also bypasses the containment.
WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of requence V at 4 x 104 perreactor-year, Z/3/
sequence s2c - sequence s2C representa i smet LOCA in whic containment spray injection system fails. This resultr, in a lack of cont removal.
The containment fails due to steam overpressure, fo6owing wh emergency core cooling systems fail due to insuf%wii not poseNo and/or damage due to containment depressi,L.iscA This results in core melt agg SANN'*', Val 3, Nwomber 19es, pagee V4 and V4.Ner~i L propered lor the U.S. f%1eer Regulatory Comrtdesion NurEG/CR 4 i
1/
H.C. Raercussen, et al. Manenv Sderv b& An A1; 2-,,
75/014, October te75, *A%h Aaport,' page NLCc.T.,ur'*' Nu Em, WASH 1400 NUREG
& Axidant Misks in U s.
r g/
The NUREG 1130 anefysis satimated the kequency of tNo type of s Intammi h Serate Nedonal Lahoresortes, prepared ter 4
Communen, NUR$GjCR 4880, SANO3H004, Vol 3, November 190s, pag 2/
N.C. Naammaman et aL, " ^= SMarv %+ An A==.
. d km C. - -
^^P
^
ent Misks In U.S.
-~ Power A 75 914 h 197s,'Mah Aaport.* pe0s e1.% U.S. Nudeer Roguey Cw....
di, WASH 1400, NufiEG-
/
t/
yper,es.tendone keertational Corporodon has re estimated the V seq App 50 or.,.e,. n, u. R=
et et, so,r. % r.,r,.no ez =-,.
EPRI Report No. NP does, Pkui Report, June 190 Science estimated the frequency of the V requence et S.0 x 10'p page 24 The NUREG 1150 enef per rescaerw. Age, Robert C. Bertuce, et et, Anan, mis d cars Erw frs=w pres ;,; T.-l h;; Sandle Nedonsi Laboratone Neember 1988, page V4,precered for the U.S. Nucteer Regulescry Csa..
un, NUREG/C&4880, SANo06 20ed, Vd. 3
l l
\\
43 containment failure. WASH-1400 estmated the frequency of sequence S 4
2 per reactor veer. S/jQ/
Secuence S2D - Sequence S D represents a smal LOCA in which 2
emergency coolant injection system fails.
WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of sequence S D st 9 x 10 5 per reactor-year. fjf 2
Secuence S2H - Sequence S H represents a smal LOCA in whhh the 2
emergency coolant recirculation system fails. WASH-1400 estimated the f sequence S H et 6 x 104 2
per reactor year.12/
~
g)
N.C. Reemuseen, et ek Meneme Sderv sn& An A ^ =3 nt_ d Acedeer Minks cc.Tcal / Nue!aar "c - Mants. U.S. Nudeer Regulatory Cw.i ica, WASH 1 75/014, Octocer 1975, ' Men Maporr,' page 98.
M/
Both science Applications International corporation and the NtrAEG-1150 analyses conclude that this is a non-core sequence.
138, R.L Razman, et eL farv t~-es form arer Car- ~we Anam.
melt EPRI Report No. NP 400s, rinal Report, June 1988, page m ; Corporation, prepared for the secae Poner Rennerch instruta 1
AnaNnts of Care Dammen wm frc 7, I=T / A amn. Sendia Nationsi for the U.S. Nudeer Reguietory Commismon, NUREG/CR 4680, 34C06 1906, page W70.
The NtTAEG-ilbo analysis identified similar sequences with medium and large IACAs, loss of offsite power transients, and loss of feedwater transients as initiating events-Thise sequances wer frec'aency 'of about 1.1 x 10"9 estimated to have an aggregate per reactor-year.
133, Robert C.
L.aboratories, prepared for one U.S. Nutteer Reg 2004, Vol 3 Newmber 1908, pages V-4e to V-71.
in frequency arissa from analyses which suggest that the large reduction coneminnant failure results in ECCS tias, rather than 100% of the time as assumed in WASH-1400 failure 11/
The Nt140 wsfrets estimated tN frequenc The ansfpels airs empseed a aimeer sequence ( y of this esquence a 7.1 x 10'7 per reactor year.
weltfl were tint onneidered kt W4SH 1400) at 2.4g10 from restser coJett pump sesi LOCAe, x
et at, Aambeds af Cat's Csa-fr:==s "T 7, Irwemet fuents. SantSe Nationa Novemeer 1988, pages V4 to V4.Propered for the U.S. NLriser Reguleto 12/
The NUREG 1150 ansbyele estimated the frequency of thhs esquence at 1.2 x 10 4
(sequences 3and
' $31, Robert C, Bertuedo, et eL, Anakais W Core Dammoe Anouericy per reactor year Fmm 1 Eeren.
Commemort NUREG/CR 4550, SANC86 2084, Vol. 3, Novembe s
44 seauenen a1D - Sequence S D represents a medium LOCA in w i
1 emergency coolant W system fails.
WASH 1400 estmated the frequency cf sequence S D at 3 x 104 3
por e year. W.1.4/
Secuence S1H - Sequence S H represents a medium LOCA in w emergency ccdant recim_W system fails. WASH 1400 estmated the fre sequence S H et 3 x 104 3
per reactor-year.15/Ig/
Sequence AD - Sequence AC represents a large LOCA in wh coolant inpcewi system fails. WASH 1400 estimated the frequency of x 104 per reactor yser.1Z/1R/
W Cewew Nuclear <*c.= PCn U.S. Nudeer RegGE 75/014. October 1975, 'Ade(n Aaport,' pees an.
W The NURES1150 anstysie eetheted the frequency of tNa esquence a 7.1 x 10*7 133, Robert C. Bertucso, et at, MnAers d cas Samaa= f,===,cs fra ImT per reactor. year.
Nancruf t.aboratertes, prepared for the U.S. Nudeer Reguletary Comm SAN 006 2004, Vct 3, Newember 1988, pages V4 to V4 W
N.C. Rasmuseen, et aL. R==**
Safew b& M V^ ^==i.- & Aceident Misks < s U S..
Crainumf4 Nisser Asser <~~n U.S Nudeer Ragdalory Corrmenion, WASM.1400, NUREG-75/014 Ocnoter 19M, 'adem Aaport.' page 80.
W The M1150 enehels eenmesed the frequency of tNo sequence a 7.7 x 10*7 33, Rebest C Senucio, et aL, Anaheim d Cara demons fr = -- _s fra l=T t ha Sandia per reactor year,
$6 Val 3, Nehember 19es, pages V4 to V4 Nations Ldesuto W
N.C. Reemussen, et d., Sa**w sa6sw h+ M_,W d Acendent 41sks In U S.
Commerelat Ahm%ner Power r"^u U.S. Nuc$aer Rage Acry Ucrrmesson, W 75/014. Ocsober 1975, 'Adest Aaport,' page e3.
W The NURE41150 anefyela estimated the frequency of thle esquence at 3 9 x 10'7 Sam, Roben C senucia, a at Anahers d ca camma. A- =a tra ;,--rw ha Sane' per renczor. year.
NetMmal t.aboratories, prepared for the U.S. Nuctaar Reguatory Communic s
SANo86 20ee, Yet 3, November 1988, pages V4 to V4
4-5 i
Secuence AH - Sequence AH represents a large LOCA h which th coolant recirculadon system fails. WASH.1400 estrnated the frequency of sequ at 1 x 104 per reactor year.12/ 2Q/
Secuence TKO - Sequence TKO represents a transient to5 owed by failure reactor protection system and a fa5ure of at least one pressuntar safety /reGef valve t reciese, WASH-1400 estimate the frequency of sequence TKO at 3 x 104 per reactor-year. 21/ 22/
Sequence TKMQ - Sequence TKQ represents a loss of feedwater transient foDowed by faaure of the reacter pici.cdce system and fature of at least one pre safety /relW valve to raciosa. WASH-1400 estimated the frequency of sequence T at 1 x 104 per reactor year. 22/ 2L/
19]
N.C Reemussen, a eL, Mm cananv kW M ^ ^- - -, ; d A :L= mms M u s cc. 7 ct/e/ Nue' ear Peneer Pfarn U.S. Nudeer Regt.isny Comrteme6cn, WASH 1 75/014, Octocer 1375, 'MaH Aaporr,' paGe al.
22/
The NUREG 1150 analysis sedmetod the treeJoney of tNo sequence a 3.9 x 10*7 Em Robwt C senucio, a et, m d core common r= =ce hv. I,-
w M.n Santa per reactor M.
Nanonal Laborescries, pregared lor the U.S. Nudeer Regulescry Commiseson, SAN 0062004, Vol 3, Newmber 1988, pa0es V 4 to Y 8, DJ N.C Raamussen, et 6,, W> Sananv b+ k A---
- . ; d L
- L = Minks M u s.
cm...== Nueimar semer =a U.S. Nudeer Regt En Conmunion, WASH 1400, NURE 75/014. Ocember 1975, "Adeh Aspart,' page oit 2.2/
The 61183 arufysis estimated the frequency of a aimler esgamco (TKRD 4 reac6 ja Robert C Bertucio, et at, L mAele d care Samma= Femar=4) a 1.1 x 10 per cs r,T I=T4,1 fan M Nedond Laboresortes, paw for the U.S. Nudeer RegLimory CGT aww N6 SMCamH, Vol 3, McNember 1988, page V-49.
