ML20206D147
| ML20206D147 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1987 |
| From: | Conlon T, Wiseman G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206D057 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-87-19, 50-425-87-19, NUDOCS 8704130257 | |
| Download: ML20206D147 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1987019
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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AT1.ANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-424/87-19 and 50-425/87-19
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 4545
. Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425
License Nos.: 'NPF-61 and CPPR-109
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Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2
Inspection Conduct d:
February 23, 7, 1987
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Inspector:
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G. R. Wiseman
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Date Signed
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Approved by:
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T. E. Conlon, Section Chief
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Date Signed
Plant Systems Section, Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted:in the areas of Fire
Protection / Prevention and followup on Previously Identified Inspection Items.
Results: One violation was ident1fied - Failure to Implement Fire Protection
Procedures
paragraph 5.c.
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87041302S7 870327
ADOCK 05000424
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- C. E. Belflower, QA Site Manager
- R. M. Bellamy, Plant Support Manager
- D. M. Fiquett, Field Construction Manager Unit 2
- W. C. Gabbard, Senior Regulatory Specialist
- T. Greene, Plant Manager
- R. Sprankle, Senior Engineer, Fire Protection
- H. Varnadoe, Plant Engineering Supervisor
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and
office personnel.
Other Organizations
- G. H. Jones, Utility Support Corporation
G. VanGemer, General Physics Corporation
NRC Resident Inspectors
- J.
Rogge
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 27, 1987,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector
described the areas - inspected and discussed in detail the inspection
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findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The
following items were identified during this inspection.
a.
Inspector Followup Item (424/87-19-01) - Incorporate Inspection and
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Testing of Fire Hose Station Pressure Reducing Valves Into the Fire
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Protection Surveillance Program, paragraph 5.b.
b.
Inspector Followup Item (424/87-19-02) - Incorporate Inspection of
Both Sides of Temporary Fire Barriers between Unit 1 and Unit 2 into
Procedure 92445-C, paragraph 5.b.
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c.
Violation Item (424/87-19-03) - Failure to Implement Fire Protection
Procedures, paragraph 5.c.
d.
Inspector Followep Item (424/87-19-04) - Provide Identification and
Procedures for Use of the Emergency Fire Control Shutoff Valve for
the H Storage Tank, paragraph 6.
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e.
Unresolved Item (425/87-19-01) - Identification of Combustible
Scaffolding Exposing the Temporary Fire Barrier Between Unit -1 and
Unit 2 Control Rooms, paragraph 6.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to
or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may - involve violations or-
deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are
discussed in paragraph 6.
5.
Fire Protection / Prevention Program (64704)
a.
Fire Prevention / Administrative Control Procedures
The inspector reviewed the following Fire Prevention / Administrative
Procedures:
Procedure No.
Title
92005-C, (Rev. 2)
Fire Response Procedure
92015-C, (Rev.1)
Control of Transcient Combustibles
92020-C, (Rev. 1)
Control of Ignition Sources
92028-C, (Rev. 1)
Control of Fire Area Boundaries
92035-C, (Rev. 0)
Fire Protection Operability Requirements
Based on this review, it appears that the above procedures meet the
NRC guideline of: NUREG-0800, Section 9.5.1, " Standard Review Plan -
Fire Protection Program; and the licensee's commitments in Section 9B
of the Vogtle FSAR.
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b.
Fire Protection Surveillance Procedures
The inspector reviewed the following Fire Protection System Surveil-
lance Procedures:
Procedure No.
