ML20206H862
| ML20206H862 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1986 |
| From: | SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP. (FORMERLY |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206H861 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-03-82-096, CON-NRC-3-82-96 NUDOCS 8606260337 | |
| Download: ML20206H862 (311) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:, DRAFT TECHNICAL EVALUATION , OF THE ,- l DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW FOR NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY'S PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 D February 19, 1986 M p Prepared by: f Science Applications International Corporation 1710 Goodridge Drive McLean, Virginia 22102 Under Contract to: F U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l j Washington, D.C. 20555 j Contract No. NRC-03'-82-096 l l . DRAFT l 8606260337 860612 PDR ADOCK 05000282
- p PDR
FOREWORD This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) under Contract NRC-03-82-096, Technical Assistance in Support of NRC Licensing Actions: Program Ill. The NRC previously reviewed Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant's (PINGP) Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan submitted on May 27, 1983 and subsequently performed an on-site, in-progress audit during March 6-9, 1984. The results of the audit were transmitted to PINGP on JQly 17, 1984. a status PINGP responded to the NRC's audit report by formally submitting 1985. On March 11, 1985, the NRC agreed to an exten-report sion on January 31,to the submittal date of PINGP's DCRDR Summary Report until Januar 1986. PINGP submitted the Summary Report in December 1985. This Technical Evaluation Report is based upon the information supplied in PINGP's Summary Report submitted in December 1985 as well as the previous
- information exchanges documented above.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace Section 1 BACKGR0VND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 PLANNING PHASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 1. Preparation and Submission of a Program Plan . . . . i . .
- 2. Establishment of a Qualified Multidisciplinary 4
Review Team ....................... 5 REVIEW PHASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
............ 6
- 1. Operating Experience Review (OER) 8
- 2. System Function and Task Analysis (SRTA) . . . . . . . . .
- 3. Comparison of Display and Control-Requirements- With a ------ -- .-- . . . . _
Control Room Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12
- 4. Validation of Control Room Functions . . . . . . ....
13
- 5. Control Room Survey ................... ,
ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ................... 19 jj 4:V 20 **'
- 1. Assessment of HEDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......
..... 24
- 2. Selection of Control Room Design Improvements
- 3. Verification That Improvements Will Provide the Necessary Corrections and Will Not Introduce Any 26 New HEDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- 4. Coordination of DCRDR Effort With Other NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Improvement Programs ............ 28 Proposed Schedules for Implementing HED Corrections ... 29 5.
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CCRRECTIVE ACTIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS 31 FOR HEDs LEFT UNCORRECTED ..................... 31
- 1. Proposed Corrective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
33
- 2. Justification for HEDs To Be Left Uncorrected ......
.................. 36 CONCLUSIONS ann RECOMMENDATIONS 40 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
APPENDIX A - HEDs With Corrective or Proposed Corrective Action .. 42
........ 47 APPENDIX B - Justification for No Corrective Action iii
i 1 i
. TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE I DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW FOR NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY'S f i
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 i . ,
- This report documents the findings of SAIC's technical evaluation of I the Northern States Power Company's Summary Report of the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) of the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Pl ant, {
Units 1 and 2 (PINGP). The purpose of the evaluation was fourfold: (1)- to determine whether the DCRDR conducted by PINGP as documented in the Summary Report is acceptable; (2) to recommend to the NRC whether an on-site, pre- l implementation audit or a meeting should be conducted; (3) to provide an , l audit or meeting agenda where appropriate; and (4) to provide a basis for , J feedback to PINGP. The requirement set forth in Supplement 1 t'o NUREG-0737,
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' titl'ed " Requirements for Emergency Response Capability" December 1982 $.
(Reference 1), served as the basis of the Summary Report evaluation. PINGP's DCRDR began with.the submittal of the Program Plan to the NRC
! on May 27, 1983 (Reference 2). The NRC staff comments on the Program Plan were forwarded to PINGP on November 9, 1983 (Reference 3)." An on-site, in-progress audit was conducted at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 on March 6-9, 1984, and the findings of the audit were forwarded to PINGP on July 17, 1984 (Reference 4). Northern States Power
- Company submitted a PINGP DCRDR status report and response to.the March 1984 in-progress audit (Reference 5). In response to the status report, the NRC agreed on March 11, 1985 to an extension of the completion date for the DCRDR with the Summary Report submittal due on January 1, 1986. The NRC received Northern States Power Company's submittal of the PINGP Summary Report in December 1985 (Reference 7). The findings of SAIC's evaluation of the PINGP Summary Report follows a brief overview of a discussion of the background requirements of the DCRDR process.
BACKGROUND ' Licensees and applicants for operating licenses are required to conduct
' a Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR). The objective is to " improve 1 , - - - - -,_-.----w,- - . . . . - - . - , . ,-,..----r----------,-w .--__3.-% ,,,-y-'*w- +-
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the ability of nuclear power plant control room operators to prevent acci-dents or cope with accidents if they occur by improving the information provided to them" (NUREG-0660, Item I.D.1). The need to conduct a DCRDR was confirmed in NUREG-0737 and in Supplement I to NUREG-0737. The DCRDR requirements in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 replaced those in earlier docu-ments. Supplement I to NUREG-0737 requires each applicant or licensee to , conduct its DCRDR on a schedule negotiated with the NRC. Gui,delines for l conducting a DCRDR are provided in NUREG-0700 while the review and assess-ment processes for the NRC are contained in NUREG-0800 (The cited NUREG documents are References 8 through 10, respectively, except for Supplement I to NUREG-0737 which is Reference 1.) A DCRDR is to be conducted according to the licensee's own Program Plan (which must be submitted to the NRC). According to NUREG-0700, the DCRDR program should include four phases: (1) planning, (2) review, (3) assessment and implementation, and (4) reporting. The product of the last phase is a 'N Summary Report which, according to Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, must include N. an outline of proposed control room changes, their proposed schedules for h implementation, and summary justification for human engineering discrepan-cies with safety significance to be lef' uncorrected or partially corrected. Upon receipt of the licensee's Summary Report and prior to implementation of proposed changes, the NRC must prepare a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) indicating the acceptability of the DCRDR (not just the Summary Report). The NRC's evaluation encompasses all documentation as well as briefings, discus-sions, and audits, if any were conducted. The purpose of this Technical Evaluation Report is to assist the NRC by providing a technical evaluation of the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant DCRDR process and results. The DCRDR requirements as stated in Supplement I to NUREG-0737 can be summarized in terms of the nin'e specific elements listed below:
- 1. Establishment of a qualified multidisciplinary review team.
- 2. Use of function and task analysis to identify control room operator
, tasks and information and control requirements during emergency
- operations.
2 b .
- 3. A comparison of display and control requirements with a control room inventory.
- 4. A control room survey to identify deviations from accepted human factors principles.
- 5. Assessment of human engineering discrepancies (HEDs) to determine which HEDs are significant and should be corrected.
- 6. Selection of design improvements that will correct those discrepan-cies.
~ Verification that selected design improvements will provide the 7. necessary correction. Verification that improvements can be introduced in the control 8. room without creating any unacceptable human engineering discrepan- y
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cies.
- 9. Coordination of control room improvements with changes resulting from other improvements programs such as SPDS, operator training, new instrumentation (Reg. Guide 1.97, Rev. 2), and upgraded emer-gency operating procedures.
PLANNING PHASE
- 1. Preparation and Submission of a Program Plan The NRC staff reviewed Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant's Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan submitted for Units 1 and
- 2. The NRC staff ~ reviewed the Program Plan with reference to the require-ment of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 and the guidance contained in NUREG-0700 and NUREG-0800, and transmitted comments to PINGP by memorandum dated ,
November 9, 1983. In summary, the NRC review found, "The NSP Program Plan addressed most of the DCRDR requirements stated in Supplement 1 to NUREG- l 0737. It did not address verification that improvements will provide neces-sary correction of HEDs or verification that improvements will not introduce hew HEDs. Other requirements were addressed, but the discussion did not l 3
I allow full understanding of how they would be accomplished. As a result, the adequacy of the DCRDR proposed for Prairie Island Units 1 and 2 cold not be fully evaluated." The current SAIC technical evaluation of the PINGP DCRDR, provided below, is based upon all information available to date and is arranged in order of the nine DCRDR elements identified in Supplement I to (1UREG-0737.
- 2. Establishment of a Qualified Multidisciplinary Review Team The NRC in-progress audit team concluded that the Praire Island Control Room Design Review Team was composed of an adequate mix of disciplines that met the guidelines in NUREG-0800. Moreover, the DCRDR team possessed the appropriate authority to carry out their missions and appeared to be ade-quately organized to conduct the DCRDR and technical assignments. The team ..
members' task assignments and levels of involvement were also appropriate. t-y As described in the Summary Report, the DCRDR team consisted of a core +' committee of specialists with expertise in human factors engineering, plant operations, system engineerng, instrumentation and controls engineering, and training. Even though the presence of a qualified nuclear engineer had not been explicitly indicated, all three of the project engineers possessed over five years of applied experience in the nuclear industry. Four of the committee . members were from PINGP and reported directly to the Plant Manager.' Three we'r e from the Nuclear Technical Services engineering group, and while located' at the plant site, they reported to the Northern States Power (NSP) Company's general office management through the manager of Nuclear Technical Services. The Human Interface Systems Department of the Honeywell Inc. Technology Strategy Center (HTSC) provided the expertise in human factors engineering. Expertise in nuclear control room systems review and task analysis were provided by Quadrex Corporation as a subcontractor. A supplemental group of specialists was available from NSP and HTSC when I needed to assist the core committee. An examination of the resumes of 'the 4 DCRDR team members confirms the adequacy and appropriate mix of the team constituents. In .accordance with NUREG-0800 guidelines, the PINGP DCRDR effort was conducted under the auspices of an NSP employee, the Superintendent of 4
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4 dis-HEDs and recommendations to correct the Nuclear Technical Services. Plant j crepancies were generated by the DCRDR Committee and presented to the which was composed of "on-site staff key supervisors Operations Committee Adequate ' interactions and who acted as advisors to the plant manager." the DCRDR and Operations Committees were ensured by communication between the fact that four members (two project engineers and two operations l In addition, any DCRDR Committee l specialists) sat on both the committees. In case of a member was free to raise issues to the Operations Committee. l disagreement between the recc.nmendations of the Operations Committee be and th Plant Manager, the course of action determined by the Plant Manager to the most " conservative" would be taken. of the DCRDR team members participated throughout the All but one One additional Senior Operations Specialist and a entire review process. DCRDR . ,; , Superintendent of Quality Assurance from the plant were added to the An additional project ;;u _ jj Committee after the Program Plan was submitted. Despite this, it engineer was added apparently after the in-progress audit. the DCRDR 4 ! is concluded that adequate continuity has been demonstrated for effort at PINGP. 4 In conclusion, it is evident that the important prerequisites for j establishing and supporting a qualified multidisciplinary review team, namely, the management and structure, team composition and member qualifi-cations, task assignments, levels of involvement and team support and inter-this actions, are present in PINGP's DCRDR effort 'and therefore satisfies requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. 1 REVIEW PHASE PINGP's review phase activities as listed in the Summary Report include the following:
! 1. Operating Experience Review (0ER)
- 2. Component Checklist Review
- 3. .Workspace Survey
- 4. System Review and Task Analysis (SRTA)
- 5. . Verification of Control Room Activities k
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- 6. Validation of Task Performance Capability
- 7. Review of Remote Shutdown Capability The above activities, excluding No. 7, are those recommended by NUREG-0700 guidelines as contributing to the review phase objectives. Activities No. 2, 3, 4 and 5 contribute to the accomplishment of specific DCRDR requirements contained in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. NUREG-Q800 includes remote shutdown capability as part of the NRC review of the DCRDR program (see NUREG-0800, Appendix A, Section 1 titled, " Areas of Review."
- 1. Operating Experience Review (0ER)
A review of operating experience is not a requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. However, such an effort is valuable in identifying events and HEDs which affect the safe operation of the pl ant, especially since , PINGP has a ten-year operational history. In conformar.-c with NUREG-0700 T guidelines, the PINGP OER was comprised of two parts: operator question- h naires/ interviews and a historical document review. First, a sample of 5 operators were interviewed to identify problems. Desirable, as well I as undesirable, system features were noted in the course of operations and in preparation for operations of the plant. Then, the archives of plant opera-tional experience were gleaned for circumstances contributing to human performance problems. Relevant HEDs were unveiled as a result of the OER. During the in-progress audit, the NRC audit team concluded that the PINGP OER was being performed in a manner which leads to a succeessful DCRDR program. Twelve of the thirty-six licensed operators at PINGP were interviewed. Although the exact sampling method was not described, they represented a one-third sample of operators of different ages with diverse educational background and plant operating experience. The interviews (each took three hours on average) were comprised of structured, open-ended questionnaire and oral interviews. Each of the chosen operators was interviewed.by a member of the human factors team, and anonymity was maintained throughout the DCRDR process. The questionnaire consisted of detailed questions about the advantages, disadvantages, and operational history of control room com-ponents and control room ambience. In addition, a set of critical incident questions were incorporated into the questionnaires to allow discussions of 6 I i _ , _ . -__ _ _ r - - - . - - . _ _ . , , , . - - - _ _ . . . _ - - - _-
The data anything that did not fall easily into the structured categories. were analyzed in two stages. First, the data were condensed into an inter-view transcription summary. Then, utilizing NUREG-0700 Section .6 listings - as guides, relevant HEDs were extracted from the transcription summary. . This process resulted in the identification of 80 HEDs. Review of plant operating experience included 647 reports, of various operating events that occurred during the period from preoperational testing an in 1973 to the end of 1983. Two criteria had been adopted to identify First, the problem must appear event which warranted further consideration. Second, the potentially amenable to human factors engineering solutions. problem was either " operational or in an on-line maintenance activity linked to operations." The establishment of these criteria represents PINGP's attempt to derive operational guidelines from NUREG-0700 recommendations for the identification of operating experience-related HEDs. There is a concern, however, that the incorporation of such criteria may exclude those f HEDs which are less obvious and which are prohibitively difficult to N correct. A closer examination of the actual.0ER procedure obviates this M concern. During the OER, a computer listing containing brief summaries of all Abnormal Occurrence Reports, Reportable Occurrence Reports, Significant Operating Event Reports, . and Unusual Event Reports was examined by human factors specialists to discard obvious cases of equipment failures, off-line maintenance errors, and externally caused disturbances (e.g., problems caused by lightning strikes). All undiscarded reports were reviewed in their entirety, as were all Shutdown and Trip Reports. As a result, 244 of the 647 reports had been thoroughly examined disclosing a total of 13 related HEDs. In conclusion, the PINGP OER is extensive, thorough, and appropriately The performed using technically sound methodology based on NUREG-0700. effort identified a total of 93 HEDs. The OER would be more thorough, ' however,. if the DCRDR team could peruse beyond the plant-specific documents } and include industry-wide reports (e.g., LER experiences with generic j Moreover, the applicability) as promulgated in the NUREG-0700 guidelines. NRC in-progress audit team also recommended development of a plan for keep-ing the operating experience surveys current even after the DCRDR. St.ch a suggestion would prove valuable throughout the operational life of the pl ant. 7 l i I
- 2. System Review and Task Analysis (SRTA)
The objective of PINGP's 'SRTA was to establish the traceability of the information and control needs for safe operation of the plant with suffi-cient depth and detail to identify the specific operating and performance characteristics of instrumentation in the control room. To accomplish this objective, the generic Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG) Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS), High Pressure Version, Revision 1, April 15, 1983, was used as the basis for PINGP's plant-specific task analysis methodology. The plant-specific SRTA was structured to follow the generic WOG SRTA as closely as possible. The foundation of the WOG's task analysis is based upon a generic reference Westinghouse PWR. To determine the applicability of actions specified in the generic techn'ical guidelines to PINGP, a comparison was performed between the reference plant and Units 1 and 2. Each of the 25 generic plant systems described in the ERG background documentation was . . compared to the Prairie Island systems and a list of differences was obtained. These differences were reviewed to determine whether they would . $3 impact any significant safety consequences. As a result of the review, it I was concluded that no safety-significant differences exist between Prairie Island plant instrumentation and controls and those described for the reference plant. - The development of plant-specific procedures involved the review of generic guidelines, supporting background information, existing plant emer-gency, abnormal, and normal operating procedures, and other plant reference material (Technical Specifications, Updated Safety Analysis Report, Flow and 1.ogic Diagrams). Where the ERGS required plant-specific steps, they were developed from a review of existing procedures, system drawings, or discus-sion with plant operators. Appropriate task criteria were written and entered into the E0P. Consolidation of certain ERG steps was done in the E0Ps to assist in operator performance of the tasks. Setpoints were also researched using plant. documentation, and a setpoint document was created for use in the procedures development to ensure consistency and accuracy. A , total of 33 E0Ps were developed for PINGP and are identified in Table 3-9 ! (page 3-29) of PINGPs Summary Report. 1 i The, plant-specific SRTA effort was performed on-site at PINGP by a consult' ant from the Quadrex Corporation. The consultant held a Senior i
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i Reactor Operator (SRO) license at a Westinghouse PWR plant and had nuclear The consultant helped to ensure power operations instruction experience. the independence, accuracy and comprehensiveness of the SRTA process and was an attempt by PINGP to minimize the influence of any bias from plant-specific knowledge of operational tasks, and equipment configurations. , The plant-specific SRTA was structured by PINGP to follow ,the generic WOG's SRTA as closely as possible. Detailed operator task requirements were identified in Element Tables which provided an expanded treatment of the technical guidance that was developed in the E0Ps. These tables identified l the knowledge and skill requirements that are essential in the performance of the task or subtask decision and action requirements. This decomposition - process was intended to identify special knowledge or training requirements beyond a general knowledge of overall plant operations. Repeated tasks were identified and a tracking . methodology using an identification number enabled the procedures personnel to improve consistency between procedures and by N' training personnel 'to identify common tasks between procedures. { p 4.e A matrix was also developed by PINGP to identify required sequential relationships between guideline tasks. This information identified the j plant systems that an operator must access to perform specific tasks and was used by the procedures personnel to help in evaluating the sequencing of tasks in order to optimize efficiency. 4 In conclusion, PINGP has developed a system review and task analysis that uses the Westinghouse Owners Group, Emergency Response Guidelines, Revision 1, to develop plant-specific E0Ps. The information and control needs were developed primarily from the ERG, Rev. 1, background documenta-tion in conjunction with a Subject Matter Expert (SME). To determine the applicability of the information and control needs specified in the ERG generic guidelines, a comparison was performed between generic information and control needs used in performing the ERGS and Prairie Island Units 1 and l 2. This review indicated that there were no . safety-significant pl ant-specific deviations. The SME then reviewed, independent of the control room, the background materials and Step Description Tables of the ERGS to l determine information and control needs. PINGP identified the information and control needs and associated characteristics separately in Element Tables by task and subtask. The Instrumentation Requirements Table and the 9 y- ,-m, ,,mr, - e v-- 2 +- 7-- , g_ , -. , -,--~~w- -m. . , w , - -
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Controls Requirements Table summarizes the instrumentation and controls and operational characteristics that are used in the PINGP's plant-specific E0Ps. and Control jff A review of the Element Tables and the Instrumentation documentation for Requirements Tables determined that there is inadequate the reviewers to identify how plant-specific information and cont'rol charac- ! or were derived from background documentation of Revision 1 ERGS teristics NUREG-0800, Appendix A, Section 2.2(3), l from plant-specific information. titl ed, "Use of Function and Task Analysis," is clear in describing the level of detail beginning with, " Analyze the operator tasks to determine the the characteristics of information and control capability needed to perform the task." PINGP should provida the above information in a supplement to (), $ I 7 I Summary Report and be prepared to discuss the SRTA process at a meeting with\~ yh.; the NRC in Bethesda, Maryl and. The reviewers require an explanation of how control -lf needed plant-specific characteristics for operator inf:rmation and u the task and . 12 needs were developed and recorded (an auditable record) at 7J subtask level. The explanation should specifically address item No. 4 from the NRC comments developed from the March 29, 1984 meeting between the NRC and the l That is, "for each instrument and control used to WOG (Reference 13). implement the emergency operating procedures, there should be an auditable I record of how the needed characteristics should be derived from Revi-the informa-tion and control needs identified in the background documentation of sion 1 of the ERG or from plant-specific information." This information is needed in order to draw a satisfactory conclusion to PINGPs SRTA effort and to meet the requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. a Control Room
- 3. Comparison of Display and Control Requirements with Inventory and The SRTA results provided the basis for comparing the information s ,
power control needs identified for effective monitoring and control of the room. This production process to an existing inventory of the control comparison process determined if the neccessary control and displays were available in the control room and were suitable for accomplishing the 10 1 I
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I tasks and subtasks. The control room identified SRTA system functions, inventory satisfies the requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. Verification of Task Performance Cacability The process used by PINGP to develop the control room inventory was 13, 1985, only briefly discussed in the Summary Report and in PINGPs January response to the NRC's in-processs audit. However, the description of the verification process was described in enough detail to determine the i The verification of task perform-adequacy of.the control room inventory. engineer-ance capability was accomplished by a multidisciplinary team with The verification process ing, operations, and human factors expertise. involved two steps: i e Verification of Availability - verification of the presence or 4* absence of instruments and equipment that provide the information i and control capabilities necessary to implement the task.
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?i' e Verification of Suitability - determination of whether the man-machine interfaces provided by the displays, controls, and other control room features are suitable to support task accomplishment effectively.
I The basis of instrument and display availability and suitability at
' Prairie Island was the information and control needs associated with plant Group emergency operating procedures as defined in the Westinghouse Owners ERGS and supporting background material. Characteristics of instrumentation .--
necessary for meeting these requirements were developed as part of the SRTA Instrumentation Tables, and process, i.e., plant-specific Element Tables, Worksheets were prepared by team members to record and Control Tables. audit the information and control requirements, required characteristics, for and the available control room instrumentation from the plant inventory each task of the E0Ps. First, the availability of displays and controls was checked for completeness by matching the instrument number for components in the control needs. Missing control room room with the SRTA information and control
. instrumentation and controls were documented as an HED.
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i Second, the suitability of existing displays and controls was verified by comparing the SRTA information and control requirements anJ associated characteristics with the existing control room inventory. In conclusion, the verification process generated a total of 44 HEDs. i A review of the individual HED descriptions provides support for a success-ful verification process. The types of discrepancies resultin,g. from the I comparison process for availability and suitability are indicative of a thorough DCRDR verification. The SRTA was accomplished with ' sufficient depth and detail to extract successfully some of the following examples of discrepancies: missing parameters or meter values, values not easily read, lack of required precision, -inappropriate meter scale ranges or scale incompatibility, or the absence of required displays. The verification process meets the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.
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- 4. Validation of Control Room Functions 3$
I The validation of control room functions was undertaken to determine @ l whether the functions allocated to the control room operators can in fact be 1 accomplished effectively within the stucture of the plant-specific emergency operating procedures and within the confines of the present control room design. The validation process was performed by a multidisciplinary team composed of engineering, operations, and human factors expertise. In addi-tion, during the simulated event sequences, a senior simulator training instructor, with SR0 credentials, orchestrated the walk-throughs and talk-throughs for the selected event sequences. The validation of control room functions for PINGP, Units 1 and 2 were i accomplished by using a functional, full-scale simulator with equipment components identical to those used in the Unit 1 control room. Event-oriented sequences were developed to cover the four principle . workstations along the control boards for each Unit in the PINGP control room. PINGP was careful to include both R0 and SR0 tasks and used a subtantial portion of ] the E0Ps. The event sequences selected were: e Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident e , Inadequate Core Cooling ! e ATWS Followed by Loss of Off-Site Power , I 12 e _ . . - _ _ . - , - _ , _ , , , , , , , . . -- .g.%u-. vi w*. - - - - p %..g_ .3 .
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7 e Multiple Failures of Tubes in a Single Steam Generator and Tube Ruptures in More Than One Steam Generator. The validation process generated 53 HEDs. Several discrepancies were identified because of the location of three systems outside the primary control room area, e.g., Reactor Vessel Level Indication System, Core Exit Thermocouple Console, and Radiation Monitoring Panel. HEDs,.were also generated where personnel availability was judged to be-inadequate and where sequence. Inadequate the order cf control usage following no natural display and control relationships were also identified as HEDs. In summary, the validation of control room function was successful in generating a total of 53 HEDs. Overall, PINGP has provided a detailed description of what appears to have been a well-planned and executed valida-tion process. The process appears to be consistent with the guidelines of , T' NUREG-0700 and that all control room workstations were exercised as part of . the four event sequences that were utliized. Real-time exercises were not [ empl oyed, however PINGP did employ applicable survey checklist items from 7 NUREG-0700, Section 6, after each walk-through. PINGP should pay particular attention to the three tasks where inadequate operator staffing was identi-fied but no corrective action was deemed necessary. Cumulative effects may be of some concern due to 12 additional HEDs identified for the requirement of extreme interpanel movement and 16 HEDs on inadequate display / control relationships. A real-time simulated exercise of the three tasks using the Unit 1 simulator on a dynamic basis should be performed prior to satisfying < this DCRDR element. PINGP should reassess these HED solutions, especially if both Units 1 and 2 could potentially.be_ involved _.in_ emergency sequences at the same time.
- 5. Control Room Survey As described in NUREG-0700, the objective of the control room survey is "to identify any characteristics of instruments, equipment, layout, and ambient conditions that do not conform to precepts of good human engineering The practice, regardless of the particular system or task requirements."
PINGP control room survey was comprised of a component checklist review and a workspace survey, and was found to be consistent with NRC guidelines during the in-progress audit. . e 13
4 The purpose of the component checklist review was to evaluate control 4 room components for compliance with human engineering guidelines without As reference to specific task performance and operating procedure. l described in the Summary Report, checklists were developed to check conform-4 ance using guidelines in Section 6 of NUREG-0700. Component information obtained from three sources was evaluated against the checklists. The three sources included the control room, a black and white photomosaic 11:3 scale) of the control panels, and a full-scale color mock-up of the control room. In l The actual control room was used only occasionally as a cross-check. " all,159 HEDs were identified in the component checklist review. A worldspace survey was performed to se;pisment the component checklist l ' NUREG-0700 indicates that contc .com workspace survey should . review. ~ address "the general ' layout, availability, and accessibility of operating equipment and materials; the anthropometric suitability of work stations; ,. 2 coordination and separation in multiunit control rooms; availability and l accessibility of emergency equipment; and environmental factors." Specifi- h cally, the 'PINGP workspace survey had examined the following aspects' (the numbers of HEDs identified are shown in brackets): o Communications (5) i e Annunciator warning system (20)* e Auditory environment and noise (0) e Illumination and emergency lighting (2)- e Control room workspace (10) e Mirror-imaging of Units 1 and 2 (1) i e Panel layout and control-display integration (37) e Labels and location aids (11)
- See " Selection of Design Improvements" in this report.
{ 4 NUREG-0700 was referenced for guidance throughout the survey. However, ; the elements of the PINGP workspace survey are depicted as separate from and l independent of the section covering " control room workspace" in NUREG-0700. l It is an area of concern when different groupings of elements result in a less than comprehensive survey of control room workspace. Ceitain aspects of the survey which are recommended in NUREG-0700 Section 6 appear to have 1 ' been excluded from the survey. Those excluded were: emergency equipment t 14
(6.1.4), temperature and humidity (6.1.5.1), ventilation (6.1.5.2), personal storage (6.1.5.6), and process computer (6.7). The present survey should be extended to examine these areas. Moreover, the in-progress audit team was informed during its visit to PINGP that the DCRDR survey team "was comparing the control room against NUREG-0700 guidelines with. some quantitative differences as recommended by INP0." NUTAC Control Room Design Review Survey Development Guidelines were also cited in the "PINGP 'In-Progress Audit Report Concer . Recommendations Response" to justify deviations from NUREG-0700 guidelines. Despite these, only the NUREG-0700 was referenced for guidance in the PINGP Summary Report. It might be the case that the PINGP survey team had decided to turn to NUREG-0700 for guidance or that in fact other guidelines were used in addition to NUREG-0700 and as a result a few areas of the control room survey may be inadequately addressed. These concerns must be addressed with a supplementary submittal before the survey requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 can be satisfied. p Three other facets of the PINGP workspace survey warrant further discussion. They include the mirror-imaging of Units l'and 2, the remote shutdown panel survey, and the review of differences between NUREG-0700 guidelines and the PINGP checklist. Mirror-Imacina of Units 1 and 2 The in-progress audit team had expressed concern about the potential problems related to mirror-imaging of PINGP Units 1 and 2 control rooms during the visit to the plant. The team was then reassured by NSP that a study would be performed to identify problems and remedial measures. Hence, the extent and type of mirror-imaging of Units 1 and 2 was estimated, as was the likelihood of its potential adverse effects on the operators' perform-
~
It was disclosed that the control panels for the~~two'~ units ~ are
~ ~
ance. mirror-imaged at the system level . However, the individual components within the subsystems were found to be " cookie-cuttered," meaning they, were arranged in the same format and order within a panel on both units. Any differences between the two control panels for Units 1 and 2 that deviated from this panel layout " rule" were identified as HEDs. Twenty-seven dis-crepancies were identified and found not to degrade the operators' perform-ance. Another thirteen HEDs were corrected during the panel redesign sfforts and one HED was improved by enhancement. 15
Remote Shutdown Panel Survev Even though not a requirement in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, a human engineering review of the remote shutdown capability is strongly recommended by the NRC. The objective of the review is' to ensure that the remote shutdown functions are adequately supported by the " hot" shutdown panel. ~ As recommended by the in-progress audit team, such a review was' performed in the PINGP DCRDR effort using NUREG-0700 guidelines to evaluate the following: e Auditory environment and noise e Illumination e Workspace e Panel layout and control / display integration e Labels and location aids ., Fy 4 S
; i:'
The deficiencies identified were improved by corrective actions followed by jd. evaluations using a full-scale color mock-up. These were accomplished in 1983 before the formal DCRDR.
