ML20206R437

Provides Commission with Info & Options on Orphan Source Issues in Response to Item 8 of Encl Srm, on SECY-97-273, Improving NRC Control Over & Licensee Accountability For,Generally & Specifically Licensed..

ML20206R437
Person / Time
Issue date:	02/03/1999
From:	Travers W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
References
SECY-97-273-C, SECY-99-038, SECY-99-038-01, SECY-99-038-R, SECY-99-38, SECY-99-38-1, SECY-99-38-R, NUDOCS 9905200115
Download: ML20206R437 (48)

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initials sea POLICY ISSUE Februarv 3.1999 (Notation Vote)

SECY-99-038 FOR: The Commissioners FROM: William D. Travers l Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

STAFF EFFORTS TO ADDRESS ORPHAN SOURCE ISSUES PURPOSE:

To provide the Commission with information and options on orphan source issues in response to item 8 of the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) (Attachment 1) dated April 13,1998, on SECY-97-273," Improving the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Conrol Over, and Licensees' Accountability for, Generally and Specifically Licensed Devices."

SUMMARY

This paper describes the staff's efforts to address orphan source issues since April 1998, when the SRM on SECY-97-273 was issued. These efforts have included presentations and coordination with stakeholders on the orphan source problem; consultation with Federal agencies and States on jurisdictions and regulatory responsibilities for addressing the orphan source problem; continued close coordination with the Conference of Radiation Control -

Program Directors (CRCPD) through a committee addressing orphan source issues; and a coordination with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), to finalize a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on management o' ealed sources. This paper also presents options for establishing an orphan source contract, provides pros and cons for the different contract options, and gives an estimate of the cost of establishing such a contract.

CONTACT: Douglas A. Broaddus, NMSS/IMNS (301) 415-5847 ',f I

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1 The Commissioners ' .2-B6CKGROUND:

On December 31,1996, the Commission issued an SRM on SECY-96-221, and the staff responded in SECY-97-273," Staff Requirements - SECY-96-221 ' improving NRC's Control Over, and Licensees' Accountability for, Generally and Specifically Licensed Devices."' On

. April 13,1998, the Commission issued an SRM on SECY 97-273.

In the SRM on SECY-9M73, the Commission instructed the staff, in part, to continue efforts to further address orphan sources, using the guiding principle that non licensees who find .

themselves to be in possession of radioactive sources that they did not seek to possess should I not be expected or asked to assume responsibility and cost for exercising control or arranging for their disposal. The Commission directed the staff to continue efforts to address orphan l sources; consult with other Federal agencies and the States to define jurisdictions and regulatory responsibilities for addressing the orphan source problem; continue to coordinate with CRCPD to ensure that a similar regulatory framework is applied to sources / devices containing Atomic Energy Act (AEA) material and sources / devices containing Naturally -

occurring or Accelerator-produce Radioactive Material (NARM); aggressively pursue finalizing the MOU with DOE; and consider the pros and cons of establishing a contract program for orphan sources, and provide an estimate of the costs of such a program. Each of these areas of the SRM is addressed, in sequence, in the following discussion. Other areas of the SRM, involving the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) general license program, are the subject of separate staff actions and are not addressed here.

1 DISCUSSION:

S.taff efforts to further address orohan sources -

The staff is actively pursuing efforts to address the issue of orphan sources, consistent with Commission direction. These efforts have included: staff participation in five faderal and state interagency meetings which included representatives of the metal recycling and mariufacturing

' industries; staff presentations at a workshop and a seminar, conceming effore to improve detection of radioactive materials in the metal recycling and manufacturing industries; interaction with DOE on a pilot program to recover and recycle certain Greater Than-Class C 4 (GTCC) materials; responses to two requests from Agreement States for DOE emergency acceptance of GTCC orphan sources; and incident response efforts on a number of orphan source and contaminated metal incidents, including several incidents that involved other Federal apncies and States. Attachment 2 contains more specific information concerning these efforts. The staff pians to continue outreach efforts with industry and stakeholders.

Consult with Federal Aaencies and States to define iurisdictions and reau'atory resoonsibilities The staff met with and/or discussed the roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions of DOE; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), regarding orphan source issues, with representatives from each of these Federal agencies. The staff also addressed the same issues with State representatives through CRCPD. In addition, the staff researched and consulted available documentation, such as the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) and the National Contingency Plan (NCP), conceming each agency's role in responding to orphan source incidents. The

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The Commissioners ' discussion in this paper and the attachments have not been reviewed, approved, or sanctioned by the applicable agencies. Attachment 3 provides the NRC staff's characterization of the i

roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions of Federal agencies and States for addressing orphan l sources, based on available information and the views expressed by the different agency j representatives.

i The issues of regulatory responsibilities and jurisdictions of Federal agencies and States in addressing orphan source problems have been complex, and there is overlap between the cognizant organizations. Regulatory responsibilities and jurisdictions are particularly difficult to ciarify, because of the many different types of sources and situations that may be associated with orphan source incidents. The numerous Federal, State, and local organizations having l responsibilities in this area have a variety of capabilities, as well as differing perceptions of each organization's roles and responsibilities, even within their own organizations. All 50 States, and no less than 11 Federal agencies (primarily NRC, DOE, EPA, FEMA, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Department of Transportation, and secondarily, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the U.S. Customs Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security j

.. Agency, and the U.S. Department of State) have responsibility for or jurisdiction over l addressing different aspects of the orphan source problem.

l Development and implementation of the FRERP and coordination work over the past several years between CRCPD, Federal agencies, and States have helped to clarify roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions on orphan source incidents, especially conceming the authorities governed by the NCP. Although these efforts have been ongoing for a number of years, significant improvement in this area has been seen over the last few years. To provide a more consistent national approach to orphan source incidents, further efforts are needed.

Several mechanisms may be utilized to continue this work, including: working directly and ,

separately with each agency, possibly resulting in additional MOU's, similar to the DOE MOU, concerning orphan sources; requesting the CRCPD E-34 Committee on Unwanted Radioactive Material (the E-34 Committee) to expand its charter to fully address this issue; initiating a .

working group of representatives of the applicable Federal agencies, and one or more State l

representatives, to provide a consensus position on this issue; as a member of the NCP National Response Team (NRT), request guidance and clarification on this matter from the NRT in accordance with the provielons of the NCP; request FEMA, through the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC), to develop a consensus position on this issue, and consider training pograms and exercises conducted through the FRPCC Training Subcommittee; and supporting and participating in additional lost source exercises.

Obtaining a national consensus posPJon on roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions will likely require a combination of these approaches. The staff plans to continue exploration of these mechanisms.

Coordination with CRCPD in late Calendar Year (CY) 1997, EPA provided funding to the CRCPD for initiation of a committee - the E-34 Committee - whose charter is to prepare a national program for addressing and responding to unwanted radioactive material. The staff has coordinated with CRCPD, through the E-34 Committee, consistent with Commission direction to ensure that a 4,imilar regulatory framework is applied to both AEA and NARM sources / devices The E 34 Committee includes advisory members from NRC, EPA, and DOE. The E-34 Committee's

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The Commissioners -4 activities have included: defining the problem; determining the part of the problem that the E-34 Committee's program would address; identifying the essential elements of an orphan source program; surveying regulatory agencies, discussiia the issue with stakeholders, and developing criteria for acceptance of radioactive materials into the program, to determine and bound the scope of the problem; requesting NRC assistance to use the Nuclear Material Event Database (NMED) for tracking orphan sources; and discussing the need for clarification of the roles and responsibilities of State and Federal agencies for addressing the orphan source issue, and coordinating these roles for a consistent approach.

The E-34 Committee plans to continue development of the program and initiate a pilot orphan source acceptance program in CY 1999. If the pilot program is successful, it may serve as a template for State and Federal agencies to respond to unwanted radioactive materials. Issues regarding EPA's funding of the program development, funding of the final E-34 orphan source acceptance program, cooperative agreements between States, application of a similar i regulatory framework between AEA orphan sources and NARM orphan sources, and the use of NMED to track orphan sources, are discussed in more detail in Attachment 4. To date, the staff I has found participation on the E-34 Committee to be a valuable mechanism for interacting with other organizations on the orphan source problem and for developing a potential solution to the orphan source problem.

Efforts to finalize the MOU with DOE '

The Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) staff worked closely with the NRC's Office of the General Counsa. (OGC) and DOE Office of Waste Management to redraft the MOU on management of sealed e,ources, in an attempt to address concerns expressed by DOE's OGC with the original 1995 draft MOU. In addition, NRC staff informed DOE about the Commission's directa in the SRM on SECY-97-273, to aggressively pursue finalization of the MOU. DOE Office of Waste Management staff agreed, in principle, to assist in this effort, and on December 18,1998, DOE management signed the MOU and retumed it to NRC in a letter of the same date. The signed MOU is being provided to the Comminion, for approval, as Attachment 5. NMSS has coordinated with OGC on the final version of the MOU, and OGC has no legal obbction to NMSS signing and issuing the MOU. Upon Commission approval, the staff is prepared to sign the MOU.

Ootions reaardina an orphan source contract orocram In considering the pros and cons of establishing an orphan source contract program that would i enable licensees or DOE to take possession of, and arrange for proper transfer or disposal of, orphan sources, the staff evaluated: the required capabilities of such a contractor and the bounds of such a contract; whether NRC has the legal authority to issue such a contract; factors that would limit such a contract; contract attematives; and the positive and negative attributes of such a contract. The steps the staff took to consider the pros and cons of 4 establishing an orphan source contract, and an analysis of the legal and contractual complexities of such a program, are discussed in detail in Attachments 6, 7, and 8.

4 O t.

The Commissioners - As shown in the analysis in Attachment 6, the staff identified four principal options for an orphan source contract:

1. NRC establishes an orphan source contract program, with a cornmercial firm or firms, for AEA material only.

2. NRC funds CRCPD to establish, implement, and manage a national orphan source program, once the E-34 Committee's pilot program is complete (- mid CY 20C0). NRC funding would be commensurate with the proportion of NRC licensees to all US licensees, and would be limited to only those efforts associated with AEA material.

3. NRC neither establishes nor funds an orphan source contract or program, but continues to work with the E-34 Committee, to develop a national orphan source program (the E-34 Committee's program would require funding from sources other than NRC).

4. A combination of Options 1 and 2. The combination would allow NRC to issue an orphan source contract while the E-34 Committee is continuing work on its national program, then end the contract and fund the E-34 Committee's -

program, once its development is complete.

The staff identified a number of pros and cons for each of the options (see Attachment 6).

Based on the pros and cons and an analysis of the legal and contractual complexities of establishing an orphan source contract, the staff recommends that the Commission proceed i with Option 2 (fund the E-34 Committee's program) as the preferred alternative. The staff 6xpects that the E-34 Committee's program will contain the essential elements that NRC would require of an orphan source contract, or more, and funding the E 34 Committee's program presents several clear advantages over other options. For instance, the E-34 Committee's program would offer a seamless framework for both NARM and AEA orphan sources; minimize many legal uncertainties and potential conflicts of interest that an NRC contract would face; cover all States and jurisdictions; require fewer NRC full time equivalent position resources; and promote inter-agency and Federal / State cooperation on the orphan source problem.

Estimate the costs of an orohan source contract oroaram The annual frequency of orphan source incidents, which is a dominant factor in the cost of an orphan source contract, is not known for a variety of reasons, as discussed in Attachment 9.

Therefore, it is difficult to accurately estimate the costs of the orphan source contract options discussed in this paper. The staff has been able to providu a rough estimate for an orphan source contract, based on current information and discussions with waste brokers and waste handlers, with the assumption that the contract covers only AEA ephan source material in non-Agreement States. The staff's estimate of the annual cost of an orphan source program is only a rough approximation, and actual costs would be highly dependent on a number of variables.

The staff's estimated costs for NRC funding the E-34 Committee's program implementation and continuation, with the assumptions that NRC's funding covers only AEA material and NRC shares the costs of the program proportionally with the Agreement States, results in an expectation of the same approximate costs. Estimates for the costs of funding the E-34

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O The Commissioners 6-CommRtee's program should be better defined after the pilot program. The staff's estimate is that either option (an NRC contract program or NRC funding of the E-34 Committee's program) would cost epproximately $450,000 per year. Actual costs would likely vary from year to year, possibly by as much as a couple hundred thousand dollars. More detail on these estimates, and the bases for the costs, are provided in Attachment 9.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The Commission approve the staff's plans to sign the MOU with DOE on management of sealed sources.

2. The Commission proceed with Option 2 as the preferred alternative for an orphan source contract. If approved, the staff will provide the Commission with the status of the E 34 Committee's program development, and the E-34 Committee's cost estimates for the program, by mid-CY 2000. Funding for this option should not be required until the E-34 Committee's program is fully developed (FY 2001), and could be addressed during the current, ongoing budget formulation cycle for the FY 2001 budget.

RESOURCES:

The resources in NMSS' budget are sufficient to support Recommendation 1. Although resources to implement Recommendation 2 have not been budgeted, if the Commission directs the staff to pursue any type of contract option that requires funding, NMSS will address the funding requirements in the next budget formulation cycle. Following initialimplementation of a program, staff would use its experience to further refine cost estimates for future budget cycles.

COORDINATION:

OGC has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. The Office of the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this Commission paper for resource implications and has no objections, f

A) b M ^ -a William D. Travers Executive Director for Operations Attachments:

1. SRM on SECY-97-273, dtd 4/13/98

2. Staff Efforts to Further Address Orphan Sources

3. Jurisdictions and Regulatory Responsibilities

4. Coordination with CRCPD

5. Letter transmi* ting signed MOU with DOE.

6. Pros and Cons of a Contract Program

7. Gources Sought Synopsis

8. Request for Legal Advice on a Contract Program

9. Cost Estimates for Contract Options

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Commissioners' completed vote sheets / comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Monday. February 22.1999.

Commission staff office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT February 12.1999. with an information copy to SECY. If the paper is of such a nature that it ,

requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be I apprised of when comments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION:

Commissioners OGC OCAA OlG OPA OCA CIO I

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i REGIONS SECY l

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l ATTACHMENT 1 SRM ON SECY-97-273 DATED APRIL 13,1998 4

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,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. O C. 20555-0001 0

• '* Cys: Callan April 13, 1998 Thadani

%<;3 + * . . . j[ Thompson OFFICE OF THE orry SECRETARY Blaha Martin, AE0D Knapp, RES Lubinski, NMSS MEMORANDUM TO: L. Joseph Callan Executive Director for Operations Jesse L. Funches Chief Financial Officer William M. Beecher, Director Office of Public Affairs-i m.,W.  ; ya , 7;N FROM: %nnette L. Vietti-Cook, Acting Secretary

SUBJECT:

STAFF REQUIREMENTS - SECY-97-273 - STAFF REQUIREMENTS - SECY-96-221 - "lMPROVING NRC'S CONTROL OVER, AND LICENSEES' ACCOUNTABILITY FOR, i GENERALLY AND SPECIFICALLY LICENSED DEVICES" The Commission had disapproved the staffs recommendation and directs the staff take the following actions:

• 8900090 and 9000192 (NMSS)

1. Terminate the rulemaking on 10 CFR Part 31.5*that was initiated in 1991 except those provisions that will enable NRC to request information from certain general licensees to l provide the regulatory basis for initiation of a registration program in advance of the l rulemaking described below. Those portions of the 1991 proposed rule should be renoticed for public comment.