23/
N.C Rearruener a aL, "
=- s::: s+ M ^^ -
. = d $=L = mms M us-ce a-tw Nudmar Anser r -a U.S. Nucteer RegLintory Comrteseson, WASH.1400, NUREG-75/014 Ocsoeer 1s75, ' Mart Aaport," page m Zi/
The NUREG-1150 anstyeis satimated the fregaency of a simdar semance (D0tZ) a 4.8 per reactor year. $as, Robert C Benucio, a et, AnaAe d can aannon prem==v Ars 3 la,sl Exactt. Sandla NancrW Laboruscrtes, prepared lor me U.S. Nudeer Regulatory CGT NUREG/CR 4aa0, SANoeNoos, Vol 3, Ncm 19es, page V-49.
= - -
u ADDENDUM TOnnt; DOMINANT SURRY UNIT 1 ACCIDENT SEQUEN 74m. v.:. -
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TO TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY TABLE a SURRY RELNASE CATEGORIES. WASM 1400 This exhibit prowdes a description of the WASH 1400 release Unit 1, as wou as a table which gives the release charactensecs (frgency magnitudes, etc.). Informa6on for this Exhibit is taken from WASH-1400 1/
U The release CW990ry frequencine arid Cherectoriedce are taken tem N.C. R Maaeme Safarv kW An A=== Tei d A-2enr Miska ks U R kr.rar 'Mrlw U.S. Nuc6eer RM"Fi Commissicrt WASH 1400. NUREG 75/014 Ocacher 1975
- - M! ants.
page 97; the descripdene of the release 6 are taken from MC. Raerroseen, et aL Mme Safarv bW An A=^ ^ ^ =--a; d Aeextent Misks in US Cammermi MQner Poww M Nuclear Reguletory Commissun WASH 1400, NUMEG 75/014, October 1975
'CalcuMon of Meector Acontent Consequencee,' pegen 21 to 24.
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- .: Acc::mrt :ssexza;:cus 7:
- esents traaf taser
- pteens of ue various paysteal pr
- rsely th release estegert.
, uns nesta:
ce toenmastuas esplayed sa compute tfor sore deta11ed infor=ataen en ue rele reaser as referred to Appendices :. r.e taea: active reisases to us at=asenere. us VI. ana 72.
Se instnant event ::ee se pas
- n esca retasse category are discussed ;a catail La seensa 4.6 of Appendia 7 rn.
has release categorf can he caaracterased ty a care 4;stavn fs11 4.t;& cst:a :n c:atart of melten fuel vtta tae res&duai oved rf a stan:
ne ::ntuament spray and heat vatar a us react =:
taerefore, saa :oataAament could to at a pressure aseremoval systens are aise as
. esse..
stans emplettoa.
It ta assumed that tas stees ampleste:
ve smetent at ce n=a of
- ornoa of ce roaster vessel and breana un contaAnaest earnerveuld r
- pture ::e uat a suestantial ameums of radiseauvsty sagat he released fr:3 um esa viss us :ssu.:
- = a puff over a persed ut ajneus 10 r.tautes.
vould ::st aue at a relauvely low rate cereaf tergenerated dunag tuassa acuve 4:::::
appr:msmately 7C% of na asdir.as and 40% of us alkall metals presentn a:.se :::a ef releasa.-
Eeeause na eentaAnannt veu14 :
ta tr.a :o gases at tse time of f ailure, a relatively higa release ra: aAs.*ust presaun:e re f::a sae contalement could he asseeaated vita *.aas cateee te ei sensale eterr/
- 1: des certata potaattal accadant sequaaesa saat would avelve u rf.
yhis catagert also cf : re telttag and a steam eJrpleetos af ter cagar imant r:
- r. uese segnances, ca rate of saargy release would te 1:wer7tus fue ts ove este relatavely ltags.
, altaouga suka Yn i Oss catsverf is assenated vita es failure =f cere-reeli ee.usg c:acurrent vtu ce f aAlure of.savarassas spray an..g systems and :g Ta:1:re of tae ::stausant harner ver.14 accu cr=ugad aset-removal systa ausstanual fracues of us centsumsat atmostaare s se releeverpressure, :aus
=s.
a ;stacd of ameut 23 tu utas.
ased u a uff ver
- .tataner.t vessel telturcuga, ce release of sdioacuve matDue se ce avee 1
a relauvely low rata cereaftar.
du.: r.:
- % af me ::dinas and !Ct of ce alkall s"se total release vault ::ntata appr:x =. at ertal veulf ::: utua ra.aase.
As La swr release category 1. taa haga temparanze nrAu us :: e at ce :=a c etals preser.:
- r.tunsant at tae :Ame of tenuu=aas faAlure veu14 react is a ; essure vie- -
- s.sase rate ci ser.sthis energy fr:s aa canta==ent, relatavely : ;
rn :
Saa satsstr/ involves an overpressure failure si the ecs
- st.uen ef : re ca.: tang.acat removal. Com m.-m a t faAlure vesad zers. ;:n=ent due is fai:, :s taa Care te tar:uga a r:Stsred :eam lting tasa vesid cause radiasetate stenais := to releasa:
=r := tr.a :....at=sesa:
ai/.411 =ctala prestat la ce core atEt harner.
Appressmately *.3% af ca :dises att I:t :t us at sspaare.
-Ea : :s cf release ve:
".eas of ne release would ccess ever a pen:4 14 he releases ::
- s. ease cf rtdiesesive natanal fr:a 36taument veuld ze ansed b se
- f aseet L. ! :s ars.
- .t ten za cf gases genertted by ue reactama of m tasse gasee *-emld he laatia11y
- y Me sweef tag er.o;;f rolesse ta us aesmespaare.asted :y :: uee setter fts. vtu rencrete, f er.:s vtta ce salt. tae rats =f s onna.*
veuld te :starately aige..
rn.
3:a categorf Lavelves failure af.as cere-seltag system and a*eenen systes after a less-of-::stant
.ao ::staz==ent ry:s-l fu.are if tae cantausent acca dar.t.
systes s prayerly :selate,t:gessar vats a :=ncurrent re. ease af it of ue Ladines ans 4% of tse alkali setals ;;esent n:a vould resul: :: ue n a :f relea 1 := 3 neurs.se.
- test of ue release veuad occu : ntuusus y is as care at e
Because taa :=ntata= ant rectridau:n spray Est heat remova ever a per =d :f wea.1 operate to remove heat ts.a::vely 1:w rate of release :f sonsthis erorgyfrom tse rentur.nent at=asyr.ez 4
i
- 2:agerl, veu;d se assecasted vt:A uas L::.
. _.,. _ _.. _.. - ~. _.,
- m..
m-
-m
4 Fwe 3 releass category 4. emeeps thatnas category Levelne failure of th suppress coetnia==atte furtAar rednee the geastity of strethe contatament spr erne rad temperature sad pressure.leactave matettal and to 5
m would operate a large leasage rata due to a est. currant f atlure aseiate, and emot of the rad 16aeuve assertal would b of tAs costumment syntes to properly a perted et several hours.
contatamaat heat-removal syetase, tas energy.Appresana metals present la tAs eers would he' released e released centhausualy ever release rate weeld be low.Seesuse of t FWa 4 Se contatament sprays wesid not operate, het31s category Lave s the core cooling systeam.
its integrity until the moltas core preeeeded ttaa enaonia===t barrier would retaAa base aat.
lea 449e to the atmaaphare oevernsg erward taretaga taene radi ce acaespaare wesid aise secur at a low rate pner te eesta&am e
Most of um release would seeus contiaceasly ever froced. Direct 1ssaage ta he release would include approxtsately 0.08% of the i di a perted of aseet 10 heers. eat-vessel meltta preseas as tae core at the time of reisase.
o nes and alkal tae atmospaars weeld be 1sw and gases esceptaseesuse leasage tres coe*l metals by contact wt ta tae soil, the energy eslease rateg through the ground would be o
=* = =t to would be very low, awa 7 31s category is sta114 would operate te reduce the contaAammatto pWR release category 4, easept tAas east 41a amount of 4Arnerne radleactivtty.
Se release would lave 1% 0.002)tamperature sad of tas release would eerar over a period of 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />sand 0.00 of the taa time of release.iodimos taa energy relerae rate would be very low Meet Ao la pW1 release categer/ 4.
rwa e nis category apprezimates a pwt design basis accidaat that taa contaAament would fall to isolate prop (large pipe break),
safeguards are assumed to fumetisa properly.erly om demand.
sacept Fest of un release would occur La tae 0 5 hwould tavolve approxA ase and 0.084 et taa alkali metals.ne releas pressure would be above annient.
. - our perted durtag veica enava s amant
=altang would act seeus, tas emergy release rat Secause cent ** ~=t spreys wesid operata and car a wesid also be Lew.
rwm 9 s
nts category approxusates a pWR design basis seekdaat eniv tae activity 1a1t1411y eestained witata the gas betwe(large pipe breakt. L cla& ding would his released inte une eestaanannt assumed taat "ta core weeld set selt.en the feel pellet sad tae anat===
0.5-noer period dortag esklah the esaemiant prregolaed eagts te ;ameve saaa fama the ears and eas'aia-It is t.
The roleasa would occur ever the Apprealaataly 0.00001% of the tadtaas and 0 0 essure weeld be above aattest.
rel a ased.
As La WWE release sategory 8, tAs anarty relea
. 00044 af tas 4kalt satals wesid be I
se rate would be very lev.
na release catagery is representative of a core melt exyi tea La reaeter esel.
- e etive sa al to the star would cause ce releasfsllowed by a stans quanta of rad approx tely 404 f tAs i taespaare. The tal releasef a substaanal cf conta2.
e and aika at fat. re.
