ML20206G818
| ML20206G818 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/28/1999 |
| From: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | J. J. Barton, Bliley T, Chafee J, Domenici P, Inhofe J, Mcintosh D, Packard R, Thompson F HOUSE OF REP., HOUSE OF REP., APPROPRIATIONS, HOUSE OF REP., ENERGY & COMMERCE, SENATE, ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS, SENATE, GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9905100153 | |
| Download: ML20206G818 (16) | |
Text
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s April 28, 1999 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Fred Thompson, Chairman Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am writing to comment on S. 746, the " Regulatory improvement Act of 1999" (RIA), especially Subchapter Ill, " Executive Oversight."
The RfA seeks to improve aspects of the rulemaking process. The NRC is working consistently to improve its own regulatory process by crafting better cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments for its rules, by using scientific information more systematically, by finding better ways to express risk findings and to deal with uncertainties and non-quantifiable factors, and by comparing regulated risks with risks routinely encountered by the public. The NRC has codified a tough requirement for cost-benefit analysis in its nuclear power plant regulations (10 CFR 50.109). This "backfit rule" puts strict limits on new requirements for reactor safety, other than those required to ensure adequate protection, to ensure that benefits justify costs.
The NRC welcomes increased exchange among the regulatory agencies on the subjects of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment. The Commission believes that it could both contribute to and learn from an increased exchange.
However, the Commission strongly opposes the enactment of S. 746, as introduced, because the RlA might be read to require that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review the substance of every proposed and final rule issued by any of the independent regulatory commissions not excluded by the definition of " rule"in the bill. At the very least, such centralized reviews would greatly lengthen the NRC rulemaking process.
Most importantly from our perspective, a requirement for such reviews would weaken the longstanding, statutorily-based, independence of the NRC. That independence, established at the agency's founding by section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, has permitted the agency to develop the scientific expertise and information necessary for regulating (in an effective and timely way) the advanced and important set of technologies used in nuclear power and the other civilian uses of radioactive materials.
In the last decade alone, the NRC has completed numerous important rulemakings in areas such as nuclear power plant maintenance; nuclear power plant license renewal; standardization l
of, and one step licensing for, new nuclear power plant designs; containment leak testing in i
nuclear power plants; and decommissioning and decontamination of nuclear facilities. In addition, the Commission is currently in the process of making significant changes to its regulations on nuclear power reactor design and maintenance, high-level waste disposal at
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2 Yucca Mountain, the medical uses of byproduct material, the use of alternate source terms at nuclear power plants, and the domestic licensing of special nuclear material. All of these rulemakings required careful consideration of costs, benefits, and risks. Many of these rulemakings have provided or are expected to provide a significant reduction in unnecessary regulatory burden. During the same time, the agency is conducting a number of projects aimed I
at increasing the consideration of risk in the agency's decision making. For example, the agency is engaged in research on probabilistic risk assessment and has worked with the regulated community and other stakeholders to develop methods of ranking risks. In summary, if the NRC is subject to centralized review of every proposed regulation, final regulation, guidance document, and policy statement the agency is developing, it is doubtful that the agency could accomplish these important tasks as effectively and efficiently as our stakeholders demand.
Adding to the agency's rulemaking the length and cost of OMB reviews of every proposed and final rule is highly unlikely to increase the scientific content or the effectiveness of NRC regulation. Thus, rules needed to promote nuclear safety and security might be delayed or modified for reasons unrelated to safety or security. As part of its implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act, the NRC is striving to reduce the time it takes to complete rulemakings, and already has made substantial progress over the past several years in achieving this goal. In contrast, this legislation would prolong an already lengthy process.
We are accomplishing the aims of better and more consistent use of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment in regulatory analysis performed by the independent regulatory agencies without the benefit of the RIA.
As an independent regulatory agency staffed and directed by the necessary experts, the NRC can adopt sound new practices more quickly than a regulator subject to continuous central oversight. The RIA seems to have recognized this principle in excluding from its reach several categories of rules issued by some of the independent regulatory agencies that regulate economic matters. Moreover, in the case of health and safety regulation, the RlA also excludes certain safety decisions of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), even though the FDA is not an independent regulatory agency. However, the RIA does not recognize the same need to exclude regulatory actions by independent public health and safety agencies such as the NRC.