! @O) (NMSS) (SECY Suspense: 8b2 W98) 9800070 l 8/14/98

2. Provide a set of milestones to the Commission for information for implementing the rulemaking described below. The milestones should be in lieu of the standard rulemaking plan required by Management Directive 6.3, but should meet the requirement for coordination with Agreement States.

(500) (NMSS) (SECY Suspense: 84W98) 9800071 8/14/98 SECY NOTE: SECY-97-273 WAS RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC ON DECEMBER 2,1997.

THIS SRM AND THE COMMISSION VOTING RECORD CONTAINING THE VOTE SHEETS OF ALL COMMISSIONERS WILL BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE 5 WORKING DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS SRM.

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3. Draft a proposed rule to implement a registration and follow up program for the generally licensed sources / devices identified by the NRC Agreement State Working Group, apply fees to these general licensees, and incorporate requirements for i permanent labeling of sources / devices. The proposed rule should include the staffs preferred approach -- Attachment item 11, Option 3 -- to apply a registration fee, per licensee, at the time of initial registration and annual re-registration of sources / devices. l The staff should explore the possibilities, advantages, and disadvantages of other fee I approaches such as pro-rating the fees, e.g., per device (fixed or sliding scale) or per licens6 and provide recommendations to the Commission. Detennine the extent to which application of the small business rule will affect the fees.

(EBO/CFO) (SECY Suspense: 42/31/08) 9800071 NMSS 12/24/98

4. Use the results of the materials risk assessment study to restructure the current licensing and materials programs. Consider the findings when determining whether additional sources / devices should be subject to registration and follow up, and for performing the risk ranking necessary if a phase-in approach is used to reduce the initial resource surge associated with an increa3cd regulttory program. Review the basis of j the generallicenses for adequacy with respect to consideration of the consequences of l

off-site accidents, such as loss of shielding or melting in metal making furnaces. The staff should provide the technical basis document for the risk assessment together with l recommendations on how to proceed. l (E90) (NMSS) (SECY Suspense: -12/31/98) 9800090 l 12/24/98 l

5. Include provisions in the registration program for follow up of cases where there are no l responses or where discrepancies are found between responses and NRC records.

Explore with ve dors their willingness to voluntarily assist the NRC (and Agreement States) in the follow up effort. Develop follow up procedures which integrate the j following fundamental concepts-

a. the extent of follow up should consider the risk to public health and safety that the source or device in question poses as well as the likelihood of finding the device;

b. considering the associated level of r;sk, there should be a point at which the follow up of certain low risk sources and devices is terminated; i l

c. all information about lost sources should be made public in a timely manner.

I (EDO) (NMSS) (SECY Suspense: concurrent with effective date 9800071 for final rule)

6. Implement an enforcement program that includes a short amnesty program for general licensees and increased civil penalties for both general and specific licensees for " lost" sources. The increased civil penalties should be significantly greater than the costs of proper disposal or transfer of a source or device. Work with Agreement States in

e implementing enforcement programs such that their policies, practices, and procedures have the same impact as NRC's enforcement program.

(E90) (NMSS/0E/SP) (SECY Suspense: concurrent with effective date 9800071 for final rule)

7. Provide an estimate of the resources needed to fully support this program. Preparation of this estimate should include:

o Estimating resource needs for the various phases of the registration program including, in particular, the substantial" spike

• of resources needed to carry out the follow up program.

o Reviewing registration programs for general licensees that have been implemented by Agreement States for applicability of concepts, and exploring the possibility of utilizing other Federal agency registration programs and off-the-shelf commercial programs to minimize development and operating costs.

o ExplNing the possibility of contracting with the States to carry out this part of the .

4 program under authority of Section 274i of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended.

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o identifying, through the Executive Council, resources to support the expanded program, and inform the Commission if other program areas need to be reduced.

The Executive Council should consider program areas outside of NMSS. The Executive Council should also evaluate and inform the Commission of the impact of this change on the Strategic Plan, Strategic Goals, and specific programs.

(EGO) (NMSS/CF0) (SECY Suspense: 12/W98) -9800091 l 12/24/98

8. Continue efforts to further address the orphan sources. A guiding principle is that non-licensees who find themselves to be in possession of radioactive sources that they did not seek to possess should not be expected or asked to assume responsibility and cost for exercising control or arranging for their disposal. These efforts should include:  ;

o Consulting with DOE, EPA, FEMA and the States to define juridictions and regulatory responsibilities for addressing the orphan source problem, and continued close coordination with the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors to ensure that a similar regulatory framework is applied to source / devices containing Atomic Energy Act (AEA) matenal and sources / devices centaining naturally occurring or accelerator produced radioactive material.

o The staff should aggressively pursue finalizing the MOU with DOE.

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o Consider the pros and cons of establishing a contract program that would enable licensees or DOE to take possession of and arrange for proper transfer or disposal of orphan sources and provide an estimate of the costs of such a j program.

(EOG) (NMSS) (SECY Suspense: 12/3898) 9800092 12/24/98 o if NRC funding is necessary for an orphan source recovery program, the staff should provide recommendations for funding the program including, as directed by the Commission in its December 1996 SRM, " exploring with Congress the j possibility of removing specific program costs from the NRC's user fee base (e.g., orphan source recovery fund)."

(CFO) (SECY Suspense: 12/31/98)

The Office of Public Affairs should issue a press release concerning the Commission's decision.

(OPA) (SECY Suspense: 4/15/98) l Chairman Jackson Commissioner Dicus Commissioner Diaz Commissioner McGaffigan l OGC CIO CFO OCA OlG Office Directors, Regions, ACRS, ACNW, ASLBP (via E-Mail)

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CONTINUED STAFF EFFORTS TO FURTHER ADDRESS ORPHAN SOURCES l

1. COMMISSION DIRECTION in the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) on SECY-97-273, the Commission instructed the staff to," Continue efforts to further address the orphan sources. A guiding principle is that non-licensees who find themselves to be in possession of radioactive sources that they did not seek to possess should not be expected or asked to assume responsibility and cost for exercising contro! or arranging for their disposal."

2. DEFINITION OF ORPHAN SOURCE Before describing the staff's efforts with " orphan sources,"it is important to define the term. A key concept in addressing the orphan source issue is answering the question: "What is cn i orphan source?" The answer is non-trivial. The answer bounds the extent of the orphan source problem. For instance, if the orphan source definition is considered to include unsealed  !

material of any form, then very large volumes of contaminated soil or building materials might i be considered to fit into the definition. This would result in a broad interpretation of the extent  !

of the orphan source problem, requiring massive funding to address the problem. Conversely, l if the orphan source definition is limited to just sealed sources, then small areas of j volumetrically contaminated metals might not be considered to lit into the definition. Small i amounts of material contaminated by a leaking sealed source also might not be considered to .

fit into the definition, although the leaking sealed source itself might fit the definition. This would result in a narrow interpretation of the extent of the orphan source problem, leading to an I underestimate of the funding needed to address the problem.

The term " orphan source" may be, and has been, used to describe a variety of types and forms )

of radioactive materials in a multitude of conditions, for which there is no viable responsible party to provide for an appropriate disposition of the material. However, the generally accepted definition of an orphan source is radioactive material in discrete form (i.e., contained within a ,

small volume such as a sealed source, activated metal, or materials encapsulated in similar '

small containers), containing either material covered by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as  ;

amended, or naturally occurring or accelerator-produced radioactive material that is in any one l or more of the following conditions:

In an uncontrolled condition that requires removal to protect the public health and safety from a radiological threat;

• Controlled or uncontrolled, but for which a responsible party cannot be readily identified;

. Controlled, but for which the continued security of the material cannot be assured and, if in the possession of a licensee, the licensee has little or no options for, or is incapable of providing for, the disposition of the material; 3

. In the possession of a person, not licensed to possess the material, who did not seek to  ;

possess the material; or l l

I Attachment 2  !

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4 In the possession of a State radiological protection program (either Agreement State or non-Agreement State) for the sole purpose of mitigating a radiological threat because of one of the above conditions, and for which the State does not have a means to provide  ;

for the appropriate disposition of the material.

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- The staff applies this definition of " orphan sources"in addressing orphan source issues.

Although imperfect, this definition contains the extent of the orphan source problem to realistic, manageable levels.

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3. CONTINUED STAFF EFFORTS TO FURTHER ADDRESS ORPHAN SOURCES In addition to the specific activities listed in the SRM on SECY-97-273, the staff has continued a number of efforts to further address the orphan source issue. These staff efforts have included the following:

A. Working with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to identify and remove (or schedule for removal) 57 americium 241: beryllium (AmBe) orphan sources, located in both Agreement and non-Agreement States, that are Greater-Than-Class-C (GTCC), in accordance with the waste classification in 10 CFR Section 61.65. In a letter dated September 5,1996, DOE indicated that it intended to implement a pilot program to -

recycle AmBe sources, in subsequent discussions, DOE staff requested that the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the States identify up to 40 potential candidates for the pilot program. Based on information provided by the NRC regional offices and the States, the staff identified and prioritized 57 sources. The staff l requested that the sources be accepted into DOE's pilot program, in letters to DOE sent between August 1997 and September 1998. DOE accepted all but one of the NRC. j identified candidates into the program and expanded the pilot by an additional 16 I sources, to 56 total sources. (The one candidate source not accepted had other i available disposition options.) To date,15 of the 57 sources have been received by DOE, with the remaining to be scheduled in early Calendar Year 1999. The staff will l continue working with DOE in an effort to establish routine acceptance of AmBe sources, as well as to expand DOE's recycling program to include other GTCC sealed j sources, such as plutonium-238 (Pu23), l B. Responding to two requests from Agreement States for DOE assistance in situations l involving GTCC material that was causi1g, or had a potential to cause, a threat to the l public health and safety. Theos requeses concerned a 213.5-Gigabecquerel (5.77-curie) i Pu ":Be sealed source used in a "neutrca howitzer," and a pacemaker containing a 0.08-gram Pu2 " sealed source. -

C. Working with industry (primarily the metal recycling and manufacturing industries) to  ;

address issues concerning the identification and proper disposition of orphan sources, l including:

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. Participation in a meeting, in April 1998, between NRC; DOE; the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); members of the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors E-34 Committee on Unwanted Radioactive Material (the E-34 Committee); and representatives of the institute of Scrap l Recycling Industries (ISRI); the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI); the 2 1 1

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Steel Manufacturer's Association (SMA); and the Specialty Steel Industry of i North America, to introduce these stakeholders to the E 34 Committee's initiative, and to provide the stakeholders with an opportunity to identify areas of concern that need to be addressed by the E-34 Committee. ,

I Participation in a meeting, in July 1998, between the DOE National Center of t Excellence for Metals Recycle, ISRI, and AISI, where EPA and NRC discussed i current activities, within their agencies, concerning the recycling of and clearance l levels for metals and orphan sources.

l Participation in a " Workshop on the Detection of Radioisotopes in Steel Scrap," 1 in June 1998, that focused on identifying means to better detect radioactive l material in the steel manufacturing and scrap recycling process. - The workshop 1 was sponsored by DOE's Office of industrial Technology, which requested NRC to make a presentation concerning NRC's current efforts to better ensure the ,

control and accountability of material and to address the orphan source issue. j Representatives of the steelindustry, including ISRI, AISI, and SMA attended  ;

this workshop, j l

Participation in a June 1998, ISRI seminar, on " Radioactivity in the Scrap l Recycling Process," that addressed how radioactive material enters the scrap j recycling process, means to prevent this from occurring, ways to detect i radioactive material in the scrap recycling process, and how to handle found material. NRC was requested to make a presentation on assistance in the identification of radioactive materials in the scrap recycling process. This presentation included a discussion of identifying markings on sources and l

' devices; typical shapes and sizes of various types of sources and devices;  !

industries in which sources and devices are typically used; common isotopes and I activities found in sources or devices; and points, during the life cycle of a source or device, when the potential for identification could be increased.

Workshop participants and attendees included a number of representatives of the steel recycling industry; other govemmental agencies (EPA, DOE, and the States); health physics consultants; and radiation detection equipment l manufacturers, j

• Participation in a December 1998, meeting, with the U.S. Department of State (DOS), concerning the creation of an International Radioactive Source Management (IRSM) initiative. The DOS is leading the IRSM initiative in response to international requests for assistance in the areas of orphan source j management, and clearance levels for metals. The IRSM initiative is intended, in j part, to develop a program for the prevention, identification, tracking, response, '

and remediation of radioactive materials being illegally imported and exported to  !

and from nation-states, including the United States. NRC presentations I concentrated on past initiatives in this area and current activities, including j rulemakings on control and accountability of generally licensed devices, and  !

clearance levels for certain materials. NRC presenters also discussed the staff's l work on orphan sources issues and recycling of contaminated materials. Other l participants and attendees included EPA, DOE, the U.S. Department of j

' Transportation, the U.S. Customs Service, ISRI, AIS!, SMA, radiation detection i 3

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l' equipment manufacturers, staff representatives from the House of l Representatives and the Senate Sub-committee on intelligence, and l representatives of other government agencies.

i D. Responding to a number of orphan source incioents, including incidents involving orphan sources that were melted at steel mills and uniformly distributed in steel  ;

products, and working with EPA, States, NRC's Office of International Programs, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to address policy issues concerning the licensing of products manufactured using the contaminated steel, attempting to recover stolen or j lost radioactive material, and locating responsible parties  :

1 The staff recommends continuing outreach efforts wi$ industry and stakeholders. These efforts will provide assistance to stakeholders in identnying orphan sources before they are shredded or melted; obtain information about the concerns and needs of the scrap recycling j and metal manufacturing industries in the areas of orphan sources and clearance levels; identify and include other stakeholders; continue identifying other related orphan source areas 4 that should to be addressed by NRC; and keep stakeholders informed of the status of NRC's  !

other efforts in the orphan source area. I i

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JURISDICTIONS AND REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL AGENCIES AND STATES IN ADDRESSING ORPHAN SOURCES

1. BACKGROUND The issues of regulatory responsibilities and jurisdictions of the various Federal agencies and States in addressing orphan source issues have been complex, leading to overlap and potential I gaps between the cognizant organizations. Roles, regulatory responsibilities, and jurisdictions of the organizations are particularly difficult to clarify, for a number of reasons. Orphan source incidents are inherently different, variable, and unplanned; a large number of Federal, State, and local agencies and organizations have responsibilities for different portions of orphan source incidents; and individual agencies may have different roles, or perceptions of roles, within their own staffs, at different locations.