Meet 3ecause of
'ie e ne r ce role metals present sentaAa ce core a tas ti a would ce=ur eve a 2-hour per generated tAs see caaractorate by a re uvely bi emplosion. tata category aise eludse rtaAm a r2ta of en rgy release to tegory would c=n ta tamen t pri ces that a tses phe re.
is tr.ese seesences to the occurrence f cure nel volve overpress fa11ste of discussed aseve e rate i energy ease woul somewnat smalle taan for these and a steam 1esten. In a t.nouga i weeld still be relatt ly h&gn.
i w c TO TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY FIGURES 1 1170 l.18. NUMEG.G3i4 This exhibit consists of reproduced pages from NUREG Figures 1 11 through 118. These Agures are reproduced on the a
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Figare 111. Conditionel Prebebility of Easooding Whole Body Dose Versus Distones. Probabilities are Canditional on a Cors Matt Assadent (5 a 10 8).
Whole body does skuleted inetudes: arternal does to the whois body due to the pesong cloud, exposure to radionuclides on yound, and me does to the whole body from udieled redaenuct'utes.
Does skuletions assumed no protectne actions taken, and stringht line plume tratoceery.
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10 100 1000 DISTANCE (telLE$1 Figure 1 12. Candhional ProtshiEty of Exosoding Lung Dooms Versus Distana Probabilitus are Conditional on a Care Meet Aosmient (5 a Itr8).
Lung does alcuW inchntes: estamal do.a as the lung he to the pesang cloud, exposure se redsonucdidos on ground, and the does to the kng from enhaled redsonuclides wetten 1 year.
Does calcath assumed no protectM acreens takon, and sirsight line trsW.
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Fipwe I 13. Condtional Probability of Emeseding Thyroid Dooms Versia Distanas. Probshilities are Condnened on a Core heeft Asemeent (5 m' 10"#).
Thyroid does em6eulated indudes: externoi does to the thyroid due to the passans c6oud, esposure to radionudidos on yound, and the dose to the thyroid from inhaned resbonuelidae.
Does calcadotions assumed no protectm actions taken, and sarsight line :rstectory, n
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Thyroid does enhulated is due soWy to radionuclide ingssoon through the mik consumpoon pathway.
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nat.e o TO TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY F10URE 8.1 FROM MARCH 1987 BNL REPORY 1his ExNbR consists of Figure 8,1 from W.T. Pratt & C. Hofmayor, et Technical Evah>adan d the EPZ SensitMtv Studv har 2"%
Laboratory, prepared for the U.S. Nudear Regulatory CGT..usio
- 19. TNs figure can be compared with Rgure 111 from NUREG4398 (333, E attached to this tesikTory).
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curve is norinalized to 6:10y suussary core salt probability.
The result stffers from NUAIG-03M.
t
REFERENCES TO TESTIMONY OF GORDON THOMPSON 5
(Kouts, 1987)
H. Kouts, Review of Research on Uncertainties in Estimates of Source Terms from Severe Accidents in Nuclear Power Plants, Brookhaven National Laboratory, NUREG/CR-4883, April 1987.
(NRC, 1975)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, October 1975.
(NRC, 1987a)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Risk Reference Document, NUREG-1150 (3 vols.), Draft, February 1987.
(NRC, 1987b)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Uncertainty Papers on Severe Accident Source Terms, NUREG-1265, May 1987.
(PLG, 1983)
B. John Garrick (Study Director) et al., Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Pickard, Lowe and Garrick Inc., prepared for Public Service Company of New Hampshire and Yankee Atomic Electric Company, 6 volumes, December 1983.
(Sholly and Thompson, 1986)
Steven Sholly and Gordon Thompson, The Source Term Debate:
A Report by the Union of Concerned Scientists, Union of Concerned Scientists, January 1986.
i e
o l
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before Administrative Judges:
Ivan W.
Smith, "hairperson Gustave A.
Linenberger, Jr.
Dr. Jerry Harbour
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Docket Nos.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
50-443-444-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL.
)
(Off-site EP)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
April 25, 1988
)
ATTACHMENTS I
TO COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS TESTIMONY OF STEVEN C.
SHOLLY ON THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. JAN BEYEA ON POTENTIAL RADIATION DOSAGE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS THAT FORM THE BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, AND DR. GORDON THOMPSON ON POTENTIAL RADIATION RELEASE SEQUENCES Department of the Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108-1698 i
(617) 727-2265
t I
i ATTACHMENTS i
Professional Qualifications of Steven C.
Sholly Professional Qualifications of
-Jan Beyea Professional Qualifications of Gordon Thompson Town of Hampton Revised Contention VIII SAPL Contention 16 NECNP Contention RERP-8 t
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1 ATTACHMENT 1 1
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l RESUME OF STEVEN C. SHOLLY STEVEN C. SHOLLY j
MHB Technical ASSCCia'es 1723 Hamilton Avenue Suite K San Jose, Califomia 95125 (4C8) 256 2716 EY8EnfENCl:
Septembef 1965 PRESENT Asseeiate MWB Tocament asseeiates San Jose CaMemia Assocate in energy consu'ttng Mrm that speciah.:es in technical and economic assessmer'ts cf energy production facdroes, escocally nudaar, for tochl, st. ara, and feceral gevemments and omvate ceganizations. MHB is as:en:Nely iruedved in regtdatory proceedings anc the preoaration of stucies Cordvs rassaren, wrtte reports, participate in discwory procesa in requfatory and reports.
proceedings. develop teertamony and other docwnents for regtAstory proceedings, and resocnd to I
client inquines. Partconfed as a panelist at the NRC sponsored Contarvnent Performance Ceti;n ObjectNe Workshop Mamers Ferry, West Virgirus (NUMEG/CP4084) (1986), and es a penetist at the Swore Accident Pdicy implementation Extemal Events Wortsnop Annapohs. MarYaac foresentation or, seisme nsk assessment) (1987). C!ients have inducac: State of Caltfoma 5' ate of New Yorx. State of IMois. State of Massachusetts, and Suffolk Courty (New York).
Fe:rua y 1981. Sectember 1985 Tee %eaf 8esearea Assee ate and Esk Anatvst Umen d Comeemed Sm.s s Wasmaa'ea OC Aessarch assocate are nak analyst for public interest group based in Cambnc;s. Massachusetts.
that specal2es in examanrng the irnpact of advanced tecnnolog es on soc:ery, enne: pally in the areas of arms contrd and energy Techncal work focused on rudent pcwer Wet safety, w1tn emenasa on precatfisoc risk assessment, radiological emergency sams,g and presareeness. and i
i genene safety issues.
Conducted researca, prepared recons and stuc:es. Damcipated in acminismatNo proceedings before the U.S. Nudsar Regulatory Commesen develocM testim 0my, anlayled NRC rule.makmg proposals and draft reports anc preparte comments thereon, anc resconded to inquaries from sponsors, the general pubhc, and the media. Partic: Dated as a memoer of the Panel on ACMS E!fectNonesa (1965). the ParW on Requfatory Uses of Procaodiste Risk Assessmert (Peer Rewsw of NUREG 1050; 1934). Invited Observer to NRC Peer Remew meetings on the source term reassessment (BMI 2104: 1963 1964), member af the Inc.iependent Acwsery Commrttee on Nudear Risk for tPe Nudear Risk Task Force of the Natenal Apocation of insurance Commissioners (1964).
w
-_,,,v
- -.n,--
12 January 1980 January 1981 Preieet Director and Pesearch Coordinator. Three Ma Hamsburn. Pennsv+vania e Island Pu*fe tr'terest Resource comer Provided administratNe direcoon ard coordinated research protects basso in Harrisburg, Pennsytvana. centered around issues related to the Power Plant.
mission, U.S. Deoartment of Energy, and General q
Three MHe tsjand Unit 2 and preparation for restart of Three Mie Island developments related to emergency planning. the financal haann of Genera NRC rulemaking actions related to Three Mile Island.
July 1978 January 1980 Chief Biolocical Process coernter. Wastewater Treatment Ptam Dow Teu. sNe Mumietar Authenty w rsney. e nnsevama o
e Chief Biological Process Operator at a 2.5 mfilon galton por day tertiary, a wastewater treatment pant.
analysis of physcal. chemcal, and bdogical test results, p micro-twelogical analysis of actMated sludge, and maintenance of cetated proc into state and federal reports on treatment procesa ard effluent qtalry. Rocerved c Pollution Control Association of Pennsy+vania. Central Secco i
July 1977 Jury 1978 WastawaterTreatment Pant Ocriter BSreoch of Lowe Lowe Pener9vania Wastewater treatment ciant operato at 2.0 millon gallon per day secondar wastewater treatment pant. Performed tasks as assigned by suDemsors, incud and chemical tests oa wastewater streams, maintenance and operaDon of # ant eq maintenance of the collect;cn system.
Seetember 1976. June 1977 Se emes Teacher. West Shore Scw Distr 4ct. Came HR #ennsvvamia Taught Earth and Space Science at ninth grade Iwed.
Developed and implemented new course matenals on pate tectonce, erMronmental geciogy, and space scence. Served as AsaW of the dismet gWnnastics team.
Sectember 1975. June 1978 Se:ence Teacher. Car 9sfa aram Schoed Distnet. Car 9ste. Pennr9vana Taught Earth and Space Science and Enwonmental Sc:ence at nine grade leet. Ow implemented new course matenals on plate tectonca, ormronmental geology, noese
- h*Wn and enercy Served as Aavtsor to the Science Projects C2ub.
i 13 f
EDUCAT103 5.S., Education, majors in Earth and Space Science and General Scence, min Education, SNppensburg Stas Cdlege, Shippensburg, Penns/ vane.1975.
