ML20205L148

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Forwards Revised FSAR Excerpts Re Changes to Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Sys Design.Changes Resolve Sys Testing Problems Noted During Hot Functional Testing of EFW Sys. Revs Will Be Incorporated Into FSAR Amend
ML20205L148
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook  
Issue date: 04/01/1986
From: Devincentis J
PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To: Noonan V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
SBN-984, NUDOCS 8604030228
Download: ML20205L148 (34)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:r 1 s j j a M SEABROOK STATION Engineering Office j Pub 5C Setylce of New Hampshbe Mew Hompshire Yonkeo Division April 1, 1986 SBN-984 T.F. B7.1.3 1.'nited States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Mr. Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director PWR Project Directorate No. 5

References:

(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444

Subject:

Emergency Feedwater System

Dear Sir:

Enclosed please find, as Attachment 2, revised FSAR excerpts regarding changes to the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System design. These changes are being made to resolve some system testing problems identified during hot functional testing of the EFW System which are discussed in more detail in. These revisions will be incorporated into the FSAR by a future amendment. Very truly'yours, S 'h l A d~v i John DeVincentis, Director Engineering and Licensing Enclosures .cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List 8604030228 860401 b PDR ADOCK 05000424-J d A PDR 0$ 9 } P.O. Box 300 Soobrook.NH03874 Totophone(603)474 %21 l

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Dicne Curran.

Pstar J. Mathews, Mayce-Harmon & Weiss City Hall 20001 S. Street, N.W. -Newburyport, MA -01950 Suite 430 Washington, D.C. 20009 Calvin A. Canney City Manager 'Sherwin E. Turk 'Rsq. City Hall Office of the Executive Legal Director 126 Daniel Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Portsmouth..lp{ 03801 Washington, DC 20555 Stephen E. Merelli Robert A. Backus, Esquire Attorney General 116 Lowell-Street Dana Bisbee, Esquire -P.O. Box 516 Assistant Attorney General Manchester, NH 03105 Office of the Attorney General 25 Capitol Street Philip Ahrens, Esquire Concord. NH' 03301-6397 ' Assistant Attorney General Department.of The Attorney General Mr. J. P. Nadeau Statehouse Station #6 Selectmen's Office Augusta, ME -04333 10 Central Road Rye, NH 03870 Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Designated Representative of Mr. Angie Machiros the Town of Kensington Chairman of the Board of Selectmen RFD 1 Town of Newbury a East Kingston, NH 03827 Newbury, MA 01950 .o Ann Shotwell, Esquire Mr. William S. Lord J Assistant Attorney General Board of Selectmen Environmental Protection Bureau Town Hall - Friend Street Department ~of the Attorney General Amesbury, MA 01913 One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, MA. 02108 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey 1 Pillsbury Street Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Concord, L'M 03301 U.S.. Senate (ATTN: Herb Boynton) Washington, DC 20510 (ATTN: Tom Burack) H. Joseph Flynn ~ Office of General Counsel Diana P. Randall Federal Emergency Management Agency 70 Collins Street 500 C Street, SW Seabrook, NH 03874 Washington, DC 20472 Richard A. Hampe, Esq. Matthew T. Brock, Esq. Hampe and McNicholas Shaines.Madrigan & McEachern 35 Pleasant Street 25 Maplewood Avenue . Concord, NH 03301 P.O. Box 360 Portsmouth, NH 03801 -Donald E. Chick Town Manager Gary W. Holmes, Esq. Town of Exeter Holmes & Ells 10 Front Street' 47 Winnacunnet Road Exeter, NH 03833 Hampton, NH 03841 Brentwood Board of Selectmen Ed Thomas RFD Dalton Road FEMA Region 1 Brentwood, NH 03833 John W. McCormack PO & Courthouse Boston, MA 02109

SBN-984 ATTACHMENT 1 Emergency Feedwater System FSAR Changes During the performance of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system Hot Functional Testing (PT-(I)-14.2), system performance problems were experienced. -Resolution of these start-up/ test problems resulted in subsequent. modifications to both the EFW steam supply and recirculation lines. The noted problems are as follows: Water hammer occurred in the EFW steam supply lines during the initial cold start of the EFW turbine driven pump (P-37A). 1 Valves MS-V127 and MS-V128 (EFW steam supply isolation valves) failed to operate satisfactorily. With a differential pressure of approximately 1,100 psi across the valves, MS-V127 and MS-V128 failed to readily open. Valve closure was not a problem. The configuration of the EFW minimum flow recirculation lines provided constant recirculation from the discharge of each EFW pump to the suction side of the alternate EFW pump. This flow scheme resulted in above normal suction temperatures for both EFW pumps. Excessive flow was bypassed by the constant minimum flow recirculation line for both EFW pumps. Investigation and evaluation of the subject problems resulted in system modifications to ultimately ensure complete system reliability. The corrective actions respective of the above subject problems are as follows: The EFW steam supply lines have been re-sloped to provide a continuous declination to new installed drain assemblies. To assist in removal of steam line condensate formed during a cold start, the system modifications provide a means of pressurizing the EFW steam lines in order to discharge accumulated header condensate prior to admitting steam to the EFW pump turbine drive. Two new EFW steam supply isolation valves will be installed downstream and adjacent to MS-V127 and MS-V128. These valves will open in response to an EFW initiation signal. The original EFW steam supply isolation valves (MS-V127 and MS-V128) will be retained as containment isolation valves which are normally open. The original EFW pump (s) minimum flow recirculation line will be eliminated. A new recirculation line will be installed for each EFW pump. Both recirculation lines will return to the condensate storage tank via a common return header. SHEET 10F 2

p ) SBN 984 ATTACHMENT 1 Emergency Feedwater System FSAR Changes (continued) To ensure the required flow to the steam generators is achievable for all operating conditions, each EFW pump minimum flow recirculation line will incorporate a normally closed motor operated valve. Operation of the EFW pump minimum flow line isolation valves will be administratively controlled. Attachment (2) details the proposed FSAR changes with respect to the EFW system modifications. SilEET 2 0F 2

