ML20206D499
| ML20206D499 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1986 |
| From: | George Thomas PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | Noonan V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| SBN-1121, NUDOCS 8606200025 | |
| Download: ML20206D499 (9) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.o. A George S. Thomas Vice President Nuclect Production PutWC SSMCS CI b June 17, 1986 New Hampshiro Yankee Division SBN-1121 T.F. B7.1.2 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Mr. Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director PWR Project Directorate No. 5
References:
(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) PSNH Letter (SBN-1074) dated May 29, 1986, "NRC Requests fo-Additional Information," J. DeVincentis to V. S. Noonan ('c) PSNH Letter (SBN-1003) dated April 14, 1986, "Seabrook Station Process Control Program," G. S. Thomas to V. S. Noonan
Subject:
NRC Request for Additional Information on Mobile Radwaste Services
Dear Sir:
During discussions with the NRC Staff on June 16, 1986, we were requested to provide additional information concerning system interfaces, spill control and quality assurance for the Mobile Solidification System. A. System Interfaces and Spill Prevention Control Mobile system interfaces with installed Seabrook Station Systems were described in reference (b). Attachment 1 specifically addresses the standard review plan design considerations when using a portable solid waste system. is an excerpt from the safety analysis section of the NUS Process Service Corporation Topical Report (NP-PS-53-0378) regarding spills and overflows. This f information in addition to the final equipment arrangement drawing no. (NUSME-8815-M-2002) will be a basis for issuance of radiation work permit requirements for con-tamination and work control. In addition, the NUS set-up and operating procedures specify compliance with NHY's health physics requirements and are approved by the Station Operating Review Committee. [ 8606200025 060617 l PDR ADOCK 00000443 [o PDR I I P.O. Box 300 + Seabrook, NH O3874. Telephone (603)474-9521
5-United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 17, 1986 Attention: Mr. Vincent S. Noonan Page 2 i e B. Quality Assurance Reference (c) transmitted the NHY Process Control Program which identifies applicability of NHY QA requirements in the following areas: I 1. Section VI - indicates that we may use a contracted mobile vendor; 2. Section VII - requires QA verification of acceptability of off-site waste shipments; and 3. Section VIII - specifically states that NHY QA requirements apply to the contracted vendor. We trust that the enclosed information provides the clarification requested by the Staff. If you have further questions, please contact Dr. G. M. Kwasnik at 603-474-9374,~ extension 4053. Very truly yours, 6 George . Thomas CST /GMK/cjb Attachments cc: ASLB Service List I f e s
1 i to 1 e 1 ) ATTACHMENT 1 f F v
STANDARD REVIEW PLAN SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDANCE FOR PORTABLE SOLIDIFICATION SYSTEM 1. Tanks containing wet wastes are limited to inplant installation, they should not be part of the portable system. Wet waste storage tanks are limited to the inplant installation. 2. The use of flexible piping should be necessary interfaces with plant systems. Such piping is also subject to the hydrostatic test requirements delineated in Regulatory Guide 1.143. Piping used to interface the plant's waste lines to the portable equipment will comply with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.143. 3. Portable systems should be located, as a minimum, on concrete pads with curbs and drainage provisions for containing radioactive spills. Pro-visions should be available for interfacing the drains with the plant's liquid radwaste system. Portable systems should have integral'ventila-tion systems with either self-contained filters, or interface with the plant's ventilation exhaust system. The waste processing components of a portable system will.be appropriately arranged in the area bounded by lines A and D and columns 5 and 6 at elevation 25 feet of the Waste Processing Building. The area is provided with floor drains and monitored building ventilation exhaust ducts. Spill control arrangements-will be evaluated on a case basis, since they would be component and equipment arrangement specific. 4 4 -~
A 4 8 1 ATTACHMENT 2 c;.
