ML20205N637
| ML20205N637 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1988 |
| From: | Zech L NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Gejdenson S HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205N641 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8811040243 | |
| Download: ML20205N637 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
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.i WASHINGTON, 0. C. 20665 October 31, 1988 CHAIRMAN The Honcrable Sam Gejdenson, Chairman Subcommittee on General Oversight an1 Investigations Committee on Interior and Insular
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,ed Str.tes House of Representatives Washington, D. C.
20515
Dear f4r. Chairman:
I am responding to your letter of October 17, 19e8, regarding a recent fitness-for-duty allegation concerning a senior manager at the Clinton Nuclear Fower Station.
Cacke ound information en the Clinton incident and specific responses t; the questions you raised are enclosed.
Under programs currently in force, 1;censees typically prohibit alcohol on company property and, at a minimum, state that use of alc)hol that adversely affects job performance is not acceptable.
Violation of the company's policy may result in disciplinary action up to and including termination.
The Commission believes that nuclear power plant personnel should not be under the influence of any substance, legal or illegal, which adversely affects their ability to 594 form their jobs and for that reason the Commission has issued a proposed rule on fitness for duty.
l In essence, the proposed rule would require l,ensees to provide l
reasonable assurance that their employees are fit to perform i
their duties.
In its present form, the proposed rule lea"es to l
the discretion of each licensee the specific measures to be used for addressing alcohol, legal drugs, ard other health problems (such as mental stress and fatigue).
The measures adopted by each licensee would be subject to NRC oversight and enforcement.
However, in publishing the proposed rule the Commission has requested public comment on whether the fitness-for-dutl rule should include more specific provisions on abuse of aletN1 and on legal drug use.
In particular, comments have been renuested on whether a specified level cf alcohol in the blood should be established as a regulatory baseline.
Indication of alcohol above that level would reouire appropriate utility action.
This issue will be carefully considered in preparation of the final rule.
We anticipate comments on all aspects of the rule.
Final resolution hP*
VVllo W O gy?
e 2-of many issues will not occur until the Commission has had an opportunity to review and analyze the public responses to this rule.
I hope our response will be helpful to you.
If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Commissioner Curtiss did not participate in this response.
Sincerely, N. W Lando W.
Ze
. Jr
Enclosures:
As stated f
cc:
Rep. Denny Smith
RESPONSE TO REPRESENTATIVE GEJOENSON'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING ALLEGED USE OF, ALCOHOL BY A_ SENIO_R MANAGER AT CLINTON BACKGROUND During the morning of October 11, 1988, the Manager of Nuclear Programs Co-ordination for the Illinois Power Company advised the NRC's Senior Resident l
Inspector and the Region III Office that Illinois Power had received an l
l allegaticn about the fitness for duty of the Clinton Power Station's Plant Manager en the evening of October 10, 1988. The Manager of Nuclear Programs Cecrdination further advised that he had become aware of this allegation shortly after the allegation was made and had directed that written staterents be taken the night of October 10, 1988, from those individuals involved in the matter. The Manager of Nuclear Programs Coordination then described his urderstanding of the events on the evening of October 10, 1988, as compiled from written statements of the involved individuals, as follows:
The Plant Manager had been called to return to the plant at approximately 8:00 p.m. on October 10, 1988 to respond to plant operational problems.
After completing a screening process at the gatehouse, the Plant Manager entered the power block and took an elevator to the control room. A firewatch attendant who had been in the elevator with the Plant Manager observed that the Plant Manager's breath smelled of alechol and tha
-he Plant Manager stumbled when walking through an elevated portion of a t
personnel contamination monitor after exiting the elevator.
The firewatch attendant reported these observations to the firewatch coordinator who, in turn, reported the matter to the Illinois Power Company's Security Liaison Officer (SLO).
. The SLO proceeded to the centrol room while the Plant Manager was still there but did not interrupt a conversation occurring between the Plant Panager and the Shift Supervisor. At the end of that conversation the SLO approached the Shift Supervisor, informed him of the allegation and advised the Shift Superviser that an assessment of the Plant Manager's fitness for duty should be performed. The Plant Panager departed the Clinton site at approximately 8:45 p.m.
The Shift Supervisor notified the Assistant Plant Maniger at about C:45 p.m., who in turn notified the Panager of huclear Programs Coordination of the 111egation. Statements were taken from the.~ndividuals involved except the Plant P.anager between approximately 8:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.
According to those statements, in the c nversation with the Plant Manager, the Shift Supervisor observed the l
Plant Manager's behavior to be normal and detected an odor of cigarettes on the 'lant Panager's breath, but not the cdor of alcohol. A Reactor Operator who had also been in direct contact with the Plant Manager cbserved that he did not detect any odor of alcohol on the Plant Manager's brea th. The Manager-Nuclear Progrcms Coordination recalled that he had spoken with the Plant Panager twice on the evening of October 10, 1988, and that he did not detect anything unusual in the Plant Manager's demeanor during those cenversaticns.