\
Review of Differences Between NUREG-0700 Guidelites and PINGP Convention Soecifications An examination of the licensee's submittals reveals that PINGP used NUTAC (INP0) guidelines in developing its conventions specifications. The in-progress audit team advised that the PINGP ' conventions specifications
- should be checked against NUREG-0700 guidelines for differences. NSP con-curred with the suggestion and responded in the above-mentioned submittal with an " Evaluation of Design Conventions Specifications against NUREG-0700 Guidelines" in which 14 differences were noted from NUREG-0700. These HEDs and PINGP's exceptions to NUREG-0700 guidelines are examined in the ensuing paragraphs
[1], [7), and [14): 6.3.3.5.d(3), 6.5.1.3.d(3), and 6.6.4.2.b(2) , i i The team concurred that NUREG-0700 Section 6.6.4.2.b(2) includes additional information which is inconsistent with 6. 3. 3 . 5.'d (3 ) and 6.5.1.3.d(3), and that the PINGP convention is acceptable. 16
~ ~ ., , u ,n-, ,,- -- . _, ,...n, n ~ n. - . . _ - _ -
[2]: 6.4.2.1 PINGP's convention is acceptable provided it will be used consistently within the same type of equipment while NUREG-0700 still applies to other , prescribed areas. [3]: 6.4.4.5.d (1)(a) . As indicated in NUREG-0700, position indication for rotary selector controls can be either illuminated indicator lights, a lina engraved both on the top of the knob and down the side, or a pointar shape. Control handle orientation alone would not suffice for positive position indication, especially for operations under stressful situations. Moreover, illuminated indicator light is not the only alternative to correct the deficiency, as also alluded to in the rationale for this item. PINGP's convention is not , ,p acceptable. a h n [4]: 6.4.4.5.d(1)(b) Alignment of a colored dot with an engraved line may be used for control position indication provided the size, color, and position of the dot on the thumbswitches are appropriate. In general, the dot should be I large enough for detection, but not unduely large making alignment with the engraved line difficult. The color of the dot should enable the dot to be seen against the color of the background and the ambient illumination. Positioning of the dot should enhance fine alignment with the engraved line. PINGP's convention is acceptable. , [5] 6.4.5.1.d(2)(b) It is noted that the proposed size of trough distance is almost- two times the dimension recommended in NUREG-0700 (1 1/8 in. .versus 0.45 - 0.75 g If there is a proportional increase in the diameter of the thumb- P in.). wheel, then it would be considered unduely large. PINGP's convention is not acceptable until information is provided on the prospective size of the i thumbwheel with a full description and photograph. NUREG-0700 recommends that the. diameter of the thumbwheel be 1.5 - 2.5 in. l 17
., ,. - ,-e-- - , --
l i [6] and [13]: 6.5.1.3.c(1) and 6.6.4.1.b(1) The pit 1GP convention of using white vinyl lettering on .the black annunciator bezel for identification of annunciator rows and columns is acceptable. [8] 6.3.1.6.c(2) . Again, the convention is acceptable provided it will be used consis-tently within the same type of equipment while flUREG-0700 still applies to other areas. [9] 6.5.3.1.c(1) The Summary Report review team decided that an indication of "motoi- .p,. start not recommended" is considered to be a caution (probably also an p important one). Indicator illumination should be used. PINGP's convention .~yl is unacceptable. +" [10] 6.6.2.1.a The convention reads " labels are consistently placed below the indi-cators to which they refer, and above the controls to which they refer with one e ception: controllers have their label below the indicator and corrol." Basically, the convention is acceptable if it is consistently imp i er.ted as stated. Caution should be exercised, however, to avoid redur. cant labels, and to include adequate spacing between unrelated labels to avoid confusion. NUTAC Control Room Design Survey Development Guideline (Appendix H, p. H-1) was cited in the PINGP conventions evaluation in support of this convention. [11] 6.6.2.4.c This convention is acceptable provided it will be used consistently for the same type of equipment throughout the control room. NUREG-0700 will
.3 )
still apply to other pertinent areas. -However, there is some concern about PINGP's , intent certaining " auto / manual" switches are mentioned as being affected. This "all or nothing" approach must be clarified by PINGP. 18
,sr-- :u---.w-a a +. - _
d [12] 6.6.3.8.a PINGP's convention is unacceptable as all control positions .should be (K) positively identified. In conclusion, three PINGP conventions are unacceptable (items 3, 9, and 12), two require further clarification bifore judgment ,can be made concerning their appropriateness (items 5 and 11), and the remainder of the items are acceptable. Several of the workspace survey checklists have not been addressed in an explicit and thorough manner even though some HEDs were g generated using these items. The deficient areas include emergency equip-ment (6.1.4), temperature and humidity (6.1.5.1), ventilation (6.1.5.2), personal storage (6.1.5.6), and process computer (6.7). The concern is that the usage of guidelines other than NUREG-0700 may have resulted in an incomplete survey. q~ PINGP should resurvey areas affected by specific checklist items j identified above and provide documentation and results of the resurvey in a (C: I supplemental submittal in order to meet the requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 for this DCRDR element. ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION The assessment phase of PINGP's DCRDR was begun to determine (1) the significance of the HEDs on the operators' ability to perform the necessary tasks, and (2) the resulting consequences of an error on plant safety and public safety. A systematic method was established by PINGP with the following three objectives: e Assess the relative degree of degradation of operator performance caused by each HED. e Assess the effect on plant safety and public safety of each HED. e Consider the possible interactions and cumulative effects of HEDs. The. HED assessment methodology was comprised of five activities which are described below. The work was led by a human factors specialist 19
, - - . - - - . - , _ _ - , , ~ - . , . , . , . ~ . . . . , _ , _ - . _ . , _ _ . _ _ _ -
. . . . - . , _ _ _ ,.,.-..,-4-,,.e- 7 ,
and performed by the human factors team together with the Control Room Design Review Committee. Each step of the process was subject to review and approval by the Committee. e Compilation of HEDs e Initial Categorization e Significance Rating of HEDs . e HED Priority Categories e Interactive and Cumulative Effects
- 1. Assessment of HEDs Based upon the guidance contained in f1VREG-0800 and the requirements of fiUREG-0737, Supplement 1, all HEDs should be assessed for safety significance. In addition, the potential for operator error and the consequence of that error, in terms of plant safety, should be [. ,
systematically considered as part of the HED assessment process. The h purpose of classifying HEDs should be twofold: (1) to determine which HEDs are significant and should be corrected, and (2) to determine scheduling priorities for implementing HED corrections.
'As a result of a recommendation frca the f1RC in-progress audit (Reference 4), PI!1GP created a computer-based data storage and retrieval system using an IBM-PC/XT computer and dBase III software. During the crea-tion of the data base, information was reviewed for accuracy, completeness and consistency. In addition, the HED descriptions were expanded, human performance information was added, and the list of affected components was reviewed to ensure that the data base contained a complete record of the HEDs.
At the beginning of the HED assessment process, certain HEDs were extracted from the data base which dealt with: e Inconsistent nomenclature on labels in the control room o fionstandard location of information on labels e Poor contrast and readability of labels e , Scale values and graduations for meters e Zone markings on meters l 20 l
4 - Lz-, -
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- I
< e Nonstandard color coding practice i I e Inconsistent direction of control movement e Lack of identification of discrete control positions e Standardization of instrument and control relationships 1 These HEDs were reviewed using PINGP documentation contained in
" Prairie Island Human Engineering Design Requirements and, Conventions Specification," (Reference 13). The human factors specialists and both the Chairman and Senior Engineer of the Control Room Design Review Committee extracted a list of 128 HEDs falling into the above categories and fully documented in Appendix C of PINGP's Summary Report. Their recommendations I
for corrective action were submitted directly to the DCRDR Review-Committee for approval in accordance with NUREG-0800, Appendix A (p.18.1-A22). 4 However, in order to ensure that'the 128 HEDs did not involve any unreviewed safety questions (per NUREG-0800), a review of these HEDs was performed outside the normal assessment process, e.g., these HEDs were not i prioritized. The results of PINGP's review of these HEDs were contained in 77 a study titled: " Evaluations of Design Conventions Specifications Against NUREG-0700 Guidelines," dated November 1984 (Reference 12). Because the convention specification was excluded from the Summary Report submittal , f SAIC has not been able to review this cocument. ( In conclusion, since the 128 HEDs identified in Appendix C have. not been considered under PINGP's assessment methodology for a significance rating or HED priority categorization, either a review must be performed as recommended in NUREG-0700, Section 4.2.1.1 titled, " Assessment for Safety Consequences"; or PINGP should provide proper documentation, justifications l with safety consequences, if any, for excluding these HEDs from the l remainder of assessment process. There are six reports identified on pp. 2-10 and 2-11 of the Summary Report (Sections 2.3.4, " Design Requirement and Conventions Specifications" and 2.3.5 " Human Engineering Discrepancy Assess-ment Results") that should be provided as part of this supplementary submit-tal as supporting source-documentation for the assessment process. 21
. . - _ _ _ . . , . . , _ _ _ , _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ , _ . . , _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ , _._.,m _ ,, ...,, m.,..,,,,n_
Methodoloov for Sionificance Ratino The DCRDR team determined the significance of a design problem in the control room by assessing: e The probability of human error associated with the HED.
~
e The severity of consequences that may result from an error. This assessment was accomplished by modifying the questions contained
; in NUREG-0800, Appendix A (pp. 18.1-A18-A19). The DCRDR team de'. eloped a five-point rating scale format for the items organized under the following four topics:
e Documented Event / Conditions - Whether an operator performance error ..gy l . or operating condition is documented in event reports or reported :b in operator interviews. M2 e Operator Performance - The likelihood and impact of potential operator performance errors with respect to physical, sensory, perceptual, and cognitive performance. e Emergency Systems / Functions - The consequences for public safety of i potential errors induced by an HED. 4 e Plant Operating Conditions - The consequences for plant operating conditions of potential errors induced by an HED. HED Priority Cateoories
~
Once the rating of HED significance was completed, the DCRDR team interpreted the data using the following steps: e Determine weighting of criticality and importance of each item on the HED r.ating form and compute weighted scores for each of the four sections. i 22 1
o Factor the weighted scores to create assessment scales for public and plant safety consequences. e Determine distributions of assessment scales and classify priority of HED/ instrument combinations. PINGP used an elaborate assessment process to determine the placement of an HE0 into a priority category. PINGP's priority classification system was developed to determine a schedule for correcting HEDs based upon each HED's safety consequences. PINGP identified five priority categories as useful for planning correction schedules: o Priority 1 - Prompt Correction e Priority 2 - Near-Term Correction e Priority 3 - Long-term Correction .p. e Priority 4 - Optional Correction i e Priority 5 - No Discrepancy ld The HED resolutions that were generated for each HED used these cate-gories as guidelines for the PINGP's correction schedule. Several assump-
~
- tions were used by the DCRDR team to help guide the team in making these i
~
- decisions. These assumptions were
e Errors documented as recorded events should be an important ' criterion of high priority. , J j e Error conditions reported in interviews should be an important I criterion of high priority. e High scores on the public safety consequences scale should be an ) important criterion of high priority. 1 I l e Scores on the plant safety consequences scale should be of lesser importance in establishing priority, i The assessment of HEDs produced the following distribution of HED priority. classifications: I i l 23 i
- ~ . - _ _ . -. - , _ __ _ - . , , , , .
PRIORITY NUMBER OF HEDS
- 1. Prompt Correction 5 1 2. Near-Term Correction 262
- 3. Long-Term Correction 788
- 4. Optional Correction 167
- 5. No Discrepancy 994 -
Total - 2,216 In conclusion, PINGP has used a systematic methodology in assessing HEDs. This integrated approach recognizes the interrelationships among HEDs and has attempted to group the HEDs into integrated control room packages by using a panel by panel approach. Such an integrated approach usually I requires that many of the individual HED corrections be implemented at the same time regardless of classification. However, the schedule for - imple- .g menting these corrections should be driven by the priority classification of p the most significant HEDs. The 128 HEDs addressed by the " Design Require- 25 ments and Convention Specification" listed in Table 4-1 (page 4-5) of the Summary Report, deviated from the DCRDR assessment process and were not prioritized but were reviewed separately for involvement in plant safety. This review was not described in sufficient detail in the Summary Report. PINGP is required to reassess and prioritize these 128 HEDs with the meth-odology described in the Summary Report or provide the rationale for using another assessment process in order to meet the requirement of Supplement I to NUREG-0737.
- 2. Selection of Control Room Design Improvements In selecting design improvements, the DCRDR team made good use of the Prairie Island control room mock-up where the layout of the proposed design changes were represented in full-scale ' color. A set of blueprints were also developed that dacumented the redesign as well as descriptions of full panel redesign for all the instrumentation and controls on panels A, B, C, D, E, F. The level of effort which PINGP has invested in this particular effort, both in terms.of breadth and depth, should pay large dividends especially considering the magnitude of changes for the control room and control panels.
24 t
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v The general methodology followed by the team was: e Review proposed resolution of HEDs pertaining to old design and determine alternatives for implementaiton of corrections. e Prepare preliminary concept design for retrofit of existing design. e Implement design change on full-scale paper mock-up. i' e Conduct preliminary design review and modification involving the - following team members: i
- Operating Staff
- - Control Room Design Review Committee
- Human Factors Specialists ;;p l D j e Implement design change on full-scale color mock-up. M g.. .
I e Conduct secondary design review and modifications. i
- Operating Staff
- C'ontrol Room Design Review Committee PINGP has developed a technically sound process to develop design improvements paying attention to the need for an integrated and consistent control room (s). The DCRDR team has made extensive use of the full-scale mock-up, which was stressed by the NRC audit team during the in-progress [ t audit, to assess the integrated effect of the design improvements and j enchancements. However, there is specific concern about the narrow focus of the HED integration effort especially related to the planned modifications '
of the annunciator / alarm warning system identified . Table 4-14 (pp. 4-34 and 4-35). There are approxinately 10 annunciator / alarm HEDs (006-S through 025-S) which are rated as category 5 but which should be integ-ated with the
.other annunciator HEDs (category 3) and evaluated for the potential for cumulative system effects (see Appendix,B-4). In addition, there are several Labeling HEDs (080-C and 041-S) which should be included in the l labeling, and scaling conventions study because of the potential cumulative l effects that 'hould s be considered. There is also concern that design solu-25-
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tions for category 2 discrepancies should not be remedied by a total reliance upon the SPDS, which is not a category 1-E safety grade system (see Appendix A-6 of this report). (
\ ($
( ' In conclusion, the licensee should review the HEDs in Appendix A-6 and B-4 for cumulative effects and provide detailed justifications for PINGP's prioritization, corrective action, and final resolution for each HED in a supplemental submittal. Conclusions regarding the licensee's satisfaction of this DCRDR requirement cannot be provided until such a submittal is reviewed.
- 3. Verification That Improvements Will Provide the Necessary Corrections and Will Not Introduce Any New HEDs A human engineering review of proposed redesigned panel sections was .
g. conducted for each panel individually; interpanel design effects were con- 7, sidered together. This verification process examined HEDs in priority 3d d' categories 1 through 4 and evaluated how existing HEDs are resolved by the redesign by the following steps: o Perform human engineering review of design concept by:
~
- Component design review
- Workspace survey
- Verification of task performance capability
- Validation of control room functions.
- e Prepare blueprints of final design concept and determine cost estimates of retrofit.
e Assess safety consequences of unresolved discrepancies pertaining l to the new design. i l i i e Obtain final design approval from plant management. e Implement modifications on the PINGP Unit 1 simulator. 26 1 j 4 _.r_._ , . , , , . _ . . _ ~ ,., . _ ,.
G t e Obtain a dynamic evaluation of the modified configuration during operator training and testing for all shifts and conduct survey with operators and instructors regarding the modifications. e Implement modifications on the plant control boards. e Resurvey operators when startup and testing occurs on' the main control board. PINGP has put a substantial amount of effort into reviewing HEDs generated from the DCRDR Review Phase and has benefited from that effort by focusing design solutions not only on individual HEDs but also on a panel by panel overview. The thoroughness of the HED review process for the control room modifications was extensively documented in Section 5 of the Summary Report. In several instances, the validation process which was conducted on y, the full-scale color mock-up revealed that instruments on the F-Panel were not needed for successful completion of the E0Ps; therefore, several normal Jc, operating procedures were utilized to evaluate the panel effectively. In addition, reactor operators and instructors were surveyed during training exercises in the simulator to collect additional operating experience with the newly installed C-Panel redesign. As a result of the thorough review of all design solutions, the DCRDR team made a comparison of the HEDs generated from the process to verify HED solutions and those H;Ds identified from the initial DCRDR Review Phase. This comparison resulted in three categories of HEDs: e Existing HEDs already documented - These discrepancies were HEDs already identified during the DCRDR. e New potential HEDs - The discrepancies in this category were HEDs created by the introduction of the redesign in the control room (32 HEDs were identified) (see Table 5-15). . 9 Existing HEDs not previously documented - This set of discrepancies pertains to the existing design but were not identified during the
,DCRDR (38 HEDs were identified).
27
e e The review of all design solutions also resulted in the identifica-tion of HEDs that were: (1) fully corrected, (2) partially corrected, and (3) not corrected by the redesign. Justifications which proposed correction of these HEDs are given in Appendix D of the Summary Report. . These new HEDS were added to the data base in November 1985 after being assessed and prioritized, and having appropriate resolutions developed in accordance with the assessment process discussed in this technical evaluation. In conclusion, PINGP has described a process and has provided results which not only verify the effectiveness of corrective actions but also is effsctive in identifying additional HEDs'that were not apparent during the Review Phase. This effort meets the requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG- cf 0737. 7
- 4. Coordination of DCRDR Effort With Other Improvement Programs The NSP Program Plan indicated t: =t the PINGP DCRDR effort would be integrated with other elements of the Emergency Response Capabilities .as stipulated in NUREG-0737 Supplement 1. These elements include the Safety Parameter Display System, Regulatory Guide 1.97, Emergency Operations Procedures, and Emergency Response Facilities. An iterative procedure would be used to ensure that "all criteria are1 consistent with each other, all significant human engineering discrepancies are being resolved, and all necessary interfaces with the other elements have occurred." However, the mechanics of the coordination were not fully described in the Program Plan and therefore the adequacy of the planned coordination could not be eval-uated in the NRC Program Plan review. PINGP has indicated that a mock-up i would be used to assess the integrated effect of the design- improvemen'ts,---- -
enhancements, and modifications affecting the control room and the j simulator. During the in-progress audit, it was established that members of the l PINGP DCRDR team also served as responsible members for the other improvement programs. The audit team concluded that the overlap of team , involvement in all programs would facilitate the coordination of these ! 28
efforts. The team also advised that particular attention should be paid to coordinating control room and simulator modifications so that operator performance would be enhanced. The coordination of the various . emergency-related improvement programs was not explicitly addressed in the PINGP Summary Report, apart from a terse statement indicating that the "SPDS modifications and Regulatory Guide 1.97 modifications will be performed in accordance with Generic Letter 82-33 confirmatory order dates."' NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 also indicates that the results of DCRDR should be applied to " train and qualify plant operating staff regarding upgraded E0Ps and modifications." It is important for the plant operators to become familiar with the modifications that will be made as a result of DCRDR. No such plan was projected in the PINGP Summary Report. In conclusion, additional information is required in order to review hy the integrated approach PINGP is now using to ensure close coordination of g the improvement programs for the Emergency Operating Procedures, Control $ Room Design Review, Regulatory Guide 1.97, Safety Parameter Display, Emer-gency Response Facilities and operator training. That information should be provided in a supplement to the Summary Report. Conclusions regarding the licensee's satisfaction of this DCRDR requirement _cannot be provided until such a submittal is reviewed.
- 5. Proposed Schedules for Implementing HED Corrections PINGP's propose'd schedule for implementing DCRDR design improvements in the control room began in 1983 and will be completed by 1990. The implemented redesign solutions to the control room are detailed below:
e Installed control room carpeting in 1983. I e Installed new shift supervisors' office in 1984. e Modified control boards on Units 1 and 2, and simulator for four systems on C-Panel and B-Panel in 1985:
- NIS and Rod Control
- Reactor Cooling 29 y ,. ,...,___}m, , . _ . . . _ . . -.- . - _ , , _ . __ - . . . . .,
CVCS Make-up CVCS Letdown , e Will modify Steam Generator System D-Panels on the simulator and on Units 1 and 2 in 1986. The Control Room Design Review Committee has evaluated and ipproved the conceptual design for Panels A, E, F, and the remaining systems on Panel B. These design solutions have been implemented on the Unit control board full-scale mock-up as part of the assessment and implementation process. However, final implementation schedules have not been established due to a yet to be conducted review of capital improvements that is scheduled for April 1986 for all expenditures occurring after 1986. PINGP should provide implementation schedules for all HED corrective ;p actions in order to satisfy the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. 1., Easier solutions should not be delayed while design solutions, procurement, and installation for more difficult problems are worked out and implemented. I[ Surface changes should proceed as quickly as possible, while intrinsic changes may have to wait for scheduled shutdowns. Correcting large groups of HEDs may extend to two refueling outages from submittal of the Summary Report, but justification for that decision should be based upon a correc- ( tion schedule that implements solutions to HEDs with regard to the safety significance of the discrepancies upon operator performance. I j 'In ' conclusion, PINGP should submit schedules for implementation and a summary justification for HEDs with safety significance to be left uncor-rected or partially corrected taking into accound the review of HEDs requested in this report (see Appendix A and B). PINGP should also identify each HED (a total of 2,216 HEDs were identified) grouped under the five priority categories listed on p. 23 of this report.
~
- - ~ - ~ ~
l The concern here ~is that Appendix C and Appendix D of the Summary Report identify 128 HEDs and 391 HEDs, respectively. A table displaying priority by HED by resolution by I implementation schedule date for all 2,216 HEDs would be entremely helpful. I 30
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HEDS LEFT
- UNCORRECTED PINGP has documented 2216 HEDs in its Summary Report. Of these, 5 were designated for prompt correction; 262 were selected for near-term correc-tion; 788 were selected for long-term correction; 167 were designated for optional correction; and 994 were determined to be not discrepaht'. The SAIC staff reviewed all of the HEDs listed in Appendix D of the Summary Report and found many, but not all, of the HEDs to be satisfactorily resolved by PINPG. Those HEDs for which corrective actions were proposed were found to fall into two basic categories
- either tne corrective actions were found to be satisfactory, or they were found to be lacking for a specific reason.
Appendix A of this report discusses this group of HEDs. A second group of HEDs for which justifications for not taking corrective actions were provided was also divided into two main-categories: the justifications were .q '. adequate, or they were found to be inadequate. Appendix B of this report 2. discusses this group of HEDs. $k2 4 The reviewers find that in addition to the grouping of all the HEDs into categories described below, there is one group which warrants special (3, mention. That group involves 18 HEDs for which the proposed solution involves the use of the SPDS. The reviewers find that this solution is not adequate because the SPDS is not qualified as 1-E, e.g., a failure of the SPDS would require the operator to revert to the uncorrected set of instru-i ments or controls. Below are the Appendix A and B group designations A-1 through A-6, and B-1 through B-10 for HEDs with and without proposed corrections, respec-ti ve'ly. Examples of each type are given to illustrate the particular concern. Complete listings are given in Appendices A and B.
- 1. Proposed Corrective Action Appendix A of this report contains the complete list of HEDs for which corrective actions were proposed or already implemented by FINPG. Many .of the actions were found to be adequate, but some actions were found to. be inadequate for one of several reasons discussed below:
31
.- , - , . .- _ .-- .- _ - _ -n.-.., ,,,y _,, .-w- - - - - _ . -
A-1 The corrective action appears adequate (already implemented). A-2 The proposed corrective action should correct the HED (correction has not been implemented yet). A-3 The proposed corrective action is to comply with plant convention specifications which have not been provided as a p' art of the Summary Report. HED-018-I: During operator interviews, it was reported that
" components are illogically arranged." The proposed corrective action to redesign panel B will conform with the plant convention specification. The reviewers have not been provided with a copy of this specification and therefore cannot assess the resolution.
(
.,g.
A-4 The corrective / proposed corrective action does not appear to #1
~
resolve the HED fully; more action may be needed. M, . y HED-004-R: The HED concerns the resetting of a complicated diesel generator interlock. The corrective action deals with training as a fix rather than a change to the existing hardware. The fact that a training plan has been " routinely given since 1977" may provide a clue that operators still have a problem with this interlock and that training may not be an appropriate solution. A-5 The description of the corrective / proposed corrective action can-not be evaluated because the description is too ambiguous, brief or general. HED-022-I-02: The HED was discovered during operator interview and deals with the difficulty in reading various recorders. A redesign for panels A, D, and E are cited by PINPG as resolving the HED, but no det' ails are given. A-6 The proposed corrective action may not be adequate due to the non-' T ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1.E. classification of the SPDS. I 3:
. 1
HED-001-x: The discrepancy involves what may be excessive operator movement during various task sequences requiring RCS parameters. The proposed solution is to incorporate these para- b meters on the SPDS rather than add more indication to the SI panel. If the SPDS is not classified as 1-E, then this solution is not adequate (also see " Validation of Control Room Functions," ] in this TER).
- 2. Justification for HEDs To Be left Uncorrected Appendix B of this report contains the complete list of HEDs for which justifications for not taking corrective actions were provided. Many of the justif,ications were found to be adequate, but some were inadequate as dis-l cussed below.
j B-1 Justification is adequate. [- - b: B-2 The justification for no corrective action is too ambiguous, brief or general to permit evaluation. HED 006-V. The verification step of the DCRDR uncovered numerous , rotary selections for controls used during emergency operations. NUREG-0700 calls for distinctive enhancement techniques to distin-guish controls used during emergency from other controls. PINPG justified no correct.ive action by the fact that " emergency
- controls comprise more than 50% of the controls on the master l control panel s" and that " enhancement of these controls would i promote confusion with present coding." There is no indication of what the present coding scheme is or why enhancement of emergency controls wcald be confusing. The fact that more than 50% of the controls are emergency related provides sufficient reason for corrections to be made. Further, it appears that a subset of controls in this, and seven similar HEDs in Appendix B-2 have high public safety (rating) concern, as well as high HED priority (priority 2), and yet will not be enhanced. Without provision of further explicit details, this kind _of justification is unaccept-able.
33
B-3 The justification for no corrective action is based on PINGP's plan convention specification, which was not submitted for review. HED 409-C-01. The 01 correction code for this HED concerns the location of rotary selectors. PINGP has justified locating them on an upper panel in accordance with its convention sp,ecification. Because the convention specification was not submitted, it is difficult to assess this justification. S B-4 Justification for no corrective action for individual HEDs may not have considered cumulative or interactive effects of other HEDs. HED 10-S: The lack of any visual coding scheme for alarm priority levels appears to be a generic problem since no specific panel or annunciator is singled out in this HED. This is one of ten such "O HEDs, all of which have to do with discrepancies associated with ti Annunciator Warning Systems. Despite their interrelationships, no indication is provided to demonstrate whether consideration was given to the possibility that there could be cumulative or inter-active effects among these HEDs. This, plus the fact that each of these HEDs is also noted as having associated safety consequences, would indicate that their having been placed in Priority Category 5, "No Discrepancy," was inappropriate. B-5 HEDs undergoing additional study. HED 029-I: The discrepancy involves nuisance alarms during a trip or startup which distract attention. PINGP will study the annun-ciator/ alarm system during 1986, hence the resolution of this HED is incomplete. B-6 HEDs prioritized as "no discrepancy." HED 034-S: Operators should be well trained and accustomed to
.using of equipment. This 4ED, and many others in this Appendix, have been resolved in the disposition of other HEDs which enveloped the problems described. The reviewers feel that the categorization of HEDs listed in this Appendix constitutes legiti-34
i l mate justifications for no corrective action and therefore, no additional PINGP action is necessary. B-7 The resolution does not address the problem / discrepancy. HED 034-V: The discrepancy discusses meter scales, whereas the justification for no correction discusses the use of'the meter, together with indicator lights, to verify that a system is in service. It is not clear that the meters associated with this HED have been adequately addressed. B-8 Justification for no corrective action should be provided to address operational or behavioral factors. HED 034-X: This HED is one example of many HEDs which involves 4 '.- the availability of personnel to deal with an emergency situation in a single unit. The resolution for this HED as with others is "
~
to pull operators off of the unit which has no emergency and assign them to the unit which has the emergency. Operational factors as they may effect both units do not appear to be addressed (see " Validation of Control Room Functions," in _ this TER). B-9 The proposed disposition is inconsistent with the HED prioritiza-tion. HED 010-X: This HED was discovered during the validation and deals with response time to a warning conditicn. The public safety rating was 31, very close to the highest safety rating for all HEDs, and yet no corrective action was taken. The justifica-tion that "most of the time, required responses are completed prior to the E-1/ task 19 resulting in a response time which is adequate to perform the task" does not address the times which are not "most of the time." What happens then? Is the risk to public safety increased? 35
I B-10 Inadequate justification - faulty rationale. HED 030-S: The HED concerns acoustical interference and status representation for each unit. The justification for no action , does not discuss the acoustical interference, rather it discusses status boards for each of the two units and common equipment. The lk$ results of the audit for the environmental and noise' survey were not addressed in the Summary Repcrt to show if acoustical inter-ference is within NUREG-0700 guidelines. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Northern States Power Company's DCRDR conducted at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units l'and 2 demonstrates a strong commitment towards meeting the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. In general, it f appears that PINGP's DCRDR effort is one of the best initiatives being y ducted by a utility. The extensive modifications to the control panels con- and to the overall M# l control room layout are indicative of the high degree of commitment of the utilities management as well as of the capability of the
- DCRDR team. The documentation reviewed, beginning with the Program Plan through the Summary Report, provided extensive discussisons of the planning, review, assessment; and implementation activities being conducted to perform the ,
DCRDR and indicates that Northern States Power Company basically will meet most of the requirements. Howeve additional information is required from the licensee to provide assuran ; that all the requirements as stated in NUREG-0737, Supplement I have been satisfied. The following is a summary of opens items, extracted from the body of this report, that require further information, explanation or DCRDR activi-ties by PINGP review team. These open items are briefly summarized below but have been described in detail under each of the DCRDR elements in this technical evaluation report.
- 1. System Review and Task Analy;is e
A' review of the Element Tables and the Instrumentation and Control
, Requirements Tables determined there is inadequate documentation for the reviewers to identify how plant-specific information and 36
- _ . , _ _ - , -- _ _ - - - _ , - , - - _ . _ , , . . - _ , , - . . , , u-,,,-
control characterisites were derived from background documentation of Revision 1 ERGS or from plant-specific information. NUREG-0800, Appendix A, Section 2.2(3), titled, "Use of Function and Task Analysis" is clear in describing the level of detail beginning with, " Analyze the operator tasks to determine the characteristics of information and control capability needed .to perform the task." PINGP should provide the above information in a suppitment to the Summary Report and be prepared to discuss the SRTA process at a meeting with the NRC in Bethesda, Maryland. The reviewers require an explanation of how needed plant-specific characteristics for operator information and control needs were developed and recorded (an auditable record) at the task and subtask level.
-l The explanation should specifically address item No. 4 from the NRC comments developed from the March 29, 1984 meeting between the NRC .
and the WOG (Reference 13). That is, "for each instrument and j, control used to implement the emergency operating procedures, there :- should be an auditable record of how the needed characteristics should be derived from the information and control needs identified in the background documentation of Revision 1 of the ERG or from plant-specific information." This information is needed in order to draw a satisfactory conclusion to PINGPs SRTA effort and to meet the requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.
- 2. Control Room Validatier, e During the validation of control room functions, several HEDs were generated involving indaequate personnel staffing, extreme inter-panel movement between tasks, and inadequate display / control rela-tionships. In addition, these HEDs involved three tasks in the E0Ps (See Table 3-17, NUREG-0737 guidelines 6.8.1.1.a, 6.1.1.2, 6.9.1.2.a, and 6.9.2.2.a of the Summary Report) . A total of .31 HEDs were identified. Twenty-one of these HEDs were identified as requiring "no corrective action" and seven HEDs were corrected by future SPDS implementation, which has been deemed an inappropriate solution. PINGP is encouraged to reassess the three E0P tasks
,under real-time dynamic conditions to evaluate fully the cumulative and interactive effects of these HEDs. All 31 HEDs should be resub-37
l mitted with appropriate reassessment documentaton and justifica-tions for corrective actions.
- 3. Control Room Survey e Workspace survey checklists for emergency equipment (6.1.4), ,
temperature and humidity (6.1.5.1), ventilation' '(6.1.5.2.), personal storage (6.1.5.6), and process computer (6.7), have not been addressed in an explicit manner, although some HEDs have been generated on these items. Have all items of NUREG-0700, Section 6, been utilized in the control room survey? The concern is that the I usage of guidelines other than NUREG-0700 may have resulted in a less than complete survey. e A review of the differences between NUREG-0700 guidelines and PINGP @ conventions specifications revealed that three of the PINGP conven-g tions are unacceptable (items 3, 9, and 12) and should be & a.- reassessed using corresponding NUREG-0700 guidelines (6.4.4.5.d(1)(a), 6.5.3.1.C(1), and 6.6.3.8.a). Two of the conven-tions specifications require further clarification before judgment can be made concerning their appropriateness (items 5 and 11; corresponding NUREG-0700 guidelines are 6.4.5.1.d(2)(b) and 6.6.2.4.C). The rest of the PINGP conventions specifications are acceptable. e PINGP should resurvey relevant areas affected by specific checklist items identified above and provide documentation and result.s of the resurvey in a supplemental submittal.
- 4. HED Assessment e The 128 HEDs identified in Appendix C of the Summary Report were not considered under PINGP's assessment methodology for signifi-cance ratings or priority categorization. PINGP should reassess these HEDs or provide proper documentation and justification for excluding these HEDs from the remainder of the assessment process.
How were these HEDs considered for cumulative and interactive effects with other HEDs in Appendix 0 (See Appendix B-4 of this 38
report for an example)? Also there are six reports identified on pp. 2-10 and 2-11 of the Summary Report (Sections 2.3.4 " Design Requirement and Conventions Specifications" and 2.3.5 " Human Engineering Discrepancy Assessment Results") that should be provided as part of this supplementary submittal as supporting source documentation for the assessment process.