Accordingly, the Commission urges that S. 746 be amended to exclude the NRC explicitly from the reach of the RfA subchapter on executive oversight. Absent such a change, the Commission strongly opposes enactment of S. 746.
Sincerely, 2
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman Members, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
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April 28, 1999 CHAIRMAN The Honorable James M. Inhofe, Chairman Subcommittee on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety Committee on Environment and Public Works United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am writing to comment on S. 746, the " Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999" (RIA), especially Subchapter Ill, " Executive Oversight." This billis currently pending before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee.
Due to the Commission's strong views on S. 746, we wanted to share this letter with you.
The RfA seeks to improve aspects of the rulemaking process. The NRC is working consistently to improve its own regulatory process by crafting better cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments for its rules, by using scientific information more systematically, by finding better ways to express risk findings and to deal with uncertainties and non-quantifiable factors, and by comparing regulated risks with risks routinely encountered by the public. The NRC has codified a tough requirement for cost-benefit analysis in its nuclear power plant regulations (10 CFR 50.109). This "backfit rule" puts strict limits on new requirements for reactor safety, other than those required to ensure adequate protection, to ensure that benefits justify costs.
The NRC welcomes increased exchange among the regulatory agencies on the subjects of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment. The Commission believes that it could both contribute to and learn from an increased exchange.
However, the Commission strongly opposes the enactment of S. 746, as introduced, because the RIA might be read to require that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review the substance of every proposed and final rule issued by any of the independent regulatory commissions not excluded by the definition of " rule" in the bill. At the very least, such centralized reviews would great ly lengthen the NRC rulemaking process.
Most importantly from our perspective, a requirement for such reviews would weaken the longstanding, statutorily-based, independence of the NRC. That independence, established at the agency's founding by section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, has permitted the agency to develop the scientific expertise and information necessary for regulating (in an effective and timely way) the advanced and important set of technologies used in nuclear power and the other civilian uses of radioactive materials.
In the last decade alone, the NRC has completed numerous important rulemakings in areas such as nuclear power plant maintenance; nuclear pcwer plant license renewal; standardization of, and one step licensing for, new nuclear power plant designs; containment leak testing in 1
2 I
nuclear power plants, and decommissioning and decontamination of nuclear facilities. In addition, the Commission is currently in the process of making significant changes to its regulations on nuclear power reactor design and maintenance, high-level waste disposal at Yucca Mountain, the medical uses of byproduct material, the use of alternate source terms at nuclear power plants, and the domestic licensing of special nuclear material. All of these rulemakings required careful consideration of costs, benefits, and risks. Many of these rulemakings have provided or are expected to provide a significant reduction in unnecessary regulatory burden. During the same time, tne agency is conducting a number of projects aimed at increasing the consideration of risk in the agency's decision making. For example, the agency is engaged in research on probabilist;c risk assessment and has worked with the regulated community and other stakeholders to develop methods of ranking risks. In summary, if the NRC is subject to centralized review of every proposed regulation, final regulation, guidance document, and policy statement the agency is developing, it is doubtful that the agency could accomplish these important tasks as effectively and efficiently as our stakeholders demand.
Adding to the agency's rulemaking the length and cost of OMB reviews of every proposed and final rule is highly unlikely to increase the scientific content or the effectiveness of NRC regulation. Thus, rules needed to promote nuclear safety and security might be delayed or modified for reasons unrelated to safety or security. As part of its implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act, the NRC is striving to reduce the time it takes to complete rulemakings, and already has made substantial progress over the past several years in achieving this goal. In contrast, this legislation would prolong an already lengthy process.
We are accomplishing the aims of better and more consistent use of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment in regulatory analysis performed by the independent regulatory agencies without the benefit of the RIA.
As an independent regulatory agency staffed and directed by the necessary experts, the NRC can adopt sound new practices more quickly than a regulator subject to continuous central oversight. The RfA seems to have recognized this principle in excluding from its reach several categories of rules issued by some of the independent regulatory agencies that regu! ate economic matters. Moreover, in the case of health and safety regulation, the RfA also excludes certain safety decisions of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), even though the FDA is not an independent regulatory agency. However, the RIA does not recognize the same need to exclude regulatory actions by independent public health and safety agencies such as the NRC.
Accordingly, the Commission urges that S. 746 be amended to exclude the NRC explicitly from the reach of the RIA subchapter on executive oversight. Absent such a change, the Commission strongly opposes enactment of S. 746.