SBN-984 ATTACHMENT 2 REVISED EXCERPTS FSAR SECTIONS 3.9(B). 6.8. 7.4 9.2. 10.3. 15.0. and 15.2 (Including Text. Figures, and Tables) SEABROOK STATION i i SilEET 1 0F 25 } } J e

SBN-984 ATTACHMENT 2 Rmeraency Feedwater System FSAR Chanaes (1) Insert 1: A common EFW pump recirculation line discharges back to the Condensate Storage Tank. This return line functions for recirculation pump testing and ensures minimum flow to prevent pump damage for any system low flow operat_ing condition. (2) Insert 2: Each branch line-includes a normally open air-operated valve and a downstream air-operated fail open valve. The common EFW steam header contains one (1) air-operated fail open valve. (See Section 10.3.2.5). (3) Insert 3: The open position of the flow control valves for system limiting conditions will be set to ensure a minimum total required flow of 470 spm to three (3) steam generators and a minimum total flow of 650 gpm to four (4) steam generators with.one (1) EFW pump operational. (4) Insert 4: The branch lines contain normally closed, fail open air-operated EFW Isolation Valves MS-V393 and MS-V394. These valves are controlled by class 1E 125V de solenoids. One branch isolation valve is controlled by a Train A solenoid and the alternate branch isolation valve is controlled by a Train B solenold. The common EFW steam supply line contains a normally closed, fall open air-operated valve (MS-V395). This valve is controlled by both Train A and Train B Class 1E solenoids. Isolation Valves MS-V393 and MS-V394 open in response to an EFW initiation signal to admit steam to MS-V395. Valve MS-V395 is timed to sequentially open following opening of either MS-V393 or MS-V394. The sequential opening of MS-V395 allows for pressurizing the EFW steam header to discharge accumulated condensate via system drains prior to introducing steam to the turbine governor valve. Approximately 35 seconds following an EFW initiation signal, MS-V395 is full open and supplying steam to the mechanical hydraulic turbine governor valve. (5) Insert 5: The east and west EFW steam supply branches and the common header each contain a condensate drain pot assembly. Each drain pot contains a steam trap arrangement and a constant steam vent line. The composite drain assemblies provide for minimizing accumuisted steam header condensate during an EFW System standby, startup, and operational condition. (6) Insert 6: Valves FW-V346 and FW-V347 are administrative 1y opened for EFW pump surveillance testing and as required to ensure minimum EFW pump flow during system operation. SilEET 2 0F 25

4 SBN-984 ATTACHMENT 2 Emergency Feedwater System FSAR Changes (continued) (7) Insert 7: Each EFW pump recirculation line contains a normally closed motor-operated valve powered from its respective train. Associated remote-manual control switches are located at the MCB and at RSS panels CP-108A and CP-108B for EFW Pumps P-37A and P-37B, respectively. (8) Insert 8: Two pneumatically operated valves are installed in each of the two branch connections from steam generators E-11A and E-11B. The upstream branch valves (MS-V127 and MS-V128) are normally open valves that serve a containment isolation function. These valves are provided with seismically designed air supplies to ensure closure from the Control Room in accordance with GDC-57 criteria. The downstream valves (MS-V393 and MS-V394) are EFW steam supply isolation valves. These branch valves are redundant, and either branch connection will satisfy the Emergency Feed Pump Turbine Drive (EFPTD) steam requirements. The branch connections feed a common header that contains a pneumatically operated steam supply isolation valve (MS-V395) located upstream and adjacent to the trip and throttle valve of the EFPTD. SilEET 3 0F 25 l

ATTACHMENT 2 SHEET 4 OF 23 SR 1 & 2 Amendeset $4 FSAR November 1985 i TABLB 3.9(3)-25 f (Sheet 3 of 8) ^ ACTIVE VALTE 1.IST BY SYSTEN i t SAFITY ACT0ATED NOWGAL ~STS TAC NO. TYPE _ CLASS SIIS NT 70817108 W V 48 Cete 2 18.00 Air Opee W V 57 Cete 2 18.00 Air Open W Y 64 Check 3 6.00 Delta F Cleoed W. V 70 Check 3 6.00 Delta F Cleoed W V 76 Schk 2 4.00 pelta F Cleoed W Y 82 Schk 2 4.00-Delta F Cleoed 4 W V SS Schk 2 4.00 Delta F Cleoed N Y 94 Schk -2 4.00 Delta P . Closed W V 216 Schk 3 6.00 Balta P Cleoed W V 330 Check 2 18.00 Belta F Opes W V 331 Check 2 18.00 Belta F Open W V 332 Check 2 14.00 Delta F Open W. V 333 Check 2 18.00 Delta F Open W' FY 4214-A Clobe 3 4.00 Meter Open ( N FY 4212-B Clebe 3 4.00 Motor Opes \\., W FV 4224-A Clobe 3 4.00 Meter Open W FY 4224-5 Clebe 3 4.00 Motor Open W FY'4234-A Clobe 3 4.00 Motor - Opes W FY 4234-5 Clobe 3 4.00 Motor ' Opes W FY 4244-A Clebe 3 4.00 Meter Opes 4 .W FY 4244-5 Globe 3 4.00 Meter Opea MS Y6 Relief 2 6.00 Self Cleoed MS V7 Relief 2 6.00 self Cleoed MS V4 Relief 2 6.00 Self Cleoed Y9 Relief 2 6.00 Self Cleoed c MS .V 10 Relief 2 6.00 Self Cleoed MS MS V 22 Relief 2 6.00 Self -Cleoed MS V 23 Belief 2 6.00 Self Cleoed MS V 24 Belief 2 6.00 Self Closed MS V 25 setief 2 4.00 self Cleoed ? MS Y 26 Relief 2 6.00 Self Cleoed MB Y 36 Belief 2 4.00 Self Cleoed MS V 37 Relief 2 6.00 self Cleoed MS V 38 Belief 2 6.00 Self Cleoed MS'