Graduate coursework in Led Use Planning, Shippensburg Suce Cdlege Penns/vania. 1977 1978.
MWCATIONS:
' Determining Mercalliintens:tles from Newspaper Reports ' Journal of Gedoeica' Ed 1.
- 1977, ucatien. Vd. 25.
2.
A Crtticus of An indeoendeat Assessment d Evacuation Times for % We Isla Ptant. Three Mile islanJ Pudic Interest Resource Center, Hamscurg, Peinspvand. Janua 3.
A Brief Review and Criticue of the Reeldand County Radideeical Emmenev Precaredmess Unen of Concemed Scientists, prepared for RocMand County Emergency Planning Pe the Chairman of the County Lagtslature, Washington, D.C., August 17,1981.
The Necessty fer a Premet Dublie Alertime Casabiltv in the Pfum Excesure BatPway E 4.
Nudear Power P' ant sites, Uruon of Concwr4 Scentsts, Cntical Mass Energy Projec Informaten and Resource Sorwe, ErMronmental Accon, and New York Pudic Imeres Group, Washington, D.C., August 27,1981.
- 5.
"Union of Concemed Sc!entists, Inc., Comments on Nodce of Preeceed Ru emaking, Amendment to 10 CFR 50 Accendk E.Section IV.O.3,' Union of Concemed Sc:enns s. Washington 21,1961.2 6.
'The Evdution of Emergency Ptanning Rues,' In The ind'am Dee h& A Smehe en f*e f tevesticatien of the Indian peint Nue' ear Swor P'aats Anne Wttta. ecrtor. Union of Co Sc:entists (Washington, D.C.) and New York Pudic Interest Researen Group (New I
?
' Union of Concemed Scientists Commeras. Proposed Rule,10 CFR Part 50.
and Preparednesa:
Scientists. Washington, D.C., January 15.1982. *Exere.ses. Ctanficanon 8
Testimony of Robert O. Pdtard and Stwen C. Shdly before the Subcommittee on Ermronmora, Commmee on Intenor and Insdar Affairs U.S. House of Represer'ta1Nes, Penns/ vama, March 29,1982, avaiade from the Unen of Concemed Sc:ennsts.
9.
' Union of Concemed Scientists Detaled Comera.r.*:tmon for Rdemaking by CUzen's Task Force, E.T,,wy Planmng, to CFR Parts 50 and 70. Docket No. PRM.50-31,47 F.R.12639 of Concemed Scienttsta, WasNngton, D.C., May 24,1982.
10.
Supplements to the Testimony of Dyn R. Weisa. Esq., General Counsel, Union of Concem Scientists, befoia the Subcommmee on Energy Conservanon and Poaer, Committee Commerce. U.S, House of Representatives, Uncn of Concemed Scientists, Washingt August 16,1982.
4
,.,--,--,.-.,----_-.,-n-,
14 Testimony of Steven C. Shdty, Union d Concerned Scientists. Washington.
t 1.
New York Pudic Interest Research Group, loc., before the Specal Committee o Radidog6c Preparedness Acs, Chapter 708, Laws of 1981, 1
12.
' Comments on 'Ortit Sup#emort to Final EnWonmental Statement Related to Co Cperation of Cinch RNor 8reeder Reactor Plant',' Co:ket No. 50 537. Union of Co Scientists, Washington, D.C., September 13,1982. '
Nnion of Concemed Sciendsts Comments on 'Repo<t to the County Commiss 11 Assory Committee on Redidogcal Emergency Plan for Cdumcia County, Penns)tva Concemed Scientista, Wash 6ngton, D.C., September 15,1982.
'Rediological Emergency Ptarvung for Nudaar Resctor Accidenta,' presented to K 14.
Cntmanteid Congress, Rotterdam, The Nether 1 ands, Union of Concemed Scientis 0.C., Cetober 8,1982.
15.
Hudear Reactor Acedert Consecuences: Implicadons for Radidogical Emergency Planning,'
presented to the Catzen's A&sory Commette to Revww Rocidand Coure/s Owft Nucitar Evacuation and Preoaredness Pian and General Olsaster Preparedness Plan, Union Scientists, Washington, D.C November 19,1982.
Testimony of Steven C. Shony before the Subcommatee on CNorsigrt and Investiga 16.
on Intenor and Insular Aftairs, U.S. House of RepresentatNes. Washington0.C., Union of Concemed ScierrJsta, December 13,1982.
17.
Tesumony of Gordon R. Thompson and Stwen C Shevy on Commasion Cuestion Contentions 2.1(a) and 2.1(d) Union of Concemed Scientt.sts and New Research Group, before the U.S. Nudear Regulatory Commtmon Atomic Safe c Interest Boar 1 in the Matter of Consdidated Edison Comparty of New Yort Ondian Point Una Pcwor Authonty of the State of New York Ondian Poirt Una 3), Docket Nos. 50 247 S SP, December 28.1982. '
Testimony of Steven C. Shdty on the Consequencas of Accidents at Indian Point (C 18 i
Ovestion One and 6xrd Quesdon 1.1, Union of Concemed Scia %sts and New York j
Research Group, before the U.S. Nudear Regulatory Commission kome Safe Board, in the Matter of Consdidated Edison Company of New Yort Ondlan Pomt Un Power Authont'/ of the State of New York Ondlan Poirs Urvt 3), Cocket Nos. 50 247 SP, February 7,1983, as carrected February 18,1983.
- i 19 Tesumony of Steven C Shefy on Commimon Quesnon FNo, Union d Concemed Scientis New York Public interest Research Group, before the U.S. Nudear Regulatent Commissen Safety anJ Ucensang Board, in the Matter of Consdidated Edison Comoany of New Y Posnt Unit 2) and the Power Autherry of the State of New York Onf.an Poet Unit 3), Docket 247-SP and 50 206 SP, March 22,1983.
- 20.
Huc!aar T.aactor Accidenta and Accident Consequences: Pfanning for the Worst.' Union of Concemed Scisntists, Washegton, D.C., presented at Cmical Mass '83, March 26,1983.
15 l
21.
Testimony d Steven C. Stdly on Emergency Planning and Preparedness at Commer Power Ptarts, U,%:n d Concemed Scientists, Washington. O.C., before the Subecm l
Nudest RegtAadon, Committee on Ermronment and Public Works, U.S. Senate. Apri
' Union of Concemed Scientists' Response to Questions for the Record from Senator Simpson,' Stwen C. Sholly aro Michael E. Faden).
t 22.
'PRA: What Can it Really Ten Us About Pubic Risk from Nudear Accdonts?,' Union of C Scientis:s. Washington, D.C., presentation to the 14th Annual Meeting, Seacoast AntbP Lsague. May 4,1983.
'Probablistic Misk Assessment: The impact of Uncertatnties on Radidogical Emergen 23.
and Preparedness Consderations,' Union of Concemed Geiennsts, Washington, D.C., June 28.
- 1983, 24
- Response to GAO Quesdons on NRC's Use of PRA,' Union of Concemed Scientists Wash r).C f 7ber 6.1983, attachment to letter dated Cetober 6.1983, from Steve C. Shdty to John E..
i AO, Washutgtort, D.C.).
25.
Th_!monet of 'hemal Events' en Radideeical Emecconev Resoonse Pfannim C Unen d Co comed Sciennsts, Washington, D.C., Decemcor 22.1983, attachment to letter catec December 22.1983, from Steven C. Shdty to NRC Commismoner James K. Asselstine.
23.
Sizewell'B' Public inqury, Proof of Evirfence on: Safefv and Waste Manacemem Imoncations o Sizewed PWR. Gorden Thompson, with supportog weence by Steven Sholly, on benaff of the anc Country P'anning Anamation, February 1984, including Annex G. 'A review of Probablistic 9i Anatyva and its Application to the SIzewou PWR,' Steven Shdfy and Gordon Thompson. (A 1983), and Annex 0, 'Emergsocy Ptanning in the UK and the US. A Cunpanson,' Stwen Shod Gordon Thompson (October 24,1983).
27.
Yestimony of Steven C. Shdly on Emergency Planning Contentbn Number Eleven, l'nien of Concemed Scientists. Washington, D.C., on behalf of the Palmetto Miance and ths Carolina Environmental Study Group, before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commisston Atomic S Ucensing Boa:c. in the Matist of Duke Power Corripany, et. al. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Uruts ano 2). Docket Nos. 5')-a13 ard 50-414, Ap.i 16.1984.
- 28.
' Risk indicators Relevart to Assessing Nuclear Accdont Uikbilty Premiums.'in P st minaN Reeert to
. r li the Indecendent Aedsw Commettee to the NAlC Nudaar Risir Tank Force. Dece Steven C. Shaly, Uruon of Caxamed Scientists, WasNngton D.C.
29.
"Union of Ccr.e T.ed Sciendstt and Nudaar ?nformation and Resource Sente's on NRC's PiW to Bar from Ucensing Procesdings the Consdorsoon of Eanhquake Effects on Emergency P6nrnng,' Union of Concemed Scientists and Nudear Informat!an and Resource Serece. WasNngton 0.C., Diane Curran and Ellyn R. Weisa (with input frorn Stsven C. Sh February 28,1986.
- 30.
' Severe Accdont Source Terms: A Presentation to the Ccmmissoners on the Stat the NRC's Source Term Raassessmc t Stucy by the Un.on of Concemed Sciantists.' Union of Concamed Scientists. Washington, D.C., Aptd 3,1985. *
$6 31.