Sincerely, Shirley Ann Jackson cc: Senator Bob Graham l
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April 28, 1999 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Joe Barton, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy and Power Committee on Commerce United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am writing to comment on S. 746, the " Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999" (RIA), especially Subchapter Ill, " Executive Oversight." This billis currently pending before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee.
Due to the Commission's strong views on S. 746, we wanted to share this letter with you.
The RIA seeks to improve aspects of the rulemaking process. The NRC is working consistently to improve its own regulatory process by crafting better cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments for its rules, by using scientific information more systematically, by finding better ways to express risk findings and to deal with uncertainties and non-quantifiable factors, and by comparing regulated risks with risks routinely encountered by the public. The NRC has codified a tough requirement for cost-benefit analysis in its nuclear power plant regulations (10 CFR 50.109). This "backfit rule" puts strict limits on new requirements for reactor safety, other than those required to ensure adequate prot.ection, to ensure that benefits justity costs.
The NRC welcomes increased exchange among the regulatory agencies on the subjects of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment. The Commission believes that it could both contribute to and learn from an increased exchange.
However, the Commission strongly opposes the enactment of S. 746, as introduced, because the RfA might be read to require that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review the substance of every proposed and final rule issued by any of the independent regulatory commissions not excluded by the definition of " rule" in the bill. At the very least, such centralized reviews would greatly lengthen the NRC rulemaking process.
Most importantly from our perspective, a requirement for such reviews would weaken the longstanding, statutorily-based, independence of the NRC. That independence, established at the agency's founding by section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, has permitted the agency to develop the scientific expertise and information necessary for regulating (in an effective and timely way) the advanced and important set of technologies used in nuclear power and the other civilian uses of radioactive materials.
In the last decade alone, the NRC has completed numerous important rulemakings in areas such as nuclear power plant maintenance; nuclear power plant license renewal; standardization of, and one step licensing for, new nuclear power plant designs; containment leak testing in nuclear power plants; and decommissioning and decontamination of nuclear facilities. In
2 addition, the Commission is currently in the process of making significant changes to its regulations on nuclear power reactor design and maintenance, high-level waste disposal at Yucca Mountain, the medical uses of byproduct material, the use of alternate source terms at nuclear power plants, and the domestic licensing of special nuclear material. All of these rulemakings required careful consideration of costs, benefits, and risks. Many of these rulemakings have provided or are expected to provide a significant reduction in unnecessary regulatory burden. During the same time, the agency is conducting a number of projects aimed at increasing the consideration of risk in the agency's decision making. For example, the agency is engaged in research on probabilistic risk assessment and has worked with the regulated community and other stakeholders to develop methods of ranking risks. In summary, if the NRC is subject to centralized review of every proposed regulation, final regulation, guidance document, and policy statement the agency is developing, it is doubtful that the agency could accomplisa these important tasks as effectively and efficiently as our stakeholders demand.
Adding to the agency's rulemaking the length and cost of OMB reviews of every proposed and final rule is highly unlikely to increase the scientific content or the effectiveness of NRC regulation. Thus, rules needed to promote nuclear safety and security might be delayed or modified for reasons unrelated to safety or security. As part of its implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act, the NRC is striving to reduce the time it takes to complete rulemakings, and already has made substantial progress over the past several years in achieving this goal. In contrast, this legislation would prolong an already lengthy process.
We are accomplishing the aims of better and more consistent use of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment in regulatory analysis performed by the independent regulatory agencies without the benefit of the RIA.
As an independent regulatory agency staffed and directed by the necessary experts, the NRC can adopt sound new practices more quickly than a regulator subject to continuous central oversight. The RfA seems to have recognized this principle in excluding from its reach several categories of rules issued by some of the independent regulatory agencies that regulate economic matters. Moreover, in the case of health and safety regulation, the RlA also excludes certain safety decisions of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), even though the FDA is not an independent regulatory agency. However, the RlA does not recognize the same need to exclude regulatory actions by independent public health and safety agencies such as the NRC.
Accordingly, the Commission urges that S. 746 be amended to exclude the NRC explicitly from the reach of the RfA subchapter on executive oversight. Absent such a change, the Commission strongly opposes enactment of S. 746.