The variability in orphan source incidents is tremendous. For instance, an incident may involve a fore'gn radioactive source imported into the United States, or a domestic orphan source. An incident could involve Naturally occurring or Accelerator-produce Rad;oactive Material (NARM),

or material covered under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA). An incident could result from an accident or intentional misconduct, in which case law enforcement agencies could be involved. An incident could occur either in an Agreement State or a non-Agreement State. Responders may have the capability to immediately mitigate any public health hazards, or they may ask for State or Federal assistance. Responders may have the authority and facilities to take and store the orphan source, or they may not. An incident could lead to minimal hazards, or to widespread contamination. An incident could even potentially involve domestic or international terrorism, in which case the Nation's intelligence agencies could become involved. All 50 States, and no less than 11 Federal agencies (primarily the U.S.  !

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),

and the U.S. Department of Transportation, and secondarily the U.S. Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Customs Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the U.S. Department of State) have some responsibility or jurisdiction for addressing the orphan cource issue.

2. THE STAFF'S APPROACH TO DEFINING JURISDICTIONS AND REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES To define jurisdictions and regulatory responsibilities for addressing the orphan source problem, the staff first researched and reviewed available gu: dance documentation for the Federal agencies on orphan source and similar incidents, including the following documents:

. The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Pltn (FRERP);

. The National Contingency Plan (NCP), formally known as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan;

. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as amended (CERCLA);

. NRC's Response Coordination Manual 1996 (RCM-96, NUREG/BR 0230);

. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; Attachment 3

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The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; The Department of Energy Organization Act; DOE Orders and guidance documents; Title 10 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 835 (DOE's regulations concerning the management of sealed sources, amended December 4,1998);

The draft NRC/ DOE Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning the management of sealed sources; and Other statements of purpose and responsibility found in agency brochuros and Internet web pages.

Of these documents, the most significant for the overall coordination of an orphan source incident response would be likely the FRERP, because this plan is specifically designed for radiological emergencies where there would be a coordinated response involving both State and Federal resources. This plan does not grant authorities, but only delineates the process and procedure for coordinating the Federal response to a radiological emergency. In addition, the most significant document regarding the authorities granted to Federal agencies for the response to a radiological release (such as an orphan source), whether the rebase constitutes  !

an emergency or not, would be the NCP as this plan specifically indicates the actions that Federal agencies may take in situations involving the release of radioactive material that require a Federal response.

Based on the documents described above, past orphan source incidents, a Lost Source Exercise conducted in September and October of 1997, and the report summarizing this exercise, the staff compiled a listing of the various roles, responsibilities, and tasks that could l be required for addressing orphan source issues. Examples of areas included in this listing l include prevention of orphan sources, response to both lost and found sources, enforcement,  ;

remediation, and investigation into orphan source incidents. To address the issue of Federal l responsibilities and jurisdictions, the staff discussed the listing with representatives of DOE, i EPA, and FEMA. The staff held discussions with representatives of DOE's Office of l Environmental Management and EPA's Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA) in September {

and October 1998, respectively, where NRC staff presented the listing to the other agencies, j and asked each representative to identify which roles, responsibilities, and tasks fell within its i agency's responsibility or jurisdiction. Each agency provided a response to the NRC staff's ,

request. These issues were also discussed telephonically with a representative from FEMA's Emergency Services Branch (who also had experience and respons!bility in FEMA's Radiological Emergency Preparedness group). To address the issue of State responsibilities, the staff provided the listing to State representatives of the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) E-34 Committee on Unwanted Radioactive Material (E-34 Committee) and discussed' State responsibilities during a committee meeting on October 1416, )

1998. In addition, the staff requested each State representative to further review the listing and provide responses,if able to, for both AEA material and NARM. To date, the staff has not yet i received the State responses. However, during the October meeting, it was suggested that this  !

Issue about jurisdictions and regulatory responsibilities could also be raised at the next full l CRCPD meeting, which is planned for mid-1999.

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3. THE FRERP AND THE NCP I The scope of the FRERP covers "...any peacetime radiological emergency that has actual, potential, or perceived radiological consequences in the United States, its Territories, possessions, or territorial waters and that could require a response by the Federal 2

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REl. EASED TO THE PDR 5

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........a POLICY ISSUE Februarv 3.1999 (Notation Vote)

SECY-99-038 FOR: The Commissioners FROM: William D. Travers Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

STAFF EFFORTS TO ADDRESS ORPHAN SOURCE ISSUES PURPOSE:

To provide the Commission with information and options on orphan source issues in response to item 8 of the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) (Attachment 1) dated April 13,1998, on SECY-97-273, improving the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Control Over, and Licensees' Accountability for, Generally and Specifically Licensed Devices."

SUMMARY

This paper describes the staff's efforts to address orphan scurce issues since April 1998, when the SRM on SECY-97-273 was issued. These efforts have included presentations and coordination with stakeholders on the orphan source problem; consultation with Federal agencies and States on jurisdictions and regulatory responsibilities for addressing the orphan source problem; continued close coordination with the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) through a committee addressing orphan source issues; and coordination with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), to finalize a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on management of sealed sources. This paper also presents options for establishing an orphan source contract, provides pros and cons for the different contract options, and gives an estimate of the cost of establishing such a contract.

CONTACT: Douglas A. Broaddus, NMSS/lMNS (301) 415-5847

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9905200115 PDR SECY 990203

• 99-038 R PDR l

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<- j The Commissioners l BACKGROUND:

On December 31,1996, the Commission issued an SRM on SECY 96-221, and the staff responded in SECY-97-273," Staff Requirements -- SECY-96-221 - ' improving NRC's Control Over, and Licensees' Accountability for, Generally and Specifically Licensed Devices.'" On April 13,1998, the Commission issued an SRM on SECY-97-273.

In the SRM on SECY-97-273, the Commission instructed the staff, in part, to continue efforts to further address orphan sources, using the guiding principle that non-licensees who find themselves to be in possession of radioactive sources that they did not seek to possess should not be expected or asked to assume responsibility and cost for exercising control or arranging for their disposal. The Commission directed the staff to continue efforts to address orphan sources; consult with other Federal agencies and the States to define jurisdictions and regulatory responsibilities for addressing the orphan source problem; continue to coordinate ,

with CRCPD to ensure that a similar regulatory framework is applied to sources / devices containing Atomic Energy Act (AEA) material and sources / devices containing Natura'ly occurring or Accelerator-produce Radioactive Material (NARM); aggressively pursue finalizing the MOU with DOE; and consider the pros and cons of establishing a contract program for orphan sources, and provide an estimate of the costs of such a program. Each of these areas of the SRM is addressed, in sequence, in the following discussion. Other areas of the SRM, involving the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) general license program, are the subject of separate staff actions and are not addressed here.

DISCUSSION:

Staff efforts to further address orohan sources The staff is actively pursuing efforts to address the issue of orphan sources, consistent with Commission direction. These efforts have included: staff participation in five federal and state interagency meetings which included representatives of the metal recyciing and manufacturing industries; staff presentations at a workshop and a seminar, conceming efforts to improve R detection of radioactive materials in the metal recycling and manufacturing industries; interaction with DOE on a pilot program to recover and recycle certain Greater-Than-Class-C (GTCC) materials; responses to two requests from Agreement States for DOE emergency acceptance of GTCC orphan sources; and incident response efforts on a number of orphan source and contaminated metal incidents, including several incidents that involved other

- Federal agencies and States. Attachment 2 contains more specific information concerning these efforts. The staff plans to continue outreach efforts with industry and stakeholders.

Consult with Federal Aoencies and States to define iurisdictions and reoulatory responsibilities The staff met with and/or discussed the roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions of DOE; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), regarding orphan source issues, with representatives from each of these Federal agencies. The staff also addressed the same issues with State representatives through CRCPD. In addition, the staff researched and consulted available documentation, such as the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) and the National Contingency

. Plan (NCP), concoming each agency's role in responding to orphan source incidents. The

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The Commissioners discussion in this paper and the attachments have not been reviewed, approved, or sanctioned by the applicable agencies. Attachment 3 provides the NRC staff's characterization of the roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions of Federal agencies and States for addressing orphan sources, based on available information and the views expressed by the different agency representatives.

The issues of regulatory responsibilities and jurisdictions of Federal agencies and States in addressing orphan source problems have been complex, and there is overlap between the cognizant organizations. Regulatory responsibilities and jurisdictions are particularly difficult to ]

clarify, because of the many different types of sources and situations that may be associated with orphan source incidents. The numerous Federal, State, and local organizations having responsibilities in this area have a variety of capabilities, as well as differing perceptions of each j organization's roles and responsibilities, even within their own organizations. All 50 States, and no less than 11 Federal agencies (primarily NRC, DOE, EPA, FEMA, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Department of Transportation, and secondarily, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the U.S. Customs Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security

. Agency, and the U.S. Department of State) have responsibility for or jurisdiction over addressing different aspects of the orphan source problem.

Development and implementation of the FRERP and coordination work over the past several years between CRCPD, Federal agencies, and States have helped to clarify roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions on orphan source incidents, especially concerning the authorities governed by the NCP. Although these efforts have been ongoing for a number of years, significant improvement in this area has been seen over the last few years. To provide a

. more consistent national approach to orphan source incidents, further efforts are needed. {

Several mechanisms may be utilized to continue this work, including: working directly and '

separately with each agency, possibly resulting in additional MOU's, similar to the DOE MOU, concerning orphan sources; requesting the CRCPD E-34 Committee on Unwanted Radioactive Material (the E-34 Committee) to expand its charter to fully address this issue; initiating a working group of representatives of the applicable Federal agencies, and one or more State representatives, to provide a consensus position on this issue; as a member of the NCP National Response Team (NRT), request guidance and clarification on this matter from the NRT in accordance with the provisions of the NCP; request FEMA, through the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC), to develop a consensus position on this issue, and consider training programs and exercises conducted through the FRPCC Training Subcommittee; and supporting and participating in additional lost source exercises.

Obtaining a national consensus position on roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions will likely ,

require a combination of these approaches. The staff plans to continue exploration of these mechanisms.

Coordination with CRCPD in late Calendar Year (CY) 1997, EPA provided funding to the CRCPD for initiation of a committee - the E-34 Committee - whose charter is to prepare a national program for addressing and responding to unwanted radioactive material. The staff has coordinated with CRCPD, through the E-34 Committee, consistent with Commission direction to ensure that a similar regulatory framework is applied to both AEA and NARM sources / devices. The E-34 Committee includes advisory members from NRC, EPA, and DOE. The E-34 Committee's

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o The Commissioners l activities have included: defining the problem; determining the part of the problem that the E-34 Committee's program would address; identifying the essential elements of an orphan source program; surveying regulatory agencies, discussing the issue with stakeholders, and developing criteria for acceptance of radioactive materials into the program, to determine and bound the scope of the problem; requesting NRC assistance to use the Nuclear Material Event Database (NMED) for tracking orphan sources; and discussing the need for clarification of the roles and responsibilities of State and Federal agencies for addressing the orphan source issue, and coordinating these roles for a consistent approach.

The E-34 Committee plans to continue development of the program and initiate a pilot orphan source acceptance program in CY 1999. If the pilot program is successful, it may serve as a template for State and Federal agencies to respond to unwanted radioactive materials. Issues i regarding EPA's funding of the program development, funding of the final E-34 orphan source acceptance program, cooperative agreements between States, application of a similar l

regulatory framework between AEA orphan sources and NARM orphan sources, and the use of NMED to track orphan sources, are discussed in more detail in Attachment 4. To date, the staff l has found participation on the E-34 Committee to be a valuable mechanism for interacting with l other organizations on the orphan source problem and for developing a potential solution to the orphan source problem. l Efforts to finalize the MOU with QQE The Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) staff worked closely with the NRC's Office of the General Counsel (OGC) and DOE Office of Waste Management to redraft l the MOU on management of sealed sources, in an attempt to address concerns expressed by DOE's OGC with the original 1995 draft MOU. In addition, NRC staff informed DOE about the Commission's direction in the SRM on SECY-97-273, to aggressively pursue finalization of the MOU. DOE Office of Waste Management staff agreed, in principle, to assist in this effort, and on December 18,1998, DOE management signed the MOU and retumed it to NRC in a letter of the same date. The signed MOU is being provided to the Commission, for approval, as Attachment 5. NMSS has coordinated with OGC on the final version of the MOU, and OGC has no legal objection to NMSS signing and issuing the MOU. Upon Commission approval, the staff is prepared to sign the MOU.

Ootions reaardina an orohan source contract oroaram in considering the pros and cons of establishing an orphan source contract program that would enable licensees or DOE to take possession of, and arrange for proper transfer or disposal of, orphan sources, the staff evaluated: the required capabilities of such a contractor and the bounds of such a contract; whether NRC has the legal authority to issue such a contract; factors that would limit such a contract; contract attematives; and the positive and negative attributes of such a contract. The steps the staff took to consider the pros and cons of establishing an orphan source contract, and an analysis of the legal and contractual complexities of such a program, are discussed in detail in Attachments 6,7, and 8.

The Commissioners As shown in the analysis in Attachment 6, the staff identified four principal options for an orphan source contract:

1. NRC establishes an orphan source contract program, with a commercial firm or firms, for AEA material only.

'2. NRC funds CRCPD to establish, implement, and manage a national orphan '

source program, once the E-34 Committee's pilot program is complete (~ mid CY 2000). NRC funding would be commensurate with the proportion of NRC licensees to all US licensees, and would be limited to only those efforts associated with AEA material.

3. NRC neither establishes nor funds an rphan source contract or program, but continues to work with the E-34 Committee, to develop a national orphan source program (the E-34 Committee's program would require funding from sources other than NRC).

4. A combination of Options 1 and 2. The combination would allow NRC to issue an orphan source contract while the E-34 Committee is continuing work on its national program, then end the contract and fund the E-34 Committee's program, once its development is complete.

The staff identified a number of pros and cons for each of the options (see Attachment 6).

Based on the pros and cons and an analysis of the legal and contractual complexities of establishing an orphan source contract, the stcff recommends that the Commission proceed with Option 2 (fund the E-34 Committee's program) as the preferred alternative. The staff expects that the E-34 Committee's program will contain the essential elements that NRC would require of an orphan source contract, or more, and funding the E-34 Committee's program presents several clear advantages over other options. For instance, the E-34 Committee's program would offer a seamless framework for both NARM and AEA orphan sources; minimize many legal uncertainties and potential conflicts of interest that an NRC contract would face; cover all States and jurisdictions; require fewer NRC full-time equivalent position resources; and promote inter-agency and Federal / State cooperation on the orphan source problem.

