ML20205P487

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Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Amend D of Chapter 7 of CESSAR-DC,Sys 80 Transmitted w/C-E ,Including Physical Separation,Trip Function Calculation & Remote Shutdown Panel Controls
ML20205P487
Person / Time
Issue date: 11/02/1988
From: Vissing G
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Scherer A
ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY
References
PROJECT-675A NUDOCS 8811080163
Download: ML20205P487 (5)


Text

, v g . November 2, 1988 Project No. 675 Mr. A. E. Scherer, Director Nuclear Licensing

-Combustion Engineering 1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500

Dear Mr. Scherer:

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING CHAPTER 7 AMENDMENT D, CESSAR-DC, SYSTEM 80+, REACTOR SAFEGUARDS BRANCH Our Reactor Safeguards Branch has reviewed Amendment D of Chapter 7 and of CESSAR-DC, System 80+ transmitted by your letter dated September 30, 1988 and has identified the need.for additional information. The enclosed Request for Additional Information describes the needed information. Our schedule calls for the information to be received within 90 days from receipt of this letter.

Sincerely,  !

/s/

Guy S. Vissing, Project Manager Standardization and Non-Power Reactor Project Directorate Division of Pcactor Projects - III, IV, Y and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ,

Enclosure:

As stated cc: See next page

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Project No. 675 Mr. A. E. Scherer, Director Nuclear Licensing Combustion Engineering 1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500

Dear Mr. Scherer:

SUBJECT:

REQllEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING CHAPTER 7, AMENDNENT 0, CESSAR-DC SYSTEM 80+, REACTOR SAFEGUARDS BRANCH Our Reactor Safepvards Branch has reviewed Amendment D of Chapter 7 and of CESSAR-DC, System 80+ transriitted by your letter dated September 30, ,

1988 and has identified the need for additional information. The enclosed Request for Additional Information describes the needed infonnation. Our schedule calls for the information to be received within 90 days from receipt of this letter.

Sincerely,

~

Guy . Vissing, Pro t Manager Standardization and Non-Power Reactor Project Directorate Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, l V and Special Projects

. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (

Enclosure:

As stated ,. I cc: See next page r i

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< Combustion Engineering, Inc. Project No. 675 Advanced CESSAR cc: Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations Combustion Engineering, Inc.

7910 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 1310 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Mr. Ernest Kennedy Manager of Licensing Combustion Engineering 1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 h

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. .; , t ENCLOSURE RE3"EST FOR ADDITIONAL INr3RMATION CONCERNING REACTOR RAFFaf1ARDR RRANCH REVTFW OF CHAPTE'1 7 (SUEMITTAL AMENDMENT D) i COMBUSTION ENGINEERING SYSTEM 80+' DESIGN - CESSAR-DC 500.7 Reference in 57.1.2.16 to Regulatory Guide 5.7, "Control of Personnel Access to Protected Areas, Vital Areas and Material Access Areas", which primarily pertains to 10 CFR 73.45 and 73.46, should be replaced instead with reference to NUREG-0908, "Acceptance Criteria for the Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactor Security Plans," which pertains to 10 CFR 73.55 and 73,70. However, CE will have to defina additional criteria since neither of these contain criteria useful for defining that "separate plant locations" means in the context of $7.1.2.16.

500.8 CE's response to Question 500.6 stated that criteria for physical separation will be presented in Chapters 9 and 13 of CESSAR-DC Submittal Group E. Why shouldn't those criteria also affect the discussions of instrumentation and control system separation interface requirements and system component arrangement interface requirements contained in il 7.1.2.16. A and 7.1.3.E. F and M7 500.9 57.1.2.16 states that the trip function calculation cannot be altered by operating or maintenance personnel but that they can change the setpoints. What provisions are being considered to prevent a single insider from being able to intentionally alter setpoints without control room knowledge and pemission?

500.10. 57.1.2.16 states that the transfer switches that detemine whether the Main Control Room or the Remote Shutdown Panel has control of critical valves and pumps are "under key lock administrative control with built-in alams." Because of the damage that could be done from the Remote Shutdown Panel controls listed in Tables 7.4-1 and 7.4-2, these alarms should meet security standards for false and nuisance alarm rates, tamper indication, line supervision, testing, and timeliness of response appropriate to protection against the design basis threat (i.e.,10 CFR 73.1[a][1]). Please discuss the importance of the "door open" alams on vital instrumentation cabinet doors, and the component inoperable or bypass alams, and whether or not they do or should meet these standards.

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,, .. ,' ENCLOSun.

' 500,11 Discuss what measures CE proposes for protection against bypass of the shutdown cooling system suction line valve interlocks (57.6.1.1.1),

and manipulation of the valves, by a single knowledgeable insider at the valve motor control centers.

500.12 67.1.1.4 includes the Emergency Diesel Generator but not Station i Service Water System as safe shutdown systems required to place the reactor in hot shutdown. At many current powet' plants the Station Service Water System is required for Diesel Generator cooling. What is the cooling system for the CESSAR Diesel Generators?

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