Sincerely, 0
Q[/ m Shirley Ann Jackson cc: Ralph M. Hall l
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April 28, 1999 j
CHAIRMAN The Honorable Tom Bliley, Chairman Committee on Commerce United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am writing to comment on S. 746, the " Regulatory improvement Act of 1999" (RIA), especially Subchapter Ill, " Executive Oversight." This billis currently pending before the Senate Governmental Afhirs Committee.
Due to the Commission's strong views on S. 746, we wanted to share this letter with you.
The RfA seeks to improve aspects of the rulemaking process. The NRC is working consistently to improve its own regulatory p,ocess by crafting better cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments for its rules, by using scientific information more systematically, by finding better ways to express risk findings and to deal with uncertainties and non-quantifiable factors, and by comparing regulated risks with risks routinely encountered by the public. The NRC has codified a tough requireme t for cost-benefit analysis in its nuclear power plant regulations (10 CFR 50.109). This "backfit rule" puts strict limits on new requirements for reactor safety, other than those required to ensure adequate protection, to ensure that benefits justify costs.
The NRC welcomes increased exchange among the regulatory agencies on the subjects of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment. The Commission believes that it could both contribute to and learn from an increased exchange.
However, the Commission strongly opposes the enactment of S. 746, as introduced, because the RIA might be read to require that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review the substance of every proposed and final rule issued by any of the independent regulatory commissions not excluded by the definition of " rule" in the bill. At the very least, such centralized reviews would greatly lengthen the NRC rulemaking process.
Most importantly from our perspective, a requirement for such reviews would weaken the longstanding, statutorily-based, independence of the NRC. That independence, established at the agency's founding by section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, has permitted the agency to develop the scientific expertise and information necessary for regulating (in an effective and timely way) the advanced and important set of technologies used in nuclear power and the other civilian uses of radioactive materials.
in the last decade alone, the NRC has completed numerous important rulemakings in areas such as nuclear power plant maintenance; nuclear power plant license renewal; standardization of, and one step licensing for, new nuclear power plant designs; containment leak testing in nuclear power plants; and dacommissioning and decontamination of nuclear facilities. In addition, the Commission is currently in the process of making significant changes to its i
l 1
2 regulations on nuclear power reactor design and maintenance, high-level waste disposal at i
Yucca Mountain, the medical uses of byproduct material, the use of alternate source terms at nuclear power plants, and the domestic licensing of special nuclear material. All of these rulemakings required careful consideration of costs, benefits, and risks. Many of these rulemakings have provided or are expected to provide a significant reduction in unnecessary regulatory burden. During the same time, the agency is conducting a number of proiccts aimed at increasing the consideration of risk in the agency's decision making. For example, the agency is engaged in research on probabilistic risk assessment and has worked with the regulated community and other stakeholders to develop methods of ranking risks. In summary, if the NRC is subject to centralized review of every proposed regulation, final regulation, guidance document, and policy statement the agency is developing, it is doubtful that the agency could accomplish these important tasks as effectively and efficiently as our stakeholders demand.
Adding to the agency's rulemaking the length and cost of OMB reviews of every proposed and final rule is highly unlikely to increase the scientific content or the effectiveness of NRC regulation. Thus, rules needed to promote nuclear safety and security might be delayed or modified for reasons unrelated to safety or security. As part of its implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act, the NRC is striving to reduce the time it takes to complete rulemakings, and already has made substantial progress over the past several years in achieving this goal. In contrast, this legislation would prolong an already lengthy process.
We are accomplishing the aims of better and more consistent use of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment in regulatory analysis performed by the independent regulatory agencies without the benefit of the RfA.
As an independent regulatory agency staffed and directed by the necessary experts, the NRC
, can adopt sound new practices more quickly than a regulator subject to continuous central oversight. The RIA seems to have recognized this principle in excluding from its reach several categories of rules issued by some of the independent regulatory agencies that regulate economic matters. Moreover, in the case of health and safety regulation, the RfA also excludes certain safety decisions of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), even though the FDA is not an independent regulatory agency. However, the RlA does not recognize the same need to exclude regulatory actions by independent public health and safety agencies such as the NRC.
Accordingly, the Commission urges that S. 746 be amended to exclude the NRC explicitly from the reach of the RfA subchapter on executive oversight. Absent such a change, the Commission strongly opposes enactment of S. 746.