Estimate the costs of an orohan source contract oroaram The annual frequency of orphan source incidents, which is a dominant factor in the cost of an orphan source contract, is not known for a variety of reasons, as discussed in Attachment 9.

Therefore, it is difficult to accurately estimate the costs of the orphan source contract options discussed in this paper. The staff has been able to provide a rough estimate for an orphan source contract, based on current information and discussions with waste brokers and waste handlers, with the assumption that the contract covers only AEA orphan source material in non-Agreement States. The staff's estimate of the annual cost of an orphan source program is only a rough approximation, and actual costs would be highly dependent on a number of variables.

The staff's estimated costs for NRC funding the E-34 Committee's program implementation and continuation, with the assumptions that NRC's funding covers only AEA material and NRC shares the costs of the program proportionally with the Agreement States, results in an

, expectation of the same approximato costs. Estimates for the costs of funding the E-34 1

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The Commissioners ,

i Committee's program should be better defined after the pilot program. The staff's estimate is that either option (an NRC contract program or NRC funding of the E-34 Committee's program) would cost approximately $450,000 per year. Actual costs would likely vary from year to year, possibly by as much as a couple hundred thousand dollars. More detail on these estimates, 1 and the bases for the costs, are provided in Attachment 9. I RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The Commission approve the staff's plans to sign the MOU with DOE on management of sealed sources.

2. The Commission proceed with Option 2 as the preferred alternative for an orphan source contract. If approved, the staff willprovide the Commission with the status of the E-34 Committee's program development, and the E-34 Committee's cost estimates for the program, by mid-CY 2000. Funding for this option should not be required until the E-34 Committee's program is fully developed (FY 2001), and could be addressed during the current, ongoing budget formulation cycle for the FY 2001 budget.

RESOURCES:

The resources in NMSS' budget are sufficient to support Recommendation 1. Although resources to implement Recommendation 2 have not been budgeted, if the Commission directs the staff to pursue any type of contract option that requires funding, NMSS will address the funding requirements in the next budget formulation cycle. Following initial implementation of a program, staff would use its experience to further refine cost estimates for future budget cycles.

COORDINATION:

l OGC has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. The Office of the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this Commission paper for resource implications and has no objections.

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A)k M^  %

William D. Travers Executive Director for Operations Attachments:

1. SRM on SECY-97-273, dtd 4/13/98

2. Staff Efforts to Further Address Orphan Sources

3. Jurisdictions and Regulatory Responsibilities

4. Coordination with CRCPD

5. Letter transmitting signed MOU with DOE.

6. Pros and Cons of a Contract Program

7. Sources Sought Synopsis

8. Request for Legal Advice on a Contract Program

9. Cost Estimates for Contract Options

7 Commissioners' completed vote sheets / comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Mondav. February 22.1999.

Commission staff office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT February 12.1999. with an information copy to SECY. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be '

apprised of when comments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION:

Commissioners OGC OCAA OlG OPA OCA CIO CFO  ;

i EDO REGIONS SECY j

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ATTACHMENT 1  ;

l SRM ON SECY-97-273 i DATED APRIL 13,1998 m

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Action: (Panaria11n- WU /  !

/  % UNITED STATES

-[ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a  !

es O s* j WASHINGTON. O C- 20555-0001 j o,

'* Cys: Callan April 13, 1998 Thadani g + , , , + j[ Thompson OFFICE oF THE oUy SECRETARY Blaha Martin, AE0D I Knapp, RES MEMORANDUM TO: L. Joseph Callan l

Executive Director for Operations Jesse L. Funches l Chief Financial Officer William M. Beecher, Director Office of Public Affairs-i .-vy,Cd_:. vl; 'Y FROM: %nnette L. Vietti-Cook;y, -L7

, Acting Secretary

SUBJECT:

STAFF REQUIREMENTS - SECY-97-273 - STAFF REQUIREMENTS - SECY-96-221 - "lMPROVING NRC'S CONTROL OVER, AND LICENSEES' ACCOUNTABILITY FOR, GENERALLY AND SPECIFICALLY LICENSED DEVICES" The Commission had disapproved the staff's recommendation and directs the staff take the following actions:

• 8900090 and 9000192 (NMSS)

1. Terminate the rulemaking on 10 CFR Part 31.5*that was initiated in 1991 except those provisions that will enable NRC to request information from certain general licensees to provide the regulatory basis for initiation of a registration program in advance of the ruiemaking described below. Those portions of the 1991 proposed rule should be renoticed for public comment.

(E00) (NMSS) (SECY Suspense: 8h24/98) 9800070 8/14/98

2. Provide a set of milestones to the Commission for information for implementing the rulemaking described below. The milestones should be in lieu of the standard rulemaking plan required by Management Directive 6.3, but should meet the requirement for coordination with Agreement States.

(500) (NMSS) (SECY Suspense: 84W98) 9800071 8/14/98 i

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SECY NOTE: SECY-97-273 WAS RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC ON DECEMBER 2,1997.

THIS SRM AND THE COMMISSION VOTING RECORD CONTAINING THE VOTE SHEETS OF ALL COMMISSIONERS WILL BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE 5 WORKING DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS SRM.

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3. Draft a proposed rule to implement a registration and follow up program for the generally licensed sources / devices identified by the NRC Agreement State Working l Group, apply fees to these generallicensees, and incorporate requirements for permanent labeling of sources / devices. The proposed rule should include the staff's preferred approach -- Attachment item 11, Option 3 -- to apply a registration fee, per licensee, at the time of initial registration and annual re-registration of sources / devices.

The staff should explore the possibilities, advantages, and disadvantages of other fee approaches such as pro-rating the fees, e.g., per device (fixed or sliding scale) or per license and provide recommendations to the Commission. Determine the extent to which application of the small business rule will affect the fees.  !

(EBO/CFO) (SECY Suspense: 42/31/08) 9800071 NMSS 12/24/98

4. Use the results of the materials risk assessment study to restructure the current licensing and materials programs. Consider the findings when determining whether additional sources / devices should be subject to registration and follow up, and for performing the risk ranking necessary if a phase-in approach is used to reduce the initial resource surge associated with an ir.creard regulctory program. Review the basis of the generallicenses for adequacy with respect to consideration of the consequences of off-site accidents, such as loss of shielding or melting in metal making furnaces. The staff should provide the technical basis document for the risk assessment together with recommendations on how to proceed.

(EBO) -(NMSS) (SECY Suspense: 42/31/98) 9800090 7 1

12/24/98

5. Include provisions in the registration program for follow up of cases where there are no responses or where discrepancies are found between responses and NRC records.

Explore with vendors their willingness to voluntarily assist the NRC (and Agreement States) in the follow up effort. Develop follow up procedures which integrate the following fundamental concepts:

a. the extent of follow up should consider the risk to public health and safety that the source or device in question poses as well as the likelihood of finding the device;

b. considering the associated level of risk, there should be a point at which the follow up of certain low risk sources and devices is terminated; l

c. E .nformation about lost sources should be made public in a timely manner.

(EBO) (NMSS) (SECY Suspense: concurrent with effective date 9800071 for final rule)

6. Implement an enforcement program that includes a short amnesty program for general licensees and increased civil penalties for both general and specific licensees for " lost" sources. The increased civil penalties should be significantly greater than the costs of proper disposal or transfer of a source or device. Work with Agreement States in

2

. i implementing enforcement programs such that their policies, practices, and procedures have the same impact as NRC's enforcement program. 1 (EDO) (NMSS/0E/SP) (SECY Suspense: concurrent with effective date 9800071 l for final rule) {

7. Provide an estimate of the resources needed to fully support this program. Preparation of this estimate should include:

o Estimating resource needs for the various phases of the registration program including,in particular, the substantial" spike" of resources needed to carry out the follow up program. I o Reviewing registration programs for generallicensees that have been implemented by Agreement States for applicability of concepts, and exploring the I possibility of utilizing other Federal agency registration programs and off-the-shelf commercial programs to minimize development and operating costs.

o Exploring the possibility of contracting with the States to carry out this part of the program under authority of Section 274i of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended.

o Identifying, through the Executive Council, resources to support the expanded program, and inform the Commission if other program areas need to be reduced.

The Executive Council should consider program areas outside of NMSS. The Executive Council should also evaluate and inform the Commission of the impact of this change on the Strategic Plan, Strategic Goals, and specific programs.

(EGO) (NMSS/CFO) (SECY Suspense: 12/3t/96) 9800091 12/24/98

8. Continue efforts to further address the orphan sources. A guiding principle is that non-licensees who find themselves to be in possession of radioactive sources that they did not seek to possess should not be expected or asked to assume responsibility and cost for exercising control or arranging for their disposal. These efforts should include:

o Consulting with DOE, EPA, FEMA and the States to define jurisdictions and regulatory responsibilities for addressing the orphan source problem, and continued cicce coordination with the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors to ensure that a similar regulatory framework is applied to source / devices containing Atomic Energy Act (AEA) material and sources / devices containing naturally-occurring or accelerator-produced radioactive material.

o The staff should aggressively pursue finalizing the MOU with DOE.

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o Consider the pros and cons of establishing a contract program that would enable licensees or DOE to take possession of and arr.ange for proper transfer or I disposal of orphan sources and provide an estimate of the costs of such a program.

(EDG) (NMSS) (SECY Suspense: 12/3.1498) 9800092 12/24/98 o If NRC funding is necessary for an orphan source recovery program, the staff should provide recommendations for funding the program including, as directed i by the Commission in its December 1996 SRM, " exploring with Congress the possibility of removing specific program costs from the NRC's user fee base

{

j (e.g., orphan source recovery fund)."

(CFO) (SECY Suspense: 12/31/98)

The Office of Public Affairs should issue a press release concerning the Commission's decision.

l (OPA) (SECY Suspense: 4/15/98) 1 l

Chairman Jackson '

l CommissionerDieus

! Commissioner Diaz i Commissioner McGaffigan )

l OGC CIO CFO OCA ,

OlG )

Office Directors, Regions, ACRS, ACNW, ASLBP (via E-Mail)

PDR DCS 1

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CONTINUED STAFF EFFORTS TO FURTHER ADDRESS ORPHAN SOURCES

1. COMMISSION DIRECTION in the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) on SECY-97-273, the Commission instructed the staff to," Continue efforts to further address the orphan sources. A guiding principle is that non-licensees who find themselves to be in possession of radioactive sources that they did not seek to possess should not be expected or asked to assume responsibility and cost for exercising control or arranging for their disposal."

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2. DEFINITION OF ORPHAN SOURCE 1

Before describing the staff's efforts with " orphan sources," it is important to define the term. A i key concept in addressing the orphan source issue is answering the question: "What is an orphan source?" The answer is non-trivial. The answer bounds the extent of the orphan <

source problem. For instance, if the orphan source definition is considered to include unsealed l material of any form, then very large volumes of contaminated soil or building materials might be considered to fit into the definition. This would result in a broad interpretation of the extent of the orphan source problem, requiring massive funding to address the problem. Conversely, l if the orphan source definition is limited to just sealed sources, then small areas of I volumetrically contaminated metals might not be considered to fit into the definition. Small I amounts of material contaminated by a leaking sealed source also might not be considered to I fit into the definition, although the leaking sealed source itself might fit the definition. This would result in a narrow interpretation of the extent of the orphan source problem, leading to an i underestimate of the funding needed to address the problem.

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The term " orphan source" may be, and has been, used to describe a variety of types and forms l of radioactive materials in a multitude of conditions, for which there is no viable responsible '

party to provide for an appropriate disposition of the material. However, the generally accepted definition of an orphan source is radioactive material in discrete form (i.e., contained within a small volume such as a sealed source, activated metal, or materials encapsulated in similar small containers), containing either material covered by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or naturally occurring or accelerator-produced radioactive material that is in any one or more of the following conditions:

In an uncontrolled condition that requires removal to protect the public health and safety from a radiological threat;

• Controlled or uncontrolled, but for which a responsible party cannot be readily identified;

. Controlled, but for which the continued security of the material cannot be assured and, if

' in the possession of a licensee, the licensee has little or no options for, or is incapable of providing for, the disposition of the material; e in the possession of a person, not licensed to possess the material, who did not seek to possess the material; or Attachment 2

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In the possession of a State radiological protection program (either Agreement State or non-Agreement State) for the sole purpose of mitigating a radiological threat because of one of the above conditions, and for which the State does not have a rneans to provide for the appropriate disposition of the material.

The staff applies this definition of " orphan sources" in addressing orphan source issues.

Although imperfect, this definition contains the extent of the orphan source problem to realistic, manageable levels.

3. CONTINUED STAFF EFFORTS TO FURTHER ADDRESS ORPHAN SOURCES In addition to the specific activities listed in the SRM on SECY-97-273, the staff has continued a number of efforts to further address the orphan source issue. These staff efforts have included the following:

A. Working with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to identify and remove (or schedule for removal) 57 americium 241: beryllium (AmBe) orphan sources, located in both Agreement and non-Agreement States, that are Greater-Than-Class-C (GTCCj, in accordance with the waste classification in 10 CFR Section 61.55. In a letter dated September 5,1996, DOE indicated that it intended to implement a pilot program to t l recycle AmBe sources. In subsequent discussions, DOE staff requested that the U.S.

I Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the States identify up to 40 potential l candidates for the pilot program. Based on information provided by the NRC regional i offices and the States, the staff identified and prioritized 57 sources. The staff requested that the sources be accepted into DOE's pilot program, in letters to DOE sent between August 1997 and September 1998. DOE accepted all but one of the NRC-identified candidates into the program and expanded the pilot by an additional 16 sources, to 56 total sources. (The one candidate source not accepted had other

, available disposition options.) To date,15 of the 57 sources have been received by l

DOE, with the remaining to be scheduled in early Calendar Year 1999. The staff will continue working with DOE in an effort to establish routine acceptance of AmBe sources, as well as to expand DOE's recycling program to include other GTCC sealed sources, such as plutonium-238 (Pu2x),

B. Responding to two requests from Agreement States for DOE assistance in situations involving GTCC material that was causing, or had a potential to cause, a threat to the l public health and safety. These requests concerned a 213.5-Gigabecquerel (5.77-curie) l Pu2":Be sealed source used in a " neutron howitzer," and a pacemaker containing a 0.08-gram Pu " sealed source.

C. Working with industry (primarily the metal recycling and manufacturing industries) to l address issues concerning the identification and proper disposition of orphan sources, l including:

. Participation in a meeting, in April 1998, between NRC; DOE; the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); members of the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors E-34 Committee on Unwanted Radioactive Material (the E-34 Committee); and representatives of the Institute of Scrap Recycling industries (ISRI); the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI); the 2

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Steel Manufacturer's Association (SMA); and the Specialty Steel Industry of

- North America, to introduce these stakeholders to the E-34 Committee's initiative, and to provide the stakeholders with an opportunity to identify areas of concern that need to be addressed by the E-34 Committee.