- 5. Selection of Design Improvements e
The concerns raised relate to the cumulative effects from HEDs developed from the use of annunciators and labeling which are ' 3 identified Appendix A-6 and 8-4. 'PIttGP's response should not only relate to specific HED corrective actions but should try to reassure reviewers' doubts about the adequacy of the solution process and provide detailed justifications for PIf1GP's prioritiza-qs tion, corrective action and final resolution for each HED. . . . b
- 6. Coordination of DCRDR Efforts 49 e
pit 1GP should describe its coordination efforts and how pit 1GP's Intergation Plan developed in response to Generic Letter 82-33 is currently being integrated for all the control room elements, e.g., The Emergency Response Capability Plan, etc.). Also include how training is integrated within the coordination of these programs.
- 7. Schedules for Implementation HED Corrections e
pit 1GP should submit schedules for implementation and a summary justification for HEDs with safety significance to be left uncor-rected or partially corrected taking into account the review of HEDs requested in this report (see Appendix A and B). PIttGP should also identify each . HED (a total .f 2,216 HEDs were identified) grouped under the five priority cate ories listed on p. 22 of this report. The concern here is that Appendix C and Appendix 0 of the Summary . Report identify 128 HEDs and 391 HEDs, respectively. A table displaying Priority by HED by resolution by ' implementation schedule date for all 2,216 HEDs would be extremely helpful. 39
I l 1 REFERENCES -
- 1. NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, " Requirements for Emergency Response Capa-bility," U.S. NRC, Washington, D.C., December 1982, transmitted to reactor licensees via Generic Letter 82-33, December 17, 1982.
- 2. Letter to Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, if.S. NRC from D. Musolf, Manager, Nuclear Support Services, NSP.
Subject:
" Supple-ment I to NUREG-0737, April 15, 1983, Response to Generic Letter 82-33 Control Room Design Review Program Plan Submittal," for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, dated May 27, 1983.
- 3. " Nuclear Regul atory Commission Staff Comments on the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan," U.S. NRC, November 9, 1983. -
;.4c
- 4. "In-Progress Audit Report of the Detailed Control Room Design Review kI '
47r. e for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2," U.S. NRC, July 17, 1984.
- 5. " Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Detailed Control Room Design
~
Review Status Report and Response to March J.984 In-Progress Audit," Northern States Power Company, January 31, 1985.
- 6. " Detailed Control Room Design Review Summary Report, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (Report Number 10188-PI-8000)," Northern States Power Company Nuclear Technical Services Department and Honey-well Inc. Technology Strategy Center, December 1985.
- 7. NUREG-0660, "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident," U.S. NRC, May 1980; Revision 1, August'1980.
- 8. NUREG-0737, " Requirements for Emergency Response Capability," U.S. NRC, Washington, D.C., November 1980.
- 9. NUREG-0700, " Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews," U.S. NRC, Washington, D.C., September 1981.
40
i
- 10. NUREG-0800, " Evaluation ' Criteria for Detailed Control Room Design Review," U.S. NRC, October 1981.
A
- 11. " Evaluation of Design Conventions Specifications Against NUREG-0700 Guidelines," Honeywell Inc. Technology Strategy Center, November 1984.
I i 12. " Human Engineering Design Requirements and Conventions' Regarding i Component Design, Labeling, and Abbreviations," PING-678A, Revision.l. Northern States Power Company, Prairie Island Nuclear. Generating Plant, October 1985.
- 13. Memorandum from H. Brent Clayton, Section Leader, Procedures ~ and Systems Review Branch, Division of Human Factors Safety, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, United States' Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief, Procedures and. Systems Review . Branch. ae; Subject " Meeting Summary - Task Analysis Requirements of Supplement 1 iti '
1 2: to NUREG-0737 - March 29,- 1984 Meeting With Westinghouse Owners Group .st i-4
, Procedures Subcommittee and Other Interested Persons," April 5, 1984.
I i r I i i i i i l . 41 i I..._._..., - . _ _ _ . . , - - . , . . - - _ . - - - , . . - - . . - __. _ - , _ . . , _ _ . . - . . . - , . _ _ - _ . - _ - , - _ _ _ - . . , . - , , , , . _ -
APPENDIX A
.s HEDs WITH CORRECTIVE OR PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION
-(I f
0
',' i ll%
y t e l l 42 e \
A-1 The Implemented Action Appears Adequate l The corrective action implemented for these HEDs is satisfactory. No
] response is necessary from PINGP.
HED Code Number HED Code Number 1 .- i 024-C 057-I l 025-C 058-I { 084-C-01 060-I 084-C-03 077-I i 085-C 079-I-03
} 086-C-01 ! 001-R-01 j 008-I-01 -
001-R-02 014-I 002-R i .,,,jp 022-I-03 010-R . ;/[. i 032-I 023-S i 038-I 2/7.
! 031-S-02 ##
J i 049-I 042-V-01 054-I 019-X J i 1 4 4 9 e J 43 4 I
- l A-2 The Proposed Corrective Action Should Correct the HED The proposed corrective actions for these HEDs should correct the discrepancy. No response is necessary from PINGP.
k HED Code Number HED Code Number HED Code Number
.~
j 001-C 022-I-02 049-S 010-C 025-I 049-S-02
- 023-C 027-I 051-S 035-C 031-I 053-S
.i '036-C 036-I 058-S { 037-C 039-I 068-S ] 038-C 045-I 070-S j 084-C-02 056-I 072-S-01 ., gy ! 085-C-02 059-I 072-S-02 l 7 085-C-04 061-I 078-S 1 1 086-C-03 pr 066-I 096-S f 086-C-04 067-I \ 020-V l 086-C-05 075-I 030-V 093-C 079-I-01 035-V u 130-C 079-I-02 038-V 131-C 006-R 043-V-06 003-I 008-R 044-V 004-I 009-R 001-X 008-I-02 013-R 009-X 008-I-04 024-S 014-X 015-I-02 027-S 021-X 020-1 031-S-01 022-X 022-I-01 037-5-01 023-X il 4 ? 44
,,,-.,w-,, - - . - . , - - ..,- - - - - - e --,_-~ -w. ,-.w,. , r y-,,,..,.w.--.-,nt--,, ..nw-.- ,
v r. , . , , , . , - - -
A-3 The Proposed Corrective Action Complies With PINGP's Plant Conventions Specification SAIC has not reviewed the convention specification and cannot determine the adequacy of the corrective actions for these HEDs until PINGP supplies the appropriate documentation. This is an open item. HE0 Code Number 046-C-02 144-C 017-I 018-I (()k) 019-I A-4 4* The Corrective / Proposed Action Does Not Appear to Fully Resolve the HED 4 Y:, Supplemental 8;l-information is required for the justification of the
- corrective action. This is an open item.
HED Code Number 004-R A-5 The Description of the Corrective or Proposed Corrective Action Cannot - Be Evaluated Because the Description is too Ambiguous or General Additional information is required to describe the solutions for these two tion. HEDs in order to understand the corrective action and make This is an open item. an evalua-HED Code Number 003-R 507-V 45
4 [ l ! i A-6 The Proposed Corrective Action Is Not Adequate Due to the Non-IE Safety { Grade Classification of the.SPDS F Alternative solutions are required for these HEDs to display the required information in the control room. This is an open item. - l HED Code Number HED Code Number ' l Oll-I 043-X
&- /
j 055-I 044-X l 026-S 045-X 001-V 046-X 002-V 047-X l 042-V-03 048-X 028-X 049-X i V~. 029-X 050-X :. : u
!, 030-X 051-X U ~
031-X 052-X # i 032-X 053-X 033-X 1 , 4 i i 1 i h i i t i i l i ! 1
)
! 46 i l I . _ , _ , . _ . _ . - - - . _ _ _ . . _ . . . -
E I 1 APPENDIX B JUSTIFICATION FOR NO CORRECTIVE ACTION
$ s 4 .'
n! e f e 9 47
3 l B-1 Justification for No Corrective Action Is Adequate The corrective action developed for these HEDs is appropriate. No , response from PINGP is necessary. HED Code Number HED Code Number HED Code Number 046-C-01 041-I 400-S i 089-C 042-I 401-S
! 108-C 046-1 600-S 109-C 047-I 601-S 110-C ,048-I' 004-V 111-C 050-1 019-V 134-C 051-I .021-V 135-C 065-I-01 026-V ;S 154-C 065-I-02 028-V i Tli 409-C-02 065-I-03 029-V-01 25 411-C 068-I 029-V-02 500-C -
069-I 033-V-01 l 608-C 073-I 033-V-02 001-I 074-I
~ 042-V-02 006-I 078-I 306-V 008-I-03 080-I 308-V 009-I 011-R 607-V 010-I 012-R 608-V 012 I ' 018-S 002-X 013-I 028-S 006-X 016-I 037-S-02 007-X ~
022-I-04 059-S 008-X 022-I-05 060-S 012-X 023-I 051-S 016-X
- 028-I 063-S 018-X
- 030-1 065-S 020-X !
034-I 067-S 024-X 035-I 084-5 025-X 037-I 085-S 026-X F 48 i s 1
. _ - . . . - . _ , - . - . - . _ , - , - . . - . - _ - . . _ . , . . . ~ - - . - . . - _ - . . . . _ - - -
B-2 The Justification for No Corrective Action Is Too Ambiguous, Brief, or General to Permit an Evaluation Additional information and/or justifications are required to assess these HECs properly. This is an open item. HED Code Number HED Code Number HED Code' Number V\ l 047-C 033-I 013-V 1 048-C 064'-I 016-V 074-C 070-I 017-V 120-C 007-R 041-V 121-C 006-V 500-V 122-C 007-V 502-V 128-C 008-V 017-X ://c 129-C 009-V 035-X t 007-I Oll-V 036-X !< 026-I 012-V B-3 No Corrective Action Is Justified in Order to Maintain Compliance With ' Plant Convention Specifications SAIC has not reviewed the convention specification and cannot determine the, adequacy of the corrective actions for these HEDs until PINCP supplies the appropriate documentation. This is an open item. (A] HED Code Number 6-l 409-C-01 502-C 604-C - 605-C 609-C 057-S 0 49 9
B-4 Justification for No Corrective Action for Individual HEDs May Not Have Co.nsidered Cumulative or Interactive Effects With Other HEDs s These Category 5 HEDs should be reviewed with the annunciator / alarm and labeling studies being pursued at PINGP as these HEDs may warrant a higher g( priority category rating because of cumulative effects. This is an open item until the review is complete. ' HED Code Number HED Code Number 080-C 012-S 006-S 013-S 0,08-S 014-5
~
009-S 016-S 010-S 018-S b; Oll-S 041-S 7 14 4: B-5 HEDs Undergoing Additional Study " Please submit corrective actions upon completion of study. This is an open item. HED Code Number 029-I 022-S 040-X l l l l e 50 e
l
.'. , l B-6 HEDs Prioritized as "No Discrepancy" These HEDs are considered adequately justified - no corrective action, and does not require a response from PINGP.
HED Code Number HED Code Number HED Code Number 003-C 002-S 083-S 007-C 003-S 087-S
~
009-C 004-S 088-S 029-C 005-S 089-S 077-C 007-S 090-S 079-C 021-S 091-S 080-C 025-S 092-S C83-C 032-S 093-S : g,. 094-C 033-S 094-S 4 095-C 034-S 095-S di-098-C 035-S 005-V 100-C 036-S 010-V 101-C 038-S 014-V 145-C 041-S 018-V 148-C 046-S 023-V 156-C 050-5 024-V 159-C 055-S 031-V 305-C 056-S 032-V 306-C 062-S 301-V : 407-C 064-S 302-V 408-C 066-S 403-V 410-C 069-S 605-V 501-C 071-S 003-X i 504-C 073-S 013-X 606-C 074-S 037-X 607-C 075-S 038-X 021-I 076-S 039-X 044-I 077-S 041-X 076-I 080-S 042-X
, 001-S 082-S 1 51 l
l l
l j B-7 The Resolution Does Not Address the Problem Discrepancy Additional information is necessary to make an evaluation of these HEDs. This is an open item. HED Code Number HED Code Number HED Code Number (6 026-C 034-V-02 043-V-02 086-C-02 037-V 043-V-03 005-I 039-V 043-V-04 024-I 040-V 043-V-05 030-S 043-V-01 005-X 034-V-01 B-8 Justification for No Corrective Action Should Address Operational or ,, Behavioral Factors a Additional information is necessary to evaluate the corrective actions. " This is an open item. HED code Number 043-1 005-R 015-X 034-X B-9 The Proposed HED Disposition Is Inconsistent With HED Prioritization Corrective actions do not satisfy the safety priority assigned to these HEDs. This is an open item. HED Code Number HED Code Number HED Code Number 040-I 003-V 027-V 053-I-01 004-V 010-X 053-I-02 022-V 011-X 005-R 025-V 027-X 52
3 B-10 Inadequate Justification - Faulty Rationale
- The reviewers do not agree on PINGPs proposed solutions. Theyragedib additional supporting documentation and information or revis justi- ;.
; fications. This is an open item. ~
l
~
W. i m . h.,.j. 3: ' HED Code Number HED Code Number HED N ester 4 085-C-03 052-I 085-5 e .' 002-I 029-S-01 OGE4 L I ' 015-I-01 029-S-02 eh :- 5,
".5, .
t ? s i a l J J h
)
I t a 1 3 53 l e
APPENDIX B RESPONSE TO VIEWS RAISED BY THE STAFF IN THE REDRAFT TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSED MEETING AGENDA TRANSMITTED JUNE 3, 1986 9 e 4 l I
1 s f PINGP response to the redraft of the Conclusion and Recommendations and Meeting Agenda transmitted June 3, 1986. i l From Conclusions and Recommendations l l "1. System Review and Task Analysis 1 1 o A review of the Element Tables and the Instrumentation and Control j Requirements Tables determine there is inadequate documentation j 4 for the reviewers to identify how plant-specific information and 1 control characteristics were derived from background documentation of Revision 1 ERGS or from plant-specific information. NUREG-0800, I Appendix A, Section 2.2(3), titled, "Use of Function and Task I Analysis" is clear in describing the level of detail beginning with, i
~ " Analyze the operator tasks to determine the characteristics of
] information or control capability needed to perform the task." PINGP should provide the above information in a supplement to the Summary Report or be prepared to discuss the SRTA process at a i 4 meeting with the NRC in Bethesda, Maryland. The reviewers require an explanation of how needed plant-specific characteristics for , operator information and control needs were developed and recorded ) (an auditable record) at the task and subtask level. ]
] The explanation should specifically address item No. 4 from the NRC comments developed from the March 29, 1984 meeting between the ! NRC and WOG (Reference 13). That is, "for each instrument and i
control used to implement the emergency operating procedures, there should be an auditable record of how the needed characteristics should be derived from the information and control needs identified in the background documentation of Revision 1 of the ERG or from
> plant-specific information." This information is needed in order to finalize the evaluation of PINGP's SRTA effort and to meet the
] requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737." - PINGP Response: 4 l During the course of the System Review and Task Analysis (SRTA) at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, plant-specific information and control characteristics were derived from background documentation of Revision 1 Westinghouse Owner's Group Emergency Response Guidelines j (ERGS). These information and control characteristics from the basis i of the Prairie Island Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and are , reflected in a record of information and control characteristics to tasks and subtasks. The following figures trace the record by infor-mation and control requirements for one example task from the E0Ps: Check Steam Generator Levels. The figures are first listed and described in the order in which the
- data contained therein were developed. Figure 1 shows an example of j background ERG materials from the Westinghouse Owner's Group Emergency i '
O Page 1 r
Response Guidelines--Background Volume-Low Pressure Version. These contain the generic information and control requirements applicable to the two ERG steps. Figure 2 contains the example " Step Description Table" for Step 6-- Check SG Levels of the ERGS. The subsections of the " Step Description Tables" entitled ACTIONS, INSTRUMENTATION, and CONTROL / EQUIPMENT describe instrumentation and control characteristics and criteria necessary to accomplish the steps. Figure 3 shows examples of the " Task Analysis Indications and Controls" worksheets. These were developed at Prairie Island by a Quadrex nuclear operations consultant. They contain a listing and description of the instrumentation required to meet the information and control requirements. Figure 4 shows examples of the Prairie Island plant-specific " Element Tables" developed from the " Step Description Tables" and the " Task Analysis Indications and Controls" worksheets. They list the instru-ment identification numbers of the required instrumentation and their criteria of measurement or control. l j Figure 5 shows an example of a " Controls Requirements Table" derived from a series of " Element Tables," each containing a specific compo-i nent. All the criteria required for operation of this control are , listed. Figure 6 shows an example of an " Instrumentation Requirements Table." This is a counterpart of the controls table, listing all the criteria for using the display / indicator. The figures above, in the order in which the data were recorded, demonstrate the process by which the information and control needs from background documentation of Revision 1 of the ERG or from plant-specific information were applied to identify each instrument and control for implementing the emergency operating procedures. The documentation comprises a record of instruments and their character-istics which can be traced back to the associated information and control requirements. First, the particular instrument or control is identified in the appropriate " Control Requirements Table" (Figure
- 5) or " Instrumentation Requirements Table" (Figure 6), respectively.
These tables are indexed by power plant system and control board panel. Then, each of the E0P numbers listed under " Task Requirements" is consulted to obtain the " Element Table" corresponds to a " Step Description Table" (Figure 2) of the ERG materials, and associated generic reference plant description background materials (Figure 1), 5 l l l l 1 l i Page 2 .
FIGURE 1
- 1. INTRODUCTION Guideline ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, provides the nece'ssary instructions to stabilize and control the plant following a reactor trip without a safety
- s injection. It is entered only from E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, step 4 when an SI is neither actuated nor required. Following the stabilization of the plant, ES-0.1 is exited to either a normal plant procedure for startup or cooldown, or to ES-0.2, NATURAL CIRCULATION C00LDOWN, if a natural circulation cooldown is required.
g
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I l l l ! ) i n l l l I ES-0.1 1 LP-Rev. 1 0089V i I
! 2. DESCRIPTION - j A reactor trip is a command to shut down a reactor which is either critical or J undergoing startup operation. The command is generated by either an automatic protective action initiated when certain setpoints for plant operating ., parameters are exceeded or by manual initiation by the operator. The i,5-l generation of a protection demand is appropriately indicated at'the !
- annunciator panel. Several automatic actions aimed at ensuring that the core i is shutdown and that there is effective decay heat removal follow the i
! occurrence of a reactor trip.
I j Following a reactor trip from full power, the reactor coolant temperature is reduced from full power temperature to no-load temperature by auto'matic operation of the condenser steam dump system. If for any reason condenser ([ 1 steam dump capability cannot be obtained, the steam generator power operated relief valves will automatically modulate. If these do not open, the steam j generator code safety valves open to protect the secondary system and by that 4 j means remove heat from the primary system. The cooldown to no-load shrinks (.. the water in the RCS and pressurizer level should stabilize automatically at j the no-load programmed level. The drop in level results in a reduction in RCS j pressure from the nominal 2235 psig. RCS pressure can be expected to drop to ! about 2000 psig before starting to increase as a result of operation of the i pressurizer heaters. For most reactor trips steam generator water level will remain above the top of the U-tubes although it may shrink out of the narrow range indication. Auxiliary feedwater pumps will start on low-low narrow range SG level to restore SG level into the narrow range. Extensive i subcooling of the reactor coolant at the core exit should exist. Forced flow ' 1 i in the RCS'will be maintained unless for some reason the reactor coolant pumps have tripped, in which case flow will be by natural circulation. ( j ) i ! l
\
, (c.:.i j i I l - ( l .i ES-0.1 2 LP-Rev. 1 a 0089V FIGURE 1 cont. J
The station electrical busses would normally be energized by offsite power. If for some reason a station " blackout" (loss of offsite power) occurs, the diesel generators would automatically start and supply power to the blackout loads to stabilize and control the plant. All critical surveillance, control, and safeguards actuation systems are continously pcwered from the plant's redundant batteries. All operating elements of the safety grada systems (ECCS pumos, for example) would have power available from the diesel' generators. A number of operating elements for "non-safety grade" systems and components may not be automatically powered by the diesel generators. These "non-safety-grade" components might include pressurizer heaters and instrument air compressors, and should be intentionally repowered as soon as possible since the availability of these components facilitate plant control. Guideline ES-0.1 deals with the specific actions necessary to stabilize and jf. control the plant following a reactor trip. It also handles reactor trips ?, x combined with either a station blackout or a total loss of forced reactor j{- coolant flow. v i l 6 l .I l ES-0.1 3 Lp.'Rev. 1 0089V FIGUPS 1. cont.
i t } 3. RECOVERY / RESTORATION TECHNIOUE ' i ( 5 i The objective of the recovery / restoration technique incorporated into i
; guideline ES-0.1 is to stabilize and control the plant following a reactor
] trip without a safety injection in operation.
! The following subsections provide a summary of the major categories of opertor l actions and the key utility decision points for Guideline ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP i j Resp 0NSE.
i 1 i 3.1 High Level Action Summary i j A high level summary of the actions performed in ES-0.1 is given o'n the j following page in the form of major action categories. These are discussed .. I below in more detail, i bf. o Ensure the primary System Stabilizes at No-load Conditions
.V er 1
i+ ( The operator should verify that RCS temperature is reduced to no-load by s actuation of steam dump. Adequate shutdown margin is ensured by verifying i that all control rods are fully inserted. If two or more rods fail to insert, i the relative shutdown reactivity should be made up by boration until shutdown i margin is equal to that required by the plant Technical Specification. t Pressurizer level and pressure are checked to verify they are responding as ! expected following a reactor trip. o Ensure the Secondary System Stabilizes at No-load Conditions .
- I i ( ,
i The operator should check the steam dump system and verify that a source of j i feedwater to the SGs is available. The operator should also control feedwater ! to maintain SG level. Steam generator level is restored in the narrow range i and controlled at that point. ], l k .i. / . 1 (. j ES-0.1 4 LP-Rev. 1 1 0089V 1 FIGURE 1 cont. l ! i
MAJOR ACTION CATEGORIES IN ES-0.1 o Ensure the Primary System Stabilizes at No-load Conditions o Ensure the Secondary System Stabilizes at No-lo'ad Conditions o Ensure Necessary Components Have Power Available o $ Maintain / Establish Forced Circulation of the RCS Ii? a.
.N' o
Maintain Plant in a Stable Condition 1 1 ES-0.1 5 00SW LP-Rev. 1 FIGURE 1 cont.
o Ensure Necessary Comoonents Have power Available i
~
i !
- Offsite power should be checked and, if not available, the necessary loads are verified or energized by diesel generators.
i j o Maintain / Establish Forced Circulation of the RCS Natural circulation is verified for the case when RCPs have tr pped and one ! cannot be restarted. o l Maintain Plant in a Stable Condition Once neutrcn flux decays low enough, the automatic reenergization of the i j source range detectors is verified. The plant is then maintained in a stable i condition until the course of action is determined by the operating staff. - i 3.2 Key Utility Decision points ^$ Af ter the plant is stabilized following a reactor trip, the operating crew i would have to determine the next course of action. ,, Generally, if no components necessary for power operation are out of service, the limiting conditions for operation in the Technical Specifications are satisfied, and if i the cause of the trip is identified and corrected, then a plant startup would be commenced. If a Technical Specification limiting condition for operation ' is violated and its action statement requires a cooldown, or a cooldown is necessary to repair non-safety grade components needed for operation, then a
- plant cooldown is commenced.
! If a cooldown is required, forced circulation of the RCS is always preferred over a natural circulation cooldown in order to j . j eliminate any concerns about drawing voids in the system and/or incomplete l baron mixing. Therefore, attempts should be made to start at least one j j reactor coolant pump prior to the cooldown,'if one is not already running. A
, natural circulation cooldown should only be performed if absolutely necessary 431 (e.g., if a Technical Specification is violated and requires a cooldown before I
an RCP can be started, a natural circulation cooldown should be performed). 4 (, i ES-0.1 ' 6
} 0089V LP-Rev. 1 FICURE 1 cont.
l
FIGURE 2 J f i STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR ES-0.1 STEP 6 - I ( . i STEP: Check SG Levels ! PURPOSE: To ensure adequate feed flow or SG inventory for secondary heat j sink requirements p" ' , '
\.
i
- BASIS:
? The minimum feed flow requirement satisfies the feed flow requirement of the g Heat Sink Status Tree until level in at least one SG is restored into the ' { narrow range. Narrow range level is reestablished in all SGs to maintain
- symmetric cooling of the RCS.
j with level readings on span. The control range ensures adequate inventory i ACTIONS: 4 o . o Determine if 3G narrow range level greater than (3)% ,s;- Determine if narrow range level in any SG continues to increase -. l o Maintain total feed flow greater than (2) gpm until narrow range level + p j greater than (3)% in at least one SG '# o o Control feed flow to maintain narrow range level between (3)% and 50% Stop feed to SG where narrow range level continues to increase , i INSTRUMENTATION: &
- o SG narrow range level indication o
Total fead flow indication ' o Feed flow control valves position indication ' J'. j CONTROL /EOUIPMENT: I j 1 Feed flow control valve switches 1 i l s KNOWLEDGE: ( I j N/A 1 i .i d j (- 1 ! ES-0.1 , 18 j 0089V LP-R'ev. 1 I, '*- - , - - _. _ ~ m.c --- ~,--, - ,- ,- - - ,,-- - ,-, - ,,y-,,,_ w m ,,, .----mm,,,, - - , . . - , .
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FIGURE 4 4 TASK E01.7
- ELEMENT TABLE -
Function I Monitor / Regulate Secondary Inventory ' \- 3 Task . 4' , EOl.7 Check Steam Generator Levels i Task Objective 1
- To ensure steam at no-load level. generator levels are restored to and controlled l
I Task Decision (Criteria) Requirements e.g.:
- See Subtasks ,
.w t
- .iT4 Task Knowledge Requirements IS I(
i See Subtasks 1 Task Instrumentation (Criteria) Requirements ' e See Subtasks ] , j Task Actions (Criteria) Requirements e 4 See Subtasks a j i Task Control Capability (Criteria) Requirements =
- See Subtasks ~
k i Consequences of Task Error / Omission ! o See Subtasks ! ! I i I 1 I j i 4
.--,---..n--_e .-----.-,-v ,- -,----n.- ,- - ,, - --.,---.,--.--.-.m------- - , , - , - ,,,,.,n-,_-.. ,,,- ,-,n,, ,-n -,--n
i SUBTASK E01.7A 'l t ELEMENT TABLE - Function Monitor / Regulate Secondary Inventory i j Task , i E01.7 Check Steam Generator ^ Level j Subtask l
) E01.7A Check Level Greater Than 60% '
Subtask Objective l e ) To ensure steam generator level is greater than 60% wide range.
. ' I.$
- i 'i .
Subtask Decision (Criteria) Requirements TE } f + Y (
- To determine if steam generator levels are greater than 60%. '
i ) & Subtask Knowledge Requirements
- No special requirements .
{ Subtask Instrumentation (Criteria) Requirements
- Main Steam System .
- Steam Generator Wide Range Level (greater than 60%)
- LR-42064,01,02 I
i { , Task Action (Criteria) Requirements . If steam generator levels are not greater than 60% wide range I level, perf,orm subsequent actions then go to the next subtask. e Maintain total feedwater flow greater than 200 GPM until wide range level is greater than 60%. Task Control Capability (Criteria) Requirements
- None f...,
p.&. ' l . v i t j FIGURE 4. cont. ' i > i I
SUBTASK E01.7A Cont. Consequences of Task Error / Omission If steam generator levels are in the narrow range span task the next subtask, error / omission will delay operator action to throttle AFW in s
. .-2
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r 2 w' FIGURE 4, cont.
SUBTASK E01.7B i ELEMENT TABLE - Function Monintor/ Regulate Secondary Inventory Task . E01.7 Check Steam Generator Levels Subtask E01.7B Control Feedwater Flow to Maintain Wide Range Level at 62 (60 to.64)% Subtask Objective M
*k.
- To ensure feedwater flow is throttled to maintain S/G level,
.hI g
.c Subtask Decision (Criteria) Requirements
- To determine maintain steamthat feedwater generator level.flow is properly throttled to
+
Subtask Knowledge Requirements
- AFW system design and means for control of AFW' flow to steam generators. .
- Relationship response. of AEW flow rates to steam generator level Subtask Instrumentation (Criteria) Requirements
- Main Steam
- Steam Generator Wide Range Level (60-64)%
- LR-42064,01,02
- Main Feedwater and Condensate
- Feedwater Flow Control Bypass Valves
- HC-4306401
- HC-4306402
- Auxiliary Feedwater System
- Auxiliary Feedwater Flow (existence of flow)
- FI-4122702
- FI-4122802 Aux FW to 11 Stm Gen Flow i k Aux FW to 12 Stm Gen Flow FIGURE 4 cont. '
! SUBTASP E01.78 Cont.
Subtask Instrumentation (Criteria) Requirements Cont.
- Motor Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (running)
ES-46439 12 MD Aux FW Pump Sel e IL-46425,Ol,02,03 12 MD Aux FW Pump
- Turbine
- ES-46433 Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (running) 11 TD Aux EW Pump Sel IL-46424,01,02,03
- e IL-46127,01,02 1A Main 11 TD Aux EW Pump (MV-32264f
- IL-46128,01,02 Stm to 11 Aux (MV-32016)
- Auxiliary Feedwater Valves 1B Main Stm to 11 Aux (MV-32017)
IL-46314,01,02 (indication of position, IL-46315,01,02 11 Aux FW Pump Discharge to 11 S/Gopen-closed) IL-46316,Ol,02 11 Aux FW Pump Discharge to 12 S/G IL-46317,01,02 12 Aux FW Pump Discharge to 11 S/G e IL-46318,01,02 12 Aux FW Pump Discharge to 12 S/G IL-46319,01,02 11/12 Aux FW to lA Stm Cen (MV-32242) 11/12 Aux FW to 1B Stm Cen (MV-32243) Subtask Action (Criteria) Requirements . C 33 p
- Control (60 to 64)%, feedwater go to flow next to maintain wide range level at 62%
task. '$E If level stop in any steam feedwater to thatgenerator continues to increase then, steam generator, go to next task. Subtask Control Capability (Criteria) Requirements Main Feedwater and Condensate
- Feedwater Flow Control Bypass Valves .
- HC-4306401
- HC-4306402 Auxiliary Feedwater System
- AFW Flow Control Valves
- ES-46314
- ES-46315
- ES-46316 11 Aux FW Pump Discharge to 12 S/G11 Aux EW P
- ES-46317
- ES-46318 12 Aux EW Pump Discharge to 12 S/G (MV-3
- ES-46319 11/12 Aux FW to lA Stm Gen (MV-32242)
- Motor Driven Aux Feedwater Pump 11/12 Aux EW to 1B Stm Con (MV-
- ES-46439 12 MD Aux EW Pump Sol(start)
- Motor
- Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (start)
ES-46425 12 MD Aux FW Pump
,
- Turbine 46438 Driven Aux Feed Pump (start)
- 11 TD Aux EW Pump Sel ES-46424
- ES-46127 11 TD Aux FW Pump (MV-32264)
- ES-46128 1A Main Stm to 11 Aux FW Pump (MV-32016)
% IB Main Stm to 11 Aux EW Pump (MV-32017) FIGURE 4 cont. '
7 . I i, SUBTASK E01.7B Cont. } Consequences of Subtask Error / Omission a j = If steam generator levels are at 62%, task error / omission will ' delay operator action to throttle AFW flow to control steam generator level to no-load level. A delay to throttle AEW flow l will aggravate the plant transient by extending RCS cooldown.
- The consequences of task error / omission are minimized by the 4
CSF status trees. ' I, i i i 4 l 1 ,
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4 l PICURE 4 cont. , 4 1
FIGURE 5 t CONTROLS REQUIREMENTS TABLE SYSTEM - Auxiliary Feedwater System CONTROLS - AEW Flow Control Valve
- ES-46314 11 Aux FW Pump Discharge to 11 SG (MV-32238) i
- ES-46315 11 Aux FW Pump Discharge to 12 SG (MV-32239
- ES-46316 12 Aux FW Pump Discharge to 11 SG (MV-323D1) i
- ES-46317 12 Aux FW Pump Discharge to 12 SG (MV-32382) j
- ES-46318
!
- ES-46319 11/12 Aux FW to IA Stm Gen (MV-32242)
! 11/12 Aux FW to 1B Stm Gen (MV-32243) i , LOCATION - Control Panel E-1 CRITERIA REQUIREMENTS TASK REQUIREMENTS 1
j
- Control AFW Flow EOO.11 4
{ EOO.23 (E30.7, E31.4, E32.4, 'd:. C33.5A) :Q-i EOl.14A (1) EOl.2 Y.3D.
