ML20206R798

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Forwards Response to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-293/87-01.Corrective Actions:Sections of post- Accident Sampling Sys Piping Identified Susceptible to IGSCC Will Be Replaced
ML20206R798
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 04/15/1987
From: Bird R
BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
87-61, NUDOCS 8704220255
Download: ML20206R798 (2)


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K Executive Offices 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Ralph G. Bird SeniorVice President - Nuclear April 15, 1987 BECo Ltr. #87-61 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 License No. DPR-35 Docket No. 50-293

Subject:

NRC Inspection Report 50-293/87-01

Dear Sir:

Attached is Boston Edison Company's response to the Notice of Violation issued with the subject inspection report.

Please do not hesitate to contact rae directly if you have any questions.

R.G. Bird EM/la Attachment t

cc: Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue - Region I King of Prussia, PA 19406 Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Senior Resident Inspector

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36 8704220255 870415

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PDR ADOCK 05000293 0

PDR

  • Violation 10CFR Appendix B Criteria XVI requires that measures be established so that conditions adverse to quality such as failures are corrected.

In 1984 the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) piping had leaked due to cracking caused by too high a heat tracing temperature and internal halogen contamination.

Procedure 2.2.133 requires a heat tracing temperature of 250*F i 20*F for the PASS piping.

Contrary to the above, on January 7, 1987 the temperature measuring instrumentation for the PASS piping heat tracing indicated a temperature of 364*F.

This is a Severity Level IV violation.

Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved Boston Edison has identified sections of PASS piping where chloride accumulation is believed most likely and piping believed to be most susceptible to Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC). Other areas of piping not already replaced in 1984 as a result of an earlier investigation for IGSCC will be tested. Cuts ~will be made in the PASS piping and internal sections analyzed for chlorides. Boston Edison will replace any sections found that exhibit greater than the concentration of chlorides specified allowable by the engineering evaluation which has been performed based upon Department of Energy criteria.

Corrective Steps to Be Taken to Avoid Future Violations As an interim measure Boston Edison will develop a surveillance procedure to monitor and record the temperature on the heat traced line.

This procedure is expected to be completed by May 31, 1987.

The interim procedure will be included in the Master Surveillance Tracking Program to ensure timely performance. In parallel with this effort, engineering has been requested to redefine temperature limits and evaluate improved methods of maintaining the PASS piping at desired temperature.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance will be achieved upon completion of the testing and any piping replacement work determined necessary as a result.

Boston Edison will complete this work prior to vessel pressurization for start-up when PASS i

operability will again be required.

Information regarding test results and plans for any piping replacement proven necessary will be available to our Senior Resident Inspector.

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