ML20205S407
| ML20205S407 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1987 |
| From: | Nobles L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 87-02, 87-2, NUDOCS 8704070022 | |
| Download: ML20205S407 (3) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _
s
., 1..
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379 March 30, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Connaission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1-DOCKET NO.
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR SPECIAL REPORT 87-02 The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire door breach greater than seven days. This event is reported in accordance with the special report requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.12.
Very truly yours.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. N. Nobles Acting Plant Manager i
Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 j
1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 8704070022 870330 PDR ADOCK 05000327 4h S
PDR u
An Equal Opportunity Employer
,5.
I SPECIAL REPORT 87-02 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 At 0700 EST on February 25, 1987, with units i and 2 in mode 5 (0 percent power, O psig. 130 degrees F, and 0 percent power, 230 psig, 116.3 degrees F, respectively) a fire breach permit on a fire door exceeded the seven-day limit allowed by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition For Operation (LCO) 3.7.12.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT Fire door A-216, the fifth vital battery room door, was determined to be nonfunctional for greater than seven days. Technical Specification 3.7.12 requires fire doors to be functional at all times.
Submittal of a special report is-required for any door which cannot be restored to functional status within a seven-day Limiting Condition For Operation (LCO) period.
Door A-216 was breached on February 18, 1987, under Breaching Permit Number 3717 to establish room ventilation. The ventilation to the room was isolated as a result of the following evolution. On October 27, 1986, TVA Division Of Nuclear Engineering (DNE) identified by Significant Condition Report (SCR) number SCR SQNEEB86136 that an inadvertent failure of either of two tornado damper control handswitches could cause the total isolation and dissabling of the redundant Control Building-pressurization systems by the closing of tornado dampers. On notification to the site on December 10, 1986, the immediate corrective action taken by Plant Operations personnel was to open the breaker for each of the two hand switches to allow the subject tornado dampers to fail "as-is" in their open position. Subsequent to this corrective action being taken, it was identified that the fifth vital battery room tornado dampers fall closed because their actuators are air operated. The other dampers are motor operated and fall "as-is."
On January 9, 1987, License Event Report Number 50-327/86057 was submitted providing details on this design error condition.- To prevent any hydrogen gas buildup from the batteries, door A-216 was opened using the breaching permit.
CAUSE OF EVENT A management decision was made to breach the door to the fifth vital battery room with both units in mode 5 to alleviate any concerns of hydrogen gas buildup in the room until the normal ventilation can be restored.
'.E.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of action statement a. of TS LCO 3.7.12.
The door is receiving a roving firewatch as required by the action statement of LCO 3.7.12 and in the event of a fire, there is sufficient fire detection and suppression capabilities such that there is no danger to redundant j
safety related equipment.
CORRECTIVE ACTION j
A design change will be initiated to modify the fifth vital battery room tornado dampers' controls to position the dampers in the f all-open position and to close the dampers when power is applied to the dampers. This will allow for the door to be closed and returned to functional status. The fire watch will be maintained until the door is returned functional.
i l
4 l
1 I
l 0401Q i
1