,l EOl.3C
EOl.7B E02.15 E03.8C _ ElO.3 ,
, E30.4 ! E33.4B'(C31.8B) i FS1.6 COO.3 FHl.2C FHl.11
,. FHl.18 FC2.8B 1' Closed to faulted SG E20.4 FSl.11 COO.5
- Fill ruptured SG E31.6 (E32.9, E33.9, C31.27, i
C32.21, C33.26) 1 Maintain greater than 200 GPM FCl.9A i FC2.6A (C33.5B) i E33.4A (C31.8A, C32.3A) i e Close valves FP l . l' FH2.6 ' FH4.3 i FZ1.5 ' Maintain SG 1evel 60 to 75% FCl.9B I 120 ' ! i ! _..._--_.,c . _ . - . _ - , . - - _ , - , , _ _ - - _ , . - , _ . . , . _ - , , . . - - - - - _ . . . , . , , - -
. ~ ._ _ __ . _ __ _ __ . __. ._ .. _ _ . _ _
i
- . =
i l t CONTROLS REQUIREMENTS TABLE l i; AFW Flow Control Valve (Cont.) 1
- i A
CRITERIA REQUIREMENTS TASK REQUIREMENTS 1
- Maintain full flow COO.8A
- Control flow at 25 GPM per SG C21.2A .
FHS.4 . FHS.5 3
- Maintain level less than 75% C21.2B 1
i I
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s fA].'z j i .I .
" 4-i .
1 4 . + e t 2 , d l t I I 1 3 I i i
- 1 i
a
- 121 *
- FIGURE 5 cont.
FIGURE 6 INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS TABLE - SYSTEM - Main Steam System INSTRUMENTATION - Steam Generator Wide Range Level
- LR'-42064,01,02
? . RANGE - 0-100% i l LOCATION - Control Board D-1 CRITERIA REQUIREMENTS TASK REQUIREMENTS
- Greater than 60% E00.20B (E30.20B, C33.7B)
E00.23 (E30.2, E31.4, E32.4, ,.,g,$ . C33.5A) ~. ce EOl.2 E-E01.7A E10.11D ' l'S' E31.6 (E32.9, E33.9, C31.27 T C32.21, C33.26) I E33.4A (C31.8A) . j FC2.8A (C32.3B) ] FPl.1 (FP2.1) '
, C00.8A 4 FHl.25 FC1.9A l
- i Level 60-64% E10.3 (FHl.6, FHl.11)
EOO.11B i E01.7 . . E03.8C C00.9 ' i
- Increasing E01.3C E30.1 At 33% E01.14A (1) 4 E01.6B
- Increasing in an uncontrolled manner E0A.4A (C33.7C) ,
1 Level equal to 5% narrow E30.3A range Ruptured SG greater than 60% 4 E31.6 166
- S
,vm- - , n v-- e * - r----" - ' ' " - - - "-
y- .. ..%._--.-.---y .n.. --.n - .--~, -, .- .-- <-~,,,-.--,y-,,.
- - - - . - - , , - w- --r
INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS TABLE
~
Steam Generator Wide Range Level (Continued) CRITERIA REQUIREMENTS TASK REQUIREMENTS ,
- Between 60 and 75% FC2.9B (C33.5B) j FPl.12 FC1.9B .
- Less than 75% C21.2B C21.18 C21.36B
,
- Less than 70% C31.11
! FH4.1
- FH4.4 C33.1 (C33.23B, C33.31B)
]
- Less than 60% FH5.1 - - - - -
j FHS.5 ,. l
- Greater than 5% FH5.4 ' .6[.
g. 4
- Stable or decreasing C33.23C (C33.31C) jp'r e
f l l 4 4 l l I i l 167 i FIGURE 6 cont. t . ._. _ - . . _ _ . . _ , _ _ , _ . . _ . , _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . . ._ _ _ _ . . . _ . , _ _ _ _ . .__ . . _ _ . . , _ . _ _ _
1 7 From Conclusions and Recommendations l
"2. Control Room Validation o
! During the validation of control room functions, several HEDs were generated involving inadequate personnel staffing, extreme inter panel movement between tasks, and inadequate display / control rela-tionships. In addition, these HEDs involved three tasks in the i E0Ps (See Table 3-17, NUREG-0737 guidelines 6.8.1.1.a, 6.1.1.2, 6.9.1.2.a, and 6.9.2.2.a of the Summary Report). A total of 31 HEDs were identified. Twenty-one of these HEDs were identified ( as requiring "no corrective action" and seven HEDs were corrected j I by future SPDS implementation, which has been deemed an inappro-priate solution. PINGP is.to reassess the three E0P tasks under realtime dynamic conditions to evaluate fully the cumulative and interactive effects of these HEDs. All 31 HEDs should be resub-mitted with appropriate reassessment documentation and justifica-tions for corrective actions." i PINGP Response: c The table below lists the 31 HEDs referenced in this open item. Reso- ]
; lutions for some of these HEDs are' clarified in the table. For other i
! HEDs, clarification will be required from the NRC for reasons why the process of validation, study of interactive and cumulative effects, development of resolutions for correction, or determination of justi-fication for no correction are unsatisfactory. HED i CODE # CLARIFICATION (1) 001-X
- Installation correct of SPDS 1AW Generic Letter 82-33 will this problem.
j (2) 015-X j (3) 019-X Panel separation is unavoidable for these components. 1 (4) 024-X Installation of new recorder has corrected this problem. i Resolution of this HED was approved (Appendix B-1 of ' j Draft TER). (5) 023-X (Same as (4)) , j (6) 043-X i (SPDS) (Same as (1)) (7) 044-X (SPDS) (Same as (1)) (8) 048-X (SPDS) (Same as (1)) ; s (9) 050-X (SPDS) (Same as (1)) { (10) 051-X (SPDS) (Same as (1)) j (11) 052-X (SPDS) (Same as (1)) (12) 053-X (SPDS) (Same as (1)) i (13) 034-X Operator staffing for emergency situations complies with PI Design Basis, (14) 035-X (Same as (13)) $ (15) 036-X (Same as (13)) ! ] (16) 006-X (Same as-(4)) (17) 008-X (Same as (4)) l (18) 011-X Present design follows flow path conventions specifi-i cations. l i I , I i Page 3
)
i 1 i
. _ _ _ _,,-~-, _ ,- - -.- . - -- _ _ _ . _.,, , _.-- . ,,__..- _ ._._ __, - _..- --.,- _ - . _ ,,._ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ -- , ,.- _
(19) 014-X This problem will be corrected with implementation of (20) 002-X control board modifications for A-Panel. (Same as (4)) (21) 004-X Clarification is required from the NRC for why the resolution is inadequate. (22) 005-X (Same as (21)) (23) 012-X (Same as (4)) (24) 013-X 4 (25) 016-X These components are all rated in priority category 5. (Same as (4)) (26) 017-X (Same as (21)) ' (27) 018-X (Same as (4)) (28) 020-X (Same as (4)) (29) 021-X This problem will be corrected with implementation of (30) 026-X control board modification for E-Panel. (Same as (4)) (31) 027-X (Same as (21)) From Conclusions and Recommendations "3. Control Room Survey # o Werkspace survey checklists for emergency equipment (6.1.4), temp-2 erature storage and humidity (6.1.5.1), ventilation (6.1.5.2), personal (6.1.5.6), and process computer (6.7), have not been addressed in an explicit manner, although some HEDs have been gen-erated on these items. PINGP should provide documentation to show that the above checklists or equivalent have been used. The <
- concern is that the usage of guidelines other than NUREG-0700 may have resulted in a less than complete survey, o
A review of the differences between NUREG-0700 guidelines and I PINGP conventions specifications. revealed that three of the PINGP conventions are unacceptable (items 3, 9, and 12) and should be reassess usingand 6.5.3.1.C(1), corresponding 6.6.3.8.a). NUREG-0700 guidelines (6.4.4.5.d(1)(a), Two of the conventions specifications require further clarification before judgment can be made concerning their appropriateness (items 5 and 11; corresponcJng NUREG-0700 guidelines are 6.4.5.1.d(2)(b) and 6.6.2.4 C). The rest of the PINGP conventions specifications are acceptable. o PINGP should resurvey relevant areas affected by specific checklist items identified above and provide documentation and results of the resurvey in a supplemental submittal." PINGP Response In the Prairie Island DCRDR, two separate review activities were con-ducted to comprehensively cover all the topics subsumed under control room survey. component The first was a component checklist review specific to design. The checklist materials for this review were derived from of NUREG-0700 component types. Section 6 and organized according to each unique group Controls and 6.5--Visual All Displays the checklist were items for subsections 6.4-- covered. Page 4
The second activity was a control room survey covering topics other than specific component design. The following subsections of NUREG-0700 were included in the control room survey checklist in their entirety: o 6.1 Control Room Workspace o 6.2 Communications .i o 6.3 Annunciator Warning Systems , o 6.6 Labels and Location Aids o 6.8 Panel Layout , o 6.9 Control-Display Integration Included in the survey were all of the checklist items from the NUREG-0700 subsections addressing emergency equipment (6.1.4), temperature and humidity (6.1.5.1), ventilation (6.1.5.2), and personal storage (6.1.5.6). The control room survey did not cover the NUREG-0700 Subsection 6.7-- Prccess Computer because the Prairie Island process computer is being replaced in 1986 as part of the Emergency Response Facility / Plant Process Computer System (ERF/PPCS) project. A human engineering ' review of the ERF/PPCS capability is being conducted as required in the PINGP Uniform Modification Process and the Emergency Response 4 Computer System Verification and Validation Plan. A concern was raised in the draft Technical Evaluation Report that the l "NUTAC Control Room Design Review Survey Development Guidelines" may - 1 have been applied to survey development instead of NUREG-0700 (draft Technical Evaluation Report, p.15). In fact, the component checklist review and the control room survey were based fully on NUREG-0700 and exhaustively treated the topic items contained therein. The NUTAC document produced by INPO were reviewed early in the DCRDR methodology and served as references for techniques in effectively conducting the surveys, as well as verification and validation activities. Item 3. Position indication of rotary selector control setting--NUREG-0700 does not provide an exhaustive list of acceptable alternatives for rotary selector control position indication. The document only cites
" desirable alternatives" (p. 6.4.-23), item 6.4.4.5.d(l)). Two of the desirable alternatives are the engraved line on top and side of the knob, and a pointer shape. Rotary selector controls at Prairie Island are Westinghouse OT-2 switches with an engraved dot pointer end of the control. (Two examples of theseindicating controls is dia-the grammed and 2-17.)in the Prairie Island " Control Board Standards" on pages 2-15 These switches have either two positions (10 and 2 o' clock) or three positions (10, 12, and 2 o' clock)--only one end of the pointer can be pointing to one of the settings. The design of these switches fulfills the requirement for position indication unambiguously.
Item 5. Specifications for discrete thumbwheel controls--NUREG-0700 item 6.4.5.1.d(2)(b) was compared to Prairie Inland's conventions specifications because no other items were at all relevant to a parti-cular component type known as star handles. As noted in the rationale statement in the " Evaluation of Design Conventions Specifications Page 5
,- n , n .-. ---,w,,-- -
I Against NUREG-0700 Guidelines," the star handle is designed to be grasped by the whole hand--not by the thumb as a thumbwheel would be. (A diagram of a typical star handle control is shown in the Prairie Island " Control Board Standards" on page 2-14.) It would not be appropriate to use a trough distance of 0.45 in. to 0.75 in. for star handles; therefore, this item is not applicable and the Prairie Island convention specification for trough distance of 1 1/8 in. is appropriate. Item 9. Indicator illumination for " motor start not recommended"--The subject of this item is the computer-controlled Large Motor Monitor system and its recommended use is only to limit heat ouildup in the motor windings from repeated starts in a short time period. It is used for normal operation as a reminder to limit deterioration of the in-sulation. The normally illuminated condition of this indicator light is considered appropriate by the Control Room Design Review Committee, and the cost / benefit of making a modification to it cannot be justified for the following reasons: 1. It is considered to be a " permissive" indication and not an
" alarm."
Permissive lights are lit when the permissive status allows functioning of the equipment. , 2. The negative impact on operator retraining would be significant if this were changed. 3. The rationale for making this change is not appropriate. Item 11. Labels of controls visible during actuation--As noted in the rationale statement, the design of controllers is a special case; the convention for positioning of labels is consistent for all other controls in the control room. There is a deviation from NUREG-0700 item 6.6.2.4.c regarding labels of controls visible during actuation of the controls only for one type of controller with 3 position, spring-loaded AUT0/ MANUAL positioner. (An example of this controller is diagrammed in the Prairie Island " Control Board Standards" on page 2-23.) The AUT0/ MANUAL positioner on this controller has multiple functions--it the valve control. is moved to left or right to manually close and open Because the available settings are indicated unambiguously by slots cut into the faceplate, operators are not confused about the action of the positioner, even if the label "AUT0" is covered by fingers momentarily while grasping the control. It is judged that the design of this controller promotes effective use, and that the Prairie Island convention specification is appropriate. Item 12. Positive identification for all control positions--The subject of this convention is the Westinghouse OT-2 rotary selector controls that have two discrete functional control positions which are labeled and a spring-loaded center position which is unlabeled. (An example of this 2-17.) control is diagrammed in the " Control Board Standards" on page For these controls, the center position is not a discrete func-tional position--it signal for motor valves. indicates only the absence of an "open" or "close" If the valve may be activated automatically, Page 6
then the center position is functional. For such valves, the " Control Board Standards" directs that the center position be labeled "AUT0" (e.g., page 2-15). The convention as currently stated in the " Control Board Standards" is appropriate and should not be changed. Clarification of the survey process above resolves the question about incompleteness of the control room survey. PINGP considers a resurvey activity unnecessary. From Conclusions and Recommendations "4. HED Assessment o The 128 HEDs identified in Appendix C of the Summary Report were not considered under PINGP's assessment methodology for signifi-cance ratings or priority categorization. PINGP should reassess these HEDs or provide proper documentation and justification for excluding these HEDs from the remainder of the assessment process. How were these HEDs considered for cumulative and interactive effects with other HEDs in Appendix D (See Appendix B-4 of this
- report for an example)? Also there are six reports identified on pp. 2-10 and 2-11 of the Summary Report (Sections 2.3.4 " Design l Requirements and Conventions Specifications" and 2.3.5 " Human Engineering Discrepancy Assessment Results") that should be pro-vided as part of this supplementary submittal as supporting source documentation for ths assessment process."
PINGP Response The 128 HEDs identified in Appendix C of the " Detailed Control Room Design Review Summary Report" were separated from the others in the HED assessment process because they were all relevant to topics covered in the " Human Engineering Design Requirements and Conventions Regarding Component Design, Labeling, and Abbreviations"--the conven-tions specification document developed to serve as a standard for all control room redesign ar;d enhancement. The set of HEDs documented in Appendix C involved problems with component labeling, meter face labeling, color coding, meter scales, and other topics. It was de-termined that each of these HEDs would be corrected by the systematic adoption of the conventions specification to which Northern States Power has committed. (Most such corrections involve paint, tape, and labeling enhancements.) Since the HEDs were selected a priori for correction, they were not subjected to safety significance rating or priority categorization. The three reports listed under section 2.3.4 of the Summary Report are three different revisions of the draft " Design Requirements and Conventions Specifications" for control room instrumentation at Prairie island. The current versica of the document is the Prairie Island " Control Board Standards," enclosed with this submittal. This document has been submitted to plant management as a guide for instrumentation modification and additions. Three interim reports listed under section 2.3.5 of the Summary Report contain background data and HED assessment results. They are: Page 7
o
" Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Control Room Design Review--Human Engineering Discrepancy Assessment Results: HED Summary Report" o
" Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Control Room Design Review--Human Engineering Discrepancy Assessment Results: Rating Scores for All Instruments and All HEDs Sorted by Instrument" o
" Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Control Room Design Review--Human Engineering Discrepancy Assessment Results" Rating Scores for All Instruments and All HEDs Sorted by HED Code Number" All of the information in the sorted lists comprising these three interim reports is containedD.in the " Detailed Control Room Design Review Summary Report"--Appendix However, the three reports are included with this submintal as requested.
From Conclusions and Recommendations "S. Selection of Design Improvements ' o The concerns raised relate to the cumulative effects from HEDs developed from the use of annunciators and labeling which are identified in Appendix A-6 and B-4. PINGP's response should not only relate to specific HED corrective actions but should try to reassure reviewers' doubts about the adequacy of the solution process and provide detailed justifications for PINGP's prioriti-zation, corrective action and final resolution for each HED." PINGP Response The concerns raised relate to HEDs from annunciators and labeling identified as Appendix A-6 and B-4. Appendix B-4 lists HEDs for which " justification for no corrective action for individual HEDs may not have considered cumulative or interactive effects with other HEDs." These HEDs cover topics of annunciator system design, legend pushbuttons, and labels and location aids. However, Appendix A-6 lists HEDs for which "the proposed corrective action is not adequate due to the non-lE safety grade classification of the SPDS." The Appendix A-6 HEDs all involve use of the SPDS as a resolution. The following discussion provides clarification of the process by which the potential interactive and cumulative effects were studied. A review of interactive and cumulative effects among HEDs was conducted during the HED assessment process for all HEDs in priority categories 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The review process, described in subsection 4.3.4 of the Summary Report, entailed the following three steps:
- 1. Review of HED information; 2.
Review through; of interactions during validation walk-through talk-
- 3. Review of instruments with multiple HEDs associated.
Page 8
1 The results of these activities are documented in three interim reports: o Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Control Room Design Review-- Human Engineering Discrepancy Compilation and Assessment j (Preliminary), Interim Report, Vol. VII, Part 1. t 2 o Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Control Room Design Review-- ) Validation of Control Room Functions. Interim Report, Vol. VI. o Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Control Room D'esign Review-- Human Engineering Discrepancy Assessment Results: Rating Scores for j All Instruments and All HEDs Sorted by Instrument. Detailed justification for PINGP's prioritization of HED/ instrument - combinations is described in the Summary Report in subsecCion 4.3.3-- Human Engineering Discrepancy Priority Categories. The three steps performed were-
- 1. Determine weighting of criticality and importance of each item
' on the HED rating form and compute weighted scores for each of the four rating sections.
- 2.
Factor the weighted scores to create assessment scales for public .' and plant safety consequences. 7 3. ] Det^rmine distribution of assessment scales and classify priority of HED/ instrument combinations. The errective action and final resolution determined for each KED/ instrument combination are described fully in Appendix D of the Summary Report. 1 From Concl-siens and Recommendations "6. Coordination of DCRDR Efforts o PINGP should describe its coordination efforts and how PINGP's Integration Plan developed in response to Generic Letter 82-33 is currently being integrated for all the control room elements, e.g., The Emergency Response Capability Plan, etc.). Also include how training is integrated within the coordination of these pro-grams. I PINGP Response 4 The comprehensive integrated plan was submitted in response to Generic { Letter 82-33 in April 1983. A copy of our latest Control Room Design Review Proposed modific'ations scheduled is attached. Trafning is t requirement-inNorthernStatesPower'sUniformModificatidnProceif; N1AWI 5.1.10 Future Needs requires training to be identified and . I Page 9 a l
N1AWI 5.1.16 Turnover for Operations requires that training be com-pleted before a modification is turned over to operations. Please note in our attachment that the schedule has been developed to ensure that the simulator has been upgraded to facilitate operator training prior to operation on the modified plant control board. The SPDS training package is being developed at this time and is required by the Emergency Response Computer System Verification and Validation Plan. The implementation schedule provides for the correction of the identi-fled HED's. NSP has proposed a schedule that will effectively allocate human and financial resources, integrate the modifications with other requirements such as refueling outages, 1.97 activities, SPDS computer installation, and the plant process computer system installation. The schedule also provides for adequate time to cover training on each modification. Making wholesale changes on the board without proper training could have a negative impact on operator performance. From Conclusions and Recommendations v
"7. Schedules for Implementation of HED Corrections o PINGP should submit schedules for implementation and a summary justification for HEDs with safety significance to be left uncor-rected or partially corrected taking into account the review of HEDs requested in this report (see Appendix A and B). PINGP , should also identify each HED (a total of 2,216 HEDs were identi-fled) grouped under the five priority categories listed on p. 22 of this report. The concern here is that Appendix C and Appendix D of the Summary Report identify 128 HEDs and 391 HEDs, respectively.
PINGP Response The Control Room Design Review Proposed Modifications schedule is in-cluded with this submittal. Summary justification for HEDs with safety significance to be left uncorrected or partially corrected, taking into account Appendix A and B, is provided in the attached "PINGP Comments on the Draft Technical Evaluation of the Detailed Control Room Design Review" in item (U). The draft Technical Eesluation Report cites a concern that a total of 2216 HEDs were identidied in the DCRDR but that only 128 HEDs and 391 1 HEDs are described in the " Detailed Control Room Design Review Summary i Report" in Appendices C and D, respectively. This concern is unfounded-- the 519 HEDs described in Appendices C and D comprise the full set of i HEDs identified during the DCRDR process. Most of the HEDs involve more t than one instrument. In the Summary Report, Subsection 4.3--Significance Rating of Human Engineering Discrepancies describes how each instrument ) t Page 10 l
, - e associated with each HED was rated for safety significance. There are a total of 2216 HED/ instrument combinations and these were all subjected to safety significance rating. A set of rating scores and a priority category is computed for each instrument of each HED. These are all listed in Appendix D of the Summary Report.
~
Page 11
- . e i
i. AGENDA FOR MEETING PINGP RESPONSE 1 We are prepared to discuss and . clarify any or all of the listed Agenda items, or provide additional information, as requested, however with the enclosed additional information and clarification you may wish to modify your proposed agenda. For ease of explanation and understanding, if a meeting is still requested, we recommend that the meeting be. held on site at PINGP where facilities and supplemental resources are available, such as the simulator, full-scale l mock-up, documentation. Control Room Design Review Interim Reporte, and background ERG i 1 4 . 1 2 a j 4_ 1 1 1 l 1 4 i I l , I l I i Page 12 l
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l CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS at Prairie Island l Northern States Power Company's DCRDR conducted towards ' Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 demonstrates a comitment , meeting the requirements of NUREG.0737, Supplement 1. In general, by it appears that PINGP's DCRDR effort is one of the best initiatives being conducted the l a utility. The extensive modifications tc the control panel's and to commitment overall control room layout are indicative of the high degree of of the utilities management as well as of the capability of the DCRDR team. beginning with the Program Plan through the The documentation reviewed, l Summary Report, provided extensive discussisons of the planning, review, assessment, and implementation activities being conducted to perform the meet DCRDR and indicates that Northern States Power Company basically will most of the requirements. However, additional information is required from in . licensee to provide assurances that all the requirements as stated the NUREG-0737, St.pplement I have been satisfied.
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EN The following is a sumary of opens items, that require further These open infor-
- mation, explanation or DCRDR activities by PINGP review team. under items are briefly sumarized below but have been described in detail each of the DCRDR elements in this technical evaluation report.
- 1. System Review and Task Analysis -
l l o A review of the Element Tables and the Instrumentation documentation and C Requirements Tables determined there is inadequate and for the reviewers to identify how plant-specific information control characterisites were derived from background documentation NUREG-of Revision 1 ERGS or from plant-specific information. titled, "Use of Function and 0800, Appendix A, Section 2.2(3), begin-Task Analysis" is clear in describing the level of detail charac-ning with, " Analyze the operator tasks to determine the teristics ol' information or control; capability needed to perform sup-PINGP should provide the above information in a the task." SRTA plement to the Sumary Report or be prepared to discuss the The process at a meeting with the NRC in Bethesda, Maryland. reviewers require an explanation of how needed plant-specific were operator taformation and control needs characteristics for 36 i l GW 8053H138 331H33 398553W 3BH T3:9198, 20'N0f 200'.d - - _ .
l i 4 the task and developed and recorded (an auditable record) at subtask level. . 4 from the The explanation should specifically address item No. , NRC comments developed from the March 29, 1984 meeting between the l NRC and the WOG (Reference 13). That is, "for each instrument and l control used to implement the emergency operatiWg procedures, l there should be an auditable record of how the needed needs character tics should be derived from the information and control of the identified in the background documentation of Revision 1 information is I ERG or from plant-specific information." This effort l needed in order to finalize the evaluation of PINGP's SRTA and to meet the requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737. g
- 2. Control Room Validation i-During the validation of control room functions, several HEOs were #g o
extreme inter-generated involving inadequate personnel staffing, panel movement between tasks, and inadequate display / control rela-tionships. In addition, these HEDs involved three tasks in the 6.1.1.2, E0Ps (See Table 3-17, lNUREG-0737 guidelines 6.8.1.1.a. A total of 31 6.9.1.2.a. and 6.9.2.2.a of the Sununary Report). HEDs were identified. Twenty-one of these HEDs were identified as by requiring "no corrective action" and seven HEOs were corrected future SPOS implementation, which has been deemed an inappropriate solution. PINGP is to reassess the three E0P tasks under real-
- time dynamic conditions to evaluate fully the cumulative and interactive effects of these HEOs. All 31 Hi0s should be resub-mitted with appropriate reassessment documentation and justifica-tions for corrective actions.
- 3. Control Room Survey.
Workspace survey checklists for emergency equipment (6.1.4), 4 o per-temperature and humidity (6.1.5.1), ventilation (6.1.5.2.), sonal storage (6.1.5.6), and process computer (6.7), have not been addressed in an explicit manner, although some HEDs have been PINGP should provide documentation to generated on these items. 1 37 ) E00'd OW 8053H138 B31H30 398553W 38H T3'91 98. E0'Hnf
-. - J--*i show that the above checklists or equivalent have been used. The concern is that the usage of guidelines other than NUREG 0700 may have resulted in a less than complete survey.
o A review of the differences between NUREG-0700 guidelines and . PINGP conventions specifications revealed that three of the PINGP conventions are unacceptable (items 3, 9, and IR) and should be using corresponding NUREG-0700 guidelines reassessed (6.4.4.5.d(1)(a), 6.5.3.1.C(1), and6.6.3.8.a). Two of the con-ventions specifications require further clarification before judgment can be made concerning their appropriateness (items 5 and 11; corresponding NUREG-0700guidelinesare6.4.5.1.d(2)(b) and 6.6.2.4.C). The rest of the PINGP conventions specifications are acceptable. o PINGP should resurvey relevant areas affected by specific check- !.(k.I list items identified above and provide documentation and results itj
~o f the resurvey in a supplemental submittal. M
- 4. HED Assessment o The" 128 HEDs identified in Appendix't of the Sumary Report were not considered under PINGP's assessment methodology for signifi-cance ratings or priority categorization. PINGP should reassess these HED: or provide proper documentation and justification for excluding these HEDs from the remainder of the assessment process.
How were ,these HEDs considered for cumulative and interactive l effects withotherHEDsinAppendixD(SeeAppendixB-4 of this ' reportforanexample)? Also there are six reports identified on pp. 2-10 and 2-11 of the Sumary Report (Sections 2.3.4 " Design l Requirement and Conventions Specifications" and 2.3.5 " Human Engi-neering Discrepancy Assessment Results") that should be provided as part of this supplementary submittal as supporting source documentation for ths assessment process. 38
#00'd OW B053H138 831N33 398553W 38N EE:91 98, 20'N0f
- 5. Selection of Design Improvements o The concerns raised relate to the cumulative effects from HEDs developed from the use of annunciators and labeling which are identified in Appendix A-6 and B-4. PINGP's response should not only relate to specific HED corrective actions but should try to reassure reviewers' doubts about the adequacy of the solution process and provide detailed justifications for PINGP's prioriti-zation, corrective action and final resolution for each HED.
- 6. Coordination of DCRDR Efforts o PINGP should describe its coordination efforts and how PINGP's Integration Plan developed in response to Generic Letter 82-33 is currently being integrated for all the control rocm elements, e.g., The Emergency Response Capability Plan, etc.). Also include h how training is integrated within the coordination of these programs. [E 2
- 7. Schedules for Implementation of HED Corrections o PINGP should submit . schedules for 'iinplementation and a summary justification for HEDs with safety significance to be left uncor-rected or partially corrected taking into account the review of HEDs requested in this report (see Appendix A and B). PINGP should also identify each HED (a total of 2,216 HEDs were identi-fied) grouped under the five priority categories listed on p. 22
' of this report. The cencarn here is that Appendix C and Appendix 0 of the Sumary Report identify 128 HEDs and 391 HEDs, respec-tively.
~
l 39 200'd GW WO53H138 831N33 398553W 3BH 8D 91 98, 20'H0f _ - , - _ _ . .. .-_- - ___ __- - _ - . ._ .. . .- J.
1 AGENDA FOR MEETING
- 1. System Review and Task Analysis Discuss process used during the task analysis to (explicitly) identify information and control needs (as opposed to instrument and control capabilities that appear on the panels). Address. how this was performed using the background documentation of Revision 1 ERGS or from plant specific information. Provide a representative sample of the task analysis data forms that illustrate an auditable record.
- 2. Control Room Yalidation Discuss the 31 HEDs that resulted from the validation of control room functions and specifically the need to consider the cumulative. effects 4 ,,
of these HEDs during the assessment. Also discuss the proposed use of I" the SPDS to resolve HEDs for display of required information.
.{
] 3. Control Room Survey - a. Present the criteria and methodology used to conduct the workspace portions of the control room survey.
- b.
Discuss the criteria used for the control room survey and rationale for choosing to replace the criteria in Section 6 of NUREG with other criteria. Be prepared to demons ~trate that NSP's preferred , criteria and methodology tu an adequate substitute for Section 6 of NUREG 0700,
- c. Discuss the conventions specification and its compatibility with Section 6 of' NUREG-0700. Discuss the process to revise the conventions specification. -
i
- d. Discuss items 3, 9, and 12 of the conventions.
40 100'd .. 0W B053H138 331H30 398553W OBH 23:9I 98, 20'N0f
*L b ,)
4 HED Assessment
- a. Discuss the rationale for exclusion of the 128 HEOs from the assessment process. Particularly the potential deficiencies from not subjecting these HEDs to an assessment for any cumulative' or interactive effects with other HEOs.
- b. Present any supporting documentation such as the six reports identified on pp. 2-10 and 2-11 of the Summary Report.
- 5. Selection of Design Improvements
- a. Discuss reviewers' concerns related to the cumulative effects from HEOs developed from the use of annunciators and labeling identified in Appendix A-6 and B-4. g
-r:
- b. Discuss the types of reasons for needing more information from NSP kh to evaluate the proposed design corrections and the justifications #
for leaving the HED uncorrected or partially corrected.
- 6. Coordination of DCROR Efforts
- a. Update NSP's integrated plan for the emergency response capability plan which was developed in response to Generic Letter 82 33.
- b. Describe how training will be integrated with the impinentation of control, room modifications.-
~
- 7. Schedules for Implementation of HED Corrections. . ..__, ..___.._. ._.. _._._____
- a. Discuss need for the submittal of schedules for implementation of HED corrections._ (See_ Appendix A and B.Ht0s.) -- -- --- -- -
l
- 8. Hiscellaneous J
l
- a. Discuss the rationale for needing more than two refueling outages to implement modifications.
41 200'd GW B053H138 B31H33 398553W 3BH 83:S1 98. 20'H0f
. v 1 i
APPENDIX C REQUESTED DOCUMENTS "C~ontrol Board Standards"
" Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Control Room Design Review--Human Engineering Discrepancy Assessment Results:
HED Summary Report" l
" Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Control Room Design Review--Human Engineering Discrepancy Assessment Results:
Rating Scores for All Instruments and All HEDs Sorted by Instrument"
" Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Control Room Design Review--Human Engineering Discrepancy Assessment Results:
Rating Scores for All Instruments and All HEDs Sorted by HED 7 Code Number" T 1
" Evaluation of Design Conventions Specifications Against NUREG 0700 Guidelines" f " Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Control Room Design Review--Proposed Modifications" .
I I p 1 rwa-m----,e,ww jv -- - - ~ -
Internal Correspondence
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A. , . 4 i i f l 1 i PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR Administrative Work Instruction
. GENERATING PLANT Rev:
.I Number: j NORTHERN STATES POkT.R COMPANY 1 4 Effective Date: '.
