ML20205N861

Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-482/87-01

ML20205N861
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	03/31/1987
From:	Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Withers B WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
References
NUDOCS 8704030120
Download: ML20205N861 (2)

See also: IR 05000482/1987001

Text

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'- # k MAR 311987

In Reply Refer To:

Docket: STN 50-482/87-01

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

ATTN: Bart D. Withers

President and Chief Executive Officer

P. O. Box 411

Burlington, Kansas 66839

Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letter of March 20, 1987, in response to our letter and

Notice of Violation dated February 19, 1987. We have reviewed your reply and find it

.

responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation. We will review

the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspection to

determine that full compliance has been achieved and will be maintained.

Sincerely,

, OrlpJm:I Sfgned Dy

J. E. G gilardo

J. E. Gagliardo, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch

cc:

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

ATTN: Otto Maynard, Manager

of Licensing

P. O. Box 411

Burlington, Kansas 66839

Gary Boyer, Plant Manager

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

P. O. Box 411

Burlington, Kansas 66839

Forrest Rhodes, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

P. O. Box 411

Burlington, Kansas 66839

Kansas Radiation Control Program Director ,

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NUCLEAR OPERATING

CORPORATION

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March 20,1987  !

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission W 2 51987

ATIN: Document Control Desk *

Washington, D. C. 20555 "- #

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tatter: WM 87-0099

Re: Docket No. STN 50-482

Ref: Ictter dated 2/19/87 from JEGagliardo, NRC, to

BDWithers, WCNOC

Subj: Response to Violation 482/8701-01

Gentlemen:

Attached is a detailed response to violation (482/8701-01) which was

documented in the Reference. The violation concerned an inproperly routed

flexible conduit which rendered a fire danper inoperable. If you have any

questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr. O. L. Maynard of

my staff.

Very truly yours, _. ,

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Bart D. Withers

President and Chief

Executive Officer

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' Violation (482/8791-91): Fire Danger Not Operable As Required By

Technical Specifications

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Finding:

TS 3.7.11 requires that, "All fire barrier penetrations (walls,

floor / ceilings, cable tray enclosures, and other fire barriers) separating.  :

safety-related fire areas or separating portions. of redundant systems

.inportant to safe shutdown within a fire area and all sealing devices in

fire-rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire windows, fire dampers,

i cable, piping, and ventilation duct penetration seals) shall be OPERABLE."

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e Contrary to the above, on January 29, 1987, the NRC inspector observed that

the flexible conduit to the electro-thermal link in Fire Danger GK GD959 was

! routed under the danper fire curtain and could possibly interfere with the

j operation of- the fire curtain and prevent 'it from fully closing and

I rendering the danper inoperable. On February 3, 1987, the licensee tested

l the fire danper by melting its thermal link and the danger curtain failed to -

) fully close as required, thereby verifying that Fire Danper GK GD959 was

inoperable.

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! Reason For Tne Violation:

Fire danger GK GD959 is a vertical danger operated by an electro thermal

l link which is controlled by a signal from a Halon System Control Panel. It

j is located in a wall duct separating Switchboard Room 4 and Battery Room 4

{ on the 2916 foot elevation of the Control Building.

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'Ihe dapper had been cycled on December 1, 1986, as part of an 18 month '

surveillance to demonstrate Halon System operability. The cycling _was

acconplished by uncrinping the damper S-hook, disconnecting the electro

! thermal links, and allowing the danper blades to drop. It is believed that

l the flexible conduit was installed inproperly during restoration from this

j testing through personnel error.

l Had a fire occurred in the area while the danper was inoperable, the Fire

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Detection System would have generated an alarm in the Control Room, thus

ensuring prmpt Fire Brigade response to mitigate the consequences of the

Additionally, the inoperable danper would not have prevented Halon

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fire.

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Systen discharge into the Switchboard Roam.

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l Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and Results Achieved:

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On January 29,

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1987, the potential for flexible conduit interference with l

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closure of danper GK GD959 was identified by a NRC Resident Reactor l

j Inspector. In order to determine the operability of the danger, on February '

3, 1987, maintenance personel tested the danper by actuating the electro

l thermal link. The test confirmed that the flexible conduit did interfere i

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• 6 ~ Attcchment to WM 87-0099

Page 2

'- with damper closure. 'Ihe maintenance personnel then notified Control Room

personnel of' the failure, and the control room personnel ordered that the

da@er be closed and maintained closed pending rework. In the closed

position, the damper fulfilled its intended fire protection function.

Additionally, an inspection of the other similar dagers controlled by

electro thermal links was conducted. During this inspection four (4)

danpers were identified ar being susceptible to flexible conduit

interference. Three of these < mpers were Technical Specification required

dampers. These danpers were also closed and maintained closed pending

rework.

Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations:

In order to prevent flexible conduit interference with damper closure, the

design of the conduit installation to the electro thermal links is being

changed for the dampers controlled by electro thermal links. Plant

Modification Request No. 02009 involves the addition of a 90 degree

connector between the flexible conduit and the electro thermal link pigtails

outside of the damper enclosure to ensure that they cannot be trapped under

the damper blades upon closure.

The Date When Full Conpliance Will Be Achieved:

Plant Modification Request No. 02009 will be fully inplemented by July 1,

1987.

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