Participation in a meeting, in July 1998, between the DOE National Center of Excellence for Metals Recycle, ISRI, and AISI, where EPA and NRC discussed current activities, within their agencies, concerning the recycling of and clearance levels for metals and orphan sources, i

Participation in a " Workshop on the Detection of Radioisotopes in Steel Scrap,"

in June 1998, that focused on identifying means to better detect radioactive materialin the steel manufacturing and scrap recycling process. The workshop was sponsored by DOE's Office of Industrial Technology, which requested NRC to make a presentation conceming NRC's current efforts to better ensure the control and accountability of material and to address the orphan source issue.

Representatives of the steelindustry, including ISRI, AISI, and SMA attended this workshop.

Participation in a June 1998, ISRI seminar, on " Radioactivity in the Scrap Recycling Process," that addressed how radioactive material enters the scrap recycling process, means to prevent this from occurring, ways to detect

radioactive material in the scrap recycling process, and how to handle found material. NRC was requested to make a presentation on assistance in the identification of radioactive materials in the scrap recycling process. This presentation included a discussion of identifying markings on sources and devices; typical shapes and sizes of various types of sources and devices; industries in which sources and devices are typically used; common isotopes and activities found in sources or devices; and points, during the life-cycle of a source or device, when the potential for identification could be increased.

Workshop participants and attendees included a number of representatives of the steel recycling industry; other govemmental agencies (EPA, DOE, and the, States); health physics consultants; and radiation detection equipment  ;

manufacturers. 1 I

Participation in a December 1998, meeting, with the U.S. Department of State (DOS), concerning the creation of an International Radioactive Source Management (IRSM) initiative. The DOS is leading the IRSM initiative in response to international requests for assistance in the areas of orphan source management, and clearance levels for metals. The IRSM initiative is intended, in part, to develop a program for the prevention, identification, tracking, response, and remediation of radioactive materials being illegally imported and experted to and from nation-states, including the United States. NRC presentations concentrated on past initiatives in this area and current activities, including rulemakings on control and accountability of generally licensed devices, and clearance levels for certain materials. NRC presenters also discussed the staff's work on orphan sources issues and recycling of contaminated materials. Other participants and attendees included EPA, DOE, the U.S. Department of Transportation, the U.S. Customs Service, ISRI, AISI, SMA, radiation detection 3

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equipment manufacturers, staff representatives from the House of i Representatives and the Senate Sub-committee on Intelligence, and representatives of other government agencies.

D. Responding to a number of orphan source incidents, including incidents involving l orphan sources that were melted at steel mills and uniformly distributed in steel

products, and working with EPA, States, NRC's Office of International Programs, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to address policy issues concerning the licensing of products manufactured using the contaminated steel, attempting to recover stolen or lost radioactive material, and locating responsib!s parties The staff recommends continuing outreach efforts with industry and stakeholders. These i efforts will provide assistance to stakeholders in identifying orphan sources before they are shredded or melted; obtain information about the concerns and needs of the scrap recycling and metal manufacturing industries in the areas of orphan sources and clearance levels; identify and include other stakeholders; continue identifying other related orphan source areas that should to be addressed by NRC; and keep stakeholders informed of the status of NRC's other efforts in the orphan source area.

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JURISDICTIONS AND REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL AGENCIES AND STATES IN ADDRESSING ORPHAN SOURCES

1. BACKGROUND The issues of regulatory responsibilities and jurisdictions of the various Federal agencies and States in addressing orphan source issues have been complex, leading to overlap and potential i gaps between the cognizant organizations. Roles, regulatory responsibilities, and jurisdictions  !

of the organizations are particularly difficult to clarify, for a number of reasons. Orphan source l incidents are inherently different, variable, and unplanned; a large number of Federal, State, l and local agencies and organizations have responsibilities for different portions of orphan source incidents; and individual agencies may have different roles, or perceptions of roles, within their own staffs, at different locations.

l The variability in orphan source incidents is tremendous. For instance, an incident may involve a foreign radioactive source imported into the United States, or a domestic orphan source. An incident could involve Naturally occurring or Accelerator-produce Radioactive Material (NARM),

or material covered under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA). An incident could result from an accident or intentional misconduct, in which case law enforcement agencies could be involved. An incident could occur either in an A0reement State or a non- l Agreement State. Responders may have the capability to immediately mitigate any public health hazards, or they may ask for State or Federal assistance. Responders may have the authority and facilities to take and store the orphan source, or they may not. An incident could lead to minimal hazards, or to widespread contamination. An incident could even potentially involve domestic or international terrorism, in which case the Nation's intelligence agencies could become involved. All 50 States, and no less than 11 Federal agencies (primarily the U.S. ,

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Emergency Miinagement Agency (FEMA),

and the U.S. Department of Transportation, and secondarily the U.S. Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Customs Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the U.S. Department of State) have some responsibility or jurisdiction for addressing the orphan source issue.

2. THE STAFF'S APPROACH TO DEFINING JURISDICTIONS AND REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES _

To define jurisdictions and regulatory responsioilities for addressing the orphan source problem, the staff first researched and reviewed available guidance documentation for the Federal agencies on orphan source and similar incidents, including the following documents:

. The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP);

. The National Contingency Plan (NCP), formally known as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan;

. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as amended (CERCLA);

. NRC's Response Coordination Manual 1996 (RCM-96, NUREG/BR-0230);

• The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; Attachment 3

The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; The Department of Energy Organization Act; DOE Orders and guidance documents; Title 10 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 835 (DOE's regulations concerning the management of sealed sources, amended December 4,1998);

The draft NRC/ DOE Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning the management of sealed sources; and Other statements of purpose and responsibility found in agency brochures and Internet web pages.

Of these documents, the most significant for the overall coordination of an orphan source I incident response would be likely the FRERP, because this plan is specifically designed for radiological emergencies where there would be a coordinated response involving both State and Federal resources. This plan does not grant authorities, but only delineates the process and procedure for coordinating the Federal response to a radiological emergency. In addition, the most significant document regarding the authorities granted to Federal agencies for the response to a radiological release (such as an orphan source), whether the release constitutes an emergency or not, would be the NCP as this plan specifically indicates the actions that Federal agencies may take in situations involving the release of radioactive material that require a Federal response.  ;

l Based on the documents described above, past orphan source incidents, a Lost Source I Exercise conducted in September and October of 1997, and the report surnmarizing this l exercise, the staff compiled a listing of the various roles, responsibilities, and tasks that could 1 be required for addressing orphan source issues. Examples of areas included in this listing l include prevention of orphan sources, response to both lost and found sources, enforcement, j

remediation, and investigation into orphan source incidents. To address the issue of Federal .

responsibilities and jurisdictions, the staff discussed the listing with representatives of DOE, EPA, and FEMA. The staff held discussions with representatives cf DOE's Office of '

Environmental Management and EPA's Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA)in September and October 1998, respectively, where NRC staff presented the listing to the other agencies, 4 and asked each representative to identify which roles, responsibilities, and tasks fell within its agency's responsibility or jurisdiction. Each agency provided a response to the NRC staff's request. These issues were also discussed telephonically with a representative from FEMA's Emergency Services Branch (who also had experience and responsibility in FEMA's i Radiological Emergency Preparedness group). To address the issue of State responsibilities, the staff provided the listing to State representatives of the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) E-34 Committee on Unwanted Radioactive Material (E-34 Committee) and discussed' State responsibilities during a committee meeting on October 14-16, 1998. In addition, the staff requested each State representative to further review the listing and provide responses,if able to, for both AEA material and NARM. To date, the staff has not yet received the State responses. However, during the October meeting, it was suggested that this issue about jurisdictions and regulatory responsibilities could also be raised at the next full CRCPD meeting, which is planned for mid-1999.

3.THE FRERP AND THE NCP The scope of the FRERP covers "...any peacetime radiological emergency that has actual, potential, or perceived radiological consequences in the United States, its Territories, possessions, or territorial waters and that could require a response by the Federal 2

Government." In addition, the plan describes how the Federal response to a radiological emergency will be organized, and the circumstances under which each agency would be the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). The FRERP does not allocate resources or provide additional authorities to Federal agencies, but it does provide for the coordination of Federal resources in response to a request from a State or local government or from owners or operators of radiological facilities or activities. The FRERP also provides for the efficient integration of Federal resources with State and local resources, and the resources of the owner or operator of the facility or activity, through the use of an LFA. The LFA is identified, in general terms, as the

"...Federal Agency that owns, authorizes, regulates, or is otherwise deemed responsible for the facility or radiological activity causing the [ radiological) emergency and has authority to conduct and manage Federal actions onsite."

The FRERP specifically indicates that it is intended, in part, to address the coordination of the Federal response to radiological emergencies at or involving NRC and Agreement State licensees. In addition, the FRERP indicates that it is also intended to address radiological emergencies involving abandoned radioactive materials, imported radioactively contaminated material (including contaminated scrap metal), and shipments of foreign-owned radioactive material that have actual, potential, or perceived radiological consequences in the United States, its Territories, possessions, or territorial waters. These situations encompass, either directly or indirectly, a large portion of orphan source incidents.

The scope of the NCP covers a variety of incidents involving the release of a hazardous material, including radioactive material. The NCP specifically indicates that it covers

" releases into the environment of hazardous substances, and pollutants or contaminants which may present an imminent and substantial danger to public health or welfare of the United States." The NCP is not limited to either NARM or AEA material, but would not cover any situations involving the release of radioactive materials for which there were other viable options. For example, the NCP states that "... release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident, as those terms are defined in the atomic Energy Act of 1954, if such release is subject to requirements with respect to financial protection established by the  ;

Nuclear Regulatory Commission under section 170 of such Act, or, for the purposes of section 104 of CERCLA or any other response action, any release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material from any processing site designated under section 102(a)(1) or 302(a) of the

. Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978(42 U.S.C. 7901 et seq.)" are excluded from the definition of a release as these materials have financial assurance provisions relating to their release.

I Similar to the FRERP, the NCP describes aspects of the response to the release of a hazardous material that presents an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare of the United States. This includes the use of Federal, State, and local resources and their respective authorities and responsibilities, in contrast to the FRERP, the NCP identifies the mechanisms available for lead agencies, response teams, and/or On-Scene Coordinators (OSC) to obtain and allocate resources to address a response. The NCP is also similar to the FRERP as it designates a lead agency depending on the circumstances of the release, but is different from the FRERP in that the lead agency is not necessarily the agency which regulates or has jurisdiction over the hazardous material involved in the release, and an OSC is appointed by the lead agency and is responsible for the overall coordination of the response. For additional guidance on releases involving radioactive material, the NCP refers to the procedures contained in the FRERP, but states that "... most radiological discharges and releases do not  !

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result in FRERP activation and should be handled in accordance with the NCP." This would be true for most orphan source incidents, but not necessarily for the same reason it is recognized .

in the NCP. Most orphan source incidents require a rapid initial response involving State and/or I local emergency response personnel. As no Federal involvement typically occurs in this initial response, coordination of Federal resources and activities is not required. Following this initial response, the hazard or threat to the public and environment is typically temporarily mitigated.

Although Federal involvement may occur following the initial response phase, the Federal response is typically not to the extent where the FRERP would need to be invoked for the coordination of Federal resources. However,in cases where the threat remained prevalent and a Federal response was required, the NCP would likely be the primary guiding document for the coordination of the Federal response.

Although the NCP addresses the availability of resources for response actions through available funding, it also states that response actions to a release "...shall be carried out under s existing programs and authorities when available. Federal agencies are to make resources available, expend funds, or participate in response to discharges and releases under their existing authority." In addition, the NCP encourages industry groups, academic organizations, and other interested parties to commit resources for response operations and indicates that response operations shall not be carried out under the NCP in situations where a " state or political subdivision thereof" has the capability to carry out the various aspects of a response, including removal actions, except in certain special circumstances (e.g., where the release has the potential to affect Federal lands, releases affecting several states, etc.).

l A particular area of jurisdictional complexity involves situations where an orphan source has I been identified, but the immediate hazard to members of the public has been mitigated, either through the actions of State and/or local emergency response personnel, actions by personnel ,

at the facility where the orphan source is located, or because the type, activity, or configuration j of the radioactive material does not present an immediate hazard. Once the immediate hazard is mitigated, but often before the source itself is removed, many response organizations' jurisdictions or responsibilities cease, leaving the facility with unwanted radioactive material. In addition, if the situation is no longer considered a radiological emergency, the FRERP is no longer applicable. State and Federal agencies having regulatory responsibility, or standards for release, for radioactive material, have employed a number of approaches to these types of  ;

situations. Differences in the approaches used in the past have occurred, in part, because of the differences M

• conditions and situations associated with each individual orphan source incident. Exam; af the different approaches taken include: 1) cases where the facility in  !

which the maten uas found was required to provide for its disposition or to obtain a license to i possess and store the material; 2) incidents where EPA provided for the disposition of material  ;

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in some situations involving sources or devices that were determined to be of unknown or foreign origin, but indicated that it would not provide for the disposition of such material in other similar incidents; 3) situations where DOE assistance was requested to, and did, retrieve and/or dispose of radioactive material that presented a potential hazard to members of the public; and

4) several incidents where State agencies removed radioactive materials and either placed the materials in storage, pending a disposition option, or provided for disposition of the material via an orphan source contractor or other similar mechanism.

Although each of these situations was unique -- as is the case with almost all orphan source incidents - they demonstrate that historically, there has not been a single, consistent, national approach to responding to orphan source incidents, both at the State and Federal levels. Some 4

agencies, such as FEMA and DOE, have clearly defined responsibilities, and other organizations' responsibilities are less clear. Considerable overlaps exist between regulatory jurisdictions in responding to orphan source is ies. For instance, EPA is the LFA under the '

FRERP for responding to unidentified radioactive material in a public location, when assistance .

is requested by the State or local government. If the source is subsequently identified as NRC-licensed material, then NRC becomes the LFA, even if the material is in an Agreement State.

The hand-off point between EPA and NRC, and the process for transfer of LFA responsibility, has never been clearly defined, so both agencies could reasonably believe that they have similar, overlapping responsibilities. If the response actions were in accordance with the NCP, the EPA would likely be the lead agency and would appoint an OSC for the coordination of the response activities. If the responsible party for the source was identified and determined to be an NRC licensee, the NRC would have certain regulatory responsibilities, including enforcement actions and working with the licensee to recover and properly dispose of the source, but the OSC may also have similar responsibilities including pursuing recovery of the costs associated with the response from the responsible party. It is unclear when OSC responsibilities would end and NRC (or other regulatory agency) responsibilities would begin. This issue was a subject of discussion during the 1997 Lost Source Exercise, but no definitive consensus was reached as to whether or when the handoff of LFA would occur. One option presented was that EPA would continue as the lead agency, with NRC assisting in its traditional regulatory role. Also, NRC has traditionally deferred to Agreement States to respond to orphan source issues within their own boundaries; however, NRC would have responsibility for the coordination of the Federal response to an incident if assistance was requested by the State, in accordance with the FRERP.

