ML20206R860
| ML20206R860 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1986 |
| From: | Baird J, Hackney C, Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206R849 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-86-12, 50-368-86-12, NUDOCS 8607070240 | |
| Download: ML20206R860 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1986012
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APPENDIX
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-313/85-12
Licenses:
DRP-51
50-368/86-12
Dockets:
50-313
50-368
Licensee:
Arkansas Power & Light Company
P. O. Box 551
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203
Facility Name:
Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 & 2
Inspection At:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Russellville, Arkansas
Inspection Conducted:
March 31 through April 4, 1986
Inspectors:
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C.A. Hackney,EmergencyPrepgrednessAnalyst
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Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Programs
Section
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JVB. Baird, Emergency Preparedness Analyst
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Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Programs
Section
Approved:
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L. A. Yandel1, Chief, Emergency Preparedness
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and Safeguards Program Section
Other Accompanying
Personnel:
R. T. Hogan, I&E Headquarters
C. Corbit, Battelle
E. C. Watson, Battelle
F. M. Carlson, Comex Corporation
A. K. Loposer, Comex Corporation
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection Conducted March 31 through April 4, 1986 (Report 50-313/86-12;
50-368/86-12)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's performance
and capabilities during an exercise of the emergency plan and procedures.
Results: Within the emergency response areas inspected no violations or
deviations were identified.
Five deficiencies were identified (capability to
establish control points for the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational
Support Center ~(OSC), paragraph 5; inadequate management control of the
Emergency Operations Facility (E0F), paragraph 6; radiological monitoring for
recovery and reentry, paragraph 8; failure to achieve continuous
accountability, paragraph 8; and failure to achieve initial accountability,
paragraph 10).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
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'J. Levine, Director, Site Nuclear Operations
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- M. Tull, Emergency Planning Coordinator
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- B. Baker, Operations Manager
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- H. Hollis, Security Coordinator
- G. Campbell, Senior Management Representative
- D. Boyd, Site Emergency Planning Coordinator
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- F. Van Buskirk, Site Emergency Planning Coordinator
- E. Ewing, General Manager, Plant Support
State of Arkansas
F. Wilson, Director, Radiation Control and Emergency Management Programs
C. Meyers, Manager, Nuclear Planning and Response Program
NRC
- W. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector
- C. Harbuck, Resident Inspector
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
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A. Lookabaugh, Chief, Technological Hazards Branch
G. Jones, Community Planner, Technological Hazards Branch
The NRC inspectors also held discussions with other station and
corporation personnel in the areas of health physics, operations,
emergency response organization, quality assurance, training and records
management.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Open Item (313/8510-03; 368/8510-03):
The licensee again failed
to demonstrate accountability during the 1986 annual exercise.
This
finding is closed. This area is a deficiency based on the 1986 exercise.
(Closed) Open Item (313/8510-04; 368/8510-04:
Radiological data from
offsite monitoring was included in the evaluation'of Gaseous Effluent
Radiological Monitoring System dose assessment.
(Closed) Open Item (313/8510-05; 368/8510-05):
The ability to downgrade
and reclassify the accident was demonstrated.
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(Closed)OpenItem(313/8510-06;568/8510-06):
The E0F communication
appeared adequate for offsite communication.
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(Closed) Open Item (313/8510-08; 368/8510-08):
Appropriate copies of
checklist and procedures were in the emergency cabinet.
(Closed) Open Item (313/8510-09; 368/8510-09):
The licensee again failed
to demonstrate accountability during the 1986 annual exercise.
This
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finding is closed.
This area is a deficiency based on the 1986 exercise.
(Closed) Open Item (313/8510-10; 368/8510-10): The fire team had been
discontinued.
The licensee utilizes a fire brigade.
(Closed) Open, Item (313/8510-12; 368/8510-12):
The licensee again failed
to demonstrate accountability during the 1986 annual exercise.
This
finding is closed.
This area is a deficiency based on the 1986 exercise.
(Closed) Open Item (313/8510-13; 368/8510-13):
The offsite radiological
monitoring team adequately demonstrated the use of radiological protection
procedures.
(Closed) Open Item (313/8211-49; 368/8209-49):
The licensee adequately
demonstrated a personnel shift change for the emergency response
facilities.
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3.
Exercise Scenario
.The scenario was written to test the reactor operations personnel, onsite
and offsite monitoring personnel, first aid, and other support functions.
The scenario challenged the operations personnel for emergency detection,
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classification, and offsite notification.