Title
92010-C (Rev. 1)
Weekly Fire Inspection
92025-C (Rev. 2)
Fire Protection Surveillance Program
92400-C (Rev. 4)
Portable Fire Extinguishers and Fire
Hose Stations Monthly Visual Inspection
92401-C (Rev. 0)
Monthly Emergency Lighting Surveillance
Test Procedure
92403-C (Rev. 3)
Hydrant Hose House Monthly Visual
Inspection
92413-C (Rev. 2)
Fire Pump Starting Batteries Quarterly
Inspection
92424-C (Rev. 1)
Fire Door Inspection
92445-C (Rev. 0)
Fire
Barrier
and
Fire
Barrier
Penetration Seals - 18 Month Visual
Inspection
The above surveillance procedures were reviewed to determine if the
various test outlines and inspection instructions adequately
implement the surveillance requirements of the plant's Fire
Protection Operability Requirements.
In addition, these procedures
were reviewed to determine if the inspection and test instructions
followed general industry fire protection practices, NRC fire
protection program guidelines and the guidelines of the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Codes. Based on this review, it
appears that the above procedures are satisfactory, except for
procedures 92400-C and 92445.
Procedure 92400-C provides for monthly visual inspections of the
plant's fire hose stations. During the preoperational testing of the
firehouse stations, tre pressure reducing valves at the stations were
tested and set to maintair. the hose pressure to 100 psig or less.
After the valves were set, a tamper seal was installed on the
adjusting mechanism to deter inadvertent misadjustment. The monthly
visual inspection procedure 92400-C; however, does not provide for a
visual inspection of these tamper seals to verify the seal integrity.
This
is identified as Inspector Followup Item 424/87-19-01,
Incorporate Inspection and Testing of Fire Hose Station Pressure
Reducing Valves into the Fire Protection Surveillance Program, and
will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
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Procedure 92445-C describes criteria for inspection of plant fire
barriers on an- 18 month basis. This procedure includes inspection
of the temporary plaster. and gypsum wa11 board fire barriers which
provide fire separation between Unit 1 and the construction
activities of Unit 2.
The surveillance procedure 92445-C does not
provide periodic inspection for the fire barrier on the Unit 2
construction side of the separation wall.
In addition, it was a
concern of the inspector that the frequency of inspection of the
construction side of the barrier should be increased due to the ever
changing activities of the construction phase of Unit 2 which may
increase the probability of physical damage to the barrier. These
concerns are identified as Inspector Followup Item (424/87-19-02),
Incorporate Inspections of Both Sides of Temporary Fire Barriers
between Unit 1 and Unit 2 into Procedure 92445-c.
This will be
reviewed during a future NRC inspection.
c.
Fire Protection System Surveillance Inspections and Tests
The inspector reviewed the following surveillance inspection and test
records for the dates indicated:
(1) 92010-C,
Housekeeping Inspection (Weekly)
January 17, 1987 through February 20, 1987
(2) 92401-C,
Emergency Lighting Surveillance Test Procedure, Data
Sheet 3, (Monthly)
December 15, 1986 through February 16, 1987
(3) 92413-C,
Fire Pump Starting Batteries Inspection (Quarterly)
September 8, 1986, November 19, 1986 and February 19, 1987
(4) 92424-C,
Fire Doors, Fire Door Mechanisms (6 Months)
August 24, 1980 and February 20, 1987
The surveillance test record data and testing frequency associated
with the above fire protection system surveillance test / inspections
were found to be satisfactory with regard to meeting the requirements-
of the plant's Fire Protection Final Safety Evaluation Report, except
that it wcs noted in the review of the inspection record for
Procedure 92010-C that after the January 24, 1987 licensee weekly
housekeeping inspection six failure to correct discrepancy reports,
which identified and described plant housekeeping discrepancies that
had been observed over a 3 week period were transmitted to plant
management for their disposition to take corrective actions. Based
upon these reports, the identified discrepancies were to be corrected
within a time requirement of one week as established in procedure
92010-C Sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5.
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On February 26, 1987, the inspector accompanied a member of the plant
fire protection staff during the conduct of the weekly housekeeping
inspection per the criteria of procedure 92010-C.
