ML20206G860

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Responds to Which Forwarded Seven Questions for Record of 990324 Committee Hearing Re Nuclear Waste Storage & Disposal Policy,Including S.608, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1999. Responses to Questions Raised Encl
ML20206G860
Person / Time
Issue date: 04/22/1999
From: Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To: Murkowski F
SENATE, ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES
References
NUDOCS 9905100163
Download: ML20206G860 (11)


Text

1 UNITED STATES

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April 22, 1999 CHAIRMAN j

The Honorable Frank Murkowski, Chairman Committee on Energy and Natural Resources United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510-6150

Dear Mr. Chai lan:

This is in response to your letter of March 26,1999, which forwarded seven questions for the record of the March 24,1999, Committee hearing regarding Nuclear Waste Storage and Disposal Policy, including S. 608, the " Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1999." Enclosed please find our response to the question you raised as well as to the question asked by Senator Larry Craig and the five questions asked by Senator Bob Graham. Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to provide testimony on these important issues.

Sincerely, b

Shirley Ann Jackson

Enclosures:

As stated cc: Senator Jeff Bingaman Senator Larry Craig Senator Bob Graham t

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e SENATOR MURKOWSKl:

Some have opposed siting an interim storage facility at the Nevada Test Site because it will allegedly prejudice a future decision about the Yucca Mountain site. Do you believe that, if temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel is carried out near Yucca Mountain, that the NRC will license the site for a repository merely because spent fuel is in '.he neighborhood?

ANSWER.

No. As the regulator, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) takes no position as to where a centralinterim storage facility should be located. For any proposed site, the Commission must make the appropriate safety, security, and environmental findings before issuing a license. The NRC believes that dry cask storage of spent nuclear fuel at an independent spent fuel storage installation may be safely located in many areas of the United States.

The Commission takes its public health and safety mission, and its mistivn to protect the environment, seriously. The NRC has worked with a variety of applicants and licensees, including the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). In all cases, the NRC has kept its safety-focus in its approach to the technical and regulatory challenges it has faced. In this regard, the staff would continue to work with the DOE to reach prudent safety, security, and environmental i

decisions that are technically satisfactory and that comply with legislation and NRC requirements.

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1 SENATOR CRAIG:

In light of the points I have just made, would you like to respond further about NRC's lack of familiarity with DOE nuclear materials?

ANSWER.

Thc Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) testimony at the March 24,1999, Senate hearing stated, "Although the proposed legislation seeks to expand the definition of high-level waste for interim storage, the NRC has not developed the technical criteria necessary to ensure safe storage of noncommercial spent fuel and defense high level waste. Including these additional waste forms could result in a far more complex and time-consuming review process for the centralized interim storage facility and cask designs, because of the need to integrate these additional waste types into planning for the centralinterim storage facility cask systems.

Consequently, we prefer to issue a license initially for spent fuel, and consider an amendment request in the future to accommodate other suitable waste types."

First, the NRC could expand the definition within Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 72, within 32 months as proposed in S. 608, but this would not result in defense high-level waste being automatically approved for storage at the proposed centralinterim storage facility. The NRC suggests that the rulemaking to change the definition proceed in parallel with the license review for the central interim storage facility. With this approach, the initial licensing for the facility could be completed within 36 months, and defense high-level waste could be stored at the facility following an amendment to the license. If defense high-level waste and other waste streams are included from the outset, this would impede the initial licensing schedule since the staff has not performed the necessary analyses of this material and its impacts on the current cask designs which are likely to be used at the centralinterim storage facility. The inclusion of defense high-level waste and other waste forms requires complex and detailed analyses of the technical aspects of cask designs to be used to store this material. For example, the NRC must assess criticality control, radiation shielding, thermal characteristics, structural considerations, and safety of operations.

Second, the NRC is aware of the commercial spent fuel stored within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. Recently on March 19,1999, the NRC granted a license to the DOE -

Idaho Operations Office (DOE-ID) for the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) fuel oebris independent spent fuel storage installation. In FY 2000, the NRC anticipates receiving a license application from the DOE ID to store Peach Bottom, Shippingport, and TRIGA reactor spent fuel. The NRC is aware of the Fort St. Vrain spent fuel because the NRC licensed the Fort St. Vrain independent spent fuel storage installation which stores most of the Fort St. Vrain reactor's spent fuel, and NRC is aware of DOE-ID's storage mechanism for limited segments of the Fort St. Vrain fuel.