Title:
I Reviewed by: Supt. Quality Eng. CONTROL BC;u'-D STAND;uiDS P Approved by: . Plant Manager l , PURPOSE l -/4 This directive describes human engineering design requirements and .:L l conventions regarding component design, labeling, abbreviations and panel X layout. These are to be used in preparing specifications for replace- '
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cents, additions or modifications to existing control room equipment. - ;A; l 1 SCOPE I Definitions This document contains human engineering specifications for control system These j operator interfaces, including control panels and components. specifications govern elements of design that directly affect huctan performance. These specifications also govern elements of design which { ! can serve to facilitate performance if used consistently across items. { Contents The co=ponents and design elements covered in this document are listed in I d the table of contents. i _. i i ,i 6 e e 4 / i 1 * !
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Table of Contents PAGE SECTION 1-1
- 1. INDICATORS:
Continuous Indicators: , e Current 1-2, 1-3(ALT) 1-3 e Flow 1-2, 1-3(ALT) e Frequency 1-4 e Level 1-3 e Neutron Flux 1-3 e Position 1-2, 1-3(ALT) e Power 1-3 e Pressure e Reactance 1-2, 1-3 ( ALT) e Speed 1-3 <4 , 1-3 " ?.;; o Temperat'are e Voltage 1-2, 1-3(ALT) ~t 1:-
. A );s.-
- w.v Discrete Indi'cators:
-n e OF7/CN or STOPPED / RUNNING 1-5 ( S ingle) , 1-6(Double) e Position 1-5( S ingle) , 1-6 (Double)
Recorders: e Two Pen 1-7 e Three Pen , 1-8
- 2. CONTROLS:
2-1 Adjuster: e With Meter 2-2 e Without Meter 2-3 Breaker (Sus or Load Center): _. . e Uith Disagree =ent Indicator 2-4 e Without Disagreement Indicator 2-5 e With Second Trip Coil 2-6 - Hester 2-7 Mode Selector 2-8 ! 1 I
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PAGE SECTION 1 i Motor (Pur.p Fan, Screen): 2-9 i e With Disagreement Indicator 2-10 2 e Without Disagreement Indicator , 2-11 e Large Motor Monitoring '
'2-12 Two-Speed Motor with Disagreement Indicator J
i j e Indicator 2-13 e Two-Speed Motor without Disagreement 2-14 Signal Selector Valve : 2-15 e Control Valve 2-16 i e Control Valve with Automatic Action 2-17 ! e Motor Valve
- 2-18 ..
- e. Motor Valve with. Automatic' Action 2-19 -V 1
e Three-Way (Diverting) Valve g b,. 2-20 E, P
.ie.;e Logic Control ae t
~
2-21 d*.s. 4 t Annunciator Control t 4 Controllers: i a 2-22 Controller-Valve Positioner i e .. i e Controller with Three-Position, Spring-Loaded 2-23 i AUT0/ MANUAL Positioner
) e Controller with Two-Fosition AUT0/MAFUAL Positioner . 2-24 4
and Attached Meter e Controller with Three-?osition AUT0/ MANUAL 2-25 . I Positioner 3-1 1 i 3. LABELS , LEGENDS , SCAL'i ?LATES :
,3-2 Annuneiator Windows i
3-3,3-4 - I. I2.:ninated Labels for Displays and Centrols 1 ., i I i I e I ? i i.- .o:- - ( - i I
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SECTION PAGE Information and Caution Labels 3-5 Component Label Location 3-6 Instrument Nu=ber Criteria - '3-7 Lettering Style and Dimensions 3-S Scale Plates
.. Numeric Progressions:
- Horirontal 3-9
- Vertical 3-10
. Nu=eric Progression for Square Root and -
".' s, Log-Scale Places 3-11 ..-
.._5..
jr:-; e Parallax . 3-12 eft. 4 4 e Preferred Zone Marking:
- Circular Scale 3-13
- Edgewise Scale 3-14 Post Accident Monitoring Instrument 3-15 Nor= ally Lit Light Sy=bol 3-16 Color Coding 3-17 4 CONTROL PArrLS 4-1 Anthropc=etric Limits on Reach and Vision:
~
e Main Panels ~ 4-2 e Diesel Console - 4-3 -- 1 iv s
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SECTION PAGE Division Labeling and. Denarcation 4-4 Control Room Floor Plan 4-5 Main Control Panel Divisions
- 4-6 to 4-8 Within-Panel Layout 4-9 Control-Display Integration 4-10
- 5. ABBREVIATIONS 5-1 APPEUDIX A: SYSTEM CODES LIST A-1
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! INSTRUMENT = 46073 8-H-17 81 SWITCHGEAA NUMBER \ l NOTE: ACTION MUST BE CLOCKWISE TO CLOSE, COUNTERCLOCKWISE TO TRIP. !
1 1 3 Breaker without Disagreement Indicator '
\ eb - *
.. 2- 5 -
,: ." ~ .i-1 . = . = 2 ..' C % ...E- : . - : -i , , n 2.. Y - =
'~:. '- - ~ :
dh b[hkThhNE'EN5$:h!Mh[,",7' f -. *'i . ~ d d ' ~" 9 k - N . N f " ? -- - '.' 2. N T * . .A.-
~ '
. - . .2
. ;. ;-vv?.pg.i. . iwh-::.~ c .-:
-n_,. m=. '.".1*===? ??=m.e.g;yg:'=El+2.~- v=e.~w,;:=w==. .' % . _
..7... . . .
. , , . _ -_+, p.+_ ,-_. . . , . - . _ . _ _
y ,, .,,m. - ,,m. m .- y..,, 4*---
r 5 e i REO: ENGRAVED , . AS SHOWN i . . i, .
; TRIP TRIP GREEN = COIL i
COIL 1 2 I DESCRIPTIVE s 345 KV SUBSTATION NAME BKR 8-H-16
-N R.,
, a. .
i .;. 4_ . F.%
. r e%'.
, .Se.
~
TRIP CLOSE
\
PULL TO ' t LOCK i
"7 l
INSTRUS' =46381 SWITCHGEAR NUMP' l 8-H-16 =ll
~
NOTE: ACTION MUST BE CLOCKWISE TO CLdSE, COUNTERCLOCKWISE TO TRIP, - 1 j Breaker with Second Trip Coil n . . . , 4l . .p.'*
#~
.je ~ .-. *-;
3
- -
- _ q*3- . gg., .-
, _q--..
, _ - - * ,* ,* ; _ * - - 2$. . .
' -~*-~';,3 ~ ~ ~- , .-- -,; .
..e
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. e .: e .
~
. ~ : ..
'-.:. ..- -.=s';"
id.d.-
. 0]?h c. Y.:. :
=.;i V
~..p..'-
'; PW
~-' :.: ::.=:. ' . . .,.
myy9g?.. ri:.y t"~. . . . L. ?L :, . 'v.
** .':w::- eiH-*.-.
~
. .1;-Q .e '.,..; .?3 . . . .:.:Y;r. t h-.* ~^ ~*pc.; ?.
.., ^.
. .s .- .
- .
- .. =, ' =.
- c.
.. .=.:.-; :L 2+.-v =.'y : -l :. E
. . . .- -. t.
-- - - WHITE = .
DISAGR EE...dNT BETWEEN HANOSWITCH POSITION AND BREAKER POSITION i i 1
' 1 r c RED GREEN PRZR HEATER CONTROL.
DESCRIPTIVE = N. NAME GROUP 1C _,
.m.;.. -
! AUTO , T$. ., 1 l OFF ~ ON ~
\
t t
?ULL TO
- LOCK .
i
^
I 1 P1 - A1 -B1 -C1cI INSTRUMENT = 46243 MOIOR CONI?.0L NUMBER [ -D 1 -E1 1 em-2. NOTE: ACTION MUST BE CLOCKWISE TO TURN HEATERS ON, COUNTERCLOCKWISE TO TURN HEATERS OFF. I
- f. .
N Heater
' .:&.;- q-.iv.. .:..? .. ... :- i.+ - :. ! - . -------:. ^. ' -
. . . .. . = . . -
- .~.d. :---- ~~:; . .- -~. =.--- -- - qecm gu u 1
- ?... ...7 u' , : ---. .u . .
.:.; .A..,. . = L*::.
2..,..;a. . . : := . . . . .".'."p.l , ; ,,.. ,S^= !!: 'sWWk' s
*h'..$i5..%...
.. ,_. y
'.. '!,RI-A.C.'~N tiij '~ --M-WM ;. 5 ~= =! 9. $. ..=. .'.* * &. 5h*.~wi.i.
. -:. .. 3.%:'". "=
. -= -. . - , - _ _ _ _ - _
I 6 l i oEscRierivE = 11 CONDENSATE NAME RECYCLE PUMP l I MANUAL c SEE TABLE BELOW
! AUTO FOR ALTERNATE
. LEGENDS ,
'.c. .f. . . . . ,
3 ..s
- r i. '
$- t.f .
tw4 ( m.y I INSTRUMENT - 46491 i NUMBER l ALTERNATE LEGEN05 I . t 10 O'CLCCK 12 O' CLOCK 2 O' CLOCK I MANUAL AUTO ).- - .
/
i
- MANUAL STAND 8Y .
2ND STANOBY - IST STANDBY PREFERRED I l 1 Mode Selector . I I i 1 l 2- 8
. , g,y ::.;. ;
,.t_-,- . . . ..: - . 2 . :.
. . ;: . r =. . . . .
..u : ...:
. -- , ;; . .;. .. - m -- . . < .u ._. . , .;.... . . . . - .
. . ~: ~ -- ~ n '. " * , ' "l' ,.-
- = =.=; . ..'~~*T. *- : ~ ~ T* . .
' , h .5R
*L.-m --~.t=a "e : ... .e-
. s. ._ -::n
- f' .b ".-
. .d =. ' s~,, ':'+;5. k' ~ y '. .
* ** [- )*3 * ' *
Yvr'~.*.~7
% A,
.t {
_e C.b'* 4
- F : "*= s se _* -s,~ mm.***O='***~'****
d..*t , 3 1 , A & . .e 4 y ~ .. . , - - . . - - - .
. . , . , . - - _ , - . - - - --.n.~ , - ~ . ,
1 , WHITE = , O!SAGR EEMENT BETWE EN HANOSWITCH POSITION AND BREAKER POSITION i 4 s * , f GREEN :- e REO i DESCRIPTIVE - 11 CHG PUMP ., NAME -
. W O. .
,;. 1;e .
?
J .{l M34.h .4 R.
. .r
{ r STOP START' , - N . l l I l PULL TO LOCK l i i e s i r 1 n 2 - r46292* 1 K2-84 cl
~ } INSTRUMENT MOTOR CONTROL NUMBER l l CENTER j
l NOTE: ACTION MUST BE CLOCKWISE TO START, _~ j COUNTERCLOCKWISE TO STOP. l 1 . . 1 Motor With Disagreement Indientor l l 1
. ; . - 3*;* .' t: .n:- ~~* .,'
~,4.w;. .. ...?. ,
~
.w: , y
.-- .- -. . ~ , . . r_ .gh .. , '
. - & =='; =.;5 ".h.. .. *. _'.Q.U 3 "' -k?** '
'a-??*5 "'" - - - '
- N ** I k.*h 'L5"*-W '. .
i ~ * ' ' -
~
D.)Q Mi ~~& kh*~15: W .~':57-QW"G.9. ~ '"=:*N5: ~ *'. .~9'*YW5W"~ "'. '* I-
- - - , . - , - - - ,,.------sm.-- r . - - - ,_ , ,m_,y-.--m-- - . .---,-.,,,,-.-,---,,,_ym-e, ..-. . . . - - - -m-- , - - - - - ,
1
= c I
GREEN C$ RED 12 CNTMT D ESCRIPTI'.'E - "
- SPRAY PUMP NAMS
. .s ,;.
r _
.;. E e.7~i S,i O P START 4$3 .#
\
) .. PULL t TO LOCK l I N 1 1 I INSTRUMENT = 46009 16-01 SWI"r.dGEAR a 1 NUMBER l \ i t ; l l NOTES: 1. ACTION MUST BE CLOCKWISE TO START, COUNTER.
~ CLOCKWISE TO STOP.
- 2. f'CS" ON RED LENS INDICATES PUMP WILL START ON CONTAINMENT SPRAY INITIATION SIGNAL. IT MUST BE ENGRAVED AS APPROPRIATE FOR OTHER APPLICATIONS.
Ik i' Motor without Dis' agreement Indicator i .
- . ., j g.. 2._'s . 2-10 . _.
.~..-~~r. ,. l w; l.5 . . . . . . n : ,,; :. . . .,, .., . a ,, ; '. '; ,, . ... . . . . , ..:. ; . ..
\> .~ W *
-.t v*,L
.3* -*g,=7- ;;,.yy.?L.: .. ;-: z'; .,- ..,2;71, a .., J _; e .,4 ,,, . ak y_:,. < . a ...;
. . . f. ~; .*,.:l5. .~.-
.~. ..:.
*l~; -
.;.:4.f
- 4+jy;.~ . ..
e i AEO l GREEN WHITE o c AMBER = r OISAGREEMENT OK TO START MOTOR . BETWEEN HANO. (OFF = MOTOR START
; SWITCH POSITION NOT RECOMMENDED)
ANO BREAKER .
; POSITION .
- s m' a r
11 CONDENSATE - DESCRIPTIVE PUMP y'#g*yj MAME :-r .$.e( r 1 e a STOP START
\
- PULL k TO \
LOCK i d i f l
= 46410 ~ swInWAR INSTRUMENT l
NUMBER, l 13-7 = l . 4 NOTE: ACTION MUST BE CLOCKWISE TO START, j COUNTERCLOCKWISE TO STOP. i i L.trge Motor Monitoring .
. . .: - . . s
.'s. . - - -
; .~a:.t . --
,x ,c
.m, ..,.:
- .y.r1-11 2.:c_ . ...._ L: ;,. .. . . : = : . a../. _:: <s--. . .. .
- ...a.. _ a _ . . _ _ . .. . . . 2 :. _ ,. :_..
. ~9'
- , ;ie . ".T.:1Et .c:. . . .:.2@hrC :.~ ...*.:: .ia .n,-).ii ~-).-
e .. . - ....p ;4 & : ::. m :.o;..;,: C.' % ~ .. ss.. ..nn,% ?-
. .:y . .xa -- . . .
= FAST = REo:
GREEN ENGRAVED ASSHOWN
; WHITE =
OISAGREEMENT = SLOW # BETWEEN HAND-SWITCH POSITION AND BREAKER POSITION'
'ii.m
- .-w" .
DESCRIPTIVE .
-h
- 3. '.ar?,
I
,NAME . su >, g-
}
' SLOW STOP FAST
\
i 1
- l m l MOTOR CONTROL
! INSTRUMENT - = 46020 1K2-A3 l CENTER NUMBER l 1
NOTE: ACTION MUST BE CLOCKWISE TO FIPST DETENT TO START I IN " SLOW," CLOCKWISE TO SECONO DETENT FOR " FAST." l COUNTERCLOCKWISE TO STOP.
- Two-Speed Motor with Disagreement Indicator ,
,. -, e- . ..
6 6 We -
. .sa .n o e e r-I ,* ,
k ' ' * * ' * ' ' ,, ** * **
. . _:.,a.
e.~.
. s-..
g .;. . - .--.
.: u :=,w.:.u nu.w .: ,, : ;:--
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.:.:::.n.s;.::;.. . f.: -
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. :. =
. .: M.
"' N- .. p .. .~ - . ^;.- - - + . -* i
' , {c - . ,
. - - , - - -- -..v-- . - + - . , , - - - - - - - - - - , , . - - - , - , , , . . - , . , , ,-
4 . .
-RED:
ENGRAVED ASSHOWN 3 GREEN
= SLOW FAST
=
11 BORIC ACID CESCRIPTIVE TRANSFER PUMP NAME ,
- :6;; h A
AU,TO s. 4*1 w:m's wp
~w i
STOP START
\
.a - PULL , TO LOCK l l 1L1-BS el - MOTOR CONTROL lNSTRUMENT =46161 CENTER NUMBER l l 4 NOTE: ACTION MUST BE CLOCKWISE TO START, COUNTERCLOCKWISE TO STOP, i i 1 1 I , i -
- Two-Speed P.otor without Disagreement Indicator +. j 1
j .* t. : . . ":.- 2-13 .. ' s
- ,.--9 '.n. .
- 7.'
- .?. . . I I*.~ . , .4' ;; - - , * ,
R* G :7. r. .:l. in.1 - . " e a c. .n. : - .,:: . , , ,. !
-6.....
. . : h. "-Cien *:. ;*:. 7::,,i z g K c :
- L+n.::;d: ;,
,s
~
,"ijZ-]-~-l. ' D32:
';c .. . . . . . h * " * ' . .W *: -
%=:: c.: :. .;;m-
. ~ .-: ; .~ n us ~ta.n.~ 7.c 8._g . - --~~.: 3:=3:r9..:.:y .=?c.y.." qucy~ y;;a;;:.q q;, :. a - :::(
~
- 7
.- u.:- .
t i - 4 i } i ,, i J A STEAM FLOW OESCRIPTIVE = CHANNEL SELECTOR NAME CONTROL & RECORDER i I i. COLOR CODED TO SIGNAL Id .A CHANNELS , -[ . , .p ;
. - gi 3
. . .e .,
4 4 i 1 i 4 4 i i 4 l 46332 HFC 465 j . NOTE: MECHANICAL STOPS SHOULO BE USED AS REQUIRED TO PREVENT SWITCH FROM TURNING TO UNLABELED POSITIONS. ALL FUNCTIONAL POSITIONS MUST l - HAVE LEGENDS. .
. i i
Si8 nal Selector I i . 4 2 4 s . 2-14 . 5 ; .* - '*,- * "- -- ~ - --. l
. .. . .t :-i..._ - - . ,
- " - .-..' - .-- , ..............::.~_..........,_,__.: 1
. .. .w
;a :ne .: . . ~ w n. - .. :.--.
. .. ... . n. .::. .~-. .-
^
e ' (2lf1.Y : *~i
.f. -: _ : it yj1G:%*.P.-Q-l R Y - ' '5M' W ~ ~:' ~~~ . .~;F.!j := ' r ~ t'M::frir%='M:=llA; - . #. <. s .;.i
_. _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ ~ . _ , _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ - . - _ - _ , _ , _ . . _ , _ _ . - , . _ _ . _ _ , - _ - , _ - , _ _ _ , _ -
.i I I. r : RED GREEN TWO.LINE DESCRIPTIVE --- A MAIN STM NAME LINE ISOL ~ CV-31098
~
VALVE = . i ,,. . :g.. NUMBER A.c-d,- AUTO % M,.
- CLOSE OPEN .
INSTRUMENT 1 = 46158 NUMBER l 1 1 i < i l l NOTES: 1. ACTION MUST BE CLOCKWISE TO OPEN, COUNTER- l j CLOCKWISE TO CLOSE. 1
- 2. FOR VALVES WITH NO AUTOMATIC FUNCTION,
' LEGEND " AUTO" MUST BE DELETED. . l [
* - l l
9
.. Control Valve 1
- f f n j .s.
l a
'.,-.+1.-
- 2-15
..'n. '. i
. .i. ,'_.. *[ ,,. *. . ,
-....'".'N.
a i
.7'i.",...J-..'..',.',
tt [76.. Q*Ey#f-OM-M?f9"- :. .;.T L *MOT.'.Ll"
' ' 1?m .a .-/fn. ~4 ~;%.3.:+_p-; ' '; *g {**Ws*4
'.~.:6, nr j' ~.t rni. G '. '*?;.,,;
. :.. . '..;, ." ;;l , ;;.j
~
l 3 :n. :3. .i' 1 . .9 .'_' f . 2-fi r.yf
~
< . --; - ~r%9 -'
l i
--e.,-- . ,
. , , ~ - - - - = - p.e - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - . - - , . - , . , - . -e-- - - - , - -~- --
l BLUE = INITIATION SIGNAL FOR . AUTOMATIC ACTUATION RECE!VEO I t ' GREEN = Cl - Fall RED TWO LINE ^ l DESCRIPTIVE & 1 CNTMT VSL -
"M .;.
NAME INSTR AIR ISOL # #5 VALVE NUMBER s
= CV-31740 X.@e,i CLOSE WO OPEN O
INSTRUMENT I NUMBER = 46154 l l j NOTES: 1. ACTION MUST BE CLOCKWISE TO OPEN, COUNTERCLOCKWISE 1 TO CLOSE. l
- 2. )
INSCRIPTION ON LENS IDENTIFIES INITIATING SIGNAL (Cl = CONTAINMENT ISOLATION: Si = SAFETY INJECTION, ETC.). LOCATION INDICATES THE POSITION THE VALVE WILL TAKE.. IN THIS CASE, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE ON CONTAINMENT ' ISOLATION OR ON LOSS OF AIR (" FAIL" FOR FAILURE). . AS SHOWN BY THE INSCRIPTIONS ON THE GREEN LENS. I
/
i I Control Valve with Automatic Action '! 2-16 . cn. . .- u. . .:. : =. - .-- - . a.13 g .k.. c ; . r= .? ._ .. . -b +r
, . - .c-w.~
. ~,.--;.
---- -, ~- ... .. -,.. , .- -- . -- 5 = . ., . . . -.. ,-, ,- . , _ ,j "y- -;~-- ' ,_
. :: y,a,a .-:..,....
. ~..~~,-t.~.-;' -
~".-~,, ,.
~
/
GREEN = = RED l i TWO-LINE DESCRIPTIVE --- 11 HOGGING JET SUCT -
'NAME FROM A COND - .. .:
v s-.t i VALVE , MV-32308
..Y.7..
NUMSER .v.1
' ":,;-s e t CLOSE OPEN . -#. s-g O
t i W e INSTRUMENT I=46393 I NUMBER 1 BA1-C4 c MOTOR CONTROL l \ CENTER NOTES: 1. ACTION MUST BE CLCCKWISE TO OPEN, COUNTER. CLOCKWISE TO CLOSE. , 2. IF THE VALVE MAY BE ACTIVATED AUTOMATICALLY, LEGEND " AUTO" MUST BE ADDEO AT 12 O' CLOCK
. _ _ . . , _ . . . - . . . . a. .
~ ' POSITION ON SWITCHPLATE. . .
1 Motor Valve -! i - 2-17
- ~ .* N i~' - :.' ~ .
.b;h+- - 2.. l% : +: :" 'in % , . - .:;- =
._ ...- . .-;. M.m. ,.a;. =..h.=.,._;----.~...-.-.....-,e..-.
-- a .: y.
. . . . . _ . _ ~ _ _-.. .. - ,. i.:...2 ? . a.a
., 4..:: . :: ,
.'$s{e.. $ ,+ ~ *'*** *._"{ k .* hW Y w ~h. .E*'** '". * * * %?D ' ' * .$.*. "Y
- l. ' 7. ' '.' . A. .f .c--..--- '.** *
? -
ri-------~-wc-y-.-t vsM- + - - - - -, f--- -e ir og--+ +- T -t -m -
---'---m--n
l
. 1 1
B LU E = INITIATION SIGNAL FOR s AUTOMATIC ACTUATION
- RECEIVED i
l T c RED GREEN r Cl TWO LINE - wm , . FW TO A STM GEN
=
eIf l OESCRIPTIVE- ISOL VALVE NAME l VALVE NUMBER
- MV-32023 .id.gtt i .
M0 OPEN CLOSE - O - d l l h I I MOTOR CONTROL INSTRUMENT =46413 1K1-E4a I CENTER NUMBER i NOTES: 1. ACTION MUST BE CLOCKWISE TO OPEN, COUNTERCLOCKWISE TO CLOSE. ' '
~
~ 2. INSCRIPTION ON LENS lOENTIFIES INITIATING SIGNAL (Cl =
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION: St = SAFETY INJECTION, ETC.). ' I LOCATION INO! CATES THE POSITION THE VALVE WILL TAKE. ~ --' ' IN THIS CASE, THE VAk.VE WILL CLOSE ON CONTAINMENT l ISOLATION, AS SHOWN BY **Cl"ON THE GREEN LENS. l Motor Valve with Automatic Action - > \- i
- j U .c . -I . .. -
. 2-18 . . . .. #.
m i;' -.. ,
~
** -i. .
.~..'
- *ek ^. ?Y I'5fl,-[ _ , _..~ . . . ,} 'e f. l__ ' _ ~ ~~QAL .
' , %:T * } ' '5*'. _gg z , ,g:y.
* ~ ~_~: .,C '- - -
.g <. . . :
m n. y.'u- _ :- ~ - - --- - .-- -r ~ .----n.;a.-- , v :.w ..;;. ._g,
-- er-tm, ,,
1 RED " RCDT VC 'n!K = RED TWO LINE ceSCalPTIVE --. EXCESS LTDN DIVERT NAME TO RCDT.
*c.
VALVE. = CV-31333 * .,M o NUMBER i (1-8146)' .le
.g.pt RCDT VC TNK .g.
. . - Q..e O
h INSTRUMENT NUMBER l = 46169 l m NOTES: 1. I IF THE VALVE MAY BE ACTIVATED AUTOMATICALLY. LEGEND " AUTO" MUST BE ADDED AT 12 O' CLOCK l l POSITION ON SWITCHPLATE.
. j
\
2._SWITCHPLATE.SHOULCLBEAR LEGENDS THA.T DESCRIBE , THE ALTERNATE FLOW PATHS.
)
I l l l 1 Three-Way (Diverting) Valve ! l
.s *
;_ .. 2-19 ,, . . .
* ,.:;; ? .:Q y:. :.:: ~' . - f ~ = s.- - ' -!
~--h+-. * ' * "
..sc::1.=d:~ir. ,- ini: :: .m.-. - - --- ' ---- ~~--- &% v
> .. - . =:: . -- d====.= .:+s- - ----~=-
.,G:: . s.Q=Af,=##-brl-m:* i u-9.:?..D ~:'i=.-W i++ . d . v: . .. +-i =-i=: n i S E s.. "E 4= =i++?-- a l
= 1.. ' .~ ~ *:. ~ . .
~
i I
~ .
m. DESCRIPTIVE-. CNTMT SPRAY RESET NAME TRAIN A '
=
RESET SEE TABLE BELOW FOR LEGENDS c SEE TABLE BELOW FOR COLORS
- i;:q .,
.4 *
.y:; - .
.dl,i r,u
. 46001 4 ALTERNATIVE LEGENDS AND BUTTON COLORS:
. LEGEND COLOR RESET BLACK I TEST BLACK BLOCK GREEN UNBLOCK RED OlSABLE GREEN ENABLE RED Logic Control t, ,s . . .
. . . _ . 2-20
~
t ' ~ ~* j '; *
-- ' . .* * ' a ,l
; *, ,[ *f7 *~**
.'.*7.~?, .
~ ** ' ..- ..L ',:". ; .:u..:.. a 1. : : '. -. . ._:.;,.':
liki.TD$2:h..'
?',. * . - '. .i t.1 ?
-+
. ' . &l Ct5.L*:
.2 . " . ~ ~ ' -~.'+ : : .rh.'
.* 4
~.?- ~ ;r.:te?A.WZ- * . ~ n *C .** T ' * *. ' " ' TT . .? L .* * -
**., .* ::~~:--M:
*~
*L.*3.*****
r * **
. ; * '~ -l' -*. ; , * +.
,' 8*.. . ,*. * * * -
.*v t 'I- * -
. J.
*** ' * "v'
,'L
' .'] * ^ ^ .
; _ ' ' ~L.
i
= PInx FAcz PLATE ANNUNCIATOR .. .. ... .. .
.lb
.,.) '- hN' -
p TEST '.?;:5 SOUND i ACK MAN RESET LAMP ACK 46475 NOTE: FOUR WAY, MOMENTARY, CENTER OFF SWITCH WITH l BALL END JOYSTICK ACTUATOR. i Annunciator Control .
~
. 1 2-21
- 7_(:. :} .. , . , s <-
- ..=,5.g. .: ? --i '_ . .
.z.: : . ; . . . , , ~.~
. . ;'. =.: .. ' ' .-:.L...-... . . :.. '
- a: .a - . u .. :... .. .;.. ..
- m. : . ...: . . . - ~~.1..
' '.- .- + e.~
*-~.-.-~%.'.
.u ~ '
.i,-?:M.":- - -:
' ' .* ' ~ * *-- r- - ~ : + = : : m ="=- - -
= ;.._.~
~%.. ~Et%.'. -
-~.:-- .: ,
1
l POINTER INDICATING ;9 SETFOINT . 5 l/
\C 0
- SETFOINT SCALE-TURN COUNTER.
@ CLOCKWISE TO Q -
INCREASE Og A ' Q . I\ i;; 3 .w : c INDICATION OF OUTPUT o ouTPt 100 7 ' " HO RIZONTAL M ETER EXPECTED - RESPONSE =CLOSE OPEN TO OUTPUT TWO-L!N E 13A PN HTR DRN TO I
==-- OESCRIPTIVE A CDSR DUMP NAME CV-31013 -: VALVE NUMBER INSTRUMENT = 4310403 NUMBER I NOTE: THIS CONTROLLER IS USED AS VALVE POSITIONER FOR PROPORTIONAL OR THROTTLING VALVE ,
Controller--Valve Positioner 2-22 ae = *
' . .n.L . .:.
- . . -~ ; - r . . ~; - --- _-::== =- - :-- - -- ~- *- :- -; =: --- ~ ~- **
,;{; , c--; + +b-1. ~
.. . _: . u- -
DEVIATION '
. s c INDICATION OF PROCESS VARI ABLE DEVIATION FRO.Y llll llll llll llll SETPOINT AT CENTER: MOVING POINTER INDICATING =I POINTER, FIXEO SCALE SET POINT SET POINT g00 0 = SETPOINT SCALE-TURN COUNTER.
o 9 CLOCKWISE TO m O INCREASE
* . rig I;,
09 0 . ...-l$ L;3
, 4 1 A(i-
;:::;.=, .
\ -
.s.
Ill i 111 illi l111 c NO! CATION OF OUTPUT 0 h 100 0 TO 100%. ON EXPECTED mmOUTPUT HORIZONTAL METER:
- RESPONSE '
MOV'NG POINTER, TO OUTPUT = CLOSE OPEN MANUAL FlXEO SCALE MOVE LEVER DOWN FOR AUTO CONTROL, UP FOR {= :
) AUTO / MANUAL SWITCH MANUAL CONTROL. V RIGHTWARO FOR OPEN VALVE OR INCREASE AUTO' OUTPUT, LEFTWARD T M .LINE
. CLOSE VALVE OR 13A FW HTR DRN TO DESCRIPTIVE DECREASE OUTPUT 12A FW HTR NORM NAME CV-31012 vAtvE nuMsER
~~
INSTRUMENT --- , = 4310103 . . . . . - . . . . . . . . - . . . - - . . . - - yy F Controller with Three-Position, Spring-Loaded AUT0/ MANUAL Positioner 2-23 , 1
~
. .; 7"4,1
'~, ..;,,
' * * ~ - '
- kE= -
l L - - . . ~.' k '
***""*****-"* ~I . '~a'=. - -$I..- * ,
i
- =
. . . . ' . . . . ,n.y 9.7 a :q-m. -:- '
, ,, f*
,.:;. .....- u.q.a* * ' . ' ' . . = . . ' .
=.. .w .
.-4 .
100
=
=-
=
g 80
=
=-
=
60
=
=
dia .,
= __
40 -
.. . . .J .?.
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SECTION 3
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I i j /8 IN. (0.96 cm) IN0lCATOR LAMP,OR RECORDER 1 IN. * (2.5 cm)
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- WHITE SURFACE BLACK CORE I I 7 DESCRIPTIVE LABELS FOR <.
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f i LABEL LOCATION INSTRUMENT NUMBER LOWER LEFT CORNER OF THE i , FLUOR NUMBER / INSTRUMENT ' ISA CODE NUMBER MOTOR CONTROL CENTER LOWER RIGHT CORNER OF. 'l;HE NUMBER / SWITCHGEAR INSTRUMENT NUMBER BRIEF MISCELLANEOUS UPPER LEFT CORNER OF THE INFORMATION LABELS INSTRUMENT l POST ACCIDENT MONITORING UPPER RIGHT CORNER OF THE (PAM) SYMBOL INSTRUMENT "ilk~:.