Sincerely, Shirley Ann Jackson cc: Representative John D. Dingell
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April 28, 1999 CHAIRMAN The Honorable John H. Chafee, Chairman Committee on Environment and Public Works United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am writing to comment on S. 746, the " Regulatory improvement Act of 1999" (RIA), especially Subchapter Ill, " Executive Oversight." This billis currently pending before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee.
Due to the Commission's strong views on S. 746, we wanted to share this letter with you.
The RfA seeks to improve aspects of the rulemaking process. The NRC is working consistently to improve its own regulatory process by craf ting better cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments for its rules, by using scientific information more systematically, by finding better ways to express risk findings and to deal with uncertainties and non-quantifiable factors, and by comparing regulated risks with risks routinely encountered by the public. The NRC has codified a tough requirement for cost-benefit analysis in its nuclear power plant regulations (10 CFR 50.109). This "backfit rule puts strict limits on new requirements for reactor safety, other than those required to ensure adequate protection, to ensure that benefits justify costs.
The NRC welcomes increased exchange among the regulatory agencies on the subjects of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment. The Commission believes that it could both contribute to and learn from an increased exchange.
However, the Commission strongly opposes the enactment of S. 746, as introduced, because the RIA might be read to require that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review the substance of every proposed and final rule issued by any of the independent regulatory commissions not excluded by the definition of " rule" in the bill. At the very least, such centralized reviews would greatly lengthen the NRC rulemaking process.
Most importantly from our perspective, a requirement for such reviews would weaken the longstanding, statutorily-based, independence of the NRC. That independence, established at the agency's founding by section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, has permitted the agency to develop the scientific expertise and information necessary for regulating (in an effective and timely way) the advanced and important set of technologies used in nuclear power and the other civilian uses of radioactive materials.
In the last decade alone, the NRC has completed numerous important rulemakings in areas such as nuclear power plant maintenance; nuclear power plant license renewal; standardization of, and one step licensing for, new nuclear power plant designs; containment leak testing in nuclear power plants; and decommissioning and decontamination of nuclear facilities. In addition, the Commission is currently in the process of making significant changes to its s
2 regulations on nuclear power reactor design and maintenance, high-level waste disposal at Yucca Mountain, the medical uses of byproduct material, the use of alternate source terms at nuclear power plants, and the domestic licensing of special nuclear material. All of these rulemakings required careful consideration of costs, benefits, and risks. Many of these rulemakings have provided or are expected to provide a significant reduction in unnecessary regulatory burden. During the same time, the agency is conducting a number of projects aimed at increasing the consideration of risk in the agency's decision making. For example, the agency is engaged in research on probabilistic risk assessment and has worked with the
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regulated community and other stakeholders to develop methods of ranking risks. In summary, if the NRC is subject to centralized review of every proposed regulation, final regulation, guidance document, and policy statement the agency is developing, it is doubtful that the agency could accomplish these important tasks as effectively and efficiently as our stakeholders demand.
Adding to the agency's rulemaking the length and cost of OMB reviews of every proposed and final rule is highly unlikely to increase the scientific content or the effectiveness of NRC regulation. Thus, rules needed to promote nuclear safety and security might be delayed or modified for reasons unrelated to safety or security. As part of its implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act, the NRC is striving to reduce the time it takes to complete rulemakings, and already has made substantial progress over the past several years in achieving this goal. In contrast, this legislation would prolong an already lengthy process.
We are accomplishing the aims of better and more consistent use of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment in regulatory analysis performed by the independent regulatory agencies without the benefit of the RIA.
Ac an mdependent regulatory agency staffed and directed by the necessary experts, the NRC can adopt sound new practices more quickly than a regulator subject to continuous central oversight. The RIA seems to have recognized this principle in excluding from its reach several categories of rules issued by some of the independent regulatory agencies that regulate economic matters. Moreover, in the case of health and safety regulation, the RfA also excludes certain safety decisions of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), even though the FDA is not an independent regulatory agency. However, the RIA does not recognize the same need to exclude regulatory actions by independent public health and safety agencies such as the NRC.
Accordingly, the Commission urges that S. 746 be amended to exclude the NRC explicitly from the reach of the RfA subchapter on executive oversight. Absent such a change, the Commission strongly opposes enactment of S. 746.