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ATTACHMENT 2 SHEET 5 OF 25 s Sa 1 & 2 Assadment 54 FSAR Beveeber 1945 YASLE 3.9(B)-25 (Sheet 4 of 8) 4 ACTIVE VALVE LISV BT SYSTSN SAFETY ACTUATES WOMAL SYS Yas no. YYFB m 8133 Of POSITION .MS . Y 53 Rollef 2 6.00 Self Cleoed MS V 54 Relief 2 6.00 Self Cleoed MS V 86 Ceto 2 30.00 'Phyd 0 pea MS V SS Gate 2 30.00 Phyd Opea MS V 90 Gate 2 30.00 Phyd-Oyee MS Y 92 Cete 2 30.00 Pbyd Opes MS V 94 Check 3 . 4. 00 ' Delte F Cleoed 5 MS V 96 Check 3 4.00 Dette P Closed M3-V 127 Cete 2 4.00 Air .Cleoed .I MS 'Y 128 Gate 2 4.00. . Air Cleoed MS Y 204 Globe 2 4.00 Motor Cleoed i! MS V 205 Globe 2 4.00 Meter Cleoed i! 'M8 V 206 Clebe 2 4.00 Motor Closed I MS V 207 Globe 2 4.00 Meter Cleoed !i MS FT 3001 Clebe 2 10.00 Air Cleoed i MS FY 3002 Globe 2 10.00 Air Closed MS FT 3003 Clebe 2 10.00 Air Cleoed MS FF 3004 Globe 2 10.00 Air . Cleoed 7 V.14. Clebe 2 1.'00 Air ' Cleoed Cleoed NC FY 4609 Clebe 2 1.00-Seles MG FY 4610 Giebe 2 1.00 Seles Cleoed RC V 323 Globe 2 0.75 . Meter Cleoed l 'RC FV 2830 Clebe 2 0.50 Seles Open RC FY 2831 Globe 2 0.30 Seles Cleoed BC FY 2832 clobe 2 0.50 Seles Cleoed EC FT 2833 Globe 2 0.50 Selon Cleoed RC FT 2836 Globe 2 0.50 .Seten Closed RC FY 2837 . Globe 2 ,0.50 Seles Cleeed j BC FY 2840 Globe 2 0.50 ' soles open i RC FY 2874 stehe 2-0.50 Seles Cleoed EC FV 2876 Globe 2 0.SO Seles Cleoed l. RC FT 2881 Globe 2 0.75 Seles C1esed BC FY 2894 elebe 2 0.50 Seles Cleoed s I BC FT 2096 Clebe 2 0.30 Seles Cleoed i .35 V 16 Globe 2 0.73 ' Air Cleoed BR V 17 Globe 2 'O.75 Air Cleoed l SB V1 Cete 2 3.00 Air Oyes SS V3 Sete 2 3.00 Air Oyee i Sa V5 Cete 2 3.00 Air Oyes ~ w k a l tw v +ot o } MS V 404 i M V 405 t% V W\\ n% V4W o y g o V M'S Olb%L 3 4M NW _ N,,,. ,,V.3 %, C L % t h,,.... _ _. l MS V 39 5 I p ( e o j k ,...-----n., ,,, -, -,. _ - -.. ~. - -, - - - - - - - -. - -. - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ -

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o TASLE 3.9(s)-23 N (Sheet 4 of M ) l ina O CODE VALVE TEST LIST r-p Systemt Smergency Feedeoter System Dreeles References 292674 W !^!E Nintesen niminens Beercise Beercise Velve Code Functice Category Leek Test Leek Test Teet Test D Class Type IW-2100 IW-2200 Frecedure Frequency Frecedere Freg seecy 08 2:Fw-V79 3 Check Active AC IW-M2e 2 yeere IW-3520 unte 1 w bFw-v64 3 Check Active AC IW-M20 2 years IW-3529 Note 1 o Fw-Fv4214A 3 nov Active a n/A N/A IW-3414 Notes 243 Fw-Fv42144 3 Ret Active 8 5/A m/A IW-3410 motes 243 g Fw-Fv42244 3 New Active a n/A m/A I W-3410 astee 243 Fw-Fv42248 3 IWW &ctive S 5/A N/A IW-Mle motes 243 Fw-Fv42344 3 apr Active a n/a n/a Int-Mit metee 243 Fw-Fv42348 3 Ist Active 5 5/4 5/A IW-3418 Botes 243 Fw-Fv4244A 3 nov Active a s/A m/A IW-34te notes 243 Fw-Fv42445 3 NSW Active 5 5/A 5/A IW-3418 Botes 243 A Fw-V2 % 3 Check Active C 5/A s/A IW-3329 Wete 1 I moto 1: These velvee will be tested earles refeelies elece operettee of this Ferties of the system meeld introduce cold water into the steen generator feed messioe. g moto 2: This velve le la the peeltlee required to fulfill its pefety faection. Beercising thle velve I will met improve its operettemel reedlesee het say acteetly decrosse eyotes reliability i if the velve falle la e --- - rrvative peelties. As se etternettwo, it will be tested l et refeetles estages. moto 3: This velve endeletee se system fle. Aemmed. Stroke time la set critical and eilt met be eseeered. I ( ) l G N:i x.: /l h -v m 3 . x cm.w kwa. c m