. .zw THE ABOVE TABLE DESCRIBES THE CONPONENT LABEL POSITIONS .PliE ON THE ACTUAL INSTRUMENT.- IF THERE IS NO ew INFORMATION FOR ONE OF
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- NOTE: INSTRUMENT NUMBERS USED IN LABELING WILL BE THE "RECORO TAG" NUMBER 4' a
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LISTED IN THE I&C DEVICES COMPONENT DATA FILE. IF THIS RECORD TAG NUMBER jk.hk:. IS DIFFERENT FROM THE "FPI TAG" NUMERIC STYLE NUMBER. THEN BOTH SHOULD .a BE SHOWN. TAG NUMBERS USED FOR LABELING MUST BE APPROVED BY THE PLANT TECHNICAL ENGINEERING SECTION. GENERALLY,IF DIFFERENT FROM THE FPI TAG. THE RECORD TAG WILL BE A WESTINGHOUSE VERSION OF AN ISA STYLE ALPHANUMERIC ~ DESIGNATION. THE TYPIC AL FORMAT IS AS SHOWN ABOVE. .,. . l Instrument Number Criteria f 1 4 i
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LEGEND INDICATORS
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ANNUNC!ATOR TILES 0.28 IN. (0.7 cm) PANEL DIVISION LABELS 1.00 IN. (2.5 cm)
*lF THESE ARE MORE THAN 82 IN. (208 cm) ABOVE .
! FLOOR, H = 0.28 IN. (0.7 cm) SHOULD BE USED e i OR H (IN.) = 0.004 x VIEWING OISTANCE (IN.) OR H (cm) = 0.004 x VIEWING OISTANCE (cm). FOR ALL ABOVE APPLICATIONS, LETTERING SHOULD BE ALL CAPS (UPPER CASE): A SANS SERIF FONT SUCH AS HELVITICA, UNCONCENSED SHOULD BE USED. Lettering Style and Di=ensions n.._.
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O 2 4 6* 1. GRADUAMNS SHOULD BE MARKED F R LESS THAN 2 PERCENT ACCURACY OF INSTRUMENT
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~ RECOMMENDED SCALE PROGRESSIONS FOR HORIZONTA L M ETERS.
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NOTE: NUMERALS MAY BE MULTIPLIED BY .
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RECOMMENDED SCALE PROGRESSIONS FOR VERTICAL METERS. NOTE: NUMERALS MAY BE MULTIPLIED BY .. ANY POWER OF 10: FOR EXAMPLE, - 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, . . . IS ACCEPTABLE, AS IS 0,10,20,30, .. Nu=eric Progression for Vertical Scale Places
- 1. 1 GRAOUATIONS SHOULO BE MARKEO FOR LESS THAN 2 PERCENT ACCURACY OF INSTRUMENT {
l 2. ENDPOINTS OF SCALE SHOULD BE LABEL'ED l
- 3. ,
FOUR TO SEVEN GRADUATIONS SHOULD BE LABELEO 4 SCALE LABELS SHOUT'0 BE MULTIPLES OF 2. 5 OR 10 5. FOR NORMAL 100 PERCENT POWER OUTPUT, SCALE SHOULD BE SET O READ IN CENTER ONE THIRO OF 1 METER OR TO MATCH SPAN OF CONTROL FUNCTION
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-0 200 300 400 500 leil[iill i i ill 6 i i i i i4l1i ii i i i i jiii i 0 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 RECOMMENDED SCALE PROGRESSIONS FOR SQUARE ROOT SCALES.
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. .F RECOMMENDED SCALE PROGRESSIONS FOR LOG. SCALES.
NOTES: 1. SQUARE ROOTSCALES APE USED FOR FLOW _ a METERS (GPM) WHENEVER APPROPRIATE,
- 2. LOGARITHMIC SCALES ARE USED FOR CURRENT INDICATION (AMPERES).
- 3. NUMERALS MAY BE MULTIPLIED BY A'N Y ,
POWER OF TEN. 1. GRADUATIONS SHOULD BE MARKED FOR LESS THAN 2 PERCENT ACCURACY OF INSTRUMENT
- 2. ENDPOINTS OF SCALE SHOULD BE LABELED 3.
._ . . FOUR TO SEVEN GPADUATIONS SHOULD BE LABELED
_g ggg(.E'CASELS SHOULD BE MULTIPLES OF 2.'5 OR 10 ' - ~' ~ ~ ' ~ 5. FOR N'ORMAL 100 PERCENTPOWER OUTPUT, SCALE - SHOULD BE SET TO READ IN CENTER ONE THIRD OF METER OR TO MATCH SPAN OF CONTROL FUNCTION NOTE: THESE CRITERIA FOR METER SCALE INCREMENTS AND LABELING SHOULD BE MET,IF POSSIBLE.IN THE ORDER THEY ARE LISTED . _ .
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Numeric Progression for Square Root and Log. Scale Plates a -
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NORMAL OPER ATING = mumm YELLOW A RANGE ; __ GREEN .y4.F7 1 M ;;h{ Y~ I' LOWER ALARM LIMIT r _ mme LOWER LIMIT FOR p AUTOMATIC ACTION (TRIP, ETC.) , w e NOTE: IF COLOR CODING ON METER FACE IS IMPRACTICAL," ZONE MARKING"MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PROVIDING AN
' INFORMATION LABEL (SEE PAGE 3-6) IMMEDIATELY .
ADJACENT TO THE METER.
~~
. Preferred Zone Marking for Edgewise Scale Plates
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1 FOR POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENT IDT.NTL:TCATICN, A BIACK, 3/8-EC4, 5 POINTED STAR ON A 1/21.NCH SOUARE, WHITE BACKGROUND SHOULD BE USED. THIS LABEL SHOULD BE PLACED IN THE UPPER RIGHT. HAND CORNER OF THE INSTRUMENT. -
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Post-Accident Monitoring Instrument syMBot. ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- -. --- -. .. . . . . . . .. _ . .._ . . . . . _ _ e. i ,
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SYMBOL FOR NORMALLY LIT STATUS LIGHTS OR ANNUNCIATORS. 1' i i THIS SYMBOL SHOULD BE USED TO INDICATE LIGHTS THAT I ARE NORMALLY LIT DURING POWER OPERATIONS.
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1-ON ANNUNCIATOR WINDOWS IT SHOULD BE ENGRAVED IN THE UPPER LEFT OF THE WINDOW. 3_y27 L,.f.P ' 2-ON STATUS LIGHT PANELS IT SHOULD BE PLACED ABOVE A NORMALLY LIT COLUMN s.Q. ]
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USE - COLOR SAFEGUARD TRAIN LABELS: o TRAIN A ORANGE o TRAIN B , GREEN INSTRUMENT CHANNEL DESIGNATOR: o CHANNEL 1 (TRAIN B) RED o CHANNEL 2 (TRAIN A) VHITE o CHANNEL 3 (TRAIN A) BLUE o CHANNEL 4 (TPAIN B) YELLOW 4
~
VALVE, BREAKER AND MOTOR INDICATING LIGHTS:
) o VALVE CLOSED OR BREAEER'0 PEN .
(MOTOR STOPPED) GREEN a-
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o VALVE OPEN OR BREAKER CLOSED " a-Q (MOTOR RUNNING) RED I o' EQUIPMENT IN STANDBY OR READY STATUS ^ [@3.$
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t-AMBER ( o DISAGREEMENT BETw'EEN HANDSWITCH POSITION AND BREAKEP, POSITION WHITE o AUTOMATIC ACTUATION > SIGNAL RECEIVED BLUE RECORDERS - REFER TO RECORDERS GREEN IN SECTION ONE FOR USAGE RED BLUE 4-CONTROL FACE PLATES: I o REACTOR TRIP AND TUP.BINE TRIP BLAZE
._ ORANGE o SAFETY INJECTION
~~ - "'
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GREEN . _ _. . l
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.co -ANNUNCIATOR ACKNOWLEDGE / RESET ' PINK --
o OTHERS WHITE OR METALLIC POINTERS FOR METERS . BLACK (EXCLUDING RECORDERS)
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Color Coding Conventions * .t
. 3-17 . 1
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\ NOTE: SIGHT LINES TO DISPLAY SURFACE
\ MUST BE 90 2 450 FOR MAXIMUM OF*
\ 36 IN. (91 cm) VIEWING OISTANCE.
\ EXCEPT LEGEN0 OISPLAYS WITH LARGER CHAR ACTERS.
\
STATUS IN0lCATORS AND ANNUNC1ATORS ONLY A80VE
\
THIS LINE. MINIMUM chi.R ACTER \ HEIGHT FOR LEGEN05 IS 0.28 IN. (0.7 cm) / \ o / 's \
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/ N h 69.6 iN. (176.8 cm)/ EYE HEIGHT: .c. W A f
NO HAND SWITCHES /
/ \ \ 95TH PERCENTILE M ALE o.14k' l \ . #.:2y@
ABOVE THIS LINE .
'c f 38.7 IN. (98.3 cm) \
N o . 5 cm SHC LOER HEIGHT: b h / THUMB.TIP REACH 7.7 IN (19.6 cm) I 95TH PERCENTILE MALE
/ EXTENCEO: $5TH '
k I r PERCENTILE MALE o 56.5 IN. (143.5 cml/ EYE HEIGHT: 84IN. g STH PERCENTILE FEMALE (213 cm) . I
\ ,_ 49.9 IN. (75.9 cm) o 49.41N. (125.S eml/ SHOULDER HEIGHT:
\ l THUMB.TIP REACH i STH PERCENTILE FEMALE THUMB.TIP \ g EXTENCEO: 5TH REACH EXTENDEO PERCENTILE 4 LIMIT 61.2 IN. \\ \ FEMALE (155 cm) g\
1 s\ 1 N 4
\\ N N i . . - . . .
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3 4 , j i . - o y , l 9 ROTE: DISPLAY ANO CCNTROL HEIGHT RESTRICTIONS BASEO CN STH PERCENTILE FEMALE
'ANO 95TH PERCENTILE MALE. (OlMENSIONS ARE DERIVED FROM Antnrocametne Data Base for Power Plant Desien, EPRI.NP 1912 SR.1981)
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Anthropometric Limits on Reach and Vision-Main Panels
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l NOTE: SIGHT LINES TO DISPLAY SURF ACE MUST BE 90 :450 FOR M AXIMUM OF 36 IN. (91 cm) VIEWING OISTANCE s 6 HANO SWITCHES IN THl3 AREA $ ONLY IF BENCHBCARO HAS CLEAR '1 63.6 IN. (176.8 cml/ EYE HEIGHT: AREA FOR H AND SUPPORT 10 x 8 IN. { 95TH PERCENTILE M ALE MINIMUM (25 x 20 cml 28.7 IN. I (98.3 cm) g 61.8 IN. (157 cmliSHOULDER HEIGHT. [f f f i 1 95TH PERCENTILE MALS. g a 56.5 IN. (143.5 cml/ EYE HEIGHT: y STH PERCENTILE FEMALE
\\ I 29.9 IN. . i
\ ik (75.9 cm) j j 49.4 IN. (125.5 cm)/SHOULOER HEIGHT:
I a STH PERCENTILE FEMALE A '\ g 12.3 LN. l
\ (31.2 cm)
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THUMB.TIP AEACH EXTENDEO LIMIT H ] s NOTE: DISPLAY AND CONTROL HEIGHT RESTRICTIONS BASED ON STH PERCENTILE FEMALE AND 95TH PERCENTILE MALE. (OlMENSIONS ARE OERIVED FROM Antereocmetric Cata Ease for Power Plant Desien. EPRI,NP 1918.SR,1981) Anthropc=etric Limits on Reach and Vision--Diesel Console, Standing Operator e6. **. e, 4
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1 I I3- PANEL DIVISION LABEL: BLACK l D.CKGROD'D ',2 IN. (10<m) HIGH ?CI ( WHITE LETTER!NG;1 IN. (5-cm) HIGH l 1 I i
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DEMARCATION LINES: BLACK 0.5 IN. (1.27 cm) i'C I I WIDE PLASTIC tj. .-;e .,- J
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M. sin Control Panel Divisions NE'J OR REPLACEMENT INDICATORS, CONTROLS, RECORDERS, ETC. , SHALL BE LOCATED El THE APPROPRIATE SECTICN OF THE PANEL, AS FOLLCWS : SECTION SCOPE / BOUNDARIES CIRCUIATING WATER FROM TRAV ELDiG SCREENS TO CIRCENSER WATER BOX *'. HEATER DRAINS SEELL-SIDE FRES SURES , LEV ELS , VALVE CON-TROL AND INDICATION HEATER DRAIN TANK TANK LEV EL AND PRES SURE PUMP CONTRCLS AND FLCW l MOISTURE SEPARATOR DRAINS l LEVELS, VALVE CONTRCLS AND INDICATION REHEATER DRAINS LEV ELS, VALV'E CONTROLS AND INDICATION
,5-G DIERATOR EICITER AND GENERATOR ELECTICAL SYSTDiS TO ~ ~N G 345 kV SUBSTATION BREAKERS; GENERATOR g3 COOLING gm
's&a* -
TUR3INE THROTTLE VALVES , E-H SYSTEM, GLAND STEMi SYSTEM, TURNIm GEAR, 'IUEBINE/GENEFRIOR OIL VACUUM SYSTEM EJECTOR STEAM SUFFLY AND CONTROL, VACUUM j -
+ ' BREAKER, . INDICATORS FOR PRESSURE AND FLCW CONDENSATE SYSTDi HOTWELL TO CONDENSATE PUMP DISCEARGE, CHEMISTRY, MAKE-UP SYSTEM INCLUDING COND l
STG TNK FEEDWATER SYSTEM FROM FEEDWATER PUMPS 'IHROUGE FEEDWATER ISCLATION VALVES AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTDi FRCM AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP SUCTION SIDE (COND STG TNK OR COOLING WATER) TO AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES STEAM GENERATOR SYSTDi FROM MADI AND BYPASS FEEDWATER CONTROL VALV ES TO MAIN STM IS OL VLV' S . INCLUDES INVENTORY ( STEAM / FEED FLCWS, LEVELS) AND BIIXO3RI . . REACTOR C,00LEIG SYSTDI FLOW AND PRES SURE CONTROL AND DISPLAY
,, TDiPERATURE INDICATION FOR PRIMARY LOOP -
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Main Control Fanel Divisions (Continued) SECTION SCOPE /EOUNDARIES NIS AND ROD CONTROL DISPLAY AND RAPID-RESPONSE C0tiTROL OF FLUX CVCS MAKE-UP SYSTEM CHARGING FROM VC TNK TO RCS COLD LEGS; BORIC ACID BLENDING, STORAGE, ADDITION CVCS LETDOWN SYSTEM LETDOWN FROM RCS COLD LEGS TO.,VC TANK; DEMINEP.AI.IZATION RRR SYSTEM FROM REFUELING WATER STORAGE TAl'K OR CONTAINMENT SUMP TO REACTOR VESSEL N0ZZLE SI SYSTEM FROM 30RIC ACID TANK OR REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK TO BCS JCC'2iILAICR CONTROL AND DISPLAY FOR TANK INVENTORY AND PRESSURE -(INCLUDING FILL AND DRAIN, H2 FILL AND VENT) -
?.q .%
WASTE DISPOSAL CONTAINMENT-ISOLATION FUNCTIONS FOR REACTOR .E' CTIMt' ISCIi COOLANT DRAIN TANK AND SUMPS $[d u ST# CONTAINMENT SPRAY CONTAINMENT SPRAY FROM CAUSTIC STANDPIPE TO SPRAY HEADERS, INCLUDING ALL SUCTION VALVES; CONTAIFMENT PRESSURE INDICATION CONTAINMENT FAN COILS CONTROL OF AIR AND WATER FLOWS, DISPLAYS OF FLOWS, TEMPERATURES AND PRESSURES, AND CONTAINMENT PRESSURE COMPONENT COOLING CONTROL OF CLOSED COOLING SYSTEM WATER FLOW; DISPLAYS OF FLOW, TEMPERATURE, PRESSURE; COOLANT INVENTORY INCLUDING SURGE TANK LEVEL COOLING WATER FROM SCREENS TO SUPPLY AND RITURN VALVES AT COMPONENTS; PRESSURE, FLOW, AND BAY LEVEL INDICATIONS VENTILATION CONTROL OF FANS IN CONTAIW.ENT AND SHIELD -- AND AUXILIARY BUILDINGS; CONTROL OF ISOLA-TION DAMPERS; INDICATION OF CONTAIUMENT PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE .
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4 Main Control Panel Divisions (Concluded) SECTION SCOPE / BOUNDARIES MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEM GENERAL PLANT SYSTEMS: INSTRUMENT AND STATION AIR, FIRE WATER, COOLING WATER (DIESEL PUMP) i THINGS WHICH SHOULD PROBABLY BE 'SbHEWHERE
- ELSE INCLUDE VENTILATION CONTROLS FOR i
AUXILIARY BUILDING AND CONTROL ROOM, RCS MAKE-UP, CONDENSATE STORAGE (COOLING TOWERS) CONTROL OF FLOW PATHS IN CANALS AND BASINS, CONTROL OF AIRFLOW IN TOWERS (INCLUDING DIRECTION OF FLOW), INDICATIONS ) 0F LEVELS AND FLOWS i (DIESEL GENERATOR) CONTROL ' 0F EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS-> . , .. .. .
. STATION ELECTRICAL < TsCT
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f
Within-Panel Layout WITHIM SECTIONS OF THE MAIN CONTROL PANELS, NEW OR REPLACEMENT COMPO-NENTS SROULD BE LOCATED IN ACCORDAUCE WIIH THE FOLLOWING CONVENTIONS: o PAIRS OF PANEL SECTIONS WITH THE SAME NAME OF COMPONENTS ON BOTH UNITS SECUID HAVE 'IHE SAME I_ EFT-TO-RIGir CRDERIIIi; i.e. , THE'Y ARE
" COOKIE-CUTTER," UOT " MIRROR IMAGE."
o PARALLIL EQUIPMENT SHOULD HAVE IDENTICALLY ARRANGED CONTI.0LS AND DISPLAYS; e.g., THE LAYOUT OF SUCTION VAL'iE , PUMP, AND DISCHARGE VALVE CONTRCLS AND PRESSURE AND FLOW INDICATORS SHOULD BE IDENTICAL FOR PUMPS IN PARALLEL. o COMPONENTS ARE " STRATIFIED" BY TYPE, ANNUNCIATORS AT THE TOP, INDICATORS AND RECORDERS BELOW THEM, AND LOOP CONTROLLERS AND HAND SWITCBES ALONG THE BENCHBOARD AREA (AND SCMETIMES HIGHER). o PARALLEL TEAINS OR EQUIPMENT DESIGNATED BY NUM?ERS OR LETTERS SHOULD BE ARRANGED IN CORRECT ALPHABETIC OR NUMERIC ORDER, , READING LEFT TO . . , . RIGHT. T
- . ... Aa o INDICATORS AND CONTROLS FOR SUPPORT FUNCTIONS THAT ARE SPECIFIC TO A Qj PIECE OF EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE LOCATED WITH THE INSTRUMENTS FOR THAT 'v m .
EQUIPMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, LUBE OIL PUMP C0;ITEOLS ARE NEAR RCP CONTROLS . o SUPPORT FUNCTIONS THAT ARE NOT SPECIFIC TO ONE PIECE OF EQUIPMENT SEOULD BE LOCATED IN THEIR OWN PANEL SECTION (e.g., COMPONENT ~ COOLING) OR IN THE MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEM PANEL. o PUMP FLOW PATES SHOULD BE LAID OUT IN A GENERALLY BOTTOM-TO-TOP ORIENTATION; i.e.,. SUCTION VALVES ARE PLACED LOWER ON THE PANEL THAN DISCHARGE VALVES. PATHS SHOULD BE ALIGNED VERTICALLY. CROSSING OF PATES SHOULD BE MINIMIZED AFD SHOULD BE INDICATED BY MIMIC LINES WHEN IT IS UNAVOIDABLE. SEE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM PANEL FOR EXAMPLE OF ACCEPTABLE LAYOUT.
.4 6 6 .5 e
- 9
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+. .-. = nw.;;;s .; ... ;, ;;- j 7,;, ,,, ; ,- _ = ; 7 ;,. ;.._s
i I i Control-Display Integration - e INDICATORS SHOULD BE LOCATED NEAR THE CONTROLS THAT MOST THE PREFERRED DIRECTLY . AFFECT THE. DISPLAYED VARIABLE. ()
. RELATIONSHIP IS DISPLAYED IMMEDIATELY ABOVE THE CONTROL S ~
AND IN 'IHE OFDER INDICATED BEIfW. e WHERE THE ELEMENTS OF TWO ARRAYS OF COMPONENTS CORRESPOND ONE-TO-ONE, THE ARRAYS SHOULD HAVE A COMMON LAYOUT. , I,F THE CORRESPONDENCE IS APPROXIMATE, THE LAYOUTS SHOULD B E' FOR EXAMPLE, THE ROD POSITION AS SIMILAR AS POSSIBLE. INDICATORS ARE LAID OUT FOR CONTRCL A-B-C-D IN ONE ROW AND SHUTDOWN A-3 IN THE SECOND; DIGITAL INDICATORS ALSO SHOULD BE LAID' OUT IN A TWO-ROW ARRANGEMENT WITH THE SAME SEQUENCE. n.
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l RELATIONSHIP OF INDICATOR . . 9 4;; nw ;,- 4. t l FLOW - -
.:.n j TEMP i PRESS
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b e SECTION 5 ABBREVIATIONS
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. . . -..-. .. .. . = s
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...w........w. .. - ,,
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- . .* .;. - r - a . . .v .
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A
O Standard List of Abbreviations 1 TERM ABBREVIATION . Abandoned ABDN Abnormal ABNL-Absolute ABS . I
! Accumulator ACCUM .
i
! Acknowledge ACK -
..yg.q ,,
Activity ACTVTY , M! I Additive ADD ' .*?.$. N_,. Adjuster ADJ e4+* w ':.F .e Adminis tration ADMIN
. Administrative Control Directive ACD
- l. Aerated ARTD Aerated Drains Treatment ADT
.Aftercooler AFTCLR ,
"
- Air Conditioner (ing) - -
A/C Alternating Current AC , Ambient AMBNT Aspere(s) AMP (S) Analog ANLG Analyzer ANLZR Annunciator ANNUNC At=osphere AIM Automatic AUTO
* ~ ~ ~~ - - ~ - '
AUX
~
Auxilian - Auxiliary Feedwater AFW Auxiliary Feedwater Pump AFWP
" Auxiliary Oil-Pump - - -
AUX OIL-PMP " '- ~~ Averag e Ayc Backup B-U Batching BATC'd . Battery BATT - Bearing BRG Elender BLNDR Blowdown. BD Boiler s BLR
.n
+
.h:: ..; : ;.7
. v:C^. . '. .:43.R.' $~2.* .;.i * :. - -
. . ~.: ;.:
- Lp:::r .- ~^ ' ..~: . ::.: = :
3: ; _'., . . : .' : :.~ ;. . , ~:;.
.:.-l:. . --~ ~.. .,... . ..: v::..
- q.:-- 2 :
a : + u ...
,: .. 1c... . . . .. . . ' . .:.. . .. . - - - . .
- -~.m.;*.: m_ : r. . .. ~ =.-- - . ;:- ':.. . . . r.- . . ~=:.:,::::. . .. : = :".= :::': ,....:.
. .,:.~.: u.?. .=.:?:.: ~.:r -'.
a.;::=..ive.2.+': .'sW -w-- -:?W Ei'e: die--- - . 2 et- - ' - ,..t. ; .: ?.%..O.d2.i.r.; e7-: : - o .- n.. - 6:y :,t w 3.4 . ii:-
. . . . .. 4... '
- .- , . . , . . . . . . . _ . - . - - . _ . . . . _ . _ ___....y , ,
L ,1. i f d i
- 2 d
4 i Standard List of Abbreviations (Continued) 6 , TERM ABBREVIATION BFP I Boiler Feed Pump BSTR Booster BA
. Boric Acid BKR Breaker BLDG-Building
, B-P Bypass
~
.u.
Calculation, Calculated CALC -
'Q'y CO2 ' Carbon Dioxide C .g. ;.
Centrigrade/Celcius g.-Q _ CHG Charging .v.g -s CE VLV -" Check Valve CEM Chemical CVCS Chemical Volume Control System - CHLOR Chlorine CKT Circuit
- Circulating CIRC Circulating Water CIRC WTR
. Circulating Water Pu=p CIRC k"I'R PMP COAG Coagulation
- i. COMM Communications CC l
Co=ponent Cooling CMPTR ' Computer CONC (N) Concentrate (ica) COND Condensate .__ CDSR ... . .... i . .._. . . Condenser . CONN Connection CNTMT
> Containment .,
' Containment Isolation . _ . . _ . . .C I , CONT <- Control CD Control Damper ~ CRDM Control Rod Drive Mechanism CS Control Switch CV Control Valve CONVI'R Converter CLNT Coolant..
- CLR Cooler i
,t' .
. M/.~f T.
*[ ' .'*;. , . ;L*- ? - ,
~
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- 2. u- .' s .. c* .. . . .: . . .
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- ..% tr . i< => , f.; - ; -* r :r: c. '.-- . . r. .
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- .:::=;.7,n ~;.. - .. .., . ; . . . . . . :.::.-. :..? . . . .
. h-...'.f-hfhh*.Q3h;
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ww~. w;w. -.n. :w. =.-ceww. name=. ~ -w=e. . .=. . . - .a-. ;w=- ..:.w.=:w=s=s
._M 68
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e n de Standard List of Abbreviations (Continued) TERM- ABBREVIATION Cooling CLG. Cooling Water CLG WTR Cooling Water Pump CLG WTR PMP Crossover IOVR j Crosstie . ITIE Crossunder - . IUNDER . . , ,, Current I. USCD Cylinder CYL- "IN
.p m Damper DMPR VM' Deborating DBOR .
Lv,;Je- .:g.y: ' Deepwell Demineralizer DPWLL DEMIN Deepwell Pump DPWLL PMP Defoaming DFOAM Degasifier DGASTR Degree DEG #
- D e-icing D-ICE Demineralired(ing) < DEMIN Detector DET Devatering -DWTR Diaphragm DIAPH Diesel DSL Diesel Driven DSL DRVU Differential DIFF l
Dif ferential. Pres sure aP . . . . . _ . Differential Temperature aT Direct Current DC Discharge DISCE _ Disposal DISP -- . Dis tribut ion DISTR Dose Assessment DA Downstream DWN STRM ' ~ D rain DRN Ejector E.7CTR
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e
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- . . . . ... . . : ;.=.:-.
..y g 4;.a. g @ -:-:.q s. y - .s w . :4.; *~
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- .~
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s.a
Standard List of Abbreviations (Continued) ' ' . 4 i TERM ABBREVIATION
~ Electrical Switch ES
. Elec tro-Hydraulic _ E-H E:sergency .
DIERG Imergency Core Cooling ECC Emergency Oil Pu:sp EMERG OIL PMP Equipment, EQUIP Evaporator E7AP , Exciter EXCTR - .. Exhaust EIHST .$.@
* -?
?.
EXPN .y.Nh2 Expansion t Exponent; e.g., 10-xE9 E @4@.,s!- sx'
~
F .4 Fahrenheit ( Failure FAIL Fan Coil FCU Feeder ~ FDR . Feedvater .W
! Feedvater Pump WP j Filter FLTR Floor FLR Flcw Element .
FE . Ficw Switch FS 1 l Foot / Feet FT , Forced Draft FD Frequency FREQ Fuel Oil F0 ' ~
~ ~
~
^ - ~
i- - - --Gallons Per. Minute GPM Generator GS ' Gland GLND ' Governor .. ._ GOV . Ground GND
' Header HDR ..
! Heat Excha'nger HX Heater HTR Heating -- HIG High HI ' High Pressure HP .. Holding HLDG , J,.., :j-. . ,--.
. . f. ' .,. . .
1 i
. : .'q .: . . ..-
i; .. Y:; ;;-%%.MO.,L9:; . $---h.bi-tlty :L :: + "3~$ .1: - - * - ' N1:: ;b.* :,,L~- ,+; ' -
. :5:c;.,&;: .: : ., pi::&.k-hl.~.:;
.. i:i.Q-
- $fsi?&;- ft: 2yhkifi+;l. V$~Q'fk=.=
~s= .-:+ +j...+:+- .~.f .r.We - 0 9.:
. -win =.+: .:i..:r-d f d:p +,re:: - -
-..w. : ..w.:.+ . - . .. z- : .
,'+..n.. u , .:-.- - - :. H e .+ --:.:+ ae ==: %:
,--,-v-,- -,-m , -- 7 .%. . ~ m - , - -y.j , ,w--, ---yy--
l 6 . Standard List of Abbreviations (Continued) TIR11 ABBREVIATION
' Holdup H-U
-Hot Water HOT WTR Hour ER Humidity HUM Hydrogen H2 Impedance Z 4 z.: .
Inboard INBRD ~ C' Inboard Bearing INBRD BRG ' 'Y' d.
. S ,. . .
~
Inch / Inches .IN .fs 4 ir Indicating Light . IL- -kdf
^
Injeetion INJ Injector INJR Inlet INLT Inspection
- INSF Instru=ent INSTR ~'
Integrated Leak Rate Test ILRT Inter 1cck INTLK ION Exchange IX Isolation ISOL Jacket JCKT Junction JUNC Junction Box JB ~ Kilovars KVAR .. . - . . . . . . Kilovolts . . . - . _ . . . .KV _ . . . . . Kilowatt KW Labyrinth Seal LAB SL - Laundry LNDRY
----Left Hand - -
. LH Letdown LTDN
~~
Level LVL Level Alarm LA , . Level Controller LC
~ ' Level Indicator LI Liquid
- LIQ Local LCL Locked Out LKOUT
- (
m.w - - , ,
- . .--a;+,.;v
..:: ? , . , - .....-;- . .w -: :. . -
. an-- .
' h .j. h ,-3-:' '.4.- 2 .../.- .pq[: ~.5- 6 Q .,... .-u '-.2.z z 93 s ; p.j e f.
. r: 3 'f i g . ;... . .Q.
- ...,.,-,...e.;...m.......
y-. w: ..
.+.*w...- ,
..:.w - . m....
p t.- =.9.; +
.,:.=.z .
-. u.y.e.e.-e.
_.,.n .. . . - - _
i 4 1 I 1 Standard List of Abbrevictions (Continued) TERM ABEREVIATION Low LO Low Pressure LP Lower LWR Lowering Bearing LWR BRG Magnetic MAG s , Maintained MNTND Makeup M-U , . , . ** C,,, S- . Manual MAN . HASTR w.. 6." p-Q Master MAX l Maxi =um MEAS
'.DN* -
- Heasure. ,
Mercury 'Eg Million (Mega) M (e.g., MW) Minimus MIN Mixad Eed~ MIXD BED Mixing MIX ^
~
Moisture Separator MOIS SPRTR Manito:(ing) HNTR ! Morpholine MORPH Motor MTR Motor Driven MD , Motor Valve MV-Neutralize NEUT
. - Nitrogen . .N2 - - -
Nominal NOM Nonaerated N-ARTD Normal NORM No::le N0ZL Nuclear Instrumentation ' NI'
" ^
' Okay' OK ! I' Operatcr(ing) OPER _ _
' Orifice ORIF Outboard OBRD 4 Outboard Bearing. 0BRG -
Outer OUTR i ,i 4 g
,e,,,e n
- - ~ - < .~ e e- 4.,
- . s. ~- *
, .s *l *
, 'L"' ' ;% * - .,
- .c,i$i=.
u . .. X .. . .' * .;c,
- .. ~ ihi2& ~ -
%:, - - .--' ; 5- 7 . ,4. : .Q., :.= . . :_ela . . - : ., . ; =~ - $.l:..... .:: ., .
- R*.N1.** OE*6_.'*_Y. .*T .NYG. .'.*.';*."
.. , ; '_-*1 T ' *~***D(f ' .y*
_, , . _M, ' " ,#,._ 7_(,
,._.*'_'*,",4?* ,
y*r*m_
'4.*,K*Y " ** ' ** *J'T [*_**@~*:;. .. _., .T '.~ 7, .
~~ __
. . - __ . . , . , , . _ _ ____ _ - . . , . ... _ _ m. . , . . . , . . . . , - , ,
I l l
. i l
Standard List of Abbreviations (Continued) ABBREVIATION TERM OUTL Outlet OVRFLV Overflou OPAT Overpower Delta Temperature OVRSPD Overspeed ' OTAT Overte=perature Delt~a Temperature 0xygen 02 .