The NRC readily acknowledges the DOE's experience in managing nuclear material and DOE's research efforts. The DOE's experience and data will be very usefulin developing a license application and technical basis for storing noncommercial spent fuel, and the NRC expects that the DOE will provide a sufficient technical rationale in its license application to support the safe transport and storage of defense high-level waste and other unique waste forms for which it seeks storage authorization.

The NRC has continuing discussions with the DOE on spent fuel storage matters. For example, the NRC could not have issued the license for the TMI-2 fuel debris storage facility if the DOE had not provided a sufficient technical basis to grant the licence. Also, the NRC and

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the DOE are working together to estab!ish the technical basis for the safe storage of aluminum clad spent fuel at the DOE Savannah River facility. Furthermore, the NRC and the DOE have worked together on the national program to return foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel.

The NRC and the DOE will continue to work together on these matters.

Thus, the NRC is willing and able to meet the technical challenges of reviewing the safety aspects of noncommercial waste forms. However, as noted earlier, to remove potential impediments and expedite licensing of a centralinterim storage facility, the NRC suggests limiting the initial license application to commercial spent fuel using current cask designs, and by later amendment, seek to add noncommercial waste forms to the initial license after a technical basis has been provided and reviewed by the staff.

SENATOR GRAHAM OUESTION 1:

In your testimony you state that the NRC has identified persistent quality assurant deficiencies in DOE's repository program, in yc.. opinion, will this cause further delays in the program?

ANSWER, Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) Quality Assurance (QA) program documentation and found it acceptable, the DOE has consistently had problems implementing the OA program which, if uncorrected, might cause delays in the program. However, the NRC believes that the DOE recognizes its OA problems and is taking appropriate actions. The DOE developed an overall data qualification strategy and plan which is currently under NRC review. In order to increase NRC attention to these problems, the NRC has established a OA Task Force to conduct an independent, objective, and focused review of the implementation of the DOE's OA program. Until the DOE has had sufficient time to implement corrective actions to the OA program, a determination of the impact on the program schedule cannot be determined. The NRC will continue to coordinate closely with the DOE to monitor its progress in this important area.

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SENATOR GRAHAM OUESTION 2:

In your testimony you state that including defense high-level waste in interim storage could result in a far more complex and time-consuming review process for j

the centralized interim storage facility and cask designs. Can you provide an estimate of the extra time and resources this inclusion would necessitate?

ANSWER.

Without a complete understanding of what is included in the definition of defense high-level waste and the technical aspects thereof, it is difficult to estimate accurately the time and resources necessary to include this waste material in our review of a central interim storage facility. Additional review time and resources would be needed since the Nuclear Regula. tory Commission (NRC) staff has not performed the necessary analyses on the waste material characteristics and properties and the associated safety parameters (e.g., criticality, shielding, structural, thermal) of defense high-level waste and other unique (noncommercial) spent nuclear fuel and their impacts on current cask designs.

Based upon the staff's current, limited knowledge of defense high-level waste, and assuming that current cask systems are ultimately deemed safe for the transport and storage of this waste, the NRC estimates that the inclusion of this waste in the proposed centralinterim storage facility would: (a) increase the license application review time by approximately 12 to 24 months, and (b) require an estimated additional four (4) full time equivalents of NRC staff resources and $1.5 million.

The NRC suggests that the inclusion of the defense high-level waste in the centralinterim storage facility be considered in a subsequent license amendment. As such, the additional review time and effort would not impact the initial licensing of the centralinterim storage facility for the receipt and storage of commercial spent nuclear fuel.

SENATOR GRAHAM OUESTION 3:

In your testimony you state that the Commission has not budgeted for the licensing review and regulation of the proposed interim storage facility as outlined in S. 608. In your opinion, what would a sufficient appropriation for this activity be?

ANSWER.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) estimates the funding for licensing the U.S.