Sincerely,
&M Shirley Ann Jackson ec: Senator Max Baucus
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April 28, 1999 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Ron Packard, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development Committee on Appropriations United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am writing to comment on S. 746, the " Regulatory improvement Act of 1999" (RIA), especially Subchapter lil, " Executive Oversight." This billis currently pending before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee.
Due to the Commission's strong views on S. 746, we wanted to share this letter with you.
The RIA seeks to improve aspects of the rulemaking process. The NRC is working consistently to improve its own regulatory process by crafting better cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments for its rules, by using scientific information more systematically, by finding better ways to express risk findings and to deal with uncertainties and non-quantifiable factors, and by comparing regulated risks with risks routinely encountered by the public. The NRC has codified a tough requirement for cost-benefit analysis in its nuclear power plant regulations (10 CFR 50.109). This "backfit rule" puts strict limits on new requirements for reactor safety, other than those required to ensure adequate protection, to ensure that benefits justify costs.
The NRC welcomes increased exchange among the regulatory agencies on the subjects of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment. The Commission believes that it could both contribute to and learn from an increased exchange.
However, the Commission strongly opposes the enactment of S. 746, as introduced, because the Rf A might be read to require that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review the substance of every proposed and final rule issued by any of the independent regulatory commissions not excluded by the definition of " rule" in the bill. At the very least, such centralized reviews would greatly lengthen the NRC rulemaking process.
Most importantly from our perspective, a requirement for such reviews would weaken the longstanding, statutorily-based, independence of the NRC. That independence, established at the agency's founding by section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, has permitted the agency to develop the scientific expertise and information necessary for regulating (in an effective and timely way) the advanced and important set of technologies used in nuclear power and the other civilian uses of radioactive materials.
In the last decade alone, the NRC has completed numerous important rulemakings in areas such as nuclear power plant maintenance; nuclear power plant license renewal; standardization of, and one step licensing for, new nuclear power plant designs; containment leak testing in nuclear power plants; and decommissioning and decontamination of nuclear f acilities, in
r 2
addition, the Commission is currently in the process of making significant changes to its regulations on nuclear power reactor design and maintenance, high-level waste disposal at Yucca Mountain, the medical uses of byproduct material, the use of alternate source terms at nuclear power plants, and the domestic licensing of special nuclear material. All of these rulemakings required careful consideration of costs, benefits, and risks. Many of these rulemakings have provided or are expected to provide a significant reduction in unnecessary regulatory burden. During the same time, the agency is conducting a number of projects aimed at increasing the consideration of risk in the agency's decision making. For example, the agency is engaged in research on probabilistic risk assessment and has worked with the regulated community and other stakehciders to develop methods of ranking risks. In summary, if the NRC is subject to centralized review of every proposed regulation, final regulation, guidance document, and policy statement the agency is developing, it is doubtful that the agency could accomplish these important tasks as effectively and efficiently as our stakeholders demand.
Adding to the agency's rulemaking the length and cost of OMB reviews of every proposed and final rule is highly unlikely to increase the scientific content or the effectiveness of NRC regulation. Thus, rules needed to promote nuclear safety and security might be delayed or modified for reasons unrelated to safety or security. As part of its implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act, the NRC is striving to reduce the time it takes to complete rulemakings, and already has made substantial progress over the past several years in achieving this goal. In contrast, this legislation would prolong an already lengthy process.
We are accomplishing the aims of better and more consistent use of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment in regulatory analysis performed by the independent regulatory agencies without the benefit of the RfA.
As an independent regulatory agency staffed and directed by the necessary experts, the NRC can adopt sound new practices more quickly than a regulator subject to continuous central oversight. The RIA seems to have recognized this principle in excluding from its reach several categories of rules issued by some of the independent regulatory agencies that regulate economic matters. Moreover, in the case of health and safety regulation, the RIA also excludes certain safety decisions of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), even though the FDA is not an independent regulatory agency. However, the RIA does not recognize the same need to exclude regulatory actions by independent public health and safety agencies such as the NRC.
Accordingly, the Commission urges that S. 746 be amerided to exclude the NRC explicitly from the reach of the RIA subchapter on executive oversight. Absent such a change, the Commission strongly opposes enactment of S. 746.