NP-PS-53-0378 o 7.0 SAFETY ANALYSIS af. E 7.1 General f The Radwaste Solidification System is designed to meet B all current industry standards incl'uding, regulatory requirements, ASME, ANSI, NEC, and NFPA codes and standards. Recognizing that no sys, tem will ever be free g, from faults, the RadwastA Solidification System was designed to minimize the potential personnel and property hazards in the event of a system malfunction or [. operator error. The primary accidents analyzed were ~ [ fire', release of radioactive material in the process m area (spills), release of radioactive material from an intact liner (overflows) and system failure during processing ~. ~(, 7.2 Fire There are only two potential types of fire for the Radwaste Solidification System - an electrical fire and hydraulic oil fire. r d 7.2.1 The potential for an electrical fire is minimized by conformance to NEC and NFPA codes in the y system design and conservative sizing of all components. All components are equipped with protective breakers or fuses and the entire system may be deactivated using an Emergency Stop from the Main Control Panel. In the event of an [t e electrical fire, the system would be deenergized and would f ail to a safe condition. g 1 0 7.2.2 For optimum system performance, the hydraulic oil 4 must be operated between 140 and 160*F. This is {, 100* F minimum below the hydraulic oil flash ( point. In designing the hydraulic power package, _ _. _ -
-,e NP-PS-53-0378 the oil reservoir was sized to adequately maintain system temperature through ambient losses. In addition, a fan cooled heat exchange is installed in the hydraulic oil return path to ensure system temperature is maintained in the operating band. 7.3 Spills The uncontrolled release of radioactive material in the processing area from component failure is commonly f U referred to as a spill. The credible situations that are considered are component failure between the utility and the Radwaste Solidification System, between the Rad-waste Solidification System and the disposable lihet, and rupture of the disposable liner. AV 7.3.1 The Radwaste Solidification System is connected to the utility radwaste system through a flexible hose. A rupture of this hose could result in a spill in the proce' sing area. The radwaste tech-s nician is able to determine a loss of flow to the Radwaste Solidification System from the flow / totalizer display and liner level l instruments installed in the main control panel. During waste transfer, the technician and the utility operator are in continuous communication. Should a loss of flow to the Radwaste Solidification System be indicated it would be immediately reported to the utility operator and corrective action by the utility would be initiated. k NN I
NP-PS-53-0378 C 7.3.2 A hose rupture or failure between the process piping skid and the liner would not be as easy to detect but monitors are available which indicate this event. The system technician monitors both liner level and waste flowrate during the liner filling operations. A mismatch between flow and liner level would key the technician that a system fault was occurring and the waste feed to the liner would be stopped. The nominal waste feed rate is 40 gallons per f ]' minute to the system which corresponds to a liner level change of 2 inches per minute. The longest credible time a complete liner rupture could go undetected is two minutes resulting in a spill of approximately 80 gallons of radioactive liquids (h before the system is isolated. 7.3.3 Th.e worst case accident which could occur during solidification is the complete rupture of a liner ~ which is filled with unsolidified radioactive I waste and cement. In this event, 1500 gallons of radioactive material could be released in the processing area. The primary concern in this event in release of airborne radioactivity. Whether the system is operated within an existing building or on an outside pad, the potential release of radioactive airborne material in excess of plant design limits is negligible. In-door operation would allow processing of particu-late and gaseous contamination through the utili-ty's off-gas system. Outdoor operation, where monitored ventilation is not possible, is includ-i ed in the utility's licensing package before the decision is made to operate'out-of-doors. j .4-m.. ,....n. . w. m. +- w - **- .=== .L,.... ~,.. d I 1
n 5..* NP-PS-53-0378 C 7.3.4 ' Minor spills from component leakage and partial hose failures were considered during system design. The connections between components are made over integral drip trays and are bagged during normal operation. All components including hoses and piping are hydrostatically tested following assembly and installation and are periodically pressure tested during normal operation. 7.4 overflows -\\,. The uncontrolled release of radioactive material from the disposable liner, excluding gross failure of the liner, 'is considered an overflow. An overflow condition could b'e an actual overflow while filling the liner, overflow from cement addition or the release of airborne {) radioactive material during waste processing. 7.4.1 Overfilling of the disposable liner during waste transfer is prevented primarily by operating procedures and indications. The waste is added i to the liner before the solidification agent is introduced. The normal radioactive waste level will be sixty to eighty percent of the available liner freeboard. During the filling phase of the solidification process, the technician monitors both the continuous liner level readout and the l totalizer readout. By procedure, the technician calculates the target waste level and coordinates the waste transfer with the utility operator. \\ W., i @~-,
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