The FRERP and NCP are even less clear about responsibilities after the immediate public health and safety hazard has been mitigated or is determined to be non-existent -(i.e., after the

" emergency" is over). In several recent incidents, EPA (as the LFA for unidentified sources in i public areas) determined that the low-level sources found in public locations did not present significant hazards, and EPA terminated its involvement in the incidents. Once EPA ceases involvement, it is entirely unclear whether NRC or the Agreement States have some responsibility to regulate the material, or investigate the source of the material, whether or not -

the NRC staff agrees with EPA's risk-informed decision. At present, for all reports that unidentified radioactive material is found in a public location (such as in a metal scrap yard, a municipal landfill, or a public street), EPA is initially the LFA.

Coordination work in this area over the past several years, especially following the creation of the FRERP, has helped to clarify the roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions of the Federal agencies and the States, as well as provide a more consistent national approach in responding to orphan source incidents. This work has resulted in productive dialogue between NRC, EPA, DOE, the States, and stakeholders, all working toward a common approach. However, the accomplishments in this area have been made relatively recently, as the orphan source issue l received greater attention at the national and international levels, and there is a need for continued improvement.

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3. JURISDICTIONS AND REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL AGENCIES AND THE STATES The following discussion provides detailed information on the identified and/or stated jurisdictions and regulatory responsibilities of EPA, DOE, FEMA, and the States regarding orphan sources issues:

EPA The FRERP identifies EPA as the LFA for the response to a radiological emergency at a facility that is not licensed, owned, or operated by a Federal agency or an Agreement State. Included in this responsibility are radiological emergencies involving both AEA and non-AEA material.

The EPA is additionally designated as the LFA for radiological emergencies involving i radioactive material from a foreign or unknown source that has actual, potential, or perceived

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radiological consequences in the United States, its territories, possessions, or territorial waters. j The FRERP indicates that " unknown sources of radioactive material" refers to those material.s l whose origin and/or radiological nature have not yet been established, and indicates that these I include contaminated scrap metal and abandoned radioactive material.

The NCP also identifies responsibilities for a number of Federal agencies, including EPA. As stated in the report issued by EPA Region 111 on the Lost Source Exercise, CERCLA "...and the NCP provide EPA broad funding and response authority to protect public health and welfare and the environment." in addition, this report states,"The NCP provides authority for an EPA removal action (cleanup) to radioactive materials so long as the licensee does not fall under the financial assurance provisions of the Price-Anderson amendments Act (not a commedt nuclear power plant or DOE facility). While EPA is authorized to respond under the NCP tc all releases not covered under Price-Anderson, EPA would not normally initiate a removal action using CERCLA funds unless other options to address the situation were exhausted or there  ;

was a request for assistance from another Federal agency." In this respect, the NCP does not distinguish between AEA material and NARM, and therefore, the identified authorities would not be limited to either of these types of material.

The EPA /ORIA's response, conceming jurisdictions and regulatory responsibilities in addressing the orphan source issue, conforms with the FRERP and the discussion in the Lost Source Exercise report. However, EPA /ORIA's response made the distinction that activities under CERCLA are limited to emergency situations, whereas the discussion in the Lost Source Exercise report made no such distinction, and the text in the FRERP states that EPA is the LFA in emergencies where the material"...has actual, potential, or perceived radiological consequences."

DQE The jurisdictions and regulatory responsibilities of DOE for addressing the orphan source problem are relatively well-defined.

DOE's roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions for the management of sealed sources are contained or described in a number of documents, including 10 CFR Parts 820 and 835; DOE Orders and Notices; DOE's Radiological Control Manual (RCM); and DOE's " Implementation Guide for Sealed Source Control and Accountability." These regulations, requirements, and 6

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guidance documents contain the essential elements of a sealed source management program l including the receipt, possession, use, transfer, security, reporting of events, inventory, accountability, leak-testing, record-keeping, enforcement, and emergency procedures for sealed sources. Specifically, these documents describe DOE's procedures and responsibilities for the reporting of lost or stolen material, or material otherwise unaccounted for, and for responding to the identification of lost, stolen, or otherwise unaccounted for material.

The FRERP identifies DOE as the LFA for the response to a radiological emergency at a facility owned or operated by DOE, as well as emergencies involving the transportation of radioactive materials shipped by or for DOE. Although DOE receives significant authority from the AEA, DOE's responsibilities and authorities are not limited to material that is covered by the AEA.

DOE also possesses and uses NARM sealed sources and is responsible for the accountability of NARM material. The FRERP also designates DOE as responsible for the initial coordination of offsite Federal radiological monitoring and assessment during the response to a radiological emergency. The DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) was developed for just this type of assistance, and was established by DOE Order 5530.3. DOE RAP teams will respond to requests for assistance from States in radiological emergencies, regardless of whether the 3 response is coordinated under the FRERP guidelines. If the Federal response were being coordinated under the FRERP, DOE would remain responsible W the activities of a RAP team, but coordination authority for these Federal response activities would reside with the LFA.

In general, DOE has responsibility for addressing all aspects of orphan source incidents occurring at DOE-owned and -operated sites, and at all DOE activities. In the case of an orphan source incident occurring outside a DOE site, DOE has indicated that its roles and responsibilities for addressing the orphan source problem are limited to orphan sources that can be identified as having originated from within DOE jurisdiction. This would include radioactive materials owned, possessed, and/or used by DOE, or a DOE prime contractor, in the conduct of DOE activities, which become orphan sources; and radioactive materials that were inadvertently released from a DOE site. DOE's responsibility would be limited in situations involving radioactive materials owned by DOE but possessed and/or used by an NRC or Agreement State licensee under a DOE loan / lease, or similar, agreement. In such situations, the agreement stipulates the responsibility of both DOE and the licensee for the possession, use, and ultimate disposition of the material. Typically, DOE remains responsible for taking possession of the radioactive material at the end of the agreement term, but would not be responsible for the packaging and transportation of the material to a DOE site (i.e., DOE would accept the material once it is shipped to a DOE facility). DOE would also not be responsible for the cleanup of radioactive materials that were covered by one of these agreements, if the

' licensee lost control of the material resulting in the release of radioactive material or spread of contamination, unless the agreement specifically identifies the responsibility as DOE's.

FEMA FEMA has only limited regulatory responsibility or jurisdiction fer addressing the orphan source problem. In addition, FEMA has very limited response personnel and equipment for responding to incidents involving radiation sources or material. If an orphan source incident were to escalate to a radiological emergency, FEMA could serve in its traditional role of coordinating Federal resources for disaster relief, if requested by the Governor of the State, or in response to a Presidential disaster declaration. This high threshold would probably require that the incident be very large-scale, before FEMA would become involved. If FEMA did become 7

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involved, FEMA's role and activities would include providing non radiological assistance with l finding medical, housing, and recovery resources for those injured or displaced by the incident; assisting in evacuation and/or relocation of individuals and animals; disseminating information and literature concerning the long-term effects to the surrounding areas, following the radiological emergency; and providing guidance to the public and non-radiological response personnel on ways to reduce their risks of injury from the radiological hazard. These activities may be performed through a number of methods, including public meetings, and radio and television broadcasts. However, FEMA typically would not become involved in orphan source incidents limited to a single location or to a small number of affected persons.

FEMA has certain roles and responsibilities, other than incident response, that may be applicable to the orphan source problem. FEMA routinely assists States and local governments and communities in the development of disaster contingency plans. These contingency plans may be site-specific or generalin nature. These contingency plans may contain sections on responding to sealed sources or devices that present a radiological threat to members of the public, or the contingency plans may involve a site that possesses and uses sealed sources and/or devices. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) requires each community to establish a Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) with responsibility for the development of such contingency plans, in addition, FEMA periodically provides training on the FRERP and other emergency and disaster response and planning, including contingency planning, for State and Federal participants. A number of the training programs apply to radiological emergencies, as well as other emergencies and disasters.

States The FRERP discusses States' general responsibilities for responding to radiological emergencies. The FRERP notes that, other than in areas under Federal control,"...the State or local government has the responsibility for taking emergency actions, both onsite and offsite, with support provided, upon request, by Federal agencies,..." for minimizing the radiological hazard to the public. In addition, the FRERP states that "...the concept of operations (of the FRERP] recognizes the preeminent role of State and local govemments for determining and implementing any measures to protect life, property, and the environment in areas not under the control of a Federal agency." To address the local government's role in emergencies, the SARA requires each community to establish an LEPC, with responsibility for developing contingency plans for emergencies and disasters. State and local governments bear the ultimate responsibility for taking the necessary steps to protect the public from hazards, including radiological hazards, in areas within their boundaries that are not under Federal control. If the State or local government is unable to adequately provide this protection during a radiological emergency, either because of the magnitude of the hazard or because of a lack of appropriate resources or equipment, Federal assistance may be requested in accordance with the FRERP provisions. The Federal assistance provided in response to such a request is only intended to supplement the capabilities of the State or local government, and is not intended to transfer the complete response to the radiological emergency to the applicable Federal agencies. Except in extremely rare cases, where the State or local government is found to be i inadequately minimizing the hazard to the public, or where there are extremely large incidents l (such as those involving several States), the entity that requested the assistance (e.g., State or local govemment, facility, etc.) remains responsible at all times for the response to the radiological emergency, and that entity makes the final determination as to when assistance is B

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no longer needed. Requests for assistance in accordance with the FRERP may include  !

radiological emergencies involving both AEA and NARM materials. l 1

in addition to the general responsibilities of all States, Agreement States have the additional regulatory responsibilities acquired under the NRC/ State agreement, pursuant to subsection 274b of the AEA. These include establishing and implementing regulations and requirements for the control and accountability of licensed radir ave materials; enforcement programs for persons who lose control and accountability of tb air licensed material; and incident reporting and response programs that include orphan source incidents. Although the regulation of AEA material is limited to NRC or the Agreement States, the regulation of NARM is reserved to the States (except for NARM owned or used by or on a Federal facility). Excepting certain requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, there are few national requirements for the regulation of NARM. Consequently, the regulation of NARM varies considerably from State to State. In an effort that provides increased inter-State consistency, the CRCPD has issued " Suggested State Regulations" that address NARM, and numerous States have adopted these regulations.

Beyond Federally legislated requirements for the regulation of radioactive materials, some States have been granted the authority, by their legislatures, to expend resources for certain additional activities, such as the removal and temporary storage or disposal of radioactive material that presents a threat to the public. Under this authority, some States have developed effective programs that allow the States to take possession of, transfer, store, and dispose of orphan sources.

4. MECHANISMS FOR IMPROVING COORDINATION:

A number mechanisms may be utilized to continue to address this issue, including:

e. Working directly and separately with other applicable agencies to address specific issues relating to NRC's working relationship with each agency in the area of orphan

= sources. This could include negotiating additional MOU's, similar to the DOE MOU, with other applicable agencies, where deemed necessary to formalize and document inter-agency agreements and procedures;

. Request the E-34 Committee to expand its charter to fuily address this issue, as it deems appropriate for its national orphan source program, and continue participation on the E-34 Committee to ensure NRC views are expressed and understood in this area;

. Initiating an inter-agency Working Group (WG) comprised of representatives from the

- applicable Federal agencies; one or more State representatives (e.g., CRCPD and the Organization of Agreement States representing both Agreement and non Agreement States); and other key stakeholders, such as industry, to provide a consensus position on this issue. The WG would need a defined focus so as to not duplicate efforts by other groups and initiatives.

. The NCP provides provisions for situations when there is losufficient national guidance, or questions, conceming interpretation of the NCP. These provisions provide that the National Response Team (NRT) may be requested to provide guidance and clarification on such matters. As a member of the NRT, NRC may request the NRT consider this  ;

lasue as a matter of interpretation of the NCP, and request guidance and clarification j from the NRT as a whole. The NRT has the authority to take steps to address issues brought before it, including the creation of a committee to address the issue. This may 9

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have a similar result as the creation of an inter agency WP as it would likely require l input from all applicable NRT member agencies as well as the States; Following the 1997 lost source exercise, a number of States and participating organizations indicated the need for, and their support for, additional similar exercises.

Specifically, the State of North Carolina has offered to host a second lost source exercise, which is currently planned for May 1999, and similar tabletop exercises have been conducted in Regions ll and Ill. Continued support of, and participation in, these exercises will help to enhance an understanding of, and further define, the roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions of both the participating Federal agencies, as well as State, local, and applicable stakeholder participants with the response to the identification of an unknown radioactive source that presents a threat to the public health and safety and the environment. To this end, NRC staff have built on the success of the original lost source exercise to enhance communication and cooperation with EPA, the OSCs, and the NRT, in the areas of inter agency roles, responsibilities, ]

and jurisdictions during the response to the identification of an unknown radioactive source that presents a threat to the public health and safety and the environment.  ;

• As discussed above, FEMA has a role in orphan sources in the area of contingency

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planning and training. FEMA currently provides training in the area of response to radiological incidents (although, generally concentrating on potential incidents occurring ,

6 at Nuclear Power plants) through the Training Subcommittee of the Federal Radiological l Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC). The FRPCC Training Subcommittee j may be requested to consider the development of training programs and exercises in l this area, which would first require that they identify and/or develop a consensus position on this issue. Alternately, the FRPCC Training Subcommittee may decide to ,

initiate a training workshop intended to address issues needing clarificatien. This I process has been utilized in the past by the FRPCC Training Subcommittee for addressing FRERP issues needing clarification; and The staff continues to attempt to identify additional areas which could enhance obtaining a national consensus position on roles, responsibilities, and jurisdictions in the area of orphan sources. Satisfactory resolution of this issue willlikely require a combination of the currently available mechanisms being utilized and one or more of the new initiatives discussed above.

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a COORDINATION WITH CRCPD AND FUNDING OF CRCPD'S E-34 COMMITTEE The staff continues to coordinate closely with Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD), through an advisory role on CRCPD's E-34 Committee on Unwanted '

Radioactive Material (the E-34 committee). In this role, the staff has striven to ensure that a similar regulatory framework is applied to sources / devices containing Atomic Energy Act (AEA) material and Naturally occurring or Accelerator-produce Radioactive Material (NARM), under CRCPD's developing orphan source program.

