ML20206B667

Forwards Safety Evaluation of Potential Safety Concern Re Capability of Component Cooling Water Sys to Function After Seismic Event Identified During Aug 1986 Safety Sys Functional Insp.Response Requested within 30 Days

ML20206B667
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	04/02/1987
From:	Chan T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Cockfield D PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
Shared Package
ML20206B671	List: ML20206B667 ML20206B672
References
TAC-65350, NUDOCS 8704100004
Download: ML20206B667 (2)

Text

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April 2, 1987 Docket No. 50-344 DISTIRBUTION d Doetet m e #

J. Partlow NRCPDR B. Grimes Mr. David W. Cockfield Local PDR N. Thompson Vice President, Nuclear PD#3 Rdg.

C. Vogan Portland General Electric Company T. Novak..

T. Chan 121 S.W. Salmon Street OGC ACRS(10)

Portland, Oregon 97204 E. Jordan W. LeFave

SUBJECT:

FAILURE MODE OF NONSEISMIC CATEGORY I PIPING AT TROJAN During an Aucust 1986 Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) of the Trojan Nuclear Plant by the NRC's Region V Office, a potential safety (concernCCW) System to associated with the capability of the Component Cooling Water remain functional following a seismic event was identified. Specifically, a major break (i.e., a complete rupture) in the nonseismic Category I portion i

of the CCW system could possibly result in both safety trains of the system becoming inoperable prior to the closure of the automatic isolation valves that are provided to isolate the nonseismic portion of the system from the seismic portion. PGE's position (in response to the inspection team) was that a major break need not be considered in the CCW system, nonseismic Category I piping because the system is a moderate energy system.

At the request of Region V, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) reviewed the Trojan design and design basis for the CCW system. As a result of the review, we conclude that the present CCW system capability at Trojan does not meet the original licensing criterion, namely, that the isolation valves at the interface of the seismic and nonseismic portions of the system should be capable of isolating at least one CCW system train, given a complete rupture of the nonseismic portion of the system, coupled with a single active failure. Our Safety Evaluation is enclosed.

We request that within 30 days from receipt of this letter, you provide this office with a discussion of how PGE will meet this original licensing criterion, and its schedule for doing so.

Sincerely, j

l Terence L. Chan, Project Manager Project Directorate #3 Division of PWR Licensing-A

Enclosure:

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Mr. David W. Cockfield Portland General Electric Company Trojan Nuclear Plant cc:

Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Corriission Trojan Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 0 Painier, Oregon 97048 Robert M. Hunt, Chairman Board of County Commissioners Columbia County St. Helens, Oregon 97501 William T. Dixon Oregon Department of Energy Labor and Industries Building Room 111 Salem, Oregon 97310 Regional Administrator, Region V U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596 D

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