The onsite and offsite
radiological monitoring teams.had the opportunity to demonstrate the use
of emergency procedures and radiological monitoring equipment during a day
time exercise.
4.
Control Room (Simulator)
The exercise was initiated at midnight (simulated) due to a high. activity
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alarm on the Unit 1 Failed Fuel Iodine Monitor.
A decrease in the failed
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fuel ratio was also observed. The shift operations supervisor (SOS)
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requested a sample of the primary coolant and considered placing the
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reactor into hot shutdown according to technical specifications.
At
6:30 a.m., the SOS received the results of the primary coolant sample.
The sample results indicated a radiofodine concentration in excess of.
technical specifications.
That condition required the reactor to be
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placed in hot shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and cold shutdown in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> if
the activity ceuld not be reduced.
The SOS declared a Notification of
Unusual Event based upon the emergency action level in the emergency
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procedures.
State officials were notified in a timely manner af ter the
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emergency had been declared.
The NRC resident inspector was notified at
his residence and he reported directly to the control room.
An Alert was
declared due to a iodine sample in excess of 100 micro-ci/gm.
The state
was notified of the Alert class within the 15 minute requirement.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
The TSC was staffed and operational within 40 minutes following the
declaration of an Alert.
The Emergency Coordinator (EC) relieved the Duty
Emergency Coordinator of command and offsite notification
responsibilities.
Dose assessment was retained by the control room Shift
Administrative Assistant (SAA) until the TSC dose assessment team was in
place and functional at the EOF location.
THE EC kept TSC personnel informed of plant status through regular TSC
update briefings.
Radiological surveys were conducted both inside and
outside the TSC during the exercise.
However, when radiation levels and
airborne activity outside the confines of the auxiliary and turbine
buildings increased because of the release, no control point was
established at the TSC as required by EPIP 1905.001, " Emergency
Radiological Protection," Section 7.1.
The Duty Emergency Coordinator, early in the exercise, directed a split
into two 12-hour shifts, and directed a shift change at 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br />.
This
was satisfactorily accomplished.
When evacuation of plant non-essential personnel was ordered,
accountability of TSC personnel was established.
However, TSC personnel
accountability was not maintained as required by exercise objective
No. 30.
Additionally, plant accountability was not reported complete
until 10:51 a.m., 79 minutes after evacuation was directed.
At 9:52 a.m., when the second decay heat pump tripped and would not reset,
and the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) and High Pressure Coolant Injection
Pumps (HCI) failed, the EC ordered that the temperature margin to
saturation be determined and tracked.
The TSC Operations Manager developed a work plan for correction of
casualties and later the TSC staff prepared a recovery and reentry plan.
Logs maintained by TSC personnel were neat and comprehensive, as were the
information/ message forms.
The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's
attention.
These observations are neither violations nor unresolved
items.
These items were recommended for licensee consideration for
improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.
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Status board update times were occasionally not posted and entries
not kept current.
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No status board or designated place to indicate offsite licensee
protective actions recommendations or protective actions implemented
or in progress by the state.
Based on observations by the NRC inspector, the following item is
considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency:
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TSC and OSC radiological control points were not established
according to EPIP 1905.001, Section 7.1 during the onsite
radiological release (313/8612-01; 368/8612-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
The EOF was activated in a timely manner.
Director (E0FD) requested that staff personnel prepare to activate the EOF
by contacting their counterparts for plant status updates.
Equipment was
in place and communications were established with onsite personnel and
offsite agencies.
However, it was noted that the EOFD had difficulty
interfacing with the NRC Director Site Operations (050) during the early
stages of the incident.
It appeared that the E0FD lacked technical and logistical support.
Additionally, the E0FD was generally on the telephone ' talking to the TSC
and making offsite notifications.
There did not appear to be sufficient
time available to review incoming information, direct EOF activities, and
interface with the NRC DSO.
Additional personnel were dispatched from the
Corporate office to augment the initial response organization; however,
sufficient technical and logistical support personnel should be located in
the EOF at the initial activation of the E0F to support the emergency
response effort.
Emergency response personnel were given periodic plant
status briefings and updates on plant conditions. There was no visible
information as to offsite protective action recommendations and what
actions the state had taken based on the licensee's recommendations.
The
NRC inspector determined that the E0F building emergency air conditioning
system had been energized prior to a radiological release; however, a
systematic check of the exits from the E0F revealed that the air
conditioning system did not maintain positive pressure on the habitable
portion of the EOF building.
