ML20207C267
| ML20207C267 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 12/15/1986 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207C230 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8612300093 | |
| Download: ML20207C267 (8) | |
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ENCLOSURE SAFETY EVALUATION RY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEMS 2.1 (PART 2) AND 2.2.2 VEND 0R INTEPFACE PROGRAM JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-348/364 INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip sigr.sl from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal.
The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment.
Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up.
In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.
Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (ED0), directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant. The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000, " Generic I
Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the Commission (NPCl requested (by Generic Letter 83-P8 dated July 8,19832) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.
8612300093 861215 DR ADOCK 05000348 PDR 4
. This report presents the staff evaluation rf the responses to Item 2.1 (Part ?)
and Item 2.2.2 (Vendor Interface Program) submitted by Alabama Power Company (APCo,41, the licensee for the Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and ?.
The actual 3
documents reviewed during this evaluation are listed in the reference at the end of the report.
Item P.1 (Part 2) requires the licensee to establish a Vendor Interface Program for all safety-related components of the Reactor Trip System (RTS).
Item 2.2.2. applies similar requirements to all other safety-related components.
Separate evaluations are being made because the licensee has provided separate responses for these two items. Since the licensee has stated that the RTS components are supplied by Westinghouse, Item 2.1 (Part 2) was evaluated against the guidelines for direct vendor contact programs.
For Item 2.2.2, the licensee has elected to use the NUTAC/VETIP program, therefore the auidelines for evaluating programs based on NUTAC/VETIP have been used.
EVALUATION Guideline Item 2.1 (Part 2) Program
Description:
Licensee's response should describe their program for establishing and maintaining interfaces with vendors of the safety-related components of their Reactor Trip System.
Evaluation:
The licensee has provided a description of their progran for establishing and maintaining an interface with the vendor of the safety-related components of their Reactor Trip System. We find this acceptable.
.. Guideline Item 2.1 (Part 2) Program Content Licensee's response should show that their program:
(a) applies to'all safety-related RTS components; (b) ensures that vendors of their safety-related RTS components are contacted on a periodic basis; (c) ensures that receipt of vendor Equipment Technical Information (ETI) is acknowledged or otherwise verified; (d) includes means to assure that this ETI is kept current and complete, preferably through the use of controlled procedures for adding, deleting, or revising this information; and (e) contains procedures to review ETI, evaluate it, and incorporate its relevant parts into plant procedures and instructions.
Evaluation:
(a) The licensee's response indicated that the program applies to all safety-related RTS components. We find this acceptable.
(b) The licensee's response states that Westinghouse, the NSSS vendor, supplies the safety-related RTS components and that technical information on these components is received through the licensee's interface program with Westinghouse which includes periodic contact for exchange of technical information. We find this acceptable.
. (c) The licensee's interface program with the NSSS vendor includes written acknowledgement of receipt of technical information. We find this acceptable.
(d) The licensee's response identified procedures for handling ETI that will ensure this information is kept current and complete. We find this acceptable.
(e) Procedures were identi#ied for screening, evaluating, and incorporating ETI into the plant procedures and instructions as found appropriate.
We find this acceptable.
Guideline - Item 2.2.2 Program Description Licensee's response should describe their program for establishing and maintaining interfaces with vendors of safety-related components which ensures that vendors are contacted on a periodic basis and that receipt of vendor Equipment Technical Information (ETIl is acknowledged or otherwise verified.
I Evaluation:
The licensee has described a continuing interface with Westinghouse, their NSSS supplier, that includes acknowledgement of receipt of technical information and provision of an annual cumulative listing of all information issued in that year so that the licensee can be assured that they possess all pertinent technical information.
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l The licensee has established interfaces similar to that established with their NSSS vendor with Colt Industries, the vendor for their diesel generators, and Generic Electric. These interfaces include written acknowledgement of receipt of technical information, and, in addition, include issuance of an annual listing of all information issued in that year so that the licensee can be assured that they possess all pertinent technical information.
We find this program of formal contact with the NSSS and two major non-NSSS vendors acceptable. However, in view of the importance of other components, the licensee should establish a progran to periodically contact the vendors of key components (such as auxiliary feed pumps, safety-related batteries, ECCS pumps and safety-related valve operators) to facilitate the exchange of current technical information.
Guideline - Item 2.2.2 Program Where Vendor Interface Cannot Practicably be Established License's response should describe their program for compensating for the lack of a formal vendor interface where such an interface cannot be practicably established.
Evaluation:
4 The licensee in their June 25, 1984 submitta1 provided a brief description of their vendor interface program which references the NUTAC/VETIP program and committed to revise procedures to assure that the VETIP program would be properly controlled and implemented.
' VETIP is comprised of two basic elements related to vendor equipment problems, the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) and the Significant Event Evaluation and Information Network (SEE-IN) programs. VETIP is designed to ensure that vendor equipment problems are recognized, evaluated and corrective action taken.
Through participation in the NPRDS program, the licensee submits engineering information, failure reports and operating history for review under the SEE-IN program. Through the SEE-IN program, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0) screens nuclear plant events which have been reported through NPRDS, Nuclear Network, and NRC reports. Rased on the significance of the event, detennined by the screening process, INP0 issues a report to all utilities outlining the cause(s) of the problem (s) and recommends practical corrective action (s). These reports are issued in the form of Significant Event Reports (SERs) or Significant Operatinn Experience Reports (SOFAsi and Operations and Maintenance Reminders (OAMRsi. Upon receipt of SEPs, SOERs or 0AMRs an evaluation is performed and documented to determine applicability to the Farley plant and corrective actions are taken as appropriate.
The licensee's response states that procedures exist to review and evaluate incoming ETI.
We find the applicant's commitments acceptable provided that the enhancements described in Section 3.2 of the NUTAC/VETIP program are implemented to the extent that the licensee can control or influence the implementation of these recommendations.
' However, the lack of either a formal interface with each vendor of safety-related equipment or a program to periodically contact each vendor of safety-related equipment does not relieve the licensee of his responsibility to obtain appropriate vendor instructions and information where necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system, or component will perform satisfactorily in service and to ensure adequate quality assurance in
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accordance with Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.
Guideline - Item 2.7.2 Responsibilities of Licensee and Vendors That Provide Service on Safety-Related Eouipment Licensee's response should verify that responsibilities of licensee and vendors that provide service on safety-related equipment are defined such that control of and applicable instructions for maintenance work on safety-related equipvent are provided.
Evaluation:
The licensee in their June 25, 1984 submittal committed to revise procedures to assure that the VETIP program would be properly controlled and implemented.
l The VETIP program includes the implementation of procedures for internal l
handling of vendor services.
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l We find the applicant's commitment to control and implement the VETIP prnoran 1
acceptable.
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REFERENCES:
1.
Generic Implications of ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, NUREG-1000, Vol. 1, April 1983; Vol. 2, July 1983.
2.
NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to All Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating Licenses, and Holders of Construction Permits,
" Required Actions Rased on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events-(Generic Letter 83-28)," July 8, 1983.
3.
Letter, F. L. Clayton, Jr., Alabama Power to S. A. Varca, NRC,
" Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant-Units I and 2, Response to Generic Letter 83-28," November 4, 1983.
4.
Letter, R. P. MacDonald, Alabama Power to S. A. Varoa, NRC,
" Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant-Units 1 and 2, Response to Generic Letter 83-28," June 25, 1984 5.
INP0 84-010 (NUTAC), Vendor Equipment Technical Information Program for Generic Letter 83-28, Section 2.2.2, March 1984.
Date:
Principal Contributor:
D. Lasher
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