Department of Energy's (DOE) centralinterim storage facility at the proposed location designated in S. 608 to be approximately $4.0 million to $4.5 million, which includes 20 to 25 full time equivalents over approximately three years. Of this amount, approximately $0.5 million would need to be appropriated in FY 2000 for this activity. The following staff assumptions were used:

NRC staff will receive the license application by June 2000 and complete the licensing action within the time-frame specified in the proposed legislation.

DOE will utilize cask technology previously reviewed by the NRC.

DOE will initially store only commercial spent fuel.

A hearing will be requested, in addition, NRC anticipates other public responsiveness activities will be required.

DOE utilizes the lessons learned from the NRC staff's review of DOE's non-site-specific central interim storage facility topical report (anticipated completion October 1999).

NRC staff will be able to take advantage of the proposed legislation regarding the preparation of an EnvironmentalImpact Statement.

DOE is able to use its site characterization work at Yucca Mountain.

This estimate and assumptions are based upon projection of resource expenditures for licensing the proposed Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., independent spent fuel storage installation in Utah.

SENATOR GRAHAM OUESTION 4:

Risk assessments of the transportation of spent nuclear fuel from the reactor sites to the Nevada Test Site have been conducted by the NRC. What were the results of these studies? How do they compare to the risks associated with the transportation of other hazardous material?

ANSWER.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently completed a risk assessment of spent fuel shipments in the vicinity of the proposed Yucca Mountain high-level waste repository as part of its generic environmentalimpact statement supporting the renewal of power reactor licenses (NUREG-1437, Vol.1 Addendum 1," Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants"(draft report for comment).] A rulemaking is currently underway which is seeking comment on the assessment and on a proposed rule to treat this issue generically in 10 CFR Part 51.

The risk assessment made very conservative assumptions about how spent fuel shipments would be carried out in the Las Vegas area (e.g., truck transport on interstate highways through Las Vegas rather than rail transport, no use of the beltway under construction around much of Las Vegas,75,000 truck shipments over a 60-year period, etc.). All of these assumptions tend to increase risk estimates. The report concluded that even making these conservative bounding assumptions, both radiological and non-radiological risks to the public are extremely low.

The report estimates that the cumulative excess radiological risk for the Las Vegas area population from spent nuclear fuel transport over the entire assumed 60-year transportation campaign is less than 1/5 of a fatal cancer. This is about 3,000 times less than the estimate of fatal cancers in the Las Vegas area (680 over a 60-year period) that would result from exposure to cosmic and naturally occurring terrestrial gamma radiation, measured at 75 to 77 mrem / year in the Las Vegas area. This is about 300,000 times less than the normalincidence of fatal cancer in the Las Vegas area (54,000 over a 60-year period).

Furthermore, using national truck accident statistics, the non-radiological risk of fatality due to vehicle accidents is estimated to be about 0.035 fatalities over the entire 60-year period.

[NUREG-1437, Vol.1, Addendum 1, " Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plant" (draft report for comment).] As a point of reference, there were 322 traffic fatalities in Nevada in 1997, of which 31 fatalities were due to crashes involving large trucks (http://www.nhtsa. dot. gov).

Currently, the NRC is conducting a risk assessment of shipping spent nuclear fuel by truck and train from commercial power reactors to a high-level waste repository. This assessment is intended to supplement NUREG-0170, " Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes," a risk assessment for radioactive material shipments completed in 1977. The study will examine possible transportation over 1,000 different highway and rail routes. The number of different routes being evaluated was selected to bound shipments from 79 different commercial reactor sites, possible shipment to and storage at up to six (6) hypothetical interim storage sites, and three (3) possible locations for a final high-level waste repository. The new study is c xpected to be complete by October 1999, s

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The NRC has not conducted any studies which compare the risk of shipping spent fuel to that of shipping other hazardous materials, and is not aware of any specific studies which have been done by the U.S. Department of Transportation or others.

SENATOR GRAHAM OUESTION 5:

What is your view of Secretary Richardson's proposal to take title to the spent fuel at the reactor sites? Are there problems that you foresee with this proposal? If so, can you please elaborate?

ANSWER.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) testimony at the Senate hearing on March 24, 1999, covered the basic views of the Commission regarding Secretary Richardson's proposal to take title to the commercial spent nuclear fuel at each reactor site. More expansive NRC views on how this option would affect the current regulatory framework and potential problems are provided herein.