During this
walkthrough the inspector observed combustible cardboard, wood and
plastics material located within safety related plant areas. Also,
identified was the storage of flammable / explosive gas cylinders in
the power block and improperly supported and secured high pressure
compressed gas cylinders in safety related areas of the Auxiliary,
Fuel Handling, and Control Buildings.
These conditions were verified as being those which were identified
from the licensee's previous discrepancy reports to plant management.
Failure to correct the above mentioned housekeeping discrepancies is
considered a failure to implement procedure 92010-C. This constitutes
a violation of Technical Specification 6.7.1.h which requires that
written procedures for the fire protection program for the fire
protection program be implemented and -is identified as Violation
(424/87-19-03), Failure to Implement Fire Protection Procedures.
Also, during the February 26, 1987, plant walkthrough, the inspector
observed evidence that cigarette smoking had recently occurred in
posted "No Smoking" safe-shutdown plant areas within the power block.
This is considered a failure to implement Procedure 00253, Smoking,
Eating, and Drinking Policy and is identified as another example
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of Violation 424/87-19-03 Failure to Implement Fire Protection
Procedures.
6.
Permanent Plant Fire Protection Features (64704)
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Several plant tours were made by the inspector. During the plant tours,
the following plant areas and their related fire protection features were
inspected:
Auxiliary Building Unit 1 - Levels D. C. and A
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Control Building Unit 1 - Levels 1, 2, and 3
Control Building Unit 2 - Levels 1, 2, and 3
Hydrogen Storage Tank - Yard
The fire / smoke detection systems, manual fire fighting equipment (i.e. ,
portable extinguishers, hose stations, etc.) and the fire area boundary .
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doors, walls, floors, and ceilings were inspected. A number _of fire doors
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in Unit I have been identified as nonfunctional due to the doors not
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meeting their design and installation criteria. Work is in process to
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correct the identified deficiencies.
The fire watch compensatory
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measures of the FSAR had been implemented for those plant areas that
contain fire doors which were deficient or out of service.
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A walkdown of the liquid hydrogen storage tank unit located outside
the auxiliary building in the yard area indicated that the system was
operational; however, the Emergency Fire Control Shutoff Valve located
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approximately 25 feet from the storage unit was not prominately identified
so that it could be used to isolate the H
supply in a fire emergency
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situation as described in the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Standards 50A and 54. Operational instructions for this valve should be
provided on the plant prefire plans.
This is identified as Inspector
Followup item (424/87-19-04), Provide Identification and Procedures for
Use of the Emergency Fire Control Shutoff Valves for the H2 Storage Tank.
This will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
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During the walkthrough of Unit 2 which was under construction it was noted
that a significant amount of combustible wood scaffolding was erected in
the Unit 2 control room very near the temporary 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated gypsum wall
board fire barrier which separates this area from the Unit 1 control room.
Some Unit 1 Control Room ceiling assembly steel support beams penetrate
the temporary fire barrier into the Unit 2 area and are not provided with
fire proofing. The inspector was concerned that the significant fire load
comprised of wood scaffolding may provide a significant fire exposure to
the fire barrier and support steel for the Unit 1 Control Room. The
licensee's fire hazards analysis did not identify this type of fire
loading hazard for the control room.
This is identified as Unresolved
Item (425/87-19-01),
Identification of Combustible Scaffolding Exposing
the Temporary Fire Barrier Between Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Rooms,
pending the licensee's review of the situation.
7.
Inspector Followup Item (IFI)
A.
(Closed) (425/86-07-03), Engineering Analysis, Testing and Justifica-
tion for Non-Standard Penetration Seal Configurations. The licensee
provided additional information to the NRC/NRR staff by letter, dated
October 24, 1986, and during a meeting on November 4,1986. This
information included a test report on a penetration fire barrier seal
of similar design to the oversized penetrations at plant Vogtle.
NRC's Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) No. 4, Appendix Q
stated that the oversized penetrations seals at Vogtle had been
reviewed and were acceptable. This item is closed.
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