Sincerely,
/
k Shirloy Ann Jackson cc: Representative Peter J. Visclosky i
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f April 28, 1999 CHAIRMAN l!:
The Honorable Pete V. Domenici, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development Committee on Appropriations United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am writing to comment on S. 746, the " Regulatory improvement Act of 1999" (RIA), especially Subchapter Ill, " Executive Oversight." This billis currently pending before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee.
Due to the Commission's strong views on S. 746, we wanted to share this letter with you.
The RIA seeks to improve aspects of the rulemaking process. The NRC is working consit,tently to improve its own regulatory process by crafting better cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments for its rules, by using scientific information more systematically, by finding better ways to express risk findings and to deal with uncertainties and non-quantifiable factors, and by comparing regulated risks with risks routinely encountered by the public. The NRC has codified a tough requirement for cost-benefit analysis in its nuclear power plant regulations (10 CFR 50.109). This "backfit rule" puts strict limits on new requirements for reactor safety, other than those required to ensure adequate protection, to ensure that benefits justify costs.
The NRC welcomes increased exchange among the regulatory agencies on the subjects Of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment. The Commission believes that it could both contribute to and learn from an increased exchange.
However, the Commission strongly opposes the enactment of S. 746, as introduced, because the RIA might be read to require that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review the substance of every proposed and final rule issued by any of the independent regulatory commissions not excluded by the definition of " rule" in the bill. At the very least, such centralized reviews would greatly lengthen the NRC rulemaking process.
Most importantly from our perspective, a requirement for such reviews would weaken the longstanding, statutorily-based, independence of the NRC. That independence, established at the agency's founding by section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, has permitted the agency to develop the scientific expertise and information necessary for regulating (in an effective and timely way) the advanced and important set of technologies used in nuclear power and the other civilian uses of radioactive materials.
In the last decade alone, the NRC has completed numerous important rulemakings in areas such as nuclear power plant maintenance; nuclear power plant license renewal; standardization of, and one step licensing for, new nuclear power plant designs; containment leak testing in f
nuclear power plants; and decommissioning and decontamination of nuclear facilities. In
i O
2 addition, the Commission is currently in the process of making significant changes to its regulations on nuclear power reactor design and maintenance, high-level waste disposal at Yucca Mountain, the medical uses of byproduct material, the use of alternate source terms at nuclear power plants, and the domestic licensing of special nuclear material. All of these rulemakings required careful consideration of costs, benefits, and risks. Many of these rulemakings have provided or are expected to provide a significant reduction in unnecessary regulatory burden. During the same time, the agency is conducting a number of projects aimed at increasing the consideration of risk in the agency's decision making. For example, the agency is engaged in research on probabilistic risk assessment and has worked with the regulated community and other stakeholders to develop methods of ranking risks. In summary, if the NRC is subject to centralized review of every proposed regulation, final regulation, guidance document, and policy statement the agency is developing, it is doubtful that the agency could accomplish these important tasks as effectively and efficiently as our stakeholders demand.
Adding to the agency's rulemaking the length and cost of OMB reviews of every proposed and final rule is highly unlikely to increase the scientific content or the effectiveness of NRC regulation. Thus, rules needed to promote nuclear safety and security might be delayed or modified for reasons unrelated to safety or security. As part of its implementation of the j
Government Performance and Results Act, the NRC is striving to reduce the time it takes to complete rulemakings, and already has made substantial progress over the past several years in achieving this goal. In contrast, this legislation would prolong an already lengthy process.
We are accomplishing the aims of better and more consistent use of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment in regulatory analysis performed by the independent regulatory agencies without the benefit of the RIA.
As an independent regulatory agency staffed and directed by the necessary experts, the NRC can adopt sound new practices more quickly than a regulator subject to continuous central oversight. The RIA seems to have recognized this principle in excluding from its reach several categories of rules issued by some of the independent regulatory agencies that regulate economic matters. Moreover, in the case of health and safety regulation, the RIA also excludes certain safety decisions of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), even though the FDA is not an independent regulatory agency. However, the RIA does not recognize the same need to exclude regulatory actions by independent public health and safety agencies such as the NRC.
I Accordingly, the Commission urges that S. 746 be amended to exclude the NRC explicitly from the reach of the RlA subchapter on executive oversight. Absent such a change, the Commission strongly opposes enactment of S. 746.