'Cevere Accident Source Terms for Ught Water Nuclear Power P1 arts: A Pres Departrnert of Nudear Safety on the Status of a Revww of the NRC's So o the I!!!ncis Study (STM3) by the Union of Cow-,ed Scientists,' Union of Ch.=6 S D.C., May 13,1985.
32.
_Thdp Team Debate: A Review d the Current Basis for Predr fc Severe A Terms _e.h_Goecial Emehasis on the NRC Source Term R Thompson, January 1966. (Ava3ade from the Union of 33.
behalf of State et Connecteut Department of Pudic OMsion d Consumer Counsel, regarding the prudence of expendtures on Mils ary tw 1966.
34 Implicatloas of the Chemobp.4 Mcident for Nudear Emergency PtarW.g for the Stat prepared for the Shte of New York Consumer Protection Board, by M-3 Technical As 1986. '
35.
Review d Vermont Yankte Containment Safefv Study and Anabas d Containmen for the Vermsnt Yankee Nuctear Pewer Plant. prepared for New England CJibo Podution, Inc., December 16,1586.
36.
Affidavit of Stwen C. Shcoy tefore tM Atomic Safvty and Uconsing Soard, in t Sofwes Company of New Hampshre, et al, regarding Seabrooir Stanon Urut Emergemy Ptanning issues. Oceket Nos. 50ML & 50-444 06 Jartary 23,1987
- 37.
Direct Tot.lmony of Richard 8. Hubbard and Steven C. Sholly on betus d Ca Commissaca, regarding O! ado Canyon Rste Case, PG&E's Falure to CA Program, Apl:dicsoon Nos. 84-06414 and 85 08425, Exhib!! No.1tJit35 March, 38.
Tastimony of Gregory C. Minor, Steven C. Sholly et. al. vn behalf d Suffd ULCC's R.cepoon Centers (Planning Bas s), before the Atomic Safgr. and Uc ng 322 OL 3, Apnf 13,1987.
- matter of Long Island Ughting Company, Shoreham Nu 39.
ULCO's Recepoon Centers (Addressmg Tesumony May 27,1987.
- 40.
EMew of Saleeted Aseects oLN.Uf1EG 1150 'Reactei> sink ReWc+ Neument'.
lillnots Copertment of Nudsat Safety, forthcoming.
Avadade ' rom tM0 U.S. Nuclear RegtJatory Commission, Public Dr.mnent Ro Street, N.W., Washington. O.C.
1*
ATTACHMENT 2 i
=
9
i Resume for Jan Beyea July 1986 EDUCATICH:
Ph.D., Colurbia University, 1968 (Physics).
B.A., Anherst College,1962.
EWIBYP5NI HIS7tRY:
1 i
1980 to date, Senior Staff Scientist and, as of 1985, Director of the Environmental Policy Analysis Departmnt, National Audubon Society, 950 Third Avenue, NY, NY 10022.
t 1976 to 1980, Research Staff, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Pri;<eton University.
1973 to 1976, Assistant Professor of Physics, Holy Cross CoIIege.
1963 to 1970, Research Associate, Colt %.ia University Physics Departrent.
CCNSLtTING WCEK:
Consultant on nuclear energy to the Office of Technology Assessment, the General in New York State and the Ccmmonwealth of M 1
lower Saxony in West Germany; the Swedish _ Energy comission; the Three Mile Island Public Health Fund; and various citizens' groups in the United States.
PUBLICATICNS CCNCEPNING ENEJUY CCNSEPVATICN, DiERTl PCLICY, N'D Articles:
t "Oil and Gas Resources on Federal Lands:
Wilderness and Wildlife Pefuges," Stege and Beyea, Annual Review of Enercy (tc be published, Octeter 1986).
No. 26, June 1985.][An earlier version appeared as National Audubon Society F M, p. 425 (1985)."U.S. Applianco Efficiency Standards," Pollin and Peyea, Ene "Computer Mcdeling for Energy Policy Analysis," Pedsker, Beyea, and' Pittsburgh, PA, 15, part 3, p. 1111 (1964).Lycns, Procewdings of t "Centainment of a Reactor Meltdown," (with Frank von Hippel), Bulletin cf
_the Atcele Scientists, 3, p. 52 (August /Septerber 1982).
"Second Thou9 hts (about Nuclear Safety)," in Nuclear Pcwer:
W. W. Norton and Co. (New York,1982).
Both Sides,
' Indoor Air Pollution," Bull. At. Scientists, y, p. 63 (Feb.1981)
_ Arcieles (Con't)
"Erergency Planning for Reactor Accidents," Bulletin of the Atceic Scientists, 36 appeared in Er, man. 40 (Decerber 19 8 ).
(An earlier version of the article p
4 Vahrenholt, editors, Keipenheuer t, Witsch, Cologne,1980.)as Chapte "Dispute at Indian Point," _ Bull. st. Scientists, 3_6, p. 63, (t'ay 1980).
"Locating and Eliminating Cbscure but Major Energy Losses in Residential Housing," Harrje, Dutt, and Beyea, ASHRAE Transactions, 85,, Part II (1979),
5 (Winner of ASHPAE outstanding paper award.)
"Attic Heat loss and Conservation Policy," Dutt, Beyea, and Sinden.
Technology and Society Division Paper 78-TS-5, Houston, Texas,1978.
A9'E "critical Significance of Attics and Basements in the Energy Balance of Tvin Pivers Townhouses," Beyea et al., Enercy and Buildings, Vol. I (1977),
Page 261.
Also chapter 3 of Saving Enercy in the Home, Ballinger,1978.
"The Two-Resistance Model for Attic Heat Flow: Irplicaticca for Core servation Policy," Hoteki, Dutt, Beyea, Enercy--De Intl. Journal,
, Published Debates:
3, 657(1978)
Proceedings of the Workshop on Wree File Island Desirretry, Dree File Island Puc11c Health Fund,1622 Locust Street, Phila., Pa., Dec.1985 "Land Use Issues and the Media," Ctr. for Cermunication, NYC, Oct.1984.
Nuclear Peautors:
Hcw Safe Are Rey?, panel discussion sponscred by tne Academy Forum of the National Acadefry of Sciences, Wash., D.C., May 5,1980.
Line, P.B.S. Television.De Crisis of Nuclear Energy, Subject No. 367 on William Transcript printed by Southern Education Ccouni-cations Assoc., 928 Woodrow Street, P. O. Box 5966, Coltscia, S.C.,1979.
Reperts:
We Audubon Energy Plan, Beyea et al., 2nd Ed., July 1984 (1st Ed.,1983 )
[See also, Intro, to Special Issue en Legal Issues Arising Free 2e Audubon Energy Plan 1984, Colurbia Journal of Envircnmental Law,1,1,, p.251, (1986)]
,1 A Review of Dose Assessrents at Wree Mile Island and Pecceendations fe Future Research, Report to t.he Bree Mile Island Public Bealth Fund, August 1984.
(Set also, "Author Challenges Review," Health Physics Newsletter, March,1985, and "TMI-Six Years Later," Nuclear Medicir.e. 26, p.1345 (1985).]
. Reports (Con't)
(
"Implications for Mortality of Weakening the <*12an Air Act," (with G.
Steve Jordan), National Audubon Society, EPAD Report No.18, May 1982.
"Some Long-Term Consequences of Hypothetical Major Peleases of Radioactivity to the Atemosphere from tree Mile Island," Report to the President's Council on Environmental Quality, Decenter 1980.
"Decentaminatico of Krypton 85 from 3ree Mile Island Nuclear Plant,"
(with Kendall, et al.), Report of the Union cf Concerned Scientists to the Governor of Pennsylvania, May 15, 1980.
"Some coments on Consequences of Bypothetical Peactor Accidents at the Philippines Nuclear Power Plant" (with Gordon 2cegson), National Auduben Scciety, EPAD Report No. 3, April 1980.
"Nuclear Reactor Accidents: The Value of Irproved Centaintent," (with Frank von Hippel), Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Report PU/ CEES 94, Princeton University, January 1980.
"The Effects of Releases to the Atacsphere of Radioactivity frem Hyrcthetical Large-scale Accidents at the Proposed Gorleben Waste Treatment Facility," report to the Government of Icwer Saxony, Federal Republic of Germany, as part of the "Gorleben International Review," February 1979.
"Reactor Safety Research at the Large conscquence End of the Risk Spectrue," presented to the Experts' Meeting on Reactor Safety Research in the Federal Republic of Ger:Any, Bonn, Septerter 1,1978.
A Study cf Scre of the Ccnsequences of Hypothetical Reactor Widents at Parseback, repcrt to the Swedish Energy Corrtt., Stockhcir, cS ! f97fi3,1978.
Testimeny:
"Respenses to the Chernobyl Accident," before the Senate Comittee on Cnergy and Natural Resources, U. S. Senate, June 19, 1986.
"Dealing with Uncertainties in Projections of Electricity Consurstion,"
befcre the Ccur. m Energy and Natural Rescurces, U. S. Senate, ' July 25, 1985.
"Scre consequences of Catastrephic Accidents at Indian Point and Their Implications for Erwrgency Planning," testimony and cross-examination before the Nuclear Regulatory Ccarission's Atcric Safety and Licensing Board, on behalf of the New York State Attorney General and others, July 1982.
i
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4 Testimony (Con't) t "In the Matter of Application of Orange and Rockland Counties conversim to coal of Lovett Units 4 and 5," testimony and crosa-ex, amination Inc. for on the health impacts of eliminating scrubbers as a requirement for conversio to coal; Department of mvironmental Resources, State of N.Y., Nov. 5,1991.