This concern was noted as a deficiency
during the Emergency Response Facility review (Report 313/8511; 368/8511).
The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's
attention.
These observations are neither violations nor unresolved
items.
These items were recommended for licensee consideration for
improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.
Protective action recommendations to offsite agencies and the action
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taken by that agency should be visible and recorded.
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Full technical and logistical support should be included in the
initial emergency response organization for the EOF.
Based on observations by the NRC inspector, the following item is
considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency:
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Management control of the EOF was inadequate during the initial phase
of the exercise (313/8612-02; 368/8612-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Dose Assessment (E0F)
The dose assessment personnel responded to the EOF in a tin.ely manner.
Communicators in the dose assessment area maintained excellent
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communications with the offsite monitoring teams.
Dose assessment
personnel were able to coordinate with the state dose assessment
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representative and produce timely information to the E0FD.
The following is an observation the NRC inspectors called to the
licensee's attention.
This observation is neither a violation nor an
unre' solved item. This item was recommended for licensee consideration for
improvement, but it has no specific regulatory requirement.
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Status boards should be maintained with up-to-date information.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Operational Support Centers
The OSCs were activated in a timely manner.
The logkeeper in the health
physics area maintained a good record of Emergency Radiation Team
Activities and the exposure for personnel performin@ reentry.
Clear
communications were maintained with emergency radiation teams in the
plant.
The shift turnover of all key personnel in the health physics area
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was accomplished without disruption of radiological activities.
The NRC inspectors noted that the command and control of the recovery and
reentry activities _from the OSC were inadequate.
There was little
coordination among health physics, operations, and maintenance personnel
within the OSC when preparing teams for recovery activities.
The onsite
monitoring supervisor provided health physics briefings for recovery teams
in the health physics assembly area; however, there wasino procedure to
assure that teams received necessary information from operations and
maintenance regarding tasks to be performed.
Although radiation teams were tracked, there was no method established for
accountability of all OSC personnel.
The same finding was observed in the
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There were no status boards, logbooks, or OSC announcements to provide
current plant status to the onsite monitoring supervisor and the emergency
radiation team.
Several routine health physics procedures, specifically,
setting up control points, donning protective clothing, filling out survey
forms and survey maps, preparing Radiation Work Permits (RWPs), signing
checklists and briefing forms were simulated during the exercise.
The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's
attention.
These observations are neither violations nor unresolved
items.
These items were recommended for licensee consideration for
improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.
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Routine health physics procedures should be followed in order to
adequately demonstrate radiation monitoring of plant areas.
Any
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functions which are to be simulated during an exercise should be
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clearly specified before the exercise.
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Current plant status, including emergency classification, should be
posted in the OSC.
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Based on observations by the NRC inspectors, the following items are
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considered to be emergency preparedness deficiencies:
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The ability of the various OSCs to efficiently coordinate recovery
and reentry activities was not' demonstrated (313/8612-03;
(368/8612-03).
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There was no method to maintain accountability in the OSC, TSC, or
EOF (313/8612-04; 368/8612-04).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Medical
Medical team responded to the injured person in a timely manner.
The
injured person was given first-aid and placed into the ambulance.
The NRC
inspector did not accompany the injured person to the hospital.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Security / Accountability
At 9:10 a.m., Security personnel received notification that the decision
had been made to evacuate all nonessential from the station.
At
9:33 a.m., the evacuation alarm was sounded and the evacuation
announcement was made.
Security personnel in the guard houses were
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prepared for the evacuation and logged out all evacuating personnel within
16 minutes.
Accountability was achieved in 71 minutes with 23 missing
persons.
This exceeds the 30 minute guidance of NUREG-0654 by a
significant amount.
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During the evacuation, some personnel retained their TLDs when they left
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the station contrary to the evacuation procedure.
The following is an observation the NRC inspectors called to the
licensee's attention. This observation is neither a violation nor an
unresolved item.
This item was recommended for licensee consideration for
improvement, but it has no specific regulatory requirement.
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Train personnel, including security, for proper disposition of TLDs
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upon evacuation.
Based on observations by the NRC inspector, the following item is
considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency:
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The capability to achieve accountability within the guidance of
NUREG-0654 was not demonstrated (313/8612-05; 368/8612-05).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Radiation Protection (Offsite)
The NRC inspector observed the formation and dispatch of three offsite
radiological monitoring teams from the E0F and accompanied one team
throughout the remainder of the exercise.
It was later determined that
two of the team members should have been retained at the E0F to support
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radiological controls there.
