ML20205T448
| ML20205T448 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1987 |
| From: | Norelius C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Fay C WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| References | |
| IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8704070298 | |
| Download: ML20205T448 (6) | |
Text
0 De APR 3 1987 Docket No. 50-266 Docket No. 50-301 Wisconsin Electric Power Company ATTN: Mr. C. W. Fay Vice President Nuclear Power Department 231 West Michigan, Room 308 Milwaukee, WI 53201 Gentlemen:
The preliminary review of your revised responses to IE Bulletin 85-03
" Motor-0perated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due To Improper Switch Settings" indicates the need for additional information before the program to assure valve operability can be approved. The specific information necessary for the completion of our review is enclosed.
Additional information is requested within one month of receipt of this letter.
The written reports shall be submitted to the Regional Administrator, Region III under oath or affirmation under provisions of Section 182a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Also, the original copy of the cover letters and a copy of the reports shall be transmitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 for reproduction and distribution.
Questions addressing this issue may be forwarded to Richard J. Kiessel, IE (301) 492-8119.
Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY C. E. NORETam 8704070298 870403 P
PDR ADOCK 05000266 Charles E. Norelius, Director G
PDR Division of Reactor Projects f
Enclosure:
Request for d bb I
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Wisconsin Electric Power Company 2
APR 3 1987 Distribution cc w/ enclosure:
3 J.' J. Zach, Plant Manager DCS/RSB(RIDS)
Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII 1
Virgil Kanable, Chief l
Boiler Section Mary Lou Munts, Chairperson i
Wisconsin Public Service Commission
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Collette Blum-Meister (SLO),
WI Div. of Emergency Government Richard J. Kiessel, IE
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i Page 1 of 2 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI) RE:
Review of Responses to Action Item e of IE Bulletin 85-03 Licensee:
Unit (s): Point Beach 1, 2 Wisconsin Electric Power Company Date of Response: 05/02/86 231 W. Michigan 07/03/86 P.O. Box 2046 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201 Respondent:
C. W. Fay Vice President, Nuclear Power The information provided in your responses to Action Item 3 of IE Bulletin l
E5-03 was found to be deficient in some areas.
Please provide the additional j
information necessary to resolve the following comments and questions:
1 1.
The following MOVs are not included in the list of valves of the safety injection system to be examined for maximum differential pressure. That is, trey are not identified in Table 1 of the response of July 3,1986.
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As a Seneral question, what controls are placed on these valves to ensure
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that they will be in the proper position when needed?
In accordance with i
the assumption of inadvertent equipment operations as required by Action l
Item a of the bulletin, revise Table 1 of the response to include these valves, or state that they are locked in position and power is removed from the motor.
(a) M3V 826A is shown normally open in the boric acid supply line, downstream of two normally closed MOVs in parallel. Refer to Zone 3
l J-6 of Drawing 110 E 017, Sheet 2, Revision 25. How would suction of the boric acid tank be ensured if unlisted MOV 826A were to be left closed inadvertently?
(b) F3Vs 878B and 878D are shown normally open in the parallel discharge lines to the reactor vessel cold legs. Refer to zones D-12 and H-12 cf Drawing 110 E 017, Sheet 1, Revision 28. They are downstream of FOV 866A (normally open, locked handwheel). Please explain how rotor operation of these valves is controlled since locking of the handwheel does not prevent operation of the valve by the motor. How i
i would safety injection be ensured if MOVs 878B and 878D were to be l
left closed inadvertently?
1 i
(c) MOVs 866A and 866B are shown normally open in the discharge lines of I
j safety injection pumps 1A and IB, respectively, and are designsted
" locked handwheel". Refer to Zone H-5 of Drawing 110 E 017, Sheet 1 i
Revision 28. How would safety injection be ensured if unlisted MOVs 866A and 866B were to be left closed inadvertently?
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Page 2 of 2 2.
The first paragraph of the attachment to the response of July 3, 1986 includes the statement that "only those MOVs that are required to change position to perform their safety function are included, and are only evaluated for that particular motion (i.e., open or close)". This assump-tion does not comply with the intent of Action Item a of the bulletin in regard to inadvertent equipment operations. Therefore, we request that you review your selection of valves to ensure that such operations are assumed in determination of maximum differential pressures.
3.
In Table 1 of response of July 3,1986, a delta-P of 1617 psig is listed for M3Vs 878A and 878C in the discharge lines of the safety injection system. Comparison with responses for other Westinghouse two-loop plants indicates that this delta-P should be about 50% higher. Please justify or correct this apparent discrepancy.
4.
Normally open MOVs 4000 and 4001 are used to control auxiliary feedwater flow from a turbine-driven pump to two steam generators. They are desig-nated " locked handwheel" on Drawing M-217, Revision 40, and are not included in Table 1 of the response of July 3,1986. How is motor opera-tion controlled? Furthermore, please explain this exception to the Westinghouse recommendation that "all MOVs within the AFW systems should be included in the list of valves to be examined for maximum differential pressure", as stated on Page 5 of the WOG report dated March 1986.
Referring to Page 16 of the WOG report, note that equivalent valves at SNUPPS plants are air-operated. Equivalent MOVs at the other W two-loop plants are listed to be examined for maximum differential pressure.
Please explain this apparent discrepancy, or revise Table 1 of the re-sponse to include these valves.
5.
Unlisted MOVs 841A and 841B in discharge lines of the accumulator safety injection system are shown normally open on Drawing 110 E 017, Sheet 1 Revision 28. The possible problem that the systea. would be inoperable if the MOVs were left closed inadvertently should be addressed, based on the assumption of inadvertent equipment operations as required by Action Item a cf the bulletin. Revise Table 1 of the response of July 3, 1986 to include these valves.
6.
Has water hammer due to valve closure been considered in the determination of pressure differentials?
If not, please explain.
1 7.
Please state the planned date of completion of Action item f of the bulletin. Note that the due date specified by the bulletin is January 15, 1988.
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a APR 3 1987 Docket No. 50-266 Docket No. 50-301 Wisconsin Electric Power Company ATTN: Mr. C. W. Fay Vice President Nuclear Power Department 231 West Michigan, Room 308 Milwaukee, WI 53201 Gentlemen:
The preliminary review of your revised responses to IE Bulletin 85-03
" Motor-0perated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due To Improper Switch Settings" indicates the need for additional information before the program to assure valve operability can be approved. The specific information necessary for the completion of our review is enclosed.
Additional information is requested within one month of receipt of this letter.
The written reports shall be submitted to the Regional Administrator, Region III, under oath or affirmation under provisions of Section 182a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Also, the original copy of the cover letters and a copy of the reports shall be transmitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 for reproduction and distribution.
Questions addressing this issue may be forwarded to Richard J. Kiessel, IE (301) 492-8119.
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Sincerely.
ORIGINAL SIGNED BT C. E. NORET,mn Charles E. Norelius, Director Division of Reactor Projects
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Enclosure:
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Wisconsin Electric Power Company 2
APR 3 1981 Distribution cc w/ enclosure:
J. J. Zach, Plant Manager DCS/RSB(RIDS)
Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Virgil Kanable, Chief Boiler Section Mary Lou Munts, Chairperson Wisconsin Public Service Commission ColletteBlum-Meister(SLO),
WI Div. of Emergency Government Richard J. Kiessel, IE 4
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