"Future Prospects for Comercial Nuclear Pcwer in the United States,"
before the Subeweittee on oversight and Investigations, Comittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U. S. House of ReFresentatives, October 23, 1981.
"Ca pents en Energy Forecasting," material submitted for the record at Hearings before the Subemeittee on Investigations and Oversights of the House Comittee on Science and Technology; Ccewittee Print No.14, June 1-2,1981.
for Restart of Trl Unit No.1," testimony and cross-examin Atenic Safety and Licensing Board on behalf of the Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York, AFril 1981.
"Advice and Rs.erdatio-Safety Analysis which should
,oncerning changes in Reactor Design and equired in Light of the Accident at % ree Mile Island," statement to tN suelear Regulatory Cemission concerning the propcsed ruleraking hearing ce degraded cores, Decenter 29, 1980.
t "Alternatives to the Indian Point Nuclear Reactors," statement before the Environnental Protecticn Ccenittee of the New Ycrk City Council, Decerber 14 1979.
Accidents at Indian Point, JuneAlso before the Cencittee, "Be Irpact on New Y 11, 1979. Also "Consequences of a Catastrophic Reactor Accident," statement to the New York City Board of Health, August 12,1976 (with Frank von Hippel).
"Erergency Planning for a Catastrophic Reactor Accident," testincny Pespcnse and Evacuation Plans Hearings, Neverber 4,1 "Cccents on the Propcsed PIC Trade Regulation Rule on Labeling and Advertising of Wermal Insulation," Beyea and Dutt, before the rir,1978.
"Censequences of Catutrephic Accidents at Jartspert," testimony before the N.Y. State Peard on Electric Generation Siting and the Fnvirenrent in the Fatter of Long Island Lighting Co. (Jarerport Nuclear Pcwer Station), May 1977.
the Sundesert Nuclear Installation," testirony before the Resources and Develeprent Cemission, Decenter 3,1976.
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ATTACHMENT 3
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I Resume for Gordon Thompson I
January 1987 Protessional Exoertise Consulting scientist on energy, environment, and international sec Education
- PhD in Applied Mathematics, Oxford University,1973.
- BE in Mechanical Engineering, University of New South Wales, Sy Australia,1967.
- BS in Mathematics and Physics, University of New South We!es,1966 Current Accotntments_
- Executive Director, institute for Resource & Security Studies ( IR Cambridge, MA.
- Coordinator, Prollferation Reform Project ( an IRSS project ).
- Treasurer, Center for Atomic Raalation Studies, Acton MA
- Member, Board of Directors, Political Ecology Research Group, Oxfo
- Member, Advisory Board, Gruppe Okologie, Hannover, FRG.
Consultino Exoertence ( selected )
l
- Natural Resources Defense Councl!, Washington, DC, of testimony on hazards of the Savannah River Plant.1986-1987 : prep
- Lakes Environmental Association, Bridgton, ME,1986 : analysis of fe regulations for disposal of radioactive waste.
- Greenpeace, Hamburg, FRG,1986 : participation in an interna the hazards of nuclear power plants.
- Three Mlle Island Public Health Fund, Philadelphia, PA,1983-presen studies related to the Three Mlle Island nuclear plant.
- Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Boston, MA,19 present : analyses of the safety of the Seabrook nuclear plant.
- Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, 1980-1985 : studies on energy demand and supply, nuclear arms control, and the safety of nucl installations.
2
- Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Boston, MA,1985 :
preparation of testimony on cogeneration potential at the Maine facilities of Great Northern Paper Company.
t
- Town & Country Planning Association, London, UK, 1982-1984 : coordination i
and conduct of a study on safety and radioactive waste implications of the proposed Sizewell nuclear plant.
- US Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, 1980-1981 assessment of the cleanoo of Three Mlle Island Unit 2 nuclear plarit.
)
- Center for Energy & Env v mental Studies, Princeton Universtty, Princeton, RJ,1979-1980 : studle:, a the potentials of various renewable energy sources.
- Government of Lower Saxony, Hannover, FRG, 1978-1979 : coordtnation and conduct of studies on safety aspects of the proposed Gorleben nuclear fuel center.
Other Exoertence ( selected )
- Co-leadership ( with Paul Walker ) of a study group on nuclear weapons prollferation, institute of Polltics, Harvard University,1981.
- Foundation ( with others ) of an ecological political movement in Oxford, UK, which contested the 1979 Parliamentary electton.
- Conduct of cross-examination and presentation of evidence, on behalf of the Political Ecology Research Group, at the 1977 Public inquiry into proposed expansion of the reprocessing plant at Windscale, UK
- Conduct of research on plasma theory ( while a PhD candidate ), as an associate staf f member, Culham Laboratory, UK Atomic Energy Authority, 1969-1973.
- Service as a design engineer on coal plants, New South Wales Electricity Commission, Sydney, Australia,1968.
publications ( selected )
i
- The Nuclear Freeze Revisited ( written with Andrew Haines ), November 1986, Nuclear Freeze and Arms Control Research Project, Bristol, UK
- Nuclear-Weacon-Free Zones A Survey of Treatles and procosals ( edited with David Pitt ), Croom Helm Ltd, Beckenham, UK, forthcoming.
- International Nuclear Reactor Hazard Study ( written with fif teen other authors ), September 1986, Greenpeace, Hamburg, FRG ( 2 volumes ).
- ~What happened at Reactor Four'( the Chernobyl reactor accident ), Bulletin Ce Atomic Scientiste. August / September 1986, pp 26-31.
Resume for Jan Beyea July 1986 EDUCATIm Ph.D., Coltarbia University,1968 (Physics),
t B.A.,
Anherst College,1962.
EWLOYMENT HISTORY:
1980 to date, Senior Staff Scf entist and, as of 1985, Director of' the Environmental Policy Analysis Departnent, National Audubon Society, 950 Dird Avenue, NY, NY 10022.
1976 to 1980, Research Staff, Center for Energy and Environmantal Studies Princeton University.
1970 to 1976, Assistant Professor of Physics, Holy Cross College.
1968 to 1970, Research Associate, Colunbia University Physics Department.
CCNSULTING WCRK:
Consultant on nuclear energy to the Office of Technology Assessrent, the General in New York State and the Cenronwealth of Mass lower Saxony in West Germany; the Swedish Energy Comission; the Dree Mile Island Public Health Fund: and various citizens' groups in the United States.
PUBLICATICNS CCNCEPNING WERTl CCNSEPVATICE, DiERTt PCLICY, AND DERTt Articles:
"Oil and Gas Resources on Federal Lands: Wilderness and Wildlife Pefuses," Stege and Beyea, Annual Review of Enercy (to be published, October 1986).
[An earlier version appeared as National Audubcn Society PeFort, EPAC No. 28, June 1985.]
"U.S. Appliance Efficiency Standards," Pollin and Beyea, Enercy Policy, 13, p. 425 (1985).
"Ccepater Modeling for Energy Policy Analysis," idedsker, Peyea, and Pittsburgh, PA,15, part 3, p.1111 (1964).Lyons, Proceedings of the "Containment of a Reactor Meltdevn," (with Frank von Hippel), Bu]Ietin of
_the Ateeic Scientists, 3, p. 52 (August /Septerter 1982).
"Second Thou9 hts (about Nuclear Safety)," in Nuclear Pcver:
Both Sides, W. W. Norton and Co. (New York,1982).
"Indoor Air Pollution," Bull. At. Scientists, J7, p. 63 (Feb.1981)
\\
l 2-Articles (Con't)
"Drergency Planning for Reactor Accidents," Rulletin of the Atceie Scientists, J,6, p. 40 (Decerber 1980).
6
(
( An earlier version of the article appeared in German as Chapter 3 in Im Ernstfall hilflos?, E. R. Roch, Fritz Vahrenholt, editors, Keipenheuer & Witsch, Cologne,1980. )
"Dispute at Indian Point," Bull. At. Scientists, jf, p. 63, (May 1980).
"Locating and Eliminating Cbscure but Majer Energy Losses in Residential Housing," Hartje, Dutt, and Beyea, ASHRAE Transactions, 8_5,, Part II (1979).
(Winner of As{RAE outstanding paper award.)
,5 "Attic Heat I. css and Conservation Policy," Dutt, Beyea, and Sinden.
Technology and Society Division Paper 78-TS-5, Bouston, Texas,1978.
A9'E l
"Critical Significance of Attics and Basements in the Energy Balance of Twin Pivers Townhouses," Beyes et al., Energy and Buildings, Vol. I (1977),
)
Page 261.
Also chapter 3 of Saving Enercy in the Home, Ballinger,1978.
l "The Two Resistance Model for Attic Heat Flow: Irp.ications for Con-servation Policy," Woteki, Dutt, Beyea, Enercy-We Intl. Journal, Published Debates:
3,, 657(1978)
Proceedines of the Workshop on %ree File Island Desimetry, 2ree Mile Irland Public Health Fund,1622 Locust Street, Phila., Pa., Dec.1985 "Land Use Issues and the Media," Ctr. for Coverunication, NYC, Oct.1984.
Nuclear Peactors:
How Safe Are %ey?, panel discussion spensored by the Academy Forum of the National Acadery of Sciences, Wash., D.C., May 5,1980.
Line, P.E.S. Television.he Crisis of Nuclear Energy, Subject No. 367 on William P Transcript printed by Southern Education ctmuni-cations Assoc., 928 Woodrow Street, P. O. Box 5966, Colurtia, S.C.,19'i9.