In addition, the Vice President of Illinois Power Company had spoken with the Plant Manager on the evening of Octcber 10, 1988, and did not detect anything unusual in the Plent Manager's speech.
. On October 11, 1988, Region III had several additional ccnversations with Illinois Power Company management.
It was cetermined that Illinois Power Company would expeditiously address this allegation. Region III suggested and Illinois Power Company adopted the ut11tration of an independent investigative "irm to evaluate the allegation and draw conclusions. That cor. tract was let, and the independent investigator initiated an investigation on site en October 12, 1968. The independent investigator interviewed the Plant Manager and the Plant Panager indicated that he had consumed a small quantity of alcoholic beveraga prior to responding to the Clinton site. On October 18, 1988, Illinois Power Company informed Region !!! that the field investigation work was completed by the independent investigator on October 17, 1988, and that it anticipated a.1 investigatien report by November 4, 1988.
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1 RESPONSES TO OVESTIONS i
OUESTION 1:
Especially in light of the utility's attempted cover-up at
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Davis-Besse, why is the NRC not investigating thit incident?
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ANSWER:
Regarding the Davis-Besse incident, the staff determined that Toledo Edison Company did not do a thorough investigation of the incident and questions had j
I been raised about the veracity of the utility's report to the NPC. NRC l
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1 Region I!! had asked the company to "fully analyze the allegation, initiate f
what you determine to be an appropriate investigation...." The Toledo i
i Edison Company's investigation should have been broader; however, the NRC staff
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did not conclude tl:at the Toledo Edison Company Vice President Nuclear i
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willfully concealed materic! Information or tried to intentionally mislead the f
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hRC.
Unlike the Davis-Besse incident, the allegntion at Clinton was provided i
directly to the licensee, and they initiated prompt action to address the l
l 1ssue, including contracting with an independent investigative firm to l
evaluate the allegation. Also, unlike the Davis-Besse incident, licensee i
statements as related to us did not indicate that the Plant Manager behaved i
in a manner questioning his fitness.
In addition, the licensee initiated 9
i timely cc m unication with NRC Fegion !!! regarding the ratter. While this i
j matter was not required to be reported under the circumstances here, the licensee's notification to NRC Region !!! was a prudent course of action. The i
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licensee's positive and candid approach to addressing this allegation, along with the independence of the investigatien being conducted, provides us the I
necessary assurance to defer further agency action until the licensee's l
independent investigation report is received. Our review of the results of the licenste's investigation will determine what scope and emphasis any further NRC action should take.
QUESTION 2:
Does the NRC agree with the utility's decision to allow the Senior Panager to continue in his duties, presumably with unescorted access to the centrol recm and other vital areas of the plant? If so, why?
, Response to Question 2 P
Yes, we agree with the utility's decision to allcw the Senior Manager to continue in his duties with unescorted access.
The facts as we understand them from the licensee's contact on October 11, 1988, indicated that the Shift Supervisor and Peactor Operator, who had the most direct centact with the Plant Manager the evening of the allegation, cencluded that the Plant Manager behaved normallv end did not smell of alcohol. The evidence available to date has not indicated that he was unfit for duty.
This allays cur concern with regard to the unescorted access allowed to the Plant Manager.
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l QUESTION 3.a:
If you do agree with the utility's decision to leave the Senior 1
Manager in place during the pendency of the investigation:
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Has the NRC placed any time limits on the utility's investigation? If not, why not?
ANSWER No, the agency has not placed a specific time limit on the utility's investigation. During cur discussions with the licensee on October 11, 1988, we understood that the licensee was placing significant emphasis en a prcept investic'; ion and resolution of this matter. The independent investigator was on site by Octnber 12, 1988, and the field investigative work was completed on October 17, 1988.
It is expected.SLt the investigation report will be completed by November 4, 1988.
t 00ESTION 3.b:
If you do agree with the utility's decision to leave the Senior Manager in place during the pendency of the investigation:
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Has the NRC requireo the utility to take any precautionary I
wasures during the pendency of the investigation, such as liniting his unescorted access to the control room? If not, why not?
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ANSWER 1
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I As indicated in the response to Question 2 the NRC agrees with the licensee's f
decision to allow the Plant Panager to continue in his duties with unescorted i
I access. We have not placed any restrictions on the Plant Panager during the l
pendency of the investigation. The individuals who had been in the most i
direct contact with the Plant Panager during the time that it was alleged he
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was under the influenca of alcohol observed no unusual behavior on the part t
of the Plant Manager and did not observe the odor of alcohol on the Plant j
Panager's breath. We do not find an adequate basis at this time to limit the access of the Plant Panager to the facility.
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