ML20205P737
| ML20205P737 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 11/02/1988 |
| From: | Morris K OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| LIC-88-900, NUDOCS 8811080276 | |
| Download: ML20205P737 (2) | |
Text
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m; Ornaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102 2247 402/536 4000 fiovember 2, 1988 LIC 88 900 U. S. fluclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl-137 Washington, DC 20555
References:
1.
Docket fio. 50-285 2.
OPPD Letter (R. L. Andrews) to f4RC (Document Control Desk) dated September 2, 1987 (LIC-87-538)
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
Visual Inspection of Cycle 10 fuel Assemblies The purpose of this letter is to satisfy an Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) commitment made in the Cycle 10 Fuel Performance Report, Reference 2, regarding visual examination and classification of six (6) failed fuel assemblies.
Four (4) failed fuel rods were confirmed in the fuel contained in the Cycle 10 core with two (2) additional rods highly suspect. The visual examination of the failed fuel assemblies, discharged a' the end of Cycle 10, has been completed.
All observations were within the limits of expectation for these assemblies.
l The assemblies do not exhibit unusual characteristics for their time in use.
i Review of assemblies indicates one failure due to manufacturing difficulties, and five failures classified as unknown.
Reference 2 reported that at the end of Cycle 10 operation 136 fuel assemblies were examined.
The 136 fuel assemblies were comprised of the 133 assemblies contained in the Cycle 10 core plus three (3) additional assemblies discharged from previous cycles which were either considered for reinsertion or reinserted in the Cycle 11 core.
Visual inspection of the Cycle 10 assemblies containing the identified and suspected failures was performed.
The results of the inspection indicate the following:
1.
Assemblies KAl8, JA01, JA18, and HA14 have no failures that are visually identifiable.
Therefore, these assemblies will be classified as unknown failures.
2.
Assembly JA02 was missing an upper end cap.
This would indicate weld l
failure, most probably caused by a manufacturirig problem. The fuel vendor had revised the welding procedure for the end caps following delivery of the batch J fuel.
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Document Control Desk LIC 88 900 Page 2 i
3.
Assembly JAl2 has one fuel pin with an inordinate amount of growth when compared to surrounding fuel pins. However, the cause of the growth is not apparent by visual examination, thus, this assembly will also be categorized as an unknown failure.
Some general observations of the fuel assemblies noted that there is approximately one half to two inches of shoulder gap remaining between the upper end fitting and the top of the fuel rods ar.d that the J batch assembliet ex11 bit heavy oxide buildup in the middle of the assembly length with some flaking.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact I
us.
Sincerely,
/
7D"O
. J. Morris Division Manager Nuclear Operations KJM/sa c:
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036 R. D. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator P. D. Milano, NRC Project Manager P. H. Harrell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector i
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