Sincerely, h
/w Shirley Ann Jackson cc: Senator Harry Reid
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- UNITED STATES p-g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 g-L g
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April 28, 1999 cHA M AN The Honorable David McIntosh, Chairman Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs Committee on Government Reform United States House of Representatiwes Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am writing to comment on S. 746, the " Regulatory improvement Act of 1999" (RIA), especially Subchapter lil, " Executive Oversight.' This billis currently pending before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee.
Due to the Commission's strong views on S. 746, we wanted to share this letter with you.
The RIA seeks to improve aspects of the rulemaking process. The NRC is working consistently to improve its own regulatory process by crafting better cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments for its rules, by using scientific information more systematically, by finding better ways to express risk findings and to deal with uncertainties and non-quantifiable factors, and by comparing regulated risks with risks routinely encountered by the public. The NRC has codified a tough requirement for cost-benefit analysis in its nuclear power plant regulations (10 CFR 50.109)..This "backfit rule" puts strict limits on new requirements for reactor safety, other than those required to ensure adequate protection, to ensure that benefits justify costs.
I The NRC welcomes increased exchango among the regulatory agencies on the subjects of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment. The Commission believes that it could both
- contribute to and learn from an increased exchange.
However, the Commission strongly opposes the enactment of S. 746, as introduced, because the RIA might be read to require that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review the substance.of every proposed and final rule issued by any of the independent regulatory commissions not excluded by the definition of " rule" in the bill. At the very least, such centralized reviews would greatly lengthen the NRC rulemaking process.
Most importantly from our perspective, a requirement for such reviews would weaken the longstanding, statutorily-based, independence of the NRC. That independence, established at the agency's founding by section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, has permitted the agency to develop the scientific exper1ise and information necessary for regulating (in an effective and timely way) the advanced and important set of technologies used in nuclear power and the other civilian uses of radioactive materials.
In the last decade alone, the NRC has completed numerous important rulemakings in areas
[-
- such as nuclear power plant maintenance; nuclear power plant license renewal; sta.ndardization l-of, and one step licensing for, new nuclear power plant designs; containment leak testing in l-
4 2
nuclear power plants; and decommissioning and decontamination of nuclear facilities. In i_
addition, the Commission is currently in the process of making significant changes to its l
regulations on nuclear power reactor design and maintenance, high-level waste disposal at Yucca Mountain, the medical uses of byproduct material, the use of alternate source terms at nuclear power plants, and the domestic licensing of special nuclear material. All of these rulemakings required careful consideration of costs, benefits, and risks. Many of these rulemakings have provided or are expected to provide a significant reduction in unnecessary regulatory burden. During the same time, the agency is conducting a number of projects aimed at increasing the consideration of risk in the agency's decision making. For example, the agency is engaged in research on probabilistic risk assessment and has worked with the regulated community and other stakeholders to develop methods of ranking risks. In summary, if the NRC.is subject to centralized review of every proposed regulation, final regulation, guidance document, and policy statement the agency is developing, it is doubtful that the agency could accomplish these important tasks as effectively and efficiently as our stakeholders demand.
Adding to the agency's rulemaking the length and cost of OMB reviews of every proposed and final rule is highly unlikely to increase the scientific content or the effectiveness of NRC regulation. Thus, rules needed to promote nuclear safety and security might be delayed or modified for reasons unrelated to safety or security. As part of its implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act, the NRC is striving to reduce the time it takes to complete rulemakings, and already has made substantial progress over the past several years in achieving this goal. In contrast, this legislation would prolong an already lengthy process.
We are accomplishing the aims of better and more consistent use of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment in regulatory analysis performed by the independent regulatory agencies without the benefit of the RIA.
As an independent regulatory agency staffed and directed by the necessary experts, the NRC
. can adopt sound new practices more quickly than a regulator subject to continuous central oversight. The RlA seems to have recognized this principle in excluding from its reach several categories of rules issued by some of the independent regulatory agencies that regulate economic matters. Moreover, in the case of health and safety regulation, the RIA also excludes j
I certain safety decisions of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), even though the FDA is not an independent regulatory agency. However, the RlA does not recognize the same need to exclude regulatory actions by independent public health and safety agencies such as the NRC.
Accordingly, the Commission urges that S. 746 be amended to exclude the NRC explicitly from the reach of the RIA subchapter on executive oversight. Absent such a change, the Commission strongly opposes enactment of S. 746.
Sincerely, J
Shirley Ann Jackson cc: Representative Dennis J. Kucinich