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ATTACllMENT 2 s SilEET 8 0F 25 SB1&2 AmeIdeelt 53 FSAR August 1984 De Emergency Feedwater System is designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Class 3; IEEE Standards 323-1974 and 344-1975, Class 1E; and l Seismic Category I requirements. System components are located within Seismic 48 Category I structures and are thereby protected against ef fects of natural phenomena. The design of the EFW system was reviewed subsequent to the issuance of the NRC's March 10, 1980 letter to riear-term operating license applicants (TMI-2 TOsk Action Plan, NUREC-0737, Item II.E.1.1). The review addressed the following areast a) Section 10.4.9 of the Standard Review Plan. b) Branch Technical Position ASB 10-1. c) Ceneric short term and long term requirements applicable to the EFW system design, and operating procedures. d) A reliability evaluation of the EFW system as outlined in NUREG-0611. An item-by-item discussion of the EFW system's compliance with each rcquirement was provided by applicants letter to NRC, dated July 27, 1982. ( 6.8.2

System Description

Upon loss of normal feedwater flow, the reactor is tripped, and the decay cnd sensible heat is transferred to the steam generators by the Reactor Cool-cnt System via the reactor coolant pumps or by natural circulation when the pumps are not operational. Ilea t is removed from the steam generators via the main condensers or the main steam safety and/or steam generator atmospheric relief valves. Steam l I I g;terator water inventory is maintained by water make-up from the Emergency 44 g F;cdwater System. The system will supply feedwater to the steam generators .g to remove sufficient heat to prevent the over pressurisation of the Reactor

2

~~ Coolant System, and to allow for eventual system cooldown. O d I Tha Emergency Feedwater System is comprised of two full-sized pumps (one } motor and one turbine elriven) wtme water source is the Condensate Storage l ip I T nk (CST). Suction li.nes are individually run from_the CST to each pum nich z :- z ; M:9 : _: : : -_ -- -- lin: m::t i: x:I S: :::i:;_i :::: . ::::Ix;.f Both pumps feed a commnon discharge.iender, which in turn sup-plies the four emergency feed lines. The common discharge header includes c:rmally open gate valves between each branch connection to provide isolation in the event of a pipe break or for maintenance. Each emergency feed line is connected to one of the main feedwater lines downstream of the feedwater icolation valve. Each main feedwater line enters the containment through a l single penetration and feeds a single steam generator.[A c--ill!7 : ; : -- 3 :; ::irr p:15 tr:_;:- :::5 ; r_; ' : f i r :N ::;;r r' it: :7;rr!!: ; ;'- J ~ 46 6.8-2

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'it For a diagram of the emergency l feedwater system see Figure 6.8-1. 48 9 Additional redundant pumping capability is provided by the start-up feed pump in the feedwater systas. The head and capacity curves for these pumps, which are plotted on the same sheet, show that the startup pump has sufficient capacity to serve as backup for the emergency feedwater pumps (see Figure 6.8-2). The startup feed pump (and steam generator recirculation pump) discharge line is seismically supported. All connections from this line to other plant piping include noras11y closed valves. Valve and pump operation is administrative 1y controlled. During normal plant operation, this line is not pressurized. valves V156 and V163 are normally closed, and are furnished with a motor operator. Figure 6.8-1 also shows a valve in the branch line from the EFW turbine-driven pump suction line to the " alternate fuel pool makeup" connection. This valve is normally closed, and is administrative 1y opened. O A minimum of 200,000 gallons of demineralized water is maintained in the lower half of the condensate storage tank for the exclusive use of the Emer-gency Feedwater System. For a description of the condensate storage facility see Section 9.2.6. Make-up to the tank is provided by the demineralized water make-up system (see Section 9.2.3). The motor-driven pump and pump controls are powered from an emergency bus. The q start-up feed pump is also capable of being powered from an emergency bus, and i O l diesel generator capacity is available to start this pump while carrying the J l fi, 4 maximum load listed in Table 8.3-1. Steam for the turbine-driven pump is sup-p )j plied from either of two main steam headers via branch lines connected upstream of cf i the main steam isolation valves./C: 1 :::5 !!-- i. : u- . :,-2,3 4a R:: pc

Q A summary of/ pump data is provided in Table 6.8-1.

The branch lines to each steam generator include a manual gate isolation valve, two motor-operated flow control valves, a flow venturi, and a flow orifice. The flow control valves are normally in the open position when the .g system is not operating and are automatically closed during system operation in the event of a pipe break. These valves can be operated remotely as des-t, cribed in Section 6.8.5 to control steam generator water level. Two valves l in series are provided for redundancy and are powered from dif ferent trains. Each valve is also provided with_a handwheel to r>eruit manual operation.: us S.: :p:

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} _..2i:een,f-- p l 6.8.3 Safety Evaluation the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System components, instrumentation, and power !U supplies are sized and designed with sufficient redundancy to maintain the system's safety-related functions under all credible accident conditions. The combination of one turbine-driven pump and one motor-driven pump provides a diversity of power sources to assure delivery of feedwater under emergency condicions. 6.8-3