Reports:
W e Audubon Energy Plan, Beyea et al., 2nd Ed., July 1984 (1st Ed., 1981)
[See also, Intro, to Special_ Issue on Legal Issues Arising From %e Audubon Energy Plan 1984, _colunbia Journal of Fnvirenmental Law, H, p.251, (1986))
A Review of Dose Assessnents at nree Mile Island and Pecamendations fe Future _Research, Report to the Wree Mile Island Public Health Fund, August 1984. ~ (See also, "Author Challenges Review,"
Health Physics Newsletter, March,1985, and "TMI-Six Years Later," Nuclear Medicir.e,,2,6, p.1345 (1985). ]
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_ _ _ _ _ _. Reports (Con't)
"Implications for Mortality of Weakening the C'.ean Air Act," (with G.
Steve Jordan), National Audubon Society, EPAD Report No.18, May 1982.
"Some Lon9-Term consequences of Hypothetical Major Peleases of Padioactivity to the Atmosphere from tree Mile Island," Report to the President's Council on Environmental Quality, recert>er 1980.
"Decontaminatim of Krypton 85 from Bree Mile Islarid Nuclear Plant,"
(with Kendall, et al.), Report of the Union cf Concerned Scientists to the Governor of Pennsylvania, May 15, 1980.
"Some Connents on Consequences of Bypothetical Peactor Accidents at the Philippines Nuclear Power Plant" Society, EPAD Report No. 3, April 1980.(with Gordon Rompson), National Auduben "Nuclear Peactor Accidents: The Value of Improved Centainment," (with Frank von Hippel), Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Report PU/ CEES 94, Princeton University, January 1980.
"The Effects of Peleases to the Atnesphere of Radioactivity frem Hyrcthetical Large-Scale Accidents at the Proposed Gorieben Waste Treatment Facility," report to the Government of Icwer Saxony, Federal Republic of Germany, as part of the "Gorleben International Review," February 1979.
"Peactor Safety Pesearch at the Large Consequence End of the Risk Spectru:r," presented to the Experts' Meeting on Reactor Safety Research in the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, September 1,1978.
A__ Study of Scre of the Ccnsequences of Hypot.hetical Peactor Accidents at Barseback, repcrt to the Swedish Energy Comr.., Stockhcir, CS I 1978:5, 19'i C Testimeny:
"Pespenses to the Chernob Energy and Natural Resources, yl Accident," before the Senate comittee on U. S. Senate, June 19, 1986.
"Dealing with Uncertainties in Projection 2 of Electricity Consunytion,"
betcre the Conr. m Energy and Natural Resources, U. S. Senate, July 25, 1985.
"Some Consequences of Catastrephic Accidents at Indian Point and Their Implications for Energency Planning," testimony and cross-examination before the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's Atceic Safety and Licensing Board, on behalf of the New York State Attorney General and others, July 1982.
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Testimony (con't)
"In the Matter of Aplication of Orange and Rockland Counties, Inc. for Conversicn to Coal of IcVett Units 4 and 5," testiscoy and cross-examination on the health impacts of eliminating scrubbers as a requirement for conversion to coals Department of Dwironmental Resources, State of N.Y., Nov. 5,1981.
"Future Prospects for Cceercial Nuclear Power in the United States,"
before the Subeceittee on Cversight and Investigations, comittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives, cetober 23, 1981.
"Ccmnents cm Energy Forecasting," material submitted for the record at Hearings before the Sutowittee on Investigations and Oversights of the House Comittee on Science and Technology; Ccarittee Print No.14, June 1-2,1981.
"Stockpiling of Potatsium Iodide for the General Public as a Condition fer Restart of Trl Unit No.1," testimony and cross-examination before the Atcznic Safety and Licensing Board on behalf of the Anti-Nuclear Group i
Representing York, April 1981.
"Advice and Reccrvnendations concerning Changes in Peactor Design and Safety Analysis which should be Required in Light of the Accident at Wree Mile Island," statement to the Nuclear Regulatory Comission concerning the propcsed ruleraking hearing on degraded cores, Decerter 29, 1980.
"Alternatives to the Indian Point Nuclear Peactors," statement before the EnvironMntal Protecticn Cemittee cf the New Ycrk City Council, Decenber 14, 1979.
Also before the Comittee, "De Irpact on New York City of Reactor Accidents at Indian Point, June 11, 1979. Also "Consequences of a Catastrophic Reactor Accident," statenent to the New York City Board of Health, August 12,1976 (with Frank von HipFel).
Erergency Planning for a Catastrophic Reactor Accident," testimeny before the California Energy Resources and Developpent Ccmrission, Energency Response and Evacuation Plans Hearings, Nevercer 4, 1978, Page 171.
Con ents on the Proposed FTC Trade Regulation Rule on Labeling and Advertising of Bermal Insulation," Beyea and Dutt, before the PIC,1978.
Censequences of Catastrephic Accidents at Janespert," testinony before the N.Y. State Ecard on Electric Generation Siting and the Fnvirenrent in the Fatter of Long Island Lighting Co. (Janesport Nuclear Pcwer Station), May 1977.
the Sundesert Nuclear Installation," testirony before the Cal Resources and Develeprent Ccmission, December 3,1976.
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Resume for Gordon Thompson i
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January 1987 Professional Exoertfse Consulting scientist on energy, environment, and international secur Education
- PhD in Applied Mathematics,0xford University,1973.
- BE in Mechanical Engineering, University of New South Wales, Sydne Australia,1967
- BS in Mathematics and Physics, University of New South Wales,1966.
i Current Accointments
- Executive Director, institute for Resource & Security Studies ( IRSS )
Cambridge, MA.
- Coordinator, Proliferation Reform Project ( an IRSS project ).
- Treasurer, Center for Atomic Radiation Studies, Acton, MA.
- Member, Board of Directors, Political Ecology Research Group, Oxford
- Member, Advisory Board, Gruppe Okologie, Hannover, FRG.
Consulting Exoerience ( selected ).
i i
- Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, 1986-1987 : preparation of testimony on hazards of the Savannah River Plant.
- l.akes Environmental Association, Bridgton, ME,1986 : analysis of feder regulations for disposal of radioactive waste.
- Greenpeace, Hamburg, FRG,1986 : participation in an internationa the hazards of nuclear power plants.
- Three Mlle Island Public Health Fund, Philadelphia, PA,1983-present :
studies related to the Three Mlle Island nuclear plant.
- Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Boston, MA,1984-present : analyses of the safety of the Seabrook nuclear plant.
- Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, 1980-1985 : studies on energy demand and supply, nuclear arms control, and the safety of nuclear installations.
2
- Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Boston, MA,1985 ;
preparation of testimony on cogeneration potential at the Maine facilities of Great Northern Paper Company.
t
- Town & Country Planning Association, London, UK, 1982-1984 : coordination and conduct of a study on safety and radioactive waste implications of the proposed Sizewell nuclear plant.
- US Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, 1980-198I assessment of the cleanup of Three Mlle Island Unit 2 nuclear plan't.
- Center for Energy & Environmental Studies, Princeton University Princeton NJ,1979-1980 : studies on the potentials of various renewable energy sources.
- Government of Lower Saxony, Hannover, FRG, 1978-1979 : coordination and conduct of studies on safety aspects of the proposed Gorleben nuclear fuel center.
Other Exoerlence ( selected )
- Co-leadership ( with Paul Walker ) of a study group on nuclear weapons proliferation, institute of Politics, Harvard University,1981.
- Foundation ( with others ) of an ecological political movement in Oxford, UK, which contested the 1979 Parliamentary election.
- Conduct of cross-examination and presentation of evidence, on behalf of the Political Ecology Research Group, at the 1977 Public inquiry into proposed expansion of the reprocessing plant at Windscale, UK
- Conduct of research on plasma theory ( while a PhD candidate ), as an associate staff member, Culham Laboratory, UK Atomic Energy Authority, 1969-1973.
- Service as a design engineer on coal plants, New South Wales Electricity Commission, Syoney, Australia,1968.
pubitcations ( selected )
- The Nuclear Freeze Revisited ( written with Andrew Holnes ), November 1986, Nuclear Freeze and Arms Control Research Project, Bristol, UK
- Nuclear-Weacon-Free Zones A Survey of Treatles and Procosals ( edited with David Pitt ), Croom Helm Ltd, Beckenham, UK, forthcoming.
- International Nuclear Reactor Hazard Study ( written with fif teen other authors ), September 1986, Greenpeace, Hamburg, FRG ( 2 volumes ).
- "What happened at Reactor Four' ( the Chernobyl reactor accident ), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. August / September 1986, pp 26-38
3
- The Source Term Debate A Aeoort by the Union of Concerned Scientists
( written with Steven Sholly ), January 1986, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA.
- ' Checks on the 3pread'( a review of three books on nuclear proliferation ),
Nature.14 November 1985, pp 127-128.
- Editing of persoectives on Proliferation. Volume I, August 1985, published by the Proliferation Reform Project, Institute for Resource and Security Studies, Cambridge, MA.
- 'A Turning Point for the NPT ?", ADIU Reoort. Nov/Dec 1984, pp l-4, University of Sussex, Brignton, UK.
- ' Energy Economics', in J Dennis (ed), The Nuclear Almanac. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA,1984.
- "The Genesis of Nuclear Power *, in J Tirman (ed), The Militarizatfon of High Lechnoloav. Balunger, Cambridge, MA,1984.
- A Second Chance : New Hamoshire's Electricttv Future as a Model for the Nation ( written with Linzee Weld ), Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA,1983.
l
- Safety and Waste Management imolications of the Sizewell PWR ( prepared with the help of 6 consultants ), a report to the Town & Country Planning Association, London, UK,1983.