From a safety perspective, the Commission does not object to the concept of the Department of Energy (DOE) taking title to spent fuel at commercial power reactor facilities. However, the concept does raise a number of legislative, legal, and resource issues that would need to be addressed specifically by the Congress. If this were to occur, the Commission firmly believes that the NRC should retain regulatory responsibihty for independent spent fuel stcrage installation (ISFSI) facilities for several reasons.

First, there is the issue of plant safety. The NRC would need to review carefully the interface between each power reactor, in the operation of its spent fuel storage pool, and the DOE facilities, particularly in the area of emergency planning responsibilities. Price Anderson liability, financial assurance for decommissioning, storage of greater than Class C waste, and other issues also would need to be addressed.

Second, there is the issue of consistency in regulation, not only for those sites planning to develop an ISFSI, but also for those sites which already have constructed one. For example, the NRC proces.s of licensing an ISFSl offers an opportunity for a public hearing. Licensing hearings at existing ISFSis have raised important issues, including concerns of state and tribal governments, that needed to be resolved before taking a site-specific licensing action.

in addition, depending on the details of any legislation, if the DOE were to take title to the waste and were to manage it at the reactor sites (or elsewhere, if it is already stored off of the reactor site), the potential would exist for multiple regulatory schemes at the sites. Also, all the spent fuel to which the DOE is scheduled to take title is not currently in dry storage at reactor sites.

Building new dry cask storage facilities simply to distinguish the DOE spent fuel from the licensee spent fuel not yet scheduled for pick-up by the DOE under contract may not be the most prudent and cost-effective approach, particularly if spent fuel pool capacity is adequate at the site. Sites where an ISFSI has been licensed by the NRC could be at an economic disadvantage in relation to future sites which let the DOE be responsible for the development and management of the ISFSI. Finally, the alternative legislation would apparently rule out cost-effective alternatives for management of spent fuel site-wide, such as re racking a spent fuel pool, by having DOE focus solely on spent fuel that is in dry storage.

Third, there is the issue of transportation. Under the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the DOE is required to use NRC-certified casks for its material. However, current law does not subject DOE-owned material to NRC transportation safety or the physical security requirements, thus creating a patchwork of regulatory requirements. Therefore, this issue should be addressed explicitly for the NRC to have a clear role in regulating the safe transport and physical security

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of casks containing DOE-titled spent fuel. Public confidence may be enhanced if such shipments are subject to independent regulatory oversight by NRC consistent with other spent fuel shipments.

Fourth, there is the issue of stakeholder concerns. For example, the public has come to expect a degree of external regulation and monitoring of ISFSis which may not occur if the DOE has sole operational and regulatory responsibility for the sites.

The Commission also notes that DOE taking title to the spent fuel at reactor sites on the contracted schedule may not satisfy the desire of local stakeholders and public utility commissions that reactor sites not become de facto permanent high level waste repositories.

Several states, such as Minnesota, Wisconsin and Vermont, have indicated at the highest f

levels, their oppcsition to additional dry spent fuel storage capacity at reactor sites. Therefore, the proposed legislation, would need to address this issue to prevent the premature shutdown of the affected reactors. In addition, the legislation should address the issue of whether DOE also would have to take title to the land on which the dry cask storage facility resides in order to i

take title to the spent fuel.

Lake Barrett, Acting Director for the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, stated at the March 24,1999, Senate hearing on high-level waste that the DOE never intended to preempt state authority and that the waste would remain under NRC regulation. If this is the case, this would eliminate one of NRC's concerns regarding who would be the regulator.

Whether or not NRC retains regulatory responsibility for spent fuel stored on site, there is the potential for diversion of Nuclear Waste Fund resources away from the primary mission of developing a permanent geologic repository and supporting facilities. Depending on the financial arrangements provided for in the legislation and how issues such as the above are resolved, there is the potential for significant expenditures of Nuclear Waste Fund (or general fund) resources for these purposes. The diversion of resources from the repository program could be as large under the alternative bill as the diversion of resources under S. 608, but without the benefits and resource efficiencies of a centralinterim spent fuel storage facility which the proposed alternative clearly does not support.

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