ATTACllMFNT 2 SilEET 10 0F 25 SB 1 & 2 Ame:dment 56 FSAR November 1985 The system has been designed to provide the required flow following a single f' active failure coupled with a passive failure in the high or moderate energy piping and a loss of offsite power. The coasson discharge header is not pressurized during normal plant operation. Figure 10.4-5 shows the stain feedwater system, the tie-in of the EW and four individual stop-check valves. nese check valves (V-76, -82, -88 and -94) prevent backflow of feedwater from the main feedvater system or the steam generator (SG) and maintain the EW piping depressurized during normal cperation. P Steam supply for the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is from either I g I of two main steam headers via branch lines connected upstream of the main oteam isolation valves.f::: ._..r n:::

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N :: r:!r:: :;;; in :::p: :: 2: : ";; : m- c';- ' 10(3 t: c fl: ::::: :: n: 1 9 : !::1 ( 2-nii: :-- d ' : '.::f : i::12 Err r:1r:: ::: 3::i;;;d :: "fri! :;::" ;;:: 1::: :f :!::::i::1 ; - E I ! v. _ -.] ') { ( I The EW supply has two safety grade flow control valves for each steam / generator. One valve in each supply is powered by the A train emergency power source and the other valve is powered from the B train. h e primary (or normal) flow control valves for the A and C steam generator will be powered by the A train with B and D steam generators' valves powered by the B train. Back-up flow control valves will be powered from the opposite / emergency power train. These valves u n be controlled from either the main l \\ control board or the remote shutdown pan =1 using safety-grade controls. 9 The five valves in the EW pump discharge header are furnished with gear cperators so that a concern for power diversity is not applicable. The design and operation of the EW system has been reviewed regarding the cecurrence of hydraulic instabilities, characterized as water hammeer. He EW system is connected to the main feedwater system through stop-check valves outside the containment. The flow regulating valves in each EW line are normally open, and are sized to pass the required flow under accident conditions. The only action required to establish E W flow is to start the pumps. One pump has sufficient capacity to furnish the required flow to the four steam generators. An analysis of the EW system has established that its function and performance is not affected by the commeon causes for loss of flow resulting in water hammmer, such as pump trip, or rapid valve closure. A pressure transient in the main feedwater system resulting from a pipe break, pump trip, and/or valve closure would be dissipated before flow is established in the E W system. Both E W pumps discharge to a cousnon header with branch lines to each SG. A trip of one pump will not affect the capability of the other pump to provide flow to the intact SG's. The only automatic valve closure in the EW system would occur in the line to a faulted SG. During cperation of the EW system, the plant operators can initiate any changes in flow to each SC, as required. +3 6.8-3a

i ATTACliMLNT 2 SilEE.T 11 0F 25 i i i SB 1 & 2 Amendment 53 J FSAR August 1984 The EFW pump turbine and its integral trip valve are. commercially unavailable as ASE Section III, Class 3, design. However, these componente h j are designed to seismic Category I requiremente and fabricated in accordance g l with an opproved QC progree. For additional information relative to the I $ i vendor's QC progree, see Subsection 3.5.1.1. The stese supply line le designed. i j in accordance with ASM Code Section_III, Class 3, and requiremente. [El feestetso m t @ u wt 3 l l The EFW pumps supply 4 piping runs gros nossles on the Condensate Storage Tank j I (CST) to the EFW pumphouse. The CST nossles and adjacent piping are T i h protected by a seismic Category I structure which is part of the CST (Dj I w enclosure and tornado missile shield. The piping is routed ur.derground and t runs below grade into the EFW pumphouse, also a seleele Category I i I 'd ' j structure. 5 The EFW pump recirculation lin to_the CST, designed to seismic j Category I requiremente.[n __ P -- rre - "Mrr:1r; i l { _ :, :__ _ _,_, ____...... T. h i ;_ h 2 :: ;; 2::: ;'__:,: 'f: x e ci:::f 7. q!:n L ?: :; __L__ if I' 1::: ::: 1: i !l$ The water lines toMhe oil cooler are designed to seismic g category I requirements. t The breakdown erifice in the line to the oil cooler [ 'I $ i limits the flow to 2-3 sps. This flow was considered _in alsing the pump V capacity. In the unlikely event of pipe failure, this flow will easily be j 1 handled by the pump room floor drains. p l An accident analysis for thle system in conjunction with the loss of the Main Feedwater Systes is provided in Chapter 15. A failure analysis of the heer-i $g gency Feedwater System following a feedwater pipe break is provided in [ } $f" Table 6.8-2. .,r + f I 6.8.4 Tests and Inspections f Frior to initial plant start-up, the heergency.Feedwater Systen le hydro-E j g statically tested in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and 3 h Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Class 3, and preoperationally tested as i h den l i described is Chapter 14. ji 3 Feriodic testing in accordance with Technical Specifications will be performed during normel plant operation. During periodic surveillance i testing of the EFW puesps, manual valve alignments will be required. Only one g EFW pump will be tested at a time. Because each RFW pump is capable of l' providing 1001'of required flow, full ayetes flow requirements will be l available at all times. Additionally, when these valves are changed free I their normal position, an alare le annunciated in the control room to alert 3 j the operators. l t j 6.8.5 Instrumentation Requiremente and Controle l 53 d8 l . The Emergency Feedwater Systes will be actuated automatically on loss of offsite power, low-low level in any of the steam generators or safety injec-tion signals. The engineered safety feature actuation system details are presented in Section 7.3. Manual controle for the turbine-driven pump steam t i f supply valves are located at the main control board (MCB), as well as at the l 6.8-3b i