Funding from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the E-34 Committee provides authorization only for development of a national orphan source program and conducting a pilot program. EPA's funding does not provide for the implementation and continuation of an orphan source program once one is developed. The staff expects that l funding for implementing a national orphan source program would probably come from a i cooperative effort by the States and applicable Federal agencies. To this extent, the E-34 Committee has discussed potential cooperative agreements between States to pool resources and capabilities for addressing unwanted radioactive materials. The E-34 Committee has also proposed discussing the orphan source program, and cooperative agreements between States, at the next full CRCPD meeting, in mid-calendar year 1999.

The E-34 Committee has determined that, for an orphan source program to be most effective, such a program requires both the States and applicable Federal agencies to agree and participate in all aspects of the program, on a national scale. To address this goal, the E-34 Committee plans to recommend to the States that they consider ways to promote national cooperation and participation in the program. In particular, the E-34 Committee will recommend that the States use the Nuclear Material Events Database (NMED), not only for materials events, in general, but also for tracking unwanted radioactive material. The E-34 Committee also plans to recommend that States enhance their regulatory programs in the area of control and accountability of radioactive materials, to reduce the potential for lost material. The E-34 Committee will make these recommendations for both Agreement and non Agreement States. l The staff has also supported the E-34 Committee's efforts by recommending that the Commission grant CRCPD's request to use NMED as a national database for tracking orphan sources. Use of NMED to track orphan sources will provide wide access to orphan source information, including NMED information about orphan sources / devices containing NARM. The staff's coordination with CRCPD also included meeting with the CRCPD Board on October 16, 1998, to discuss CRCPD's plans regarding the E 34 Committee and the orphan source problem, and to discuss NRC's efforts and activities in the orphan source area. The staff plans to continue participating in an advisory role on the E-34 Committee, meeting with CRCPD when requested on orphan source issues, and emphasizing that a similar regulatory framework ,

should be applied to orphan sources / devices containing AEA material and orphan 1 sources / devices containing NARM. I e

Attachment 4 1

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ATTACHMENT 5 LETTER FROM DOE, l TRANSMITTING SIGNED MOU, l DATED DECEMBER 18,1998

.m e--__- - - _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - - - _

Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 December 18, 1998 Mr. Carl J. Paperiello, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Dear Mr. Paperiello:

The purpose of this letter is to transmit the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Office of Waste Management and the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards regarding the management of sealed sources. I have signed the enclosed MOU and am forwarding it to you for your signature.

Both of our staffs have put a great deal of time and effort into this document and I am happy to be able to bring this effort to closure. I look forward to continuing to work with you and your staff as well as your regional offices and the Agreement States to protect the public health and safety.

If there are any questions, please have your staff contact Robert Campbell at (301) 903-7127.

Sincerely,

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Mark W. Frei Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Waste Management Environmental Management Enclosure 1

& ~ ~ m.s.n w m

l MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF WASTE MANAGEMENT CONCERNING MANAGEMENT OF SEALED SOURCES

1. INTRODUCTION The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) provides guidance for the response of Federal agencies in peacetime radiological emergencies that have actual, potential, or perceived radiological consequences within the United States, its Territories, possessions, or territorial waters. Although the FRERP encompasses a broad range of radiological emergencies, it does not provide specific actions tha't each agency must take when a radiological emergency is identified. This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) defines the roles and responsibilities between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Energy (DOE) in situations where the NRC is responsible for the Federal response to a radiological emergency, but that does not require an immediate response (i.e.,

activation of the NRC Incident Response Plan as described in NRC Management Directive 8.2),

and where the transfer of licensed source, special nuclear, or byproduct radioactive material -

as defined under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act)- primarily in the form of sealed sources and devices as described in section IV. B., to the DOE is determined to be necessary to protect the public health and safety and the environment.

II. BACKGROUND This MOU formally defines the activities carried out since 1992 under agreements reached via exchange of correspondence between NRC and DOE. The need for this agreement arose due to the fact that licensed radioactive material which exceeds the Class C limits defined in $61.55, Title 10 Code of Ferleral Reaulations (CFR) is not acceptable for disposal at commercial disposal sites. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (PL 99-240) made DOE responsible for the ultimate disposition of this material. Until such time as the DOE has in place a disposal or routine acceptance and storage capability for the various types of this material, this agreement is necessary to allow transfer of material which exceeds Class C limits from NRC and Agreement State licensees to the DOE in limited situations which pose an actual or potential threat to the public health and safety.

Under limited situations, described in more detailin Section IV. A. of this agreement, DOE will consider accepting material at the request of NRC which does not exceed Class C limits, but only under situations where there is an actual or potential threat to the public health and safety that cannot be mitigated by other reasonable means.

Revisson. December 3,1998, #2

f 4 Ill. PURPOSE -

This MOU applies to the recovery and disposition of byproduct, source, and special nuclear 1 material in the possession of licensees and in the public domain by the DOE at the request of NRC. Although this MOU is intended to apply to these materials in the form of sealed sources, it is envisioned that under rare circumstances this MOU will apply to the recovery and i disposition of radioactive materials in other forms, as described in section IV. B. In addition, i this agreement applies only to materialin the private sector, licensed by NRC or an Agreement State, which represents an ectual or potential threat to the public health and safety. i i

The determinat:on of an actual or potential threat to the public health and safety will be made by )

the NRC as described in this MOU, in consultation with and participation by DOE, and may be 1 based on such factors as condition of the material, environmental conditions that may affect the I containment of the material, or loss of adequate controls by the licensee because of financial, l technical, or other reasons. This MOU represents the process by which NRC may request I assistance of DOE to mitigate or eliminate an actual or potential threat to the public health and I safety from sealed sources and devices, after all other reasonable attematives have been unsuccessfully explored.

This MOU does not apply to situations where the DOE has in-place the required capabilities for routine acceptance, storage, and/or disposal of material which exceeds the limits of $61.55,10 CFR as specified in P.L.99-240. Any agreements required under those situations will be entered into separately or as a specific modification of this MOU. In addition, this MOU does not apply to situations which require activation of the NRC incident Response Plan, nor does it apply to safeguards or reactor incidents.

IV. SCOPE A. Types of radioactive materials This agreement is limited to only those radioactive materials which are defined under the ,

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, as source, special nuclear, or byproduct I materials. This agreement does not have the authority to require the NRC or DOE to l respond to non-emergency situations, pursuant to this MOU, involving radioactive j materials or to respond to emergency situations which do not involve materials regulated i by the NRC. I This agreement is primarily intended to provide, under emergency situations as described in this MOU, for the proper recovery and disposition by the DOE of radioactive materials that are regulated by NRC that exceed Class C waste limits defined in $61.55, 10 CFR. Radioactive materials which do not exceed Class C limits are also covered by this agreement in circumstances that represent an actual or potential threat to the public health and safety and for which there are no other reasonable altematives to raitigate the threat. NRC and DOE will consider situations involving radioactive material which does not exceed Class C limits on a case-by-case basis as described in section IV. E., or other agreed upon procedures. 1 Revleion: December 3,1996, #2 2 i.

• l Routine acceptance of material that does not exceed Class C limits is not a part of this MOU and would fall under the authority of the States in accordance with the intent of PL 99-240. No activities contained in this MOU are intended to undermine the authorities and responsibilities of the States as defined in PL 99-240. Further, situations which would be considered an emergency solely due to the lack of access to a compact or l regional disposal site are not part of this MOU. These situations are covered in the emergency access provisions of PL 99-240 and must be addressed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 62. The purpose of 10 CFR Part 62 is to mitigate any serious or immediate threat to the public health and safety due to denial of access to a low-level waste disposal facility.

B. Form of Radioactive Material This agreement primarily addresses the radioactive materials defined in section IV. A. in the form of sealed sources or in devices containing sealed sources. In general, the material must also be a form that is readily transportable, does not require significant special handling or unique handling equipment or capabilities, and is confined to a single location. Material forms which are determined to be outside these conditions will be handled on a case-by-case basis in accordance with section IV. E., or other agreed upon procedures.

C. Quantity of Radioactive Material .

l It is envisioned that most cases covered under this MOU will involve only a small number of sealed sources or devices, usually less than ten, and only relatively small licensees. Quantities of radioactive material contained in individual sealed sources or devices should not exceed the maximum authorized on the sealed source or device vendor's license. Situations involving significantly greater numbers of sealed sources or devices or large scale licensees will be considered on a case-by-case basis by the NRC dnd DOE in accordance with section IV. E., or other agreed upon procedures.

Radioactive materials shall not be combined or altered for the sole purpose of meeting the conditions of this MOU.

D. Nature of the Threat to the Public and Response Required This agreement does not apply to emergency situations requiring an immediate response, to situations for which immediate health and safety concems have not been mitigated or to situations for which the NRC would not be designated as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for the federal response to a radiological emergency. This MOU addresses situations which the NRC determines, in consultation with DOE, represent an actual or potential threat to the public health and safety. The level of response required under this MOU will be based on an assessment of the potential health and safety consequences of the situation (e.g., amount of materialinvolved, potential for radiation exposure or releases of radioactive material, and potentialimpact on the environment).

The authorities and responsibilities of certain Federal agencies (including NRC and DOE) for responding to radiological emergencies are specified in the FRERP. Activities under this MOU must be consistent with the FRERP for responses to radiological emergencies and must not interfere with or take precedence over FRERP activities. In Revislort December 3,1998, #2 3

addition, actions necessary to mitigate an emergency requiring an immediate response, or to mitigate an immediate health and safety threat (radiological or otherwise)-

including temporary control over radioactive material- must be taken prior to any DOE recovery or disposition activities.

Assistance by DOE to recover and manage the material may only be requested by NRC after all other reason % altematives to alleviate the situation are addressed. in addition, NRC sha!! identify the response requested of DOE. DOE shall determine the appropriate response to ensure the present or potential threat is mitigated or eliminated in such situations where existing controls may not be adequate to ensure long-term assurance of the public health and safety.

E. Exceptions to the primary intent of this MOU The purpose of section IV, Scope, is to define the bounds of this agreement in specific terms. Paragraphs A-C of this section indicate that exceptions to the conditions of this agreement may be necessary. The reason for these exceptions is that it is recognized that situations involving actual or potential health and safety threats requiring DOE assistance will not be limited to only small quantities of sealed sources which exceed the Class C limits as defined in 10 CFR Part 61.55.'

in situations where the materials involved do not meet the specific conditions described in paragraphs A-C above, but DOE assistance is determined by NRC to be necessary, then the NRC shall document the reason why it is appropriate to respond to the particular situation under the terms of this MOU, document why DOE assistance is  ;

necessary for the particular situation, and provide this information to DOE. The DOE shall review this information and document the response it intends to take based upon the information provided, and provide this information to the NRC. So as to not delay a response to a request for assistance, this exchange of information may take place electronically, so long as hardcopy follow-up is provided.

F. Other Limitations This agreement, and subsequent DOE recovery and disposition actions, are generally l limited to packaging, transport, and/or receipt of radioactive materials, and the I associated requirements to conduct those activities. l This agreement is not intended to require or imply that DOE will provide decontamination or clean-up activities, except as a direct result of a DOE recovery operation, nor will DOE be expected to perform recovery or disposition actions for materials other than those specifically identified in this document.

This MOU does not apply to requests for radiological assistance from DOE Radiological Assistance Program teams.

V. AUTHORITY AND REGULATORY PROGRAMS A.NRC Revtslott December 3,1998, #2 4

i NRC is responsible for licensing and regulating nuclear facilities and material and for conducting research in support of the licensing and regulatory process, as mandated by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended; and other applicable statutes. NRC responsibilities include protecting public health and safety, protecting the environment, and safeguarding nuclear materials in the '

interest of national security.

The Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) was established under  ;

Section 204 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and is charged with l the responsibility of protecting the public health and safety through regulatory control of the safe use of byproduct, scurce, or special nuclear material, for medical, industrial, academic, and commercial uses. To accomplish this goal, NMSS uses licensing, inspection, enforcement, development and implementation of regulations, guidance and policy, safety reviews for products that use the material (including sealed sources and l devices), and other means available according to 10 CFR.

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I B. Agreement States Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, provides the NRC the authority to discontinue its regulatory authority over certain radioactive materials (including sealed sources and devises) within a State that has agreed to establish and maintain a regulatory program for the materials that is adequate to protect the public health and safety, and is compatible with NRC's program. States that have been found to meet these criteria and have entered into such agreements with NRC are called Agreement States. These Agreement States have independent authority to regulate the radioactive materials specified in the agreement within their boundaries, and are charged with protecting the public health and safety through the licensing, regulation, and enforcement of activities associated with the materials.

Under PL 99 240, each State is responsible for providing for the disposal of radioactive material wtth does not exceed a waste Classification of C that is generated within its boundaries. in addition, State and local govemments have primary responsibility for determining and implementing appropriate measures to protect life, property, and the environment from radiological and other hazards.

C. DOE DOE is responsible for conducting research and development, and other activities, to support the use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials for medical, biological, health, and other uses as mandated by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as l amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; the Department of l Energy Organization Act, as amended; and other applicable statutes.

l DOE is responsible for the disposal of radioactive material which exceeds a waste Classification of C as defined in $61.55,10 CFR as mandated by PL 99-240. DOE is required to assure the public health and safety as mandated by Section 102(13) of the Department of Energy Organization Act, as amended, and is responsible jointly with NRC for the development of contingency. plans to recall or recapture radioactive Revision: December 3,1996, #2 5

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materials under Section 204(b)(2)(B) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, in addition, DOE is granted the authority to take, requisition, condemn, or otherwise acquire any special nuclear, source, or byproduct material as authorized by Sections 55,66, and 81, respectively, of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

VI. AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES AND AGREEMENTS l

NRC and DOE staffs will closely coordinate actions in both the planning and execution phases l to: (1) ensure a timely response where DOE assistance is necessary; (2) provide adequate protection of the health and safety of the public and occupational workers involved in ,

responding to requests for assistance; and (3) ensure cost effective operations. Each agency l will develop, in consultation with the other, appropriate procedures as necessary to implement i this agreement. Each agency will designate the organization and key personnel responsible for I the day-to-day coordination and management of activities covered by this MOU.