The offsite monitoring team members assembled at the OSC. initially and
were briefed and sent to the EOF to obtain emergency kits after
declaration of the Alert classification at about 8:30 a.m.
The NRC
inspector noted that the teams arrived at the EOF at about 8:50 a.m.,
inventoried the kit equipment, conducted ndio checks with the Offsite
Monitoring Supervisor (OMS) in the OSC anc were dispatched to offsite
locations at about 9:30 a.m.
The teams were briefed on release conditions
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and wind speed and direction by radio initially and throughout the
exercise.
The NRC inspector noted that the teams were initially directed to
locations in the downwind direction to obtain prerelease surveys, and to
areas of interest for plume radiation surveys and air samples after the
release of radioactivity occurred up to the termination of recovery and
reentry considerations.
The NRC inspector accompanied the " Green" team
and observed adequate demonstrations of survey techniques, use of
implementing procedures, tracking of pocket dosimeter readings and general
application of radiation protection procedures during the exercise.
The
use of respiratory protection, anti-contamination clothing and final
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vehicle, equipment and personnel surveys were simulated, with each being
described adequately to.the NRC inspector.
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The NRC inspector noted that radio communications between the teams and
the OMS, as well as between the teams themselves, appeared to be
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excellent.
The transfer of location and monitoring data between the teams
and OMS appeared to be more than adequate, although the radio
communication protocol differed significantly with the various players and
some sampling data such as time of measurement or sample was occasionally
not transmitted without a prompt from the OMS.
The NRC inspector noted
that the OMS was very effective in repeating survey data and directing
team deployment.
The teams appeared to maintain an awareness of the plume
location and had a good knowledge of the offsite area.
On more than one
occasion, teams questioned OMS instruction which appeared to conflict with
the plume location and obtained resolution of the problems.
The NRC
inspector observed that direct radiation measurements of the plume did not
include open window techniques to aid in the determination of whether or
not the surveyor was in the plume.
The team members were also unable to
describe a technique for determining if they were in the plume when an air
sample was being taken and no radioiodine was detected in the sample.
The
NRC inspector noted that air samples were taken, results determined,
documented and reported according to procedures.
It was also noted that a
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calculator malfunction due to low batteries resulted in delay in reporting
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the results.
The sample results were calculated by hand until the
calculator function was restored, but there was no procedure for this
calculation and there appeared to be no contingency for making the
calculation back at the plant.
The following are observations the NRC inspectors called to the licensee's
attention. These observations are neither~ violations nor unresolved
items.
These items were recommended for licensee consideration for
improvement, but they have no specific regulatory requirement.
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Offsite team monitoring procedures should include open and closed
window survey techniques to aid in the determination of plume
location and air sampling points,
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An alternate method for air sample calculations should be provided
for use in the event of calculator malfunction or failure.
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Additional instructions and training should be provided to offsite
team members on standardizing radio responses and reporting of air
sample and radiation monitoring data.
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Supervisory overview and direction should be provided for the offsite
monitoring team members of the E0F prior to dispatch to the field to
ensure updated briefing prior to departure, direction in
implementation of procedures and that the proper personnel are
dispatched.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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11.
Public Relations / Media
The NRC inspector observed that the Joint Information Center (JIC) was
staffed in a timely manner.
The licensee staff assigned to the JIC staff
for the exercise was sufficient to carry out their assigned duties.
News
releases were coordinated with the state representatives and released in a
timely manner.
The news conferences were held in a time frame which was
commensurate with the events as they were happening in the scenario
without any indication of anticipatory action.
The information
disseminated by news releases was clear and concise.
The information
available during the news conferences was adequate.
The performance of
all personnel in the JIC was adequate during the exercise, also
coordination of information with the state was adequate.
The licensee
used both public affairs and technical staff for press conferences.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Exit Meeting
The exit meeting was conducted on April 4,1986, with licensee
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representatives.
Messrs. W. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector and
C. Harbuck, Resident Inspector, were in attendance. Messrs. C. A.
Hackney, the NRC team leader, and J. B. Baird, Emergency Preparedness
Analyst, Region IV, and other staff members represented the NRC.
Mr. C. A. Hackney summarized the team comments and observations in the
subject areas of the exercise scenario, control room, EOF, TSC, OSC,
offsite monitoring, and public affairs.
The team leader commented on the
critique that was held prior to the exit interview by Arkansas Power &
Light Company personnel.
The licensee's exercise critique observations
were not, in most cases, similar to the NRC inspectors findings.
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