- Utility-Scale Electrical Storage in the USA : The Prosoects of Pumoed Hydro.
j Comoressed Air. and Batteries. Princeton University report PU/ CEES '120, 1981.
- The Prosoects for Wind and Wave Power in North America. Princeton University re. cort pun.EES
- 117,1981.
- Hydroelectric Power in the USA Evolving to Meet New Needs. Princeton University report PU/ CEES
- 115, 1981.
- Editing and part authorship of ' Potential Accidents & Their Effects", Chapter 111 of Recort of the Gorleben internatfonal Review. oublished in German by the Government of Lower Saxony, FRG,1979 -- Chapter ill available in English from the Political Ecology Research Group, Oxford, UK
- A Study of the Consecuences to the Public of a Severe Accident at a Commeretal FBR located at Kalkar. West Germany. Political Ecology Research Group report RR-1,1978.
Excert Testimony ( selected )
- County Council, Richland County, SC,1987 : Impilcations of Severt Reactor Accidents at the Savannah River Plant.
- International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War,6th Annual Congress, Koln, FRG,1986 : Relationships between nuclear power and the
4 threat of nuclear war.
- Maine Land Use Regulation Commission,1985 : Cogeneration potential at f acilities of Great Northern Paper Company.
)
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- Interfaith HeaHngs on Nuclear issues, Toronto, Ontarlo,1984 : Options for Canada's nuclear trade and Canada's involvement in nuclear arms con
- Sizewell Public inquiry, UK,1984 : Safety ano radioactive waste implications of the proposed Sizewell nuclear plant.
- New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission,1983 : Electricity demand and
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supply options for New Hampshire.
- Atomic Safety & Licensing Board, Dockets 50-247-SP & S0-286-SP, US l
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,1983 : Use of filtered venting at the Indian Point nuclear plants.
- US National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere,1982 :
Implications of ocean disposal of radioactive waste.
- Environmental & Energy Study Conference, US Congress,1982 : Imolications of radioactive waste management.
Miscellaneous
- Australian citizen.
- Married, one child.
Resident of USA,1979 to present; of UK, 1969-1979.
Extensive experience of public speaking before professional and lay audiences.
Author of numerous newspaper, newsletter, and magazir.e articles and book reviews.
Has received many interviews from print and electronic media.
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TOH Revised Contention VIII to Revision 2:
Revision 2 fails to provide adequate emergency equipment, facilities, or personnel to support an emergenev response and fails to demonstrate that adequate protective responses can be implemented in the event of a radiological 10 CFR 550.47(1)(8)(10).
emergency.
Appendix, Board's Order & Memorandum, May 18, 1987 Admitted Bases:
In preparing the Hampto'n RERP, the State relies I
upon a "shelter-in-place" concept as a "valuable protective action" (in) that it can be implemented quickly, usually in a matter of minutes.
RERP, ogs.
II-25, 26.
The Hampton RERp acknowledges, however, that "sheltering may not be considered as a action on Hampton Beach during the summer." protective RERP, eg.
II-25.
The plan thereby fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate and immediate protection measures will be available to the thousands o' beachgoers in the event of emergency.
Under its RERP, therefore, the Town is required to rely upon evacuation as the sole means of avoiding radiological t
exposure to large segments of the population.
Since a "major portion" of radioactive material may be.
released within one hour of the initiating event, NUREG, eg. 17, and present estimates indicate evacuation could take up to seven and one-half hours, RERP, II-32, RERP measurec for evacuation are a wholly inadequate protective response to meet an emergency.
I Contentions of Town of Hampton to Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Town of Hampton, New Hampshire, November, 1985 (Contention VIII), at p. 12, admitted per Board's Memoranda and Orders of April 29, 1986, at 8, and May 18, 1997, at 27.
While acknowledging that "Hampton has a very high seasonal population," Revised Hampton RERP II-24, the State has revised the Hampton RERP to purportedly-provide for "Protective Actions For Seasonal Beach l
Population."
Revised Hampton RERP Appendix G.
These "precautionary measures" merely provide that beaches may be closed and traffic control initiated for all but the lowest level of emergency classification in the event an emergency develops at Seabrook.
By relying upon evacuation as the sole means to "protect" the beach population, the State thereby implicitly
acknodledges that no adequate sheltering or other protective responses short of evacuation would be appropriate or adequate in the event of radiological emergency.
Indeed, the Revised Hampton RERP exoressly acknowledges that, although "sheltering is a valuable protective action.
sheltering may not be concidered as a protective action on Hampton Beach curing the summer."
Revised Hampton RERP, Page II-26.
As set forth in the bases to Town of Hampton Contentions IV (Inadequate Transportation), Contention V (Inadequate Road System), and Contention VI (Lack of Adequate Personnel), however, evacuation of the tens of thousands of people from Hampton Beach is simply not feasible.
Since a "major release" of radioactive material may occur within one hour of notification of
{
onset of an accident, NUREG-0654 pages 13, 14, the thousands of beachgoers, many without benefit of the protection of even normal clothing, will likely be i
subject to significant radiological exposure and injury.
13, 14.
The Revised Hampton RERP and the Compensatory Plan prepared by the State, therefore, fail to make provision for any substantive changes over the original Hampton RERP to protect the beach population, confirm the Town's position that sheltering or alternative protective actions are unavailable to the Hampton Beach population, and fails to demonstrate that evacuation will provide adequate protection in the event of radiological emergency.
Contentions of the Town of Hampton to Revised Radiological Emergency Response Plan and to Compensatory Plan for the Town of Hampton, New Hampshire, April 14, 1986 (Revised Contention VIII), at pp. 3-10, as admitted by Board's Memoranda and Order i
of May 22, 1986, at 5, and May 18, 1987, at 27 4
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SAPL Contention 16:
The New Hampshire State and local plans do not make adequate provisions for the sheltering of
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various segments of the populace in the EPZ and therefore the plans fail to meet the requirements of 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1),
5 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 II.J.10.a. and m.
Appendix, Board's Memorandum and Order, May 18, 1987 Admitted Bases:
10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) requires that a range of protective actions be developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
NUREG-0654 requires that there be maps of shelter areas and the inclusion of the bases for the choice of recommended protective actions from the plume exposure pathway during emergency conditions.
NUREG-0654 II.J.10.m. specifies that the expected level of protection to be afforded in residential and other units must be evaluated.
The New Hampshire State and local plans fail to meet these requirements because there are no provisions for sheltering the population in the beach areas and no provisions for the sheltering 1
of the population in the many camping areas in the EPZ.
In a quickly developing accident with anticipated fast release of short duration, sheltering could be the only realistic protective action that could be implemented.
Evacuation of all transients is supposed to be carried out, according to the plans, if an evacuation is ordered.
There is, however, no realistic description as to how this can be done.
Given the current status of these plans and the lack of availability of sheltering capability for large segments of the population, a reasonable lovel of assurance that adequate protective measures will be available for transients in beach or camping areas has simply
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not been attained.
Seacoast Anti-Pollution Leagues Secon6' Supplemental Petition for Leave To Intervene, dated February 21, 1986 (Contention 16), at pp. 19-20, admitted per Board Memorandum and Order of April 29, 1986, at 93.
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Though an evaluation of the sheltering adequacy of some of the buildings housing special facilities appears at Table 2.6-3 of Vol. 1 of
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the NHRERP Rev. 2, there is no information given with regard to schools and day care centers.
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Contantions on Revision 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan, November 26, 1986 (amended Contention 16), at pp. 24-25, admitted per Board Memorandum and Order of May 18, 1987, at 38.
NECNP Contention RERP-8:
Neither the New Hampshire RERP nor the local plans provide a "reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency,"
as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1), in that the plans do not provide reasonable assurance that sheltering is an "adequate protective measure" for Seabrook.
Nor do the plans provide adequate criteria for the choice between protective measures, as required by S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654, S II.J.10.m.
Appendix, Board's Memorandum and Order, May 18, 1987 Admitted Bases:
The New Hampshire RERP relies on two principal protective actions for the public:
sheltering and evacuation.
The plan, however, contains only the most general critoria for determining when shelter should be used as opposed to evacuation.
It provides no evaluation of the j
sheltering capacity of the Seabrook EPZ; or any analysis of how sheltering is expected to contribute to dose reduction in the event of an emergency.
The following examples illustrate the plan's lack of analysis of the adequacy of' sheltering, in spite of Seabrook area characteristics which raise considerable l
questions about the effectiveness of shelterinq there.
I a.
The RERP includts virtually no assessment of the capacity to protect the public with sheltering facilities, whether during peak use periods ot at other times.
Only the adequacy of special facilities is described to any degree.
Thus, there is no basis for a finding of reasonable assurance that sheltering constitutos an adequate protective measure for all people who may need it.
NECNP Contentions on Revision 2 of the New Hampshire State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans, November 26, 1996 (Contention RERP-8), at 7, as admitted per Board Memorandum and Order of May 18, 1987, at 53.
Y b.
The RERP suggests that in order to achieve the greatest protection, "shelter should be sought in the lowest level of the building (e.g., in basements), away from
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windows."
RERP at 2.6-6.
No assessment is made of the number of structures in the Sea 5 rook EPZ that have basements.
In fact, it may reasonably be assumed that an unusually high proportion of Seabrook area houses, many of which are summer homes, do not have the tight construction that is necessary for effective sheltering.
NECNP Contentions on the New !!ampshire State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans, February 24, 1986 (Contention RERP-8), at pp. 11-13, as admitted per Board Memorandum and Order of April 29, 1986, at 59.
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