'G .C ;,
PKG ' ~ #' Package PNL Panel YN'$ PPB ^ Parts per Billion Parts per Million PPM %[e Percent PERE P er fo rmance PERM P ermis s ive pH Th . *
"" 6 Thase PROS Phosphate Pickup P-U POT Potentiometer LB/HR Pounds Per Ecur '
Pounds per Square Inch Absolute . PSIA Pounds per Square Inch Gauge PSIG PWR Power PRFRD Preferred PREHTR . , Preheater ._ PRESS (P when embedded Pressure in equipment labels) PC Pressure Controller PI Pressure Indicator PS Pressure Switch PRESS TEST Pressure Test PRZR Pressurizer PH Preventive Maintenance PRI
. Primary PROT Protection PURIF Purification
. - ~- 5 .
~~ *
.. ....e en e **--***4.= .
. .. .. s *a. " =
5:::.&.*l W.: .%::.S_ pih .-: = -
- _ " ~ - 'f Q : ?(: - S
= sf.l* l_ f-Q.S=' n L 5- 8 +=:* .
.= .. :. = . .. - = w;= := , _ : , p.1 -- ...-a.::
. ;:9g.
.,3.
; u.= x. . .
.g= .:. , p. w.mm. y;+ +; ..=: :- . ,. -
pa. 2. .
l '> i I. Standard List of Abbreviations (Continued) TERM ABBREVIATION PB Pushbutton RAD - Radiation RADWST Radwaste Range RNG Reactor RX RC Reactor Coolant 'j Reactor Coolant Drain Tank RCDT A Reactor Coolant Puhp RCP RCS .~f,T!
- Reactor Coolant System N 4't RCVR
. Receiver RECIRC
~#.-
.Q Recirculation Recembiner RCIGUR Recorder RCDR Recyc1e(ing) RCYCL(G)
Reference REF RFLG Refue1ing Refueling Water Storage Tank RWST , Regenerative REGEN Regulator REG Reheater RETR
.Re= oval, Removable RMVL Required REQD RSVR Res ervoir Residua 1 RSDL .
Residual Heat Recoval RHR Resistant Temperature Detector RTD Return RTRN Revolutions Per Minute RPM _ . . . . _ . Right Rand RH Rod Control Cluster Assembly RCCA Rod Position Indication RFI - Roentgen R Safeguard SPGD Safety Audit Cocmittee SAC Safety Injection SI .. s 9
~~'
'h- *y p -
f .i ,.'.3-._ :- . -- , , ,. . . .
. . _ . . . .-- , . ~. ._
5- 9 m . . , . . . . .: . , , .
; =.:.t.:r . .- , . .c ,- _ . . p . ;n .=.
. . =p:+=. . - . .. :9 1.. _; y . ' :'_
z Q .;.' . _ j . :.* ; ;., ; j .~
- h:-y y.4- :- ,{:- z.
Standard List of Abbreviations (Continued) . TERM ABBREVIATION Sa=ple SMPL Saturated SAT Screen SCRN Screen House SCRN HSE Secondary . SEC
. Selector SEL Separator SPRTR
,;-) q?
Servic e SERV . . . Shield Building SHIELD BLDG j.l}$ 2 Shift Supervisor SS :N Gi..
~
Shift Technical Advisor STA -
'D Shutdown SD Silica SiO2 Solenoid Valve SV Sp illover,_ . -- .
- __ m RFLOVR Square Root SQ RT
- Standard Cubic Feet Per Minute SCFM Standby STBY Standpipe STDPIPE Station and Instrument Air STA AIR Station Auxiliary STA AUX Steam STM S t e am Dump - STM DMP Steam Generator Blowdown SGB ~
Storage STG Strainer STRNR Suction SUCT Supervisory _, SUPV , Supply SPLY Surveillance SURV Surveillance Calibration Procedure SCP Surveillance Test Procedure STP ,- Switch (es) SW(S) Switchgear SWGR System SYS Tachometer TACH
?
. n. - -
. . . , . . 4-
; c. . :-- :
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- yp. .
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.. .- . . . . . . . . . . ~
- ~ ~ S _' -:. : - h --.-- . . . . _
- -:------ , .:--~~
- .- -iEb H- --$ .,? N :* -- S N .
. _ _ _ . . : - & --5= ~_- _-- ~.An ,, .. _
s J 5 1 L i l; i a 1 . i Standard List of Abbreviations (Continued) TERM ABBREVIATION 1
; Tank.
TNK - Temperature TDiP (T when embedded in equipment labels) Temperature Element TR , i Temperature Indicator TI .
. n.
..^ W 1 Ther=occuple T/C Thousand K .].1;] .
Thrust Hearing T-BRG , v:.69*t.: TRN m3;.: Tra:..n , Transducer XDUCR Transfer IFRR Transformer IniR i Transmitter ~ DiTR ' Turbine Driven . TD .-,.. . Turbine / Generator TURB Turning Gear T-4 Upstress UPSTRM .i Vacuus VAC . I Valve VLV l Vertical VERT i Vessel VSL ! Vibration VIER
- - - Volts , Voltage VOLT -
) VOL t Volume . Volume Control VC Waste . WST Waste Disposal System -- WDS . Water WTR ~ + Waterbox WTRBOX Weight WT!- , , I - i is . , 4 t .. l .
~
5-11 ,
.. : . - ._.m. , ..
~ ^ * ~'
*. ,~ .
t f *v .
- :-. f*:&. '7 *-L:-f k :,
.lS?, ,hh ^5s N "5 *- , -
~~$** * % = 0. *-l ub::.* 1, 'Y.Y .~ \
1;-~-+h. . l . l - --f+--- --?F &_2. . - f- .- si.-e+ ~ ...---- m:- n '.-- - ~ ---- f.- 6 .~: -_
+s .n , ' , . -
. W+?it t .
.__ -,.__...._.,-...,,.,.._-,,,.,_~,-~.r_, .~ ,.m ,---._,_ .. . _.y ,- _ ,_... -.,,.,_. - , - - . . . . . - - , , _ , , . , , , . . _ . . , -
l 1 d l l APPENDII A SYSTEM CODES LIST t Table A-1. Mechanical System Codes 4 CODE SYSTEM NAME '. AE ACCUSTIC EMISSION AF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AR AIR RDiOVAL AS PROCESS STEAM BL BLEED STEAM BR BORON RECYCLE CA' CONTAINMENT SPRAY CAUSTIC ADDITION CC COMPCNENT COOLIlU CD CONDENSATE . CF CHEMICAL FEED
<W. .>. E.
CG- CO2 , N,H2 2 .M(- CL COOLING WATER ,? ' M . CP CCNDENSATE POLISHING
'5-$;$..
CR CONTAINET LEAR RATE ~.+
; CS CONTAINMENT SPRAY CT EXTERNAL CIRCULATING WATER CW CIRCULATIIC WATER I
DE DEEPWELL DEMINERALIZER i DW DOMESTIC WATER i' EH TURBINE GENERATOR CONTROL i EM EVENT MONITORING FH FUEL HANDLING FO FUEL AND DIESEL OIL FP FIRE PROTECTION AND DETECTION W FEEDWATER GA GAS ANALYZER GF GUARD FORCE, SECURITY -
; GH GUARD HOUSE DIESEL, VETTILATION GS GLAND SEALS
~~
HC CONTAEIMENT RYDRCGET CONTROL f ~ HD HEATER DRAINS j HG HYDROG EN
\ . .
l f d t A-1 1
,3 , . _
4
. .. -u
. =:.- r-- . . : =:= .
w ; -e: . :.= .- u~.- q:f.-ll. :.-W *.pi+h " ~ A
$_ : ~. . _. . * * '..'_~ .l.s.. . . .. ._.- =. . @ k.. +. - ..
.. Z.--isii+r*"*s
*:-5:-_
9 8 t Table A-1. Mechanical Systen. Codes (Concluded) i CODE SYSTEM NAME !, - RS PLANT BOILER AND HOT WATER HEATING i HT HEAT TRACING I HV HEATER VENTS t MD MISCELLANEOUS DRAINS AND YD(TS MP MISCELLANEOUS PLANT UTILITIES j MS MAIN AUXILIARY STEAM AND STEAM DUMP- , NG NITROG Di . . PC CRANES / HOISTS i PR r PORTABLE RADIATION MONITORING ' RC REACTOR COOLANT '
- RH RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL RM REACIOR WATER MAKEUP
} ~RV REACTOR VESSEL SA STATICN AND INSTRUMENT AIR SB STEAM GDIERATOR BLCWDOWN . I SE t STEAM EXCLUSION t SF . SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING m.
! SI SAFETT INJECTION' - '
~
SM "fy; } REACTOR HOT SAMFLING
- SN SNUBBERS AND SUPPORTS a,.I. Q
} SS 5-TURBINE COLD SAMPLING '$gy. d: .l TB -TURBINE / GENERATOR
- 1 A-1( TC CONDENSER TUBE CLEANING i
TD TURBINE BUILDING TRAPS AND DRAINS
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Table A-2. Ventilation System Codes CODE SYSTEM NAME GH GUARD HOUSE DIESEL, VDITILATION ZA AUXILIARY BUILDING SPECIAL VENTILATION ZB ADMINISTRATION BUILDING AIR CONDITIONING T ZC CONTAINMENT AIR HANDLIlU ZD AUXILIARY BUILDING NORMAL VENTILATION i ZE EQUIPMENT HEAT REMOVAL 1 ZF SPENT MTEL POOL NORMAL VENTILATION ' 4 ZG DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM COOLING ZH CHILLED WATER SAFEGUARDS Z.I HOT
- CHEMICAL LAB AND SAMPLE ROOM VENTILATION ZK BATTERY ROOM SPECIAL VENTILATION -
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00V-C Decilist Controlst totary 6. 4. 4.5. d t i l Vision Contes 11er RCLE top of the control and doen the side. Nueber s:RCLE- 4304101, Contr ol 43C4102, 4304103 Specifications Vision, Contr oller Direction of eation should be identified for retary No Chect enter for component sto-C D nttist labels and location 6.6.3.8.6 Aidst tabel Content Touch controls. , I.l. neders. Nueerals greater than 4 should be grouped, separated No Dect easter for component 823-C Decklist Visual Bisplayst 6.5.5.1.a(31 Vistae Counter by coesas and decioal posats as appropriate. 1.D. neebers. R!scellaneces Cisplay types visual Displayst 6.5.5. I.a t31 Vision Counters NIS Orne surfaces and surrounding areas should be glare No Dub easter for componest 8:4-C Dettlist Miscellaneous resistent. l.3. neebers. Ossplay Types . vissal lisplayst 6.5.5.1. h t ll vision Counters Nis Orte counters shosti le sounted perpendicolar to No Dect saster for coeposest 8?3-C Dettlest Piscellaneses operator's line-of-sight. I.8. nieters.
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Inist on- secessary, they should be labeled. NIS- N418, #478, N438, Principles of N449 Sisplay eating vision Meter Messages should describe entts on the display and say No Dnk easter for coepeneet GT3-C Decklist Visual 6.5. I. 4. a Bisplays/ Principles include engineering characteristics or I.B. neebers. of 8: splay traesforestions. In this case, engineering snits have , been ositted free the display face entirely. vissal 8: splays / 6.5. 5. 4.6 Vision Meter Messages should avoid entraneous inforeation. No Duk easter f or coeponent 03FC Doctlist 1.3. puebers.
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Principles of eating brief, and easily distinguishable free one another. Resplay vision,' Meter Messages on the display f ace should be clearly No Chun saster for coeponent 438 C Dettlist visual Bisplayst 6.5. I. 4. c Principles el lecision- sorded,brief,and easily distinguishable free one 1.3. numbers. Display saling another. Visual tisplayst 6.11.5.d Inision- Peter When too or more displays of the saer parameter most No Ont easter for cosponent 04FC Decklist Prisciples of eating be coepared, scales should be compatible is numerical 1.0. nielers. 8 splay progression and scale organlaation.
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*( B Eul:EllRE FIRF ORN. COMPONE NT RELATED EVENTI EVENit CONV, INTERACil04 El':E SOURCE TOPIC REFEEEitCE RODAt tif ivrE SYSTER NEO DESCRIPt!ON FUNCTIONif ASE INTERVIEW SPEC. CDNSE9'JENCE5 COMMENTS It+C Decilist Visual tisplant 6.5. 3. l .a lli Viss on Rot ary For light indicators, use dual bulb er dul filasent. No Duk easter for component Light Indicaters Selectar Use bulb test capdility. I.O. numbers.
(Knoll lle-C Dettlist Vissat Bisplayst 6.5. 3. I. a t t i Vision Rotary for light indicators, use deal bulb or dual filament. No Dett easter for component Light Indicators Selector Use bull test capability. I.O. ausbers. ,, itsobl ill-C Decklist Visual Displayst 6.5. 3.1.a t t i Vision Rotary For light indicators, use dal belt or dul filasent. No Dett easter for componest Light ladicators . Selec t or. Use ball test capability. l.8. neebers. Iteott 120-C Dectlist Controls 1 Rotary 6. 4. 4.5. d t 28 Vision Rotary Sel. It should not be possible is confuse contral position No DHb easter for coeponent Control (Star relative to position earners. 1.1. puebers. Specifications Handlen I 121-C Dettlist Labels and location 6.6. 3.5.c Vision, Rotary , Contr.. position information showld be visible to the No Dech easter for coeponent J Aidst tabel Content feuch Se!. tSt ar operator during operation of that control. 1.0. neebers. Handlel 122-C Decklist Ldels and location 6. 6. 3. 8.c Vislen, Rotary Control position inforsation should be visible to the No Deck easter for coeponent Aidst tabel Content fasch Set. tSt ar - operator during operation of that control. l.9. niebers. Handlel III C Decklist Controlsf Rotary 6.4.4.5.d(2) Vision Rot ary It should est be possible to confuse control position No Deck easter for componut Contra! Selector ti- relative to position markers. l.3. neebers. Specifications Mandlet l'V-C Decklist Controls # Iotary 6. 4. 4. 5.d t 21 Vision Rot ary It should not be possible to confuse control position No Dect easter for component Contr ol selector IT- relative to position earners. I.B. puebers. Specifications Handlet 110-C Decnlist Contreist totary 6. 4. 4. 4. 6 Vision Rotary Engraved lines should be filled eith contrasting No Dech easter for component Contra! Selector ti- pigeent. I.O. neders. Specifications Handlet III-C Decklist Controls # Rotary 6. 4. 4. 4. b Vision Rot ary Engraved lines should be it!!ed eith contrasting . No Dect easter for component Esatt al SelectorIT- pigeent. I.S. neders. Specifications Handlel 134-C Decklist Vissa! lisplaysl 6.5.3.8.alli Vision Rotary use dal bulk er dual filament. Use bulb test No Dech easter for coeponent Light Indicators Selec tor ti- capdility. I.9. ausbers. Handlet 135-C Dectlist Vissa! Bisplayst 6.5.3.l.allt vision Ret ary Uso dual bulk or dual filaeent. Use bulb test No Dett easter for component , Light Indicators selectorII- capdllity. l.3. sesbers. Handlet 144-C Dettlist Visual 8:splayst 6.5.3.2.a t il Vision states Bisplays and controls should be appropriately labeled. No Dett easter for component tight Indicators Light for non-legend light indicators, nearby Ideling 1.3. nee 6ers. should be ssed when seaning is not apparent. - 143-C Dechlist Vissal Bisplayst 6.5. 3.3.c Vision, tegend TURI tegend states lights should be readily distinguistele No Component I.S. Light Indicators footb States free legend pushtsttons by fore, site, and other pueberstiURB- 40001, 48062 Light f actors. 148 C Dettlist Vissal Bisplayst 6.5. 3.3. a t 21 Vision tegend Nis Legend should be legible eithout illusination. seed No Component I.8. tight Indicators Status contrast should be provided eith er eitboat Numbers:NI5- 44112, 44111, Light illseinstion. 44100, 44111 154-C Dectlist Vissal Sisplaysf 6.5. 3. l. a t t i Vision legend Use dual built or dual filasent. Use bulb test Component I.D. No.: No Coop !.l. No.506EN- IR Light Indicators Status capability. 96EN- 4.8 tv 905 1RMS,is 241Ran5,To 201 j Light 110,.48 KV 905120, IIM, CL6 NTR SUS,lo RE5 To 4.16 9US 14. Dect IRAN,llt441191,4.16 XV SUS easter for reeaining 15 coeponent !.8. #0.. 48'#-** .
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-( HE9 Surl!!AAf REFORI NUSEE 0700 HURAN 00CllMEui MB EUICEllict FERFGR9 CDffCNEul RELATED EVENTI EVENTI CONV. INTERaC!!DN .
CCSE SOURCE TOPIC REFERENCE RODAlltY ITFE SYSTEll HE8 CESCRIP110it FUNCTIONITASE INTERVIEN SPEC. CONSEQUENCES CORREN!5 150C Checklist Controlst Selection 6. 4. I . 2 Toert Seit cli, NIS Controls should be located to preclude accidental No Cooponent I.8. af Controls Ri sc. activation. Number s:NIS- 46171, 46281 IM-C Chettlist Controls / Rotary 6. 4. 4. 4. t Vision Mini N!5C Engraved lines should be filled with contrasting No At assesseest, this Component I.9. Control J-Nandle pigeent. HED was split inte lluderstR15C- 46497, 46496 Specification 13-C & 159-C. 001 1 Intervie. Centrel Roos 6. l. t.2 Coefort ibe contret roce becoses ntremely creeded during Inter vies No See HEI 006-1, 007-8 martspacel General energencies is both controlled and visiter areas. L ayout , en21 Intervie. Contret Roos 6.1.1. Ital Vision Obscured or dif ficult viteing configurations: al of Int er vies No vartspacel General diesel generater panel free SRO and R0 dests. 65 of layout eisc. panel free SRO dest. 1 003 I latwnee Anasaciator Warning 6.3.1.2(di Decision- Shared equipment annunciators for units t 6 2 leads to Interview No Control Board ranel: A Systeet Genwal saning confusion. i Characteristics 004-1 Intervie. Centrol Rho 6. I .S. 7 (b l Confort Restroces are leadequate to needs. General Int er vie. No partspacel evercreeding is kitchen / rest area and poor Environment ventilatt oa. 005-8 In'ervice Control Roos 6.1.5.1 Coelort Nueidity is entremely las during winter sonths. Interview No Static electricity tor tspacer probless say cause Eevironment equipment j salfunction or daeage. I During roergencies, noise level is high due to latervies No See HE8 001-l, 007-1 006-1 Intervies Contret Roos 6.1.5.5 til Decision-Wortspacet making, lacreased activities, etservers. Enviropeest Hearing 007-8 latervie. Contret soce 6.1.5.5161 Decision- The vntilation systee is entreeely noisy during Intervien No See HED 006-1,001-1 Nor tspacer eating, safegaard mode or safety injection. Envirereest Hearing crit-! latervice Control Rees 6.1.5.3(18 Vision trend Elare problee eith trend recorders. Intervies No Check easter f or component Wortspacel Recorder s 1.5. neebers. Enviroroeet 0091 latervie. Control #ses 6.1.5.4 f c l vision Energency light levels are set adequate. Interview Ile kor tspacel Environeret 410 I latervive Control Roos 6.1.5.1 letision- Policy for detersining she sets roos leeperature is lat ervies No Wortspacet . eating act mell-defined. Environent til-l latervie. Control Rcce 6. l . l. i t a l Vision, RACR Nest leave sais control board to ese radiation latervies No isortspacel General Decision- eanitors. , layout eating 0121 latervie. Control Roos 6.1.5.2 Coef or t Ventilation le the control roos is est adequate to Intervie. No Nortspacet accoseodate cigarette seoke. Environent 013-! lateresee Contret tone 6.l.2.2tti Touch Reactor The reactor trip seitch is outside anthroposetric latervie. No Ceeponent I.9. Nortspacer uork frap 5eitch lients (too highl. Number s:NIS- 46450, 56EN-Station Besige 46331 814-1 latervice Contret Roos 6.1.2.2 fli fosch trend Trend recorders are hard to reach for esistainance. Intervice llo Check easter for coeponent Nortspacel Work Recorder s I.S. numbers. Station Besige 4:5-1 latervies Control Roos 6. l.2.2 t e l Vision States States lights are outside anthroposetric lients Itoo Intervies No Chett easter for component sortspacel Work Lights hight 1.8. naeters. Station lesign
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U* N GB SUMMARf CEPCRI NUREE 0700 HUMAN DDCUPENT HE 2 6UIDEllet PE RT ORN. C0FPONENT RELATED EVENTI EVE Nil CONV. INTERAtil0N C"CE 50Uett Sf5fER PES BESCRiFi!DN FUNCllCN/fASK INTERVIEN SPEC. CONSE90ENCES CDP. RENTS 10 Pit REffituCE RCDall1Y ITrE 4t6-1 latervies Centrol Rose 6. I.5.2 Decision- EMER Escessive noise levels, poor air quality in room latervire No Control Board Panel: Nor t spac e i eating, containing energency shut-down panel. Eeergency Shet-dosa Fanet Envirosest Hearing O!F-I !=tervie. Fanel i Lareut 6.9.2.2 Vision, RHR !! logical arrangement of components. Intervire No Contral Board Fanelt 8 Arrangeoest f actors Decision-eating ett-I latervies feel layout # 6. 8.2.2 Vision, CVCSL !!!cgical arrangesent of components. Intervies No Control Board Fanet I Layout Arrasgreent , Decision-Factor s eating 011 1 Intervice feel i Lareut 6.8. 2.2 Vision, $1 Ittogical arrangement of components. Intervies No ' Control leard Panel I arrangeoest Facters Cecision- . nating 829 I latervies tabels and location 6. 6. I.1 Decision- Dart CVCSM Steilar charts are met clearly and distinctly labeled. Intervies so Control Board Fanet: C, Aidst tabeling eating Recer det s Cosponent I.9. Principles Number s CVCSN- 42025, 42058 021 ! latervies Visual Displayst 6.5.1.1 Vision, '8ar t oe* Calibration is too fine, resulting in oscillations, latervies No Not clear free latervies Principles of Decision- Fred F!se shich seter this is. Display maning flet er 022-8 latervie. Visual Displays / 4.5. 4.1 T sion. Trend Rec., Recorder is difficult to read, the colors are cet Intervles No Specific instances, i.e., Graphic Recorders Occision- putti-Foint clear, and the channels are overleaded. coeponent eases or ll eating s numbers sere not cited. 423-1 latervice Centrolst Selection 4. 4.1.2 Teuct Controls are located is a position nating thee Intervies No Control Board Faael E, F. of Controls vulnerable to accidental activation. Deck easter for component I.I. nue6ers. 024-! laterview Centrolst Selection 4. 4. l.2 touch 56EN Controls are located is a position eating thee Intervire No Control Board Fanels of Contrats vulnerable to accidental activation. 56ER-back board . Dect easter for coeponent f.8. euebers. 025-1 latervie. Centrolst Selection 6. 4.1.2 t al Touch Male Ste 56EN Nigt potential for accidental activation. Intervles No Coeponent 1.5. of Centrols Isolation thsabers:56EN- 46308, Valve 46301. Control Board Panels B 026 I latervice annonciator Warsing 6.3.l.2tal Mening toepster toepster alares are excessively conservative, Intervise no Systees/ General Alares especially for testing or for abnorsal plant Daracteristics conditions. 927-1 Intervies annunciator Narsing 6.3.3.3(af Vision a15 First-outs are lost enes cancelled, latervies No Control Board Fanels 8 Srsteest General Daracteristics 021 1 Intervies Anasaciater Naning 6.3.3. 4 (al Decision- Alares are of ten labeled in engineering rather than Int ervies No Systest visual Alare saning operations teres. Sunsystees 82g-1 Intervie. Annunciator Naraing 6.3.1.4(al Decision- Nuisance alares, especially during a trip or during latervise No Systeet General eating, start-up, distract attention and easn oost important paracteristics Hearing , thigh priority 1 alares, e.g., easte disposal. 630-1 latervies annunciator Narsing 4.3.3.Itcl fosch Annunciator Danging light bulbs for annunciator tiles is latervies No Systest Visual Alare Light luf ts dif ficult. , Subsystes til-l latervies Anavaciator Nareing 6.3.2.lf al Hearing Computer Sin;te ring can be dif ficult to detect. Intervies No Systeest auditary Auditory Alert $3bsystes Alar e k d .. ' 4
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DOCtlMCui NURE6 9700 HUMAN HE R GUTCELINE l'I RI ORM. [0ff0Nief RELATE 8 EVENTI EVEN!/ C0itV. INTERACT!DN FJ4CI!Out1A5x lailRVIEN SPEC CONSEQUENCES COMENTS ECCE SOURCE IDPIC REFERENCE P00ALIIV IfrE SYSTEN HED DESCRIPT!04 012-1 latervie. Control Boce 6. l. t.3 (al vision Computer Obstructs sight-lines to other parts of centrol roos latervice No Nortspuet See,eral Console respnially 55 of fice and other eniti. Layout DU-! latervies Control Race 6.1.1.I t a l vision, Ccepeter Must leave control race to restart coepster af ter Intervies No mortspacel General Decision- computer f ailcre. Layout eating 834-I latervie. Con.enication f N/A Hearing Inadequate seans of coseunication eith containeent. Intervies No t Voice Cesemaications . Srstees 815-I latervie. Coseunicationsf 4.2.1.3ral Hearing Scand Sound powered phones provide poor coseusication Intervies No Aeplitedet frequency voice Comunication Power ed capability. response should be checned Systees Phones , or sansf acturers specifications double chuled. 6341 laterview Oper ational N/A Decision- Shif t sort ieposes stress on operators personal lives. Intervies No Practites i Shif t eating wor k 037-3 Interview Operational N/A Cettsian- 0 ertise regoireeents are estessive, averaging 400-600 Intervies No Practices 1 Overtise eating hours / year. 438-8 latervie. Co. unicationst 6.2. 3. B (c ) Mearing f ace Nast Ose of fue easts during energencies seuld prevent Intervt es Ne voice Coenenication moreal vernal coseunication er use of telephone. Systees 039-1 Intervise Control Roos 6.1.1. I tal Vision, Fire Must leave esis control race ta chuk fire protution lat ervies No Control Board Panel: Fire Nortspuel General Decision- Protetti panel. Protection Panel layout eating on 843-! Intervies Control Roes 6.l.l.lf al Vision, NIS Bering red control esercise, an operator is needed Intervies No Control leard Panel C Nortspuel General Decision- behind the boards. Layest eating est-I laterview Central-8: splay 4.t.2. I t al Vision, NIS Senter control and His instrueentation are not Inter vies No Contro! Board Panels C lategratient Groups Duision- grouped together. of Cants. 6 lispls. eating 942-1 latervies Visual tisplayst 6.5.1.1.4 Vision, NI5 Megasatt chart tie start-opI is not availante la the latervies No Contral Scard Panet C Principles of Decision- control race. Display salang 043-1 !sternee Control Rose 6.1.3.l tel lecision- Inforeation about status of shared equipeent is set Intervlee No Nortspuel Nutti salsag aleays sell coseueicated. linst Castret fooes 044-1 latervise Controls / Desige N/4--m Setision- $6EN Setutor suitch for bloedoen. latervies No No details given. Principles e4 king , Rechect. Control Board Panel: $ 445-8 latervie. Viseal Bisplayst 6.5.5.2tal vision Coepster Digital displays are not visille free all locations. Intervies Ne
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Bisplay types 046-! latervire Centrol tone 4.1.5.3188 Vision ilI5C Elare pro 6tes en eleic panel. Intervies No Control leard Panet: A Nortspacel favironeest 647-! latervies Centrol Rose 6. l.5.3 (f l Visine 311 5 Glare prontes. Intervlee no Nortspacet (svironerat 648-I litervice Panet layout 6.8.2.2 t h Dnision- Circulating CitCN Arranged la reverse of geographic espectations. Intervice No Cosponent I.9. eating Mater Pumps Nueber s:CitCW- 46447, 46460. Control Board Panet: F b.Li L 5:
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(CDi SERCE IOPIC REftrINCE MODAltly irrE SYSTER HES DESCRIPilDN TUNCil0N/ TASK INTERVIE W SPEC. CONSEBUENCES Cora!INTS 6s9-8 latervie. Puet tarout i 6. I. 2. 2 Vi s s on, n!5 Illogical arrangreest. Int er vie. No Control Board fanels C tavest Arrangrwat Sn ision-1 Facter s saning l 850-1 laterview Panel lapset / 6.8.1. I t a l Vi si on , Escessive sovement beteten systres during start-ep latervice No l See.eral Panet layout Sni sion- shich requires attention to reactor, let-deen and ! eating eate-sp, and stese generator. 051-1 latervie. Control-Display 6.9.l.11a1 vision NTRD Starting heater drala posps requires sanitorlag of Intervies no Componenet I.g. Integretient Basic CRT-- centre!-display prosteity guidelines est eet. NueberstNTID- 46481, Conti-Bispi Rettssip 46412, 46443 0521 latervie. Visual tisplayst 6.5.1.2. d Dec ision- s!5 Source and intereediate range seters are dif ficult to Intervice he Control Board Panel C. Principles of eating use. Check easter for coeponent Ba sslay I.8. nue6ers.
#5F1 Intervies Contralst Selection 6.4. I. I t al Decision- AFN Motor valves do not provide as adequate degree of Intervlee no Control laard fanels E.
el Controls saning contral. . Chect easter for coeposest I.S. aseters. 054-1 latervlee fant! Layout / 6.8.3.3 Vision, T (heti and troldt inconsistently arranged across Intervies no Spnific Fanet Decision- enits I & 2. tayout gesign eating 055-3 latervie. Visaal Bisplayst 6.5.1 Itti Visi on, Needed displays are not currently available, II Head Intervies No See HE8 042-I. May need to treat these Principles of Iniss on- tesperature en RCS, 21 CCTV for sanitoring reacter itees seperately for tisplay eating head, 31 Palf anction light on valve control, 41 assesseest and Containment hueidity and temperature trends, (See ispleeentation. Masterl 056-1 latervice faael layout / 6.8.2.2 Vision, VENT lllogical arrangesent. latervies llo Control Board fanel A loroet Arrangeneat Decision-Facters eating 45F-I latervie. Cent! 8:spl 6.t. l. I ta l vision, CVCSM Charging peep contre!!ers and seters are too f ar Intervies no Contrel Board Panels C. Integration / Basic teach apar t. Chut easter for component Conti Bispl Pos 1.5. enebers. Reitstip 858-8 latereire Centralst Selection 6. 4.1.2 Touct Rod Drive E!$ Accidental activation is possible, when leaning on the later vire No Control Board Panelt C. of Centrats Position control console. Component 1.0. No.:415-Coet t. 46288 459-! latervies Contral Roos 6.1.2. Flat Coefort RO station does not provide enough surface for paper latervies to Nortspacel Nort sor t. Station Besign C68-8 Intervies Visest lisplays # unne Found- Vision Meters NIS Farallas problees generally, especially red postion Intervies no Inhnt NURE8 0700 for Principles of eeters, appropriate guideline. Display
- Component I.8. No.:
41017,41090,41092,4!013,4! 090,41015 C41-1 latervice Visual 61splaysl 6.5.1.1.c Vision, RISC F6craneses or permanently out-of-service etsipsent en latervies No Ceeponent I.9. Principles of Ru s sion- ease contral board: Il generator chart recorders, bue6ers RISC- 45005, 45006 8: splay eating fleeters on top of eisc. systre,31 chesistry displays, 41 esistare separator reheater. C64-8 Intervie. Vissal Bisplayst 6.5.1.2.4 Vision, Electricai Not feII-scale. Intervie. No Principles of Decision- Panel Bisplay eating Peters 065-1 !stervie. Contrelst Selection 6.4. t.l tc l Decision- Controllers laconsistent control valve action for 11 stese latervire llo Dett against checklist of Centrols saltag generator panel, il RCS panel, 33CVCS panel, 41 revies. Chett easter for reheater drais, coeponent 1.9. anters.