A. NRC Responsibilities l l

1. Upon discovery of a potential radioactive materialincident conceming NRC or .l Agreement State licensed materialin an uncontrolled condition that does not ,

require activation of the NRC Incident Response Plan, the NRC regional and I headquarters offices will follow the procedures contained in NRC Manual Chapter (MC) 1301, " Response to Radioactive Material incidents that do not Require Activation of the NRC incident Response Plan," or Policy and Guidance Directive (P&GD) 9-12," Reviewing Efforts to Dispose of Licensed Material and Requesting DOE Assistance," as applicable.

a. Manual Chapter 1301 is applicable to this MOU in situations where licensed materialis in an uncontrolled condition in an unrestricted area and a responsible party cannot be readily identified. Incidents applicable to MC 1301 may include locations which are unlicensed, as well as licensed locations where the licensee is not authorized to possess the radioactive material. When requesting assistance of DOE is considered for these type incidents, MC 1301 will be consulted for the procedures and guidance to follow for determining whether DOE assistance is appropriate and necessary. Once DOE assistance is determined to be appropriate and necessary, MC 1303, " Requesting Emergency Acceptance of Radioactive Material by DOE," will be consulted for the procedures for making the request.

b. P&GD 9-12 is applicable to this MOU in situations where an NRC or Agreement State licensee is unable to safely maintain control over its licensed material, or there is a high potential for the licensee to lose control of its licensed material. NRC and Agreement State license reviewers will use this document to determine if DOE assistance with the materialis appropriate and necessary, and for making the request. This document contains, in part, guidance for determining the need for DOE assistance based on an evaluation of: (1) whether viable options are available for recovery and disposition of the radioactivo material, (2) the licensee's ability to adequately maintain control over the material and Revision: December 3,1998, #2 6

available options for achieving this, and (3) whether the material is causing or has a high potential to cause a significant health and safety risk to members of the public.

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. 2. Upon determining that DOE assistance is likely, NRC staff shall consult with DOE staff to: (1) provide appropriate information available on the incident (e.g.,

information listed in Enclosure 1 to P&GD 9-12 or MC 1303); (2) determine if any additionalinformation is needed; and (3) identify any special conditions or requirements conceming the incident.

3. Upon determining that DOE assistance is appropriate and necessary, NRC staff shall formally request DOE assistance in accordance with MC 1303 or P&GD 9-12, as applicable. These documents specify the procedure for making an official request for DOE assistance, information that is to be provided to DOE (e.g., sealed source identification and condition information, licensee name, point of contact, applicable historicalinformation, etc.), the DOE addressee for the request, and follow-up actions after the request is made. Prior to issuance of the formal request, NRC will notify the applicable DOE staff (via phone or electronic media) that the request is being made.

4. Prior and subsequent to requesting DOE assistance, NRC will determine the extent of assistance that other parties involved are responsible for, or are able to, provide for the recovery of the material to minimize the cost to the govemment.

Examples include providing for the packaging and/or transport of the material.

5. Agreement States seeking DOE assistance applicable to this MOU shall make all requests through NRC, following the guidance in MC 1301, MC 1303, or P&GD 9-12. NRC staff will evaluate the Agreement State's request and determine if all applicable information has been provided and if requesting DOE assistance is appropriate and necessary. NRC will not forward the request to DOE until the request contains complete information and provides sufficient justification for requesting DOE assistance, and will work with the Agreement State to obtain this information. NRC will make all requests for DOE assistance.

under this MOU on behalf of the Agreement States and shall serve as the single j point-of-contact for evaluating the requests in accordance with this MOU.

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6. NRC shall arrange for transfer of title of the recovered materials to DOE or to {

other parties who will take possession of the material, as designated by DOE. {

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7. Within its regulatory authority, NRC will ensure, and expedite where appropriate, license and/or certification reviews and amendments are performed as necessary to support safe and timely recovery of the materials and to {

minimize costs to the govemment incurred in recovery and shipment operations.

8. NRC shall coordinate the efforts of non-DOE involved parties in recovery operations, and participate, as appropriate and necessary, to ensure adequate protection of public/ worker health and safety, and to ensure regulatory compliance, as applicable.

Revision: Decernber 3,1998, #2 7

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B. DOE Responsibilities

1. DOE staff will participate and consult with NRC in the determination process for requesting DOE assistance.

2. Upon receipt of a formal request for assistance, DOE will review the request against the requirements of this agreement, Departmental policies in effect at the time of the request, changes in legislative authority which may affect actions requested, and expected cost versus available funds to carry cut the requested action. DOE will review each request to ensure all reasonable options for disposition have been exhausted prior to providing assistance. Upon completion of this review, DOE will notify NRC of the action it will take.

3. Upon acceptance of a request for assistance, DOE shallidentify, package, transfer, receive, and/or store the radioactive material at a DOE or other appropriate facility; or contract with appropriately licensed firms for these sen/ ices.

4. DOE will coordinate, through NRC, with the licensee and/or local authorities and other agencies, as appropriate, regarding the details of the recovery operations and provide information on progress and status.

5. DOE will take title of the radioactive material either at the material pickup location or at the designated receiving site, as determined on a case-by-case basis, or ensure title is transferred to appropriate parties contracted for services.

6. DOE may review procedures that NRC uses to determine: (1) that material is an imminent threat to the public health and safety; (2) that all available options for disposition of the material have been exhausted; and (3) that a request for DOE assistance with radioactive material is appropriate and in accordance with this MOU. -

7.' DOE will plan and budget, as appropriate, for its costs to provide for reasonably expected requests under this agreement.

8. DOE shall utilize its field elements, contractors, laboratories, and facilities, and private industry, as required, in recovery ind disposition operations, for the safe, timely, and efficient conduct of these operations. The use of these facilities is limited to those sites with appropriate capabilities and compliance with applicable regulations, as well as necessary funding, if such a site or necessary  !

funds are not available, DOE will consult with NRC and/or other Federal and l State agencies to determine if managing the material may be accomplished by other means.

l C. Coordination Officers Each agency shall designate an individual (s) who will serve as the respective coordination officer (s), or point (s) of contact (POC). The POCs will coordinate and facilitate actions required by their respective agencies. Additionally, they will establish Revision: December 3.1996, #2 8

l and maintain a calllist (names, phone, and fax numbers) of responsible persons for day-to-day contact on any matter related to this MOU, and shall provide this call list to each other, as requested and appropriate.

Vll. ELEMENTS OF COORDINATION A. Information Exchange Both agencies agree to exchange information with respect to relevant programs and

. lessons leamed. The purpose of the exchanges is to provide expert technical

, assistance to both agencies and to assist either agency by reducing or eliminating duplication of effort. The sharing ofinformation between DOE and NRC (and Agreement States as appropriate) will be exercised to the extent authorized by law (i.e. NRC and DOE directives, statutes, and regulations), and will be consistent with each agencies' missions.

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Both agencies recognize the need to protect from f ut>' ddisclosure, data and information that are exchanged between them, which fall withire ce definition of trade secrets, and confidential commercial or financial information. Both agencies agree to exchange proprietary information in accordance with applicable regulations and their regulatory authority. If a request calls for a disclosure determination regarding proprietary information obtained from either agency, such as a Freedom of Information Act request I t

or response to a Congressional inquiry - or either agency must comply with various regulatory or public information responsibilities - the agency responsible for the information will be promptly notified, by the other agency, of the need for disclosure of the information. The responsible agency will make any needed contact with the submitter of the protected information and will accept the responsibility for evaluating the submitter's comments, before rendering the disclosure determination.

B. Sharing Other Information DOE and NRC will also offer each other the opportunity to comment on regulations, regulatory guides, or other communications that refer to activities, policies, or regulations l of the other agency, that are relevant to this agreement. If practicable, the documents l will be provided for comment prior to issuance.

Either agency may request additionalinformation, whhn such is deemed necessary to complete its mission.

Vill. MEETINGS A. AnnualInter-Agency Meeting The following are the offices and officers responsible for this agreement:

1. For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Revision: December 3.1998. #2 9

Mail Stop T8-A23 Washington, D.C. 20555 Telephone: (301) 415-7800

2. For the U.S. Department of Energy-Deputy ssistant Secretary for Waste Management l Environmental Management U.S. Department of Energy Mail Stop 5B-040/FORS Washington, D.C. 20585 Telephone: (202) 586-0370 The DOE and NRC responsible officers, or their designated representatives, shall meet at least annually to evaluate the activities related to this MOU and make recommendations to agency heads on its effectiveness. DOE and NRC will host the meeting on altemating years.

B. Coordination Officers 1

Coordination officers, POCs, or their designated representatives, shall meet, on a semiannual basis, to discuss technicalissues related to this MOU, review the status of actions underway or planned, discuss any problems orissues, and recommend necessary changes. DOE and NRC shall host the meeting on altemate dates.

IX. OTHER LAWS AND MATTERS Nothing in this MOU shall be deemed to restrict, modify, or otherwise limit the application or enforcement of any laws of the United States with respect to matters specified herein, nor shall ariything in the MOU be construed as modifying, restricting, or directing the existing authority of either agency.

Nothing in this MOU shall be deemed to eslablish any right nor provide a basis for any action, either legal or equitable, by any person or class or persons challenging a govemment action or a failure to act.

This MOU shall not be used to obligate or commit funds or as the basis for the transfer of funds.

X. EFFECTIVE DATE, MODIFICATION, AND TERMINATION OF MOU This MOU may be further implemented by supplementary agreements in which authorized

- representatives of DOE and NRC may further amplify or otherwise modify the policy or provisions in the memorandum or any of its supplements, provided that any material modifications of the provisions or any of its supplements shall be subject to the approval of the authorized signatories of this memorandum or their designated representatives.

This MOU will take effect when it has been signed and dated by the authorized representatives of DOE and NRC. It may be modified by mutual written consent, or terminated by either agency upon 60 days advance written notice. The agencies agree to reevaluate this MOU at least Revision: December 3,1996, #2 10

O every five years, at which time either agency has the option of renewing, modifying, or terminating this MOU.

Approved and accepted for the Approved and accepted for the  !

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Department of Energy

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Carl J. Paperiello Mark'W. Frei Director Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Office of Nuclear Material Safety Waste Management and Safeguards Environmental Management

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ATTACHMENT 7 4 i

SOURCES SOUGHT SYNOPSIS FOR THE  !

ORPHAN SOURCE RECOVERY PLAN 1 -.

(Published in the Commerce Business Daily September 29,1998) j

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l September 25, 1998 I

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MEMORANDUM TO: Mary Mace, " Chief  !

i l Contract Management Branch 1 Division of Contracts and Property Management Office of Administration FROM: Gary S. Janosko, Chief Original signed by:

Resource Management Branch Program Management, Policy {

l Development and Analysis Staff l Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

SUBJECT:

SOURCES SOUGHT SYNOPSIS The Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety (IMNS), Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, has prepared the attached sources sought request for the project entitled.

" Orphan Source Recovery Program." This synopsis is not a request for proposals.

l IMNS has requested that the synopsis be sent out for the minimum period of time required.

Attachment:

Sources Sought Synopsis l

CONTACT: Carolyn Boyle, NMSS/PMDA 301-415 7818 j b

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([ C:RMEf j NAME CBoyle:cjb h DBr abus SMoore hfA GJak o DATE 09 8 /98 09/'2 [/98 09/.si/98 09/AN98 C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NO COPY l l- OFFICIAL RECORD COPY ]

G:\BOYLE\SSS lMNS,cjb ,

SOURCES SOUGHT SYNOPSIS FOR THE ORPHAN SOURCE RECOVERY PROGRAM The Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS)is seeking a contractor to provide an ongoing, readily available capability for the recovery and transfer or dispcsal of discrete " orphaned" radioactive material -- referred to as an orphan source -- that may be causing a health and safety risk to members of the public. Examples of orphan sources include licensed and/or unlicensed radioactive materialin any of the following conditions: l l

. In an uncontrolled condition which requires removal to protect the public health and safety from a radiological threat; Controlled or uncontrolled, but for which a responsible party cannot readily be identified; Controlled, but for which the continued security of the material cannot be assured; or In the possession of an unlicensed person who did not seek to possess the material.

This recovery may require the contractor to travel to the location of the material and recover, package, and deliver (or arrange for this service) the material for transport to an authorized l licensee or licensed near-surface disposal facility. The contractor may also be requested to identify potential recipients (other authorized licensees or acceptable disposal sites) or attemot to identify the sealed source and/or device (by isotope, activity, model number, serial number, manufacturer, or other identifying marks on the sealed source or device) in which the material is contained. In addition, the contractor would be expected to be available to respond to an identification of an orphan source in as little as 24 - 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, depending upon the health and safety threat posed by the material.

Types of radioactive material that may need to be recovered: ,

• Byproduct material (possibly also plutonium and depleted uranium shielding), as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, with a waste classification of C or less, as defined in $61.55 of 10 CFR Part 61; -

- The above radioactive material contained in sealed sources, either unshielded or contained in devices, and in various conditions (possibly even damaged). In some cases, the sealed source may be leaking and/or breached;

• Unsealed radioactive materialin a discrete condition (contained within a small area, such as activated metals or a sealed source that has been breached, but is contained);

and

. Radioactive material which cannot initially be well-defined, such as unidentified isotope, activity, form, or condition.

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2-Capabilities that would be required:

. "On-demand

• responses to identification of an orphan source that would require recovery and transfer or disposal; i 1

. Appropriate license (s) and/or authorization (s) that would allow recovery of a broad range of the radioactive materials,. as outlined above, possessed by authorized and unauthorized persons;

. Ability to package and transport radioactive material, including: i

. knowledge and understanding of DOT and NRC packaging and transport ,

regulations and requirements; I

- ability to prepare and transport Type A a id Type B shipments. and determine which type shipment would be appropriate or required;

. access to both Type A and B shipping containers; and

. a quality assurance program approved in accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, Subpart H, and applicable Agreement State equivalents (i.e., authorization to package and transport Type B shipments from within NRC jurisdiction and from any Agreement State).

. Knowledge of the requirements for, and ability to prepare, radioactive material for disposal in a licensed near-surface land disposal facility (low-level waste disposal site);

. Ability to respond to locations within all 50 states and territories of the United States;

. Ability to separate, if needed, sealed sources from the devices in which they may be installed for disposal purposes; and

. Decontamination and clean-up ability would only be required for activities directly associated with a recovery operation.

Other factors'that may or may not be required, but which would be helpful:

. Familiarity with sealed sources, and the devices in which they may be installed, for

( identification purposes and an ability to perform an analysis of the sealed source and/or l device for the following:

. isotope (s) identification;

. activity determination; l

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determination of identifying markings (such as model number, serial number, l l

manufacturer's logo or trademark, etc.) on the sealed source and/or device. This may require varying degrees of cleaning of the sealed source or device and i magnification of identifying markings, such as micro-engraving (no greater than I i

50X magnification, typically 10X); and I

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rough dimensions (typically to within 10% accuracy; sealed sources may be as small as 1.0 x 1.0 mm (0.039" x 0.039").

Ability to photograph (under magnification, if necessary) sealed source or device identifying markings for transmittal to NRC for identification purposes; and Means to identify interested parties who may want or be authorized to accept the radioactive material for reuse (i.e., determine potential alternatives to disposal).

Examp'e3 include other licensed users, ra.licactive material sealed source and device manufacturers waste brokers, and s iled source and device service companies.

Interested firms shou ld submit written capability statements. The capability statements shall address the capability to conduct recovery and transfer or disposal activities discussed above.

It is not a requirement for interested firms to show capabilities in the "other factors' areas discussed above, but capabilities in all areas are preferred.

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