ATTACHMENT 2 SHEET 12 0F 25 SB ! & 2 A:nendment 56 FSAR November 1985 remote safe shutdown (RSS) panel. For the motor-driven pump, the controls cre located at the MCB and in the switchgear room. The suction and discharge pressures of both pumps ate indicated locally and at the HCB. I,ov suction pressures are alarmed at the HCB. The auction pressure indication at the MCB is safety grade. This suction pressure indication will also enable the cperator to determine level in the CST. Flow indications for all four individual emergency feedwater lines are provided. Safety grade flow orifice instrumentation readouts are displayed E ct the HCB. The instruments are powered from the safety grade inverters - A cnd C steam generators on the Train A inverter, and B and D steam generators f on the Train B inverter. Two of the four flow venturi instrumentation read-k"o cuts are displayed at a RSS panel, and the remaining two flow venturi instrumentation readouts are displayed at a second RSS panel. These instru-4 mentation channels meet or exceed the requirements for design Category 2 8 instrumentation as provided in Section 7.5.5. The design details of the I cecident monitoring instrumentation are presented in Table 7.5-1. 48 A sustained high flow condition in any one of the lines is indicative of a 6' line break. A pump run-out protection control system is incorporated such that the affected line will be iselated by automatically closing the motor-f cperated valves on high flow signals from the flow orifice instrumentation. High flow alarms are also provided to alert the operator to this condition. l [ The protection system is designed such that a single failure will not prevent 4 cmergency feedwater flow to at least two steam generators. Manual override M provisions are also incorporated at the HCB as well as at the RSS panels, clong with the open/close valve position indication. Each of the motor-cperated control valves in each branch line is provided with fully independent gk p power supplies, instrumentation, and controls to ensure that at least one of o the valves in each branch line can be closed when needed. All eight valves A ccn be operated from the MCB. Four of the valves, one in each branch, can cleo be operated from an RSS panel and the remaining four valves, one in 6 n, ccch branch, can be operated from a second RSS panel. The associated control j switches are located on the HCB and the RSS panel such that the valves normally l used to control flow have the same train assignment as the flow instrumentation 54 cnd the atmospheric relief valve for the steam generator (i.e., A and C SG cre normally controlled with the A train control valves and B and D SG with 3a B train valves. Thus, complete redundancy is provided to control flow or to f isolate any steam generator in the event of pipe breaks. g M ,P q The review of the emergency feedwater flow indication was performed as part g '3 cf the detailed control room design review (DCRDR). As part of this effort, gj r o determination of the needed characteristics of this display to support the - h emergency operating procedures (EOPs) was made. A comparison of the needed dyo Ig) characteristics against the available instrumentation was made, and no d;ficiencies were found. a s y A flow orifice and associated instrumentation are provided in the common pump discharge recirculati_on path to the CST. This instrumentstinn is ' a; provided to( :----ir m.. i f:: ::=:rg n th: cr - 2: r ,m- ' :I f1:D f "- :n r i12:] Alarms are also provided to indicat e that either train of - I - the emergency feedwater system is inoperative. The design features of the bypass and operable status alarm system which provide system level indications la compliance with Regulatory Guide 1,47 are presented in Subsection 7.1.2.6. 6.8-4

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1) Decay Heat Removalt Instrumentation RSS Control Location Description Device Location MCB CP108A CP1085 Local

=1 Emergency Feedwater Pum d " 7 o O CP-108A hh-V*MO p ^;v n t (W-P-37A) oO CP-1085 rh- _ cp icA AG Emergency Feedwater Pump W -P-375 Bus E SC A EW Control Valve W-FV-4214A CP-108A SG A EW Control Valve W-FV-42148 CP-1088 SC B EW Control valve W-FV-4224A CP-108A SG B E W Control Valve W-TV-4224B CP-1088 SC C EW Control Valve W-FV-4234A CP-108A SC C E W control Valve W-FV-42348 CP-1088 SG D E W Control Valve W-FV-4244A CP-108A SG D E W Control Valve W-FV-4244B CP-1088 SG A EW Flow W-FI-4214-5 X W-FI-4214-2 X SG B E N Flow W-FI-4224-5 X W-FI-4224-2 X SC C E W Flow W-FI-4234-5 X W-FI-42 34-2 X SG D E W Flow W-FI-4244-5 X W-FI-4244-2 X RC Loop 1 Hot Leg Temp. RC-TI-9406 X l RC Loop 1 Ilot Leg Temp. RC-TI-413A X RC Loop 4 Ilot Leg Temp. RC-TI-9407 X st l 6 RC Loop 2 Ilot Les Temp. RC-TI-423A X l gg RC Loop 1 Cold Leg Temp. RC-TI-9410 X p RC Loop 1 Cold Leg Temp. RC-TI-4138 X l l RC Loop 4 Cold Leg Temp. RC-TI-9411 X st % RC Loop 2 Cold Leg Temp. RC-TI-4238 X l 5 SG A Atmos. Relief Valve MS-PV-3001 CP-108A SC B Atmos. Relief Valve MS-PV-3002 CP-1088 f4 w ~ g Eft (sat W,3 1tt h.WGEA M V-3% CP * \\M A l .mu.. <.s m.v s u C,. sm

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A1 A Aucu,1 2 SilEET 16 0F 25 SB 18 2 Amendment 53 FSAR August 1984 i is already at its minimum prior to an EFP start, the tank contains 211,900 gallons. Also, it is assumed that once water is displaced to the annular space, it cannot return to the EFW supply. Ih t'J If the missile exits at the lowest possible elevation, at the tank base r ^d elevation 23'-6", then the level in the annulus will approach the initial 4 level in the CST and reach equilibrium. At this elevation, a total volume i of 8675 gallens would be lost according to the assumptions stated above, h Os Since, at the initial tank elevation, 211,900 gallone are available for EFW 5 g/ sy supply, this leaves over 203,000 gallons for EW supply, exceeding the 200,000 jg gallons designated for EFW use. j-Each of the redundant EFW lines has at its origin inside the CST a piping g o, tee. This tee will give two possible flow paths to each of the redundant 9 EFW lines. These EFW nozzles are located approximately 10 feet apart. There g U are no other components inside the CST, therefore debris smaat consist of the Wgf missile itself and/or material from the stainless steel tank. Debris would have to block more than 50% of both ends of each EFW connection in order to k restrict sufficient flow from reaching the EFW pumps. j r n i The environmental effects of a tank failure would be inconsequential due to /J E80 the containment of the released water. As a result, there are no specific g#g limitations of radioactivity concentrations for a rupture associated accident g g g. of this tank. g "%