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*E 3 SUIDEList FUNCllDR/IASE INTERv!!u SPEC. CONSEQUENCES COMENis CM 5&*CE 17tC stileEnCE ft0Dattiv fyrt SV5 fen f(3 CISC81Fi!04 de e ae. e. letssion- 8 esel DGEE The diesel generater enterlock is estreeely 90: 77-42, No Contral Board Panel E Color Cadant and hobee seg eating Ee.or ator toeplicated. Operators have dif ficulty in resetting 32 24 Resets st.
#8'd 6,,ie. gec a ssen- Sieset I and diesel 2 are sirror-ieaged entile east RO 3131 No (description cent.1 sell Fenet tarout DEEN saning other panels le tDe centrol race ohich are *centle grouped er associated eith Enttered* sithis subsystes. Alse,tostrels f or entiter estt seter and satt seter and governor are est (See Coseentsi respectively.
One-B le ae. Bacusest ation + tetision- Safeguar Separate eerk requests sieuttaneously af fected AO: No tattless cent.) eating is parallet safeguard systees resulting la less 77 33,83-2 acceeptishing safeguards redundancy than the test specificatlee pereits. t f unctions. 067 a Ee.ies lisplays (Atarest vissen, Caeputer te!ta I eas set of target land for ever as hour and BD 82-29 No tsafety coat.1 Alare say tetision- Subsyste operators f ailed to respond to alare during that be overlooted. eating a period.Ceeputer alare auditory and visual displays say set be suffitlently attention gettleg. 000 t ae.ne. 8ssplays (Atarest Decision- SIACC Lee level alares are set at technical specification White redating level 20 83-12 No Contral Board lettion: 51 eating liest ohich alloes no time for operator response to in a:cuestator, Accueulater Service. correct the probles, operator was Camponent 1.9. habers distracted by another ett. af are and level oest belse easteus. tot t Se,see Bisplays (Alaret lecision- Aneuecsator Ridt alares en anamaciator ett are stove St Accueulator R013-12 no Safety Consequentess eating s 016 & Gil and 51 Attneulater alares se annuettater $16 are 44 eve $ leser response to alares. RHR panel. 815-t se.ie. Centrals Touch DISC Operator espected pushtsttee contre!!!ag the typass 80 13-19 No Contro! Icard fuel A, gates to le latching epee it e.s sonestary. Contral Scard Sectices Cooling Mater Nielt. Check asster ior toop, l.I. NO., ett t se.ie. Bisplays talarest tetisa en- CL6u Sperious los hay Irvel alares ottar in ligt sind due RO 8315 to Control leard Fanet: A. eating to ea e action. Control Board Section: Cooling Bater Pielt. Component 1.5 Nuebers: 46031 812-8 Revies Bisplay Vist en, lest Cai5 Indicator lasps lack test capability. 50C 74-27 #e Safety Consequentes: Detssues- taaps,togic Unable to tell leap eating Cartsits f ailere free systre test f ailure. 813- 8 te.n ew Ba splay Vision e EEE Control rose lacks indication on 20 tv disceanects. SOE 76-01 to Control leard Fanel: E. Retiss en- Control Boari Sections eating , Generator 001-5 Servey Ceeeuascationst 6. 2.1.2.6 t31 Inch tong telephone cords say interfere eith passing me Teice Caseueicaties traf fit.
. Systees 802-5 5.rvey teeeenicationst 6.2.1.6. 6 Hearing Control room inputs to the announcing systee should no voice Coeeueication have priority.
Systees 003 5 Survey Cenevaitationst 6. 2.1.8.19 1 Hear seg Cceauaitatise egulpeent and teergency protettive gear No voice Coeeustration are not compatible. Systees 404-5 Survey Ceeeu s itationst 6.2.1.5.c t il Hearing toergency equipeent is est designed for speect No voice Caesee cation transeission. Systees
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(@E 50tAtt TOPIC REFERE eCi PODAtt TV tvrt SYSTER lit 8 DISCllrl!D4 FilNCTICN/I A2 le![RVltu 50tt. CONSE90Estt5 Ccutell e4 5 ser,,, Cuomicataeast 6.2.5.5.ctu Hearing Electresic speech systees nst te installed during an ne veste Ceeweicatsen ener genc y. Syst ees 64-5 Sw.ey sensaciater Warsieg 6.3. I.2.a fil eassen Doriat systee opset tenditions, seee alares acter sitt ma Saf ter Ceasetences: 5estenf 5eaeral escessive frequency. Alaras en Riscellaneses panel . Potential to f ail to Dar acteristics are an enasple tranel 0221. sollte critical alare when seisance alares are f r egsent. ea7-5 Sw.ey aanvariator Warning 4.LI.F.htts tecision- alares for uter treateest, easte treateent, and No Systeest General sating turbine learings require the control rose operator to Daracteristics call assiliary operaters if met cleared la a reasonable aesent el tiee. 808 5 Swee, aaneaciater sarmieg 6.LI.2.citi cecision- fertise learing a! ares se terline panet (0088 tave No Safety Consequences Systeest Several uting tapets free saltiple paraseters. Potential for estra time D.racteristics tales te localise the pretire to a single turnine. 04 5 Sur.ey annonciater sarming 4.Lt.4.a:ll hsien, inere is es coding scsene for logical prioritiratise so Safety Consequences: pere l Systeel Eeneral Sen sian- el annunciatert stares. . time east te spent le Dar acteristscs uting probles diagnosis. Sit-5 Sweer enemaciator eareing 6.3.l.4.4881 eW on, Ne tismal codang sclese for alare priority levels is no Safety Consequences: pere j Systest Seaeral tecisioe- used. time east te spent la l Daratteristics eating probles diagnosis. 011-5 Sevey Anaeaciator sareseg 6.3.1.L a Pearing as anditte signal acceepanies cleared atates. No Safety Consequencess i Systeet Seaeral Bif ficett to metice shes l Daracteristics alare las tees cleared. 412 5 Sw,ey annunciator sarsing 4.3.I.5.nt!! Vision, there is se speclat flash rate, reduced brightness, er Be Safety Consegmencest Systeet Seeeral Decision- special celer to signify as alare has cleared. The Isificult to actact shen Daracteristics , sating sely indication is the annonciator tile changing free alare has teen cleared. shite illeelmated to dark. 413-5 Sw,ey Annonciater earning 4.3.Lt.f nearing A single auditary signal sunseees all systees and me Safety Conseg.: No coes Systeest Auditory eartstations for each snit. Ine e is no auditory are available by auditory Alert hesystee coding encept hetseen saits. subsystes to assist operater le locatining the alar e, 814 5 Servey Aasenciator bareing 6.LLI.a vision, viseal alare tiles associated eith radiation stare are se Safety Conseq.: Operating Systeest viseal Decision- located es este centrol neard rad. eenitor Alare 5.tsystes salieg related costrets and displays are located on controls / displays requires radiation seeitering panet tented the sale centre! , operator to leave his boar ds. sor t st aties. 4105 Server anaunciator earsing 6.3.3.2.6 Tision flash rate is too les (0.6 flashes per setend (Hall be Safety Consequences:
. Systeer Vassal alare for test discrisisaties, neeestery glance is i Setsystes seestices set sc"icient ,
to see elseal alare. 817-5 Servey Anneaciator Barsing 6.3.3.2.c Vision, Flaster fallere reselts le steady as annonciater light Be Safety Consequences: 5,steet visaat Alare tecisies- e: cept shes point cards de set foncties properly. lif ficult to ascertiae htsystee eating flasher f allere. s18-5 Sweep Aaasaciater mareing 6.3.L2.4 vision til CVCSR States tedicators are provided ateve CVC5 nateep No (fescription cent.l these 5ysteet visaat 4!are systee Ipanet 014). Their actieated state is light are est acteally 5.nsystee blee illmeisaties and presides peer centrast for annunciatart alare tiles. discrisisatility. Mosever, (See teasents)
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ell-5 Swvey Co**uascationst 6.2.2.1861 tecisisa- Auditary signals for annunciator systre provide ne to Asdatory Sagsal matang, localisation cues to direct operators to mort Systees Hearing st ations. Signals for sait I and unit 2 are dif f erenta ates. 022-5 Sweey Annunciator Visual Vision, Suring shstdo.a. eeny anaveciator tiles reeais lighted No Safety Consequences: Subsystes Decision- and indicate moreal conditions. At various reactor Violates dark panel eating power levels, some anavaciators on reactor panel concept
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023-5 Sweer Aansaciator Visual tecision- Anesariators related to Boric acid tant en CVCS No Safety Consequences Alare 5dsystre eating Letdseg panel (0131 and those related to pumps on lif ficulty in flagassing Waste Bisposal panel (0181 Dave sultiple inputs and protles. set points for shich the labels do not supply in f or estion. 024-5 Servey Anaenciator Visual Vision, Saee annunciator tiles are not located near associated No ties. cent.I annunciators Alare 5dsystee Decision- controls and displays. II Annonciators related to are located on Ava sating electrical systres are loca'ed on Curculating tater feedeater panel lastead of panel. Il peactor coolant pues lected retor (see tractor Cooling. (see cessents) easter t en-5 Sweet Anneaciator Visual Vasies, TURS Functional grouping of tiles so Isrbine panels (00F & No Control Board Fanels E. Alare Subsystee Cecisten- 0085 is act consistent. Informaties os instrueest tus Cooponent 1.3. eating systee is not available le the saee area. NuebersifURI- 007, 000 476 5 Survey Control Roos 6. I. I. l f k l Vision, Rad Operators should not have is leave the primary no partspacel Generat Cecision- Iloat., Fire operating area to covert access testrasentaties/ tayout sating Als. Fanel controls. l 02F-5 Survey Centrol Roos 6. l. I.3. f (33 Coefort Frisary There should be a sinieue of B feet between the No portspacet General Operating contrei board and coeputer console shere sore than one layout Aisle persos east eart (nact to bact). 429-5 Servey Central Rooe 6. l.2.2. d (Il fosch tiypical Controls should be set tact a sinieue of 3 laches free No Safety Consequences: uortspacer Nort throughouti freat edge of panel. Accidental activation. Station Besip Chect easter for composest 1.8. neeters. 421-5 Survey Control Roos 6. l.2.3.6 feuch teacter All controls should be eithis reach radies af 5th to Chett easter for component ucttspacel Nort Trip , Fercentile uneas. I.8. see6ers. Station Design Seitch,et.a 1 030-5 Swvey Control Roos 6.1.3.1.e t t i Vision, Each sait should te independent of each other, no ucrbspacei Multi Dec-sal, vis-a-vis acoustical interference and states Unit Centret Rooes Hearing representation. 431-5 Survey Contro! 9eos 6.1.2.5.l(18 Vision Controt Bisplays should be as higher than 70 inches above the no portspacet mort Panel floor Station Desige 6eteces 50 inches and 63 inches for frequent / precise reading. 432-5 Survey Centrol Roos 6. l.3.2. a Decision- Operational crees shesid be dedicated to see unit. No portspacei Multi eating unit Castret fooes 033-5 Servey Control Roos 6.1. 4.1.b Hearing Fratective Equipeent skosti provide adequate coseunication no j Nortspace/ [sergency Face Masks f acility. . (quiperat _ y h.+ : c e
S sp g a :: _ vM :s + .4 ,.- HE9 SUMARV 6[F0ki NURIE 0100 HUMAN 00CllMENT . MI EJ10(LINE FikFORfl. C0rr0N[NI RELAf(O (VENTI EVENTI CONV. INi[RACil0N CCCt SOURCE TOPIC REFEnt hCE n00At !!V IVPE SYSTER HED BISCt!Pi!DN FUNCil0N/I45K INI(RVIE N SPEC. CONSIOUENCES COMINIS 814 5 brvey Control Roos 4.1. 4.1. h Decision- Operators should be sell trassed/ accustosed to use of No Nortspaces Energency salsag equipeent. Equiperat 035-5 Sever Control Roos 6. I .5. 7. a t 38 Conf or t Carpeting should be installed to lessen f atigue. No Nor tspacet Environment 036-5 krvey Control Roos 6.1.5.31g1 Vision floor Reflettivity of shite replacement floor panels is los No Nor tspacel
- Panels high.
Environment 037-5 Survey Castrol Roce 6. l.5.3 ( f l Vision LLN Escessive glare free covers. Also, internal lighting No Check easter for coeponent Nor tspacel Sperdosas tends to 'eash-out* display surf ace. l.9. neaters. Environeest Recorders
#38-5 Survey Labels and location 6.4. l. I Vision, FN fue, FN Cosponent identification sunber is missing. No Cooponent I.9. Nuebers FN-Asis / Labeling Decision- RCRC Valve 46416, 46411 Principles eating 041-5 Server Ldels and location 6.6.1.2. ia,4) Vision, Functies labels repeat higher-level hierarchical No Aidst Ldeling Bet t sion- inforsation unnecesarily Principles saling label content not brief and concise Idel content of ten highly siellar for adjacent er parallel equipeent functional grouping met Ideled.
046-5 Survey Labels and Location 6.6.3. B ic i Vision, I&J Control position inforsation not eisible during No Aids / Label Content lecision- Handles.Sta actuation of contret. eding r Han Se 049-5 Survey Controit Oisplay 6.V. 2.3 Vision, Peter, CNIS Otsplays are sounted on separate panels. No Control Board fanel A-l. Integration /Froups Decision- Status Coeponent 1.3. of Ctts. & Displays eding Light lluebers:CNIS- 41025, 44003, 44004 050-5 Survey Fanel tayouti Layout 6.8.2.2 Decision- Rotary CNTFC Coeponents should be arranged lef t-to-right le suaeric No Centrol leard Fanet A-1, Arrangeoest f acters eating Selec tor ti- seguenc e. Cosponest I.S. llandlet NuoterstCNIFC- 46018, 46021 058 5 hrvey Panel Layoutt layout 6.8.2.2 Decision- potary CL65 Controls should be arranged is alphabetical seguence. No Control loard Panet: A-l. Arrangreent Factors eding Selector Coeponent 1.0. he6ers:CN-46118, 46046 053-5 Servey Panel layouti Layout 6.5.2.1.c Vision, Rat. Villi Functionally related controls should be grouped No Centrol Board Panet A-l. Arrangesent Factors Decision- Selector Pe together. Component I.8. eding shbutton , Nuoters: VENT- 44160, 46082 a 055 5 Survey Contrott Bisplay 6.9.2.3 Touch CVtSL Controls should be oosnted on lower panel area. No Control leard Panels 8-l. Integration / Groups Component I.B. of Ctts, & Oisplays Nuobers:CVC5L- 4616',
- 44162, 46164 056-5 hrvey Controf f Display 6.t.2.2.6 Vision Peters, CVC5L Control shesid occupy the relative position of the No Control leard fanela 1-t i latrgration/ Groups Rotary associated display, of Ctts. & Displays Controls 657-5 Survey Controlf 8: splay 6.9.2.3 fouch Rot ary 51 Controls should be sounted in the loser panel area, to Control Board Panet:t-l.
Int egr ation/Srosps Selector li- Ceeponent I.3. heters:51-of Ctis. & Displays Needlel 46190 058-5 Survey Contro!1 Display 6.t. l.2.h t?l Vision Meter s $1ACC Open panel space 6eteeen displays and controls should No Control ked reel: I-l. Integration / Groups ne avoided. Component I.I. Nuebers:51-of Ctts. & Sisp;ays 4108201, 4106502
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Arrangeoest Factors Decision- Caepeneet I.S. saning NueherstRCts- 41071, 4 t 817, 41061 060-5 Survey Centroit Oisplay 6.1. 2.2 fawn I-Hudle, RCLE Controls should te sonated in leser panel area, se Control Board Fuela C-l. Int egr ation/6terps Round Enob Caepeatat I.S. el Ctts. & Bisplays he6ers:tttE- 44408, 464G1, 46423 0615 Survey Panel layout 1 4.%. 2. l.t Vision, Lary RCLE Related ter.t'sts should te grouped le the saee panel No Centrel load Paael C-l. tarcut Arrangreent Cetision- Seletter area, pieterally eith vertical aligneemt. Ceepeerst I.S. Fatter s a4bing habers:RCL5- 46260, 44764, 44241, 44242, 44244, 46243 062-5 Survey Controit Bisplay 6.1.2.2.6 Vision RCt6 Controls should attspy the relative position of the se Centrel leard Fasels C l l lategration/ Groups associated display. of Ctts. & Displays 063 5 Survey Conteett Oisplay 1.1.2.3 touch Rot ar y NIS Controls should be sounted la leser puel area. se Centrol leard Fanet: C-l. Istegratles/Greeps Selettor ti- Coopensat I.I. el Ctts. & Displays Handlel puebers:515- 46450 064-5 Survey Controll Display 6.1.2.2.6 Vision Rot ar y NIS Controls should ettspy the relative pesilles of the 8: Centrol Seard Fasel: C-1. Integration / Groups SeletteriJe associated display. Ceepeneat 1.3. of Ctis 4 Oisplays ystitti bueter s:sts- 46233, 46279, 46291 065 5 Survey Fanel layoutt layout 6.8.2.1.a vision, Met er CVC5N pelated displays should be adjacent, set separated, as Caetrel Board Faerla C-1. Arrangreent f atters let t sion- Coopenent 1.3. eating Muster s:CVCSR- 41118, 41114 066-5 Survey ControII lisplay 6.9.2.2.6 Vision CVCSN Controls should ettery the relative posities of the se Centrol Board Fuela C-1 Integration /Groeps associated display. of Ctts. 5 Displav. 067 5 Survey Contrell Dip.y 6.t.2. 3 fouth Astary 56tN Controls should le scented on loser panel area. De Centrol Soard feels 8-l. lateg 4 tion /5 tests Seletter ti- Ceepenent 1.3. of Ctis. & lisplays Nandlet Bue6ers 55ts- 44331 s68-5 Survey Panet layout I 6. 8. 2.1.t Vision tot ary SEEN Controls for a related plant systes should be grouped as Centret Soard Faseta 3-1. Layout Arrangeneat Se t., tech together, prefer 46ty eith eertical aligneent. Caeponent I.3. Factors Coptrol pue6ers 5Ets- ?!762788-4, 44969, 46331, 44349, 46968 069 5 Survey Panel layoutt tarcut 6.8.2.l.c Visine Controller 5614 Centrols for a related plant systes should be groeped no Castrel leard Panel B-l. Arrangement Factors together. . Caseeneet I.9. Nuohers 5EEE- 43813, . 46460, 46441, 44338 070-5 Survey Fanel layoutt Layout 6.9.2.2.6 Setisten- Rotary SEEN ibe panel layout violates operater espettations. The No Castrel paard Panet 3-1. Arrangeoest Fatters saling Seletter ' layout does met follos physical plant configuration Caepenent f.9. trae61 lautside on lef t fusit il er leside second pair of Nuebers 5GEG- 46169, controls tenit Ill. 44331, 46340, 46168 0715 Sureer Panel layout 1 tayout 6.I.2.1.t Decision- Peters 6EN sisplays for the saae paraseter should be groeped so Centrst Board Panels E-1. l Arrangesent factors saling together and separated free non-related displays. Ceepeatat 3.3. l heters:Ets- 41112'., l 4 tit 407 l 012-5 Survey Faael layoutt layout 6.I.2.2.n vision, teterder TURB peterders should te sonated in Isser display area. De Centret Board Fenel: E-8, Arrangement Factors Decision- Ceeppeat 1.8. l l eating Aebers:fURB- 42003, 42966, 47095. 42247, 420tf
a. bp w. se erce.s3 . O * *i h ' gg $ganatt ELFORI NUEtG 0700 Hunat DOCuntut "l 0 SUICf LINE FE Rf CRM. [DMFDNtui Rtllitt (Vt4Tt (Vthf/ CONV. InitAAC110N [0tt SOUR [t TOPIC ttffstutt n004tif f Irf't 5f5ftM Nf3 DESCRIFi!C4 FUNCilDul!ASK leftRVits $ Fit. CON 5tGuthCil COMMtuf5 013-5 Survey Panel Layout / tayout 6.8.2.1.c Vision, frot ar y fuRt Centrols for a related plant systes should be grouped No Centrol leard Fanels ( l. Arrangeerst f acters Decision- Selector tf- together. Ceepeneet I.B. eating Handlel buderstTUet- 43682, 46184, 46385 074-5 Survey Controls Dispta, 6.9. 2.2.6 Vision 1-Handle, TUE3 Centrols should occupy the relative posittee of the se Centrel leard Fanels t-1. lategration/ Groups Meter associated display. Component 1.3. of Ctts. & Displays NueberstIUSB- 463B2,
, 4121908 075-5 Survey Panel Layout / tayout 6.8.2.2.6 Vision, Recorder CNO51 Recorders should be sounted is to er display area. No Coettel Board Fanel: E-1.
Arrangement Factors Decision- Ceeponent 1.3. eating Buders:tel5f- 42014, 42011 076-5 Servey Controll Display 6.1.1.2 Vision CNDSI Opre panel space letween centrols and displays should to Centrol Board Pamel: E-l lategration/Sroups be avoided. el Ctts. & Displays 071-5 Survey Controll Display 6.1.2.3 vision States Fu Bisplays should be scented on apper panel area. No Centrol Board Fanels (-l. Integration / Groups tights Coepeneat I.9. Buebers FO-of Ctts. & tisplays 44209, 44219, 44211 078-5 Survey Panel Layout / tayout 6.8.2.2.h Vi s t un, Recorder Recorders should be sounted le lower display area. No Centrol teard Facel: E-l. Arrangreest Factors Decision- Chett easter der composest eating I.S. see6ers. 000-5 Survey Controit Display 6. 9. l.2 Vision Status NTRO Opes panel space letseen displays and controll sheeld be Centrol 9eard Fanel: F-l. lategratica/6reups Lights le avoided. Caepeneet 1.5. el Ctis. & Displays Nue6ers:NTID- 44311, 44434 082-5 Survey Controll Display 6.1.1.2 Vision Status R53 Opee panel space netwees displays and controls should no Castrel Board Fanel F-l. Integration /6toups Light te avoided. Coepeneet I.9. of Ctis. & Displays huetersinSB- 444t3, 44422 093-5 Survey Controlf Bisplay 6.1.1.2 Vision St atus RHTR9 Open panel space tet een displays and controls should No Centrol Board Fanelt F-1. Integr ation/ Groups Lights te avoided. Caepenent 1.3. of Ctts. L lisplays nueters:RWfR9- 44423, 44430 084-5 Survey Panel layoutt Layout 6.8.2.l.c Decision- Meter 26EN Meters for the same parseeter should be grouped no Coettet leard Fanet: E-l. Arrangreent Factors eating together and seperate free see-related controls. Coepeneet 1.8. husbers:DGis- 4112001,
- 4192004 085-5 Survey Controit Oisplay 6.1.2.3 tenct Star 4 DGER Controls should be sounted on the lower panel area. Be Castrol Beari Fanel E-l.
lategration/$roups 2-Naadles,t . Coeponest 1.3. of Ctts. & lisplays non uvetersipGit- 46961
. 46962, 46131 096-5 Survey Control Roos 6. 5.5. 3. a Vising under moreal control roos lighting conditions, se Wor t spacet illselaation is inadequate on the folleeing panels (svirenneet Unit i Noisture 5eperator Orainstvertical sectical, Radiation Monitors Fasel,In-Core lastrueestaties Panels.
067 5 Survey Control Roos 6.1.5. 4.c Vision Battery-operated flood lights provide leadequate no the foer tel Wortspacet illisination for eeergency conditions. lattery-operated fleed invironeemt lights tact sp the diesel-po ered energency lighting. 088-5 Survey Occusent 6.1.1. 4. a (21 Vision, 55 Occueents on the top shell deve center har are too no Organisaties and fasch Office high to reach or read labels on spises. Starage
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- FUNCT!04/tA5x luft# VIEW Stit. CONSElPJENCES COMM[nts (CDE SOURCE TOP!C Rif(RENCE N00Alliy IVFt Sy5ite Ht0 B[5C21F1104 Sets of proceedures are not stored separately for each so 099-5 Survey Control Roos 6.l. l.4.e tecision- 55 Wortspacet General eating Of fice unit. They are filed eith 'As** together, the 'Is**
Layout together etc. the top 3 ras of annuniciators are etscated by as no 090-5 Survey Control Roos 6.1.2.3.etil Vision 55 Nor tspacel Of fice intervening CAI. Workstation Design No 091-5 Survey Control Roon 4. L.5.3. a vision 55 Lighting at shelf arts, under sverhead shelves, is Nortspacel Of fice 28.7 f t-c lastead of the reconeended 50 to 100 f t-c Invir onment IT5 It-c is preferredt. no 092-5 Survey Control Roos 6.1.5.3. f vision 55 til stare free control rose Iseinaries is reflected on Nor tspacel Of fice the glass dect top. (2) Glare free 55 of fice ceiling Environneet lights and light-colored clothing is reflected le all the miedoes that evertsok the control race. Control reos operators' rest area is not coefortable, so 093-5 Survey Control Roos 6. I .5. 7.c Conf or t fest Nor tspate/ Area - quiet er secluded. favironment tovnge Storage lotters we not large enough to held the itees se 094-5 Survey Control teos 6. l.5.6.6 Coef or t 55 Wortspacet Office that can reasonably be espected to go late thee. The Environnet letters are 10 inches side, 82 inches deep and l1.5 leches tall. Instructions for the use et coseenications systees no , 095-5 survey Cosevalcationst 6.2. l. I. a Decision- 55 voice Cooeunication sating, Of fice (including suitestions for a lack-up alternativest are Syst ees Hearing not provided. 56tt De unit I, component appears en the lef t-hand side of so 096-5 Survey touch teactor Trip Seitch panel 8 but on unit 2 it appears on the right-hand side. Operator moveeent dartog a task sequence should be (OP/ fasts: E-cit, as see easter for coeposest 001-3 Validation Minimal Rovement 6.8. l. l . a various E-3124. ECA-3.lf21, 1.3. pseters levolved in Requirrunts sintoal. ECA-3.!Il5, this HER. (CA-3.3/It, FR-C.1/2,15,22, F A-C.2/2 EDPliasts: E-0/14,30, no See easter for coepenent 002-1 Validation Display 1 Control 6.1. 2.2.a Various lisplay / control pairs should be arranged in roes, eith each display directly above its associated ECA-3.ll24 I.S. nee 6ers involved le pelationship control. ECA-3.2/it this IIE8. Alares should not occur so fressently as to be E0P ECA-9.9 No inis it[3 pertains 003-1 Validation Alare Freguncy 6.3.1.2.a.1 specifically to the alares considered a esisance.
, os panel 5 and in the generator systes.
E0Pitasts: See easter for componeet 004 I Validatten Displayt Control 6.f 2.2.s Varlovs lisplay / control pairs should be arranged is tws, We eith each display directly dove its associated _ E-6/15,26,29, I.S. nuaters involved in l Relationship E-Il6,lt, E-3/8,14, this HE8. contral. ECA-0.0/13, ICA-3.III,4,5,
, ECA-3.2/l, ICA-3.3/3 E0P/ fasts: E-0/31, to see easter for coepeneet 005-I Validation Display 1 Control 6.9.2.2. a Various Bisplay / control pairs should be arranged is roes,
- with each display directly above its associated E-III0, E-3/15,25 l.5. neebers levolved is Relation = hip ECA-3. II6, tiif s HEl.
control. ICA-3.3/t,14 Where there is a screal order of use, controls should E0PITasts: E-0/33, No this 1(8 interacts See easter for coeponent 0061 Validation Natsra! Order of Use 6.9.l.2.a Various 06EN be arranged for ese le lef t-to-right, top-to-tottee, E-II21. E-3130,3510, eith MEll 007-1. 3.9. esoters lavstved is
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or le attier sateral sequences. (CA-3.1/23,
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V "P HES SLGARY REPOCI WDRES 0F00 HUMAN DOCUME NT WE O SUIDEt thE PERf 0H. COMPOMN! RELATED EVENil EVEN!I CONY. INTEpaCIION - ECCE SOUREE t0 Pit REFERENCE MODAllIV IVPE SYSTER M8 DESCRIPItDN FUNCTIDM/f ASE InTERviEN CPEC. CONSE90EuCES COMENT5 00bt Validation Identification Aids 6. 8. l.3 Various O6EN Enhancement alds should be available to facilitate E0rifasts: E-0/33, No this HED interacts See easter for coepeneet recognition and identification. E-l/21, E-3/30,35#, e eith HEDI 006 I. I.B. enders levolved in ECA-3.1/23, this M8.
. [CA-3.2/lF, EC4 3.3115 009 I Validation Natural Order of Use 6.9.l.2.a Various Afd Where there is a screal order of eso, controls should E0rifasts: E-3/3,35A, No Control Order:46438, See easter for coeponeet
- Controls ne" arranged for est is lef t to-right, top-to-6cttos, ECA-3.1127, 46439, thee 46424, 1.8. aseners levolved is or in other natural sequences. [CA-3.2121, 46425, then 46314, this MS.
ECA-3.315,76, 46315, 46316, 46317 FR-5. It6 001-3 Validation Operator Vieming 4.1. 2.2.e. 2 various the oblique angle free the operator's line of sight to EDP/fask: E-II4 No See easter for coeponent Angle a display, should be greater than 45 degrees. l.S. asebers levolved in this HED. 010-1 Validation Response fine 6. 3.1.2. a. 2 Various Adequate response time to a earning condition shoeld EDPliash: E-litt No le avallalle. The response tiee of le elestes, given in EDP:E-3 test !?, is inadequate to f acilitate the t ast. Oll I Valadation Natural Order of Use 6.9.l.7.a Various $1 Nhere there is a norsal erder of use, controls should EDPlfasts: E-3/23,35E Ns Control Order: See saiter for coopcmeet
- Controls be arranged for use is lef t-to-right, top-to-nettoe, 46119,46111,thee 1.3. aseters levolved to or in other natural sequences. 46115, 46196 this HES.
012 3 Validation Displayt Control 6.t. 2.2. a Various Bisplay I control pairs should be arranged in roes. EDP/ fast E-3/38 No See easter for coeposest Relationship with each display directly above its associated . I.S. ese6ers involved is cect r ol. this HEl. 013-I Validation Display I Control 6.1. 2. 2.a various Sisplay / control pairs should te arranged is roes, E0PItasts: E-3133, No See easter for composent Relationship eith each display directly above its associated FR-C.2/4 1.5. seeners involved in control. . this HED. 014 I Validation Natural Order of Use 6.1.1.2.a Various Where there is a norsal order of ass, controls should Control Order: 46070, No EDritants: See easter for coeponest
- Controls be arranged for use la lef t-to-right, te-to-bottee, 46079, thes 46104, E-31353,35r, 1.3. nseters lessived la er in other satural sequences. thes 46101, then FR 1.3/15 this HE8.
,46105,thee 46500,4615/, then 465f4 015-1 Validation Minisal Movement 6.8.1.1.a Various Operator soveerst during a task sequence should be EDP/ Tasks: No this 'll interacts See easter for coepostet pequir ene einimal. ECA-3.1/IT, mn MDI 016 I. l.9. aseters involved in ECA-3.2fil, E5-4.412 this HE8.
Ol6-I validation 0:splayt Control 4.t.2.2. s Various Display 1 control pairs should be arranged la roes, EDP/f ast s: No This HEI interacts See easter f ar componeet Relationship eith each display directly above its associated ECA-3. IllF, eith Hest 015-1. I.I. esoters involved la control ECA-3.2/II, ES-0.4/2 the MB. 017-3 Validation Displayt Control 6. f. 2. 2. 4 Various CVC5tt Oisplat . trol pairs should be arranged is roes, EOFilast ECA-3.3/21, No- See easter for componeet, Relationship sitt each display directly above its associated
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E5-0.4/I I.I. aseters involved is control. this MES. 018-I validation Displayt Control 6.9. 2.2. a various Oisplay / control pairs should be arranged is roes, E3Ptfasts: No See easter for coeponent Relationship eith each disets, aireets. sha.e les asseriated ECA-3.3/22,24 !.l. seaters levolved is
. control, this HE8.
Olt-I Validation Miniaal Moveeent 6.8.1.1. s various Operator movement during a task sequence should be EDP/Tasts ECA-3.3/27 No See easter for coeponest Requiresent eleisal. I.S. nee 6ers involved in this NER. 070-1 Validation Display Control 6.1.2.2. a various Display / control pairs should be arranged in roes, EDP/Tast: ECA-3.3/30, No See easter for composest Relationship mith each display directly above its associated ES-0.4/3 I.8. masters involved is control. this HEO.
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