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'E ' With the exception of the condensate storage tan he auction piping 2' 35 fro = the taak to the e=ersencF read 9==9=,tche c a'aca 'corare facitiev 'S is not required for plant sa fe ty. It is not expected to contain any radio-fhg active contamination during normal operation. Radioactive contamination can 2 fr4j only occur through carry-over of radioactivity during a surge in the condens-7 l ate system which results in recirculation ftom the condensate or startup feed pump discharge to the condensate storage tank, when a steam generator tube leak exists. Due to the radioactive monitoring which is provided, and the length and complicated path that the contaminated condensate saast take prior to its settling in the CST, the level of activity expected is low and, in any event, will be contained within the plant boundaries. See Section 11.2 for expected levels of contamination. The EFW system is designed to operate continuously to effect cooldown to RHR system cut-in. Based on a cooldown rate of 500F/hr., this cooldown will require 4.85 hours of operation, in addition to the four hour period at hot shu tdown. The total quantity of decay heat integrated over a 9 hour period following a postulated accident is 1020 x 106 Beu. Considering pump heat, reactor coolant heat, metal heat and steam generator inventory, the total i heat to be removed is 1460 x 106 8tu. Based on EFW supply at 1000F, a total of 156,200 gallons is required. The dedicated EFW supply in the CST is 200,000 gallons. For a discussion of EFW system operation with an assumed single failure, see Section 6.8.3 and Table 6.8-2. The entire volume of the { CST (400,000 gallons if full) would be available for EFW supply. Also, the contents of the condenser hotwelle for each unit, the cournon demineralized SS 1 9.2-27a L

ATTACl! MENT 2 S!!EET 17 0F 25 SB 1 & 2 Amendment 54 FSAR February 1985 The valve has a stroke time of less than 20 seconds, and fails in the closed position. " Full open" and " full closed" position indication lights are located in the control room, on the local panel and on the remote shutdown panel. Each valve is an 8" x 10" ANSI Class 900f globe type valve. A stop valve upstream of each ARV is provided for isolaticn. Each valve discharges to atmosphere through a restrictor (silencer) sized and supplied by the ARV manufacturer. The ARV's are designed, fabricated and inspected in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, Class 2. The silencer is classified NNS. l "J > 10.3.2.5 Emergency Feed Pump Turbine Supply ' ) 7 _. -.. :..,, ;. _ g _ Su lv .,... :. :_. 9,__s

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3 3 7_2 3... .<; gt i ..,.m p._ n g a )y___ a., . y :_ >_.. 1, y ... z... ps.. .t. 7 actuation o t e steam supplygvalves and a ful escraption of the emergency feed system, see Section 6.8. no5th 10.3.2.6 Safety Valves e Five spring-loaded, self-actuated safety valves on each 30-inch steam generator outlet line provide overpressure protection for the secondary side of the ( steam generators, and consequently for the main steam piping. The total capacity of the twenty valves exceeds 110% of full load steem flow at a pres-sure not exceeding 110% of the steam generator shell side design pressure. The maximum capacity of any single valve does not exceed 970,000 lbs/hr at an inlet pressure equal to the steam generator shell design pressore, to limit heat release if a valve inadvertently sticks open. The valves are set at 1185 to 1255 psig with capacities ranging from 893,200 l Lo 945,300 lbs/hr, respectively. These safety valves are designed, fabricated 5a and inspected 11 accordance with the ASME Boiler and pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, Class 2. These valves may be utilized for safe shutdown of the plant and are classified " active". 10.3.2.7 Main Steam Isolation valves one main steam isolation valve (MS1Y) with a bypass valve is provided on each steam generator main steam line. The bypass valve is used at startup prior to opening the HSIV for pressure equalization and warming of the main steam piping system. The HSIV provides positive shut-off of steam flow in either direction during emergency as well as normal operation. The HSIV is a gate valve actuated by a hydraulic / pneumatic actuatnr. Ilydraulic fluid is pumped into the valve actuator to open the valve against a pressurized pneumatic system. The valve is closed by pneumatic pressure when the hydraulic fluid pressure is relieved. The actuator is a stored nitrogen unit with a hydraulic cylinder coupled directly to a precharged nitrogen accumulator ( 10.3-4 i ts..c

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~ ~ ATTACHMENT ' 2 - 4 SHEET 20 0F 25 SB 1 & 2 Amendment-53 FSAR August 1984 b. Results Figures 15.2-11 thru 15.2-12b, and 15.2-10d show the significant l plant parameters following a loss of normal feedwater. n Following the reactor 'and turbine trip from full load, the water level in the steam generators will fall due to the reduction of J steam generator void fraction and because steam flow through the '2 safety valves continues to dissipate the stored and generated f heat.t one minute following the initiation of the low-low level ,} trip, the emergency feedwater pumps are automatically started, Q reducing the rate of water level decrease. The capacity of the emergency feedwater pissps is such that the water level in the steam generators being fed does not recede below the lowest level at which sufficient heat transfer area is available to dissipate core residual heat without' water relief from the RCS relief or safety valves. Figures 15.2-11 and 15'2-12 show that at no time is thero water relief from the pressuriser. i The calculated sequence of events for this accident is listed in Table 15.2-1. As shown in Figure 15.2-11 and 15.2-12, the plant will slowly approach a stabilised condition at hot standby with emergency feedwater removing decay heat. The plant may be maintained at hot standby or furcher cooled through manual control of the emergency feed flow. The operating procedures would also call for operator action to control RCS boron concentration and pressuriser level using the CVCS and to maintain steam generator level through control of the emergency feedwater system. Any action required of the operator to maintain the plant in a stabill ed condition will be in a time frame in excess of ten minutes following reactor trip. 15.2.7.3 Radiological Consequences j The radiological consequences resulting from this malfunction are consider-ably less than those calculated for a main steam line rupture. The analyses performed asstasing a rupture of a main steam line are given in Subsection l 15.1.5.3. 15.2.7.4 conclusions Results of the analysis show that a loss of normal feedwater does not adversely affect the core, the RCS, or the steam system since the emergency feedwater capacity is such that reactor coolant water does not overpressurize and water is not relieved from the pressurizer relief or safety valves. The radiological consequences of this event would be less severe than the steamline break accident analyzed in Subsection 15.1.5.3. 15.2-15 i

ATTACHMENT 2 SHEET 21 OF 25 SB 1 & 2 Amenduest 56

d. C FSAR November 1985

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Plant characteristics and initial conditions are further discussed ., y in Section 15.0.3. 4r My No reactor control systems are asstuned to function. The reactor protection gC system is required to function following a feedwater line rupture as 8Ind

  • tCtive f8ilure will Prevent operation of g

analyE'd here-N I ggg this system. g Cg oj The engineered safety systems assumed to function are the emergency g, yc, feedsater system and the safety injection system. For the emergency up V#r feedwater system, the worst case configuration has been used, i.e., 6 Fr only two intact steam generators receive emergency feedwater following 3i the break. The flow restrictor and control valve on the faulted loop N f+$'limittheflowspillingoutthebreakto750spapriortocontrolvalve j 3 Pg The control valve to one intact steam generator was asstaned closure. o to fait closed (single failure). n e control valves to the remaining hl ) intact loops t 3:___ 235 gpm to each loop Q _ 3 j: g : p fg This assumption is conservative because it ministres Ge total e:nergency feedwater flow supplied to{hunaffected steam generators. For the case without offsite power, there will be a flow coastdown until flow in the loops reaches the natural circulation value. The core flow ! f-calculated is given in Figure 15.2-12c. This may be compared to that .O presented in Figure 15.2-10s where the pumps begin to coastdown at 53.1 y seconds vs.15.6 seconds in Figure 15.2-12c. The natural circulation l h capability of the RCS has been shown in Section 15.2.6, for the loss of ae g [. power transient, to be suf ficient to remove core decay heat following reactor trip. Pump coastdown characteristics are demonstrated in Section 15.3.2. A detailed description and analysis of the safety injection system is provided in Section 6.3. The emergency feedwater system is described in Section 6.8. b. Results Calculated plant parameters following a major feedwater line rupture are shown in Figures 15.2-13 through 15.2-22. Results for the l case with offsite power available are presented in Figures 15.2-S 13 through 15.2-17. Results for the case where of f aite power is lost are presented in Figures 15.2-18 through 15.2-22. ne calculated sequence of events for both cases analyzed is listed in Table 15.2-1. The system response following the feedwater line rupture is similar for both cases analyzed. Results presented in Figures 15.2-14 l and 15.2-17 (with of fsite power available) and Figures 15.2-19 and 15.2-22 (without offsite power) show that pressures in the RCS and main steam system remain below 110 percent of the respective design pressures. Pressurizer pressure decreases after reactor trip on low-low steam generator level (16 seconds). Pressurizer pressure decreases due to the loss of heat input, until the safety injection system is actuated on low steam line pressure in the ruptured loop. Coolant expansion occurs due to reduced heat transfer 15.2-20 s

~ TABLE 15.0-8 5 COMPOWENT TIMES AND CAPACITIES COMPONENT RESPONSE TIME CAPACITY TEST PROVISIONS 1 See Table _14.2-3 ites 13 Main Steseline 2 sec. logic and delay Ioolation valves 5 sec. closure See Table 14.2-3 item 14 Main Feedwater 2 sec logic and delay Isolation Valves 5 sec. closure l-2 Valves 6 210000 1he/hr See Table 14.2-3 ites 2 Proosuriser Power l Operated Relief f' Valves 4 3 Valves 9 420000 lbe/hr See Table 14.2-3 item 40 ca Prosauriser Sofoty Valves g" Stcan Generator 120% of rated flow Power See Table 14.2-3 item 40 i S fety valves steam flow (rated flow = BNLN}- 15.14 x 106 lbe/hr)

  • Emergency 60 second delay with Feedline rupture - 470-spe See Table 14.2-3 ites 14 Feedwater or without offsite minimue*to two intact j

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ATTACHMENT 2 SHSET 23 0F 25 An'ndment 56 541&2 e FSAR November 1985 TABLE 15.0-9 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Component Response Time Capacity Main Steam Iso-2 sec. logic delay (l) lation Valves and 5 s+c. closure time Main Feed Iso-2 sec. logic delay (I) lation Valves and 5 sec. closure time Steam Generator Full o p n at 3% accumula-120% of rated full power }$ Sr.fety Valves tion (2e above set steam flow. (Rated steam 3 pressure flow - 15.14 x 106 lb/hr) d I --- ;: :7 7::f f^ ::: f:1:7 ::: --fill ??? ;; r!-i-z t: ::r' S-,:

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